DOCSLIB.ORG

Is Apple Playing Fair? Navigating the Ipod Fairplay DRM

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Is Apple Playing Fair? Navigating the Ipod Fairplay DRM UC Irvine UC Irvine Previously Published Works Title Is Apple Playing Fair? Navigating the iPod DRM Controversy Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6nq2g1b0 Journal NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY & INTELLECTUAL PROP, 5 Authors Arewa, OB Sharpe, NF Publication Date 2007 License https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 4.0 Peer reviewed eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property Volume 5, Number 2 (Spring 2007) Is Apple Playing Fair? Navigating the iPod FairPlay DRM Controversy By Nicola F. Sharpe* and Olufunmilayo B. Arewa** I. INTRODUCTION ¶1 On April 2, 2007, Apple Inc. and EMI Music held a joint press conference in London that may be the harbinger of significant changes in the digital music arena.1 This press conference, whose attendees included EMI Group CEO Eric Nicoli and Apple CEO Steve Jobs, unfolded in an environment of significant technological and commercial changes in the music industry. The shift to the digital era has been a turbulent one for many players in the music industry, particularly as a result of the widespread distribution of unauthorized digital music files and the concurrent significant decline in record industry sales.2 The Apple-EMI agreement permits Apple to sell EMI Music’s entire digital music catalog without digital rights management (DRM),3 which represents a significant shift from the previous policy of the major record companies. Such companies have until this point typically required that music distributed in digital form include DRM restrictions on use and copying.4 ¶2 The Apple-EMI announcement should be considered in light of the recent developments in the broader digital music market.5 Apple has in many respects played a pivotal role in those developments, transforming itself from a technology company to an entertainment company with its core strength in the sale and distribution of digital * Visiting Assistant Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. Cornell University; J.D., M.B.A., Yale University. Email: [email protected]. **Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. A.B., Harvard College; M.A., Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley (Anthropology); A.M., University of Michigan (Applied Economics); J.D., Harvard Law School. The authors would like to thank Paul Heald, Steve Ramirez, Max Schanzenbach, and Jamelle Sharpe for their comments and for inspiring us to expand this project. Any errors, of course, are ours alone. Email: [email protected]. © 2007 Nicola F. Sharpe and Olufunmilayo B. Arewa. 1 EMI Group Press Release, EMI Music Launches DRM-Free Superior Sound Quality Downloads Across Its Entire Digital Repertoire, Apr. 2, 2007, http://www.emigroup.com/Press/2007/press18.htm; Apple Inc. Press Release, Apple Unveils Higher Quality DRM-Free Music on the iTunes Store, Apr. 2, 2007, http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/04/02itunes.html. 2 See Nicola F. Sharpe & Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Interoperability, Antitrust and Consumer Welfare: Is the Apple iPod Changing its Tune? (2007) (manuscript on file with authors). 3 See EMI Group Press Release, supra note 1; see also infra notes 26 to 32 and accompanying text. 4 With a few notable exceptions, such as Sony Rootkit software, which was anticopying software installed on certain Sony CDs that also secretly collected security information from computers playing the CD, music content contained on physical CDs has generally not been subject to DRM or other protective measures to prevent copying. See Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2. 5 See infra notes 115-128 and accompanying text. Vol. 5:2] Nicola F. Sharpe and Olufunmilayo B. Arewa music.6 Apple derives its strength from the iPod portable digital music player, which is currently the world’s dominant digital music device.7 Apple has also become one of the largest sellers of musical content in the U.S.8 Although Apple has now agreed to distribute music from the EMI catalog without DRM, many believe the technological choices that Apple has made in the past surrounding DRM technology have laid the foundation for Apple’s market dominance.9 Until now, Apple has facilitated its market dominance by deliberately limiting interoperability with non-Apple devices and non- Apple online music stores for iPod device and iTunes Music Store (“iTMS”) users.10 From a technology perspective, this bundling11 of the iPod with iTMS has been made easier by virtue of Apple’s FairPlay DRM, which limits usage of music purchased from iTMS.12 Apple’s bundling of the iPod and iTMS, which together form a network, has led to lawsuits against Apple alleging antitrust violations ranging from tying to attempted monopolization; some foreign jurisdictions have gone so far as to threaten to ban certain Apple technologies on consumer protection grounds.13 This type of legal pressure has likely played a role in Apple’s decision to sell digital music without DRM in partnership with EMI.14 ¶3 The technological choices that Apple has made in developing the iPod and iTMS raise difficult questions about the emergence of new technologies, the development of markets for innovative products, and how existing legal frameworks, including intellectual property and antitrust laws, should deal with new technologies and new 6 See Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2. 