Operation Condor the U.S

Bachelor thesis

Operation condor The U.S. involvement - A rational strategy or a political powerplay?

Writer: Amanda Hedman Supervisor: Martin Nilsson Examinator: Emil Uddhammar Date: Fall 2018 Political Science: 2SK30E

Abstract

During 1975-1989 a transnational state-terror operation was carried out by several South American states called Operation Condor. Declassified documents show that the U.S. government assisted the operation with communication and intelligence techniques. This case-study is with a theory consuming method aiming to analyze the internal decision process within the U.S. government to assist Condor. The analysis is based on two theoretical frameworks by Allison Graham, the “Rational Actor” and “Governmental Politics”. By studying the cold war doctrine, the objectives of the U.S. and the political actors behind the assessment the aim is to understand the structures that shaped the final decision. The conclusion shows that the Cold War, political crises and power relations between politicians played a major role in the internal decision process.

Key words: Operation Condor, National Security, Latin America, USA, Foreign Policy

Table of Content

1 Introduction ...... 4 1.1 Scientific problem and relevance ...... 5 1.2 Purpose and question formulation ...... 6 1.3 Disposition ...... 6

2 Research design and method: ...... 7 2.1 Qualitative single case study ...... 7 2.2 Theory consuming research design: ...... 7 2.3 Demarcation ...... 8 2.4 Source credibility and gathering ...... 8

3 Previous research and theoretical framework ...... 9 3.1 Previous research ...... 9 3.2 Theoretical framework ...... 10 3.3 Model I: Rational Actor ...... 11 3.3.1 Analytical tool for Model I: ...... 11 3.3.2 Limitations within Model I: ...... 12 3.4 Model III: Governmental politics ...... 12 3.4.1 Analytical tool for Model III: ...... 13 3.4.2 Limitations within Model III ...... 14

4 Historical background ...... 15 4.1 The cold war and counterinsurgencies ...... 15 4.2 U.S. National security doctrine and its implementation ...... 16 4.3 The structure of Condor and the U.S. Involvement ...... 17

5 Analysis ...... 18 5.1 The US decisions through a rational actor perspective ...... 18 5.1.2 Organizing concepts ...... 18 5.1.3 Components used for action ...... 20 5.2 The US decision through a governmental politics perspective ...... 24 5.2.1 Organizing concepts ...... 24 5.2.2 Each players components used for action: ...... 24

6 Conclusion ...... 33

Bibliography ...... 35

1 Introduction

“ The focus on war by stealth, against civilian population, gave rise to strategies of state terror that led to the brutalization, torture and murder of tens of thousands of people.” (McSherry, 2005, p. 37)

In the midst of the cold war, in November 1975 a summit was held in Chile with military representatives from Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay and Chile. The meeting was initiated by the director of the Chilean “Secret Police” DINA (Dirección de Inteligiencia Nacional) Manuel Contreras. The purpose of this summit was to officially establish the transnational intelligence cooperation “Operation Condor”, between the South American countries. The meeting consisted in promising to cooperate and to more efficiently carry out the missions (Zancheta, 2016, pp. 1088-1089). Its main mission and purpose was to brutally repress political opponents and to halt the communist and socialist political movements rising in the continent. This was operated by subjecting the political opponents to forced disappearances, torture and killings. The main victims were people with different political standpoints e.g. leftists, teachers, union members and students. The operation consists of thousands of violations against the humanitarian laws, including the protection of refugees and asylum seekers (Lessa, 2015, pp. 497-498).

In the beginning of the 21st century several declassified documents from the U.S. government were revealed and testimonies pointed that the operation was supported by the Central Intelligence Agency, CIA that works under the orders of United States of America (U.S.). Military officers operating in Condor state that meetings were held in the US facility of the Panama Canal Zone. In which, with the help of the US, exchanged interrogation techniques and communication strategies. In the context of the Cold War it is known that Washington, FBI, and the CIA adopted special national security doctrines towards the war against communism. Some of these doctrines included counterinsurgency and covert war. The question in this research is not why or how the US got involved but to understand the process and the political powerplay behind foreign policy decisions.

1.1 Scientific problem and relevance

The role of the South American regimes during the cold war and in Operation Condor has been analyzed and well presented in the academic scholars, however the behavior of the external actors and influencers such as the U.S. is less investigated. When the Operation Condor was officially developed, the U.S. had already made several foreign policy decisions regarding actions in Latin America. The Panama canal zone was already established and running, the CIA had already been involved in covert operations to take down governments etc. This thesis will focus on the U.S. decision to assist the condor network with intelligence, communication and military techniques. It is clear that the U.S. acted in ways that were demanded during the Cold War, but the explanation of the thoughts behind the actions in this case still remain hidden. Why would the US get involved in the operation? What other options did they have?

Within the field of foreign policy, there is an importance in finding answers to why specific international situations arose, but the answer is never simple. A government will not always act rationally, a leader will not always calculate the right outcome. Players within the decision-making process that determine the foreign policy behavior of a state will have preferences based on multiple conditions. The preferences and objectives might be influenced by historical, political and personal circumstances. All of this adds a complexity in understanding the why in a foreign policy decision. The challenge that arises and what makes the research topic interesting is that the decision making processes within a governing body might be affected by several unpredicted happenings. Every research case of “decision making” will be depending on time, presidency, international political situations etc. This makes the research within this field in need of constant re-analyzing because every case is unique.

1.2 Purpose and question formulation

During the years of 1975-1989 a transnational operation was carried out between the South American states to persecute political opponents. Through military training in the Panama Canal Zone and communication techniques provided from the U.S. government the operation could unhindered and efficiently carry out its missions. The main purpose with this thesis is through an explanatory study analyze how different internal mechanisms can affect a state’s decision within international politics. Further it means to show the complexity of policies in foreign affairs and to deepen the understanding of the U.S. internal decision process.

The questions to be answered in this research are: (i) What type of security threats and problems where perceived by the USA during that time? (ii) How can the choice to get involved in Operation Condor be understood, using the rational actor model? (iii) How can the internal power struggle between decisionmakers in this case be understood, using the governmental politics model? (iv) Was the decision a result of rational choice or a result of political powerplay?

1.3 Disposition

This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter one contains the introduction, the purpose and the aim of the research. The second chapter presents the chosen method and research design. Later, the third chapter presents previous research, the theory applied and the analytical tools used and the fourth chapter introduces the historical background of the particular case. Chapter five contains the analysis of the case using Model I and Model III. The sixth and final chapter contains a conclusion of the findings that are used to answer the research questions.

