Libia – Studiu De Caz 21/02 - 23/10/2011 Theophyle Materialul Acestei Colectii Este Pus La Dispozita Cititorului Gratuit

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Libia – Studiu De Caz 21/02 - 23/10/2011 Theophyle Materialul Acestei Colectii Este Pus La Dispozita Cititorului Gratuit Libia – Studiu de Caz 21/02 - 23/10/2011 Theophyle Materialul acestei colectii este pus la dispozita cititorului gratuit. Orice reproducere, totala sau partiala fara acordul in scris al autorului, este strict interzisa si se pedepseste conform Legii dreptului de autor. © Theophyle Politeia 2008 - 2011 Libia – un studiu de caz O mica introducere Prolog si epilog; Gaddafi - sfârşitul unui Politeia- Contributors - Hotnews 23/10/2011 bufon şi tragedia unui popor Orientul Mijlociu: al doilea val – Libia Politeia 21/02/2011 Libia – O întoarcere în istorie Politeia- Contributors - Hotnews 2/03/2011 Mic indreptar de diplomaţie prin cătarea Politeia 18/03/2011 puştii Conflictul libian spre epilog – înainte de Politeia 19/03/2011 intervenţie Razboi în Libia – 1 Politeia 20/03/2011 Razboi în Libia – 2 / situaţia tactică Politeia 20/03/2011 Razboi în Libia – 3 / sfârşitul primei faze Politeia 21/03/2011 Clausewitz moare din nou! Politeia 21/03/2011 NATO: Un pod prea departe Politeia 25/03/2011 Sindromul libian Politeia 31/03/2011 Show me the money! Politeia 1/04/2011 Libia după 100 de zile Politeia 1/04/2011 Moartea unui general Politeia- Contributors - Hotnews 31/07/2011 Un Ramadan sângeros – Libia Politeia- Contributors - Hotnews 21/08/2011 Libia: lupte de stradă în Tripoli Politeia- Contributors - Hotnews 6/2/2011 De la Homer până la Gaddafi Contributors - Hotnews 23/08/2011 Petrolul ca preţ al libertăţii Politeia-Contributors – Hotnews 26-28/08/2011 Fără panică, despre războaiele petrolului Politeia 28/08/2011 Cucerirea oraşului Tripoli – Operaţiunea Politeia-Contributors – Hotnews 28/08/2011 “Zorii Sirenei” Libia – un studiu de caz O mica introducere Brosura de fata este o culegere de articole, publicate de mine cu ocazia evenimentelor din Libia de la inceputul lor si pana la deznodamantul tragic al fostului dictator. Culegerea este de fapt inceputul unei carti scrisa in aceste zile, una din primele in limba romana si una din primele care cuprind evenimentele in desfasurare. Brosura este in format PDF. Va sugerez sa mariti la 130-150% daca doriti sa vedeti pozele sau hartiile care insotesc articolele. Sper ca le veti citi si astept prin mail comentariile voastre. Libia – un studiu de caz Prolog si epilog Gaddafi - sfârşitul unui bufon şi tragedia unui popor Acum doi ani, in 2009, in cadrul Adunarii Generale ale “Ligii Arabe,” Muammar Gaddafi dictatorul absolut al Libiei spunea: “Eu sunt un lider international, decanul liderilor lumii arabe, regele regilor Africii si imamul musulmanilor de pretutindeni. Statutul meu international nu-mi permite sa ma cobor la un nivel inferior” . Se referea la faptul ca nu a primit suficienta atentie in acel summit. Acum trei zile, scos de rebelii care cucereau Sirte, dintr-un tub de beton unde se refugiase din cauza unor atacuri aeriene ale fortelor NATO intreba: “Unde ma aflu si cine sunteti voi”? Omul nici macar nu intelegea ce se intampla cu el. Am publicat mai mult de 25 de articole in limba romana legate de insurgenta libiana, conflictul iscat de interventia NATO, petrol, dizidenta si jocurile intre puterile lumii in “cazul libian”. Articolele sunt postate pe Politeia