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Opportunities for Peace in Kismayo, Somalia

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Opportunities for peace in Kismayo, Somalia Insights from local peacebuilders on the causes of violent conflict and the prospects for peace April 2019 AMISOM About this report Contents The findings of this report and knowledge gathered through Abbreviations 4 the Peace Exchange would not have been possible without List of Figures 4 the participation and contributions of Kismayo’s civil society actors. We extend our gratitude to the various peacebuilders Executive Summary 5 who volunteered their time to produce this analysis and who 1. Introduction 10 contributed invaluable insight regarding the ongoing dynamics for peace and conflict in Kismayo and wider Somalia. 2. Methodology 14 We thank Nicholas Frost as the main author of this report, with 3. A background to conflict in Somalia 16 writing support from Charlotte Melly, Megan Renoir and Ahmed 4. Key challenges for peace in Kismayo 20 Abdi. We would also like to thank Dimitri Kotsiras, Adrienne 4.1 Rule of law and governance 22 Monteath-van Dok and Bridget Moix for their editorial support. 4.2 Inter- and intra-clan dynamics 23 The Kismayo Peace Exchange was co-convened by Peace Direct 4.3 Remnants of the civil war and Al-Shabaab occupation 25 as a consortium member to the Conflict Research Programme 4.4 Unemployment and insecurity 25 led by the London School of Economics and Political Science, and the Social-Life and Agricultural Development Organisation 4.5 Environmental degradation and land management 26 (SADO). Additional support was provided by the Somali Women 4.6 Lack of education 26 Solidarity Organisation (SWSO) and SADO, with both the 5. The role of local peacebuilders 28 organisation of the Peace Exchange, as well as with editorial 5.1 Traditional justice mechanisms 29 support for the report. 5.2 Community Peacebuilding 31 We are grateful to the United States Institute of Peace and 5.3 The role of women 33 the European Union for providing financial support to make 6. Conclusions and recommendations 36 this report possible. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this report are those of the Annex – Participating organisations 39 author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace or the European Union. 2 Peace Direct | Opportunities for peace in Kismayo 3 Peace Direct | Opportunities for peace in Kismayo Abbreviations Executive Summary AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia SNA Somali National Army Over 3.5 million people in Somalia have been affected by war and famine in AU African Union TFG Transitional Federal Government the past 30 years. Fighting between rival warlords and the activities of Islamic militants like Al‑Shabaab have destroyed much of the country’s infrastructure CSO Civil Society Organisation UN United Nations and forced over one million people to flee their homes to Kenya. FGS Federal Government of Somalia UNDP UN Development Programme Between 1991 to 2012, successive Transitional context. Since 2015, Peace Direct has worked ICU Islamic Courts Union UNITAF Unified Task Force Federal Governments (TFG) were unable to in Kismayo with the Social-life and Agricultural implement rule of law. This left the country largely Development Organisation (SADO), a Somali KDF Kenya Defence Forces UNOSOM dependent on health relief and food aid, and organisation that provides livelihoods opportunities [I & II] UN Operation in Somalia much of its population were left to deal with the to young people in the region through skills training LVP Local Voices for Peace consequences of conflict without adequate access in mechanics, electronics and tailoring. SADO US United States SADO Social-life and Agricultural Development to aid. supports local young people to get jobs and earn an Organisation income, providing a practical alternative to militant In 2012, a limited, indirect election of a new groups or the treacherous boat journey across the federal parliament and president took place. The Mediterranean. new Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was established in August, concurrent with the end of This report presents the findings of Peace Direct’s the Transition Federal Government’s mandate, and first Peace Exchange workshop in Kismayo, List of figures represents the first permanent central government a practioner-led conflict analysis workshop in the country since the start of the civil war. (subsequently referred to as ‘Peace Exchange’), bringing together 24 representatives from Figure 1: Somalia Conflict Timeline The city of Kismayo in the south-east of the country grassroots peacebuilding organisations from within is home to more than 30 rival clans and 2,000 militia Kismayo. The main objective of the workshop members, all competing for political and economic was to provide a forum where local peacebuilding power. Al-Shabaab remains approximately 30 km organisations could discuss the drivers of conflict, outside the city, its threat ever-present. Political, the key challenges to peace in Kismayo, and economic and social tensions threaten a hard-won to collect information on best practice in local sense of stability, and marginalisation coupled with peacebuilding to identify successful peacebuilding large scale population displacement and ineffective initiatives within Kismayo. state security contribute to the volatility of the 4 Peace Direct | Opportunities for peace in Kismayo 5 Peace Direct | Opportunities for peace in Kismayo The main findings Key strengths of local peacebuilders The participants in the Peace Exchange process In addition, local peacebuilders identified four • Local civil society actors, including women’s • Women in Kismayo play a critical role in identified two primary obstacles to peacebuilding secondary obstacles to peacebuilding: and youth groups, play an extremely important brokering peace. Women’s position in Somali in Kismayo: peacebuilding role in Kismayo. When local society is often contradictory - expected to • Peripheral insecurity resulting from the disputes cannot be dealt with autonomously, mobilise and arm sons and husbands, they • The absence of functioning state institutions. continued operation of -Al Shabaab and the local peacebuilding groups are relied upon are equally associated with teaching and Though the government of Somalia has absence of functioning state entities with the to prevent escalation. They have been the parenting against violence, stepping in and attempted to establish formal institutions for capacity to shut these operations down; primary actors in developing conflict resolution disarming their kinsmen.1 However, with their justice and rule of law, the formal court systems mechanisms, and communities depend on them ability to move in and out of conflict their are fairly weak and corrupt, and are beholden • High rates of unemployment in Kismayo to establish trust during dispute processes. role is increasingly seen by participants in to clan competition for positions of power. and wider Jubaland – particularly amongst the workshop as one of a relatively ‘neutral’ While governance systems within Kismayo are youth – leaving the population vulnerable to • The roles of traditional clan elders, while not party, providing them with a potential role more representative and less corrupt, Kismayo manipulation by warring elites; as prominent as they had once been, still in facilitating dialogue among conflicting residents still rely primarily on traditional command the most respect and influence parties. In many cases, they have broken • Land tenure and environmental degradation – systems of governance and justice. in Kismayo. As state institutions have been through the strict patriarchal structures specifically the impact of the control over the traditionally weak, communities prefer to rely which have previously prevented women’s production and illegal export of charcoal by • The over‑reliance on navigating social more heavily on the traditional systems than participation. Many of them have become Al-Shabaab; systems through clan dynamics. Clan relations they do on the police and justice system. Elders peace ambassadors and activists who actively determine how groups can secure access to are relied upon to vet the recruitment of police • An education gap whereby youth lack engage in peacebuilding. economic resources both inside and outside officers and civil servants. The traditional clan particular skills required to maximise economic formal institutions. Police and law enforcement structure and its associated justice mechanisms Despite these strengths, the challenges faced opportunities open to them. are largely arranged along clan lines, and has been one of the most durable and by local peacebuilders in Somalia and Kismayo residents rely primarily on their respective clan Throughout the Peace Exchange it became clear authentic institutions that Somalis have are significant. Limited resources (both financial members to address issues. that traditional local peacebuilding actors continue trusted throughout the conflicts. and trained human resources), limited accurate to play a vital role in Kismayo. However, both information sharing from government and • Local civil society groups and clan elders short-term and long-term strategies involving security forces, potential targeting by violent frequently collaborate with one another to all actors – including grassroots organisations actors, and mistrust between civil society and support dispute resolution, ensuring that – would need to be adopted if peacebuilding local government, will need to
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