African Perspectives REPORTS

Sudanese Role in 2011

Asim Fathelrahman Ahmed Researcher and Strategic Expert in African Affairs

Introduction:

Sudan Played a pivotal role in the Libyan crisis in 2011, and has had a significant impact on the process of change that took place in Libya during that period, which brought radical changes in the equation of governance in Libya. With the arrival of the rebels in Tripoli, on 21 August of the year 2011, the National Transitional Council (NTC) assumed power control in most Libyan areas, fol- lowing a grinding war involving the international community, rep- resented by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as the involvement of other individual countries such as the with its security and military forces, and Qatar using its own money, for the benefit of the National Transitional Council (NTC) to overthrow the Gaddafi regime. Colonel Muammar Gad- dafi himself, who had governed Libya for a period of 42 years, was killed on October 20, 2011, allegedly by Libyan revolutionaries inside the Libyan territories. The events that started in February and ended in October 2011 had a substantial impact on national, regional and international levels. The relationship between Sudan and Libya was important for both govern- ments. The Sudanese actions arose as a result of the negative effects of the Gaddafi regime policies towards the Sudan, especially its impact on its na- tional security, as the Gaddafi regime used to provide logistic support to the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and other rebel (1) move- ments, as well as the Gaddafi regime’s threats to the Sudanese-Chadian rela- tions and to Sudan's relations with other neighboring states. These threats and their impact on the regional situation resulted in a state of instability. Sudan participated effectively in the conflict in Libya 2011, through effec- tive collaboration with the NTC, and the international community. The Su- danese government offered security and militarily assistance to the Libyan

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rebels against the Gaddafi regime, of Colonel Gaddafi and his ability to and helped the NTC politically and harm Sudan. Nonetheless, these Lib- militarily to gain power in Libya. yan interventions created a gap in The Libyan role in Sudan during the the relations between the two coun- Regime of Gaddafi: tries, despite the possibility of strengthening good neighborly rela- Libya played different roles in tions and cooperation between the neighboring countries during the two states. years of the Gaddafi regime. This was especially in Sudan, during the During the Gaddafi era, Libya period of the late Sudanese Presi- supported the Darfur rebel move- dent Jaafar Nimeiri and during the ments, and had also greater ambi- former Cold War between the US- tions in the Darfur region. led Western bloc and the former Libya’s activities created fears Soviet-led Eastern bloc, as well as and increasing concerns to the Suda- during coup of the National Salva- nese government, which, subse- tion Revolution (Ingaz) Regime in quently, adopted a strategic plan to Sudan. Throughout this period Gad- deal with the threat. It tried to neu- dafi pursued a policy of intervention tralize the impact of the Gaddafi in the internal affairs of the Sudan, regime on the Sudanese internal af- resulting in destabilizing the country fairs by trying to support the activi- by supporting the political opposi- ties of the internal Libyan opposi- tion. He contributed to arming the tion, to make the regime of Colonel opposition, including the Sudan Peo- Gaddafi busy with internal troubles, ple Liberation Movement/Army until it can find a suitable opportu- (SPLM/A), led by the late Colonel nity to remove it. When the Ingaz John Garang, which later led to the regime seized power in Sudan, in secession of southern Sudan in July 1989, Libya was worried because of of 2011, forming the state of South its Islamic orientation. Despite the Sudan.(2) fact that the Libyan authorities tried Libyan intervention in the Suda- to hide this fears Libyan intelligence nese affairs had a significant impact organs were working constantly in on the course of the Sudanese- order to create instability in Sudan. Libyan relations, despite the keen- Colonel Gaddafi considered the Is- ness of Sudan to not crack the rela- lamic movements as a significant tionship between the two countries, threat to his regime, and these fears as the Sudanese government was increased after the coup attempt fully aware of the political approach against his rule in the early 1980s, as he accused Islamic groups of prepar-

