Dtsaddoun Hammadi
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AConversatlonwith DtSaddoun Hammadi A Conversationwith DtSaddoun Hanunadl Iraq'sForeign Polley Held on October 2, 1981 at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Washington, D. C. ISBN �7-3482-9 Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 82-70160 AEI Studies 352 © 1982 by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., and London. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without permission in writing from the American Enterprise Institute except in the case of brief quotations embodied in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. The views expressed in the publications of the American Enterprise Institute are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, advisory panels, officers, or trustees of AEI. "American Enterprise Institute" and � are registered service marks of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Printed in the United States of America Welcoming Remarks WILLIAM J. BAROODY, JR. President, American Enterprise Institute We are pleased to welcome Dr. Saddoun Hammadi, the foreign minister of Iraq, who will discuss with us the foreign policy concerns of his country. A dialogue has been emerging at a private level between our two countries. Dr. Hammadi has met with members of other institutions in New York and in Washington and has spoken to a broad group of Americans. We hope that this will be part of a widening dialogue between Baghdad and Washington. The formu lation of U.S. foreign policy requires a clear understanding of inter national points of view on issues where important concerns of the United States and other nations meet. Some of the events at AEI and some AEI publications are devoted to foreign commentary. At the American Enterprise Institute we believe in the compe tition of ideas. This is a public policy research institution that studies, identifies, and presents diverse points of view. We look forward to this discussion as a part of that continuing discussion. 1 Introductory Remarks JUDITH KIPPER AEI Resident Fellow It is a pleasure to have His Excellency Dr. Saddoun Hammadi with us today. This is Dr. Hammadi's first visit to Washington since his appointment as Iraq's foreign minister in 1974. Previously he served in other important posts in the Iraqi government. He has been min ister of agrarian reform and minister of oil from 1970 to 1974. Dr. Hammadi is no stranger to the United States. He received his doc torate at the University of Wisconsin in 1957 after graduating from the American University in Beirut. Today's topic, "Iraq's Foreign Policy," will include a discussion of the Middle East conflict and of the Iranian-Iraqi war. This is a unique opportunity to hear an assessment of the situation in the Middle East from Baghdad's point of view. We consider this ex change of views with Iraq's foreign minister an important contri bution to American understanding of some of the complex problems in a region so vital to the interests of the United States. Dr. Hammadi has agreed to respond to questions following his formal remarks. It is my privilege to present Dr. Saddoun Hammadi. 2 A Conversation with Dr. Saddoun Hammadi I am here not only to convey our ideas to you, but also to benefit from these meetings. It is very useful for Americans on different levels to hear the Arab point of view in a clear way. It makes a good basis for a sound foreign policy. The most important point in the area is the Arab-Israeli conflict. I will have something to say at the end of these remarks about the new developments-namely, the war with Iran. Arab-American re lations are now at a crucial point. American support to Israel made Israel strong enough to continue its program of territorial expansion and its aggressive policies in the region. U.S. economic assistance is almost unmatched. Total American assistance to Israel from 1948 to 1977 was more than $25.6 billion. This averages more than $10 for every single American citizen, man, woman, and child, per year. That is more than any federal assistance given to any state in the United States. Total U.S. assistance to Israel during the last four years was more than $11 billion. A good part of this assistance was in the form of grants and unredeemable credits. In addition, large amounts are in the form of private contributions and sales of Israeli bonds, which are tax free. This has taken place at a time when the U.S. government is cutting expenditures on social services to fight inflation. Israel, feeling strengthened, is now on the threshold of annexing the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem. It has adopted an aggressive military policy aimed at destroying the resistance of the Palestinian people inside and outside Palestine. The Arab countries, despite some divisions and problems, are determined to resist. The issue cannot be postponed any longer. The possibility of a crisis is therefore much greater now than it was before. The crisis could be the result of a decision or it could develop spontaneously out of desperation. Because of the complexity of the situation and the intensity of feel- 3 ings, the crisis, once it starts, cannot be confined to one arena, but is likely to be comprehensive-political, military, and economic. The present American administration has the opportunity to do something constructive to avoid the crisis. The conflict in our region is not new. Its essence is well known, and world public opinion has already expressed itself. The main elements of a just and durable peace are understood. They are understood by those who have no predetermined positions and who are free from the influence of pressure or self-interest. The United States can work to achieve a fair and durable peace if the political will is there. In 1956, the president of the United States made Israel quit Egypt and Gaza, so nothing happened. What if the United States does not act in this way again, but continues its support to Israel? There would be two interpretations of such a position in the Arab countries. One would be that American politicians, con scious of their political interests and wanting to maintain the support of the Zionist lobby, would be under the illusion that they could do that without anything happening on the Arab side-in other words, on the assumption that they could have the support of both at the same time. We are certain that this is impossible. Soviet influence was introduced to the region through the Arab-Israeli conflict. The American reputation in the Arab world and in the Muslim world was greatly eroded. In the future the outcome would be much worse. The Arab countries are now in a better economic position. The other possible interpretation would be that there is an iden tity of ideology between Zionism and American policy in that area. That is to say, the United States really wants the colonization of Palestine, the Israeli territorial expansion, and the final destruction of the Palestinian people at large. If this is the case, the outcome for Arab-American relations should not be difficult to comprehend. In this case the basic American interest in the region cannot be pro tected, and American efforts to resist Soviet influence cannot suc ceed, It is important to note that these two theories have their sup porters in our region now. The immediate future will be decisive. The situation in the region has become explosive, and the people there are almost at the end of their patience. The aggressive inten tions of Israel are clear enough now. One important point is relevant in connection with this. Some people in this country or in Europe might believe that this is mainly the position of the so-called Arab radicals and that the Arab mod erates have a different position. My comment on this view is as follows. The so-called moderate Arabs are concerned to reach a just 4 and durable peace not only because of national commitment but because their internal security is now in danger. The situation is so tense that a crisis could very well generate political upheaval. The so-called Arab moderates are considered friends of the United States. Being moderates and friends of the United States can be, in itself, a source of danger to them. Israel is not interested in a just and durable peace. Its main concern is more and more territorial expansion through more and more American assistance. Its policies obviously run con trary to peace. Examples include the steps to annex East Jerusalem, to establish more and more settlements in the occupied Arab terri tories, the attack on Iraq's nuclear facilities, the provision of spare parts and ammunition to Iran, and the continuous military interfer ence in Lebanon. Israel is going to do everything it can to block any initiative for a genuine and durable peace. It is crisis and not peace that serves the Israeli interests. If the situation explodes, if Arab American relations get worse, if the Soviet influence in the region becomes stronger, so much the better for Israel because such de velopments can be used easily to extract more and more American assistance. Is the United States going to act, or is it going to let the situation drag on? Does it have an overall policy that comprehends the future, or is it going to deal with each case as it arises and move from one situation to another? Is it going to rid itself of the myth of the Zionist lobby and act in an independent way? Should American foreign policy be based on the overall long-run interest of the American people, or should it be based on expedience and considerations of internal politics? Is America that America that led the revolution against colonialism and went to civil war against slavery, or is it just another colonial power? These are questions that need to be an swered.