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Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/28/2021 04:48:53PM Via Free Access JOBNAME: Stone PAGE: 1 SESS: 3 OUTPUT: Tue Jun 26 10:09:58 2018 TABLE OF CASES EU CASES A, Case C-523/07, [2009] ECR I-2805 ......... 20.21, 20.45, 21.32, 21.44, 21.75, 21.83, 21.93 AvB,Case C-112/13, EU:C:2014:2195 ........................................................................... 8.75 AvB,Case C-184/14, EU:C:2015:479 ........................................................................... 22.24 AvB,Case C-489/14, EU:C:2015:654 ................................................................. 20.36–20.37 AOy,Case C-123/11 EU:C:2013:84 .................................................................................. 1.56 Aertssen v VSB, Case C-523/14 EU:C:2015:722, ...................................................... 2.39, 9.29 Aguirre Zarraga v Pelz, Case C-491/10-PPU, [2010] ECR I-14247 ............................. 21.159 Alder v Orŧowska Case C-325/11, EU:C:2012:824 ............................................................. 3.25 Allianz v West Tankers, Case C-185/07 [2009] ECR I-663 .......... 2.65, 2.74–2.75, 2.77–2.81, 2.84–2.85, 9.57 Alpha Bank Cyprus, Case C-519/13, EU:C:2015:603 ......................................................... 3.27 Alta Realitat, Case C-384/14, EU:C:2016:316 ................................................................... 3.27 Antonio Gramsci Shipping Corp v Lembergs, Case C 350/13, EU:C:2014:1516. ............... 11.26 Apostolides v Orams, Case C-420/07 [2009] ECR I-3571 .......... 2.02, 2.32, 3.19, 7.02, 11.13, 11.27, 11.36, 11.51, 11.55, 11.74 Apple and Pear Australia Ltd v OHIM and Carolus C. BVBA, Case T-378/13, EU:T:2015:186 ............................................................................................................ 7.91 Arcado v Haviland, Case 9/87, [1988] ECR 1539 .............................................................. 4.18 AS-Autoteile Service v Mahle, Case 220/84, [1985] ECR 2267 ........................................ 7.116 ASML v Semiconductor Industry Services, Case C-283/05, [2006] ECR I-12041 ................................................................................................. 11.71, 11.73 Assens Havn v Navigators Management, Case C-368/16, EU:C:2017:546 ......................... 6.22 Austro-Mechana v Amazon, Case C-572/14, EU:C:2016:286 .................................... 4.70, 4.98 Bank Handlowy v Christianapol, Case C-116/11, EU:C:2012:739 ............ 24.52, 24.60, 25.07, 25.20 Bavaria Fluggesellschaft Schwabe v Eurocontrol, Case 9–10/77 [1977] ECR 1517 ............. 2.33 Benincasa v Dentalkit, Case C-269/95 [1997] ECR I-3767 ................... 6.29, 6.31, 8.35–8.36 Berghoefer v ASA, Case 221/84 [1985] ECR 2699 ............................................................. 8.10 Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe v JPMorgan Chase Bank, Case C-144/10 [2011] ECR I-3961 .... 7.19 Bertrand v Ott, Case 150/77 [1978] ECR 1431 ................................................................. 6.29 Besix v WABAG, Case C-256/00, [2002] ECR I-1699 ............................................. 4.57, 4.61 Bier v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace, Case 21/76, [1976] ECR 1735 ........................................ 4.78 Blanckaert &Willems v Trost, Case 139/80, [1981] ECR 819 .......................................... 4.116 BMW v Acacia, Case C-433/16, EU:C:2017:550 ...................................................... 7.88, 8.76 Bohez v Wiertz, Case C-4/14, EU:C:2015:563 ............................................................... 21.134 Bolagsupplysningen v Svensk Handel, Case C-194/16, EU:C:2017:766 ............................... 4.90 Bradbrooke v Aleksandrowicz, Case C-498/14-PPU, EU:C:2015:3 ................................. 21.116 Brenner v Dean Witter Reynolds, Case C-318/93, [1994] ECR I-4275 ............................. 8.73 Brennero v Wendel, Case 258/83, [1984] ECR 3971 ................................... 12.28–12.29, 12.31 xviii Peter Stone - 9781784712662 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/28/2021 04:48:53PM via free access Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Stone-Private_international_law_in_the_EU / Division: TableCases /Pg. Position: 1 / Date: 13/6 JOBNAME: Stone PAGE: 2 SESS: 4 OUTPUT: Tue Jun 26 10:09:58 2018 TABLE OF CASES Brite Strike Technologies Inc v Brite Strike Technologies SA Case C-230/15, EU:C:2016:560 .................................................................................................. 2.90, 7.35 Brogsitter v Fabrication de Montres Normandes, Case C-548/12, EU:C:2014:148 ..... 4.76, 6.59 Burgo Group v Illochroma, Case C-327/13, EU:C:2014:2158 ........................................... 25.09 C, Case C-435/06, [2007] ECR I-10141 ................................................... 20.75, 21.14, 21.32 CvM,C-376/14-PPU, EU:C:2014:2268 ................................................ 