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Lbex-Am 007527

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Lbex-Am 007527 Schedule A Cusip Par Value 31280C4X4 3,154 31280C5N5 2,083 31280C6BO 2,772 31280EJN6 10,647 31280G2C3 8,617 31280J3U6 7,946 31280PLP3 2,600 31280PSL5 34,050 31280Q4L9 1,664 31281AKE1 6,834 31281AKV3 1,419 31281BU40 5,461,177 31281BU57 4,308,044 31281BU57 4,855,396 31281BU65 5,260,496 31281BU73 6,762,838 31281BU99 9,198,303 31281 BVA5 33,208,410 31281BVB3 32,079,751 31281 BVC1 24,651,539 31281BVG2 8,486,226 31281BVHO 22,939,522 31281BVK3 22,136,819 31281BVL1 12,225,008 31281BVM9 15,618,880 31281BVN7 14,290,258 31282CDV6 2,839 31282RYG3 123,994 31282RYN8 38,453 312828033 2,630 31282XB26 67,397 31282XDK4 295,202 31282XE56 7,575 31282XQL8 420,109 31282XVL2 20 31282XYN5 476,208 31282XYN5 476,208 31282XYN5 75,710 31282Y3J6 2,916,820 31282YA25 688,894 31282YA25 712,403 31282YA25 712,403 31282YA25 712,403 31282YA25 712,403 31282YA25 712,403 31282YA66 124,242 31282YAV1 369,813 LBEX-AM 007527 31282YB40 15,865 31282YBC2 809,541 31282YBE8 857,717 31282YBE8 411,704 31282YBVO 334 31282YBW8 100,743 31282YBX6 390,490 31282YC49 310 31282YC80 408,466 31282YCD9 22,280 31282YCK3 4,263 31282YCP2 183,138 31282YCU1 291,710 31282YCV9 18,199 31282YCW7 193,941 31282YCX5 347,148 31282YDA4 362,899 31282YDE6 64,807 31282YDR7 33,562,640 31282YDR7 33,562,640 31282YDR7 33,562,640 31282YDR7 22,080,712 31282YEJ4 31 ,860,911 31282YEN5 1,992,969 31282YJ34 9,111,303 31282YJ42 40,376,966 31282YJ42 3,303,570 31282YSS9 16,996,918 31282YXC8 41,010,024 31283FAB5 330,894 31283FAB5 16,545 31283GPR2 2,010 31283GU21 5,412 31283GYX9 2,096 31283H2J3 6,795,393 31283H4Z5 829,772 31283H6C4 2,523,081 31283HF59 24,451 31283HHG3 61,021 31283HK61 267 31283HU52 194,473 31283HUA1 5,763,482 31283HUA1 5,763,482 31283HUA1 5,763,482 31283HUA1 5,763,482 31283HUA1 5,763,482 31283HUA1 5,763,482 31283HUA1 5,763,482 31283HUA1 4,478,630 31283HVL6 2,313,546 31283HWY7 1,324,938 LBEX-AM 007528 31283HX67 270,334 31283HYG4 105,397 31283JEL 1 57 31283JNN7 11,349 31283JPY1 403,706 31283JQD6 5,111 31283JT68 2,229 31283KD96 9,547 31283KE20 6,734 31283KNJ3 4,521,531 31283KUJ5 510,995 31283KULO 80,129 31283KXTO 291,302 31283KYY8 516,767 31287LVX7 275,715 31287PEX7 4,849,591 31287PEX7 2,706,686 31287PH48 127,995 31287PJA2 315,873 31287PM75 112,186 31287PNE9 316,432 31287QFM8 1,134,529 31287RMM8 814,001 31287RT82 39,210 31287S3Y1 207,472 31287S5S2 