The Political Ecology of Environmental Justice: Environmental Struggle and Injustice in the Yeongheung Island Coal Plant Controversy Hosuk Lee

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COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:

ENVIRONMENTAL STRUGGLE AND INJUSTICE

IN THE YEONGHEUNG ISLAND COAL PLANT CONTROVERSY

HOSUK LEE

A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Geography in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2009

The members of the committee approve the dissertation of Hosuk Lee defended on July 13, 2009

Dan Klooster Professor Co-Directing Dissertation

Tony Stallins Professor Co-Directing Dissertation

Ivonne Audirac Outside Committee Member

Barney Warf Committee Member

Jonathan Leib Committee Member

Approved:

Victor Mesev, Chair, Department of Geography

David W. Rasmussen, Dean, College of Social Sciences

The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ...... vii LIST OF FIGURES...... viii ABSTRACT ...... ix CHAPTER 1 ...... 1 INTRODUCTION ...... 1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ...... 6 CHAPTER 2 ...... 9 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ...... 9 DEFINITIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ...... 9 HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ...... 10 ENVIRONMENTALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE...... 12 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND ENERGY ...... 13 JUSTICE ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ...... 17 1. Theories of Social Justice and Environmental Justice ...... 17 2. Distributive Justice, Procedural Justice and Environmental Justice ...... 19 CONCLUSION ...... 22 CHAPTER 3 ...... 23 POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ...... 23 POLITICAL ECONOMY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ...... 23 1. Political Economy ...... 23 2. Political Economy of Neoliberal Capitalism and Nature ...... 24 3. The Political Economy of Environmental Justice in Geography ...... 30 POLITICAL ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ...... 32 1. Theoretical Political Ecology and Practical Environmental Justice ...... 33 2. Justice in Political Ecology ...... 34 3. Scale in Political Ecology and Environmental Justice ...... 36 4. The Social Construction of Nature and the Environment ...... 42 CONCLUSION ...... 43 CHAPTER 4 ...... 44 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN KOREA ...... 44 A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN KOREA ...... 44 1. Short History of the Environmental Movement in Korea ...... 44

iii

2. History of Environmental Justice in Korea ...... 48 DEBATES ABOUT ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN KOREA...... 51 1. Local Case Studies of Environmental Justice in Korea ...... 51 2. Political Economy of Environmental Justice in Korea ...... 55 3. Alternatives ...... 56 DIFFERENCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND KOREA ..... 57 1. Different Subjects ...... 58 2. Different Victims ...... 59 3. Different Geographies ...... 60 COAL ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN KOREA ...... 61 1. Global Trends of Coal Energy ...... 63 2. National Trends in Coal Energy in Korea ...... 65 3. Coal Energy and Environmental Justice ...... 67 CONCLUSION ...... 68 CHAPTER 5 ...... 70 RESEARCH METHODS ...... 70 THE QUALITATIVE APPROACH ...... 71 TEXT, DOCUMENT AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS ...... 72 INTERVIEWS WITH ENVIRONMENTALISTS AND LOCAL RESIDENTS ...... 73 STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF RESEARCH METHODS ...... 74 CHAPTER 6 ...... 78 CASE STUDY OF THE COAL PLANT ...... 78 DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA ...... 79 1. Yeongheung Island...... 79 2. Yeongheung Coal Plant ...... 82 3. The Cultural Landscape of Yeongheung Island ...... 83 THE FAILURE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ...... 87 1. The Beginning of the Coal Plant Plan (1990-1995) ...... 87 2. Environmental Conflicts (1995-1998) ...... 89 3. Construction of Four Units and Extensions (1999-2007) ...... 90 THE EXISTENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE ...... 94 1. Coal Dust ...... 94 2. The Noise and Vibration of the Power Transmission Towers ...... 96 3. Destruction of Tidelands ...... 98 POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ...... 101

1. Power Relations between Social Groups: Making Different Discourses ...... 102 1.1 The Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) and the Korea South-East Power Company (KOSEP) as Developers ...... 103 1.2. The Korean Federation for Environmental Movements as Environmentalists ...... 109 1.3. National and Local Governments as Fair or Unfair Arbitrators? ...... 115 1.4. Local Residents: Victims or Profiteers? ...... 120 2. The Neoliberal Capitalism of Coal Energy ...... 128 3. The Social Construction of Environmental Injustice ...... 132 3.1. The Social Construction of Coal Energy ...... 133 3.2. The Social Construction of Nature ...... 135 3.3. The Social Construction of Scale ...... 137 CONCLUSION ...... 140 CHAPTER 7 ...... 143 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION ...... 143 SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS CHAPTERS ...... 143 ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS ...... 145 1. The Failure of Mainstream Environmentalism ...... 145 2. The Geography of Environmental Injustice ...... 146 3. The Political Ecological Framework of Environmental Injustice ...... 147 IMPLICATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN KOREA ...... 150 TOWARDS A POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ...... 152 APPENDIX I...... 153 THE PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ...... 153 APPENDIX II...... 156 PROGRESS REPORT OF THE COAL PLANT CONSTRUCTION ...... 156 1. Coal Plant Side...... 156 2. Environmental Groups and Local Residents Side ...... 157 APPENDIX III...... 160 OPEN-ENDED IN-DEPTH INTERVIES WITH ENVIRONMENTALISTS (ENGLISH) ...... 160 APPENDIX IV...... 162 INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FOR LOCAL PEOPLE (ENGLISH) ...... 162 APPENDIX V...... 166 OPEN-ENDED IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS WITH ENVIRONMENTALISTS (KOREAN) .... 166 APPENDIX VI...... 168 INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FOR LOCAL PEOPLE (KOREAN) ...... 168

APPENDIX VII...... 171 CONSENT FORM FOR ENVIRONMENTALISTS (ENGLISH) ...... 171 APPENDIX VIII...... 173 CONSENT FROM FOR LOCAL PEOPLE (ENGLISH) ...... 173 APPENDIX VIIII...... 175 CONSENT FORM FOR ENVIRONMENTALISTS (KOREAN) ...... 175 APPENDIX X...... 178 CONSENTFORM FOR LOCAL PEOPLE (KOREAN) ...... 178 REFERENCES ...... 180 WEBSITE REFERENCES ...... 187 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... 188

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Key Terms of Environmental Justice...... 10

Table 2: Relationships between Social Justice and Environmental Discourses...... 19

Table 3: Case Studies of Environmental Movement in Korea...... 46

Table 4: Number of Korean Environmental Organizations by Establishment Year (1988~1992).47

Table 5: Growth of the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM)...... 47

Table 6: Trend of Citizen’s Movement for Environmental Justice (CMEJ)...... 50

Table 7: Examples of Environmental Injustice in Korea...... 52

Table 8: Major World Producers of Coal in 2006 (millions of tons)...... 65

Table 9: Major World Importers of Coal in 2006 (millions of tons)...... 66

Table 10: Korean Electricity Production by Energy Source in 2007...... 66

Table 11: Comparison of Energy Consumption and Carbon Dioxide Emission in 1999...... 68

Table 12: Population of Yeongheung Island (Myun)...... 81

Table 13: Changes in the Production of Short-Necked Clams...... 99

Table 14: Publicly Announced Prices of Land in Yeongheung Island (US dollars per m²)...... 126

Table 15: Trends of the Coal Industry in South Korea...... 130

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Schematic Framework of Anthropogenic Climate Change Drives, Impacts and Response...... 14

Figure 2: Changes in Temperatures, Sea Level and Northern Hemisphere Snow Cover...... 15

Figure 3: Diagram of Coal Energy and Environmental Justice...... 62

Figure 4: Alaska North Slope Crude Oil Price, 2005 to 2008...... 63

Figure 5: 1973 and 2006 Regional Shares of Global Hard Coal Production...... 64

Figure 6: Map of South Korea and Satellite Image of Yeongheung Island...... 80

Figure 7: Fisherwomen Shucking Oysters in Tidal Land of Yeongheung Island...... 82

Figure 8: Satellite Image of Yeongheung Coal Power Plant...... 83

Figure 9: Yeongheung Bridge...... 85

Figure 10: Real Estate in Yeongheung Island...... 86

Figure 11: Energy Park in Yeongheung Island...... 92

Figure 12: Public Hearing for the Construction of Four Units ...... 93

Figure 14: Power Transmission Tower in Yeongheung Coal Plant...... 98

Figure 15: The Cultural Landscape of Low-Income Residents in Yeongheung Island...... 101

Figure 16: Contrary Images of the Coal Plant: Environmentalists’ vs. Developers’ Portrayals. . 135

viii

ABSTRACT

There is general agreement that environmentalism has contributed much to applying an environmental brake to a growth-driven society. Thus far, however, environmentalism cannot be considered perfectly successful in solving environmental problems. Sometimes, it fails to draw the independent and active participation of citizens due to its indifference toward the socially weak. The elitism of mainstream environmentalism tends to disregard the middle or lower classes. Analysis of the study area tells the story of the failure of environmentalism in South Korea during the 1990s. The environmental movement in the 1990s against the construction of the coal plant was not successful due to the: (1) lack of the residents’ independent and active participation (2) one-sided assertions by environmentalists, and (3) oppressive policies of developmentalism by the central government and developers. Each factor shows the fragility of environmental theories. The weakness of environmental theories needs to be complemented by the theory of environmental justice. The new discourse of environmental justice raises an important question of justice and social classes, which environmentalism tends to overlook. Environmental justice has developed with complementary and alternative characteristics. From the perspective of environmental justice, the construction of the coal plant on Yeongheung Island in South Korea is environmentally unjust. Procedural justice has been completely ignored and excluded from the conflict between development and the environment. One important debate in environmental justice is about the realization of procedural and distributive justice. The most important factor toward the realization of environmental justice, has been distributive justice; as a result, procedural justice has not been considered an issue. Economic issues related to financial and educational support and compensation for the local residents by coal plant developers seems to mislead one to believe there is a realization of distributive environmental justice. However, the emphasis on distributive justice clearly shows procedural injustice. Without consideration of procedural justice, environmental justice can never be realized. In addition, a series of environmental symptoms such as coal dust, noise of power transmission towers, and destruction of tidelands means environmental injustice in that the region is composed of senior citizens and low-income residents. Environmental injustice is easily observed from most places where environmental problems occur, therefore it can be said to be a prevalent phenomenon. Therefore, simple observation of environmental injustice does not hold the key of the solution for the injustice. In other words, activists and academic analysts need a larger framework to explain a chain of processes of how environmental injustice is produced, reproduced, and manipulated.

