OPINION the Arab Regional System: a Question of Survival* Ali El Deen Hillal Dessouki**

Contemporary Arab Affairs, 2015 Vol. 8, No. 1, 96–108, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2014.990797

OPINION The Arab regional system: a question of survival* Ali El Deen Hillal Dessouki**

Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt

It would be a mistake to believe that the Arab regional system (heretofore referred to as the ‘Arab regional system’; ‘the system’ or the ‘regional system’)is endangered by the current instability and upheaval affecting the Arab region, and that the threats that currently loom over it are new and unlike anything that have previously been faced. It would be equally erroneous to believe that the current dangers and threats are merely a repetition of what the system has experienced before and was able to confront and deal with. To say that the Arab regional system is a ‘product of struggle’ that originated and developed amid the successive waves of internal conflict between the countries that it comprises and the external clashes with other regional and international powers would not be an exaggeration. Up to now the Arab regional system has disproved all the analyses that predicted its death, beginning with Fouad Ajami’s famous studies entitled “The End of Pan Arabism” (1978/79, in Foreign Affairs 57 (2): 355– 373) and The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice since 1967 (1992, Cambridge University Press) to Burhan Ghalioun’s article for Al Jazeera (“Nihayah al-nizam al-iqlimi al-’arabi” [The end of the Arab regional system]. Al Jazeera, 10 March 2004), just as it proved its ability to contain the threats it faced and to adapt to them. The reason for its survival is primarily attributable to a unique feature that distinguishes it from other regional systems; this feature combines two characteristics: geographical continuity between a group of neighbouring states (with the exception of Somalia and the Comoros Islands), and linguistic homogeneity, cultural affinity and a sense of belonging to a common space of civilization and culture, while simultaneously acknowledging the existence of diversity and distinctive particularities. The question arises today as to whether the Arab regional system can continue to sustain itself successfully, or whether the present challenges and threats it now faces are of a new kind that go beyond the capabilities of its institutions and member states? Within this context, this opinion and position paper focuses on the author’s point of view and the essential factors supporting it. It does not present, discuss or critic the views of others. The paper is divided into three parts: the first describes the origin of the Arab regional system and its development in the heart of struggle; the second describes the new factors that endanger and challenge the status quo; and the third proposes scenarios for the future of the Arab system. Keywords: Arab regional system; Sykes–Picot Agreement; ISIS; Arab League; Middle East

*An earlier version of this paper was published in Arabic in Al Siyassa Al Dawliya (The Inter- national Politics Journal), no. 198, October 2014, pp. 42–48, www.siyassa.org.eg **Email: [email protected]

Introduction Over the last three years there has been increasing talk predicting ‘the end of the Arab world’, it being no longer able to continue to exist because of the downfall of the Arabs who have entered into a long-term crisis. Similarly, there is much talk about the ‘end’ or ‘fall’ of the Sykes–Picot Agreement (1916), the outlines of which were deﬁned with the end of the First World War and the ensuing settlements that divided the Ottoman Empire. In addition, there has been talk of redrawing the borders between countries and changing the political geography in the region towards more balkanization, osten- sibly due to the ‘fact’ that the present situation has lost its legitimacy.1 Yezid Sayigh expresses this in his recent article, ‘The Arab region at tipping point’ (Sayigh 2014) describing it as being ‘the onset of a period’ similar to the one that followed the Second World War, when independence and nation-building were materia- lizing. In a similar vein, Richard Haass, a former veteran American diplomat, views the Middle East region today as resembling Europe in the ﬁrst half of the 17th century with the outbreak of the sectarian Thirty Years’ War (1618–48), between Protestants and Catholics. He further analyses the necessity of moving beyond the prevailing illusions and accepting ‘the inevitability of Iraq’s break-up’ (Haass 2014). Israeli researchers and their supporters have used the arsenal of their historical infor- mation to explain the ‘false’ present-day political borders of the Arab states. According to them, there was no social basis on which these borders were drawn up, but they were instead drawn up according to the interests of the colonial powers. They claim that the continuation of these borders is the source of political instability in the region and, therefore, it is necessary to dismantle the existing states along ethnic and sectarian lines.

