Democracy and Plan Colombia
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NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS report: in the name of democracy Democracy and Plan Colombia Plan Colombia, a “pro-democracy” aid package, was established as a plan to wipe out Colombia’s drug trade, but it soon became clear that it had the additional objective of defeating the guerilla movement. by Héctor Mondragón R E S I D E N T G E O R G E W. B U S H H A S A S K E D T H E that has since been repeated in a State American people to “be patient” so that D e p a rtment document. Obviously, these “other PIraq can become like Colombia—so that t h reats” to Colombian security do not refer to the Iraqis can defeat terrorism and establish a sta- e x t r a t e rrestrials, but to forces like the Chávez ble democracy like the one Washington has nur- g o v e rnme nt in Venezuela and the indigenous t u red in Colombia. I would like to comment on mobilizations in Ecuador—forces that re p re s e n t this nightmare . anti-neoliberal, anti-imperial changes in South Héctor Mondragón Plan Colombia, a “pro-democracy” aid pack- America by way of democratic elections and pop- has been a human rights worker in age provided by the United States to Colombia, ular mobilization. Colombia for 35 was established in 1999. Its primary stated objec- Washington has now spent $4.7 billion on years, working tive was to end drug trafficking in Colombia. Plan Colombia, and if you include the expendi- closely with homeless Later on, it was discovered that the plan had the t u res of the U.S. Agency for Intern a t i o n a l shelters, labor f u rther objective of defeating the guerrilla move- Development (USAID) in that total, it re a c h e s o rg a n i z a t i o n s , human rights and ment, though that component of the plan was $7.7 billion. But despite this investment, the c h u rch groups, and never acknowledged by Washington while Bill U . S . - s u p p o rted government of Alvaro Uribe has a number of indige- Clinton was in office. It was, however, made defeated neither the drug traffickers nor the guer- nous groups. Tr a i n e d explicit in subsequent versions of the plan rilla movement. To the contrary, the plan’s only as an economist, he devised by George W. Bush’s administration, success has been to guarantee a majority to the has worked as an adviser to the which identified its principal objective as com- p a rties that supported Uribe in the Congre s s i o n a l Indian National bating “narc o - t e rrorism,” thus conflating the elections of March 2006, and to guarantee Uribe’s O rganization of d r ug war with the anti-guerrilla stru g g l e . own re-election last May. Colombia and the F u rt h e rm o re, the Bush government has pro- When Uribe was first elected, his primary Peasant National posed that the plan combat any other threat to campaign promise had been to defeat the guer- Council. the security of the Colombian state, a pro p o s a l rillas, and to accomplish this, he instituted a 4 2 J A N U A RY FEBRUARY 2007 report: in the name of democracy one-time war tax. In his campaign for re-election, he pro- lends the money back to itself. It plays the same game with posed a second “one-time” war tax. The reality is that, far its public health and pension funds. What’s going to hap- from being defeated, the guerrilla movement in Colombia pen when the government has to pay this money back? is today much stronger than when Uribe began his pres- But this doesn’t explain the whole story of Colombia’s idency. The guerrillas had been hard hit in the last year of spectacular growth. There is a much more important the Pastrana government and during Uribe’s first year, in explanation: the agreement with the paramilitaries. Many part thanks to U.S. technical assistance to the Colombian have criticized this agreement, arguing that it amounts to air force that allowed it to engage in effective anti-guerril- an amnesty for crimes against humanity. But all of this la bombing campaigns. The guerrillas had also suffered discussion has obscured the economic essence of the setbacks due to their own political and strategic errors, agreement, which is to allow the legalization of billions of many of which negatively—and gravely—affected the paramilitary narco-dollars. The paramilitaries finance not civil population. only their operations, but also their lifestyles with the Nevertheless, the U.S. Southern Command and the Never before have country’s largest drug-trafficking Uribe government committed a huge military erro r operations. known as Plan Patriota, which called for the Colombian drug traffickers had Since negotiations between armed forces to surround and annihilate the guerrillas in so much power in Uribe and the paramilitaries their interior strongholds. But these were locations the began, billions of dollars and guerrillas knew well and where they enjoyed solid popu- Colombia. Today e u ros in drug profits have lar support, allowing them to soundly defeat the military. they have penetrated e n t e red Colombia. Thro u g h o u t Today the guerrillas—especially the FARC—have gained the stock market, 2003, 2004 and the beginning of political momentum after having launched an effective 2005, more o v e r, the paramili- counter-offensive. Over the past year the Colombian mil- laundered their drug taries exported a huge quantity of itary’s losses in the civil war have considerably surpassed money in the form of the cocaine they had stockpiled, those of the U.S. military in Iraq. The departments of knowing that anything sold prior Putumayo and Caquetá have been paralyzed for well over treasury bonds and to the amnesty would be par- six months, and in many areas of Colombia the army gained a foothold in doned under the peace agre e- cannot guarantee anyone’s safety. Yet despite failing to the electoral process. ment. This is the true cause of the fulfill his main electoral promise, Uribe still managed to e n o rmous wave of speculation— be re-elected. How was this possible? To paraphrase Bill a sea of illicit funds entering Colombia. And like an emper- Clinton: It was the economy, stupid. or of ancient Rome, Uribe was able to provide the popu- Like many other areas in the world, Colombia is expe- lace with “bread and circuses” prior to the pre s i d e n t i a l riencing a post-Iraq-invasion economic boom. But elections of May 2006. Was Washington aware of this? Of C o l o m b i a ’s boom may be the least sustainable of them all. course it was. Stock exchange values have increased 1,100%, meaning prices have multiplied 11 times. This has not occurre d WHAT IS THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF PLAN COLOMBIA? a n y w h e re else since the 1920s, simply because no other Never before have drug traffickers had so much power in c o u n t ry would allow it. Any other national bank or feder- Colombia. Today they have penetrated the stock market, al re s e r ve system would intervene to curb such inflation, l a u n d e red their drug money in the form of tre a s u ry bonds knowing that such rapid unchecked increases in value— and gained a foothold in the electoral process. And which are not the result of growth but of pure specula- although those in Uribe’s party who have been publicly tion—will eventually cause a terrible recession. In identified as drug lords were purged, they created their Colombia this has not only been allowed, but actually own parallel pro-Uribe parties and have gotten themselves encouraged through specific economic measures. For elected to Congress. This is not to say anything of those example, the Colombian state buys its own tre a s u r y d rug lords who have not been publicly identified and who bonds. It takes the money from its left pocket and lends it remain on Uribe’s part y ’s lists. to its right pocket, and whereas a moment ago it had only In the past, drug traffickers financed electoral cam- four dollars, it now has eight—four dollars plus a cert i f i- paigns from the shadows, financing publicity and paying cate proving it has borrowed another four! So Colombia for hotels and travel. This was a relatively small-scale oper- receives billions of dollars from the United States as part of ation. To d a y, however, they openly finance entire electoral Plan Colombia, and the Colombian government then campaigns. The govern m e n t ’s own statistics acknowledge 4 3 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS report: in the name of democracy that in 2005, $3 billion flowed through Colombia, with In Colombia, however, there is also a democratic civil no re c o rd of how the money entered the country. No resistance that rejects the guerrillas’ methods and that is one planted money seeds and grew the $3 billion; this often, in fact, victimized by the guerrillas.