2 Research design and method:

2.1 Qualitative single case study I have with careful consideration chosen the method that will give me the most detailed and valid answers to my research questions. A qualitative single-case research method has been applied. A single-case study entails studying and analyzing one single case to get a profound understanding of it. The single-case applied in this thesis is the decision making process within the United States of America to support and get involved in Operation Condor. Within political science many find that some variables are hard to measure, e.g. democracy, group dynamics etc. Since the decision making within a country is known to be affected by many unmeasurable variables I found the option to do a quantitative study less suitable (Bennet & George, 2005, pp. 77-88).

The limitations in using a qualitative single-case study is that the chosen case can be biased, the researchers foreknowledge might have a role in deciding the case. The qualitative case study cannot identify as easy as a quantitative study to what extent a variable affected the outcome. It leaves the measure of probable outcomes to the researcher itself (Lowndes, et al., 2010, pp. 100-101). This method makes the study less dimensional since it only studies one case (Bennet & George, 2005, pp. 94-95). However the research design and the theories chosen has given this research more observations and dimension. These limitations will be in mind when carrying out the research.

2.2 Theory consuming research design:

The objective in this research is to explain a certain action, giving the essay an explanatory approach. The descriptive study approach would be useful if the objective of this thesis was to describe the happenings in Operation Condor, such as when the US got involved and how. My purpose is to explain the causal mechanisms within a single event making the explanatory approach the most suitable one (Esaiasson, et al., 2017, p. 37). To be able to analyze and explain the chosen case and to link it to an existing political science theory I have chosen the theory consuming design. This research design implies to use existing theories and apply them to a particular case, with this method the theories work as tools to understand the case and not necessarily testing or developing the existing theory (Lowndes, et al., 2010, p. 226).

2.3 Demarcation

To limit the search for information and to achieve a viable research, I chose to focus on the internal decision process of the U.S. and not on Operation Condor itself. This limitation is important to maintain context, since Operation Condor and the Cold War are complex with many actors and perspectives. How the U.S. was involved is mentioned to understand the actions taken, but this thesis does not have a main focus in dismantling the linkage between Condor and the U.S. To find reliable sources and to have consistency in the thesis I have set the timeframe from 1960-2018. The motive for this restricted timeframe is that factors before the Operation Condor affect the objectives and result of the decision. Many documents of the cold war and insurgencies where also revealed at the end of the 20th century.

2.4 Source credibility and gathering

A researcher can seldomly guarantee that every source and every aspect of the case has been discovered. However I have with careful consideration taken it into account when searching for sources, most importantly by questioning what gaps might be presented in the collected information. The material used for this research are printed and online sources such as: scientific researches, articles and relevant declassified documents related to the particular case. The declassified documents used and referred to in this research are documents presented by the research institute the National Security Archive. The institute wants by using FOIA, Freedom of Information Act to secure the declassification of documents and for them to be made public and accessible to the civil society. Many of the Condor Documents presented in NSA were used as evidence in the Condor trials in Argentina 2013. When compiling and searching for research material I have collected documents that are relevant and as unbiased as possible. A regular mistake made by political scientists, according to Metodpraktikan, is the failure in distinction between the story being told and the actual happening (Esaiasson, et al., 2017, pp. 289-290). The case I have chosen and the documents found are based on evidence by original documents but also testimonies. To keep the material valid and relevant I was constantly in need of analyzing who is telling the story and to separate the narrator from the actual content.

3 Previous research and theoretical framework

3.1 Previous research

The cold war and the counterinsurgency doctrines by the United States of America and the Soviet Union has been researched in several levels and connected to many cases of conflicts around the world. The cold war and its doctrines are interesting since the warfare used was untraditional, something that today might seem regular. Covert wars and counterinsurgencies was played out for the first time in that extent, which led to numerous research and analysis in the matter. I find most of the research available to be focused on eastern Europe and South East Asia (Hanhimäki & Westad, 2003, p. 450).

The previous research done on Operation Condor is scarce. Previous literature show a body of work in areas related to Condor e.g. on the military regimes in South America. Peter Kornbluh has researched the Pinochet regime and throughout his work analyzed the U.S. involvement and the cold war doctrine (Kornbluh, 2013). J, Patrice McSherry has studied Operation Condor and the foreign policy of the U.S. towards Latin America. Her studies are the most elaborated ones within the academic scholar on this area and she focuses on Operation Condor as a parastatal structure (McSherry, 2005, p. 208). Both researchers demonstrate the cold war and covert actions, but lack the perspective of the U.S. decision process. This research gap establishes that a study with this approach is needed.

The theoretical framework applied in this research is based on two classic theory-consuming models from Graham Allison and Philip Zelikows “The Cuban Missile crisis”. The models are well presented in numerous scholars that aim to comprehend decision processes (Esaiasson, et al., 2017, p. 42). This implies that the interest within political scientist to understand political decisions is highly requested. These models were developed when studying the U.S. government, which makes it a suitable framework for this particular case. Nevertheless it is important to note that this research will measure and analyze a different case and empirical material.

3.2 Theoretical framework

The authors, Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow study the internal decision process during one of the most significant political happenings during the Cold War, the missile crisis in Cuba 1962. The study tries to answer what processes of decisions occurred and how the two states, U.S. and Soviet Union acted to avoid a nuclear war (Esaiasson, et al., 2017, p. 42). They elaborated three different models to be used when analyzing political decisions within foreign policy. These models focus on different angles but also in different levels, depending on the information revealed and on the depth of the research. The three models are developed to understand governance and bureaucracy and how it can affect the chosen action. The purpose of the models is to display new perspectives and explanations to political decisions and happenings (Bendor & Hammond, 1992, p. 301). Model I, Rational actor consists of assuming that a unified actor is rational and will calculate costs and benefits to every possible action to achieve its objectives (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, pp. 17-18). Model II, Organizational behavior is to analyze the institutions within a government. According to Allison the decisions made within organizations are not always rational and instead “Standard operating procedures” that develops from outputs and inputs (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 147). Model III Governmental politics allows you to analyze the decisions made of several political actors. The decision process includes inputs from numerous political players that together will determine the outcome (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 258).

It is possible to combine all the models depending on the depth of the research and timeframe. Applying all three models in a research is the most extensive method but also very time consuming. In this research I have focused on Model I, Rational Actor and Model III Governmental politics. The rational actor model is useful to understand how the main actor, from a notional state to personified state level tries to make decisions based on the best calculated outcome (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 21). The governmental politics theory is important to apply because within a (democratic) government the president is the final decisionmaker and the front figure but seldom the only actor involved in the process. It is important to understand that every foreign policy decision is not as abstract as presented in the rational actor. I find it therefore necessary to take into account the political strategy and game behind every decision. Making these two models relevant in this research and in this particular case.

