DOCSLIB.ORG

The Many Facades of DRM

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Many Facades of DRM The Many Facades of DRM Author: Rod Schultz [email protected] 1. INTRODUCTION In February 2007, Apple's CEO Steve Jobs wrote an open letter to the world denouncing DRM and its use in the music industry. In this letter Jobs stated, "DRMs haven’t worked, and may never work, to halt music piracy". The world took notice of this statement, and blogs all over the Internet were devoted to interpreting his message and meaning. The debate over DRM and its value began even before that, and has raged for over a decade now. Over time more and more people have developed a mental picture of what DRM is and what it does. But what do people really know about DRM? Most people only understand that a DRM prevents them from sharing or copying music and movies. Very few understand the intricate nature of this technology, how it enables business models, how it is built, and how it can be attacked. Even fewer understand the sheer mathematical complexity needed to create a DRM, and the cost of maintaining it. In this article I will discuss the many facades of DRM, including its multiple layers, their construction, and the functionality they provide. I will expand on DRM techniques and how they can fail based on my experiences at Apple (iTunes and iPod protection) and Adobe (Flash Player RTMPe protection). 2. BUSINESS MODEL Perhaps the most interesting thing about the Steve Jobs DRM letter to the world was the timing. When it was written, I was a member of the Apple FairPlay team (the engineering group at Apple that creates its DRM) and we were already working on a software update to iTunes that would allow the purchase and playback of DRM free music. Jobs was astute enough to realize the negative reaction the public had to DRM, and he successfully painted the picture that Apple hated DRM, and that Apple wanted music to be freely shared. On April 2nd, 2007 EMI Music announced an agreement with Apple to sell DRM free music on the iTunes store, with all other major labels to follow in January of 2009. The music industry finally gave in to Steve Jobs, giving him—and the consumer—a victory in the music war on DRM. Maybe there was another motive. Maybe Steve Jobs was really trying to spin a pending decision by the music industry into a public perception victory for Apple. The truth was that with the power of its DRM Apple was locking the majority THE MANY FACADES OF DRM 1 of music downloads to its devices, the most import of which was the iPod. The music industry didn't go DRM free because they hated DRM; they went DRM free because they were fearful of the leverage Apple was gaining with their iTunes + FairPlay + iPod combination. Apple’s DRM created this lock, and it became so successful that the music industry went with the lesser of two evils (songs locked to Apple’s iPod monopoly vs. the distribution of DRM-free music) and chose to distribute DRM-free music. These actions, taken only a few years after the disastrous impact of Napster, illustrate that DRM is an instrumental technology in creating and shaping business models for digital content distribution. Without DRM the iTunes store would never have been born. No music label would have licensed content to Apple, and the majority of the general public would not have purchased iTunes content that didn't come from a major label. It was only after the service became mature and too powerful that the music labels changed the rules of the game and went DRM-free. The same content protection needs apply for movies as well. DRM provides the digital security that studios (Disney, Fox, Warner Brothers) require a digital content distributer (Apple, Amazon, Netflix) to provide. For video, DRM is even more important, and the studios can still set the rules without yielding to a public demand for DRM-free movies. Until the world evolves to a point where this digital security impacts the revenue or future growth of the studio, DRM will be required. When the cost of creating a movie like Avatar ranges between $300 million and $500 million, the studios naturally want their money back. They want protections in place that will give them confidence to release digital copies to the world. Video is consumed very differently than music. A good song is something you listen to multiple times, over months, years, and sometimes decades. It is something you share with others. The best songs have an extremely long lifetime in the consumer space. Movies are more expensive to produce and are usually viewed once. So studios have to be strategic about how they release movies to consumers. Studios break the licensing and release of their content into distribution windows. The majority of movie revenue is generated at the box-office release window, the VOD (video on demand) window, and the home video window (DVD and Blu-ray sales). These windows were created to segment the market and generate as much revenue as possible for a product that can easily cost hundreds of millions of dollars to produce, and is usually viewed only once. Each of these widows (there are at least six, and potentially more if you count airline, hotel, and foreign distribution) provides an opportunity for the studio to distribute to different segments. Each window also provides a unique opportunity for a consumer to steal the content, and forces the content distributer to deploy a DRM. The paradigm that exists is one where the content creator wishes to get the maximum revenue for its content for each distribution window. Each window has different DRM requirements, with current and future revenue impacting the mandated strength of the protection for each window. This DRM approval gives the content providers the ability to influence the DRM features and its corresponding design. 