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ing and planning that coup. ernment, that it must find another After seizing power, the Ingaz gov- way to stop Libya from interfering ernment tried to communicate with in the Sudanese internal affairs, and Colonel Gaddafi at the highest po- to block Libya’s persistent involve- litical level in order to explain the ment in agitating the conflict in Dar- motives of change that occurred in fur. Consequently, the government Sudan. Gaddafi closely followed all of Sudan saw the Revolution of 27 the developments in Sudan, espe- February 2011 as an opportunity to cially the declaration of the Islamic achieve its objectives in Libya, top- state of Sudan by the Ingaz regime pling Gaddafi from power and, sub- in January 1991. Despite the inter- sequently protecting the Sudanese national embargo imposed on Libya national security from Libya inter- by the US and the West at that time, vention. the Gaddafi regime possessed all the The Libyan intervention was clear means to destabilize Sudan, thanks in the Darfur conflict since its inter- to the Gaddafi regime’s revenues ruption in 2003,(3) and all indica- from oil exports. tions were clear of the Gaddafi re- The Sudanese regime dealt con- gime’s involvement in financing the tinually with Gaddafi through a pol- by providing the Su- icy of restraint, based on their un- dan Liberation Movement (SLM) derstanding of Gaddafi’s personal- and JEM, led by the late Dr. Khalil ity. It tried to avoid involvement into Ibrahim, with weapons and other any conflict with him, and made sev- military assistance, as well as pro- eral official visits to Tripoli, explain- viding the Darfur rebel movements ing the political developments in Su- with training bases inside the Libyan dan. The Sudanese leaders did their territories. best to not enrage or provoke him, After the Chadian(4) authorities and also convinced him that he is an refused to receive Khalil Ibrahim in integral part and a key character for May 2010 and confiscated his stability in Sudan. However, all Chadian travel documents, the JEM these diplomatic moves did not leader and ten of his companions change Gaddafi’s mind and never flew to Libya, where they were deterred him from supporting the hosted by Gaddafi. As a result, the movements involved in the Darfur Sudanese authorities closed its bor- conflict, especially the JEM. This ders with Libya, and sent its security active Libyan role in supporting the and military forces to implement Darfur armed movements formed a this action in the same month. firm conviction of the Sudanese gov-

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Gaddafi’s involvement was possi- gested in the Tripoli initiative will bly due to his desire to play a politi- weaken its sovereignty in the Darfur cal role in Sudan after it became region. clear that the problem of Southern Motives of the Sudanese role in Sudan was on its way to settlement. Libya 2011: Gaddafi might have probably feared that stability in north Sudan, with It became clear to Sudan that the its ability in the future to extract oil, overthrow of Colonel Muammar would lead to a greater development Gaddafi, would improve Sudan's for the country, which might in turn direct relations with neighboring lead north Sudan to use its potential countries and regional ones, and influence to effect change in Libya would achieve internal stability in and to threaten its influence in Sudan. As a result, Sudan joined the North Africa and in the African re- international community led by the gion in general. Gaddafi’s fears US(5) and most of the Arab coun- might have also exacerbated by his tries after the revolution of 17 Feb- perception that most of Libya's ruary 2011, as a result of the refusal population have religious leanings of Colonel Gaddafi’s regime to re- that tend to ally with the Sudanese spond to the demands of the Libyan regime's Islamic orientation. people, and used force and brutality to suppress protests, leading to the The Libyan intervention might UN Security Council Resolution have also been due to the pressures 1970 (2011) taken unanimously on exercised by some of the citizens of 26 February 2011 to halt violence southern Libya to intervene in the immediately , and considered the Darfur problem, including Mr. Os- systematic crimes oriented by Gad- man Al-Boshra and other members dafi regime against civilians in Libya of the Revolutionary Committees as crimes against humanity. This belonging to the alliance of the decision imposed an embargo on the Tubu, Bideyat and Zaghawa tribes, supply of all types of weapons to who are relatives to some of Darfur Libya, and prohibited it from pur- tribes and have old mutual alliances. chasing weapons, in addition to pre- Also Gaddafi may have been an- venting some officials from Gaddafi gered from the Sudanese authorities regime officials from travelling that preferred the Qatari peace ini- abroad. However, the African states’ tiative on Darfur and neglected that response was late as a result of their of Tripoli, as the Sudanese authori- relation with the Gaddafi regime, ties did not trust Gaddafi, because and as a result of the finance given they believed that solutions sug- by Gaddafi to the African Union.