3.3 Model I: Rational Actor

The central purpose of the rational actor model is to understand why and how a specific actor acted in a certain way. This model assumes that the actor is rational and will make decisions that will generate the most value in relation to cost to pursue its goals and objectives. When the researcher analyzes the decision making process it will find a range of potential actions that are rationally calculated. Some of which will generate more value than cost and vice versa. It is important to point out that not acting is also an option. This model provides the tools to understand political decisions and to predict future ones (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, pp. 21-22). Allison states that the rational actor model can be used in different depths depending on the context and the amount of information gathered. A notional state can be the actor with least context that only is studied as an unspecific state, a generic state is when the state actor is defined as a regime type e.g. a democracy. The more layers applied to the context the more specific the actor becomes, for example an Identified state signifies that the actor is specified with information regarding previous acts, political history and time and place. The most extensive research within this model would be a personified state which implicates that the personal values of the actor is presented, perhaps the presidents administration (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 21).

3.3.1 Analytical tool for Model I:

According to ”the dominant inference pattern” in this model, the purpose is to understand the pattern of the decision process and to recognize the preferences of the actor. The action made is always assumed to be rational and the most beneficial one (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, pp. 24-25). Allison suggests different steps to be used to operationalize the theory. I have chosen to focus on the following steps to carry out the analysis: 1. Organizing concepts: a. Unified actor: Define the actor within this research using the different levels stated above. The actor is conceived as rational and with common objectives, preferences and choices. This actor will be assumed to have all the information provided to select the options that will maximize the outcome and be as beneficial as possible. b. The problem: A strategic problem/situation that the actor encounters. What has occurred that forces the actor to make a decision. The problem might be a physical threat to the nation, to the international arena etc.

2. Components used for action: In this step the organizing concepts will be applied and analyzed through four components: a) objectives, present all the goals that the actor has. b) options, in relation to the objectives during the decision making process the actor will be presented several options to achieve its goals. c) costs and benefits, every option will generate a benefit and a consequence. All of these are assumed to be presented with every option. d) final choice, the actor will after careful consideration and calculation choose the most beneficial option (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, pp. 24-25).

3.3.2 Limitations within Model I: Allison and Zelikow point out that when analyzing an actors different decisions there might arise complications in identifying objectives and options. Specially in the depth of the research, if many details are studied it can create problems defining what problem or factor is the most important. It can also be misleading to get in the actors position since the reality of problems and the interpretation may vary depending on whom is being analyzed and who is the one analyzing. The authors therefore stress the importance within this model for the analyst to use the evidence found when placing him/herself in the position of the actor. This will increase validity and the understanding in the cost/benefit calculation (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, pp. 23-25).

3.4 Model III: Governmental politics

The third model within the decision making process is considered to be a result of a multiplicity of actors. It is described by Allison and Zelikow as a game of politics. Governmental decisions are often influenced by several competitive leaders from a variety of governmental institutions (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 255). These actors attain a certain influence within decisions and the chosen option is a result of compromises between the actors, rather than a unitary rational action. The other two models lack the awareness of the complex hierarch game between leaders with different objectives and perceptions. Allison and Zelikow explain the governmental politics as a game with several players with numeral goals, national, personal and organizational. When the civil society or the international arena learns or reads about a foreign policy decision or action the bargaining and compromising behind the actual result is often left out (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 257). For those that are not familiar with politics and the processes it contains it is often understood that a government makes

decisions unitarily or that the only one deciding is the elected representative. It is with great importance to study and present who the players are and how the game is played out (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, pp. 256-257).

3.4.1 Analytical tool for Model III:

Like Model I, Graham and Zelikow present several steps needed to operationalize the theory. The action chosen in this model is explained as a result of several actors with different perceptions and objectives bargaining, debating and compromising to a decision. The purpose is therefore to display the game and how the individual actors have acted (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 394). To carry out the analysis I have chosen to focus on the following steps:

Organizing concepts: Who plays – Within the game of national security several actors are seen as players. The model demonstrates different types of players in different levels, depending on the position they occupy. The highest ranked players are the chiefs, such as the president, secretary of state, treasury, chief of the CIA etc. Ad hoc players are the ones in the broader governmental game that don´t necessarily have foreign policy and national security as their main operation e.g. a ministry. Other players with less influence are lobbyists, media and different representatives from civil society. It is important to find the most relevant players that are assumed to have the most influence in the analyzed decision process (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 298).

With each elected player, display and analyze the following components: a) What factors shape the players perceptions – What shapes our perception are stemming from several factors. The most important one within this model is the role of the player. What position within the decision making process the player has will shape the preferences it holds. A certain authoritarian position will impose preferences on the actor, for example the Secretary of Defense will have preferences focused on the military force and what might affect his/her operations. The actors perception is also influenced by personal, organizational and domestic interests and experience. All the preferences and the perception of national interest overlap and result in how the actor stands on a certain issue (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 298). The preferences will also shape the face of the issue depending on the actor. For instance the chief of the CIA and the treasury might have voted for the same action but on

the basis of different preferences, one focusing on the intelligence perspective and the other on the benefit of the state’s economy (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 309). b) What determines each players impact on results? – Allison and Graham present three features that influence the power one actor holds; bargaining advantages, bargaining skills and the perception of the first two that the other players have. Is the position the actor holds producing a certain authority? Is the actor controlling certain sources? Is the actor controlling the information that is hand down to the other players? All of these factors are seen as improving the actors bargaining skills and advantages. But none of these factors are valid if the other players don’t comprehend and perceive that actor as one with power. This component is used as the most vital one in the analysis to understand which player has the best advantages to shape the decision (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 300).

The political game: To define the game itself is one of the most important organizing concepts of the theory. In this section the researcher shall analyze how the political game is assumed to be played out by comparing the results of each players preferences and components stated above.

3.4.2 Limitations within Model III

The most significant limitation in this model is finding the correct information. The evidence needed in this model ranges from personal experience of the actors to the role the actor has within the government. The analyst might find it difficult in finding personal information that has influenced the preference of an individual and there is a lack of information about e.g. group dynamics in the official documents. It is therefore key to use a wide range of evidence, from official documents, media reports, and interviews to get the extensive sample of information needed. Graham and Zelikow claim that documentaries and interviews will sketch the outlines of the research while the rest of the sources and imagination must supply the colors. Another difficulty within this model is the “Agency problem”. Having several players is beneficial to get a well thought result where all perspectives have been analyzed. The disadvantage is that it is hard to reach a rational choice since every actor has different preferences and wants to have their objectives achieved. All these factors are important to have in mind when analyzing and gathering information (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 313).

4 Historical background

To understand the connection between the U.S. and Operation Condor I stress the importance in understanding the U.S.-Latin America relations during the 20th century. The U.S. has a long economic, geographical and cultural relation to the Latin American continent. The relations include trading of raw materials and U.S. commercial export (Paredes, 2004).