First: development of the system in the heart of struggle The institution of the first Arab regional system – theLeagueofArabStates– emerged in a regional and international environment fraught with conflict. At the international level, the victorious alliance of the Second World War was ending and the Cold War was beginning, and at the regional level, the Palestinian issue was worsening with the creation of the State of Israel. The Arab League adapted to the significant changes in its membership, the relationships between its members and its regional and international environment. The number of member countries rose from seven when it was first established to nine member states in 1957, then to the present 22 member states. These countries have experienced military unrest, popular revolts, foreign intervention, civil war and changes in their systems of government. Relations between the Arab states have suffered various forms of disagreements and divisions related to economic and social policies, as well as position alignment and international alliances, accompanied by political struggles, military conflict and border disputes. Externally, the Arab regional system adjusted to the changing roles of Iran and Turkey, and also faced the challenges imposed by the Arab–Israeli wars and the repeated aggression against Lebanon and the occupied Palestinian Territories. Moreover, the Arab regional system accommo- dated itself with the break-up of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Despite all these changes, the Arab regional system succeeded in maintaining its presence and its organizational cohesion. It even expanded by establishing new Arab organizations and unions specializing in various fields. Furthermore, it increased the role of Arab civil society organizations by deepening the interaction between the Arab states and societies. 98 A. El Deen Hillal Dessouki

Around the end of the 20th century, a succession of major events shook Arab relations to their very foundations. At the forefront was the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990. This event had profound effects on the regional system and its core values. It opened the door to a wave of Arab divisions, and shook the fundamental underpinnings of the concept of Arab security, whereby the principal sources of threat to Arab countries were expected to originate from non-Arab sides. The repercussions of this event revealed aspects of the imbalance in the management of relations between the elements that made up the regional system, as well as in the management of relations with the external world, and the limits of contact between the regional system and the global system. Following that came American pressure for the Arab countries to join the ‘Global War on Terror’ in the wake of the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, the failure in negotiations to reach a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority, the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Israeli attack on Lebanon in 2006 and on Gaza in 2010, and events up until the Arab revolutions and uprisings in 2011– 12, the Arab League’s resolution on Libya which provided the legal basis for international intervention and the military role for the NATO alliance, and the League’s decision for Syria’s seat to be occupied by a delegation of the Syrian National Council and not the Syrian government.

Second: what is new? The fact that the Arab regional system was established and developed in the heart of struggle does not constitute a sufﬁcient reason for complacently believing in the system’s ability to face the current challenges. The latter enshrine diverse dangers and threats originating from within the Arab states, as well as outside them. A state of political ﬂuidity and uncertainty has been generated and a number of member states of the system are under threat to their very existence and continuation within their present borders. These new factors are evident in the following issues.

The worsening state of crisis There has been an accumulation of structural problems, coinciding, in an unprece- dented way, in a large number of Arab states, whether in those that saw popular uprisings and revolts or those able to adapt, with their repercussions, so far. The elements of this crisis are diverse and include the escalation of internal conﬂict, related to issues of social justice, political participation and rights, the legitimacy of the systems of government, threats to existing borders, as well as the emergence of new types of social protest movements revolving around the younger generation who used the tools of the new media and the internet in their movement and activity.

