On the Feasibility of Large-Scale Infections of Ios Devices

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On the Feasibility of Large-Scale Infections of Ios Devices On the Feasibility of Large-Scale Infections of iOS Devices Tielei Wang, Yeongjin Jang, Yizheng Chen, Simon Chung, Billy Lau, and Wenke Lee School of Computer Science, College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology ftielei.wang, yeongjin.jang, yizheng.chen, pchung, billy, [email protected] Abstract by Apple can be installed and run on iOS devices. This While Apple iOS has gained increasing attention from significantly reduces the number of distribution channels attackers due to its rising popularity, very few large scale of iOS apps, forcing attackers to have their apps signed infections of iOS devices have been discovered because by a trusted authority. of iOS’ advanced security architecture. In this paper, Third, the Digital Rights Management (DRM) tech- we show that infecting a large number of iOS devices nology in iOS prevents users from sharing apps among through botnets is feasible. By exploiting design flaws arbitrary iOS devices, which has a side effect of limit- and weaknesses in the iTunes syncing process, the de- ing the distribution of malicious apps published on the vice provisioning process, and in file storage, we demon- App Store. Although recent studies show that malicious strate that a compromised computer can be instructed to apps can easily bypass Apple’s app vetting process and install Apple-signed malicious apps on a connected iOS appear in the Apple App Store [26, 36, 51], lacking the device, replace existing apps with attacker-signed ma- ability to self-propagate, these malicious apps can only licious apps, and steal private data (e.g., Facebook and affect a limited number of iOS users who accidentally Gmail app cookies) from an iOS device. By analyzing (e.g., by chance or when tricked by social-engineering DNS queries generated from more than half a million tactics) download and run them. Specifically, to run an anonymized IP addresses in known botnets, we measure app signed by Apple, an iOS device has to be authenti- that on average, 23% of bot IP addresses demonstrate cated by the Apple ID that purchased the app. For exam- iOS device existence and Windows iTunes purchases, ple, suppose we use an Apple IDA to download a copy of implying that 23% of bots will eventually have connec- a malicious app from the App Store and later we install tions with iOS devices, thus making a large scale infec- this copy on an iOS device that is bound to Apple IDB. tion feasible. This copy cannot run on the iOS device that is bound to Apple IDB because of the failure of DRM validation. 1 Introduction On iOS 6.0 or later, when launching this app, iOS will pop up a window (Figure 1) to ask the user to re-input As one of the most popular mobile platforms, Apple an Apple ID and a password. If the user cannot input the iOS has been successful in preventing the distribution of correct Apple ID (i.e., Apple IDA) and the corresponding malicious apps [23, 32]. Although botnets on Android password, iOS refuses to run the app. and jailbroken iOS devices have been discovered in the In this paper, we show that despite these advanced se- wild [40, 42, 43, 45, 54], large-scale infections of non- curity techniques employed by iOS, infecting a large jailbroken iOS devices are considered extremely difficult number of non-jailbroken iOS devices through bot- for many reasons. nets is feasible. Even though iOS devices are designed First, Apple has powerful revocation capabilities, in- for mobile use, they often need to be connected to per- cluding removing any app from the App Store, remotely sonal computers via USB or Wi-Fi for many reasons, disabling apps installed on iOS devices, and revoking any such as backup, restore, syncing, upgrade, and charging. developer certificate. This makes the removal of mali- We find that the USB and Wi-Fi communication chan- cious apps relatively straightforward once Apple notices nels between iOS devices and computers are not well them. protected. Consequently, a compromised computer (i.e., Second, the mandatory code signing mechanism in a bot) can be easily instructed to install malicious apps iOS ensures that only apps signed by Apple or certified onto its connected iOS devices and gain access to users’ 1 app signed by attackers in possession of enterprise or in- dividual developer licenses issued by Apple. This weak- ness leads to many serious security threats. For example, attackers can first remove certain targeted apps (such as banking apps) from iOS devices and replace them with malicious apps that look and feel the same. As a result, when a victim tries to run a targeted app, they actually launch the malicious app, which can trick the user to re- input usernames and passwords. We originally presented this attack [31] in 2013 and Apple released a patch in iOS 7 that warns the user