As an aftermath of colonialism, many Latin American states experienced social injustice and oligarchy. However during the 20th century due to industrialization, literacy, urbanization and globalization citizens became more active throughout the continent. Resulting in citizens gaining knowledge in expressing themselves, demanding rights and their own role within a state. The economic development in the continent during the 60-70s was mainly beneficial for oligarchs, close elites and the military forces that together with foreign investment managed to increase their own wealth and control the economy (Hartlyn & Valenzuela, 1994, pp. 101- 102). This left little or no chance for the working class to develop or gain influence in the nations democratic and economic development. All of these circumstances led to growing social movements that shared the common objectives to reduce the injustices in the society (Hartlyn & Valenzuela, 1994, pp. 102-103).

4.1 The cold war and counterinsurgencies

After the end of World War II, the tensions between the Soviet Union and the U.S. increased. The two superpowers needed to compromise how the world peace would be organized, however, with two different political ideologies and preferences of economy and power they opposed each other in every phase. The Cold War, from 1947-1991 was a strife between the East and West concerning geopolitical issues and power. The main threat during the cold war was the political ideologies, the U.S. started the fight against communism and the Soviet Union against liberal economy and western hegemony (Hanhimäki & Westad, 2003, p. 445). These two superpowers where the only ones that had the ability to influence and to change the post-war period. The war itself did not only go by the traditional term of war, it also operated in covert wars and espionage (Hanhimäki & Westad, 2003, pp. 445-446). Covert wars/Counterinsurgency in this context is defined as military activities and warfare that does not fully define or reveal who the perpetrator is (McSherry, 2005, p. 25). Comparing to the literal use of force or military actions, covert operations are less alerting and more discreet. Within foreign policy it is perceived as only two options of action are available,

physical warfare or diplomacy. Covert actions create another option possible for implementing foreign policy objectives (Johnson, 1989, p. 1982). McSherry defines counterinsurgency in her book Predatory States as a form of creating a state that controls and create fear within society. Counterinsurgencies are operated through working closely with paramilitary groups and organizing them to gather information. It also implies monitoring society, spreading fear and implementing psychological warfare (McSherry, 2005, pp. 31-32).

Two of the main agencies that operated counterinsurgency was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the U.S. and the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) in the Soviet Union. After the cold war many documents were declassified that evidently relate both CIA and KGB to several cases of operations in South East Asia, Latin America and the Middle East (Hanhimäki & Westad, 2003, p. 445). When the tensions between Soviet and the U.S. increased during the cold war, the importance for the U.S. to control Latin America and its politics increased as well (Paredes, 2004, pp. 123-124).

In the 60´s the CIA and U.S. armed forces implemented strategies to fight guerillas and revolutionaries across borders by creating counterguerillas. This was operated in numerous countries in Latin America, for example in El Salvador and Guatemala. These operations entailed mobilizing civilians to create counterguerrilla groups to overthrow the governments in power. Governments in which had ideologies related to communism or socialism (McSherry, 2005, p. 32). Documents revealed from 1968 from the U.S. army contained evidence that they shared information and tactics to the guerilla groups instructing them in using psychological warfare against their own people (McSherry, 2005, pp. 32-33). Other operations made during the same period of time using similar methods was the failed mission in Cuba (1961) and the successful operation towards the socialist elected president Salvador Allende in Chile (1973) (Hanhimäki & Westad, 2003, p. 380). By supporting the control of paramilitary groups, militarizing civil society, supporting psychological warfare and spreading fear, the U.S. was by the definition of McSherry using counterinsurgency as a tactic.

4.2 U.S. National security doctrine and its implementation

In the post-war period the U.S. was facing several situations that could threaten their national security. Resulting in the implementation of the National Security Doctrine. A doctrine is the strategy of a nation that designs what methods to be taken when facing threats to the interests

of the nation. This strategy consists of how to use military forces, intelligence and internal security. Throughout the Cold War the interests of the U.S. were characterized by an anti- communism campaign together with the fear of unstable capitalism and revolutionary groups. This doctrine was also influenced by the 1947 law on national security which reorganized the military forces in the U.S. but also instituted the Central Intelligence Agency (Buitrago, 2003, p. 74). The security doctrine also resulted in the Latin American Special Action Force. The purpose was to establish training centers for the military force. The first one of eight centers was the Mobile Training Centre in the Panama Canal Zone. One of the many purposes of this center was to train Latin American militaries in counterinsurgency and intelligence together with the assistance of the CIA (Birtle, 2006, p. 298). These training centers provided possibility for the CIA to share torture techniques with e.g. psychological methods and electroshocks (McSherry, 2005, p. 35).

4.3 The structure of Condor and the U.S. Involvement

The Operation Condor was, as mentioned earlier a state sponsored terrorist network between South American states to oppress, torture and assassinate political opponents. The network worked in three different operational levels. The first level entailed sharing information about suspected political opponents to other Condor states. This works as a surveillance and alerting system to track suspected individuals that enter and leave the countries. The second level and the most atrocious one was to operate together towards subjecting the perceived opponents to kidnapping, torture and forced disappearances. In the last level of operation the Condor system developed to work outside of the continent. The goal was to target political opponents and political exiles in the U.S. and several countries in Europe (Zancheta, 2016, pp. 1090- 1091). In 2001 a document was declassified from 1978 revealing the involvement of the U.S. in Operation Condor. The document consisted of a cable sent from the U.S. ambassador in Paraguay Robert White to the secretary of state Cyrus Vance. The cable contained information that the condor operation was communicating through codes and installations based in the U.S. facility of the Panama Canal Zone. White highlights that the facility is used to coordinate intelligence techniques towards the states in South America (White, 2001).

5 Analysis

5.1 The US decisions through a rational actor perspective

The following perspective will be analyzed using the operationalized steps provided in point 3.3.1:

1. Organizing concepts: 2. Components used for action: - Unified actor - Objectives - The problem - Options - Costs and benefits - The rational choice

5.1.2 Organizing concepts The actor in this analysis is an identified state. The U.S. government is unified with common preferences and objectives that will shape the preferences of the decision process. The U.S. decided during the Cold War to assist the Operation Condor with intelligence, military and communication techniques. Assuming that the actor only makes rational options we can establish that this particular decision was the most beneficial and rational one presented. What drove the U.S. to this decision and that was the perceived problem?

The problem: Given the background information in previous chapter we can with some confident define several perspectives of the problem. The political environment in Latin America was changing, after years of few elites controlling the economy, social movements and collective political action started to flourish in the continent. Leaders with socialist and communist influenced ideologies started to gain trust and power by the people. What could this mean for the U.S. government?