Political ecology is a useful framework to investigate environmental injustice. Political ecological framework functions to explain: (1) degradation and marginalization, (2) environmental conflict, (3) conservation and control, and (4) environmental identity and social movement (Robbins 2004). Those elements are all associated with what we call environmental justice. Environmental injustice is concerned with: (1) the marginalization of local residents from environmental discourses, (2) conflicts between developers and environmentalists and the exclusion of local residents, (3) the identity of local residents who are not able to conserve and control their own land, and (4) environmental movements that do not take into consideration local residents’ life. Therefore, the political ecological framework improves and enlarges the discussion of environmental justice from a larger social, political, and economic perspective. It uncovers the structures and relationships that underlay procedural injustice. In this respect, the political ecological framework helps to investigate the problems of environmental injustice and concealment of environmental injustice. Environmental injustice is observed everywhere environmental problems occur. In the study area, environmental injustice is evident because local residents are low-income farmers and fishermen and are the victims of potential environmental pollutions. The more important finding is the way environmental injustice is subtly hidden by: (1) unequal social relations, (2) neoliberal capitalism, and (3) the social construction of nature, environment and scales. As proven by the failure of the environmental movement that took place during the 1990s, the social relations between the different groups (environmentalists, developers, governments, and local residents) are unequal. The central government and developers tend to subvert the legal processes by adjusting existing policies and by manipulating consent form from local residents. This kind of environmental injustice suggests that procedural justice should be emphasized and that it has been relatively belittled in comparison with distributive justice. Neoliberal capitalism in a global context is another way of hiding environmental injustice. Neoliberalism is relevant in understanding economic crisis or depression. This is no exception in the case of coal energy in Korea. In the name of the free trade-stimulus between Korea and China, the utilization of cheap coal from China was no longer in doubt, regardless of environmental concerns. In this way, global capitalism and developmentalism justified coal as the preferred energy source. In addition, developers socially construct nature, environment and scale to hide environmental injustice. The project of developers for the breeding of short-neck clams and their manipulation of the plant’s environmental impact assessment are clear examples that demonstrate the social construction. These findings are measurable through the political ecological framework. In other words, understanding the conflict of the coal plant in the study

x area, which demonstrates localized environmental injustice, requires a political ecology approach that explains social relations, capitalism and social construction of nature and environment. In conclusion, environmental justice studies deemphasize political economic processes, social relations between various social groups, scale, and the social construction of environmental issues, all of which hide environmental injustice. Political ecology, in contrast, emphasizes social relations, scale, political economy, marginalization, and social constructionism, which are useful for identifying the environmental injustice by both developmentalist and mainstream environmentalist approaches to environmental conflict. Using a political ecology framework, this research uncovers the environmental injustice hidden in conflicts over coal plant installation and expansion on Yeongheung Island, South Korea. Methods include analysis of public reports and statements and qualitative interviews with 20 local residents. Even though the residents live in poverty and suffer the effects of coal-dust, noise from transmission towers, and tidelands destruction, environmental justice has little presence in their environmental debates and decision-making. Instead, these derive from dominant social relations among developers, governments and environmentalists, with the local residents excluded, marginalized and disempowered. At the scales of national and global capitalism, localized environmental injustice is a consequential result of the global and national scales of political economy. In addition, environmental injustice tends to be hidden by social constructions of coal energy, nature, environment, and scale, which are manipulated by developers, environmentalists and governments. Political ecology provides the theoretical lenses to see how money floats upward and pollution sinks downward as environmental injustice is produced and hidden.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“The bourgeoisie has only one solution to its pollution problem: it moves them around…” Frederick Engels (cited in Harvey 1996: 366)

“I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is impeccable…” Lawrence Summers, chief economist of the World Bank (cited in Harvey 1996: 366)

In December 2004, on a small island called Yeongheung in South Korea, a coal plant of 1,600 megawatts (Mw) with two units (800 Mw per unit) was completed after five years and four months of construction. Despite a campaign headed by the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM) in the city of Incheon against the coal plant, the plant’s proponents successfully argued that the rise in demand for energy in the National Capital region required the construction of the coal plant on Yeongheung Island. Without any mutual agreement between the government of Incheon city, environmentalists or local residents, two more units of the coal plant, also owned by national companies, the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) and the Korea South-East Power Corporation (KOSEP), were constructed (1,740 Mw with 870 Mw per unit). It is rumored that eight more units of the coal plant will be constructed, which will make this the largest complex of coal plants in the world (KFEM 2004). The plant promises to provide cheap electricity, thereby improve the lives of a substantial number of Korea’s residents. At the same time, through the construction of the coal plants, the plan inflicts environmental costs on local people now, and through global warming, on unknown future populations planet-wide. Proponents tout the national benefits of cheap, abundant energy while dismissing environmental arguments against coal plants as parochial, local, and NIMBYism. Notably, while environmentalists mobilized the discourses of environmental degradation from locally dispersed pollution to global warming, they made little attempt to take into account the will of the local people and communities and de-emphasized the disproportionate costs the coal plant inflicts on people, especially the old, the marginalized poor, and children in nearby places. Developmentalists tend to focus on the needs of energy supply for

1 the adjacent regions. Both environmentalists as well as developmentalists offered their own discourses without considering the perspective of local people and communities. The projected global proliferation of coal-burning power plants raises serious environmental justice concerns, with economic benefits for some people in some places and some times and environmental costs for other people at other times and in other places. Without substantial conceptual buttressing, environmental justice is an inadequate framework with which to assess the implications of the Yeongheung coal plant in particular, or global energy policy in general. Current theories of environmental justice, however, fail to have an adequate theoretical basis. Previously discussed studies of environmental justice tend to show a simple description of injustice in various places rather than establish relevant theoretical bases for how injustice occurs. Environmental justice studies should have focused on the structural factors that produce injustice. Political ecology is able to provide such a theoretical framework. The political economic approach to the nature and environment provides a measuring stick to look at the social structure and social relations that have been absent in the studies of environmental justice. While contributing to a better understanding of environmental justice in South Korea, this study analyzes the discussions of environmental justice from the political ecological approach, which is able to provide larger social and political economic framework to the issue of environmental justice. Thus, this dissertation presents a geographical study of environmental justice, informed by ideas of scale, political economy, and political ecology, to contribute to the conceptual development of environmental justice and the social justice of development. Environmental justice scholars have played a critical role focusing on local people’s unequal environmental benefits and burdens. They assert that there are few political voices that advocate for the local people, who are most directly affected by environmental degradation. An abundance of documentation in the U.S. shows blacks, lower-income groups, and working-class persons are subjected to a disproportionately large amount of pollution and other environmental stressors in their neighborhoods as well as in their workplaces (Bullard 1990). There seems to be no exception in the case of coal plants. Local people who live around coal plants tend to be neglected not only during the construction and operation of the coal plant but also in the environmental debates between developmentalists and environmentalists. They are both certain victims of air pollution and insecure recipients of economic revitalization. This is exactly how environmental justice should be seen, by the social, the political, and the economic experiences of the local people as well as their environmental problems. In addition, environmental justice scholars have also played an important role in criticizing discourses of mainstream environmentalism. Mainstream environmentalism

2 tends to focus on the significance of the environment without consideration of poor people and environmental justice (Bullard 1990; Capek 1993; Taylor 2000; Holifield 2001; Torres 2002). It also overlooks the social aspects of environmental conflicts. There exists a need to discuss the context of social structure, from the local to national and global scales about the issues of localized coal plant constructions. In other words, the impacts of coal plants on the local environment should be considered in relation to the global context of environmental issues such as global warming. However, mainstream environmentalism has failed to explain the contradiction of social structure and the connections between localized and globalized environmental impacts. Over-emphasis of mainstream environmentalism on environmental issues put aside the discussion of the unequal social relations such as different classes or different countries. As a result, environmentalism reveals an absence of social structural explanation to the environmental problems. Environmental justice, when approached from the political ecological framework, is able to provide clues to finding the social consequences and connections between the local construction of coal plant, national environmental policies and the global environmental issues. In addition, environmental justice can suggest new paradigms to overcome the critique of mainstream environmentalism. Mainstream environmentalism has failed to pose a sufficient challenge to the Yeongheung coal plant. I argue that this problem is partly due to the failure of mainstream environmentalism to fully engage environmental justice debates. Mainstream environmentalism often ignores social justice. In contrast, developmentalists’ interests were much more successful in constructing the scale of the environmental justice argument in a way that permitted them to compensate the victims of environmental injustice, apparently ameliorating the ethical problem. Making use of the politics of scale literature, I argue that global environmentalism’s failure to construct a local scale of social justice in its criticisms of coal plants greatly weakens its ability to confront developmentalist discourses. Therefore, the environmental justice critique shows the need for an alternative environmental movement that addresses the limitations of mainstream environmentalism by taking better account of poor people who tend to be marginalized. Regardless of the significance of environmental justice discourse, it has theoretical limitations. Environmental justice is not a new issue. Since the movement for environmental justice was born in the 1980s (Pulido 2000), the issue has widened its theoretical and practical debates in various disciplines within the social science as well as environmental studies. However, because environmental justice originated from activism, it has not been well grounded theoretically. In other words, because the environmental justice movement has largely been driven by activism, it has not had to theorize itself adequately (Torres 2002). However, within studies of environmental justice there have been several

3 theoretical debates. For example, justice issues have been debated by questioning precisely what types of justice should be realized in environmental justice. In addition, the conflict between distributive and procedural justice is another theoretical discussion. Such theoretical arguments will provide an important clue to explain what types of environmental injustice occur in the Yeongheung coal plant case and how they connect to theoretical issues. Another significant issue is the theoretical frame of environmental justice. There have been few discussions about the relations between environmental injustice and the social construction of environment. In addition, discussions of social marginalization and the disempowerment of local residents in environmental conflicts have been scarce. Most studies of environmental justice deal with the results of a spatially disproportionate distribution of environmental pollution. However, they have not focused on the social processes that marginalize and disempower local people through the social construction of environmental injustice. For example, detection of environmental injustice can be effective through the explanation of social structures (such as capitalism), which produces unequal social relations and that produces, reproduces and hides environmental injustice. In this respect, the spatial decision-making process behind the location of the coal plant needs to be analyzed in the context of environmental conflicts and political ecology. Political ecology suggests theoretical alternatives to graft environmental problems, such as the local coal plant, on to social relations such as unequal social classes and relations, capitalism, and neoliberalism. For example, the local people who are victims of environmental injustice are socially marginalized, and this construction of environmental injustice in the coal plants’ establishment and operation is a significant theoretical question. The issue of energy is another important element of environmental injustice. Much evidence indicates that the global pattern of energy utilization shows a spatially and temporally unjust distribution. As global climate change became an important issue in environmental discourse, the use of fossil fuels has also grown. Of course, environmental issues related to fossil fuel energy such as coal have been studied from the context of global warming and climate change rather than environmental justice. This is mainstream environmentalism on a global scale. According to the Synthesis Report from the IPCC1 in 2007, whose research has been about the observation, causes, and projections of global warming and climate change, we find out the consecutive relations of cause and effects of global warming. The report shows that global warming mainly results from the emission of carbon dioxide generated by fossil fuel use. Fossil fuel use is mainly for energy supply. Due to the volatility of oil prices, coal tends to be

1 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-syr.htm)

4 reintroduced as an alternative energy supply. Under a high-emissions scenario associated with a drastic global increase of coal energy, the global climate will be fundamentally altered, resulting in a high probability of dire consequences for the global environmental system and disproportionately impacts on the poor and marginalized. If proposals for the establishment of coal plants such as the one in Yeongheung Island are not defeated, humanity will certainly lose its struggle against global climate change. Global environmentalism attempts to warn of the consequential aspects of coal energy via fossil fuel use, such as the emission of carbon dioxide. The report reflected this assumption by expecting that carbon dioxide emissions from energy use between 2000 and 2030 are projected to grow between 40 and 110% (IPCC 2007). Ultimately, the difference between 40% and 110% depends in largely on whether local coal plants, such as the coal plants of Yeongheung, are multiplied hundreds of times across the globe. Therefore, discussions about energy supply, coal power plant and climate change are necessary for environmental justice studies. Although the interrelations between energy and climate change are important, there is little consideration of “justice” in this process. This analysis contributes to the task of unraveling the justice implications of pro-environment and pro-development discourses surrounding individual coal plants. By extension, it also contributes to a more robust theorization of environmental justice and a better understanding of justice implications of discursive strategies about global energy policy in the context of global poverty, global climate change, and the local implications of coal plants. Environmental injustice happens primarily to the poor. Because of the paradox of energy needs and local coal and environmental burdens on the poor, they tend to be doubly victimized. In other words, they are exposed both to the threat of global warming and the pollution of local coal plants. Coal plants producing a stable energy supply are a controversy in which the poor should be considered in the name of environmental justice. With these theoretical debates of environmental justice and its relation to energy use, scale, and the political economic discourse of coal plants, the purpose of this research is to investigate the social relations producing and concealing environmental injustice through the case study of a coal plant in South Korea by using a political ecology approach. Analyzing the environmental injustice of a coal plant from the political ecology approach means not only the consideration of the geographical scales in discourses from the global (global warming) to the local (air pollution), but also the consideration of the local people’s environmental benefits and burdens, and the social structure and relations that create those phenomena. I attempt to accomplish the aforementioned goals as follows. First, I