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This explains the refusal of the Afri- vided them with logistical assistance, can Union summit held in the capi- training and supply of arms, ammu- tal of Equatorial Guinea (Malabo) in nition and combat equipment and July 2011 to intervene in Libya. security and intelligence coopera- Despite the success of the revolu- tion. After that, the presence of Su- tion in ending the Gaddafi regime, danese security and intelligence in- yet reaching a peaceful solution to creased inside Libya, to play critical the conflict in Darfur had failed, roles for the benefit of the Libyan not to mention the spread of weap- armed revolution. On 1 May 2011, ons from Libya to the desert the Libyan authorities expelled the and neighboring countries. There is Sudanese consulate at Kufra, in also an increase in militant groups southeast Libya close to the Suda- once associated with the Gaddafi nese border, and closed down the regime in West, Central and Eastern mission headquarters, accusing Su- parts of Africa, and the spread of dan of interfering in favor of the small and medium arms, and anti- revolutionaries. At the same time, aircraft weapons in the northern Sudan also expelled Libyan consular parts of the Sahara desert, from the mission in the city of El-Fasher and southern Libyan border up to areas ordered its members to leave the between Algeria and Mali, which country within 24 hours. now poses a threat to neighboring The international community re- countries and regional security. sponded to what was happening in The Sudanese role started to grow Libya upon a demand from the in Libya after the uprising of Febru- Arab League and the Libyan opposi- ary 17 ,2011, with news saying that tion to intervene. The Sudan had there is a preparation for a military then made considerable progress in operation by the JEM to support the field of political, security and Gaddafi, besides preparing for a military coordination with the NTC. military operation inside the Sudan When Security Council issued Reso- with military support from Libya. lution 1973 (2011) on March 17, 2011 to protect civilians from Gad- Thereafter, the Sudanese armed dafi’s brutal attacks towards his forces alongside forces of the Na- own people, US(6) and other NATO tional intelligence and Security Ser- forces began to carry out military vice (NISS) tightened their grip on air and sea operations to impose a the Sudan-Libyan border. The Su- ban on and reduce the entry of arms danese authorities coordinated with to Libya, as well as force a no-fly the Libyan opposition, and pro- zone over the Libyan territories.

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They formed the Contact Group on armed groups backed by the Gad- Libya on March 29, 2011, which met dafi regime tried to move out of in Doha after a week of composition. Libya with significant military This meeting conceived a vision for equipment and huge funds. But the the future of Libya and gained sup- coordination efforts between Sudan, port from coalition of countries, in- the NTC and the international forces cluding the Sudan. NATO and part- became a key tool in defeating the ners began operations in Libya on Gaddafi regime and helped rebels to March 31, 2011 to implement the enter Tripoli on August 21, 2011. UN Security Council Resolution The Sudanese role was instrumen- 1973 (2011). Sudan opened its air- tal in Libya in 2011 before and after space to NATO aircraft operations calling the NATO to intervene. Su- at the beginning of the Odyssey op- danese national security and mili- eration in March 2011, while all the tary intelligence monitored all move- required information on the Millen- ments of Gaddafi Brigades in east- nium bombing in Libya was passed ern and southern Libya, and pro- by Sudan from its Libyan agents. vided logistical and military support The to the revolutionaries in Benghazi, (SAF) played a vital role to expel Misurata and Ajdabyia and other Gaddafi elements from the city of areas. Sudanese intelligence formed Kufra (7). They then recaptured it the mainstay for concentrated through an attack via three axes bombing operations by NATO managed through the destruction of against military targets of the Gad- most of the Gaddafi battalions. dafi regime. A significant role was Later on, Kufra town was handed played by Sudanese officers in pro- over to the rebels. Sudan continued viding logistical and military sup- its efforts in Libya to track Khalil port operations to the Libyan rebels, Ibrahim and his movement, based as well as continuously providing on information from intelligence intelligence to the NATO, besides agents confirming that the forces of their assistance in arresting leading Khalil Ibrahim planned to return to figures in the Gaddafi regime. Darfur with equipment, weapons The size of support provided to and Libyan money. Sudan continued the Libyan rebels to topple the Gad- Joint Coordination of security and dafi regime was revealed by the Su- military ties with the TNC. In the danese President, Omar Al Bashir, heat of battle between Gaddafi and on October 26, 2011, when he spoke rebels in Misrata, Zintan, Ajdabiya at a celebration in Kassala, attended and other Libyan cities, several by the Prince of Qatar, Sheikh