7 Id. 8 Nick Wingfield & Ethan Smith, Music’s New Gatekeepers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2007, at W1 (noting that Apple is now one of the largest sellers of music in the U.S.). 9 See Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2. 10 The iPod controversy highlights potential ambiguities in uses and understandings of the term interoperability, particularly with respect to consumer devices. Interoperability may refer to technological possibility, which might exist if any potential consumer could make a device interoperable. Under this view of interoperability, devices might be characterized as interoperable despite the fact that only technologically sophisticated consumers are able to interconnect the devices. Alternatively, interoperability may refer to devices that are “plug and play,” where even technologically unsophisticated users are easily able to interconnect devices. These differences in uses and understandings of the term interoperability are evident in the iPod/iTMS controversy, where Steve Jobs sees Apple’s products as already interoperable with those of competitors. In contrast, the lawsuits against Apple and assertions from European regulators make different assumptions about what constitutes an interoperable device. The understandings of the term interoperability by plaintiffs in lawsuits and European regulators are based on assumptions about what should constitute an interoperable device, based at least in part on both the ability of users of average technological sophistication as well as the number of intermediate steps that might be required to interconnect devices. Discussions of interoperability in this article reflect the varied uses of the term in different contexts but do not always identify the specific derivation or explicitly identify the assumptions made about interoperability in particular instances. For further discussion of this point, see Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2. 11 While economists and some U.S. courts at times use the term “bundling” and the term “tying” separately, this article will use the terms interchangeably. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 103 (2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf (noting that the term bundling “typically refers to a sale in which products are sold only in fixed proportions,” whereas the term tying is typically used when the portions are not fixed. “Case law in the United States sometimes uses the terms ‘tying’ and ‘bundling’ interchangeably.” (citations omitted)). 12 Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2. 13 Id. 14 Id. 333 NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [2007 innovations. To address these questions, this Article examines the iPod/iTunes network and argues that while innovation, intellectual property laws, and network effects may in part explain Apple’s market dominance, consumer welfare should be taken into account in legal assessments of the iPod/iTMS bundle, as well as the competitive market consequences of Apple’s bundling. Specifically, where new technologies once increased the choices available to consumers, growing recognition exists today that such technologies may now unnecessarily constrain consumer choices.15 ¶4 This Article lays out the topography of the Apple FairPlay controversy, looking closely at the business and market environment within which the iPod/iTMS network arose. This Article does not seek to draw conclusions about the legal status of the iPod/iTMS network under existing laws. Rather, it outlines some ways in which existing legal frameworks may be applied to the structures and behaviors associated with companies’ development of technological and business innovations. Part II discusses the iPod device, the iPod/iTMS bundle, and the broader business, technology and cultural context within which the iPod and iTMS were deployed. Part III analyzes the antitrust allegations against Apple and examines Apple’s behavior and success in light of the network effects produced by the iPod/iTMS bundle. In conclusion, Part IV identifies some questions courts should contemplate when considering the competitive concerns
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and the Itunes Ecosystem