The rise of ethnic and sectarian identities and the resort to violence That is happening through the increase in conflicts of identities between races, sects and ethnicities. The danger of this type of conflict is emphasized by the fact that it is at the highest level, dividing all of society from top to bottom, across social classes and strata. Those who ascribe to them regard them as existential battles. Their severity increases if the identity conflict becomes entangled with economic and political considerations. An example would be if the ethnic group is economically disadvantaged or socially oppressed. The rise of sectarian identities is not only an issue of belonging to a Contemporary Arab Affairs 99 culture; rather it is usually associated with economic deprivation and political and social exclusion. In this field, writings and analyses have proliferated on the ‘Sunni–Shia’ conflict, initially in Iraq and then in Syria and Lebanon, and on the tensions represented by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. King Abdullah of Jordan warned of the danger of the ‘Shia triangle’ led and supported by Iran. Moreover, the words Sunni and Shia have been used widely as analytical categories, according to which they explain events and conflicts and the analyses of alliances. Western research centres and the media have successfully exported these conceptions of Arabs which have influenced and deepened the portrayed image as becoming ever more deeply divided and separated along sectarian lines, and they are presenting this facile and ready-made explanation for what is happening in a number of Arab countries. This analysis ignores the fact that these ethnicities have lived alongside each other for decades. Their children participated together in the national movements that demanded independence. The political parties were non-ethnic or sectarian and were founded on ideological and intellectual bases. The highest political positions in these countries are occupied by leaders from different ethnicities and sects. The outcome of this historical fact is the necessity for the separation between the ethnic diversity as an incontrovertible, social and existential fact, on the one hand, and the sectarian relationships or the ‘political sectarianism’, namely the branding of political activity with an ethnic or sectarian character, on the other hand. Most researchers in the social sciences agree that this move in pluralist societies gives rise to economic inequal- ity and political exclusion. The horrific image evoked by the fighters of ISIS (Da’ish)2 have generated feelings of estrangement, fear and anger; people wearing attire from the pre-Islamic period of Jahiliyya,3 who speak in the language and follow the behaviour of the pre-Islamic period but who corrupt the image of Islam, by masquerading as Muslims, while carry- ing out horrifying and savage acts of killing and slaughtering people in their hundreds who differ from them religiously and politically. Such individuals, when at their ‘com- passionate’ best, forced the Yazidis to choose between repentance or to leave their homes and villages; threatened to attack Shia regions with one of their leaders brand- ishing the slogan ‘Revenge is not in Baghdad but in Karbala and Najaf’ and the sacred shrines of the Shia Community. The sectarian direction that this movement has taken has driven a wedge in the social and national wall of cohesion. This movement has threatened to inflict a regional sectarian war and for events in Iraq to be repeated in Syria. Their perpetrations and practices have beat opportunities for coexistence within one nation into a steady retreat. Although such a degree and extent of mass savagery as that perpetrated by Da’ish was not attained, there is another example, however, which is the one that has stemmed from the thinking and observance of the Muslim Brotherhood and their supporters who also resorted to the use of violence in Egypt during and after their takeover of power, and the conduct of the extremist Islamist organizations in Libya and Tunisia.

Governments’ lack of control over all the regions they are supposed to govern and the crystallization of this phenomenon The glaring example of this is ISIS’s control over regions in Iraq and Syria. In July 2014, the organization extended its control over a wide area extending from the city of Raqqa in Syria to Ramadi in Iraq. This region includes the city of Deir Ezzor in 100 A. El Deen Hillal Dessouki

Syria, close to the borders with Iraq. In Iraq, it includes the provinces of Ninevah and Salah ad Din, the centre of Iraq, the cities of Fallujah in Anbar province, Mosul, the second biggest city in Iraq, Tikrit, which includes the Bayji oil refinery and Tal Afar, and some of the areas in the province of Diyala. In the weeks that followed, ISIS forces threatened the Syrian city of Ayn al-Arab or Kobane, inhabited by a Kurdish majority and situated on the border with Turkey. They entered into confrontation in a ground war with Peshmerga forces in a number of Kurdish villages in the north of Iraq. ISIS’s control over these areas had two important outcomes. Firstly, it established a geographical and sectarian wall separating the ‘Shia of Iraq’ and the Syrian interior, another against the extension of Iranian influence, and a third between the region of Kurdistan in Iraq and the Kurds in Syria. Secondly, the political entity established by ISIS may encourage other groups to set up independent entities in Iraq and Syria, and there are threats to the region from Iraqi Kurdistan and Lebanon resulting from this. Other examples include the breakdown of the central authority in both Somalia and Libya, and the control of armed militias clashing and fighting against the regions of the state, and the Houthis’ control of some regions in Yemen.

Lack of control over borders ISIS, for example, removed the borders between Syria and Iraq by taking control of two of the four border crossings which link the two countries: the Qaim crossing in the Iraqi part and the Boukamal crossing bordering on the Syrian part. Another example of that is Egypt’s weak control over its western borders with Libya, which have become a pas- sageway for the ﬂow of weapons and drugs, its lack of control over the borders with Israel at the Quneitra crossing, and likewise, the eastern borders with Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon, through which there is a ﬂow of Syrian refugees seeking safety and tranquillity.

