Science Skepticism in Times of COVID-19
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GPI0010.1177/1368430220981415Group Processes & Intergroup RelationsRutjens et al. 981415research-article2020 G Group Processes & P Intergroup Relations I Article R Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 2021, Vol. 24(2) 276–283 Science skepticism in times of © The Author(s) 2020 Article reuse guidelines: COVID-19 sagepub.com/journals-permissions https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430220981415DOI: 10.1177/1368430220981415 journals.sagepub.com/home/gpi Bastiaan T. Rutjens,1* Sander van der Linden2* and Romy van der Lee3 Abstract In the current paper, we argue that to get a better understanding of the psychological antecedents of COVID-related science skepticism, it is pivotal to review what is known about the (social) psychology of science skepticism. Recent research highlighting the role of ideologies and worldviews in shaping science skepticism can inform research questions as well as pandemic responses to COVID-19. It is likely that the antecedents of general COVID-19-related skepticism substantially overlap with the antecedents of climate change skepticism. Additionally, skepticism about a potential vaccine in particular will likely be fueled by similar worries and misperceptions to those shaping more general antivaccination attitudes, of which conspiracy thinking is particularly worth highlighting. We conclude by reflecting on how the COVID-19 crisis may shape future social-psychological research aimed at understanding trust in science and science skepticism. Keywords climate change, conspiracy thinking, COVID-19, science skepticism, vaccination Paper received 20 October 2020; revised version accepted 26 November 2020. Introduction science skepticism is on the rise (e.g., Pittinsky, 2015; Rutjens, Heine, et al., 2018) and that “anti- It’s going to disappear. One day, it’s like science forces are on the march” (Nature a miracle, it will disappear (Wolfe & Editorial, 2017). This increase, however, seems Dale, 2020). The systematic and unwarranted rejection of sci- 1University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands ence—both in terms of empirical evidence and 2University of Cambridge, UK the methods used to produce that evidence—can 3VU Amsterdam, the Netherlands have catastrophic effects on public health, the *The first two authors contributed equally to this paper. economy, and the environment (van Bavel et al., Corresponding author: 2020; World Health Organization [WHO], 2019). Bastiaan T. Rutjens, Department of Psychology, University Although trust in science is still comparatively of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands. high in many countries, it has been argued that Email: [email protected] Rutjens et al. 277 domain-contingent and does not apply to science heterogeneous (Rutjens, Sutton, & van der Lee, generally. Some of these contentious domains are 2018; Rutjens & van der Lee, 2020). This heteroge- climate change, vaccination, and genetic modifi- neity refers to the domains of skepticism as well as cation (Rutjens, Sutton, & van der Lee, 2018). To to its predictors. Levels of skepticism vary across illustrate, consider that two of the top 10 public domains (Rutjens, Sutton, & van der Lee, 2018; health threats as listed by the World Health Rutjens & van der Lee, 2020), but more importantly Organization in 2019 are climate change and vac- perhaps, heterogeneity also pertains to the predic- cine hesitancy (WHO, 2019). The potentially irre- tors of skepticism. That is, levels of skepticism versible (Steffen et al., 2018) effects of human about diverse domains vary across ideological emissions on global warming stem from, at best, groups. Whereas it has long been thought that polit- an underestimation of the problem or, at worst, ical conservatism is the main contributor to differ- from the blatant denial of the reality of climate ences in science skepticism, this view now seems change (Dunlap, 2013; Lewandowsky & more nuanced, with climate change skepticism as a Oberauer, 2016). The recent resurgence of mea- notable exception (Hornsey et al., 2018a; Rutjens, sles outbreaks in various countries across the Sutton, & van der Lee, 2018; Rutjens et al., 2021). globe can arguably be traced back to public skep- Self-identifying as a religious and particularly as a ticism about vaccination (Wenner Moyer, 2018). spiritual believer has been found to be a more The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic can now be potent contributor to skepticism in various other added to the list of contentious topics that the domains, such as vaccination and evolution (Rutjens public is sharply divided on (Dryhurst et al., & van der Lee, 2020; Rutjens et al., 2021). In what 2020). Heated discussions about the severity of follows, we outline how existing research on science COVID-19 