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Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani and endeavored since the out- the Eritrean President Isaias Af- break of the Libyan Revolution, to werki, marking the occasion of the play a key role in the removal of the opening of a road connecting Sudan Gaddafi regime. This is done and . President Bashir an- through supporting the revolution- nounced officially for the first time, aries in Libya, providing them with that weapons and ammunition had information and data, weapons and reached all Libyan revolutionaries ammunition and logistical support, in Misrata, the western mountains, and revealing alliances that were Benghazi and Kufra, stressing that made and sponsored by Gaddafi the forces that entered Tripoli had, with the movements and activists in as part of their armaments and lo- Darfur, according to a statement gistical and information capabilities, from the Libyan military operations a one hundred percent Sudanese room. supplies. In his speech, President Al One of the biggest successes of Bashir talked about the Gaddafi ef- NISS was the process of normaliza- forts to undermine the Sudan na- tion between Sudanese government tional security, and stated that Su- and , which led both govern- dan was able to fight back. ments to sign a military and security Shortly after the fall of the Gad- protocol(8) in January 2011to pro- dafi regime, the Libyan operations tect their borders (1280 km). Now HQ expressed its thanks and appre- the borders between Sudan and ciation on October 20, 2011, for the Libya are also under the control of a active role of the NISS to arrest Saif joint Sudanese-Libyan force, which Al Islam Al Gaddafi. Libyan secu- seize and block all outlets to prevent rity source said that the national any infiltration into the Sudanese security and intelligence of Sudan and Chadian border by Gaddafi fol- played a central and essential role lowers. These forces worked as sen- by providing technical and opera- sor and reconnaissance system for tional support and information lead- any suspicious movements of armed ing to arrest of Saif Al Islam in the groups and small arms. Because the south of Libya. The source con- Libyan Revolution has produced a firmed that this role is an extension new reality in Sudan and Chad, this to the Sudanese government's role in joint force consists of one Sudanese supporting the Libyan revolution. battalion and one Libyan, supported The role of the Sudanese security by armored, air and reconnaissance and military intelligence in Libya elements, Sudan has provided im- 2011: portant support to these forces rep-

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resented in 35 combat vehicles (pick- with much mistrust and disorder, up) and about 20 large military and deeply influenced by the person- transport vehicles for various pur- ality of Gaddafi which carried with poses,(9) in addition to a consider- it contradictory positions towards able number of light armored vehi- Sudan. Despite his calls on unity of cles and other combat aids. the African continent, and his quest In statements by Sudanese security to abolish boundaries and adopt officials, who preferred not to men- common policies among African tion their names, they said that NISS countries, as well as his calls to form and Sudanese military intelligence a united African government, a sug- services, penetrated the Libyan in- gestion, which was discussed at a telligence from its highest position to Sirte conference in 2009, Gaddafi, the bottom. Objective reasons facili- was at the same time supporting and tated the penetration process, as the encouraging Sudanese rebels includ- former Libyan security system was ing secessionists. considered as the worst security sys- The fall of the Gaddafi regime pro- tem in the Arab and African region, duced a new equation in the region in which its members do not have (10) and ended the instability situa- any secret approach. In addition to tion concerning Libyan-Sudanese lack of skills due to their behavior relations, thus allowing many oppor- and corruption, the Libyan security tunities to build new foundations officers use foreign servants, and and to contribute to the formation of some of them have a number of firm future relations between Sudan houses and recreation lodgings run and Libya, on the basis of good by Sudanese. It seems that the Suda- neighborly relations and common nese security and military intelli- interests. gence achieved many successes in There are several factors that will Libya before and after the Libyan play positive roles in developing new revolution, but perhaps it is not the reality for Libyan-Sudanese rela- time to reveal the details yet. tions. The most important factors Sudanese-Libyan relations after will be the ability of the Libyan Gaddafi: revolution to exercise control over The fall of the regime of Colonel the army and security throughout Gaddafi played a crucial role in re- the Libyan lands, and the removal of shaping the future of relations be- the remnants of the Gaddafi regime tween Libya and Sudan. After over (the liberation of Beni Walid town 42 years of past relations marked from the grip of Gaddafi loyalists 25 October 2012 acts as an example.)