Political ideologies One of the most vital perceived threats during the Cold War was the political ideologies. In relation to the U.S. security doctrine implemented throughout that period we can establish that the fight against communism was one of the main influences in the foreign policy decisions (Buitrago, 2003, p. 74). Through this perspective, the elected Salvador Allende in Chile most

certainly alarmed the U.S. government that the Soviet influenced ideologies might continue to spread throughout the continent. Together with the failed attempts to intervene in Cuba the U.S. undoubtedly feared for the rest of the Latin American continent to become the next Soviet pit-stop. The continuous spread of communist ideologies would leave the U.S. alone in a world order where their nations ideology and capitalist system would be eradicated, threatening the complete existence of their nation.

Economy This leads us to the economic perspective. Another Soviet influenced state in Latin America would be problematic for the U.S. government regarding their financial security (Cox, 1990, p. 30). Firstly it would mean that the U.S. after decades of economic, cultural and social relations with the continent was now losing the control of it. The trade of raw materials and the U.S. commercial export to Latin America would change if they converted to a continent with less liberal capitalist systems. The U.S. government was exposed to several expropriations by the southern countries, 22 cases were documented during 1968-1976 that show U.S. companies being expropriated in the southern region. According to the historian Hal Brands, these expropriations created great tension between the U.S.-Latin America relations. Loosing economic influence means also the loss of power and interests in the region (Brands, 2007, p. 217).

Geographical location Latin America is beneficial as an ally through many aspects, most importantly its geographical location. The geographical perspective is vital to understanding the physical threat it might imply to the U.S. national security. During the cold war the geography played a vital role, the two superpowers were in need to control and influence territories creating a “Bipolar strategic partition of the world” (Galgano, 2012, p. 219). The geopolitics is a part of the national security and includes studying the political and economic developments in territories that are geographical and strategically important to the nation (Galgano, 2012, p. 221). If the socialist and communist movements would gain more power leading to an increased Soviet-friendly area it would, like Cuba, lead to possible Soviet occupation. To avoid another missile crisis and to having communist neighbors, the U.S. would probably be in desperate need to prevent any southern state from developing soviet influenced ideologies.

National security National security can be measured in many ways. A realist would most certainly measure national security as a physical threat and the nation’s ability to survive in the international arena (Baylis, et al., 2017, p. 110). The national counterintelligence and security center states that the national security can be divided in several dimension. Depending on time and circumstances the dimensions will be prioritized differently. The first dimension is most certainly defined as security from physical threats. This indicates direct actions that can cause physical damage towards the nation (The National Counterintelligence and Security Center, u.d.). Within the time frame researched in this thesis we can ascertain that the physical threat would be Soviet nuclear weapons getting closer to U.S. soil and threaten U.S. facilities in the Latin American region.

International order The image and perception of a nation, internationally, would be highly essential to be acknowledged as a powerful state. The cold war era consisted of a U.S. hegemony that with liberal perspectives influenced and created alliances (Mastanduno, 2018, p. 4). Soviet influenced ideologies implies disrupting the liberal order created by the U.S. If more states declined from the U.S. centered order the status and image of the U.S. might be affected. A weakened U.S. influence in the global arena would give the Soviet a great advantage in pursuing its own political objectives and strengthening their possibilities of winning the cold war.

With all this in mind and with earlier U.S. counterinsurgencies in Latin America, we can establish that the U.S. government felt the responsibility to face and act on the problems themselves.

5.1.3 Components used for action

Objectives When analyzing the U.S. as a unified actor we assume that the state has joint objectives. With the historical background and the perspectives of the problems and perceived threats the main objective would be to prevail their political goals in the Cold War. Within the context of Operation Condor it would imply to protect their national security. More specifically to secure their nation towards physical threats such as nuclear weapons and threats towards U.S.

facilities in the region. The nation would most probably prioritize their physical security above all. The achievement of this main objective would directly help the U.S. government to achieve other objectives such as keeping the international dominance, securing the liberal ideology and the economic relation towards Latin America.

Options and consequences: As the background chapter establishes the U.S. had for a long time made numerous foreign policy actions towards the Latin American region. Operation Condor was developed and established in 1975 by namely the Pinochet regime and on initiative of Manuel Contreras the director of DINA. Nonetheless, the knowledge of this operation reached the U.S. and generated a decision process towards what actions should be taken given the circumstances. The two options most plausible to been considered are presented below:

Option I: Assist with military, intelligence and communication techniques. A rational nation with political, economic and military interests in a region would most probably continue to act in ways that maximize those interests. Operation Condor was already targeting political opponents that through a cold war context would result as beneficial for the U.S. It is important through a national security perspective to secure that the operation does not develop into a network that can threaten the U.S. Considering that they already had a military facility in the Panama Canal Zone, the action to assist condor would logistically be facilitated. Further, this type of covert action is aligned with the counterinsurgency methods used by the U.S. as a Cold War doctrine. The objective to secure the national security and to inhibit the communist and socialist movement would be possible if the Condor network was operated successfully. Therefore, to make Condor strategically efficient when carrying out its missions and to secure the development of the network, the U.S. would most probably consider it beneficial to assist with intelligence techniques. The result would enhance the U.S. political and military influence in the region. This may also result as beneficial for the U.S. to halt the extortions and secure their economic interests. Implying that the U.S. can defend the liberal capitalist system that it benefits from.

The costs and benefits The benefits with getting involved in the operation would therefore be; develop the Condor to work more efficiently, have enough control of Condor to create a relation were they are

depending on U.S. assistance and therefore not targeting the U.S. government, military or U.S. facilities in the region. Furthermore, the involvement would entail the U.S. Cold War objectives being secured without carrying out the actions themselves. Implying that the main objective of securing the nation from physical threats is attained.

The costs to get involved in this operation would indicate that the U.S. government had to provide and prioritize military and intelligence personnel to the region and to actively control and surveil the operations. Demanding both time and finance from the government, two resources that could appear to be limited due to the cold war. Operation Condor has, as mentioned earlier, violated several international and humanitarian laws. Bearing in mind that the rational actor is considered to have all the information provided I find it difficult to believe that the U.S. government was not aware of the legal concerns. The U.S. government was most certainly not in a position to prioritize humanitarian laws when facing threats towards their political and physical existence. Therefore, on the basis of the U.S. objectives presented I believe that the benefits from this option rules out the costs of it.

Option II: No action as an action Since the Operation Condor is operating with goals that are beneficial for the U.S. in the cold war context, not acting and simply letting the operation single handedly develop might also have been an option. As mentioned earlier the U.S. was at the time receiving threats from Cuba and south east Asia, more specifically Vietnam. It is therefore not granted that South America was a priority in the U.S. foreign policy. Considering that other threats might be present in other regions, being passive would result as less financial and time consuming.

Costs and benefits As mentioned earlier, the operation was targeting mutual threats and would have been carried out regardless of the U.S. This implies that the government would still benefit from the results of the operation without investing in it. This would result in attainting the national objectives and securing the economic and ideological goals. If the operation is carried out successfully it would halt the communist and socialist development and secure the liberal dominance in the cold war.