when connecting iOS devices to a computer for the first time. However, this patch does not Figure 1: User attempting to run an app downloaded by a protect iOS devices from being stealthily provisioned by different Apple ID on his iOS device needs to first enter a compromised computer that the user already trusts. the correct Apple ID and password. private data without their knowledge. In this paper, con- In addition to injecting apps into iOS devices, attack- nected iOS devices refer to those that are plugged into ers can also leverage compromised computers to obtain a computer through USB cable or have Wi-Fi syncing credentials of iOS users. Specifically, since many iOS enabled. Note that if Wi-Fi syncing is enabled, the iOS developers presume that the iOS sandbox can effectively device will automatically sync with a paired computer prevent other apps from accessing files in their apps’ when they are on the same network. home directories, they store credentials in plaintext un- The feasibility of a large scale infection is facili- der their apps’ home directories. For example, the Star- tated by two main problems that we have discovered bucks app was reported to save usernames and passwords in our research. The first is a previously unknown de- in plaintext. Starbucks thought the possibility of a secu- sign flaw in the iTunes syncing mechanism (including rity exploit to steal the plaintext passwords was “very far both USB and Wi-Fi based syncing), which makes the fetched” [8]. However, once an iOS device is connected iTunes syncing process vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle to a computer, all these files are accessible by the host (MitM) attacks. By exploiting this flaw, attackers can computer. Consequently, malware on the computer can first download an Apple-signed malicious app (e.g., a easily steal the plaintext credentials through a USB con- Jekyll app [51]) using their Apple ID and then remotely nection. In our work, we found that the Facebook and instruct a compromised computer to install the attacker’s Gmail apps store users’ cookies in plaintext. By stealing copy on a connected iOS device, completely bypassing and reusing the cookies from connected iOS devices, at- DRM checks. In other words, an attacker can have a ma- tackers can gain access to the victims’ accounts remotely. licious app of his own choosing run on a user’s iOS de- vice without the user ever seeing an authentication pop- While it is known that a host computer can partially up window. access the file system of a connected iOS device, we Coupled with botnet infrastructures, this exploit en- point out that it leads to security problems, especially ables large scale delivery of arbitrary Apple-signed apps. when attackers control a large number of personal com- This has two serious security implications. First, it chal- puters. Considering that there are many apps dedicated lenges the common belief that the Apple App Store is the to iOS, this problem may allow attackers to gain creden- sole distributor of iOS apps. Instead of relying on trick- tials that are not always available on PCs. ing a user into downloading apps from the App Store, attackers can now push copies of their app onto a vic- To quantitatively show that botnets pose a realistic tim’s device. Even if an app has been removed from the threat to iOS devices, we also conduct a large scale App Store, attackers can still deliver it to iOS users. Sec- measurement study to estimate how many compromised ond, this expolit challenges the common belief that the computers (i.e., bots) could connect with iOS devices. installation of iOS apps must be approved by the user. Intuitively, given the immense popularity of iOS devices Attackers can surreptitiously install any app they down- and compromised Windows machines, we presume that loaded onto victim’s device. many people are using iOS devices connected to com- The second security issue we discovered is that an promised computers. However, to the best of our knowl- iOS device can be stealthily provisioned for development edge, there exists no previous work that can provide large through USB connections. This weakness allows a com- scale measurement results. promised computer to arbitrarily remove installed third- party apps from connected iOS devices and install any By analyzing DNS queries generated from 473,506 2 Infection Type Root Cause Connection Type Install malicious apps signed by Apple Man-in-the-Middle attacks against syncing USB or Wi-Fi Install malicious apps signed by attackers Stealthy provisioning of devices USB Steal private data (e.g., Facebook and Gmail apps’s cookies) Insecure storage of cookies USB Table 1: Infection Summary. anonymized IP addresses1 that were involved in known by their Apple ID on iOS devices that are bound to botnets on 10/12/2013 in 13 cities of two large ISPs in different Apple IDs, bypassing DRM protections.
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