Extent of Arab policy’s exposure to international powers and the permissibility for intervention by armed force That was prominent in the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its regime change, using behaviour that did not differ much from the traditional imperialist model of the 19th century. This was followed by NATO’s intervention, at the request of the Arab League, to support the Libyan uprising and which soon came to have the upper hand in determining the priorities of the movement there. The role played by such external players has had its effects on the political and security developments which Libya is experiencing. Likewise, the American military intervention against ISIS forces at the request of the Iraqi government, and the similar American intervention to strike certain locations in Yemen. These have led to repeated talk of failure, of the ‘Arab regional system’, or the plan for the ‘Islamic state’, and, occasionally, the failure of ‘the national plan for independence’. The seriousness of the crisis is increasing with the lack of a comprehensive solution for it, whether on the part of the Arab states or external powers.

Third: Scenarios for the future A review of all these different challenges, and their likely repercussions, suggests four possible scenarios for the future of the Arab regional system. Contemporary Arab Affairs 101

Adaptation This scenario highlights the ability of the Arab regional system to contain the current challenges, as well as to maintain its organizational components and Arab identity. This would be through the development of the Arab League and its institutions, and by providing a greater role for the ‘interregional’ organizations within it. This would also be done by developing a political alliance comprising some of the Gulf states, Egypt, Jordan and Algeria. It could include other states that find it in their interest to stem divisive repercussions and fragmentation, such as what is now occurring in the east Arab region and preventing their influence from reaching their societies. This scenario would allow a bloc of Arab states to contain the ensuing influences of the Arab uprisings and revolts, and to minimize, if not completely invalidate, their impact on their internal situations. Added to that is Egypt which, in 2013, put an end to the rule of the political Islamic trend and brought about the powerful return of the role of the Egyptian state. This is an example that illustrates and confirms the cooperation and coordination that exists in confronting the security challenges stem- ming from the Libyan and Iraqi situations. It is probable that the states of this bloc would strive to include the majority of the other Arab states, and to prevent the Arab regional system from being exposed to fragmentation or decline. This scenario is also supported by the fact that the image of ISIS and its counterparts is losing acceptance with the mainstream Arab populace. Furthermore, the political dis- course does not express the general mood of this trend. On the contrary, the general feeling regards ISIS as a danger that goes beyond Iraq and Syria and represents a threat to regional security. Furthermore, this scenario is supported by the emergence of an international position that considers ISIS as a threat to international security and peace. The expressions of that include President Barack Obama’s announcement on 19 June 2014 that there could not be any acceptance of the ISIS state. There was also the Security Council’s decision of 15 August under Chapter 7 that called for the necessity to dissolve and disarm the organization. The same position arose regarding Libya. The Security Council issued a resolution on 28 August 2014 that imposed sanctions on the various armed groups, individuals and sides supporting them which commit or assist in committing ‘acts threatening peace, stability or security, or which hinder or harm political transition’. Nonetheless, in order for this scenario to come about, it would be necessary to be informed from previous experience and to be aware of what led to the signs of imbalance in the Arab regional system. This includes the fact that some parts of the system attempted to work from outside it or direct it through isolated control. The result was that in addition to this attempt that violated the covenant of the Arab League, it failed to achieve its goals and created a climate of mistrust between Arab governments. There was also the excessive military and political dependence on the United States in the period following the liberation of Kuwait which made it an active part in the interactions of the Arab regional system. Additionally, the decline or regression of the role played by Egypt within the Arab League, and the inability of any country or group of Arab countries to take over the role Egypt had previously played. The main difficulty, however, in achieving this scenario lies in the fact that given that the systems of personal rule have become reliant on narrow ethnic or sectarian loyalties and are devoid of institutionalism and respect for the law, how far are 102 A. El Deen Hillal Dessouki

Arab rulers’ prepared to establish strong regional institutions which rely on modern state institutions? How ready will they be to accept the implementation of a programme of political reform in their countries and to establish political systems which rely on the principles of wise government, the rule of law and institutions and respect for human rights. This is the main obstacle to activating the Arab regional system. The fundamental solution to problems of the Arab regional system has little to do with amending one or other article of the Arab League’s covenant, or a change to the ‘special aspect’ of one or other of its councils, or with legal and organizational issues. The primary obstacle is the nature of the prevailing systems of rule in the Arab countries which are characterized by their isolation and the absence of institutionalism. This situation represents a hindrance to developing the institutions of the Arab regional system. It is not normal that a political system in which the ruler alone makes decisions, for that ruler to be beholden to a decision issued by the majority in the Arab League, or one of its institutions, if that ruler disagrees with that decision. Systems where the institutions do not enjoy a signiﬁcant role in the process of policy and decision-making should not expect to be accepted on a regional level. It is for this reason that Arab societies are reluctant to renounce any of their ‘particular features’ in favour of the regional system on the basis of preserving their sovereignty. Yet many concessions were made in their relations with foreign states. Linked to this is the development of the political and ethical message of the Arab League and the fact that the dedication to the principles of wise government and respect for human rights is a main pivot for its role. The Arab League has to become a democratic actor on the regional stage and present the intellectual and moral authority for democratic development in the Arab world, adopting the model of the Organization of American States, whose members agreed to consider the establishment of democratic systems as a condition for realizing the aims of the organization, and the Associ- ation of Southeast Asian Nations which focuses on democratic issues and human rights.