The consequences of not acting would be the loss of control in the region. If the military network did not receive intelligence and communication techniques and military training the

network itself would probably operate differently. It could develop to a threat towards the U.S. government and place their physical security at stake. Since the U.S. has history of sharing intelligence techniques in the region we can assume that the military forces in south America lacked the knowledge of those techniques. To carry out a transnational operation, communication is key, therefore the absence of U.S. assistance could result in a less efficient operation. Without well-developed insurgency techniques the missions carried out could be disorganized and gain attention from the international community. All of which would halt the progress of the operation and its efficiency, creating more harm than good. Since the costs of this option set the main objective of the U.S. government at stake I find this option to be less rational.

The rational choice: Considering the two options the most rational one presented was to get involved and assist Operation Condor with military, intelligence and communication techniques. Bearing in mind the objectives of the nation, the costs of for instance humanitarian perspectives and economic ones are less prioritized. The U.S. was in a position that demanded full control and actions that would be as efficient as possible to avoid the Soviet getting more influence in the region. The cold war has blinded the nation and the fear of losing to communist and socialist movements was high. The liberal and capitalist system of the U.S. was threatened and the only way to control the situations was simply to make sure that Operation Condor was carried out as efficient as possible, regardless of the costs.

5.2 The US decision through a governmental politics perspective

This perspective on the decision will be presented with the following operationalized steps from point 3.4.1:

1. Organizing concepts: - Who plays? 2. Components used for action: - Perceptions - Impact on results 3. The political game

5.2.1 Organizing concepts The actors within this model are based on influential actors within the U.S. foreign policy decision process. Considering the time frame and the needed demarcation I have chosen to focus on the actors active in the Ford administration 1974-1977. His presidency is highly relevant considering the year the Condor was established and its active years. The actors analyzed from the U.S. government are:

Gerald Ford, President Henry Kissinger, Secretary of state William Colby, director of the CIA

The chosen actors are based on their relevance and ranking. The focus will be emphasized on the objectives and perceptions that stem from the political arena as a whole and from the responsibilities stemming from the individual roles.

5.2.2 Each players components used for action:

President, Gerald Ford: Being the president of the U.S. entails several roles and responsibilities for example Head of state. Moreover the president is Commander in Chief over the armed forces, meaning that the president can control and decide the strategy used and placement of the armed forces etc. However, the president needs to be supported by the congress to be able to declare war and/or

invade another state. Through history, this clause has been used with and without the congressional approval since the definition of “declaring war” is interpreted differently (Ahlander, 1969, p. 147). All of this implies that the role of the U.S. president generate perceptions and responsibilities to be the front figure towards the international arena and the role model towards his/her population. The president is elected by the people and has a responsibility and accountability to secure the nation both domestically and externally. This will affect the perception of how the president as a player should act and what needs to be taken into account when making decisions. The impact of the president as a player is his power and how it is perceived. The president is a chief executive implying that he/she is responsible for nominating chiefs and federal authorities, for example the secretary of state and the Director of the CIA. This implies that the president has the additional power to discharge any director that goes against his/her objectives and plans (Ahlander, 1969, p. 148).

This power signifies that the other players within this political game are aware that if they contradict the president in too many decisions they are risking their own position. The president is also the highest ranked political player within a decision process and is most likely perceived as the one with highest authority, even if the president might not single- handedly make a decision without the support of the senate and congress (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 296). Being the highest ranked authority also means that the players circulate around the president, making him/her in control of the final decisions and the information being passed through. This concludes that the president fulfills the three power dimensions mentioned in the theoretical chapter.

Gerald Ford is the only U.S. president that was not elected but took over office when Nixon resigned after the Watergate scandal. The Watergate scandal was the revelation of the Nixon´s administrations involvement of domestic spying, illegal campaigns, wiretapping and CIA covert operations (Schudson, 2044, pp. 1232-1233). One of the revealed covert actions was the CIA involvement the Chilean elections and overthrowing Allende (Johnson, 1989, p. 88). This left Gerald Ford in the first administration facing the Watergate consequences. A position in which the public opinion of the president was in some level damaged. The congress, the public and journalists were pressuring and questioning Fords capability of both handling the scandal but also his competence to control the intelligence agency (Olmsted, 1996, p. 725).

Richard Falk states in his article “President Gerald Ford, CIA Covert Operations, and the Status of International Law” that during a press conference in 1974, Ford was asked whether there is an international law that gives a nation the right to destabilize a foreign states elected government. The question was referring to the covert operations in Chile and Allende. President Ford responded: “I'm not going to pass judgment on whether it's permitted or authorized under international law. It's a recognized fact that historically as well as presently, such actions are taken in the best interests of the countries involved.” (Falk, 1975, p. 354). This statement was undoubtedly an act of diplomacy, knowing that he could not reject nor accept such actions, but it gives us a speculation of his views in the matter.

Ford was facing the dilemma in gaining back the congressional and public trust together with the perception of being a powerful leader. With the international hegemony and U.S. influence in world politics, being the president entails great power. Much like Graham and Zelikows definition of power, it means nothing without the other players perception of it. If the congress, public and other political players were questioning his competence to be a powerful president, what would the rest of the world believe? This leaves president Ford in a role where the image of power and influence must be secured at all costs. In the Cold War context that permeates this whole research, the presidents image is a powerful tool in the fight against communism. Ford was probably receiving pressure into securing the nations advantages in the war both from his political colleagues but from the U.S. citizens as well. This leads us to assuming that Gerald Ford would make decisions based on securing his own popularity within the public opinion, his power towards the international arena and a dominance in the cold war context. He could not after the Nixon scandal lead the U.S. towards another flounder. The option to assist Operation Condor would entail an advantage in the Cold War and securing the political development in Latin America, that would result in public popularity and congressional respect. The disadvantages would be that the eyes were already pointed at the CIA covert operations and another covert act might enlarge the skepticism towards Ford.

Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger: The secretary of state works within the Department of state and is to be the advisor for the president regarding foreign policy issues and advices on electing the U.S. ambassadors and diplomats. Moreover, the secretary of state has its role towards establishing and maintaining the diplomatic relations towards other states and international organizations. One of the

responsibilities entails to inform U.S. citizens and congress of the foreign relations and the political, economic and social issues in other states. The secretary of state shall also work towards constantly securing and protecting the property and interests of the U.S. government and its citizens (U.S. Department of state, 2018). All of these responsibilities leaves the secretary in a certain control of the information that is being handed to the president and the U.S. government. Since the role as the diplomatic front figure, the secretary of state must also be perceived as the most experienced within foreign policy issues, demanding confidence and value to his/her knowledge within the decision processes. This leaves the secretary of state as powerful and influential but not necessarily as the “final decisionmaker”.