5 analyze how environmental injustice has been spatialized through the coal plant construction and operation. Second, the environmental injustice of coal plants will be analyzed through the lens of political ecology. For example, the local phenomenon of the coal plant can be nationalized via governmental strategies of energy, and it can also be globalized via the environmental discourse of global warming and energy use. Here, analyzing how local people are marginalized is critical in the perspective of political ecology. In addition, it examines how neoliberal capitalism, which enforces economic growth without caring for the poor, has variously affected environmental problems. Korea’s case shows diverse aspects of environmental injustice. For example, the social and cultural aspects of capitalism in South Korea led to a unique context of environmental injustice for the coal plant. Environmental issues are about far more than the environment itself. Environmental issues also involve a society’s actions dealing with environmental problems. Environmental justice in this study focuses on how the political economy of capitalism creates environmental problems. In other words, the environment is no longer simply about “environmental” problems. It should be examined from social, economic, and political perspectives. The political ecology of environmental justice means that unequal social relations should be exposed as a cause of environmental injustice. It means neoliberal capitalism hides the injustice that it creates. It means the social construction of several factors such as nature, environment and scale also function to conceal injustice. This study uncovers the political ecological process that produces environmental injustice.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This research deals with environmental justice issues seen through the lens of political ecology. Therefore, its key arguments examine the processes of environmental injustice that occurred in the establishment of coal plants in Korea. Through the explanation of the failure of mainstream environmentalism in Korea, I present the necessity of invoking environmental justice discourse. This dissertation observes the conflicts between environmentalism and developmentalism in the coal plant in Yeongheung Island in the late 1990s. The purpose of the study is to raise a critique of environmental movements based on mainstream environmentalism and to make the assertion that environmental justice is a necessity to achieve a socially just outcome. Second, the dissertation makes clear how environmental injustice occurs in the study area. I investigate geographical phenomena related to environmental injustice, including the relations between environmental pollution and environmental injustice. Another argument is

6 the reconciliation of distributive and procedural justice in order to realize environmental justice. I examine the discourse of how local people have been socially, economically, and politically marginalized and disempowered by the powerful. The main victims of environmental injustice of the coal plants are the local poor, who are disproportionately experiencing environmental pollution and live in “environmental sacrifice zones” near the coal plants. Therefore, through the discourses of justice, environment, and development, the marginalization and disempowerment of local poor people can explain other aspects of the construction of environmental injustice. For example, how justice has been represented differently or ignored by different groups is an important consideration that explains how environmental injustice has formed. In addition, how environmentalism and developmentalism have both ignored the issue of justice near coal plants can show how environmental injustice has been constructed. Third, the most important approach to environmental injustice is political ecology, which is able to explain the process of how environmental injustice is produced and hidden. First, the social relations between environmentalists, developmentalists, governments, and local people on the environmental/developmental debates of coal plants will be analyzed. In other words, socially stratified relations of those groups function to hide environmental injustice near the coal plant. Second, neoliberal capitalism is deeply related to the process of environmental injustice in the political ecology approach. The understanding of relations between neoliberal capitalism of energy consumption and the environmental injustice of coal plants is a central question of the research. Thus, in focusing on the environmental injustice of the two coal plants and the marginalization of local people, the research tries to clarify the local peoples’ marginalization from both environmental discourses: the policy-making of related environmental policies and the environmental degradation by neoliberal capitalism. Third, the social construction of nature, environment and scale are examined. Powerful groups such as governments or developers are generally able to hide environmental injustice. Therefore, examining the social construction of justice provides an effective means to seek out the undercurrent of environmental injustice. In addition, I investigate the fact that the manipulation of scale by some groups tends to distort local environmental injustice. The following are the main questions that the research investigates:

(1) What is the role of mainstream environmentalism in resistance to the coal plant project and the reasons for its failure in the Yeongheung coal plant in South Korea in the 1990s? ò How do environmentalists, developmentalists, and governments portray local people in their environment-development discourses regarding the construction and operation of the coal plant?

(2) How can environmental injustice in this region be explained from a geographical perspective? ò How have local people been socially, economically and politically marginalized by the discourse that various groups have produced? ò What are the environmental problems associated with environmental injustice? ò How does political ecology clarify the procedures producing injustice? (3) How is environmental injustice exposed and hidden? ò What kinds of social relations are formed and how do they hide environmental injustice? ò How does neoliberal capitalism shape environmental and developmental discourses and hide environmental injustice? ò Do social and cultural aspects of capitalism in Korea affect environmental injustice around coal plants? ò How do social constructions of nature, environment and scale hide environmental injustice?

CHAPTER 2

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the issue of environmental justice, including its definitions, history and principles, and to identify key components researchers and activists can use to analyze the implications of coal plants. Regardless of its theoretical shortcomings, scholars have defined the term, “environmental justice” in various ways. In addition, with a basis in social and civil movements concerned with environmental safety, environmental justice has shown a unique pattern of historical emergence. The second purpose of this chapter is to differentiate environmental justice from mainstream environmentalism. The explanation of environmental justice is important with consideration of current environmentalism because environmental justice is regarded as a radical transformation of environmentalism. Finally, I examine the issue of justice. The term “justice” is derived from diverse concepts of social justice. Therefore, through the critical description of representative theories of social justice, the better alternative to the term environmental justice can be examined. In this context, distributive and procedural concepts of justice are an important issue.

DEFINITIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

In a broad context, a healthy environment is the basic right of all the Earth’s inhabitants, a right reaffirmed by the Rio Declaration (Cutter 1995). When the United Nation’s Rio Declaration in 1992 is applied in a global context, every individual and local community also has a right to enjoy a healthy environment. Every individual’s equal right to enjoy the environment is the starting point in defining environmental justice. However, once we use terms such as environmental justice, environmental equity, environmental racism, and environmental classism, things get complicated. It is true that the terms are somewhat elusive (Lake 1996). Nevertheless, the terms have been used frequently without careful consideration of their differences. Draper and Mitchell (2001) compare the terms (Table 1). Environmental justice seems to include racism, classism, and sexism. Environmental justice refers to a socio-political movement that seeks to articulate environmental issues from a social justice perspective (Pulido 2000). In other words, it

9 utilizes the concept of social justice, which is related to race, gender and class, in the environmental context. In theory, environmental justice involves the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, ethnicity, culture, income or educational status, with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies (EPA 1998 cited in Draper and Mitchell 2001).

Table 1: Key Terms of Environmental Justice.

Environmental Justice The right to a safe, healthy, productive and sustainable environment for all, in which “environment” is viewed in its totality, and includes ecological (biological), physical (natural and built), social, political, aesthetic, and economic components Environmental Racism Involves racial discrimination in environmental policy making, enforcement of laws and regulation, and targeting of communities of color for noxious waste disposal and siting of polluting industries Environmental Classism The results of and process by which implementation of environmental policy creates intended or unintended consequences which have disproportionate impacts (adverse or beneficial) on lower income persons, populations, or communities Environmental Equity An ideal of equal treatment and protection for various racial, ethnic and income group under environmental statues Source: modified from Rajzer et al. 1997; Government of Canada 1996 cited in Draper et al. 2001.

HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

As a social movement, environment justice does not have a long history; its origin only dates back to 1982 in Warren County, North Carolina, when the state selected a site to host a hazardous waste landfill containing 30,000 cubic yards of PCB-contaminated soil (Bowen, Salling et al. 1995; Cutter 1995; Draper and Mitchell 2001). Residents, mostly African-American, rural and poor, were joined in their protests by national civil-right groups, environmental groups, clergy, and members of the Black Congressional Caucus (Cutter 1995). This incident illustrates why environmental justice is deeply related to environmental racism. Another important and remarkable study was performed by the United Church of Christ’s Commission for Racial Justice in 1987 (Bowen, Salling et al. 1995; Cutter

1995; Heiman 1996; Lake 1996; Pulido 2000; Draper and Mitchell 2001; Bowen and Wells 2002; Harner, Warner et al. 2002). The United Church of Christ (UCC) popularized the term “environmental racism” in a report on toxic waste patterns. The report concluded that race was the central determining factor in the distribution of chemical hazard exposure in the United States (Bowen and Wells 2002). While the social movement for environmental justice in Warren County was the starting point of the issue, the study of United Church of Christ was an invaluable chance to form a public consensus. In addition, the relationship between environmental justice and environmental racism was examined, describing how racism was rooted in environmental justice. As a result of the study the UCC did during the1990s, more case studies were conducted. Pulido (2000) summarized six studies examining environmental hazards in Los Angeles, which dealt with environmental racism against Latinos and African Americans. In addition, studies of environmental justice since 1990 were able to change the framework of public policy. In 1992, at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Office of Environmental Equity (now the Office of Environmental Justice) was established. As a sequel, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12898 on February 11, 1994 (Bowen, Salling et al. 1995), which required federal agencies to develop a plan within the year “that identifies and addresses disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies and activities” (Clinton 1994, cited in Bowen et al. 1995). Warren County’s environmental justice movement and the report of the UCC were so successful that a public consensus formed and public policies by governmental administrations have been created and changed. Therefore, one better way for future studies of environmental justice is to see how such environmental policies have performed in the spatial distribution of facilities, using case studies in a local communities-based context. Before environmental justice was defined theoretically, the issue was derived from the social justice movement. In addition, such a movement has a racial dimension. The term “environmental justice” originated and was developed in the United States as a social movement. Warren County’s movement was a starting point for the analysis of environmental justice and environmental racism and the studies of Los Angeles started environmental justice as a theoretical and academic topic. In 1991, the First National People of Color Leadership Summit on the Environment adopted the principle of environmental justice (Appendix I). There are 17 clauses to elucidate what environmental justice supports, asks for, and opposes. This principle is not limited to purely environmental issues. It is more than an environmental phenomenon, including social (free from the discrimination and prejudices of public policy), cultural (respect for different cultures), economic (objections against multinational corporations), and political

11 discourses (participation in the process of decision making).

ENVIRONMENTALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

Environmental justice can provide a new and alternative form of environmentalism. In addition, environmental justice is sometimes opposed to mainstream environmentalist movements. In other words, environmental justice has been an important element in wider concerns about environmental health, a key element in post-war environmentalism, particularly in the United States (Adams 2001). Environmental justice can be regarded as an alternative opposed to environmentalist elitism. The movement for environmental justice developed in response to the limitations of mainstream environmentalism, in particular its role in reproducing structures of inequality, and is thus considered an oppositional or counter-hegemonic form of environmentalism (Pulido 2000). In addition, by bringing issues of race, class, culture, and gender into the realm of environmentalism, grassroots environmental justice activists challenge the focus of traditional environmentalists on resource conservation, wilderness preservation, population growth, or similar issues (Holifield 2001). Capek (1993) mentions the difference between environmental justice and environmentalism in the context of the subjects of who take part in the movement. Representing more economically marginal actors than do traditional mainstream environmental organizations, environmental justice grassroots groups are more likely to frame their demands in terms of social justice and to challenge stratification based on race, class, gender, and the distribution of power (Capek 1993). Therefore, the shift from environmentalism to environmental justice entails a political and social transformation of the subject in environmental discourse. Social activists have begun to an effort to address some of the distributional impacts and equity issues (Bullard 1990). Harvey (1996) also differentiates environmental justice from environmentalism. Environmentalism is still a significant part of the environmental movement. The environmental justice movement has frequently been at odds with mainstream environmental groups such as Friends of the Earth, the Sierra Club, the Environmental Defense Fund, etc – usually referred to as “the Big Ten” (Harvey 1996). This paradigm shift is a way to recognize the different waves of the change from environmentalism to environmental justice (Taylor 2000). Environmental movements in the United States can be classified into four phases: the exploitive capitalist paradigm (focused on

12 economic growth); the romantic environmental paradigm (wilderness and wildlife); the new environmental paradigm (limits to growth); and the environmental justice paradigm (people of color and their environmental rights, autonomy and self-determination) (Taylor 2000). Taylor’s explanation also shows how the four paradigms share some common characteristics and are differentiated by other characteristics. It is true that environmentalism has generally been led by white, middle class people, and sometimes Christians. Therefore, the environmental rights of people of color and people of low income have been marginalized from the environmentalist discourse. Environmental justice originated from several incidents on a local scale that created a direct threat to their lives.