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This is especially important in the Therefore, fall of the Gaddafi's re- bordering desert areas between Su- gime helped to stop support to dan and Chad, because of the con- armed movements in Darfur. tinued presence of Gaddafi re- The Political system in Libya after mained elements in that region, the revolution and its impact on the which will contribute to the destabi- formation of relations between Su- lization of the new situation in Libya dan and Libya: and may act as a source for the sup- ply of arms to Darfur region and all The nature of the political system regions (11)around Libya. In turn, in Libya after the fall of Gaddafi, this creates conditions conducive to and the nature of its foreign policy a guerrilla war, if some armed and its trends towards the neighbor- movements in Darfur and northern ing countries, is an active ingredient regions of Chad refuse to engage in in the formation of close Libyan- the peace process. Sudanese relations. It should be ac- knowledged that the essential sup- There were many rumors about port that the international commu- smuggling of large quantities of Lib- nity provided to the Libyan revolu- yan arms into Darfur after the col- tion, and the role played by the US, lapse of the Gaddafi regime, espe- France, and Britain through the cially after the passage of late Dr. NATO, led to the victory of the Lib- Khalil Ibrahim from Libya to South yan rebels. This will all have an im- Sudan in September 2011. The fall pact on the future relations between of Gaddafi regime has in effect Sudan and Libya. ended all its previous regional alli- ances. The Gaddafi regime had been The continued tense relations be- associated with Chad, Uganda and tween Sudan, the US, and some Eritrea, all of which have succeeded Western countries, with the latter with the support of Gaddafi to play imposing sanctions and pressure on pivotal roles in the Darfur crisis, by the Sudanese regime, due to the harboring leaders of Darfur rebel situation in Darfur and the relations movements, and establishing camps between Khartoum and , may to train them. Despite the geo- probably influence the post-Gaddafi graphical distance of some of these Libyan policy towards the Sudan, countries from Darfur region, for despite Sudan's effective involve- example Uganda was able to play an ment in the overthrow of Gaddafi instrumental role in the Darfur cri- regime. Nonetheless, Sudan is the sis because of the close relationship largest beneficiary of the fall of the between Gaddafi and Museveni. Gaddafi regime. Its fall led to the