Union A crucial underpinning in the current crisis faced by member states of the Arab League is pushing a part of their political and intellectual elite to propose the consolidation of an ‘Arab union’ as a means of overcoming the present predicament. The motive for this trend lies in the increasing realization that the regional system is in jeopardy, since it has failed to carry out its basic tasks, including maintaining the integrity of the region. Con- fronting this situation through a union, could well be an ideal strategy to prevent further sliding towards fragmentation (the fourth scenario). In this scenario, priority within the union would be on military and economic cooperation. This scenario would be hindered in its application by the personal character of the systems of rule in place, and the adherence to the ostensible signs of independence and sovereignty. Hence, this scenario may be itself the outcome and result of the application of the ﬁrst scenario over many years and the emergence of the necessity of the union as a tool for adapting to the challenges. For understandable considerations, the choice would be difﬁcult for the rulers of the wealthy states, or those with very small popu- lations. Nonetheless, in this case the union would be the least costly choice for them, in comparison with the possibility of the fall of the systems of rule in these countries, and the loss of all the privileges currently enjoyed by the ruling elites and their families. Contemporary Arab Affairs 103

Dissolution In this scenario, the countries of the Arab regional system would disband and regroup in a wider regional framework that would include non-Arab states. Some of the Arab states may avoid it, which would deprive the new system of the ‘pan-Arab nationalist’ characteristic which has distinguished the Arab regional system from other systems. This scenario may take one of two secondary tracks.

The Islamic system This is a call adopted by several of the organizations of political Islam. It is an old idea going back to the concepts and organizations that appeared at the end of the 1920s after the abolishment of the Islamic caliphate in Turkey in 1924, and their demands to revive the caliphate once again. Among the examples at the end of the 1940s was the appeal by Zafrullah Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, to establish an ‘Islamic bloc’ and another by a group of Muslim states, including Saudi Arabia, Iran and Morocco, to set up the Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) which held its first conference in Morocco in 1969 and currently includes 57 states. There was also the failed attempt of President Anwar Sadat to set up the League of Arab and Islamic Peoples after the Arab League’s headquarters transferred to Tunisia in 1979. There have been numerous forms of this call from one country to another. In Egypt, for example, the Freedom and Justice Party, the political arm of the Muslim Brother- hood group, connected Arabism to Islam. Its programme stated that the security of Egypt could not be separated from ‘its regional, Arab and Islamic surroundings’ and referred to ‘Arab and Islamic unity’, as well as ‘the strengthening of the networks of integral relations with Arab and Islamic countries and neighboring regional countries’. In the same trend, the 2012 constitution that was issued under the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood mentioned the ‘affinity of Arab Islamic Egypt’ and ‘Arab and Islamic security’. This is in addition to the fact that establishing the caliphate has remained one of the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood. In Iraq and Syria, ISIS announced the establishment of an ‘Islamic State’ in June 2014. In Libya, this trend took on the form of the establishment of ‘an Islamic emirate’, similar to the announcement of the Islamic emirate in Benghazi in August 2014. In the same month, Boko Haram likewise announced the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in the state of Borno in north-east Nigeria. This idea has been reiterated in the programmes of many Islamic parties in Arab and Islamic countries, as well as the International Organ- ization for the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Qaeda on the international level. This call has become widespread with the arrival of Islamic currents to power in several Arab countries, or with the increase of their political influence in other states through the power of their organizational and financial resources, and the effect exer- cised by the halo of innocence and holiness surrounding them. However, the outcome of this participation has been miserable, with the exception of Morocco and Tunisia. Either it has brought their country into the throes of chaos and division, as in Libya, or it has distorted the path of the revolution, as in Syria, or has impaired the state’s management of affairs, as in Egypt. That has cast deeply negative shadows for the future of political Islamic organizations, at least in the short and mid terms and is what Saad Eddin Ibrahim has termed ‘the eclipse of political Islam’ (Ibrahim 2014). 104 A. El Deen Hillal Dessouki