si partial pe HotNews / Contributors. Astazi inchei acest “periplu” publicistic, convins fiind ca voi avea inca sansa sa mai scriu despre ceea ce s-a petrecut, se petrece si se va petrece in Libia. Comparatiile dintre Ceausescu si Gaddafi sunt simpliste si in majoritatea lor neadevarate. Sunt insa trei puncte de convergenta: primul ar fi o reconfigurare geopolitica profunda, care a dat posibilitatea unor reasezari regionale. Al doilea ar fi impopularitatea si lipsa de sprijin intern pe care il aveau cei doi, care reusisera sa-si erodeze sustinerea chiar fata de beneficiarii regimului – intr-un cuvant - posibile tradari ale “garzilor pretoriene.” Al treilea ar fi faptul ca “jucatorii internationali” nu mai aveau incredere in cei doi. Pur si simplu cei doi dictatori o luasara razna! Ambii nu mai intelegeau schimbarile aduse de reasezarile geopolitice. Circul facut de Gaddafi care se plimba cu cortul prin lume nu deranja mai mult decat faptul ca nici una din firmele globale care exploatau petrolul libian nu avea certitudine ca acest colonel nebun nu va rezilia contractele abia semnate. As dori ca cititorul sa inteleaga ca Gaddafi nu a fost un dictator mai malefic decat membrii familiei Ibn Saud, care guverneaza de mai mult de doua secole teritoriul numit astazi Arabia Saudita, dar care intodeauna au respectat contractele avute cu “beneficiarii vestici.” Ca paranteza - pentru a demonstra de ce nu se intampla Libia – un studiu de caz 1 nimic acolo, dar s-a putut intampla in Libia, trebuie de stiut ca familia Ibn Saud are protectie contractuala cu “beneficiarii occidentali” pe baza a trei contracte care mentioneaza ca atata timp cat petrolul forat va ajunge la beneficiarii contractuali Casa Ibn Saud este ferita de “neplaceri”. Primul contract semnat in 1931 de Presedintele american Herbert Hoover si Casa Ibn Saud aducea beneficii de nu mai putin de 50 de mii de lire sterline pentru dreptul de exploatare petroliera, al doilea semnat de Presedintele Roosevelt in 1945 (ultimul contract semnat de el) la bordul vasului de razboi USS Quincy si ratificat de Harry Truman in 1951 si care facea imparteala 50-50% intre Ibn Saud si firma de exploatare petroliera CASOC (mai tarziu Aramco) si in sfarsit al treilea contract din 1988 care fonda Saudi Aramco. Bineinteles ca au fost idei de razgandire a sauditilor, care nu au dorit sa impartaseasca soarta sahului Iranian. Noile vremuri si evenimentele generate i-au facut sa se razgandeasca. Daca Saudia a respectat cu strictete intelegerile cu “beneficiarii,” Gaddafi nu a facut-o nici macar pe departe. In 40 de ani de guvernare, colonelul Gaddafi a reziliat mai mult de 250 de contracte, inclusiv cu tari prietene (spre exemplu Romania) creand datorii neplatite si penalitati de zeci de miliarde de dolari. Dupa o sustinere (intensa) a terorismului international, incercari de a-si procura arme de distrugere in masa, Gaddafi a incercat sa schimbe directia aratand o penitenta limitata, dar complet nesatisfacatoare pentru “beneficiarii occidentali”. Constructia africana a lui Gaddafi si miliardele investite in Africa nu au fost de ajuns. Africanii si-au pastrat loialitaea fata de Gaddafi, fara insa prea mare efect. Prea putin si prea ineficient. Gaddafi si-a distrus cu propria mana armata bazandu-se numai pe cateva unitati Kataeb al Amn (Batalioane ale Securitatii) si Al Haras Assauri (Gardieni ai Revolutiei), ambele conduse de fiii sai, nu mai mult de 5-600 de