    533 ANTITRUST, INTELLECTU AL PROPERTY, AND THE ITUNES ECOSYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF APPLE’S FAIRPLAY TECHNOLOGY WITH A NOD TO THE PECULIARITIES OF • INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WILLOW NOONAN* I. INTRODUCTION In December 2008, Apple’s iTunes online music store surpassed Wal- Mart as the largest music retailer in the world.1 In the closely related portable music player market, Apple’s iPod enjoys similar success.2 Undoubtedly, Ap- ple’s insight and innovation won much of this eminence. However, a close look at Apple’s business practices reveals some conduct that draws a suspicious eye from antitrust and intellectual property laws. The first part of this article traces the development of online music and the subsequent proliferation of copyright infringement. The next part outlines the technical details, benefits, and drawbacks of Apple’s iTunes ecosystem, a notable combination of Apple products and services. The third part undertakes a traditional antitrust analysis of Apple’s conduct and suggests the need for dee- per inquiry. The next part investigates how Apple’s conduct implicates intellec- tual property law. The fifth part reviews the doctrine of intellectual property misuse and how it might apply to Apple. The final part revisits the antitrust • 2009 IDEA Student Intellectual Property Writing Competition Winner. * Candidate for Juris Doctor, 2010, The George Washington University Law School. 1 Press Release, Apple, Inc., iTunes Store Top Music Retailer in the US (Apr. 3, 2008), http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2008/04/03itunes.html [hereinafter iTunes Store]. 2 Jessica Hodgson, Leap Year Trips Zune in Black Eye for Microsoft, WALL ST.
    [Show full text]
  • OPINION Defendant-Appellee
    FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT STACIE SOMERS, On Behalf of No. 11-16896 Herself and All Others Similarly Situated, D.C. No. Plaintiff-Appellant, 5:07-cv-06507- JW v. APPLE, INC., OPINION Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California James Ware, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted February 11, 2013—San Francisco, California Filed September 3, 2013 Before: Dorothy W. Nelson, Stephen Reinhardt, and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr. 2 SOMERS V. APPLE, INC. SUMMARY* Antitrust The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a putative class action against Apple, Inc., alleging antitrust violations in connection with Apple’s iPod and iTunes Music Store. The panel held that the plaintiff waived review of the district court’s order denying certification of a class of indirect purchasers of the iPod because she abandoned her underlying individual claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act based on inflated iPod prices. The panel also held that the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to state antitrust claims for damages and injunctive relief. The plaintiff alleged that Apple encoded iTunes Music Store music files with its proprietary Digital Rights Management (DRM), called FairPlay, which rendered the music files and the iPod compatible only with each other. She alleged that through certain software updates, Apple excluded competitors and obtained a monopoly in the portable digital media player and music download markets, which inflated Apple’s music prices and deflated the value of the iPod.
    [Show full text]
  • Ios Hacking Guide.Pdf
    Hacking iOS Applications a detailed testing guide Prepared by: Dinesh Shetty, Sr. Manager - Information Security @Din3zh 2 Table of Contents 1. Setting Up iOS Pentest Lab ................................................................................................. 5 1.1 Get an iOS Device ................................................................................................................................ 5 1.2 Jailbreaking an iOS Device................................................................................................................... 7 1.3 Installing Required Software and Utilities ........................................................................................ 10 2. Acquiring iOS Binaries ...................................................................................................... 13 3. Generating iOS Binary (.IPA file) from Xcode Source Code: ............................................... 15 3.1 Method I – With A Valid Paid Developer Account. ........................................................................... 15 3.2 Method II - Without a Valid Paid Developer Account ....................................................................... 18 4. Installing iOS Binaries on Physical Devices ........................................................................ 23 4.1 Method I - Using iTunes .................................................................................................................... 23 4.2 Method II - Using Cydia Impactor ....................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Kw-V820bt Monitor with Dvd Receiver Instruction Manual