2 THE MANY FACADES OF DRM 3. CONTROL ARCHITECTURE When architecting any security system it is critical to identify points of failure and design around them whenever possible. Security systems are barriers, and when barriers are created they are attacked. A DRM is no different. The very nature of a DRM system--preventing the user from accessing something that is completely under their control--makes it extremely vulnerable to attack. Due to this vulnerability one feature studios look for is something called renewability. Renewability is a channel that the DRM provider can utilize to update key software modules in the field. This allows the security of the DRM to be renewed and restored if there is a breach. It is analogous to changing the engine or tire on a car if it breaks. The entire car doesn't need to be replaced; only the area that has failed. The difference is that a car must be taken to a mechanic for repair; a DRM is updated in place. It is this concept of a secure system that is critical to the durability of a DRM. It is extremely difficult to predict how detrimental a flaw in the design will be to the integrity of what the DRM is protecting, so it must be designed to withstand attacks, adapt to attacks, and avoid catastrophic failure when it is attacked. On the surface it seems obvious that the DRM would be designed this way, but the execution of this concept is not as simple as it sounds. Modular software systems are designed to be broken into independent pieces. Each piece has a clear boundary and well-defined interface for 'hooking' into other pieces. Progress in most technologies accelerates once systems have achieved this state. But clear boundaries and well-defined interfaces also make a technology easier to attack, break, and reverse engineer. Well-designed DRMs have very fuzzy boundaries and are designed to have very non-standard interfaces. THE MANY FACADES OF DRM 3 !"##$%"&'()"*$+,-./0"$+1&2"34 !"##$%"&'()"*$%67$+1&2"34 5,,0#1$%"&'()"*$%67$+1&2"3$ 5,,0#1$%"&'()"*$+,-./0"$+1&2"3$ Module 1 Module 2 Module 3 Module 1 Module 3 Module 4 Module 5 Module 6 Module 4 Module 6 Module 2 Module 5 8'(90"$:$;$+1&2"3$%"&'() These non-standard interfaces make it harder to reverse engineer, but also much more difficult to upgrade in the field. To minimize the cost of failures that cannot be fixed with a software update (renewability), DRMs are designed to be revoked. Revocation can occur at different levels of device and content granularity. This means that entire device classes can effectively be prevented from playing protected content, or a specific users device can be turned off to prevent it from playing back content (it should be noted that I have never seen user level revocation done in the real world). It is also possible to revoke specific movie titles if the content provider feels that there has been a breach on the content. To further defend itself against the cost of breach, DRMs are also designed to have binary diversity. This is the equivalent of a biological immune system. In this case the immune system is not protecting an individual but rather an entire DRM ecosystem. Just as it is impossible to predict what viruses will infect the human population, it is impossible to predict what attacks will be levied against a DRM. The diversity of each person’s immune system helps prevent global pandemics, and the binary diversity of a DRM helps prevent global breaches. The attack on the DRM can be modeled as a virus. Here the DRM breach is the virus, and the vector is the downloading and replaying of the attack.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and the Itunes Ecosystem
    533 ANTITRUST, INTELLECTU AL PROPERTY, AND THE ITUNES ECOSYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF APPLE’S FAIRPLAY TECHNOLOGY WITH A NOD TO THE PECULIARITIES OF • INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WILLOW NOONAN* I. INTRODUCTION In December 2008, Apple’s iTunes online music store surpassed Wal- Mart as the largest music retailer in the world.1 In the closely related portable music player market, Apple’s iPod enjoys similar success.2 Undoubtedly, Ap- ple’s insight and innovation won much of this eminence. However, a close look at Apple’s business practices reveals some conduct that draws a suspicious eye from antitrust and intellectual property laws. The first part of this article traces the development of online music and the subsequent proliferation of copyright infringement. The next part outlines the technical details, benefits, and drawbacks of Apple’s iTunes ecosystem, a notable combination of Apple products and services. The third part undertakes a traditional antitrust analysis of Apple’s conduct and suggests the need for dee- per inquiry. The next part investigates how Apple’s conduct implicates intellec- tual property law. The fifth part reviews the doctrine of intellectual property misuse and how it might apply to Apple. The final part revisits the antitrust • 2009 IDEA Student Intellectual Property Writing Competition Winner. * Candidate for Juris Doctor, 2010, The George Washington University Law School. 1 Press Release, Apple, Inc., iTunes Store Top Music Retailer in the US (Apr. 3, 2008), http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2008/04/03itunes.html [hereinafter iTunes Store]. 2 Jessica Hodgson, Leap Year Trips Zune in Black Eye for Microsoft, WALL ST.
