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CRYPTREC Report 2001

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CRYPTREC Report 2001 CRYPTREC 2001 CRYPTREC Report 2001 March 2002 Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan Telecommunications Advancement Organization of Japan CRYPTREC 2001 Contents Introduction 1 On the CRYPTREC Evaluation Committee Report 3 Note on the use of this report 7 1 Overview of Cryptographic Technique Evaluation 8 1.1 Evaluation Organs and Schedule ･･････････････････････････････････････････8 1.2 How cryptography evaluation was carried out. ･･････････････････････････････12 1.3 Terminology ･････････････････････････････････････････････････････････13 1.4 Evaluation Committee Members ･････････････････････････････････････････14 2 Evaluation of public key cryptographic techniques 17 2.1 Target of Evaluation and Evaluation Method ････････････････････････････････17 2.1.1 Evaluated Cryptographic Techniques ･･･････････････････････････････････17 2.1.2 Evaluation Policy･･･････････････････････････････････････････････････17 2.1.3 Evaluation Method ･････････････････････････････････････････････････19 2.2 Evaluation result ･･････････････････････････････････････････････････････21 2.2.1 Outline of evaluation result ･･･････････････････････････････････････････21 2.2.2 General Evaluation of the Difficulty of Arithmetic Problems･････････････････23 2.2.3 Overall Judgment of Cryptographic Techniques that were the Target of Detailed Evaluation ･････････････････････････････････････････････････23 2.2.4 Overall Judgment of Cryptographic Techniques under Observation ･･･････････26 2.2.5 Overall Judgment of Cryptosystems that were Targets of Screening Evaluations in 2001 ････････････････････････････････････････27 2.3 Evaluation of the Difficulty of Arithmetic Problems ･･････････････････････････28 2.3.1 Factorization Problem ･･･････････････････････････････････････････････28 2.3.2 Discrete Logarithm Problem ･･････････････････････････････････････････32 2.3.3 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem ･･････････････････････････････36 2.4 Evaluation of Individual Ciphers ･････････････････････････････････････････40 2.4.1 DSA ･････････････････････････････････････････････････････････････40 2.4.2 ECDSA ･･････････････････････････････････････････････････････････43 2.4.3 ESIGN Signature･･･････････････････････････････････････････････････49 2.4.4 RSA (RSA-OAEP, RSA-PSS, RSA signatures) ･･･････････････････････････58 2.4.5 EPOC-2 ･･････････････････････････････････････････････････････････67 i CRYPTREC 2001 2.5 Evaluation of Cryptographic Techniques under Observation ････････････････････71 2.5.1 ECIES in SEC1 ････････････････････････････････････････････････････71 2.5.2 ECDH in SEC1 ････････････････････････････････････････････････････74 2.5.3 DH ･･････････････････････････････････････････････････････････････76 2.6 Evaluation of Cryptosystems that are the Target of Screening Evaluation･･････････78 2.6.1 OK-ECDSA･･･････････････････････････････････････････････････････78 2.6.2 NTRU ･･･････････････････････････････････････････････････････････80 2.6.3 HIME(R) ･････････････････････････････････････････････････････････81 2.6.4 OK-ECDH････････････････････････････････････････････････････････83 2.6.5 PSEC-KEM ･･･････････････････････････････････････････････････････85 3 Evaluation of symmetric-key cryptographic techniques 87 3.1 Evaluation method ････････････････････････････････････････････････････87 3.1.1 Evaluation method of symmetric -key ciphers･････････････････････････････87 3.2 Overall evaluation ･････････････････････････････････････････････････････94 3.2.1 64-bit block ciphers･････････････････････････････････････････････････94 3.2.2 Overall security evaluation ･･･････････････････････････････････････････96 3.2.3 128-bit block ciphers･･･････････････････････････････････････････････104 3.2.4 Overall security evaluation ･･････････････････････････････････････････107 3.2.5 Stream cipher ･････････････････････････････････････････････････････ 116 3.3 Evaluation of ciphers targeted for detailed evaluation (individual ciphers)････････ 119 3.3.1 CIPHERUNICORN-E･･････････････････････････････････････････････ 119 3.3.2 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) ･････････････････････････････････126 3.3.3 CIPHERUNICORN-A･･････････････････････････････････････････････133 3.3.4 SEED ･･･････････････････････････････････････････････････････････142 3.3.5 MULTI-S01 ･･････････････････････････････････････････････････････149 3.4 Evaluation of Ciphers under Monitoring ･･････････････････････････････････161 3.4.1 Hierocrypt-L1 ････････････････････････････････････････････････････161 3.4.2 MISTY1 ･････････････････････････････････････････････････････････167 3.4.3 Triple DES ･･･････････････････････････････････････････････････････173 3.4.4 Camellia･････････････････････････････････････････････････････････174 3.4.5 Heirocrypt-3･･････････････････････････････････････････････････････180 