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Guideline for Implementing Cryptography in the Federal Government

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Archived NIST Technical Series Publication The attached publication has been archived (withdrawn), and is provided solely for historical purposes. It may have been superseded by another publication (indicated below). Archived Publication Series/Number: NIST Special Publication 800-21 Title: Guideline for Implementing Cryptography in the Federal Government Publication Date(s): November 1999 Withdrawal Date: December 2005 Withdrawal Note: SP 800-21 is superseded in its entirety by the publication of SP 800-21 2nd edition (December 2005). Superseding Publication(s) The attached publication has been superseded by the following publication(s): Series/Number: NIST Special Publication 800-21 2nd edition Title: Guideline for Implementing Cryptography in the Federal Government Author(s): Elaine B. Barker, William C. Barker, Annabelle Lee Publication Date(s): December 2005 URL/DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-21e2 Additional Information (if applicable) Contact: Computer Security Division (Information Technology Lab) Latest revision of the SP 800-21 2nd edition (as of June 19, 2015) attached publication: Related information: http://csrc.nist.gov/projects/crypto.html Withdrawal N/A announcement (link): Date updated: June Ϯϯ, 2015 NIST Special Publication 800-21 Guideline for Implementing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF Cryptography in the COMMERCE Federal Government Technology Administration National Institute of Standards and Technology NATL INST. OF STAND & JECH Annabelle Lee WIST AlllDb MDHSD3 PUBL/CAT/ONS COMPUTER SECURITY QC Nisr 100 U57 .800-21 [999 fhe National Institute of Standards and Technology was established in 1988 by Congress to "assist industry in the development of technology . needed to improve product quality, to modernize manufacturing processes, to ensure product reliability . and to facilitate rapid commercialization ... of products based on new scientific discoveries." NIST, originally founded as the National Bureau of Standards in 1901, works to strengthen U.S. industry's competitiveness; advance science and engineering; and improve public health, safety, and the environment. One of the agency's basic functions is to develop, maintain, and retain custody of the national standards of measurement, and provide the means and methods for comparing standards used in science, engineering, manufacturing, commerce, industry, and education with the standards adopted or recognized by the Federal Government. As an agency of the U.S. Commerce Department's Technology Administration, NIST conducts basic and applied research in the physical sciences and engineering, and develops measurement techniques, test methods, standards, and related services. The Institute does generic and precompetitive work on new and advanced technologies. NIST's research facilities are located at Gaithersburg, MD 20899, and at Boulder, CO 80303. Major technical operating units and their principal activities are listed below. For more information contact the Publications and Program Inquiries Desk, 301-975-3058. Office of the Director Physics Laboratory • National Quality Program • Electron and Optical Physics • International and Academic Affairs • Atomic Physics • Optical Technology Technology Services • Ionizing Radiation • standards Services • Time and Frequency^ • Technology Partnerships • Quantum Physics^ • f^leasurement Services • Technology Innovation Materials Science and Engineering • Information Services Laboratory • Intelligent Processing of Materials Advanced Technology Program • Ceramics • Economic Assessment • Materials Reliability^ • Information Technology and Applications • Polymers • Chemical and Biomedical Technology • Metallurgy • f^aterials and Manufacturing Technology • NIST Center for Neutron Research • Electronics and Photonics Technology Manufacturing Engineering Manufacturing Extension Partnership Laboratory Program • Precision Engineering • Regional Programs • Automated Production Technology • National Programs • Intelligent Systems • Program Development • Fabrication Technology • Manufacturing Systems Integration Electronics and Electrical Engineering Building and Fire Research Laboratory Laboratory • Microelectronics • structures • Law Enforcement Standards • Building Materials • Electricity • Building Environment • Semiconductor Electronics • Fire Safety Engineering • Electromagnetic Fields^ • Fire Science • Electromagnetic Technology^ • Optoelectronics^ Information Technology Laboratory • Mathematical and Computational Sciences^ Chemical Science and Technology • Advanced Network Technologies Laboratory • Computer Security • Biotechnology • Information Access and User Interfaces • Physical and Chemical Properties^ • High Performance Systems and Services • Analytical Chemistry • Distributed Computing and Information Services • Process Measurements • Software Diagnostics and Conformance Testing • Surface and Microanalysis Science • Statistical Engineering 'At Boulder, CO 80303. ^Some elements at Boulder, CO. NisT Special Publication 800 21 Guideline foF Implementing Cryptography in the Federal Government Annabelle Lee COMPUTER SECURITY Security Technology Group Computer Security Division National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg. MD 20899-cS930 November 1999 U.S. Department of Commerce William M. Daley, Secretary Technology Administration Dr. Cheryl L. Shavers, Under Secretary of Commerce for Technology National Institute of Standards and Technology Raymond G. Kammer, Director Reports on Computer Systems Technology Tlic Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation's measurement and standards infrastructure for information technology. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL's responsibilities include the development of technical, physical, administrative, and management standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of sensitive unclassified information in federal computer systems. This Special Publication 800 series reports on ITL's research, guidance, and outreach efforts in computer security, and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-21 Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Publ. 800-21, 138 pages (Nov. 1999) CODEN: NSPUE2 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: 1999 For sale by the Supei intcndent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325 51 GUIDELINE FOR IMPLEMENTING CRYPTOGRAPHY IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1.1. Purpose 1 1.2. Audience 1 1.3. Scope 2 1.4. Content 3 1 .5. Uses of Cryptography 4 2. STANDARDS AND CRITERIA 6 2.1. Benefits of Standards 7 2.2. Standards Organizations 8 2.2.1 . American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 8 2.3.2. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 1 2.2.2. Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 1 2.2.3. International Organization for Standardization (ISO) ..12 2.3. Common Criteria 12 2.4. FIRS Waiver Procedure 13 3. SOME IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 14 3. 1 . Interfaces/Use of CAPIs 14 3.2. Hardware vs. Software Solutions 14 3.2.1. Public vs. Secret Key Cryptography 15 3.3. Key Management 1 3.3.1. Key Generation 17 3.3.2. Key Use 18 3.3.3. Key Archiving 19 3.3.4. Key Destruction 20 3.4. Authentication 20 3.4. 1 . Traditional (Weak) Authentication 20 3.4.2. Authentication Using Dynamic Authentication Data 21 3.4.3. Authentication Against Active Attacks 22 4. CRYPTOGRAPHY METHODS 23 4.1 . Symmetric/Secret Key Cryptography 23 4.1 .1 . Symmetric/Secret Encryption 23 4. 1 .2. Message Authentication Code 27 4.2. Hash Functions 28 4.2.1. SHAandSHA-1 28 4.3. Asymmetric Key Cryptography 29 4.3.1. Digital Signatures 29 4.3.2. Key Transport/Agreement 37 4.4. Key Management ......42 5. PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE (PKI) 44 5.1 . Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Overview 44 5.2. PKI Architectures 45 5.3. Security Policies of Other CAs and the Network 46 iii 1 5.4. Interoperability 46 5.5. Minimum Interoperability Specification for PKI Components (MISPC)....47 5.6. Federal PKI Architecture 48 5.6.1 . Architecture Components 49 5.6.2. Operational Concept 51 5.6.3. Federal PKI (FPKI) Steering Committee 52 6. TESTING 53 6.1 . Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) 55 6.1.1. Background 55 6.1.2. FIPS PUB 140-1 Requirements 58 6.1.3. Validated Modules List 60 6.1.4. Effective Use of FIPS PUB 140-1 60 6.2. National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) 60 6.3. Industry and Standards Organizations. 60 6.3.1. National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) 61 6.4. Certification and Management Authorization 61 7. SELECTING CRYPTOGRAPHY - THE PROCESS 63 7.1. Planning Phase 67 7.1.1. Security Policies. 67 7.1.2. Risk Assessment 71 7.1.3. Security Objectives 73 7.2. Definition Phase. 74 7.2.1 . Security Requirements/Specifications 75 : 7.2.2. Cryptographic Method Example 83 7.2.3, Selecting Cryptographic Countermeasures 84 7.3. Acquisition Phase 94 7.3.1. Implementation Approach 95 7.4. Operations Phase 97 7.4.1. Training and Documentation 97 7.4.2. Life Cycle Management of Cryptographic Components 97 8. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER - EXAMPLES 99 8.1. Key Recovery Demonstration Project (KRDP) 99 8.1.1. Department of Energy: EZ_ERA32 and the KRDP 99 8.1.2. U.S. Electronic Grants 103 8.2. Army Corps of
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