oameni si cateva zeci de tancuri. Sute de tancuri si avioane cumparate pe bani grei au zacut la “conservare” pana cand rebelii au pus mana pe ele. Cu toate astea, revolta a fost aproape inabusita cand la sfarsitul lui martie a.c., trupele lui Gaddafi erau deja in suburbiile orasului Bengazi, singurul in care mai Libia – un studiu de caz 2 exista o rezistenta armata impotriva lui Gaddafi. Intrarea rapida a francezilor si a britanicilor in conflict pe baza unei rezolutii ONU complet nesatisfacatoare (vezi articolul meu - Mic indreptar de diplomaţie prin cătarea puştii) a schimbat echilibrul si a produs intrarea intr-un conflict de uzura, care pana la urma a distrus toata infrastructura civila construita in zeci de ani si a ucis sau ranit grav aproape 10-12.000 oameni. NATO, fara americani (sau cu o prezenta simbolica), s-a dovedit ineficient si nepregatit pentru un conflict armat, chiar minor, cand in fata lui se prezenta o ramata prost comandata si dezorganizata de mai putin de 10 mii de oameni. Lucrurile s- au rezolvat nu prin instruirea si eficientizarea fortelor rebele, ci prin introducerea unor forte proxi de sorginte islamica (vezi articolul meu “Cucerirea oraşului Tripoli – Operaţiunea “Zorii Sirenei”). Sa fie foarte clar - cucerirea capitalei rapida a fost facuta sub comanda unor forte din statele arabe – Jordan’s Royal Special Forces, care sunt specializate in lupte urbane si cucerirea instalatiilor fortificate si unitati ale fortelor speciale ale Qatarului care au preluat paza oficialilor civili si militari din Consiliul de Tranzitie Libian. Felul in care a fost linsat Gaddafi nu aduce multa speranta pentru viitoarea democratie libiana si nici multa onoare NATO, care a facilitat prinderea si masacrul prin bombardarea si distrugerea coloanei lui Gaddafi care se retragea din Sirte. Cateva date si concluzii posibile dupa Gaddafi si perioada de tranzitie care o va trece Libia. 1. Libia este o societate tribala, alcatuita din aproape 300 de triburi, conduse de cateva zeci de triburi mai mari care concureaza la banii si resursele libiene, aflate in aliante schimbatoare sau in conflicte din negura istoriei lor. Se poate vorbi de un popor libian numai cand discutam despre locuitorii oraselor principale, care la randul lor sunt membrii acelorasi triburi, dar cu un nivel mai ridicat de constiinta civica dobandita de zecile de ani de urbanizare. 2. Despre oamenii “prezentului libian” am scris in articolul “Petrolul ca preţ al libertăţii” . Consiliului de Tranzitie a Libiei (CTL) arata ca un CA al viitorilor beneficiari ai contractelor de reconstructie si explorare al petrolului libian. Era si de asteptat – nu se putea altfel! 3. Din nefericire, acest CTL contine elemente islamiste radicale, veterani ai conflictelor din Afganistan, Irak, Cecenia si Bosnia. Cred ca am reusit sa-i Libia – un studiu de caz 3 descriu foarte bine in articolul “Moartea unui general”. Subiect bineinteles pus sub presul evenimentelor pentru a nu dauna efortului de lichidare a dictatorului. Cred ca din nefericire vom mai auzi despre Obaida Ibn Jarrah Brigade, ucigasii generalului Abdel Fattah Younes si de puternicul trib Obeidi care domina toata Cirenaica (Cyrenaica). 4. Majoritatea membrilor CTL au fost colaboratorii lui Gaddafi, nici mcar nu in linia a doua. Mi-e greu sa cred in metamorfoze subite, desi o alta parte a acestui consiliu sunt cu adevarat dizidenti ai regimului persecutati si schingiuiti ani de zile.