The Middle Eastern system This is the objective of many western and Israeli politicians which aims at restructuring the region and expanding the scope of the Arab regional system to include non-Arab states such as Israel and Turkey in order to form ‘a multinational regional system’ in which the Arab character would be non-existent. This scenario is supported by three factors:

. The first is that it concords with the Western–Israeli academic and official concept of the region. This considers it to be a mosaic populated by various religions, nationalities, sects, ethnicities and languages. . The second is that this development and absence of the Arab characteristic of the regional system will facilitate the integration of Israel into it, as an essential and influential member, and earn it the regional political legitimacy which it has long aspired to achieve by denying the Arab characteristic of the region and imparting to it the label ‘Middle Eastern’. In this context, there have been repeated plans for the new, bigger and expanded Middle East which the United States has proposed alone or with the G8’s (Group of 8) main industrialized countries. . The third is the increasing influence of Turkey and Iran in Arab affairs. Iran has attempted to crystallize a political message for Shia Muslims in the Arab countries to mobilize them and gain their loyalty. It has continued to be one of the main sources of support for the Syrian regime, militarily and economically. It has supported the role of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria and the Houthis in Yemen. It tried to get closer to the Egyptian regime during the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. Ahmadinejad was the first Iranian president to visit Egypt in February 2013. Turkey has sought support for its economic investments and activities in various Arab countries. It put itself forward as a supporter of the Arab popular uprisings and revolts and as a model for moderate Islamic rule to be imitated by the Arab countries where Islamists are reaching power. In addition to this Iranian–Turkish role, hostile Israeli policies have continued. The sum of these developments has been to upset the balance of power to the detriment of the Arabs.

The problem with this scenario is the Arab public’s refusal of Israel. Even the states that have signed peace treaties with it have justified signing them only for reasons related to military and security issues, and have emphasized that the preservation of their relationship with Israel in the framework of mutual interest would be possible without that affecting the concept of Arab belonging. Yet, Western and Israeli attempts to propose this system through calls such as that made by Shimon Peres in his book The New Middle East (1993), and the call in the 1990s for a series of conferences including the ‘Middle East and North Africa summits’ held in Morocco, Jordan, Egypt and Qatar have met with failure. Likewise, the Iranian–Turkish role in the Arab world has not supported the concept of the Middle East. Turkish foreign policy fell victim to the conflicts among its membership in the NATO alliance, its establishing of diplomatic ties with Israel, its adoption of positions against the Israeli siege of Gaza and its support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in a way which brought it into conflict with a number of Arab states. This is what led to the diminishing of its influence. Likewise, Iranian policy has, in turn, led to sectarian conflicts igniting in a number of Arab countries. However, Iran became the Contemporary Arab Affairs 105

ﬁrst power in Iraq after the departure of the American forces, and it has not been any more successful than their predecessors in acknowledging the necessity of improving representation of the diverse social components of the Iraqi people. This has led to the uprising of the provinces of Anbar and Diyala in 2013, ISIS in 2014 and whose interference represented a direct defeat for Iran. In general, Turkey and Iran have adopted an ambiguous position towards the international campaign against ISIS. Turkey participated in a conference of foreign ministers of the countries of the region which was held in Jeddah in September 2014, along with the American Secretary of State. However, Turkey refused to sign the declaration issued and the media repeatedly reports on Turkey’s support for ISIS’s role as part of its stance to oppose the Syrian regime. It refused American forces the use of bases located on Turkish soil. As for Iran, it also has refused to par- ticipate in the international campaign, preferring to work alone to support the Iraqi and Syrian governments.