143,684 31287SQK6 87,041 31287ST80 671,845 31287T2F1 215,309 31287T3J2 39,860 31287U5Q1 127,830 31287V3L2 72,789 31287XZP4 699,664 31287YEK6 278,576 31288BV83 4,419,329 31288CUB5 7,789,847 31288CUB5 7,789,847 31288CUB5 2,492,751 31288CWF4 7,447,764 31288CWF4 7,447,764 31288CWF4 364,225 31288DJ59 394,440 31288DKG3 5,570,368 31288LRR4 2,827,705 31288LSL6 342,129 31288LSU6 301,512 31288LSZ5 639,613 31288LTK7 1,968,393 31288MCU1 161,789 3128C6L80 232,870 3128CU3D6 587,719 LBEX-AM 007529 3128CU5E2 791,282 3128CU5E2 208,899 3128CU7F7 798,112 3128CU7F7 798,112 3128CU7F7 798,112 3128CU7F7 139,989 3128CUF76 21,392 3128CUG34 146,660 3128CUH82 534,225 3128CUHQ2 1,041,303 3128CUJM9 1 ,281 ,810 3128CUKB1 190,663 3128CUNN2 9,597,488 3128CVBL7 604,993 3128CVKA1 2,761,741 3128CVLT9 2,448,110 3128CVLT9 2,438,029 3128CVPVO 937,924 3128CVPVO 937,924 3128CVPVO 937,924 3128CVPVO 937,924 3128CVPVO 937,924 3128CVPVO 70,956 3128CVSX3 2,025,437 3128CVSX3 2,025,437 3128CVSX3 323,672 3128CVXJ8 2,354,019 3128CVXJ8 2,354,019 3128CVXJ8 2,354,019 3128CVXJ8 2,354,019 3128CVXJ8 2,354,019 3128CVXJ8 2,354,019 3128CVXJ8 2,354,019 3128CVXJ8 1,414,654 3128DYDC8 9,411 3128DYFF9 24,807 3128DYLPO 7,814 3128E2B96 24,449 3128E3ABO 189,512 3128E3ZU1 97,096 3128E4JE3 1,061,232 3128E4M41 1,960,459 3128E4TW2 1,150,435 3128E4WH1 5,194,274 3128E4WJ7 49,494,024 3128E4WJ7 11,720,219 3128E4YG1 2,018,812 3128E4YH9 1,409,316 3128E4YJ5 2,997,278 3128E4YK2 1,408,759 3128F3WF6 4,823 LBEX-AM 007530 3128F5MU9 111,228 3128FSPF9 1,186 3128G45CO 1,036 3128G4BQ2 13,895 3128G4GT1 107,613 3128G9FE4 11,816 3128GCUK6 30,306 3128GCY71 311 ,323 3128GFAU9 9,107 3128GG2C6 4,651 3128GGDM2 33,304 3128GGE90 6,898 3128GGEF6 27,340 3128GGEP4 10,938 3128GHCRO 13,708 3128GHEV9 1,508 3128GJ4J3 2,064 3128GJRE9 4,487 3128GJXV4 5,419 3128GKD92 80,161 3128GLHH8 158,298 3128GMLF5 69,446 3128GMY95 102,048 3128GQL74 148,694 3128GRM22 3,991 3128GRRV3 176,928 3128GRV30 224,065 3128GSNU7 105,911 3128GUKF8 6,951 3128GUL67 121,387 3128GXXY7 3,404 3128H26P3 4,142 3128H4TK5 75,453 3128H5A30 60,933 3128H7N81 1,296,766 3128HEAD9 1,593,000 3128HUA50 5,742,289 3128HUEF4 669,160 3128HUJB8 44,733,502 3128HUJB8 44,733,502 3128HUJB8 44,733,502 3128HUJB8 44,733,502 3128HUJB8 44,733,502 3128HUJB8 5,636,421 3128HUZU8 25,055,387 3128HUZV6 19,945,287 3128HUZW4 35,595,512 3128HUZX2 48,670,379 3128HUZX2 36,978,747 3128HUZYO 19,540,698 3128HUZZ7 14,445,385 LBEX-AM 007531 3128HVF20 18,652,919 3128HVFD6 3,624,765 