Two Perspectives on Demographic Change and the Future of the Family Naomi Cahn, June Carbone, Howard Lavine David Blankenhorn
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Two Perspectives on Demographic Change and the Future of the Family Naomi Cahn, June Carbone, Howard Lavine David Blankenhorn FEBRUARY 2016 The States of Change: Demographics and Democracy project is a collaboration of the Center for American Progress, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Brookings Institution. The project began in 2014 and has been generously funded by the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. In year one, States of Change examined the changing demography of the nation and projected the racial and ethnic composition of every state to 2060. The detailed findings, available in this report, were discussed at the project’s February 2015 conference. In year two, the project’s leaders commissioned six papers on the policy implications of the demographic changes, two each from different political perspectives on the significance of the changes for the family, for the economy and workforce, and for the social contract. A second report, which will be released with the papers in February 2016, projects possible presidential election outcomes from 2016 to 2032 using data from the project’s first report. A New Look at Demographics, Family Stability, and Politics Naomi Cahn (George Washington University), June Carbone (University of Minnesota), Howard Lavine (University of Minnesota) n 1960, more than 70 percent of American chil- two incomes have become increasingly important. This Idren lived with their first-time married, heterosex- group has become, if anything, more marriage cen- ual parents; in 2016, fewer than half do.1 In 1960, the tered in creating families and assuming responsibility nonmarital birthrate was 5 percent; today, it is approx- for children. imately 40 percent. In a more equal era, the country might support the The marriage and baby boom of the 1950s cor- universalization of these new family strategies through responded to an era of greater economic equality greater efforts to ensure employment stability, invest- and good jobs for blue-collar male workers when the ment in children, flexibility and support for work- United States emerged from World War II as the only ing parents, family-planning initiatives, and a rebuilt major industrialized nation with an intact manufactur- safety net geared toward workers who switch jobs more ing infrastructure. This produced a marriage-oriented frequently and families dealing with more complex culture in which most men could find jobs paying a trade-offs between work and family. Instead, economic family wage shortly after finishing high school, working- changes hollow out the middle of the American work- class women could join their middle class sisters as full- force, while regional, cultural, and political divisions time homemakers, and family differences that reflected block agreement on supportive measures that might income and region shrank. mitigate the impact of these economic changes. Reli- Over the next 40 years, class, racial, and regional dif- able, well-paying jobs for blue-collar men are disap- ferences will likely increase, and changing strategies for pearing, with the slowest projected employment growth family formation both reflect and magnify the growing expected in male-dominated jobs that require only a economic inequality that characterizes the United States. high school education.2 Yet unions remain under polit- Over the next 40 years, the highly educated upper mid- ical assault, and no alternative organizations effectively dle class will likely draw further away from the rest of represent working-class interests. the population. These families have adopted a new strat- The groups that produce the most stable families and egy that accepts the changing roles of women and builds invest the most in children delay childbearing and care- on the opportunities for those with desirable skills. fully time the beginning of family life. Yet the United This new arrangement involves investing equally States has the highest level of unintended pregnancy in in men’s and women’s earning capacities, postponing the developed world, and regions of the country dif- family formation until both parents have reached emo- fer dramatically in their support for comprehensive sex tional maturity and stable workforce participation, and education and ready access to contraception. investing intensively in children. It also involves a much Since 1990, unintended pregnancies have fallen by greater degree of assortative mating, in which elites almost half for the best off while increasing substan- marry similarly well-educated partners, and men and tially for the least well off. These women see little point women more carefully choose spouses who will com- in committing to unreliable men, who without sta- plement their choice of family roles in an era in which ble employment, engage in more violence, substance 1 A NEW LOOK AT DEMOGRAPHICS, FAMILY STABILITY, AND POLITICS CAHN, CARBONE, LAVINE abuse, and other destructive behaviors. Rather than These trends raise profound questions about how we defer childbearing, mothers do it alone, often in unsta- address the needs of children and the growing inequal- ble cohabitations. This increases the disparities between ity across regions, socioeconomic classes, and racial the children of the elite and those in the bottom half of and ethnic groups. The United States has traditionally the population. provided for families by supporting the married, two- These factors aggravate regional and racial dispari- parent family with measures such as the “family wage.” ties in the United States as well. First, the upper middle The changing economy no longer provides sufficient class individuals who have most successfully adjusted employment for all parents to be able to afford chil- to the new economic system are overwhelmingly white dren on a single full-time salary, nor does it provide suf- and Asian. The communities with the least social ficiently flexible employment for full-time workers to mobility tend to be economically isolated communi- manage child care. ties of either rural whites or urban minorities in less State financial support—which has historically filled prosperous parts of the country. The wealthier parts of many of the gaps created by periods of unemployment the country with better schools and developed infra- and the transitions that arise from childbirth, death, structure tend to reflect the policy preferences of suc- divorce, or illness—exhibits greater regional variation cessful professionals, and while they are characterized as states have been accorded more control of federal by high inequality, they often offer greater opportu- funds. Diverging political approaches also increase the nities for social mobility. In contrast, poorer regions differences among states. In the past, public leadership have become much more conservative, slashing public has helped systematize the change from one economic funding that might assist those trapped in poverty and system to another, with support for measures such as adopting punitive policies that further disadvantage the universal compulsory secondary education, phone and worst off. postal services in rural areas, and child labor laws. With Second, in the United States as a whole, as we know the transition from the industrial to the information with even greater precision from the States of Change economy, public leadership has, at least to date, played data, minority populations are increasing as a percent- a much less prominent role. age of the total population. Black voter turnout is com- This report suggests that the economy, regional cul- parable to white voter turnout in presidential elections, tures, and family organization are integrally linked. but Hispanic voting rates are lower in all elections. Family-based strategies have overwhelmingly empha- Moreover, party elites tend to be most responsive to sized marriage-promotion policies that treat the family their more active constituents, with Republican poli- as though it were a cultural matter, independent of eco- cies most closely in line with the low-tax, low public- nomic conditions. While marriage is correlated with spending preferences of business elites and Democratic better outcomes for children, it is the “higher incomes policies more in line with the higher public-spending and the more engaged parenting of married parents preferences of the professional classes. As a result, nei- [that] count for a good deal.”3 ther party effectively represents the economic interests In contrast, strengthening the family requires of those at the losing end of these changes. strengthening communities in ways that change the Third, regional differences compound these effects. relationship between prospective partners. Both men For example, tax and spending policies that reduce and women overwhelmingly say that men without income taxes and increase sales taxes shift more of the jobs, particularly less educated men, are unmarriage- tax burden from the wealthy to the poor. And low-tax, able, and the larger the population outside of the mar- low infrastructure-spending policies compound the riage equation, the more these communities’ culture effects of community decay, because racial and eco- encourages women to distrust the reliability of inti- nomic isolation increase with less access to affordable mate partners and instead look to their own earning transportation, good schools, nearby employment, capacity and support from extended kin to take care health care, and community-based support. of their children. And if men see women