Sudanese Role in Libya 2011 REPORTS
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African Perspectives REPORTS Sudanese Role in Libya 2011 Asim Fathelrahman Ahmed Researcher and Strategic Expert in African Affairs Introduction: Sudan Played a pivotal role in the Libyan crisis in 2011, and has had a significant impact on the process of change that took place in Libya during that period, which brought radical changes in the equation of governance in Libya. With the arrival of the rebels in Tripoli, on 21 August of the year 2011, the National Transitional Council (NTC) assumed power control in most Libyan areas, fol- lowing a grinding war involving the international community, rep- resented by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as the involvement of other individual countries such as the Sudan with its security and military forces, and Qatar using its own money, for the benefit of the National Transitional Council (NTC) to overthrow the Gaddafi regime. Colonel Muammar Gad- dafi himself, who had governed Libya for a period of 42 years, was killed on October 20, 2011, allegedly by Libyan revolutionaries inside the Libyan territories. The events that started in February and ended in October 2011 had a substantial impact on national, regional and international levels. The relationship between Sudan and Libya was important for both govern- ments. The Sudanese actions arose as a result of the negative effects of the Gaddafi regime policies towards the Sudan, especially its impact on its na- tional security, as the Gaddafi regime used to provide logistic support to the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and other Darfur rebel (1) move- ments, as well as the Gaddafi regime’s threats to the Sudanese-Chadian rela- tions and to Sudan's relations with other neighboring states. These threats and their impact on the regional situation resulted in a state of instability. Sudan participated effectively in the conflict in Libya 2011, through effec- tive collaboration with the NTC, and the international community. The Su- danese government offered security and militarily assistance to the Libyan Volume 11 - Issue 38 – 2013 41 African Perspectives rebels against the Gaddafi regime, of Colonel Gaddafi and his ability to and helped the NTC politically and harm Sudan. Nonetheless, these Lib- militarily to gain power in Libya. yan interventions created a gap in The Libyan role in Sudan during the the relations between the two coun- Regime of Gaddafi: tries, despite the possibility of strengthening good neighborly rela- Libya played different roles in tions and cooperation between the neighboring countries during the two states. years of the Gaddafi regime. This was especially in Sudan, during the During the Gaddafi era, Libya period of the late Sudanese Presi- supported the Darfur rebel move- dent Jaafar Nimeiri and during the ments, and had also greater ambi- former Cold War between the US- tions in the Darfur region. led Western bloc and the former Libya’s activities created fears Soviet-led Eastern bloc, as well as and increasing concerns to the Suda- during coup of the National Salva- nese government, which, subse- tion Revolution (Ingaz) Regime in quently, adopted a strategic plan to Sudan. Throughout this period Gad- deal with the threat. It tried to neu- dafi pursued a policy of intervention tralize the impact of the Gaddafi in the internal affairs of the Sudan, regime on the Sudanese internal af- resulting in destabilizing the country fairs by trying to support the activi- by supporting the political opposi- ties of the internal Libyan opposi- tion. He contributed to arming the tion, to make the regime of Colonel opposition, including the Sudan Peo- Gaddafi busy with internal troubles, ple Liberation Movement/Army until it can find a suitable opportu- (SPLM/A), led by the late Colonel nity to remove it. When the Ingaz John Garang, which later led to the regime seized power in Sudan, in secession of southern Sudan in July 1989, Libya was worried because of of 2011, forming the state of South its Islamic orientation. Despite the Sudan.(2) fact that the Libyan authorities tried Libyan intervention in the Suda- to hide this fears Libyan intelligence nese affairs had a significant impact organs were working constantly in on the course of the Sudanese- order to create instability in Sudan. Libyan relations, despite the keen- Colonel Gaddafi considered the Is- ness of Sudan to not crack the rela- lamic movements as a significant tionship between the two countries, threat to his regime, and these fears as the Sudanese government was increased after the coup attempt fully aware of the political approach against his rule in the early 1980s, as he accused Islamic groups of prepar- 42 SIS African Perspectives ing and planning that coup. ernment, that it must find another After seizing power, the Ingaz gov- way to stop Libya from interfering ernment tried to communicate with in the Sudanese internal affairs, and Colonel