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removal of one of the greatest assisting them militarily and logisti- threats against national security in cally. The Sudanese hoped that the Sudan, and had also led to calm the Libyans may appreciate the Suda- situation in Darfur. Now, the proc- nese supporting role. If there had ess of finding a peaceful political been no such Sudanese support to solution to the Darfur crisis is con- the Libyan revolutionaries, the Ku- sidered one of the most important fra zone would not have been liber- objectives of the Sudanese govern- ated from Gaddafi brigades. Sudan ment, which will continue its efforts also played an important role in fa- to stabilize the troubled region in cilitating communication with the Darfur so as to achieve rapid politi- Libyan neighboring countries dur- cal and socio-economic changes, find ing the 2011 revolution. This is espe- resolutions to the root causes of the cially the case with Niger, unless for crisis (1) in Sudan, and to perform Sudan’s intervention, the Libyan radical changes in ending conflicts Transitional Council may not have through dialogue and peace-building communicated politically with the processes. Government of Niger, because its Conclusion: leadership was still supporting the Libyan ex-regime. The relationship between Sudan and Libya has gone through three The third stage: is the development stages. The first: represented by the of future relations between the Su- period of the Gaddafi regime, who dan and Libya to strengthen bilat- harmed Sudan and its people even eral relations based on good more than it harmed the Libyan neighborliness and to enhance re- people, due to his regime’s involve- gional peace to safeguard common ment in funding everything that may interests between the two countries. cause instability in the Sudan, Cooperation between the two coun- which, in turn, damaged Sudan's tries, and other countries of the re- relations with neighboring, regional gion, in social, cultural, security, po- and international countries. litical, economic and military and security fields, will undoubtedly con- The second stage: is the stage tribute to greater stability for both marked by the beginning of the 17 countries and the whole region(12). February 2011 revolution up to the end of the Gaddafi regime in 20 Oc- The end of the Gaddafi regime tober 2011, during which Sudan dealt a fatal blow to the JEM, which played a vital role in supporting the later suffered the elimination of its Libyan revolution politically and in leader, Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, after he crossed from Libya through Darfur

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to , which led to de- regional and the international chal- struction of most of his vehicles and lenges. These challenges included army in September 2011. The end of achieving regional stability and se- the Gaddafi regime had in effect curity, and developing the economic marked the end of his regime’s re- structure of the regional states. Co- gional alliances, which aimed to cre- operation between the Sudan and ate instability in the Sudan and most Libya today, instead of supporting countries of the region, threatening illegal armed groups, which contrib- peace and security of Africa and be- ute to the instability of the region yond(13). and the diffusion of violence, can Sudan's role in Libya in 2011 significantly contribute to eliminat- aimed to topple the Gaddafi regime, ing the expansion of war and armed which was viewed as the greatest groups in the region, as well as to threat to the Sudanese national secu- integrating all citizens of the region rity, as well as the regional and in- in the economic systems of the re- ternational security. It was intended spective countries, and building a to contribute to building a modern culture of peace and stability(14). system capable of confronting the

1. Asim Fath-Elrahman, Darfur Crisis, Fact and Solutions, Research Paper, Khartoum, 2008. 2. Flint, Julie and Alex de Waal, Darfur: New History of A long War, London Zed Books, 2008. 3. Marina Ottay & Mai Saadani, Sudan conflict to conflict, Carnegie Papers, Middle East May 1, 2012 4. Claudio Gramizzi & Jerome Tubiana, Small Arms Survey, Forgotten Darfur, old meth- ods and new players. Graduate Institute of International and Development © Studies, Geneva 2012 5. Clark A. Murdock and Becca Smith, the Libyan Intervention A Study in U.S. Grand Strategy, Global Forecast 2011 6. Sami Ahmed, the position of the United States of America of the Libyan revolution, African Strategic Report 2010 - 2011, the seventh edition, Research Institute of African Studies, University of Cairo, Egypt, October 2011. 7. Interview with Sudan army officers, Sudanese Libyan frontiers Nov 2011 8. Protocol of securing Sudanese Chadian frontiers, January 2011 9. Interview with Sudanese security officers, Sudanese Libyan frontiers Nov 2011. 10. Mustafa Omar Alter, the challenges of the transition to democracy in Libya, Libyan Al- Watan newspaper, September 23, 2011. 11. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Media Review for September 7, 2011 12. www.sudanile.com/thursday16June 2011 7:33 13. Mohamed Ahmed Abdel Ghaffar, political transitions and regional changes and their impact on Sudan and the region, Journal of Future Studies, the first issue, the fifth volume, the sev- enth year, Sudan, Khartoum, December 2011. 14. Badr Hassan Shafie, the settlement of conflicts in Africa - ECOWAS model, Cairo university publishing house, First Edition, 2009.

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