    KW-V820BT MONITOR WITH DVD RECEIVER INSTRUCTION MANUAL © 2016 JVC KENWOOD Corporation B5A-1052-00 d (EN) CONTENTS BEFORE USE BEFORE USE............................................................ 2 BLUETOOTH ......................................................... 30 IMPORTANT INITIAL SETTINGS .................................................. 4 SETTINGS .............................................................. 41 To ensure proper use, please read through this Initial setup ......................................................................... 4 Settings for using applications of iPod/iPhone/ manual before using this product. It is especially Clock settings .................................................................... 4 Android ..............................................................................41 important that you read and observe WARNINGS BASICS .................................................................... 5 Selecting different sources for the front and rear and CAUTIONS in this manual. Please keep the Component names and functions ............................. 5 monitors—Zone Control .............................................42 manual in a safe and accessible place for future Common operations ....................................................... 6 Sound adjustment—Audio ........................................43 reference. Common screen operations ......................................... 7 Adjustment for video playback .................................48 ◊ WARNINGS: (To prevent accidents and
    [Show full text]
  • A Secure and Fair Solution to Digital License Reselling Over the Internet
    SUPPORT CONSUMERS' RIGHTS IN DRM: A SECURE AND FAIR SOLUTION TO DIGITAL LICENSE RESELLING OVER THE INTERNET A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Engineering and Physical Sciences 2012 By Tarek Gaber School of Computer Science Contents Abstract 17 Declaration 19 Copyright 21 Dedication 23 Acknowledgement 25 Abbreviations 27 Definitions 29 Notaitons 31 1 Introduction 33 1.1 Introduction to Digital Rights Management (DRM) . 33 1.2 Introduction to Concurrent Signature Scheme . 34 1.3 DRM and Consumers' Rights . 36 1.4 Research Motivation and Challenges . 38 1.5 Research Aim and Objectives . 40 1.6 Research Methodology . 41 1.7 Novel Contributions and Publications . 42 1.8 Thesis Structure . 46 2 Digital Rights Management Overview 47 2.1 Chapter Introduction . 47 2.2 What is DRM . 48 2.3 DRM History . 48 3 2.3.1 First Generation DRM Systems . 49 2.3.2 Second Generation DRM Systems . 49 2.4 DRM Fundamental Principle . 50 2.5 DRM System Entities . 52 2.6 DRM System Components . 53 2.7 How a DRM System Works . 55 2.8 Existing DRM Systems . 56 2.8.1 Windows Media DRM . 56 2.8.2 FairPlay DRM . 58 2.8.3 Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) DRM . 61 2.9 Open Issues in Current DRM Systems . 65 2.9.1 Consumer Privacy . 65 2.9.2 Interoperability . 66 2.9.3 First-sale: License Reselling . 67 2.10 Chapter Summary . 68 3 A literature Survey 71 3.1 Chapter Introduction . 71 3.2 Current License Selling Solutions .
    [Show full text]
  • Audiobooks on Ipods Boost Relationships with NIST Scientists
    Audiobooks on iPods BoostBoost RelationshipsRelationships withwith NISTNIST Scientists: Scientists Keeping Them Current with Management Trends Technology Services, Information Services Division Nancy Allmang, [email protected] Who We Are The National Institute of Standards and Technology What We Learned What We Learned, cont. Our Solution, cont. We began in July of 2007 with two 5th generation video (NIST) develops and promotes measurement, About digital media players: checked out for a specified time period, tracked, and standards, and technology to enhance security and downloaded from library web sites. At this time they iPods, and 6 audiobooks on each. Over the ensuing improve the quality of life. The Information Services - Apple®* media players (iPods) have an intangible cannot be played on iPods. months as demand grew we added 6 more iPods Division provides professional, scientific/technical “coolness factor” that appeals to customers (iPod Classics). We now are circulating a total of 39 information assistance to NIST research staff. The - iPods have the largest U.S. market share of all We decided to use Audible® audiobooks because they audiobooks on 8 iPods. media players NIST Research Library holds approximately 300,000 are in the format iPods require and it is simple to We developed a Responsibility Agreement for each - iPods have video screens that permit viewing of science and engineering volumes. download and transfer them to iPods. We made our borrower to sign, instructions, and complete listings of movies choice in spite of the fact they cannot easily be audiobook titles by iPod. tracked by library circulation systems, downloaded by multiple customers , and do not “expire” after a About Audiobooks specified checkout period.