Gaddafi at the highest po- to block Libya’s persistent involve- litical level in order to explain the ment in agitating the conflict in Dar- motives of change that occurred in fur. Consequently, the government Sudan. Gaddafi closely followed all of Sudan saw the Revolution of 27 the developments in Sudan, espe- February 2011 as an opportunity to cially the declaration of the Islamic achieve its objectives in Libya, top- state of Sudan by the Ingaz regime pling Gaddafi from power and, sub- in January 1991. Despite the inter- sequently protecting the Sudanese national embargo imposed on Libya national security from Libya inter- by the US and the West at that time, vention. the Gaddafi regime possessed all the The Libyan intervention was clear means to destabilize Sudan, thanks in the Darfur conflict since its inter- to the Gaddafi regime’s revenues ruption in 2003,(3) and all indica- from oil exports. tions were clear of the Gaddafi re- The Sudanese regime dealt con- gime’s involvement in financing the tinually with Gaddafi through a pol- war in Darfur by providing the Su- icy of restraint, based on their un- dan Liberation Movement (SLM) derstanding of Gaddafi’s personal- and JEM, led by the late Dr. Khalil ity. It tried to avoid involvement into Ibrahim, with weapons and other any conflict with him, and made sev- military assistance, as well as pro- eral official visits to Tripoli, explain- viding the Darfur rebel movements ing the political developments in Su- with training bases inside the Libyan dan. The Sudanese leaders did their territories. best to not enrage or provoke him, After the Chadian(4) authorities and also convinced him that he is an refused to receive Khalil Ibrahim in integral part and a key character for May 2010 and confiscated his stability in Sudan. However, all Chadian travel documents, the JEM these diplomatic moves did not leader and ten of his companions change Gaddafi’s mind and never flew to Libya, where they were deterred him from supporting the hosted by Gaddafi. As a result, the movements involved in the Darfur Sudanese authorities closed its bor- conflict, especially the JEM. This ders with Libya, and sent its security active Libyan role in supporting the and military forces to implement Darfur armed movements formed a this action in the same month. firm conviction of the Sudanese gov- Volume 11 - Issue 38 – 2013 43 African Perspectives Gaddafi’s involvement was possi- gested in the Tripoli initiative will bly due to his desire to play a politi- weaken its sovereignty in the Darfur cal role in Sudan after it became region. clear that the problem of Southern Motives of the Sudanese role in Sudan was on its way to settlement. Libya 2011: Gaddafi might have probably feared that stability in north Sudan, with It became clear to Sudan that the its ability in the future to extract oil, overthrow of Colonel Muammar would lead to a greater development Gaddafi, would improve Sudan's for the country, which might in turn direct relations with neighboring lead north Sudan to use its potential countries and regional ones, and influence to effect change in Libya would achieve internal stability in and to threaten its influence in Sudan. As a result, Sudan joined the North Africa and in the African re- international community led by the gion in general. Gaddafi’s fears US(5) and most of the Arab coun- might have also exacerbated by his tries after the revolution of 17 Feb- perception that most of Libya's ruary 2011, as a result of the refusal population have religious leanings of Colonel Gaddafi’s regime to re- that tend to ally with the Sudanese spond to the demands of the Libyan regime's Islamic orientation. people, and used force and brutality to suppress protests, leading to the The Libyan intervention might UN Security Council Resolution have also been due to the pressures 1970 (2011) taken unanimously on exercised by some of the citizens of 26 February 2011 to halt violence southern Libya to intervene in the immediately , and considered the Darfur problem, including Mr. Os- systematic crimes oriented by Gad- man Al-Boshra and other members dafi regime against civilians in Libya of the Revolutionary Committees as crimes against humanity. This belonging to the alliance of the decision imposed an embargo on the Tubu, Bideyat and Zaghawa tribes, supply of all types of weapons to who are relatives to some of Darfur Libya, and prohibited it from pur- tribes and have old mutual alliances. chasing weapons, in addition to pre- Also Gaddafi may have been an- venting some officials from Gaddafi gered from the Sudanese authorities regime officials from travelling that preferred the Qatari peace ini- abroad. However, the African states’ tiative on Darfur and neglected that response was late as a result of their of Tripoli, as the Sudanese authori- relation with the Gaddafi regime, ties did not trust Gaddafi, because and as a result of the finance given they believed that solutions sug- by Gaddafi to the African Union.