3.4.6 RC6 ････････････････････････････････････････････････････････････186 3.4.7 SC2000 ･････････････････････････････････････････････････････････190 ii CRYPTREC 2001 3.5 Evaluation of Ciphers Selected for Screening Evaluation ･････････････････････196 3.5.1 MUGI･･･････････････････････････････････････････････････････････196 3.5.1 A Comments of Evaluators (Unmodified Excerpts) ･･･････････････････････198 4 Hash-Function Evaluation 200 4.1 Evaluation Method ･･･････････････････････････････････････････････････200 4.1.1 How to Evaluate Harsh Functions ･････････････････････････････････････200 4.2 General Evaluation ･･･････････････････････････････････････････････････200 4.2.1 Hash-Function Evaluation ･･･････････････････････････････････････････200 4.3 Detailed (Individual) Evaluation of Cryptograph ･････････････････････････････201 4.3.1 draft SHA-256/384/512 ･････････････････････････････････････････････201 4.4 Monitoring Process Evaluation ･･････････････････････････････････････････212 4.4.1 RIPEMD-160･････････････････････････････････････････････････････212 4.4.2 SHA-1 ･･････････････････････････････････････････････････････････217 5 Evaluation of Pseudorandom Number Generation System 218 5.1 Evaluation Method ･･･････････････････････････････････････････････････218 5.1.1 Method for Evaluating Pseudorandom Number Generation ･････････････････218 5.2 Overall Evaluation ･･･････････････････････････････････････････････････218 5.2.1 Pseudorandom Number Generation System ･････････････････････････････218 5.3 Evaluation of the Ciphers under Monitoring ･･･････････････････････････････220 5.3.1 PRNG Based on SHA-1 ････････････････････････････････････････････220 5.4 Evaluation of Ciphers to be Screening-Evaluated ･･･････････････････････････227 5.4.1 TAO TIME･･･････････････････････････････････････････････････････227 6. Evaluation of SSL-protocol cryptographic techniques 229 6.1 Overall evaluation ････････････････････････････････････････････････････229 6.1.1 Purpose ･････････････････････････････････････････････････････････229 6.1.2 Target and scope of the investigation ･･････････････････････････････････229 6.1.3 Method･･････････････････････････････････････････････････････････230 6.1.4 Result ･･･････････････････････････････････････････････････････････230 6.1.5 SSL/TLS application and considerations of actual use･････････････････････232 6.2 Implementation of SSL/TLS protocol and evaluation of operation ･･････････････233 6.2.1 Security associated with cryptosystem ･････････････････････････････････233 6.2.2 Security associated with protocol mechanism････････････････････････････234 iii CRYPTREC 2001 6.2.3 Security on implementation･･････････････････････････････････････････234 6.2.4 Security in operation ･･･････････････････････････････････････････････234 6.2.5 Comparison of SSL/TLS ････････････････････････････････････････････235 6.2.6 Expansion work of TLS･････････････････････････････････････････････235 6.2.7 General descriptions ･･･････････････････････････････････････････････235 6.3 Evaluation of cryptographic technique used in SSL/TLS･･････････････････････236 6.3.1 Investigation on vulnerability in key sharing and electronic signature schemes using RSA (1024 and 2048) ･･････････････････236 6.3.2 DES (40-/56 bit-key DES, 168bit-key Triple DES) ･･･････････････････････241 6.3.3 RC2 (40,128)･････････････････････････････････････････････････････246 6.3.4 RC4 (40, 128) and Arcfour (128) ･････････････････････････････････････248 7 Intellectual Property Information, Licensing Policy and Reference List of Cryptosystem Scheduled to be Evaluated in 2002 251 7.1 Cryptosystem in Monitoring State ･･･････････････････････････････････････251 7.1.1 Public -Key Cryptosystem ･･･････････････････････････････････････････251 7.1.2 Common Key Cryptographic Technique････････････････････････････････255 7.2 Candidates of Cryptosystems to be Evaluated in Detail in 2002 ････････････････267 7.2.1 Public Key Cryptographic Techniques ･････････････････････････････････267 7.2.2 Common Key Cryptographic Techniques ･･･････････････････････････････272 8 Cryptographic Techniques Evaluated 274 iv CRYPTREC 2001 Introduction This report summarizes the evaluation work done in 2001 by the CRYPTREC Evaluation Committee. This committee has been actively undertaking evaluation of cryptographic techniques as part of the CRYPTREC Project for the list-up of cryptographic techniques useful for the Japanese e-Government whose foundation is to be established by the year 2003. Construction of the Japanese e-Government has been under way in recent years to establish a system for electronic administrative procedures such as applications, notifications and government procurement. Use of a cryptographic technique is indispensable for higher-level security of the e-Government services. Various cryptographic techniques have been developed in the
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