Recommended publications
  • Public Redacted Version of ICC-Ol/11-25-Conf-Exp-Anxl
    ICC-01/11-25-Anx1-Red 05-06-2012 1/12 NM PT Public redacted version OfICC-Ol/11-25-Conf-Exp-Anxl ICC-01/11-25-Anx1-Red 05-06-2012 2/12 NM PT Cour Penale { /\T7\~ _In_t_e_r_n_a_ti_o_n_a_le ~ ~¥ _ InternationaI ~J Criminal Court Original: English No.: ICC-Oll11 Date: 03/06/2012 PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I Before: Judge Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi, Presiding Judge Judge Hans-Peter Kaul Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert SITUATION IN LIBYA Public Document with Confidential Annexes 1 & 2, ex parte, Legal Representative Only Aisha Gaddafi's request for information relating to the status of the Prosecutor's investigations in the Libyan Situation Source: Aisha Gaddafi, represented by Nicholas Kaufman No. ICC-Oll11 1/9 3 June 2012 ICC-01/11-25-Anx1-Red 05-06-2012 3/12 NM PT Document to be notified in accordance with regulation 31 of the Regulations ofthe Court to: The Office of the Prosecutor Counsel for the Defence Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor Ms. Fatou Bensouda, Deputy Prosecutor Legal Representatives of the Victims Legal Representatives of the Applicants Mr. Nicholas Kaufman Unrepresented Victims Unrepresented Applicants (Participation/Reparation) The Office of Public Counsel for The Office of Public Counsel for the Victims Defence States' Representatives Amicus Curiae REGISTRY Registrar Defence Support Section Ms. Silvana Arbia Deputy Registrar Victims and Witnesses Unit Detention Section Victims Participation and Reparations Other Section No. ICC-01l11 2/9 3 June 2012 ICC-01/11-25-Anx1-Red 05-06-2012 4/12 NM PT Relevant Procedural Background 1. On 20 October 2011, Muammar Gaddafi and Mutassim Gaddafi were tortured and subsequently murdered near Sirte, Libya.
    [Show full text]
  • ICC-01/11-01/11 Date: 18 February 2013 PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I Before
    ICC-01/11-01/11-281-Red2 19-02-2013 1/72 FB PT Original: English No.: ICC-01/11-01/11 Date: 18 February 2013 PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I Before: Judge Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi, Presiding Judge Judge Hans-Peter Kaul Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert SITUATION IN LIBYA IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. SAIF AL-ISLAM GADDAFI and ABDULLAH AL- SENUSSI Public with Public Annexes 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 12, Confidential Annexes 4 and 13, and Annexes 6 and 11 confidential ex parte only available to the Representatives of the Libyan Government, the Prosecution, the OPCV, and the Defence for Mr. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi Public Redacted Version of the “Response to the “Libyan Government’s further submissions on issues related to admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi”” Source: Defence of Mr. Saif Al Islam Gaddafi No. ICC-01/11-01/11 1/72 18 February 2013 ICC-01/11-01/11-281-Red2 19-02-2013 2/72 FB PT Document to be notified in accordance with regulation 31 of the Regulations of the Court to: The Office of the Prosecutor Counsel for the Defence Ms. Fatou Bensouda Counsel for Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi: Mr. Xavier-Jean Keïta Ms. Melinda Taylor Counsel for Abdullah Al-Senussi: Mr. Ben Emmerson QC Mr. Rodney Dixon Legal Representatives of the Victims Legal Representatives of the Applicants Unrepresented Victims Unrepresented Applicants (Participation/Reparation) The Office of Public Counsel for The Office of Public Counsel for the Victims Defence Ms. Paolina Massidda Ms.