    [Show full text]
  • OPINION Defendant-Appellee
    FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT STACIE SOMERS, On Behalf of No. 11-16896 Herself and All Others Similarly Situated, D.C. No. Plaintiff-Appellant, 5:07-cv-06507- JW v. APPLE, INC., OPINION Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California James Ware, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted February 11, 2013—San Francisco, California Filed September 3, 2013 Before: Dorothy W. Nelson, Stephen Reinhardt, and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr. 2 SOMERS V. APPLE, INC. SUMMARY* Antitrust The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a putative class action against Apple, Inc., alleging antitrust violations in connection with Apple’s iPod and iTunes Music Store. The panel held that the plaintiff waived review of the district court’s order denying certification of a class of indirect purchasers of the iPod because she abandoned her underlying individual claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act based on inflated iPod prices. The panel also held that the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to state antitrust claims for damages and injunctive relief. The plaintiff alleged that Apple encoded iTunes Music Store music files with its proprietary Digital Rights Management (DRM), called FairPlay, which rendered the music files and the iPod compatible only with each other. She alleged that through certain software updates, Apple excluded competitors and obtained a monopoly in the portable digital media player and music download markets, which inflated Apple’s music prices and deflated the value of the iPod.
    [Show full text]
  • Ios Hacking Guide.Pdf
    Hacking iOS Applications a detailed testing guide Prepared by: Dinesh Shetty, Sr. Manager - Information Security @Din3zh 2 Table of Contents 1. Setting Up iOS Pentest Lab ................................................................................................. 5 1.1 Get an iOS Device ................................................................................................................................ 5 1.2 Jailbreaking an iOS Device................................................................................................................... 7 1.3 Installing Required Software and Utilities ........................................................................................ 10 2. Acquiring iOS Binaries ...................................................................................................... 13 3. Generating iOS Binary (.IPA file) from Xcode Source Code: ............................................... 15 3.1 Method I – With A Valid Paid Developer Account. ........................................................................... 15 3.2 Method II - Without a Valid Paid Developer Account ....................................................................... 18 4. Installing iOS Binaries on Physical Devices ........................................................................ 23 4.1 Method I - Using iTunes .................................................................................................................... 23 4.2 Method II - Using Cydia Impactor ....................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Kw-V820bt Monitor with Dvd Receiver Instruction Manual
    KW-V820BT MONITOR WITH DVD RECEIVER INSTRUCTION MANUAL © 2016 JVC KENWOOD Corporation B5A-1052-00 d (EN) CONTENTS BEFORE USE BEFORE USE............................................................ 2 BLUETOOTH ......................................................... 30 IMPORTANT INITIAL SETTINGS .................................................. 4 SETTINGS .............................................................. 41 To ensure proper use, please read through this Initial setup ......................................................................... 4 Settings for using applications of iPod/iPhone/ manual before using this product. It is especially Clock settings .................................................................... 