3128HWC62 2,643,729 3128HWJC2 41,010,024 3128HWJC2 10,252,506 3128HWNR4 46,006,632 3128HWNR4 4,600,663 3128HWPJO 28,514,879 3128JPN30 18,285,470 3128JRSHO 15,845,851 3128K1HT1 646,070 3128K3AP2 9,168,744 3128K3MZ7 132,960 3128K45E1 309,111 3128K6NE6 2,908,363 3128K6WD8 69,624 3128K6WJ5 25,611 3128K7LJ5 130,392 3128K8UC8 19,097 3128KDLE3 3,917,487 3128KDWC5 1,357,723 3128KG4K1 2,354 3128KGVR6 40,066 3128KHN77 8,613,599 3128KLPSO 987,250 3128KMCX1 911,229 3128KR3N2 938,790 3128KRY40 2,478,667 3128KTM31 911 ,985 3128KVJD8 462,172 3128KVMN2 875,482 3128KWPR8 1,173,956 3128KXU25 1,348,734 3128KXUW9 2,886,055 3128KXXE6 1,204,574 3128KYJM2 485,801 3128L05J7 941,211 3128LOQ88 2,226,368 3128LORC8 473,009 3128LOXT4 998,034 3128L12W9 1,293,575 3128L14V9 1,468,808 3128L14W7 768,994 3128L1BZ2 337,231 3128L1R77 468,763 3128L 1XX3 1,387,492 3128L3PX8 180,163 3128L3S72 33,066 3128L3UU8 2,499,117 3128L4XD1 2,134,377 3128L6LN7 1,088,652 LBEX-AM 007532 3128L6QY8 2,585,314 3128L6TG4 1 ,726,198 3128L6XG9 1,889,021 3128L6YP8 1,203,883 3128L7JQ1 944,109 3128L7S73 3,042,260 3128L7SE8 2,249,804 3128L7US4 2,694,512 3128L7UT2 4,411,278 3128L7UU9 2,388,310 3128L7VBO 256,351 3128L8QY4 1,351,781 3128L8YM1 3,925,387 3128L9DS9 3,967,893 3128L9SU8 671,776 3128LA4J6 398,551 3128LA5J5 4,605,066 3128LA5K2 1,739,248 3128LA5LO 4,293,058 3128LA5M8 2,576,655 3128LA6D7 2,108,224 3128LA6E5 3,203,289 3128LA6F2 2,480,785 3128LA6U9 14,552,296 3128LAGBO 2,849 3128LAME7 2,253,847 3128LATS9 1,563,509 3128LATWO 2,682,250 3128LATX8 1,850,440 3128LAWD8 5,746,951 3128LBKY3 1,585,949 3128LBXH6 3,253,404 3128LBXK9 3,117,798 3128LCGR1 6,667,508 3128LCQ66 7,608,344 3128LCRJ7 2,678,180 3128LCW44 3,784,617 3128LCXH4 216,565 3128LCYK6 3,874,227 3128LCZ66 36,781,515 3128LD3C6 14,037,890 3128LD4Q4 2,205,249 3128LDAKO 3,342,162 3128LDUC6 22,316,271 3128LECC4 798,421 3128LU2M7 2,540,429 3128LUSC1 27,445,505 3128LXAD2 624,357 3128LXGL8 3,634,997 3128LXJR2 11,722,146 3128LXLK4 39,003,178 LBEX-AM 007533 3128LXLK4 39,003,178 3128LXLK4 17,434,421 3128LXNQ9 652,447 3128LXQN3 7,919,053 3128M1ET2 308,512 3128M1GTO 4,049 3128M1J67 7,678,827 3128M1MP1 28,741 3128M1R50 3,675,243 3128M1T41 37,368,864 3128M1T41 26,905,582 3128M46E8 10,903,049 3128M4AH6 2,460,601 3128M4BAO 2,593,267 3128M4C35 527,762 3128M4C43 925,174 3128M4F32 12,246 3128M4J38 190,700 3128M4LE1 8,689,830 3128M4XA6 918,440 3128M54E7 4,216,107 3128M56E5 14,199,393 3128M5AY6 100,000 3128M5BQ2 404,175 3128M5CDO 54,043 