Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung Nr. 68 Tina Kempin Ready for Peace? The Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland 1998–2002 Hrsg.: Andreas Wenger Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik der ETH Zürich Contents List of Abbreviations 7 Foreword 5 Note on Terminology 10 Introduction 11 1 The Good Friday Agreement: Background, Content and Assessment 27 1.1 A Short Background to the Belfast Agreement 28 1.2 Content: Constitutional and Institutional Changes, Policy Issues 36 1.3 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Agreement 52 2 Implementing the Good Friday Agreement: The Main Factors and Positions 57 2.1 Between Progress and Caution: The British and Irish Approaches 60 2.2 The Struggle for the Union: The Unionist and Loyalist Positions 70 2.3 The Quest for Irish Unity: The Nationalist and Republican Approaches 82 2.4 International Infl uences 92 3 Implementing the Good Friday Agreement: The Core Questions 103 3.1 The Question of Identity 104 3.2 Decommissioning of Paramilitary Weapons, Police Reform and Prisoner Release 116 3.3 Negotiations with (Former) Terrorists? 139 Outlook for the Future 145 Conclusion 149 Bibliography 159 Annex I Annex A The Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations 1998 (Belfast Agreement, Good Friday Agreement) III Annex B Chronology of the Implementation Process, 1998–2002 XLV Annex C Map of Northern Ireland LIV List of Tables and Illustrations Table 1.1 Assembly Elections – Results by Party 43 Table 3.1 Religion and Ethnic Identity, 1989–1998 106 Table 3.2 Religion and National Identity, 1989–1998 107 Table 3.3 The Relationship Between Ethnic and National Identity, 1989–1998 107 Table 3.4 The Relationship Between Ethnic, National and State Identity, 1989–1998 109 Table 3.5 The Relations between Protestants and Catholics, 1989–1999 113 Table 3.6 Estimation of the Relations between Protestants and Catholics in Five Years Time, 1989–1999 114 Foreword The implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, reached dur- ing the Multi-Party Negotiations of 1997/1998, has proven to be very complicated, and the process is not yet complete. Although some of the new institutions set out in the agreement have been established and the paramilitary organisations have decommis- sioned a signifi cant number of arms, the peace process in North- ern Ireland has been slow and fraught with crises. This study examines the main factors and core issues of the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement in order to assess the signifi cance of the Agreement to the peace process in Northern Ireland. It refl ects the fact that most parties in Northern Ireland are ready and willing to coexist peacefully on the basis of the implementation process. The study thus focuses on the provi- sions of the Agreement, as well as on the developments in the fi rst four years of the implementation process (1998-2002). It discusses the roles and positions of the major political actors in Northern Ireland, especially of the large offi cial parties and the British and Irish governments. It further addresses the core issues surround- ing the confl ict, which remain partly unresolved. The author concludes that the Good Friday Agreement repre- sents a major step towards peace in Northern Ireland but that the process is far from complete. The study uses a historical approach and is thus based on many resource documents, especially offi cial reports from the Northern Ireland Assembly, negotiation docu- ments, government papers and newspaper articles. The editor would like to thank the author, who was a research assistant at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology) until summer 2003, for her con- tribution to the research on the confl ict in Northern Ireland. Prof. Dr. Andreas Wenger Director, Center for Security Studies 5 6 List of Abbreviations AIA Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985 ANIA Americans for a New Irish Agenda APNI Alliance Party of Northern Ireland CAC Continuity Army Council DUP Democratic Unionist Party EU European Union FAIR Families Acting for Innocent Relatives FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) HURT Homes United by Republican Terror, later changed to ‘Homes United by Recurring Terror’ IICD Independent International Commission on Decommissioning INC Irish National Caucus INLA Irish National Liberation Army IRA Irish Republican Army LVF Loyalist Volunteer Force MP Member of Parliament MEP Member of European Parliament NIA Northern Ireland Assembly NIAOR Northern Ireland Assembly Offi cial Report (Hansard) NILP Northern Ireland Labour Party NIWC Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition PUP Progressive Unionist Party RUC Royal Ulster Constabulary 7 RUSI Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies SDLP Social Democratic and Labour Party SF Sinn Féin UDA Ulster Defence Association UDP Ulster Democratic Party UFF Ulster Freedom Fighters UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland UKUP United Kingdom Unionist Party USA United States of America UUP Ulster Unionist Party UVF Ulster Volunteer Force WTC World Trade Center 8 Note on