symptoms, the necessity and (eco- skepticism and worldviews—including political and nomic) consequences of the various lockdowns religious identities and group processes—can across the world, and the usefulness of face inform research and pandemic responses to masks and social distancing measures rage across COVID-19 (see Packer et al., 2021, for discussion the internet (Kerr et al., 2020). To get a better of conforming and deviant responses to understanding of the psychological antecedents COVID-19). of COVID-19-related science skepticism, it is therefore pivotal to review what we know about Political Ideology and (Climate) Science the (social) psychology of science skepticism. Skepticism Hornsey and Fielding (2017) highlight that whilst Pre-COVID: How Can Research antiscience attitudes are generally what people on Science Skepticism Inform observe, it is the “root” of the attitude that Social Psychological Perspectives scholars need to understand. Attitude roots are the factors that drive and sustain surface skepti- on the COVID-19 Crisis? cism about science, and include deeply held As mentioned before, two of the domains that have worldviews, identities, and ideologies. To this been the subject of both heated public debate and extent, the denial of science is often uniquely psychological research on the causes and conse- attributed to the political Right (Mooney, 2012). quences of the skepticism they are evoking are cli- For example, in an editorial, Nature (“Science mate change and vaccination (Hornsey et al., 2018a, Scorned,” 2010) describes an “anti-science strain 2018b; Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013; pervading the right-wing in the United States” Rutjens, Sutton, & van der Lee, 2018; van der (p. 133). Indeed, trust in science has declined Linden, Panagopoulos, et al., 2020). However, does particularly amongst U.S. conservatives (Gauchat, skepticism about climate change and vaccination 2012). As mentioned in the previous section, share the same antecedents? Evidence suggests that however, this trend is especially clear in some this is not the case. In fact, science skepticism is domains—such as climate change—where denial 278 Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 24(2) of the issue has been prevalent on the Right curtailed people’s economic and personal free- (Dunlap, 2013; Hornsey et al., 2018a; van der doms. These measures directly antagonize key Linden, Panagopoulos, et al., 2020). One reason aspects of the conservative worldview, such as a that has been offered for this is that the free- strong preference for justifying the status quo market ideology espoused by many conserva- over social change, the prioritization of individ- tives does not sit well with environmental policies ual freedom, and a desire for minimal govern- (e.g., Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013). ment intervention (Jost, 2017; Jost et al., 2003; Although there is evidence that similar patterns Stenner, 2009). Similarly, the antireflexivity are observed in European countries (Krange hypothesis suggests that compared to liberals, et al., 2019; Rutjens et al., 2020), other large-scale conservatives trust and support science less in comparisons have found that such elevated and situations when science emphasizes negative politicized skepticism amongst conservatives is public health impacts of economic production often confined to the “paranoid style” of U.S. (McCright et al., 2013). Perhaps unsurprisingly politics (e.g., see Hornsey et al., 2018a; van der then, cross-cultural research in 10 countries has Linden, Panagopoulos, et al., 2020). found that those who hold individualistic as However, the role of conservative or right- opposed to egalitarian worldviews consistently wing political ideology seems largely confined to view COVID-19 as a lower risk (Dryhurst et al., skepticism about climate change specifically. 2020). Recent research has also found that com- Religiosity is a stronger correlate of evolution pared to liberals, conservatives are much less and vaccination skepticism than political ideology likely to trust COVID experts and the World is (Ecklund et al., 2017; Rutjens, Heine, et al., Health Organization, and to engage in impor- 2018). Other scholars have also noted that sci- tant public health behaviors such as wearing a ence skepticism is “bipartisan” in the sense that face mask (Kerr et al., 2021), and significantly both liberals and conservatives can engage in more likely to endorse misinformation about motivated denial when the science is uncongenial COVID-19 (Roozenbeek et al., 2020). This may to their worldview or their political or social iden- be in part because the intergroup discourse tity (Ditto et al., 2019; Nisbet et al., 2015; among political elites has been polarizing (Green Washburn & Skitka, 2018; see Abrams et al., et al., 2020), and extreme right-wing outlets have