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND ENERGY

In order for the environmental justice discourse to criticize environmentalism, it is important to relate environmentalism to the discussion of global environmental issues and energy issues. It is valid to see mainstream environmentalism in light of global environmental problems. Discourses of “environmental protection” and “limits to growth”, prior to the environmental justice discourse, according to Taylor (2000), are deeply related to globalized issues such as climate changes or global warming. In this respect, the reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) speak for both discourses by reacting to globalized environmental problems. The IPCC published a new version of its synthesis report in 2007. The report is a comprehensive and scientific analysis of climate change. This is composed of observations of changes, the causes of the changes, projections of future climate change, and impacts under different scenarios. Figure 1 shows the schematic framework of anthropogenic climate change drives, impacts and responses. The framework has four elements that are interrelated. Thus, the four main phenomena of climate change (temperature change, precipitation change, sea level rise and extreme events) occur from the concentration and emission of green house gases (GHG), which are climate process drivers. Socio-economic development is the source of GHG. Those four phenomena also affect the natural ecosystem and human societies. Increases in global average temperatures and sea levels and the decrease of snow cover have proved to be scientific facts for several decades (Figure 2).

Figure 1: Schematic Framework of Anthropogenic Climate Change Drives, Impacts and Response (Source: IPCC Synthesis Report 2007)

Figure 2: Changes in Temperatures, Sea Level and Northern Hemisphere Snow Cover. (Source: IPCC Synthesis Report 2007)

The analyses of carbon dioxide emission are an important part of the report. Human-generated carbon dioxide emissions are a direct cause of climate change. In addition, under different scenarios (IPCC 2007), carbon dioxide emissions through energy use and supply are predicted to continuously increase over the next few decades. Carbon dioxide emissions

15 through fossil fuel use account for 56.6 percent of all GHGs (IPCC 2007). Energy supply accounts for 25.9 percent of all the carbon dioxide emission (IPCC 2007). In the meantime, due to volatile oil prices, coal-burning power plants have been suggested as an alternative to provide cheap energy. A new generation of more than 150 coal-fired power plants is currently on the drawing board nationwide in the United States (Hitt 2007). As long as coal plants are considered as the global trend for energy supply, carbon dioxide emission is doomed to increase. The report reflected this assumption by expecting that carbon dioxide emissions from energy use between 2000 and 2030 are projected to grow between 40 and 110 percent (IPCC 2007). The synthesis report by the IPCC explains climate change’s causes, effects and predictions in the near future. In the context of environmentalism, the role and comprehensive analysis of the IPCC is valid. However, the report possesses a critical flaw. Regardless of the obvious warnings based on scientific fact, it lacks political and legal dimensions. Therefore, according to this logic, each country is ready to implement variable and flexible policies on carbon dioxide emissions. Annex I countries have a political duty to reduce emissions through the Kyoto Protocol. However, as seen from the U.S. case, the selfish logic of the individual country’s economy seems more important than its environmental obligations. The report does not consider issues of justice. The national duties on climate change are equally imposed without any consideration of ecological debt. The constant assertion of global environmentalism on environmental problems results in negative and unjust burdens on different countries. In this context, the developed countries are in ecological debt to underdeveloped ones (Agarwal and Narain 1998). Climate justice critiques point out the injustice of the differences between developed and developing countries. However, climate justice does not consider local environmental problems or more importantly justice issues within developed and developing countries. Therefore, coal plant construction in the study area as well as in the world goes against the tide of mainstream environmentalism and the warnings of environmentalism are generally useless and ineffective. As long as justice issues are included, local environmental justice can be adjusted to the larger frame of national and global climate justice. Thus, the inclusion of justice can simultaneously consider both local environmental injustice and globalized climate injustice that poor local residents have experienced. Coal plant construction and a series of related environmental conflicts seem to have local characteristics of environmental issues. However, we need to embed such a case study in a larger picture. Localized and individual coal plant construction is a tiny piece that springs up like so many mushrooms due to volatile oil prices. However, globalized environmental organizations and movements are at a loss how to stop the enormous and

16 continuous construction. The failure to stop construction is not limited to their catastrophic implications of ecosystem destruction and biodiversity risk. The failure also includes the problem of injustice that affects different social classes differently. A coal plant in a small island in South Korea is the starting point of the comprehensive environmental discussion that includes climate change, energy supplies, economy of fossil fuel and its price, and the issue of justice.

JUSTICE ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

1. Theories of Social Justice and Environmental Justice In order to understand the concept of environmental justice, it is important to note how justice has been conceptualized. However, it is difficult to firmly define justice. According to The Concise Oxford Dictionary, the term simply means “equitable” with respect to persons or conduct, “fair” and “deserved” treatment (Smith 1994). However, justice can be classified into five perspectives: egalitarianism, utilitarianism, libertarianism, Marxism, and communitarianism (Beitz 1975; Shue 1982; Smith 1994; Hay 1995; Harvey 1996; Liu 2001). Smith (1994) offers a theoretical overview of justice, its elements, main theories, and the relationship between justice and equalization. Justice, even though the term is still difficult to define, seems to be mainly analyzed from the context of ethics and morality. Moral subjectivity and objectivity, whether internally inherited characteristics or socially constructed, are embedded in the discourse of social justice. Smith makes two remarkable points on justice. First, he tends to focus on the moral and ethical concepts of social justice. Moral philosophy is a necessary starting point for the elaboration of social justice, for justice is a specific aspect of a more general problem of morality, or how people should act (Smith 1994). What Smith meant by this is that it should be a precondition to considering morality and ethics when we contemplate the term “social justice”. In this regard, the question of how morality and ethics have formed in human history is not still answered. Second, the social construction or constructivist view of justice is ignored by Smith. He hardly mentions the meaning of morality – if justice is important in the context of moral and ethical philosophy – in the consideration of social construction. In other words, little concern with the social relations from social construction is found in his argument. His disinterest in social relations and social construction result in his dismissal of Marxism, communitarianism and feminism as a critical theory of justice. Smith equates the mainstream view of social justice with “egalitarianism” with the principle of equal distribution, “utilitarianism” with the principle of maximization of happiness suggested by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill,

“libertarianism” with the principle of individual liberty argued by Robert Nozick, and “contractarianism” with the principle of social agreement in distributional arrangement put forth by John Rawl. In comparison with Smith’s starting point of social justice in moral and ethical philosophy, David Harvey makes two considerable arguments about social justice: (1) the social construction of justice, and (2) the political economic perspective of justice. Harvey’s initial point, which appears in Social Justice and the City (1973), is different from Smith’s. He moves from a predisposition to regarding social justice as a matter of eternal justice and morality to regard it as something contingent upon the social processes operating in society as a whole (Harvey 1973). In other words, he tends to focus on social structure, which defines what is just and what is unjust, rather than focusing on a philosophy that morally and ethically define it. Belief that we have justified for a long time can be questioned in the context of human practice embedded in a social structure. To him, social relations and the construction of justice are central to the debates of social justice. A significant point that he asserts in Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference (1996) is that justice is socially constructed, like space, time, and even nature. Justice is a socially constituted set of beliefs, discourses, and institutionalizations expressive of social relations and contested configurations of power that have everything to do with regulating and ordering material social practices within places for a time (Harvey 1996). Second, Harvey’s view of social justice is closely related to the political- economic perspective to deconstruct capitalist society. Consequently, his idea of justice is deeply related to that of Marx. While Smith makes a great effort to theorize social justice through a philosophical perspective, Harvey moves towards how this justice can be realized in capitalist society. Harvey’s Spaces of Hope (2000) is an outcome of the epistemological application of justice in the name of utopianism within the context of Marxism. Even though the conceptualization of social justice is not his main topic – the issue of body and globalization – the realization of utopianism is nothing but the subjugation of capitalist injustice (Harvey 2000). Justice, for Harvey, is not simply a philosophical and ideological interpretation, but an important agent that has to be utilized in order to challenge the injustices of capitalist society. Another task of Harvey was to connect his theoretical frameworks of justice to the discussion of environment and nature. His principle of justice in the discourse of environment is shown in Table 2, which reveals how he connects the traditional theory of justice to the discourse of environment. He tries to divide the discourse of environment into four types: (1) standard views of environmental management, (2) ecological modernization, (3) wise use (with advocacy of private property), and (4) environmental justice movement for the socially weak. In addition, he points out that those discourses are associated with specific concepts of

18 justice (utilitarian, social contract, libertarian, and egalitarian perspective). Environmental justice, according to Harvey is related to radical egalitarianism, which tends to be discussed in terms of distributive justice (Smith 1994). Egalitarianism’s starting point is the possibility that the principle of equal distribution is all we need by way of a theory of social justice (Smith 1994). He also mentions that egalitarian principles demand a more equitable distribution of environmental advantages and burdens (Harvey 1996). However, he enlarges his discussion of environmental justice into something more radical and more communitarian beyond individualistic distribution. Not satisfied with simply distributive environmental justice, he ties the discourse to the context of social and power relations and processes. The practice of the environmental justice movement has its origins in the inequalities of power and the way those inequalities have distinctive environmental consequences for the marginalized and impoverished (Harvey 1996). Therefore, environmental justice is not just concerned with the distribution of environmental benefits and burdens, but is also concerned with the political empowerment of the socially weak.

Table 2: Relationships between Social Justice and Environmental Discourses.

Tradition of Justice Discourse of Environment Utilitarianism Standard View of Environmental Management Social Contractarianism Ecological Modernization Libertarianism Wise Use Radical Egalitarianism Environmental Justice Movement (Communitarianism) Source: Harvey 1996.