Fragmentation and collapse The political borders drawn by Britain and France after the First World War is the start- ing point for this scenario. Reality has since then gone well beyond those borders against the backdrop of experience and reality, and the inability of the Arab states to meet the tasks of economic growth and democratic participation. Because these borders were not drawn on any historical or social basis has resulted in calls for a new political map to be drawn up, based on ethnic afﬁliations, in order to achieve stability. As one Israeli researcher writes, the splitting of the current states is a ‘natural matter’ because the modern state is built on ‘ethnic similarity’ that includes one ethnicity, speaking one language, and that the independence of South Sudan represents a model example!4 It is noticeable that all the exponents of this scenario focus their pre- dictions on the division of the Arab states without any reference to what will happen to Turkey, Iran and Israel in this situation. The essential aspects of this scenario is for the region to enter into a state of chaos and political unrest, leading to sectarian confrontation, civil war, battles by proxy and the spread of armed militias and terrorist activities. This is the model of the failed state and the break-up of the countries of the region. The media compete in publishing new maps of these states, in most of which the number is 30 and in some, more than 40. This scenario has found currency in recent years with the rise of ethnic loyalties and the victories of ISIS in Syria and Iraq in 2014. With the provocative climate connected to this, many have not hesitated to question what the opportunities are for ISIS to maintain its victories or sustain the ‘Islamic caliphate’ which it has established. There are a number of factors that impose curbs and limits on ISIS. Among them are events that have led to the wide mobilization of Shia Muslims to embark on a long holy war, and Iran increasing its military support materially and with personnel. In addition, there is the fact that the United States has undertaken a series of attack on ISIS positions and set up an international alliance to coordinate military operations against the organization. They provided the Kurdish Peshmerga forces with arms to defend their region and regain the villages which they lost, and agreed on rearranging the political situations in Iraq and creating a more conciliatory climate. Added to that is the Western states’ redeployment and arming of the Iraqi Army and their increase in the number of trainers and consultants to support it. Likewise, they increased local resistance, especially the tribes and groups of people affected by the expansion of ISIS. 106 A. El Deen Hillal Dessouki

All these factors are likely to put ISIS in a defensive position, and increasingly encircle and exhaust them. A large number of the Arab states’ governments must acknowledge their responsibility for the region’s current state. Their mutual competition for influence, dubbed ‘the new Arab cold war’, has led to these states supporting armed groups without any appreciation of the consequences that increasing the powers of such groups will have. The Qatar–Turkey axis supported ISIS as a part of their policy to bring down the Syrian regime. It has been confirmed that the elements of ISIS received military training in Turkey. This axis has also taken an active role in supporting Libyan militias. The role of the Saudi–Emirate axis in supporting the armed groups in Syria and the militias in Libya is another example. This race for influence has contributed to deepening and widening the divides. Furthermore, the Arab League and its largest member states bear the responsibility for not proposing Arab plans to confront these crises and for relying on the request for American and European intervention. Moreover, there is the factor of retreat by some Arab states into their current internal situations and their ‘disengagement’ from the Arab regional system because of the worsening internal problems or because of the desire to synthesize a sense of ‘Arab nationalism’ particular to them. There are huge obstacles preventing this scenario as an alternative to the Arab regional system. Firstly, it is uncertain that the prevailing strategic view in the United States will find its interest in the division of the region, as this development represents a direct threat to its economic and strategic interests especially in oil and gas in the Gulf. When chaos prevails and its instigator is the likes of ISIS, then anything can happen, and fear increases with the possibility of a weapon of mass destruction getting into the wrong hands. Secondly, the state of chaos represents a direct risk to the Mediterranean member states of the European Union because of the flow of illegal emigrants along its coasts, and the security risks this scenario represents to all states of the European Union in which Muslims are living. Thirdly, there is no Arab state supporting or encouraging this scenario. Yet some of them have interfered on more than one occasion to support change in the system of rule in other countries, or to support popular uprisings there, except that not one of them openly supports calls for division or separation. Fourthly, there are Turkish and Iranian fears about this development that could have repercussions on the internal situation in these two countries. Fifthly, with the exception of ethnicities who are populous and concentrated geo- graphically in border regions, the opportunities for most ethnicities to achieve separation is a near impossible matter, both politically and economically. This scenario would lead to a state of instability, chaos and struggle between states and groups for resources and borders. In such a reign of chaos, the establishment of an alternative regional system would not be possible.