    [Show full text]
  • DEATH of a DICTATOR Bloody Vengeance in Sirte WATCH
    HUMAN RIGHTS DEATH OF A DICTATOR Bloody Vengeance in Sirte WATCH Death of a Dictator Bloody Vengeance in Sirte Copyright © 2012 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-952-6 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world. We stand with victims and activists to prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom, to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring offenders to justice. We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable. We challenge governments and those who hold power to end abusive practices and respect international human rights law. We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org OCTOBER 2012 ISBN: 1-56432-952-6 Death of a Dictator Bloody Vengeance in Sirte Summary ........................................................................................................................... 1 Recommendations .............................................................................................................14 I. Background ..................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Tháng 05, Trang 2 Người Dân Số 249 Kính Chiếu Yêu Người Dân Hiện Nay, Chúng Tôi Nhận Định Như Sau: 1
    Tháng 05, Trang 2 Người Dân Số 249 Kính Chiếu Yêu Người Dân Hiện nay, chúng tôi nhận định như sau: 1. Đảng Cộng Sản Việt Nam có lãnh thổ, có nhà nước, 8. Đảng Cộng Sản, bạo quyền và đảng viên cộng sản được các nước công nhận / bang giao, và là hội viên tiếp tục lên án những người thực tâm chống bạo quyền Liên Hiệp Quốc. là Việt gian, phản quốc, tay sai, gián điệp để tạo ấn - Những kẻ cơ hội chủ nghĩa dựa vào đó để khuyến dụ tượng bất lợi ở những người không am tường vấn đề. người Việt phải chấp nhận cộng sản. - Những kẻ cơ hội chủ nghĩa đồng tấu, cho những người 2. Đảng viên Cộng Sản tranh giành, đấu đá về địa vị, chống bạo quyền là chống cộng lạc hậu, xơ cứng, ngoan về quyền lợi, và móc ngoặc làm ăn bất chính nên đã cố và quá khích. giầu có, tiền rừng bạc biển nhưng tối đại đa số đồng 9. Cộng sản tung sách báo, băng dĩa, gửi văn công đi bào vẫn bị tước đoạt quyền tư hữu, quyền sống, quyền trình diễn để lung lạc những thành phần tò mò, dễ tính mưu sinh, quyền suy nghĩ, và miễn cưỡng khuất phục và chuộng lạ. bạo quyền. - Những kẻ cơ hội chủ nghĩa tiếp tay bằng việc cổ võ - Những kẻ cơ hội chủ nghĩa dựa vào đó để nói là đã giao lưu đối thoại một chiều, loan tin, phỏng vấn các có những thành phần ngoài Đảng có tiền, có quyền, đất thành phần cộng sản, thiên cộng, phản đối việc chống nước đã có đấu tranh chính trị và có mầm mống tự do đối giao lưu một chiều là không tôn trọng dân chủ và dân chủ.
    [Show full text]
  • Mutassim Gaddafi's Girlfriend Tells of the Final Days of Libyan Regime
    12 Monday 29th August, 2011 The Island Features Against the Tide tax evasion and bribes turns into black money. A through comprehensive constructive programs BY PROFESSOR VIPIN TRIPATHI major sector where black money is generated and and these were directed against the system. Anna Hazari and his supporters have won a major circulated is real estate. In last eight years prices Gandhi never employed fast as a weapon of satya- victory with the Indian Parliament accepting their t is unfortunate that when a serious initiative of land and homes in Delhi, for instance, have graha. Whenever he underwent fast it was under gone up eight fold and only a small fraction of deep agony and was meant to arouse self intro- demands unanimously. True, the Hazari fast has to curb corruption and black money was need- Ied two fasts, by Anna Hazare and Baba Ram money involved in these dealings is in white. spection and sensitivity in the masses. His historic projected corruption as a major issue in India and Dev, have diverted the focus onto two minor issues, Swiss Bank offers 1% or 1.5% interest on its fasts came against communal passions and brought a groundswell of support against it. Will the Lokpal bill and Swiss Bank accounts. There deposits, while real estate return is 30 times more, untouchability. He never encouraged any one to India however change? Will the momentum of the are already several institutions in the country to hence whatever black money goes to Swiss Bank, undertake fast as a short cut to ground work on Hazari movement evaporate once the enthusiasm check corruption, e.g., CAG, CBI, Police, Courts, eventually returns to Indian real estate, as one the issue at hand.
    [Show full text]
  • Photo Feature
    H U M A N R I G H T S DEATH OF A DICTATOR Bloody Vengeance in Sirte WATCH Summary and Recommendations Human Rights Watch | October 2012 A still image from a video recorded by opposition fighters on October 20, 2011, and obtained by Human Rights Watch, shows the late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi apparently just moments after his capture on the outskirts of Sirte by Misrata-based opposition fighters. When captured, Muammar Gaddafi was already heavily bleeding from a shrapnel wound to his temple caused by a grenade thrown by his own bodyguards that exploded in their midst, according to interviews with eyewitnesses. After his capture, Muammar Gaddafi was stabbed in the buttocks with a bayonet and severely abused by the opposition fighters. A later video shows his apparently lifeless and semi-nude body being loaded into an ambulance. DEATH OF A DICTATOR Bloody Vengeance in Sirte When protests against the rule of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi broke out in Libya in February 2011, the government’s security forces responded by opening fire on the protesters. As an initially peaceful protest movement transformed into a fully-fledged armed uprising against his 42-year rule, Gaddafi pledged to chase down the “cockroaches” and “rats” who had taken up arms against him “inch by inch, room by room, home by home, alleyway by alleyway, person by person.”1 A brutal conflict began, with pro- Gaddafi forces indiscriminately shelling civilian areas, arresting thousands of protesters and others suspected of supporting the opposition, holding many in secret detention, and carrying out summary executions.