2. Distributive Justice, Procedural Justice and Environmental Justice Smith’s efforts to universalize social justice with the concept of equality and the process of equalization have a tendency to emphasize the significance of distributive justice. The distribution of benefits and burdens is closer to economic justice rather than social justice. There is no doubt that distributive justice is also an important consideration and the distributive paradigm has been regarded as an imperative theme when we think about the maldistribution of wealth between the rich and the poor or between the developing and developed countries. Schroeder (2000) demolishes the market-based approach to environmental justice associated with neoliberalism. Simple payment programs for distributive justice fail to

19 achieve environmental justice because compensation for lost livelihood and cultural resources is usually impossible. Some things just cannot be reduced to monetary equivalents. Thus, the distribution of economic benefits to localized groups appears as little more than a condescending gesture on the part of powerful political and economic interests designed to manipulate public sentiment and quell popular dissent. Thus, distributive justice cannot satisfy a complete and fundamental realization of environmental justice (Schroeder 2000). Distributive justice is a partial element of environmental justice. Controversial debates between distribute and procedural justice can also be traced back to Young (1990). She provides reasons for why the distributive paradigm has not fully explained the discursive discourse of social justice and suggests an alternative with the paradigm of “domination and oppression”, which is able to supplement and substitute for the distributive paradigm (Young 1990). According to Young, the distributive paradigm is prone to limit the discourse of social justice to material characteristics by asserting that the problems of decision making issues, division of labor, culture and right cannot be solved by a parochial and material discussion of the distributive paradigm of justice. It does not mean that distributive justice might be neglected for the sake of consideration of other types of justice that are thought to be more urgent. Distributive justice is more urgent that any other kind. In addition, distributive justice has been systemically discussed in the economic justice paradigm. Young’s critical assertion for the limitation of distributive justice and paradigm means that there needs to be an alternative theoretical consensus for justice, even though she uses the ideological terms domination and oppression and those terms point to the importance of process of how injustice has been formed. There has been intense controversy about the notions of distributive and procedural justice in environmental justice research. Distributive justice deals with concerns of those who believe they enjoy less of the resource than that to which they are entitled, and those who enjoy less than the minimum they need (Draper and Mitchell 2001). It was an issue even when environmental equity was more publicly known than environmental justice. Cutter (1995) categorizes equity into the social, the generational, and the procedural. She points out that procedural equity is the extent to which governmental rules and regulations, enforcement and international treaties and sanctions are applied in a nondiscriminatory way (Cutter 1995). In other words, procedural equity, even though there are differences between equity and justice, means that the process from policy making to policy implementation should operate in a just way. However, the difference between environmental equity and environmental justice sometimes comes from the conceptualization of procedural justice. Procedural environmental equity means self-determination (Lake 1996). It

20 also means inclusion, empowerment, entitlement, and active participation in institutional decision making. While environmental justice encompasses and transcends distributive concerns to include procedural justice, equity is purely distributive in its focus (Ikeme 2003). It means that without procedural justice there is no realization of environmental justice. In this regard, it is necessary to examine how different kinds of justice can be applied to coal plants. As long as the poor cannot actively participate and be involved in the policy making process, the just outcome is not ensured. Another important consideration is for the people who live in the vicinity of the new power plant. Their involvement in the policy making process is another imperative issue. We have to consider the relations between social and environmental justice. Justice cannot be quantitatively calculated by focusing on the many who enjoy the benefits and by the few who bear the burdens and costs, even if the benefits outweigh the costs. In this case, we fail to consider two important elements: first, a few people who are victimized and marginalized by the proximity to the plants, and second, environmental degradation of the region. In this environmentally vulnerable era, equal distribution of environmental benefits and costs are not enough to realize social justice. Social justice is impossible without environmental justice, and vice versa (Harvey 1996). Environmental justice is a dialectical relation of justice and environment. Concepts of justice need to go beyond the concept of distributive justice (Ishiyama 2003). Distributive justice only problematizes the unequal distribution of costs and benefits, and avoids social relations, historical, cultural, and ideological contexts that exist within capitalist geographies. The environment should also be considered in this study of justice. Marx's thoughts about justice suggest that the distributive characteristic of environmental justice should be overcome. Marx's justice is not simply a distributive one. It is about workers’ rights in class struggle against exploitation, profit making, and worker disempowerment (Harvey 1996). Lake (1996) also criticizes the elusive definition of environmental justice in the context of distributive justice. Therefore, Marx's view of procedural justice is potentially applicable to environmental justice. In other words, financial support for and distribution to the socially weak, could be a partial condition for justice, but this is not enough. Justice seen through Marxism’s class struggle requires a just social structure. Beyond distributive justice, Marxism criticizes a series of social process that causes such inequality. In sum, the shortcoming of distributive justice is the absence of interactive relations between groups because the distributive justice only emphasizes the benefits and burdens from top down policies. This kind of distributive justice limits the discussion of justice to economic justice without careful consideration of the social context of who is really involved in this distributive process. This kind of distributive justice still has the power and tends to

21 disregard how social justice is ideologically distorted.

CONCLUSION

This chapter unpacked the main components of environmental justice, especially the key concepts of justice. In the context of environmental conflict of the coal plant, this suggests a need to understand how the conflict can be seen from the viewpoint of environmental justice. Distributive justice suggests that a coal plant project could be environmentally just, if sufficient compensation reaches those harmed. However, this is insufficient. Environmental justice should include the concept of procedural justice. Procedural justice directs our attention to the substance of the problem of injustice, i.e., a chain of social acts that form an unequal social structure. Such social acts include drafting and implementation of laws and policies without considering the socially weak. The same happens in environmental and developmental policies. Local residents’ exclusion, disempowerment and isolation are environmental injustice, seen through a procedural justice perspective. Unfortunately, the environmental justice literature contributes little to our understanding of what causes procedural injustice. Environmental injustice related to the coal plant has many potential causes through social relations, social structure, and so on. The more research concentrates on the fundamental causes of the injustice, the more useful political ecology becomes for explaining environmental justice. In other words, political economy and political ecology can be a theoretical framework for environmental justice. There has been little research on the connection between political ecology and environmental justice. However, the connection is helpful for the two disciplines to interact effectively with each other. This issue will be explored in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL ECOLOGY AND

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

Politics, economy, ecology, the environment, and justice are all significant elements in the fields of political economy, political ecology, and environmental justice. The relations among political economy, political ecology and environmental justice need to be analyzed because they can (and must) be recognized in the continuum between practice and theory. Political ecology must be a practical part of the political economy of nature as well as a theoretical basis of environmental justice as a social movement. The three concepts are interrelated, and political ecology can play a role as the bridge between theoretical political economy and practical social movement. In addition, through the explanation of justice issues in political ecology and scale issues, I offer the means of connecting the two.

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

1. Political Economy The term “political economy” was first used in the early eighteenth century and referred to government policy (Johnston, Gregory et al. 2000). It can be said that political economy starts with the political influence on economic phenomena. Political economy has two important branches. First, political economy was characterized by classical economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Second and later, the term was redefined in terms of two theoretical emphases: first, the production and accumulation of wealth, and second, the distribution of the “surplus” so produced (Johnston, Gregory et al. 2000). The Marxist dialectical approach became an alternative political economy in contrast to classical political economy. Nowadays, the term political economy is often related to Marxism (Lee 1985). In the context of Marxist political economy, there are three characteristics in comparison with classical political economy. First, political economy emphasizes the domain of production rather than any other element of economic behavior. Marx’s masterpiece, Capital, starts with the process of production of capital. Out of eight parts, not only do three of the parts deal with the production of absolute and relative surplus-value, but other parts treat wages and

23 labor (Marx 1976). The mode of production is also central to Marx’s political economy. For Marx, there are structural connections between the social relations of production and the form of the state apparatus (Peet 1998). In addition, the mode of production is strongly related to the social relations which direct the application of forces of production in the transformation of the natural environment. The mode of production has shifted historically from primitive communism through the slavery system to feudalism and today’s capitalism. Marxist’s political economy is different from neoclassical economics. While neoclassical economics emphasizes the rationality of the economic person (homo economicus) and efficiency of markets, political economy looks to the mode of production and social relations as basic concepts. Therefore, the production for commodities and services becomes the fundamental object to be studied in political economy. Second, political economy emphasizes the historical perspective in economic domains. This is why we call Marxism historical materialism. Historical materialism can be understood as the progressive growth of the forces of production, as the history of class struggle, or as a schema of historical evolution (Peet 1998). Even though neoclassical economics does not totally ignore the historical perspective, political economy focuses much more on the historicity of the economic domain than does neoclassical economics. Due to this historical materialism, Marxism is often criticized for its historicism, i.e., its neglect of space and spatiality. Third, political economy emphasizes social classes in the analysis of economic issues. While modern and neoclassical economy is prone to categorize economic identity in terms of consumption, political economy classifies it as capitalist (the bourgeoisie) and worker or laborer (the proletariat). Social relations are conceived as relations between classes centered on the extraction of surplus labor time, or exploitation (Peet 1998). According to these three characteristics, the epistemological characteristics of political economy can be drawn. In neoclassical economics, it is desirable to exclude value judgments. In other words, neoclassical economics tends to concentrate on logical and rational explanations with the premise of value neutrality. In contrast, however, in political economy, it is necessary to explicitly acknowledge ethical values. In sum, political economy analyzes economic phenomena on a very different basis of epistemology from neoclassical economics. In addition, because political economy focuses on history and class, the object to be analyzed is nothing but capitalist society.

2. Political Economy of Neoliberal Capitalism and Nature Without an explanation of neoliberalism, the contemporary political economy of capitalism cannot be understood. Harvey (2006: 145) defines neoliberalism as

a theory of political economic practices which proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, free markets and free trade.

Neoliberalism, in this respect, can be associated with the neoclassical economic perspective. The term “neoliberalism” itself is an abbreviation of neoclassical (economic) liberalism. The dominant economic prevalence in the capitalist era is regarded as a neoclassical economics interposed in neoliberal thought. The term “neoliberal” was a sign to adhere to the principle of free markets, an idea supported by neoclassical economics in the late nineteenth century, which tried to replace and complement the classical theories of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx (Harvey 2007). Adam Smith’s invisible hand was, in other words, reproduced as a free market in the name of neoliberalism. The free market ensures that the invisible hand functions to control demand and supply without state intervention. Neoliberalism emphasizes deregulation, privatization and financialization. From this neoliberal perspective, socialism loses its persuasive power and becomes obsolete. Harvey (2006) points out the terms “liberty” and “freedom” tend to be misused in neoliberalism. In other words, neoliberalism emphasizes the fundamental and universal value of freedom or liberty, but it restricts them to the case of capitalist economy (Harvey 2006). Therefore, the question becomes: what kinds of liberty and freedom should be achieved, and for whom should they be considered. In neoliberalism, liberty and freedom are focused on enterprises rather than individuals. Misuse of terms foils us in the precise search for real liberty and freedom of people from the beginning. The linguistic manipulations of neoliberalism can be traced back to the liberal movement of western countries, especially during the 1960s and 1970s in the U.S. At that time, individual freedom and national liberty were thought of as political virtues. However, neoliberalism has removed the important aspects of justice from the liberal movements and replaced them with enterprises and the free market. Therefore, it is imperative that we are careful when using the term “free” or “liberal” in an individual sense. Harvey (2007) warns that even political movements that assert that individual freedoms should be sacred and inviolable are liable to be caught in a neoliberal trap. Privatization and commercialization are important dimensions of neoliberalism. Harvey explains that these phenomena are symptomatic of the neoliberal project (Harvey 2007). In the process of neoliberalism, all kinds of public industry and economy are transformed into individual and private enterprises and all kinds of materials are converted to

25 commodities. For example, privatization has affected Korea’s power-electric industry. The Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), a nationally-owned electric company, was broken into several private companies, including the Korea South-East Power Company (KOSEP) that constructed the Yeongheung coal plant. This is a symptom of neoliberalism. Commercialization is a more serious problem in the environmental context. The commercialization of nature led to exhaustion of public property in the global environment such as land, air and water and the ruin of habitat (Harvey 2007). Privatization and commercialization, under capitalist neoliberalism, infiltrate into every aspect of the world by relaxing national regulations on the nature and environment. Korea’s political economic direction is also moving toward neoliberalism. Myungbak Lee, the president of South Korea in 2008, gave a strong defense of neoliberalism:

We shall increase our effectiveness by abiding to the small-government, big- market principle. The jobs that are not meant for the government shall be privatized. Only then will we see investments and consumption increase once again. Corporations are the source of national wealth and the prime creator of jobs. All who wish must be allowed to start a business and build a factory without difficulty. We also need to create an environment where entrepreneurs can invest freely, and our companies can roam the world market with much excitement. Unnecessary regulations will be cast away or reformed as early as possible. Opening of the market to the foreign sector is an unavoidable mega-trend. Such an economy as ours, which depends so much on exports, should increase our national wealth through free trade regimes (Myungbak Lee, Korean President’s inaugural address 2008)2.