    [Show full text]
  • On the Feasibility of Large-Scale Infections of Ios Devices
    On the Feasibility of Large-Scale Infections of iOS Devices Tielei Wang, Yeongjin Jang, Yizheng Chen, Simon Chung, Billy Lau, and Wenke Lee School of Computer Science, College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology ftielei.wang, yeongjin.jang, yizheng.chen, pchung, billy, [email protected] Abstract by Apple can be installed and run on iOS devices. This While Apple iOS has gained increasing attention from significantly reduces the number of distribution channels attackers due to its rising popularity, very few large scale of iOS apps, forcing attackers to have their apps signed infections of iOS devices have been discovered because by a trusted authority. of iOS’ advanced security architecture. In this paper, Third, the Digital Rights Management (DRM) tech- we show that infecting a large number of iOS devices nology in iOS prevents users from sharing apps among through botnets is feasible. By exploiting design flaws arbitrary iOS devices, which has a side effect of limit- and weaknesses in the iTunes syncing process, the de- ing the distribution of malicious apps published on the vice provisioning process, and in file storage, we demon- App Store. Although recent studies show that malicious strate that a compromised computer can be instructed to apps can easily bypass Apple’s app vetting process and install Apple-signed malicious apps on a connected iOS appear in the Apple App Store [26, 36, 51], lacking the device, replace existing apps with attacker-signed ma- ability to self-propagate, these malicious apps can only licious apps, and steal private data (e.g., Facebook and affect a limited number of iOS users who accidentally Gmail app cookies) from an iOS device.
    [Show full text]
  • The Many Facades of DRM
    The Many Facades of DRM Author: Rod Schultz [email protected] 1. INTRODUCTION In February 2007, Apple's CEO Steve Jobs wrote an open letter to the world denouncing DRM and its use in the music industry. In this letter Jobs stated, "DRMs haven’t worked, and may never work, to halt music piracy". The world took notice of this statement, and blogs all over the Internet were devoted to interpreting his message and meaning. The debate over DRM and its value began even before that, and has raged for over a decade now. Over time more and more people have developed a mental picture of what DRM is and what it does. But what do people really know about DRM? Most people only understand that a DRM prevents them from sharing or copying music and movies. Very few understand the intricate nature of this technology, how it enables business models, how it is built, and how it can be attacked. Even fewer understand the sheer mathematical complexity needed to create a DRM, and the cost of maintaining it. In this article I will discuss the many facades of DRM, including its multiple layers, their construction, and the functionality they provide. I will expand on DRM techniques and how they can fail based on my experiences at Apple (iTunes and iPod protection) and Adobe (Flash Player RTMPe protection). 2. BUSINESS MODEL Perhaps the most interesting thing about the Steve Jobs DRM letter to the world was the timing. When it was written, I was a member of the Apple FairPlay team (the engineering group at Apple that creates its DRM) and we were already working on a software update to iTunes that would allow the purchase and playback of DRM free music.
    [Show full text]
  • Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition
    Case4:05-cv-00037-YGR Document999 Filed12/13/14 Page1 of 27 1 ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP 2 BONNY E. SWEENEY (176174) ALEXANDRA S. BERNAY (211068) 3 CARMEN A. MEDICI (248417) JENNIFER N. CARINGAL (286197) 4 655 West Broadway, Suite 1900 San Diego, CA 92101 5 Telephone: 619/231-1058 619/231-7423 (fax) 6 [email protected] [email protected] 7 [email protected] [email protected] 8 – and – PATRICK J. COUGHLIN (111070) 9 STEVEN M. JODLOWSKI (239074) Post Montgomery Center 10 One Montgomery Street, Suite 1800 San Francisco, CA 94104 11 Telephone: 415/288-4545 415/288-4534 (fax) 12 [email protected] [email protected] 13 Class Counsel for Plaintiffs 14 [Additional counsel appear on signature page.] 15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 16 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 17 OAKLAND DIVISION 18 THE APPLE IPOD ITUNES ANTITRUST ) Lead Case No. C-05-00037-YGR 19 LITIGATION ) ) CLASS ACTION 20 ) This Document Relates To: ) PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW 21 ) IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO GRANT ALL ACTIONS. ) JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 22 ) FAVOR OF DEFENDANT APPLE INC. 23 Date: TBD Time: TBD 24 Courtroom: 1, 4th Floor Judge: Hon. Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers 25 26 27 28 991139_1 Case4:05-cv-00037-YGR Document999 Filed12/13/14 Page2 of 27 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 Page 3 I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 4 II. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD .................................................................................1 5 III. APPLE’S MONOPOLY POWER IS UNCONTESTED IN APPLE’S MOTION .............2 6 IV. APPLE IS NOT “IMMUNE” FROM SECTION 2 LIABILITY ........................................3 7 A. Plaintiffs Assert an Actionable Claim Under Allied Orthopedic .............................3 8 B.