4 Android ..............................................................................41 important that you read and observe WARNINGS BASICS .................................................................... 5 Selecting different sources for the front and rear and CAUTIONS in this manual. Please keep the Component names and functions ............................. 5 monitors—Zone Control .............................................42 manual in a safe and accessible place for future Common operations ....................................................... 6 Sound adjustment—Audio ........................................43 reference. Common screen operations ......................................... 7 Adjustment for video playback .................................48 ◊ WARNINGS: (To prevent accidents and
    [Show full text]
  • A Secure and Fair Solution to Digital License Reselling Over the Internet
    SUPPORT CONSUMERS' RIGHTS IN DRM: A SECURE AND FAIR SOLUTION TO DIGITAL LICENSE RESELLING OVER THE INTERNET A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Engineering and Physical Sciences 2012 By Tarek Gaber School of Computer Science Contents Abstract 17 Declaration 19 Copyright 21 Dedication 23 Acknowledgement 25 Abbreviations 27 Definitions 29 Notaitons 31 1 Introduction 33 1.1 Introduction to Digital Rights Management (DRM) . 33 1.2 Introduction to Concurrent Signature Scheme . 34 1.3 DRM and Consumers' Rights . 36 1.4 Research Motivation and Challenges . 38 1.5 Research Aim and Objectives . 40 1.6 Research Methodology . 41 1.7 Novel Contributions and Publications . 42 1.8 Thesis Structure . 46 2 Digital Rights Management Overview 47 2.1 Chapter Introduction . 47 2.2 What is DRM . 48 2.3 DRM History . 48 3 2.3.1 First Generation DRM Systems . 49 2.3.2 Second Generation DRM Systems . 49 2.4 DRM Fundamental Principle . 50 2.5 DRM System Entities . 52 2.6 DRM System Components . 53 2.7 How a DRM System Works . 55 2.8 Existing DRM Systems . 56 2.8.1 Windows Media DRM . 56 2.8.2 FairPlay DRM . 58 2.8.3 Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) DRM . 61 2.9 Open Issues in Current DRM Systems . 65 2.9.1 Consumer Privacy . 65 2.9.2 Interoperability . 66 2.9.3 First-sale: License Reselling . 67 2.10 Chapter Summary . 68 3 A literature Survey 71 3.1 Chapter Introduction . 71 3.2 Current License Selling Solutions .
    [Show full text]
  • Audiobooks on Ipods Boost Relationships with NIST Scientists
    Audiobooks on iPods BoostBoost RelationshipsRelationships withwith NISTNIST Scientists: Scientists Keeping Them Current with Management Trends Technology Services, Information Services Division Nancy Allmang, [email protected] Who We Are The National Institute of Standards and Technology What We Learned What We Learned, cont. Our Solution, cont. We began in July of 2007 with two 5th generation video (NIST) develops and promotes measurement, About digital media players: checked out for a specified time period, tracked, and standards, and technology to enhance security and downloaded from library web sites. At this time they iPods, and 6 audiobooks on each. Over the ensuing improve the quality of life. The Information Services - Apple®* media players (iPods) have an intangible cannot be played on iPods. months as demand grew we added 6 more iPods Division provides professional, scientific/technical “coolness factor” that appeals to customers (iPod Classics). We now are circulating a total of 39 information assistance to NIST research staff. The - iPods have the largest U.S. market share of all We decided to use Audible® audiobooks because they audiobooks on 8 iPods. media players NIST Research Library holds approximately 300,000 are in the format iPods require and it is simple to We developed a Responsibility Agreement for each - iPods have video screens that permit viewing of science and engineering volumes. download and transfer them to iPods. We made our borrower to sign, instructions, and complete listings of movies choice in spite of the fact they cannot easily be audiobook titles by iPod. tracked by library circulation systems, downloaded by multiple customers , and do not “expire” after a About Audiobooks specified checkout period.
