Contemporary Arab Affairs, 2015 Vol. 8, No. 1, 96–108, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2014.990797 OPINION The Arab regional system: a question of survival* Ali El Deen Hillal Dessouki** Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt It would be a mistake to believe that the Arab regional system (heretofore referred to as the ‘Arab regional system’; ‘the system’ or the ‘regional system’)is endangered by the current instability and upheaval affecting the Arab region, and that the threats that currently loom over it are new and unlike anything that have previously been faced. It would be equally erroneous to believe that the current dangers and threats are merely a repetition of what the system has experienced before and was able to confront and deal with. To say that the Arab regional system is a ‘product of struggle’ that originated and developed amid the successive waves of internal conflict between the countries that it comprises and the external clashes with other regional and international powers would not be an exaggeration. Up to now the Arab regional system has disproved all the analyses that predicted its death, beginning with Fouad Ajami’s famous studies entitled “The End of Pan Arabism” (1978/79, in Foreign Affairs 57 (2): 355– 373) and The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice since 1967 (1992, Cambridge University Press) to Burhan Ghalioun’s article for Al Jazeera (“Nihayah al-nizam al-iqlimi al-’arabi” [The end of the Arab regional system]. Al Jazeera, 10 March 2004), just as it proved its ability to contain the threats it faced and to adapt to them. The reason for its survival is primarily attributable to a unique feature that distinguishes it from other regional systems; this feature combines two characteristics: geographical continuity between a group of neighbouring states (with the exception of Somalia and the Comoros Islands), and linguistic homogeneity, cultural affinity and a sense of belonging to a common space of civilization and culture, while simultaneously acknowledging the existence of diversity and distinctive particularities. The question arises today as to whether the Arab regional system can continue to sustain itself successfully, or whether the present challenges and threats it now faces are of a new kind that go beyond the capabilities of its institutions and member states? Within this context, this opinion and position paper focuses on the author’s point of view and the essential factors supporting it. It does not present, discuss or critic the views of others. The paper is divided into three parts: the first describes the origin of the Arab regional system and its development in the heart of struggle; the second describes the new factors that endanger and challenge the status quo; and the third proposes scenarios for the future of the Arab system. Keywords: Arab regional system; Sykes–Picot Agreement; ISIS; Arab League; Middle East *An earlier version of this paper was published in Arabic in Al Siyassa Al Dawliya (The Inter- national Politics Journal), no. 198, October 2014, pp. 42–48, www.siyassa.org.eg **Email: [email protected] © 2014 The Centre for Arab Unity Studies Contemporary Arab Affairs 97 Introduction Over the last three years there has been increasing talk predicting ‘the end of the Arab world’, it being no longer able to continue to exist because of the downfall of the Arabs who have entered into a long-term crisis. Similarly, there is much talk about the ‘end’ or ‘fall’ of the Sykes–Picot Agreement (1916), the outlines of which were defined with the end of the First World War and the ensuing settlements that divided the Ottoman Empire. In addition, there has been talk of redrawing the borders between countries and changing the political geography in the region towards more balkanization, osten- sibly due to the ‘fact’ that the present situation has lost its legitimacy.1 Yezid Sayigh expresses this in his recent article, ‘The Arab region at tipping point’ (Sayigh 2014) describing it as being ‘the onset of a period’ similar to the one that fol- lowed the Second World War, when independence and nation-building were materia- lizing. In a similar vein, Richard Haass, a former veteran American diplomat, views the Middle East region today as resembling Europe in the first half of the 17th century with the outbreak of the sectarian Thirty Years’ War (1618–48), between Protestants and Catholics. He further analyses the necessity of moving beyond the prevailing illusions and accepting ‘the inevitability of Iraq’s break-up’ (Haass 2014). Israeli researchers and their supporters have used the arsenal of their historical infor- mation to explain the ‘false’ present-day political borders of the Arab states. According to them, there was no social basis on which these borders were drawn up, but they were instead drawn up according to the interests of the colonial powers. They claim that the continuation of these borders is the source of political instability in the region and, therefore, it is necessary to dismantle the existing states along ethnic and sectarian lines. First: development of the system in the heart of struggle The institution of the first Arab regional system – theLeagueofArabStates– emerged in a regional and international environment fraught with conflict. At the international level, the victorious alliance of the Second World War was ending and the Cold War was begin- ning, and at the regional level, the Palestinian issue was worsening with the creation of the State of Israel. The Arab League adapted to the significant changes in its membership, the relationships between its members and its regional and international environment. The number of member countries rose from seven when it was first established to nine member states in 1957, then to the present 22 member states. These countries have experienced military unrest, popular revolts, foreign intervention, civil war and changes in their systems of government. Relations between the Arab states have suffered various forms of disagreements and divisions related to economic and social policies, as well as position alignment and international alliances, accompanied by political struggles, military conflict and border disputes. Externally, the Arab regional system adjusted to the changing roles of Iran and Turkey, and also faced the challenges imposed by the Arab–Israeli wars and the repeated aggression against Lebanon and the occupied Palestinian Territories. Moreover, the Arab regional system accommo- dated itself with the break-up of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Despite all these changes, the Arab regional system succeeded in maintaining its presence and its organizational cohesion. It even expanded by establishing new Arab organizations and unions specializing in various fields. Furthermore, it increased the role of Arab civil society organizations by deepening the interaction between the Arab states and societies. 98 A. El Deen Hillal Dessouki Around the end of the 20th century, a succession of major events shook Arab relations to their very foundations. At the forefront was the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990. This event had profound effects on the regional system and its core values. It opened the door to a wave of Arab divisions, and shook the fundamental underpinnings of the concept of Arab security, whereby the principal sources of threat to Arab countries were expected to originate from non-Arab sides. The repercus- sions of this event revealed aspects of the imbalance in the management of relations between the elements that made up the regional system, as well as in the management of relations with the external world, and the limits of contact between the regional system and the global system. Following that came American pressure for the Arab countries to join the ‘Global War on Terror’ in the wake of the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, the failure in negotiations to reach a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority, the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Israeli attack on Lebanon in 2006 and on Gaza in 2010, and events up until the Arab revolutions and uprisings in 2011– 12, the Arab League’s resolution on Libya which provided the legal basis for inter- national intervention and the military role for the NATO alliance, and the League’s decision for Syria’s seat to be occupied by a delegation of the Syrian National Council and not the Syrian government. Second: what is new? The fact that the Arab regional system was established and developed in the heart of struggle does not constitute a sufficient reason for complacently believing in the system’s ability to face the current challenges. The latter enshrine diverse dangers and threats originating from within the Arab states, as well as outside them. A state of political fluidity and uncertainty has been generated and a number of member states of the system are under threat to their very existence and continuation within their present borders. These new factors are evident in the following issues. The worsening state of crisis There has been an accumulation of structural problems, coinciding, in an unprece- dented way, in a large number of Arab states, whether in those that saw popular upris- ings and revolts or those able to adapt, with their repercussions, so far. The elements of this crisis are diverse and include the escalation of internal conflict, related to issues of social justice, political participation and rights, the legitimacy of the systems of govern- ment, threats to existing borders, as well as the emergence of new types of social protest movements revolving around the younger generation who used the tools of the new media and the internet in their movement and activity. The rise of ethnic and sectarian identities and the resort to violence That is happening through the increase in conflicts of identities between races, sects and ethnicities.