This neoliberal direction of Korea is not a new one. Korea’s neoliberal economic policies began to be compelled by global enforcement through the Uruguay Round, launched in 1986, which abandoned the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and created the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 19953. Korea’s ratification of the Uruguay Rounds led to the agreement to adopt neoliberal positions on free trade and the free market. However, the fatal incident which cemented Korea’s involvement with neoliberalism was the economic crisis during 1997 and 1998. At that time, Korea lost its ability to control capital

2 http://www.cwd.go.kr (Website of the Office of President in Korea, Cheong Wa Dae) 3 http://www.wto.org (Website of World Trade Organization, Uruguay Rounds)

26 markets. Korea’s financial bankruptcy paradoxically led to the United States’ benefit through the economic encroachment in Korea of privatization and deregulation in the name of structural adjustment (Harvey 2007). Neoliberalism was inevitably a poison to be swallowed in order to overcome the economic crisis in Korea. Unstable chaebol, the Korean term for giant corporate conglomerates or financial cliques (Blij and Muller 2006), seemed to collapse in the crisis, but were subtly deployed to destroy small and medium sized enterprises. In addition, income inequality and poverty increased and labor’s political opposition against irregular and flexible jobs was oppressed by the state, which had become a slave to neoliberalism. There are several critiques of neoliberalism. First, inequality and poverty, which are ironically believed to be removed by the idea that neoliberalism creates economic growth, is the main focus of the criticism of neoliberal capitalism. Ironically, this miserable poverty coexists with enormous wealth (Harman 1995). Harvey (2007) exemplifies the inequality and polarization of income citing the Human Development Report4,

In 1996, the poorest 20% of the world’s people saw their share of global income decline from 2.3% to 1.4% in the past 30 years. Meanwhile, the share of the richest 20% rose from 70% to 85%. The assets of the world’s 358 billionaires exceeded the combined annual incomes of countries with 45% of the world’s people in 1996. To make it worse, the world’s 200 richest people more than doubled their net worth in the four years to 1998, to more than $1 trillion (Harvey 2007).

Neoliberalism is not an apparatus for economic growth for all people and for all countries. Confronting the neoliberal economy, most countries and people are experiencing a worse economic atmosphere. Such polarization and poverty have their origin in exploitation, not in unequal production. In other words, the success of neoliberalism from the corporate perspective does not come from the accumulation of increasing capitalist production but from dispossession (Harvey 2007). Harvey (2006) points out that there has been no substantial economic growth in the global economy under neoliberalism5. Second, the role of the state in neoliberalism has two paradoxical sides. In theory, the state’s role is expected to shrink under neoliberal capitalism. Governmental control

4 Harvey cited Human Development Report, 1996 (p.2) and 1999 (p.3) by United Nations Development Program. http://hdr.undp.org (Website of United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports) 5 According to World Commission (2004), Aggregate growth rates stood at 3.5% or so in the 1960s and even during the troubled 1970s fell to only 2.4%, and the subsequent global growth rates for the 1980s and 1990s are 1.4% and 1.1% (Harvey 2006: 151).

27 over economic activities is regarded to be inefficient from the neoliberal perspective. The failure of Keynesian policies in the U.S. also played a critical role in developing neoliberalism. In other words, the efficiency of state intervention in the economic crisis in the 1970s became suspicious and gave great opportunity for the emergence of neoliberalism (Harman 1995). However, in practice, the role of states is not weakened even under neoliberal capitalism. Instead, neoliberal states have been transformed from democratic and bureaucratic organizations to corporate and entrepreneurial ones (Harvey 2007). Neoliberal states show their real power by supporting free markets and free trade, protecting corporate property rights, and maintaining the status quo. Some neoliberal states – the United States being the most representative – sometimes even require military backup. Power relations are still important in the neoliberal context. Power, regardless of whether it is military or political, functions as an oppressor of democratic freedom and simultaneously as a supporter of neoliberalism. Thus, the use of power implies that neoliberalism itself runs counter to the spirit of liberty and freedom (Harvey 2007). In other words, when neoliberalism, which tries to be liberal, confronts social movements, the state negates individual liberties by physically intervening (Harvey 2007). State authoritarianism enforces the free market at the expense of individual freedom. Third, income inequality is evident not only in class relations but also in spatial relations. Harvey (2006, 2007) asserts that neoliberalism is a mechanism that produces geographically unequal development. Under the leadership of the United States, unequal development has been enforced on several developing countries (Pinochet’s Chile and Shah’s Iran were representative of United States-led neoliberal countries). This unequal development increases the global inequality among countries as well as national and local inequality within countries. Accumulation by dispossession is happening on the global scale as well as the local scale. Globalized neoliberalism often resembles imperialism and colonialism, which once utilized silver and slaves, but now uses capital flows. Finally, the geographical consideration of neoliberalism can be linked to the discourse of nature and environment. Environmental degradation worsened by neoliberalism is criticized by environmentalists. Neoliberalism itself does not have a satisfactory theory of environmental degradation and nature’s exploitation. One of the failures of neoliberalism is that corporations have a tendency to avoid their responsibilities for environmental problems and place them outside of the free market. In other words, by externalizing their environmental responsibilities – for example, air pollution – neoliberal corporations evade environmental costs (Harvey 2007). More serious problems are that environmental degradation, which occurs at scales from the local to the national and the global. In the past, the exploitation of nature was a localized phenomenon, but with neoliberalism and globalization, it became globalized (Harman 1995). The

28 commercialization of nature led to the dearth of globally owned common properties (and, air or water) and to the ruin of diverse ecological habitats. Harvey (2007) details the environmental degradation brought on by neoliberalism. The growth of neoliberalism and environmentalism since the 1970s are subtly entwined with each other. Environmental movements have attacked neoliberalism as well as capitalism in light of the rapid destruction of biodiversity and the negative impacts of global anthropogenic climate change (Harvey 2007). However, there is little discussion of justice in neoliberalism and its critiques. Neoliberals tend to exclude the discourse of justice by emphasizing economic growth, development, and freedom and liberty of markets, while anti-neoliberals focus more on inequality, the role of states, and environmental degradation. Even though Harvey tries to include justice as a central concern and the best terrain upon which anti-capitalists (as well as anti-neoliberals) can make their stand (Harvey 1996: 11), debates about the pros and cons of neoliberalism exclude the discourse of justice. A positive sense of justice can revitalize the movements for social change by revealing various kinds of injustice from the social, the economic, and the environmental. Alternatives to neoliberalism should begin with the issue of justice. Global social and environmental justice by reform or dissolution of powerful institutions such as the IMF, the WTO, and the World Bank (Harvey 2006: 156) can be a starting point. In this regard, freedom and liberty need to be reconceptualized and justice must be introduced in the debates about neoliberalism. As long as justice is regarded as an important concern, neoliberalism can be assessed from the standpoint of social and environmental justice. The relations between distributive and procedural justice are important issues in environmental justice, as asserted in the previous chapter. Neoliberal logic suggests a different view of environmental justice. Neoliberal environmental justice is based on the idea that all environmental goods and harms can be reduced to money, such that markets can function justly and just compensation is possible for damages. For neoliberalism, virtue is essentially “liberal” which reflects interested parties such as private property owners, companies, multinational corporations or financial capital (Harvey 2007); “liberal” does not reflect the universal liberty and freedom for ordinary people. The same is true for justice. Justice is reserved primarily for huge and multinational corporations, not for the socially weak. Liberty and justice are for the corporations. Neoliberalism manipulates environmental problems in accordance with corporations’ convenience. Environmental issues are monetized in ways that almost always benefit the rich and powerful. As a chief economist of the World Bank put it, “The measurement of the costs of health- impairing pollution depends on the foregone earnings from increased morbidity and mortality” (Lawrence Summers cited in Harvey 1996: 366). From this point of view, a given amount of health-impairing pollution should be done in the country with the lowest

29 cost, which will be the country with the lowest wages.”

3. The Political Economy of Environmental Justice in Geography With environmental justice, the political economy of nature begins with Marx. Even though political economy was derived from classical economics and continues with neoclassical economics in contemporary geography, this term is deeply related to Marxism, which criticizes the contradictions of neoliberal capitalism (Lee 1985). Marx himself did not explicitly explain the social construction of nature and the environment. His concentration was on historical materialism, dialectics, and the political economy of production. His aspatial insight into capitalism has been criticized by geographers concerned with the spatial characteristics of capitalism. However, this does not mean he disregarded nature and the environment. To him, the existence of nature always tends to be associated with social relations. According to Marx, labor is, first and foremost, a process between people and nature, a process by which humans, through their own actions, mediate, regulate and control the metabolism between themselves and nature (Marx 1976). Some geographers (e.g., Neil Smith and David Harvey) have been able to rectify Marx’s silence on spatiality, creating a transformation from aspatial to spatialized Marxism. The reason why this is possible is because Marxism is not an ontologically exclusive theory of political economy but an epistemological way of thinking about how the world works in the context of capital circulation and accumulation. Therefore, Marxism is perfectly open to spatialization. Marxism has played a critical role in developing radical geography and has been helpful for the civil rights movement, anti-racism, and for the working class (Peet 1998). Therefore, to consider nature (or environment) and justice in the context of Marxism is useful for approaching environmental justice from the political economic perspective. In capitalism, environmental degradation is inevitable; in neoliberal capitalism, the degradation is severe. For Marx and Engels, who observed the industrial revolution with both awe and concern, the degradation of the environment was a fundamental feature of capitalism (Robbins 2004). To be capitalized, nature and environment are produced. This approach is associated with Marxian economics and Marxist geography and is part of a broader political economy approach to nature and the environment (Castree 2003). There is also a deep connection between Marxism and the issue of justice (Swyngedouw 2003). Since the 1960s, questions of social justice have been high on the agenda, and it became abundantly clear that justice is a deeply geographical affair. What Marx and

Marxism offered was a comprehension of why, where, and how deep and perverse injustice and inequalities persist. Swyngedouw (2003) concludes that if we connect this injustice to capitalist society, capitalist social relations – by virtue of the unequal power relationship embodies in the class relations – produce systematic conditions of repression, social and ecological exploitation, uneven development, disempowerment, and social exclusion for many, as well as immense wealth, power, and freedom for a few (Swyngedouw 2003). This is exactly where, why and how the Marxist approach should be projected into justice issues in environmental justice. Marxism provides an integrated and relational approach that helps untangle the interconnected economic, political, social and ecological processes that together form a highly uneven and deeply unjust urban landscape (Swyngedouw and Heynen 2003). The effective application of Marxism in environmental justice concerns class struggle. Environmental justice is about the class struggle between dominant power groups (i.e., the rich, and racially white in the case of the United States) and the dominated (i.e., the poor and people of color). According to Marx, social relations are conceived as relations between classes centered on the extraction of surplus labor time (Peet 1998). This idea can be applicable to the social relations of environmental injustice because environmental justice ultimately derives from different and unequal relations between classes. In addition, the environmental justice movement can be thought of as a potential solution to some of the problems of global capitalist society. As Escobar (2001) points out, through the environmental justice debates, strategies of global localization by capital, the state and technoscience can be challenged by subaltern strategies of localization by communities and particularly social movements (Escobar 2001). Environmental justice is ultimately a dialectical story about the dominant and the dominated in terms of environmental benefits and burdens. Therefore, accounts of environment and development should begin with the overall contradictory character of relations between societies and natural environments and recognize that dialectics remains a compelling theory of contradiction, crisis, and change (Peet and Watts 1993). Harvey's career introduced Marx and Marxism in a spatial and geographical context. In other words, his studies are about the political economy of space. His book, Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference (1996), in particular deals with justice, the environment and globalization as well as space and time. His work on the political economy of space is extremely important in the discussion of environmental justice. In other words, the economic logic of political-economic power and its discriminatory practices (Harvey 1996) inevitably generates environmental injustice. This kind of consideration moves us beyond the moral and ethical perspective on environmental justice. The discourse about environmental justice should be considered not simply as a philosophical and ethical debate, but rather in terms of environmental

31 conditions (beliefs, institutions, social material practices) and relations (form of political- economic power) (Harvey 1996). Therefore, Marx’s and Harvey's views about nature, environment, and justice form a useful initial framework when examining environmental justice and its movement. As long as the problems of environmental justice and its movement are derived from neoliberal capital society, the Marxist approach must be considered in environmental justice. Of course, there are other approaches. However, by considering what is wrong with the decision making in locations of environmental benefits and burdens, and by including those who are powerless to confront such a degraded environment, Marxism provides an insightful theoretical and methodological perspective to analyze such a phenomenon. The environmental justice movement has been criticized for its ignorance of the capitalist political economy. How can this critique be overcome? Marxist political economy of nature and environment can provide a helpful answer. It maintains that uneven socio-ecological conditions are produced through the particular capitalist forms of the social organization of nature (Swyngedouw and Heynen 2003). In other words, environmental injustice is frequently the outcome of the workings of neoliberal capitalism.