    [Show full text]
  • On the Feasibility of Large-Scale Infections of Ios Devices
    On the Feasibility of Large-Scale Infections of iOS Devices Tielei Wang, Yeongjin Jang, Yizheng Chen, Simon Chung, Billy Lau, and Wenke Lee School of Computer Science, College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology ftielei.wang, yeongjin.jang, yizheng.chen, pchung, billy, [email protected] Abstract by Apple can be installed and run on iOS devices. This While Apple iOS has gained increasing attention from significantly reduces the number of distribution channels attackers due to its rising popularity, very few large scale of iOS apps, forcing attackers to have their apps signed infections of iOS devices have been discovered because by a trusted authority. of iOS’ advanced security architecture. In this paper, Third, the Digital Rights Management (DRM) tech- we show that infecting a large number of iOS devices nology in iOS prevents users from sharing apps among through botnets is feasible. By exploiting design flaws arbitrary iOS devices, which has a side effect of limit- and weaknesses in the iTunes syncing process, the de- ing the distribution of malicious apps published on the vice provisioning process, and in file storage, we demon- App Store. Although recent studies show that malicious strate that a compromised computer can be instructed to apps can easily bypass Apple’s app vetting process and install Apple-signed malicious apps on a connected iOS appear in the Apple App Store [26, 36, 51], lacking the device, replace existing apps with attacker-signed ma- ability to self-propagate, these malicious apps can only licious apps, and steal private data (e.g., Facebook and affect a limited number of iOS users who accidentally Gmail app cookies) from an iOS device.
    [Show full text]
  • Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition
    Case4:05-cv-00037-YGR Document999 Filed12/13/14 Page1 of 27 1 ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP 2 BONNY E. SWEENEY (176174) ALEXANDRA S. BERNAY (211068) 3 CARMEN A. MEDICI (248417) JENNIFER N. CARINGAL (286197) 4 655 West Broadway, Suite 1900 San Diego, CA 92101 5 Telephone: 619/231-1058 619/231-7423 (fax) 6 [email protected] [email protected] 7 [email protected] [email protected] 8 – and – PATRICK J. COUGHLIN (111070) 9 STEVEN M. JODLOWSKI (239074) Post Montgomery Center 10 One Montgomery Street, Suite 1800 San Francisco, CA 94104 11 Telephone: 415/288-4545 415/288-4534 (fax) 12 [email protected] [email protected] 13 Class Counsel for Plaintiffs 14 [Additional counsel appear on signature page.] 15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 16 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 17 OAKLAND DIVISION 18 THE APPLE IPOD ITUNES ANTITRUST ) Lead Case No. C-05-00037-YGR 19 LITIGATION ) ) CLASS ACTION 20 ) This Document Relates To: ) PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW 21 ) IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO GRANT ALL ACTIONS. ) JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 22 ) FAVOR OF DEFENDANT APPLE INC. 23 Date: TBD Time: TBD 24 Courtroom: 1, 4th Floor Judge: Hon. Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers 25 26 27 28 991139_1 Case4:05-cv-00037-YGR Document999 Filed12/13/14 Page2 of 27 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 Page 3 I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 4 II. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD .................................................................................1 5 III. APPLE’S MONOPOLY POWER IS UNCONTESTED IN APPLE’S MOTION .............2 6 IV. APPLE IS NOT “IMMUNE” FROM SECTION 2 LIABILITY ........................................3 7 A. Plaintiffs Assert an Actionable Claim Under Allied Orthopedic .............................3 8 B.