Henry Kissinger was in the Nixon administration the national security advisor and was after the presidential change named the secretary of state. Kissinger developed the National Security Council during the 70´s by enhancing the personnel. From 34 employees to 13.000, he required agents and personnel working abroad, in which half of them where positioned in U.S. embassies and other facilities (Hanhimaki, 2004, pp. 291-292, 298). In 1978 Kissinger stated that the intelligence community needs the accessibility to operate and defend the U.S. interests and security in the “grey areas” where diplomacy or military force cannot reach (Johnson, 1989, p. 82). Taken into account that this statement is made one year after his role as secretary of state, it is important to highlight his views on how and why the intelligence actions should be operated. Also because it is aligned with the view of covert actions as operations to be implemented when diplomatic or military actions are not effective and/or to not openly create a conflict.

In 2004 a document was released from June 1976, a memorandum of a meeting between the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Argentina’s foreign minister César Guzzetti. The conversation between the two included discussions about Argentina’s perceived terrorist problems and Guzzetti mentions the fight against subversion as: “The terrorist problem is general to the entire southern cone. To combat it, we are encouraging joint efforts to integrate with our neighbors” (Einaudi, 2013, p. 8). Shortly after Guzzetti confirms that their neighbors are “All of them: Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia, Uruguay, Brazil”. (Einaudi, 2013, p. 8). In which Kissinger replies that the U.S. wants them to succeed their fight against terrorism. (Einaudi, 2013, p. 8) I find it important to highlight that Argentina’s coup d’état occurred in 1976, before this meeting was held. Implying that Kissinger new about the political situation in the country.

Another document that was declassified from 1976, only two months after the meeting with Guzzetti, is the monthly report from the Assistant Secretary of state for Latin America, Harry Shlaudeman. Directly addressed to Henry Kissinger he highlights his concern of the southern cone and the strategy and work of Operation Condor. Shlaudeman also mentions that the Condor operates towards subversion and might target anyone opposing the government. More specifically to “find and kill” and that the operations will be expanded to Europe, his report includes all three operational levels of Operation Condor (Shlaudeman, 1976, pp. 3-4). These two documents establish that Kissinger was aware that a transnational network, later revealed as being named Condor was operated in Latin America and targeting political opponents.

The role played by Kissinger during this presidency gives him a responsibility to secure the interests of the U.S. and its citizens, through diplomacy. As mentioned before, there is no doubt that the Operation Condor targeted opponents that would be beneficial for the U.S. Cold War objectives. The secretary of state would assumingly in this position see it as beneficial to establish good relations with the ongoing military regimes in Latin America and to give the support needed to not damage the diplomatic ties. The position of Kissinger and his daily work includes a political game, much like this one analyzed, but with players from foreign states. By reporting the human rights violations or by denouncing the Operation Condor, Kissinger might damage the relation with the participating Condor nations. That would imply that Kissinger, as secretary of state was not fulfilling one of his key responsibilities and the important Cold War objectives. Through that, he might jeopardize his own career and authority, considering that the President has the power of discharging federal authorities that don’t follow the same political agenda or don’t fulfill their duties. With this presented we can assume that Kissinger was basing his decision towards Operation Condor on the responsibilities that stem from his role, but also towards securing his own political authority.

CIA director, William Colby: The Truman act in 1947 resulted in the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency. The main purpose and responsibilities of the agency is to assist the Director of the CIA. The director shall gather information relevant for the national security and direct the coordination made outside of the U.S. territory (CIA, 2018). The agency conducts research and develops

high-end technology for the use of intelligence (CIA, 2018). The mission stated by CIA itself is to provide the tactic information and research it gathers to the president of the U.S. to give the state department a “strategic advantage” and to always secure the nation. Directed by the president the agency also has the mission to conduct covert operations (CIA, 2018). The role of the director, is to control and surveil the agency. This leaves the director of the CIA with the power of controlling the information given towards other players regarding the threats towards the nation but also the information of the operations carried out by the agency. The knowledge and experience of the director is in this political game assumed to be perceived as powerful.

The article “How security agencies control change” examines the autonomy of agencies such as the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI. The author, Patrick S. Roberts, states that the agency does not fulfill all the criteria’s for full autonomy, but that it has some means in operating without full control of state department. Since the operations conducted are covert and the information produced is highly classified the agency itself commands some self-rule for the sake of the survival of the nation. Something that according to Roberts is understood and valued by both politicians and the public (Roberts, 2009, p. 188). The secrecy needed for the information collected gives also the CIA an advantage in information control. The agency is the only one that investigates, analyzes and presents intelligence information of foreign states. Controlling the information and the analysis of determining what is a threat lets the CIA possess “…unique information that it used to shape its environment” (Roberts, 2009, p. 190).

In an article published in Foreign Policy (1976) William Colby, the former CIA director discusses the complexity of secrecy and the CIA. The purpose of the article is to discuss the reorganization of the CIA. He stresses that the Watergate scandal has created a confusion and debate regarding the limits of intelligence operations. Colby states that the information of covert operations need in some extent to be held secret, for the purpose of securing the nation against espionage. He suggests numerous of changes for organizing the CIA. One of them being to limit the number of staff, congressmen etc. to the ones that “truly need to know” all the information regarding an operation (Colby, et al., 1976, p. 55). This statement determines that Colby valued secrecy for the sake of national security and that the information regarding the covert operations towards personnel outside of CIA must have been limited.

With the information above we can assume that the preferences of the CIA director, William Colby were to secure the nations survival through intelligence operations. These operations as mentions in earlier chapter include propaganda, economic control and support of paramilitaries. Abstaining from acting on what might be perceived as a threat, Colby would lose one of his most vital responsibilities. The emergence of soviet influenced movements in Latin America was most definitely perceived as a threat. Colby´s role implies that the actions to be taken are not warfare or diplomacy, but covert and discrete actions. As mentioned, most of the political authorities, the CIA director included, were facing a lot of exposés regarding earlier covert actions and the Watergate scandal. Placing Colby in a situation in which he has to secure the reputation of the CIA. One can presume that another covert action might belittle the agency even more. But since the main purpose of the CIA is intelligence, the director was possibly in need of proving the public and the government that successful covert operations are conceivable and that the agency itself is vital and necessary for securing the U.S. existence. Since Operation Condor was already targeting a mutual threat, Colby must have calculated that the operation would be relatively easy to result in success. Not acting in Operation Condor could influence the efficiency of the Condor network and hinder its success, resulting in the continuous growth of communist and socialist ideologies. Since Colby as director is assumed to be well aware and informed of the CIAs capability he must have known that the CIA assistance would improve the Condor network with developed communication and interrogation techniques, enhancing the chance of success.