    [Show full text]
  • Case Study of Apple, Inc. for Business Law Students: How Apple's Business Model Controls Digital Content Through Legal and Technological Means
    Case study of Apple, Inc. for business law students: How Apple's business model controls digital content through legal and technological means Author: Margo E. K. Reder Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/1473 This work is posted on eScholarship@BC, Boston College University Libraries. Published in Journal of Legal Studies Education, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 185-209, Winter/ Spring 2009 Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States" (http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/us/) Journal of Legal Studies Education Volume 26, Issue 1, 185–209, Winter/Spring 2009 Case Study of Apple, Inc. for Business Law Students: How Apple’s Business Model Controls Digital Content Through Legal and Technological Means Margo E.K. Redern I. INTRODUCTION This article describes a six-week long exercise that incorporates a dynamic learning approach into an e-commerce or Internet technology business law elective course; the exercise pursues an entrepreneurial approach to the use of an appropriate business model by emphasizing the interaction between technology, business, and law.1 ‘‘Students learn best when they are actively involved in and responsible for their own learning.’’2 Because of student familiarity with technology, Apple, Inc., and Apple products pro- vide the backdrop for this coursework. This active learning exercise yields engaged students, who gain the ability to address these issues outside of the classroom. This exercise is meant to create a forum for interactive learning along with a context for this experience. ‘‘At a basic level, under- graduate law courses inform students about key legal concepts and foun- dation principles.
    [Show full text]
  • Fairplay Streaming Overview
    FairPlay Streaming Overview Developer Contents FairPlay Streaming .................................................................................................................................4 Key Delivery Process .......................................................................................................................................................4 Content Ingestion and Formatting ...........................................................................................................................5 Key Request ........................................................................................................................................................................5 Device Identification .......................................................................................................................................................7 Content Key Expiration ..................................................................................................................................................7 Video Rental ................................................................................................................................................................7 Secure Lease ................................................................................................................................................................7 Key Management Cryptography................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Bishop Fox Cybersecurity Style Guide
    BISHOP FOX CYBERSECURITY STYLE GUIDE VERSION 1.1 JUNE 27, 2018 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic License. Bishop Fox Contact Information: +1 (480) 621-8967 [email protected] 8240 S. Kyrene Road Suite A-113 Tempe, AZ 85284 Contributing Technical Editors: Brianne Hughes, Erin Kozak, Lindsay Lelivelt, Catherine Lu, Amanda Owens, Sarah Owens We want to thank all of our Bishop Fox consultants, especially Dan Petro, for reviewing and improving the guide’s technical content. Bishop Fox™ 2018/06/27 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Welcome! ................................................................................................................................. 4 Advice on Technical Formatting ........................................................................................................ 5 What to Expect in the Guide .............................................................................................................. 6 The Cybersecurity Style Guide .............................................................................................. 7 A-Z .......................................................................................................................................................... 7 Appendix A: Decision-making Notes .................................................................................. 96 How We Choose Our Terms ............................................................................................................96 How to Codify Your Own Terms ......................................................................................................97
    [Show full text]