21.31–21.32, 21.107 Capelloni v Pelkmans, Case 119/84, [1985] ECR 3147 ................... 12.08, 12.17, 12.19, 12.32 Car Trim v KeySafety Systems, Case C-381/08, [2010] ECR I-1255 ...... 4.35, 4.37–4.38, 4.40 Cartel Damage Claims (CDC) Hydrogen Peroxide v Akzo Nobel, Case C-352/13, EU:C:2015:335 .......................................................... 4.103–4.104, 5.13, 5.20, 8.38, 8.48 Cartesio, Case C-210/06 [2008] ECR I-9641. .......................................................... 1.57–1.58 Cartier v Ziegler, Case C-1/13, EU:C:2014:109 ........................................................ 9.12, 9.32 Castelletti v Trumpy, Case C-159/97, [1999] ECR I-1597 ........... 8.12–8.16, 8.20–8.21, 8.24, 8.31, 8.34, 8.40 CE de Nortel Networks SA v Rogeau, Case C-649/13, EU:C:2015:384. ........ 2.53, 2.57, 24.65, 25.13–25.14, 25.16 Centros, Case C-212/97 [1999] ECR I-1459 ............................................................ 1.54, 7.80 Česká Spořitelna v Feichter, Case C-419/11, EU:C:2012:586 and EU:C:2013:165 ........... 4.11, 4.18, 4.44, 4.55, 4.60, 6.29, 6.32 Child and Family Agency v JD, Case C-428/15, EU:C:2016:458 ................ 21.76, 21.78–21.79 Chudaś v Deutsche Allgemeine, Case C-66/17, EU:C:2017:972 ......................................... 13.06 CHW v GJH, Case 25/81 [1982] ECR 1189 ................................................. 2.47, 8.76, 10.04 CILFIT v Ministry of Health Case 283/81 [1982] ECR 3415 ........................................... 1.09 Collect Inkasso v Aint, Case C-289/17, EU:C:2018:133 ......................................... 13.16–13.17 Color Drack v LEXX International, Case C-386/05 [2007] ECR I-3699 ........ 4.32, 4.36–4.37 Commission v AMI Semiconductor, Case C-294/02, [2005] ECR I-2175 ......................... 24.62 Commission v Spain, Case C-70/03, [2004] ECR I-7999 ................................................ 16.24 Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs v Sunico, Case C-49/12, EU:C:2013:545 .................................................................................................. 2.33, 2.38 Concurrence v Samsung and Amazon, Case C-618/15, EU:C:2016:843 ............................ 4.102 Coreck Maritime v Handelsveem, Case C-387/98, [2000] ECR I-9337 .......... 3.19, 8.21, 8.33, 8.46 Corman-Collins v La Maison du Whisky, Case C-9/12, EU:C:2013 .......................... 4.45, 4.52 Coty v First Note Perfumes, Case C-360/12, EU:C:2014:1318 ... 4.83, 4.96, 4.100, 4.102, 7.88 Coursier v Fortis Bank, Case C-267/97, [1999] ECR I-2543 ........................................... 11.27 ČPP v Bilas, C-111/09, [2010] ECR I-4545 ............... 6.04, 6.16, 6.18, 6.47, 6.49, 6.67, 6.70 Custom Made v Stawa, Case C-288/92, [1994] ECR I-2913 ........ 4.33, 4.57, 4.60, 8.14, 8.25 Daily Mail and General Trust, Case 81/87 [1988] ECR 5483 ........................................... 1.57 Dansommer v Götz, Case C-8/98, [2000] ECR I-393 ............................................... 7.12–7.14 Danvaern v Otterbeck, Case C-341/93, [1995] ECR I-2053 ............................................. 5.30 Data Delecta v MSL Dynamics, Case C-43/95, [1996] ECR I-4661 ............................... 10.13 De Bloos v Bouyer, Case 14/76, [1976] ECR 1497 .................................................. 4.57, 4.116 DeCavelvDeCavel(No1)[1979] ECR 1055 ............. 2.43, 2.47, 10.04, 22.12–22.13, 22.74 DeCavelvDeCavel(No2)Case 120/79, [1980] ECR 731 ... 2.43, 2.47, 10.04, 22.02, 22.12 De Wolf v Cox, Case 42/76, [1976] ECR 1759 ..................................................... 11.14, 12.08 Debaecker v Bouwman, Case 49/84, [1985] ECR 1779 ......................................... 11.68, 11.71 Denilauler v Couchet Frères, Case 125/79, [1980] ECR 1553 ........................................... 11.11 xix Peter Stone - 9781784712662 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/28/2021 04:48:53PM via free access Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Stone-Private_international_law_in_the_EU / Division: TableCases /Pg. Position: 2 / Date: 19/6 JOBNAME: Stone PAGE: 3 SESS: 3 OUTPUT: Tue Jun 26 10:09:58 2018 TABLE OF CASES Deticˇek v Sgueglia, Case C-403/09-PPU, [2009] ECR I-12193 ........................... 21.92, 21.95 Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank v Brasserie du Pecheur, Case 148/84, [1985] ECR 1981 ..... 12.08, 12.23, 12.32 Develey v OHIM, Case C-238/06-P, [2007] ECR I-9375 ................................................. 7.91 DFDS Torline v SEKO, Case C-18/02, [2004] ECR I-1417 .................................... 4.65, 4.80 DHL v Chronopost, Case C-235/09, [2011] ECR I-2801 .................................................. 7.94 Di Paolo v Office National de l’Emploi, Case 76/76, [1977] ECR 315 ............................. 20.21 Diageo Brands v Simiramida-04 EOOD, Case C-681/13, EU:C:2015:471 .......... 11.29–11.30,
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