The role as director is as established in great control of the information presented towards the President and Secretary of State. The director is assumed to know what, and who is a threat and also how the covert actions shall be operated. Since the CIA is the only agency that collects intelligence information and analyzes it, the agency can shape what type of information is presented. Giving Colby the ability to shape and influence his own objectives in the decision process.

Analysis of the political game: Given the information above the President has the last move in the decision process in relation to the other chosen players. However he/she is still depending on the trust and support of the congress. The game rules for this decision is quite vague since the rules have been bent and changed depending on case. For example firstly the National Security Council needed to approve the covert actions made. However, during the years of 1961-1975 only a few operations were accepted by the NSC. Later the Hughes – Ryan act was implemented in December 1974. The aim was that no covert action can be operated without the approval of the president. The president himself had also to report all the cover actions to the congress. This was seen as a try to enhance the accountability in covert operations, a result after the Watergate scandal (Johnson, 1989, p. 91).

We can assume that the political game was played out as following: With the information presented of the three players and what perception and responsibilities stem from their roles, we can ascertain that the political decision was a result of a set of self- interest and the ongoing scandals in the political arena. Besides the traditional objectives that entail all of the three roles, such as national security I believe that every player was desperate for securing their reputation. As a result of Watergate the image of the state department and the CIA needed to be secured as much as every personal image of the players. I don’t see that the views of national security or Cold War objectives are different depending on the political roles, but that the means to achieve those objectives is what sets them apart. Fords means was to secure the objectives without risking another set of scandals. Kissinger’s role entails a lot more diplomacy and dialogues between other political players of the South American states. Colby´s focus on the intelligence approach was to secure the nation and to work as discreet as possible to give the U.S. a strategic advantage. The responsibilities that stem from political authoritarian positions are of course prioritized and important to every player but it is also needed to emphasize that self-interest plays a big part too. Ford was not elected, meaning that he could not rely on the “popularity” of his voters and that after the Nixon scandal might not have the full trust of the congress. To avoid resigning and shortening his presidential career, he must have had personal objectives towards securing his political position. Kissinger was probably in need of securing his political position as well as personal relations towards other political players, like the foreign minister of Argentina. Colby is the highest ranked player within the CIA and certainly a position he wants to keep and make use of.

It is also important to highlight that if the decision to get involved in Condor was certain, the most probable way of involvement would be a covert operation. This considering that physical warfare would most certainly get little approval of the congress and the diplomacy strategies would not give the U.S. enough control of the operation.

With the information presented of the players I find it clear that Kissinger and Colby would most likely approve of assisting Operation Condor. Ford on the other hand, considering his sensitive situation and to his role as President that implicates a different accountability than the others, might have found it difficult to decide. The costs of joining if the covert act would be revealed would damage his and the U.S. governments status. The decision was evidently made and Ford might have been persuaded by another players. This leads us to the power of persuasion. The power within this political game can be analyzed through many perspectives. One of the most important aspects that I find, is the control of information that the CIA has. Since they find, process and present the intel information the only perspective presented is from the agency itself. The president nor the secretary of state will have time to do the research of their own. They are therefore depending on the information from the CIA to be accurate and trustworthy. I don’t deny the CIA´s capacity of analyzing threats, but I want to point out that the perception of a threat can vary depending on who is the analyzer. Considering the situation with the Cold War, Vietnam, communism and Cuba we can for a fact ascertain that the U.S. and the political players felt threaten from several angles. Ideological, economic and geographical interests were at stake, and considering the political turmoil domestically the perception of threats might be affected. But with the CIAs control of the intelligence information and in a time where politicians fear the Soviet dominance, I find the CIA director in an advantage to persuade the other political players in the decision process.

6 Conclusion The main purpose of this research is to understand how the internal decision process of the U.S. led to assisting the Operation Condor with intelligence and communication techniques.

Notably the security threats perceived by the U.S. during that time were related to national security, dominance in the cold war and the ideological threats emerging globally. Domestic problems also played a role, such as the Watergate scandal and the exposé of the CIA covert actions. All of these problems and perceived threats are a result of international, domestic and personal inputs and outputs.

To understand the involvement using the Rational Actor Model we must comprehend the national objectives. These include the ideological, economic, geographical and national security perspectives. The first option presented is to get involved and generate a political and military control of Operation Condor. Resulting in the operation being less likely to derail or threaten the U.S. government. The second option presented was not acting, since abstaining from an action is in fact an action. The U.S. was involved in numerous conflicts and political disputes that Operation Condor was probably not the highest priority and the operation was already aligned with targeting mutual threats. Not acting would therefore be economical, less time-consuming and still generate some benefit. The cost and benefits presented in the two options resulted in assuming that the most rational decision was assisting Operation Condor. The objectives of national security and advancing in the Cold War were too important that it outweighs the costs calculated.

To understand the political decision to get involved in Condor using the governmental politics model, I used three political actors. The chosen actors were Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger and William Colby. All of these three different roles were affected by the internal scandals in the U.S. generating high demands on securing the reputation of their positions. The traditional objectives i.e. national security are taking different forms regarding the preferences stemming from the political role. The CIA director has naturally the objective to secure the nation using intelligence operation while the Secretary of state sees diplomacy as more beneficial. Ford at the time was focusing on handling the international and the domestic problems with responsibilities and accountability stemming from his role as president. All of these perceptions and objectives generated a powerplay between the actors. This resulted in considering the CIA director as the most powerful, given his prerequisites to persuade the

other players with information. This model gave us the understanding that even if the players choose the same action they are basing it on different agendas, perspectives as well as power- relations. The results from both the models indicate that the U.S. government as a unified actor and the political players were blinded by the Cold War. Justifying all their foreign policy decisions on the war against communism, soviet dominance and nuclear weapons. This resulted in making many countries a big battlefield for the Cold War, South America was not an exception. The fear of losing the Cold War generated a responsibility for the U.S. to single-handedly secure the international arena.

With the findings from the two models I can establish that the decision of the U.S. to assist condor is a compilation of both a rational strategy and a political powerplay. This is based on Model I being essential to understand how the chosen action was rational and how the objectives on a national level affect the result. This gives us the fundamental information in understanding the decision process. However this model is too abstract resulting in an analysis with little dimension. The second model is necessary to comprehend the players involved, their objectives and how their own chosen action can be seen as rational on an individual level, giving the analysis a wider dimension. This results in a study in which the two models complement each other.

Decision processes are very complex. The decision process in this particular case is a big grey area, in which not enough documents have been declassified, the international arena has not shed the sufficient light towards Condor and the extent of the U.S. involvement is still not fully revealed. All of which suggests that this area of research is in need of further investigation.

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CIA, 2018. Vission, Mission, Ethos & Challenges. [Online] Available at: https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/cia-vision-mission-values [Collected 27/12/2018].

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