POLITICAL ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

Political ecology seeks to understand the complex relations between nature and society through a careful analysis of what one might call the forms of access and control over resources and their implications for environmental health and sustainable livelihoods (Paulson, Gezon et al. 2003). The relations between nature and society, therefore, are the main themes in political ecology. In this respect, responding to the environmental activism of the 1970s and early 1980s, an important offshoot from such Marxist-inspired theories of society-nature relations (Peet 1998) emerged as a more pragmatic “political ecology”. Political ecology, an approach to, but far from a coherent theory of, the complex metabolism between nature and society (Johnston, Gregory et al. 2000), has its origin in political economy, particularly in Marxism, and emphasizes the role of political economy as a force of instability (Walker 2005). Therefore, the definitions of political ecology are deeply associated with political economy. Various scholars have diversely defined the term “political ecology”. Robbins (2004) summarizes the main definitions. Blaikie and Brookfield points out that political ecology combines the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined political economy (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Robbins 2004). Greenberg and Park (1994) defines political ecology as a

32 synthesis of political economy, with its insistence on the need to link the distribution of power with productive activity and ecological analysis, with its broader vision of bio-environmental relationships (Robbins 2004). Peet and Watts define it as a confluence between ecologically rooted social science and the principles of political economy (Robbins 2004; Watts and Peet 2004). This political economy approach deals with the elements of society, culture, nature/environment, politics, and economy in the context of interactions between politics and economics. Almost all research in political ecology is theoretically engaged with what has often been described as a broadly defined political economy (Robbins 2004). Political ecology can be simplified as the political economy of “nature” and “environment”. In the context of these definitions, political ecology is the study of conflicting social groups with different political powers projected on to a specific environment. It includes geographical scales that are simultaneously local, regional, and global, a social scale that ranges from individuals to larger social groups, and to the interrelations between developing and developed countries. In comparison with political ecology, political economy can deal with diverse elements, such as culture, politics, economy, nature, and environment as a result of the political economy relations in capitalist society. Therefore, political ecology is political economy that focuses on nature/environment and its relations to human and society. Marxism is a confluence where political economy and political ecology meet. Political economy is a dialectical process between the neoliberal approach, which advocates a free market economy, and the resistant stream of Marxism (including post-Marxism, Marxist structuralism and the like). The study of nature/environment (political ecology), therefore, also criticizes capitalist power over marginalized regions, peoples, and environments. In conclusion, political ecology and political economy are deeply interrelated in the context of Marxism. While political economy is a more discursive discipline that looks at the world through the lens of economy, politics, culture, as well as nature and environment, political ecology is a dialectical political discourse about nature and the environment. In other words, the field of environmental justice can be applied to that of political ecology and vice versa in three ways: (1) the theory/praxis dichotomy, (2) justice issues in political ecology, and (3) the politics of scale.

1. Theoretical Political Ecology and Practical Environmental Justice The field of environmental justice can provide a practical base for political ecology. The environmental justice literature has evolved through political praxis and focuses on the uneven distribution of both environmental benefits and damages to economically/politically

33 marginalized peoples (Swyngedouw and Heynen 2003). The starting point of environmental justice is a kind of activist social movement. Environmental justice has a weak theoretical base due to its derivation from its practical roots. The environmental justice movement has been driven largely by pragmatic activism so it has not had the need to theorize itself (Torres 2002). Some political ecologists are concerned with the lack of a theoretical framework in environmental justice. Swyngedouw and Heynen (2003) point out that as opposed to the broad theoretical perspective employed by political ecologists, most studies done in the context of environmental justice/equity are more narrowly focused. Because of the lack of a theoretical framework, environmental justice often fails to put justice issues in a larger political economic framework. It misses the links that make it environmental injustice integral to the functioning of a capitalist political-economic system (Swyngedouw and Heynen 2003). In contrast, political ecology often fails to be applied practically to real social and environmental problems, which are directly related to justice issues. In addition, political ecology tends to apply social theory, including Marxism, in the environmental world rather than to try to actively solve the problems that generate environmental degradation and social marginalization. Political ecologists have played an important role in theorizing environment and nature in the context of political economy, but in comparison with environmental justice activists, their work plays a relatively minor role in social and environmental movements. Therefore, making up for the weak points of theory and praxis, it is helpful to use both approaches. Overcoming the dichotomy between theoretical political ecology and the environmental justice movement is the way the two disciplines can be reconciled to each other. Environmental justice can borrow its theoretical framework from political ecology and political economy. At the same time, from many social and environmental movements, political ecology can extend to practical issues. Practical characteristic of environmental justice is able to enrich the field of political ecology by extending it with political praxis beyond just theoretical pursuits.

2. Justice in Political Ecology Political ecology in the early stages failed to examine the relations between capitalist processes and environmental “injustices” (Swyngedouw and Heynen 2003). Political ecology has mostly criticized environmental problems and capitalism, so it ignores the issue of justice, which is a core target. In other words, these studies show that political ecology is a political economic issue rather than simply a justice issue. The limitation is that there was little consideration of the deep relations between political economy and justice. Political ecology and justice should be bound up

34 together. Justice debates are associated with issues of inequality for people in the Third World, including an emphasis on class inequalities. For example, the oppression of Third World peasant farmers was linked to the practices of local landlords, who, in turn, were enmeshed in subordinate relations with capitalists based in Europe and North America (Bryant 2001). As nature is socially constructed, the logic of socionature becomes deeply related to justice by asking how might the logic be related to issues of social equity and justice (Bryant 2001).. Blaikie (2001) problematizes the issue of social justice in terms of human rights, legal confirmation of property rights, more equitable distribution of access to resources for the landless, women and other oppressed groups, and the utilization of local or indigenous knowledge and values. Political ecology is also the study of marginalized peoples, environments, and regions. Theories of political ecology were shaped by concerns for marginal social groups and issues of social justice concerns that have taken the forefront in recent publications such as Liberation Ecologies by Peet and Watts (1996) and The Environmentalism of the Poor by Martinez-Alier (2002). Even though political ecology originated in Marxism, justice debates tended to emerge in the late 1990s and beyond. The newly emerged First World political ecology has more explicitly addressed the issue of justice on a local scale. Political ecology came to deal with informal property relations, micropolitics, socially unequal distributions of risk and benefits, attachments to particular livelihoods, unjust exclusions from protected natural areas, and many other factors related to justice (McCarthy 2005). In addition, urban political ecology focuses more on justice issues. A just urban socioenvironmental perspective, therefore, always needs to consider the question of who gains and who pays and to ask serious questions about the multiple power relations through which deeply unjust socioenvironmental conditions are produced and maintained (Swyngedouw and Heynen 2003). Another important debate in justice is about what kinds of justice should be realized. There are two main kinds of justice, distributive justice and procedural justice. Many political-ecological books do not discuss this issue, and political-ecological studies more often make use of the concept of distributive justice rather than procedural justice. Dobson (1998), for example, focuses on distributive justice in the discussion of environment (Dobson 1998). Many studies in political ecology that deal with justice are limited to the issue of social justice without a distinction between distributive and procedural justice. However, the existence of these debates regarding justice indicates that the field of environmental justice can be congruent to the field of political ecology. Similarly, political ecologists who are interested in justice issues also turn to environmental justice.

Justice cannot and should not be downgraded or underestimated over other issues in political ecology. Political ecology is a normative discipline rather than a positivist discipline. The term “normative” describes how things should or ought to be, how to value them, e.g., which things are good or bad and which are right or wrong. In other words, it provides an answer to the question of how and why a specific phenomenon should be. As long as political ecology is a normative discipline, it must provide a measuring stick to clarify whether a phenomenon is “good or bad” or “right or wrong” and justice is one measure. In sum, political ecology should move towards the issue of justice. The political ecology should move towards considering the social justice of nature. If a more justice- based approach is taken, then evidence from the economic, cultural, and social impacts of policy will be given prominence (Blaikie 2001). In addition, the ethical considerations of political ecology are another move toward incorporating justice in this issue. Environmental justice could be infused with a political ecological concern with the moral bases of human thought and action and the forging of theoretical linkages between marginalized peoples and marginalized environments (Bryant and Jarosz 2004).

3. Scale in Political Ecology and Environmental Justice The social sciences, geography in particular, have long struggled with the issue of scale (McCusker and Weiner 2003). Scale is a significant factor in geography. According to The Dictionary of Human Geography (Johnston et al. 1994), scale simply refers to a “level of representation”. It is a more cartographical and geographical definition than a social and political economic one. However, since the early 1990s, the study of scale came to include political perspectives. In the politics of scale, scale developed as an imperative issue. Marston (2000) began the social construction of scale with a fundamental explanation. The initial step for the social construction of scale is that scale is a contingent outcome of the tensions that exist between structural forces and the practices of human agents (Marston 2000). In other words, scale, which once meant a scientific cartographical factor, came to include social processes and human manipulation. Scale, which roughly refers to one or more levels of representation, experience and organization of geographical events and processes (Johnston, Gregory et al. 2000), is not ontologically and inherently a pre-given concept. In the context of politics, social relations and social movements, scale is an epistemologically constructed apparatus not only to support a specific group’s legitimation in a specific region but also to resist such legitimation. Therefore, the significance of social production and the construction of scale are important in this context.