Conclusions Overviewing the future is in itself a risky business. Under these circumstances, when is there so much talk about a region marked by the changing conditions, changing positions of its parties and the depth of penetration by the major powers in it, the choices and priorities of the political and intellectual elites are among the influential factors in forming the future. Their political and moral support and legitimacy is Contemporary Arab Affairs 107 necessary when solutions are proposed. It is in the interest of the majority who make up society to respect political, economic and cultural rights, and to be in harmony with the spirit of the age in establishing modern states which adhere to the principles of wise government and respect for human rights; all based on the concept of citizenship which guarantees equality among all citizens in their rights and duties. In view of current reality, facts and circumstances, I favour the first scenario as the more realistic and representative. I believe in the continuation of the Arab component as a meaningful foundation for the Arab regional system, and that it is by virtue of its con- nection to the dominant language and culture in the region that ethnic and sectarian differences are transcended. I do not regard the acknowledgement of ethnic identities and the respect for their rights as a position contrary to Arabism. Rather, it confirms the status of Arabism as a cultural framework that combines that diversity. What is also supported by this scenario is the Arab ruling elite’s realization of the common dangers and threats, violence and terrorism embodied by extremist organizations, and their need for solidarity within the Arab framework in order to confront them. Fur- thermore, a third factor has emerged: the growth of a sense of doubt and uncertainty about the policies of the traditional ally – Washington. Negotiations with Iran regarding its nuclear programme and the effect of that on security in the Gulf has given rise to this. Similarly, Washington’s attitude towards the parties of political Islam, which most of the Arab regimes consider as a direct threat to them, constitutes another aspect of this factor. This was evidenced with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates’ pursuit of policies that were completely contradictory to the American position on Egypt after the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in July 2013.

Notes 1. This opinion has roots going back to the early part of this century, among the most prominent is Susser (2003). Other recent examples are Bowker (2014) and Scheinmann (2014). 2. Da’ish is the Arabic acronym for ISIS (Islamic State of Syria). 3. Jahiliyyah is an Islamic concept of ‘ignorance of divine guidance’ or ‘the state of ignorance of the guidance from God’ or ‘Days of Ignorance’ referring to the condition in which Arabs found themselves in pre-Islamic Arabia (in the non-Islamic sense), i.e. prior to the revelation of the Quran to Muhammad. The root of the term jahiliyyah is the I-form verb jahala ‘to be ignorant or stupid, to act stupidly’. 4. This claim has no basis or truth to it. Most of the African and Asian countries and some European nations contain more than one ethnicity and one language, including the case of South Sudan mentioned by the writer.

References Ajami, Fouad. 1978/79. “The End of Pan-Arabism.” Foreign Affairs 57 (2 Winter): 355–373. Ajami, Fouad. 1992. The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bowker, Robert. 2013. Ending Sykes–Picot: The Arab World and the West After 2011.HH Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah Publication Series. Durham University, Number 7, 2013. Accessed November, 2014. https://www.dur.ac.uk/alsabah/publications/insights/ no7bowker/ Ghalioun, Burhan. 2004. “Nihayah al-nizam al-iqlimi al-’arabi” [The end of the Arab regional system]. Al Jazeera, 10 March. Accessed November 2014. http://www.aljazeera.net/ ﻧﻬﺎﻳﺔ-ﺍﻟﻨﻈﺎﻣ-ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻴﻤﻲ-ﺍﻟﻌﺮﰊ /knowledgegate/opinions/2004/10/3 Haass, Richard N. 2014. “The New Thirty Years’ War.” Project Syndicate. July. Accessed November 2014. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/richard-n–haass-argues- that-the-middle-east-is-less-a-problem-to-be-solved-than-a-condition-to-be-managed 108 A. El Deen Hillal Dessouki

Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. 2014. “Khusuf al-islam al-siyasi: al-ikhwan al-muslimun numudhajan” [The eclipse of political Islam: the Muslim Brotherhood as an example]. In Mustaqbal al- Islam al-siyasi ﬁ watan al-‘arabi [The future of political Islam in the Arab nation]. Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies: 173–182. Peres, Shimon. 1993. The New Middle East. New York: Henry Holt. Sayigh, Yazid. 2014. “al manteqa al arabia inda noqtat tahawel” [The Arab Region at a Turning Point]. Al Hayat, 21 August. Scheinmann, Gabriel. 2014. “The End of the modern Middle East?.” In Focus Quarterly Journal, 8 (2). Accessed November 2014. http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/5206/ modern-middle-east Susser, Asher. 2003. “The Decline of the Arabs.” Middle East Quarterly, 3 (4): 3–15. Accessed November 2014. http://www.meforum.org/564/the-decline-of-the-arabs.