    [Show full text]
  • Cases: Syria and Ukraine (2012 -2016)
    Universidad del Azuay Department of Legal Sciences School of International Studies THE NEW COLD WAR? CASES: SYRIA AND UKRAINE (2012 -2016) Graduation thesis prior to obtaining a Bilingual Bachelor in International Studies minor in Foreign Trade Authors: María Gabriela Carrión Cisneros María Belén Guerrero Pesántez Director: Lcdo. Matías Zibell García Cuenca-Ecuador 2017 INDEX OF CONTENT INDEX OF CONTENT ............................................................................................. ii ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................ v INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER 1: THE COLD WAR ............................................................................. 3 1.1 Background ....................................................................................................... 3 1.2 Development of the Cold War ......................................................................... 6 1.2.1 “Good intentions”: the Marshall Plan and the Molotov Plan ............... 7 1.2.2 Interventionism: Germany, Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan ............. 9 1.2.2.1 Germany ............................................................................................ 10 1.2.2.2 Korea .................................................................................................. 13 1.2.2.3 Vietnam .............................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Was It Worth It? Reflections on the Libyan Revolution
    Transcript Was it Worth it? Reflections on the Libyan Revolution Lindsay Hilsum International Editor, Channel 4 News Chair: Elham Saudi Co-Founder and Director, Lawyers for Justice in Libya 27 April 2012 The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s)/ speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the publication or details of the event. Where this document refers to or reports statements made by speakers at an event every effort has been made to provide a fair representation of their views and opinions, but the ultimate responsibility for accuracy lies with this document’s author(s). The published text of speeches and presentations may differ from delivery. Transcript: Was it Worth it? Reflections on the Libyan Revolution Elham Saudi: Good afternoon, and welcome to Chatham House. I'll introduce myself very briefly. I'm Elham Saudi. I'm the co-founder and director of Lawyers for Justice in Libya. And I'll also make a disclosure, as a lawyer, upfront: I'm a big fan of Lindsay's, so I might be slightly biased in the course of this afternoon. It gives me a lot of pleasure, as a result, to introduce Lindsay.
    [Show full text]
  • Libya, the New York Times, and a Propaganda Model of the Mass Media
    Western Michigan University ScholarWorks at WMU Master's Theses Graduate College 12-2017 Libya, The New York Times, and a Propaganda Model of the Mass Media Randy LaPrairie Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses Part of the Sociology Commons Recommended Citation LaPrairie, Randy, "Libya, The New York Times, and a Propaganda Model of the Mass Media" (2017). Master's Theses. 1995. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses/1995 This Masters Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LIBYA, THE NEW YORK TIMES, AND A PROPAGANDA MODEL OF THE MASS MEDIA by Randy LaPrairie A thesis submitted to the Graduate College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Sociology Western Michigan University December 2017 Thesis Committee: Gregory Howard, Ph.D., Chair Barry Goetz, Ph.D. Ronald Kramer, Ph.D. LIBYA, THE NEW YORK TIMES, AND A PROPAGANDA MODEL OF THE MASS MEDIA Randy LaPrairie, M.A. Western Michigan University, 2017 This project derives a set of research expectations from the propaganda model, a structural model of the corporate news media developed by Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky. The model predicts that the news media will reflect elite views and priorities and marginalize views outside the range of elite opinion. Consequently, it is expected that the media will tend to support the elite’s preferred modes of exercising state power in international affairs.