Terminology In the paper the terms Unionist, Nationalist, Loyalist and Repub- lican are capitalised to denote parties or organisations and their members; without capitals they refer to supporters within the wider community. Although not all Protestants are unionists and all Catholics are nationalists, it is a commonly held perception that religious belief or upbringing corresponds with political allegiance. The terms ‘Protestant’ and ‘Catholic’ are used in the text where political allegiance merges with communal membership. Terms such as Ulster and Londonderry, which are mainly used by mem- bers of the unionist community, and the Six Counties, the North and Derry, which are mainly used by members of the nationalist community, refl ect the different political and cultural perceptions. To avoid adopting any political position, the term ‘Northern Ire- land’ is used to describe the geographical and political entity in the North-eastern part of Ireland (The term ‘Northern Ireland’ is not neutral because it implies that the Northeast is independent, which is not the case). For reasons of convenience, the terms ‘Republic of Ireland’ and the ‘Irish Government’ – rather than ‘Ireland’ (this describes the whole island of Ireland) and the ‘Gov- ernment of Ireland’ – are used in the text to avoid confusion. Good Friday Agreement. The offi cial title of the Agreement is ‘The Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations’. The name ‘Good Friday Agreement’ is attached to the day when it was reached. This expression is now mainly used by cultural Catholics. The term ‘Belfast Agreement’ is that of the UK government, and is used by many cultural Protestants – even though the Agree- ment was created in many places. Internationally, the Agreement is known as ‘Good Friday Agreement’. In this study, the three names are used as equivalents. 9 Introduction* Today is only the beginning, it is not the end. Headline on the front page of the Irish News, 11 April 1998. The implementation of the Good Friday Agreement appeared to be almost completed, four years after it was signed. The novel institutions are established, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) has decommissioned a signifi cant amount of its arms, and the new police service is launched. Northern Ireland is said to have learned about peace.** The Good Friday Agreement or, variously, the Belfast or the Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations was achieved on 10 April 1998. Since the fall of the Sunningdale Agreement in 1974, the British and Irish Governments had sought a settlement that would have cross-community support and would bring a permanent end to violence. With the Belfast Agreement, it seemed, it had been achieved, based on a compromise not only between unionism and nationalism, but also between loyalism and republicanism. In two referendums held on the same day, 22 May 1998, the settlement secured the support of a large majority in the North (71 per cent) and an overwhelming majority in the South (94 per cent). Its signifi cance was recognised even among unionist opponents in Northern Ireland. In the immediate aftermath of the Agreement, widely dif- ferent interpretations were put forward by commentators and politicians. Some saw it as the starting point for new relationships not only in Northern Ireland, but throughout the island of Ireland * I would like to thank Prof. Kurt R. Spillmann for his assistance and support during the time writing, and Prof. Brendan O’Leary for his helpful inputs and comments while reviewing parts of the study. Earlier drafts of this study have benefi ted highly from the suggestions and criticism of others. I am particularly grateful to Claude Nicolet and Lisa Watanabe. Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Horst and Heidi Kempin, as well as Roman Sorg for their love and support. ** The publication was concluded in May 2002. New developements were not taken into account. 11 and between the two islands of Ireland and Great Britain. Others declared it to be an error that could open the back door for unac- ceptable claims from both sides. Some defi ned it as a positive step for the Union, others saw it as a victory for nationalism. Many saw it as a historic compromise between two communities which remain unchanged by it, while others hoped it would be the start- ing point of a process of transformation, which would soon bring far-reaching cultural, institutional and constitutional change. Between these extremes of optimism and pessimism, the most informed voices called for caution. The party leaders who negoti- ated the Agreement stressed that it would work only if people applied their minds and will to make it work. The most neutral, but directly involved observer of the peace process, US-Sena- tor George Mitchell, chairman of the peace talks leading to the Agreement, warned that the Agreement might not be in existence in eighteen months’ time and commented on the complete lack of trust, ‘a presumption of bad faith’, between unionists and repub- licans.1 Four years after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, it should be possible to give a fi rst evaluation of the implementation process.