    [Show full text]
  • Case Study of Apple, Inc. for Business Law Students: How Apple's Business Model Controls Digital Content Through Legal and Technological Means
    Case study of Apple, Inc. for business law students: How Apple's business model controls digital content through legal and technological means Author: Margo E. K. Reder Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/1473 This work is posted on eScholarship@BC, Boston College University Libraries. Published in Journal of Legal Studies Education, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 185-209, Winter/ Spring 2009 Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States" (http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/us/) Journal of Legal Studies Education Volume 26, Issue 1, 185–209, Winter/Spring 2009 Case Study of Apple, Inc. for Business Law Students: How Apple’s Business Model Controls Digital Content Through Legal and Technological Means Margo E.K. Redern I. INTRODUCTION This article describes a six-week long exercise that incorporates a dynamic learning approach into an e-commerce or Internet technology business law elective course; the exercise pursues an entrepreneurial approach to the use of an appropriate business model by emphasizing the interaction between technology, business, and law.1 ‘‘Students learn best when they are actively involved in and responsible for their own learning.’’2 Because of student familiarity with technology, Apple, Inc., and Apple products pro- vide the backdrop for this coursework. This active learning exercise yields engaged students, who gain the ability to address these issues outside of the classroom. This exercise is meant to create a forum for interactive learning along with a context for this experience. ‘‘At a basic level, under- graduate law courses inform students about key legal concepts and foun- dation principles.
    [Show full text]
  • Fairplay Streaming Overview
    FairPlay Streaming Overview Developer Contents FairPlay Streaming .................................................................................................................................4 Key Delivery Process .......................................................................................................................................................4 Content Ingestion and Formatting ...........................................................................................................................5 Key Request ........................................................................................................................................................................5 Device Identification .......................................................................................................................................................7 Content Key Expiration ..................................................................................................................................................7 Video Rental ................................................................................................................................................................7 Secure Lease ................................................................................................................................................................7 Key Management Cryptography................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Bishop Fox Cybersecurity Style Guide
    BISHOP FOX CYBERSECURITY STYLE GUIDE VERSION 1.1 JUNE 27, 2018 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic License. Bishop Fox Contact Information: +1 (480) 621-8967 [email protected] 8240 S. Kyrene Road Suite A-113 Tempe, AZ 85284 Contributing Technical Editors: Brianne Hughes, Erin Kozak, Lindsay Lelivelt, Catherine Lu, Amanda Owens, Sarah Owens We want to thank all of our Bishop Fox consultants, especially Dan Petro, for reviewing and improving the guide’s technical content. Bishop Fox™ 2018/06/27 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Welcome! ................................................................................................................................. 4 Advice on Technical Formatting ........................................................................................................ 5 What to Expect in the Guide .............................................................................................................. 6 The Cybersecurity Style Guide .............................................................................................. 7 A-Z .......................................................................................................................................................... 7 Appendix A: Decision-making Notes .................................................................................. 96 How We Choose Our Terms ............................................................................................................96 How to Codify Your Own Terms ......................................................................................................97
    [Show full text]
  • Navigating the Ipod Fairplay DRM Controversy Nicola F
    Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property Volume 5 Article 5 Issue 2 Spring Spring 2007 Is Apple Playing Fair? Navigating the iPod FairPlay DRM Controversy Nicola F. Sharpe Olufunmilayo B. Arewa Recommended Citation Nicola F. Sharpe and Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Is Apple Playing Fair? Navigating the iPod FairPlay DRM Controversy, 5 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 332 (2007). https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njtip/vol5/iss2/5 This Perspective is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property by an authorized editor of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Is Apple Playing Fair? Navigating the iPod FairPlay DRM Controversy Nicola F. Sharpe and Olufunmilayo B. Arewa Spring 2007 VOL. 5, NO. 2 Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property Volume 5, Number 2 (Spring 2007) Is Apple Playing Fair? Navigating the iPod FairPlay DRM Controversy By Nicola F. Sharpe* and Olufunmilayo B. Arewa** I. INTRODUCTION ¶1 On April 2, 2007, Apple Inc. and EMI Music held a joint press conference in London that may be the harbinger of significant changes in the digital music arena.1 This press conference, whose attendees included EMI Group CEO Eric Nicoli and Apple CEO Steve Jobs, unfolded in an environment of significant technological and commercial changes in the music industry. The shift to the digital era has been a turbulent one for many players in the music industry, particularly as a result of the widespread distribution of unauthorized digital music files and the concurrent significant decline in record industry sales.2 The Apple-EMI agreement permits Apple to sell EMI Music’s entire digital music catalog without digital rights management (DRM),3 which represents a significant shift from the previous policy of the major record companies.
    [Show full text]