    [Show full text]
  • Why and How Authoritarian Regimes Produce Narratives of Governance: Discourse and Policy Narratives in Libya (2003-2010)
    Why and How Authoritarian Regimes Produce Narratives of Governance: Discourse and Policy Narratives in Libya (2003-2010) Submitted by Anas Abubakr Buera to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics, June 2015 This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. Anas Buera………………………………………………………… Abstract This thesis starts from a basic intellectual curiosity: why would an authoritarian regime care about the ‘governance change’? What would governance possibly mean for a regime heavily sanctioned by the United Nations? And assuming that an authoritarian leader is forced to accept some notions of ‘improving on governance’; what specific dimensions of governance would be targeted for reform? How would they be ‘narrated’ to the domestic and international audience? The main purpose of this thesis is to explore the communication of policy change in authoritarian regimes through a new lens on the policy process. This original lens is based on the combination of discursive institutionalism and the narrative policy framework. At the outset, we argue that authoritarian regimes are interested in ‘good governance’ as defined by international organizations, but very selectively and with strategic intentions connected to the different internal audiences and international audience costs. We also argue that these regimes use narratives to support their strategic intentions and that their discourse is contingent on the institutional context – which shapes coordinative and communicative elements of policy discourse.
    [Show full text]
  • Was It Worth It? Reflections on the Libyan Revolution
    Transcript Was it Worth it? Reflections on the Libyan Revolution Lindsay Hilsum International Editor, Channel 4 News Chair: Elham Saudi Co-Founder and Director, Lawyers for Justice in Libya 27 April 2012 The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s)/ speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the publication or details of the event. Where this document refers to or reports statements made by speakers at an event every effort has been made to provide a fair representation of their views and opinions, but the ultimate responsibility for accuracy lies with this document’s author(s). The published text of speeches and presentations may differ from delivery. Transcript: Was it Worth it? Reflections on the Libyan Revolution Elham Saudi: Good afternoon, and welcome to Chatham House. I'll introduce myself very briefly. I'm Elham Saudi. I'm the co-founder and director of Lawyers for Justice in Libya. And I'll also make a disclosure, as a lawyer, upfront: I'm a big fan of Lindsay's, so I might be slightly biased in the course of this afternoon. It gives me a lot of pleasure, as a result, to introduce Lindsay.
    [Show full text]
  • Public Redacted Version of ICC-Ol/11-24-Conf-Exp-Anxl ICC-01/11-24-Anx1-Red 05-06-2012 2/12 NM PT
    ICC-01/11-24-Anx1-Red 05-06-2012 1/12 NM PT Public redacted version Of ICC-Ol/11-24-Conf-Exp-Anxl ICC-01/11-24-Anx1-Red 05-06-2012 2/12 NM PT Cour Penale , , Internationale t~\ -----------, J! ----------- International ~ # Criminal Court Original: English No.: ICC-OVll Date: 01/06/2012 PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I Before: Judge Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi, Presiding Judge Judge Hans-Peter Kaul Judge Christine Van den Wygaert SITUATION IN LIBYA Public Document with Confidential Annexes 1 & 2, ex parte, Legal Representative Only Aisha Gaddafi's request for information relating to the Prosecutor's investigation of the murder of Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi Source: Aisha Gaddafi, represented by Nicholas Kaufman No.ICC-Ol/II-0VII 1/9 1 June 2012 ICC-01/11-24-Anx1-Red 05-06-2012 3/12 NM PT Document to be notified in accordance with regulation 31 of the Regulations ofthe Court to: The Office of the Prosecutor Counsel for the Defence Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor Ms. Fatou Bensouda, Deputy Prosecutor Legal Representatives of the Victims Legal Representatives of the Applicants Mr. Nicholas Kaufman Unrepresented Victims Unrepresented Applicants (ParticipationlReparation) The Office of Public Counsel for The Office of Public Counsel for the Victims Defence States' Representatives Amicus Curiae REGISTRY Registrar Defence Support Section Ms. Silvana Arbia Deputy Registrar Victims and Witnesses Unit Detention Section Victims Participation and Reparations Other Section No. ICC-01l11-01111 2/9 1 June 2012 ICC-01/11-24-Anx1-Red 05-06-2012 4/12 NM PT Relevant Procedural Background 1.
    [Show full text]