3128M5GU8 33,521,721 3128M5HJ2 343,773 3128M5JU5 5,244,501 3128M5KM1 16,522,970 3128M5R77 14,984 3128M5SL5 3,988,587 3128M6AQ1 496,893 3128M6AVO 572,433 3128M6D96 13,591,994 3128M6FN3 10,652,912 3128M6JU3 5,468,158 3128M6JW9 4,925,781 3128M6K23 32,303,346 3128M6K64 8,285,435 3128M6KW7 43,853,940 3128M6KY3 49,226,762 3128M6KY3 23,579,701 3128M6LZ9 2,315,567 3128M6MC9 20,465,001 3128M6RL4 164,450 3128MBBY2 6,124,841 3128MBF93 42,092 3128MBFD4 272,316 3128MBHEO 114,494 3128MBJ99 7,757 3128MBQ59 38,600 LBEX-AM 007534 3128MBQB6 837,019 3128MBSX6 869,443 3128MBV53 739,472 3128MBV61 1,289,480 3128MBX51 3,965,265 3128MBX69 712,869 3128MBX77 13,976 3128MBYT8 2,949,060 3128MBYU5 45,336 3128MBZD2 21,213 3128MJAJ9 854 3128MJAR1 32,701 3128MJCK4 1,092,578 3128MJCR9 553,404 3128MJDS6 246,160 3128MJDX5 135,901 3128MJE55 2,510,249 3128MJGA2 170,557 3128MJHY9 569,318 3128MJJW1 1,322,958 3128MMAZ6 166,276 3128MME33 65,539 3128MME82 3,182,595 3128MME90 64,841 3128MMED1 360,095 3128MMFF5 164,756 3128MMFN8 1,101,738 3128MMGX5 197,346 3128MMHA4 186,709 3128MMJN4 18,058 3128MMJU8 3,238,446 3128MMJX2 20,284,035 3128MS3DO 1,012,861 3128MSB82 2,505,919 3128MSC40 5,461,931 3128MSE97 912,876 3128MSEB2 603,407 3128MSMF4 90,250 3128MSMG2 415,018 3128MSRJ1 1,754,297 3128MTAS7 3,004,488 3128MTAU2 3,421,291 3128MTEKO 1,609,791 3128MTH50 1,392,857 3128MTK56 45,162,748 3128MTK56 22,229,673 3128MTKX5 1,366,929 3128MTLCO 4,747,938 3128MTM21 4,323,020 3128MTN46 37,099,948 3128MTN61 23,894,935 LBEX-AM 007535 3128MTVR6 145,594 3128MTVU9 1,240,062 3128MUA96 44,895,604 3128MUA96 18,574,272 3128MUAF2 1,056,262 3128MUDL6 525,680 3128MVQX4 933,066 3128MVTP8 10,351,759 3128MVTQ6 11,480,537 3128MVTR4 6,418,469 3128MVTS2 947,749 3128MXV55 717,222 3128N1MF2 967,069 3128NC5Y6 9,844,333 3128NCMT8 4,696,227 3128NH5J8 7,832,654 3128NJB40 5,905,550 3128P7AFO 65,866 3128P7CM3 371,371 3128P7E58 375,470 3128P7EF6 79,180 3128P7EH2 28,609 3128P7G64 794,689 3128P7GD9 58,329 3128P7GM9 497,872 3128P7J38 3,017,981 3128P7J53 6,439,647 3128P7J79 49,501,864 3128P7J79 3,137,671 3128P7JU8 11 ,996,818 3128P7JW4 553,511 3128P7K44 11,325,367 3128P7K51 5,000,000 3128P7K93 1,244,163 3128P7KH5 1,503,957 3128P7KL6 13,895,815 3128P7KU6 6,950,909 3128P7KY8 9,577,888 3128PEAL2 12,867 3128PF2P9 5,688 3128PF3L7 469,843 3128PFPC3 700,048 3128PG4B6 300,000 3128PG4L4 97,000 3128PG4NO 1 ,211 ,920 3128PGC92 989,938 3128PHAP6 308,345 3128PHGN5
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