Scale is an important element in the connections between environmental justice and political ecology. Before clarifying how scholars in political ecology and environmental justice define scale, it is necessary to examine how scale has been recently discussed in geography. There is a wide consensus among human geographers that the social construction of scale affects cultural and political landscapes (Howitt 2003). In other words, the local, urban, regional, and national scales are human constructs that reflect and in turn shape social relations (Towers 2000). Scale is not ontologically given; to insist on the essential existence or priority of any scale is scalar fetishism (Towers 2000). In this regards, scale can be intentionally manipulated with the interest of any social group, and has, more often than not, been manipulated by the powerful. It does mean that to resist the manipulation of the powerful, those who are powerless also need to construct their own scales. Therefore, the struggle over scale will inevitably exist. In sum, scale is socially produced to ideologically maintain the vested rights of the powerful, to hide the injustices of marginalized people, and to resist the dominant by the dominated. Political ecology emerged from cultural ecology. Cultural ecology is a field of geographic and anthropological research to interpret and understand the logics, choices, and imperatives of daily environmental practices in a way that is sensible, practical, and universal (Robbins 2004). Cultural ecology, in this manner, is the study of how a specific and local cultural group has adapted to its own environmental situation. It is a locally oriented form of study. There is, therefore, little consideration of external intervention from the regional, national, and global scales. However, political ecology tends to center upon the explanation of a local community’s environment, ecology, degradation, and adaptation on external factors. In other words, political ecology has distinguished itself from mainstream nature-society studies (e.g., cultural ecology) by its multiscalar approach of the analysis of human-environmental relationships (Zimmerer and Bassett 2003). Therefore, the roots of the political ecology tradition lie in an effort to transcend the limitations of cultural ecology, which are too often examined only at the local scale and treated as a closed system (Brown and Purcell 2005). Political ecology has significant issues of scale having to do with the restructuring of global capitalism. The politics of scale in political ecology range from the body to the locally imagined community to state and intra-state struggles to new forms of global governance (Watts and Peet 2004). Political ecologists are predisposed either to examine empirical evidence directly from local case studies or focus on regional and global impacts on local landscapes (McCusker and Weiner 2003). In other words, political ecology examines how a local region and local people have been environmentally and ecologically affected by the larger scale of action, mainly global capitalism, which is a concept of all global governance and

37 multinational corporation. In political ecology, scale is customarily centered on the interactions between developed countries (or multinational corporations) and developing countries (or local communities). Robbins (2004) mentions the examples of Michael Watts and the oil industry in Nigeria, Piers Blaikie and soil erosion in Nepal, James Scott and the Green Revolution in Malaysia, and so forth. Political ecologists call for more attention to how local human ecologies were embedded in a set of wider political-economic processes that influence local outcomes (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Brown and Purcell 2005). For example, Blaikie and Brookfield’s “chain of explanation” model is a scalar consideration of local environmental degradation. The chain of explanation starts with the land managers and their direct relations with the land, and the next link concerns their relations with each other, land users, and groups in the wider society who affect them in any way (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Robbins 2004). A “chain” refers to cross-scale (or multiscalar) relations of a community, its landscape and ecological system. This degraded environment and landscape, which even though it initially resembled the outcomes of producers’ and communities’ abuse of the environment without external intervention, is an outcome of the complex processes of social relations among producers, communities, local/regional institutions, the state, transnational financial and international institutions, and the like. Therefore, the chain of explanation suggested by Blaikie and Brookfield shows how different scales of various identities have affected a local region. In sum, political ecologists have long shared an interest in exploring multiple scales and have engaged in the broad experimentation and ardent debate around the question of how to link together sites of study, ranging from the household garden to the whole earth (Paulson, Gezon et al. 2003). There are also exist self-reflections and critiques of political ecology. In the traditional literature on political ecology, little attention has been paid to “the urban” as a process of socioecological change, which discusses global environmental problems and the possibilities for a sustainable future, which customarily ignore the urban origin of many problems (Swyngedouw and Heynen 2003). The stereotype of political ecology is one concerned exclusively with localized degradation and globalized impacts on a specific region. However, the localized regions have a tendency of being mostly located in the Third World such as Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In other words, nearly all the work in the field of political ecology has been centered on case studies of small-scale primary producers in rural areas of developing countries (McCarthy 2005). However, recent academic work in political ecology has begun to examine

38 the urban and local scales within the First World. Political ecology in the First World is a kind of scalar challenge against this binary division between developing and developed countries. The same kind of degradation of environment and marginalization of people is simultaneously occurring in industrialized countries and communities. By considering the First World, political ecology is concerned with not only trying to abandon the classic distinction between developing and developed countries. According to McCarthy, political ecology could both contribute to and benefit from research on environmental relations and conflicts in industrialized countries, including cases centered on urban areas or on consumption (McCarthy 2005). On a more local scale, it assumes that informal property relations, socially unequal distributions of risks and benefits, attachments to particular livelihoods, or unjust exclusions from protected natural areas are central to the dynamics of human-environment relations (McCarthy 2005). Swyngedouw and Heynen (2003) also mention the significance of urban political ecology in the context of scale. Rather than considering the rural areas of developing countries, they consider the urban areas of developed countries. As far as political ecology is concerned, urban scale has hardly been dealt with; little attention has been paid to date on the urban as a process of socioecological change, while discussions about global environmental problems and the possibilities for a sustainable future customarily ignore the urban origin of many of problems (Swyngedouw and Heynen 2003). Political ecology, although, it has been used to examine locally and rural environments and people victimized by globally imposed powers of capital, governance and institutions, needs to extend its scalar consideration from the rural to urban areas and developed countries. Environmental justice is prone to focus on local issues, especially community-based movements. Environmental justice was traditionally a local scale movement, and most studies have dealt only with the local scale (e.g., Capek 1993; Bowen, Salling et al. 1995; Cutter and Solecki 1996; Pulido 2000; Towers 2000; Manuel Pastor, Sadd et al. 2001; Ishiyama 2003). However, there are cross-scale connections among environmental justice scholars. For example, the relocation of toxic industries from developed to developing countries continues the pattern of environmental injustice only at a different spatial scale (Cutter 1995). Harvey (1996) also clarifies the need for a global scale of environmental justice by beginning his discussion with the migration of dirty industries to less-developed countries. Global climate change is another important issue in local environmental degradation. In this case, the global scale of governance does not always solve the problems of environmental justice in the local community (Adger 2001). Environmental justice has to be considered at a global scale because political economy relations have been thoroughly globalized. For example, at a global scale, the citizens of rural areas of developed countries might suffer the dual burdens of negative impacts

39 from local environmental degradation and of marginalization from the world political economy. This consideration of scales from the global to the local without the dichotomy between the two scales can be applied to environmental justice and political ecology. Political ecology and environmental justice are explicitly normative, focusing on the intersections of multiple forms of marginality and vulnerability, and critical of the narrowness of many mainstream environmentalist discourses and agendas (McCarthy 2005). Therefore, environmental justice and political ecology must consider the geography of crossing scales. The reconciliation of political ecology and environmental justice means the utilization of multi-scalar considerations and the application of cross-scale analyses. Another important implication for both disciplines is the social production and construction of scale. Although scale is a very important issue in both political ecology and environmental justice, it is not fully considered in the context of social production and construction. Most political ecologists do not explicitly theorize scale as a social construction, and this void leaves open the possibility of entering the trap of assuming that certain scales can be inherently tied to particular process (Brown and Purcell 2005). The main aim of political ecology is to examine the global and local relations of environmental degradation and marginalization, not to figure out the hidden meaning of scale within the global and the local or to manipulate the meaning of scale by social construction. Consequently, scale in political ecology has simply been used to analyze the relations between the globalized political economy and localized outcomes. First World political ecology developed to challenge the stereotypical choice of scale in classic political ecology. In this regard, Brown and Purcell’s assertion about the danger of particular scalar configuration can be considered valid. Their assertion is that scale and scalar configurations are not an independent variable that can cause outcomes, rather they are a strategy used by political groups to pursue a particular agenda (Brown and Purcell 2005). Therefore, the local is never free from this configuration of scale. In other words, the local is not solely local and the global is not purely global, either. In this respect, they argue that the local trap assumption is embedded in calls for greater attention to local indigenous knowledge, community- based natural resource management, and greater local participation in development; however this line of thinking misses the fundamental fact that political economy, culture, and ecology all exist and operate simultaneously at a range of scales (Brown and Purcell 2005). The local and the global should not be understood as a binary dichotomy but as a continuum. Swyngedouw and Heynen (2003) are also important thinkers of scale in political ecology as well as in other fields in human geography. While they focus the study of political ecology on the urban as other First World political ecologists, scale is another significant consideration for them in the context of social production. Scale should be understood as the flux

40 of sociospatial and environmental dynamics and these dynamics are embedded within networked or territorial scalar configurations that extend from the local milieu to global relations (Swyngedouw and Heynen 2003). They emphasize that scale is not fixed: it is constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed. In other words, territorial and networked spatial scales are never set, but are perpetually disputed, redefined, reconstituted and restructured in terms of their extent, content, relative importance and interrelations (Swyngedouw and Heynen 2003). Scalar debates in political ecology and environmental justice are discussed above. First, classic political-ecological studies focus on the global/local relations on environmental degradation and marginalization. Consequently, such binaries are characterized by developed countries’ global political economy and underdeveloped countries’ local victimization of the environment and indigenous peoples. This kind of scale-related issue in political ecology has been challenged by First World political ecology. This idea is supported by the discussion of the social production of scale. Through the social production of scale, political ecology needs to consider and examine how the specific scale, no matter whether it is local or global, is intentionally manipulated by what kind of social groups. This kind of consideration of scale implies the theoretical development of scale in several directions. First, political ecology and environmental justice should overcome the binary and dualistic characteristics of scale between globalization and localization. Scale is always problematized within the continuum of two extremes. There is no ideal or superior scale since scale is not only continually crossed and mixed but also socially produced. Every scale shows a kind of political struggle, therefore there can never be anything inherent about any particular scale (Brown and Purcell 2005). This means that the global and the local are deeply interrelated, or glocalized. Globalization should be deconstructed by other various scalar struggles and localization should also be projected in the larger scale of the national, the regional, and the global. Another consideration is temporal scale. In geography, political ecology, and environmental justice, the temporal perspective has hardly been theorized in scalar terms. Processes of environmental degradation and marginalization always have a temporal dimension. Temporal scale is equally as important as spatial scale. Temporal scale is also manipulated and constructed similarly to the spatial scale. For example, long term environmental degradation and marginalization is prone to be veiled by a short-term synchronic perspective. Therefore, consideration of temporal scale should be included in political-ecological research. Finally, as long as scale is a flexible and changeable process, ecological scale must be included in the context of the politics of scale. Future political ecological research might consider how ecological scales interact with socially constructed scales to produce

41 distinctive environmental geographies. Zimmerer and Bassett (2003) suggest four productive avenues of research related to ecological scale: (1) the scales of ecological dynamics; (2) functional conservation areas; (3) mismatches between ecological and social scales; and (4) fragmented scales. Ecological scale has a tendency to be superseded by the social scale. Even though ecological scale does not seem to include the power and social relations of different groups, it should never be neglected. A scale that is ontologically fixed does not exist. Rather, scale is always operationalized and socially constructed in order to maintain the vested rights of power groups and to ideologically hide the injustice of marginalized people, to victimize the environment, and dialectically resist this kind of oppression by the dominant of the dominated. Such a theoretical background of scale is useful for examining the environmental injustice of coal power plants in Korea. For example, the developers justify the need for the coal plants at a national economic scale and the procedures that disempower island residents are constructed at the regional and national scales. Meanwhile, environmentalists work at a regional scale of pollution and the global scale of climate change fail to address problems at the scales of the individual, family, community, and livelihood.

4. The Social Construction of Nature and the Environment Another important study related to environmental justice within the political ecological framework is about social constructivism. In the discipline of geography, social constructions of nature, environment, and scale have become significant in that nature/environment and scale are projected into space and place. From the political ecological perspective, approaching environmental problems through social constructivism is a different approach from looking at them through the lens of scientific knowledge. In this respect, the social construction of nature as well as scale must be a meaningful part of utilizing political ecology for environmental injustice. Pursuing the origin of the study of social construction – at least from the geographical perspective related to space and place – begins with Henry Lefebvre. In a series of writings from the early 1970s, he offered geographic viewpoints about urban area, space, and capitalism, relating them to social production and construction. Thus, he studied space as a social product (Marston 2000). However, more geographically, Neil Smith is also an important scholar regarding the social production of space. Avoiding dualisms such as home and locality, and divisions from the local to the global, he asserted that there is nothing ontologically given in the context of scale (Smith 1984). Another suggestion from Smith is that the agent of social construction lies in capitalists who are superior to any other class in the context of power

42 relations. In other words, scale construction is a political process endemic to capitalism, the outcome of which is always potentially open to further transformation (Marston 2000). The social construction of nature was another imperative study considering environmental problems. Bird’s study (1987) suggested the necessity of research of the social construction of nature in environmental problems. Scientific knowledge has played an important role describing and solving environmental problems. However, Bird states that it is needed to examine how environmental problems are socially constructed and manipulated in the name of scientific knowledge (Bird 1987). The manipulation of scientific knowledge cannot be understood without invoking the work of Bruno Latour (1986). Generating scientific knowledge is a sociological process and scientific facts are constructed by social interaction among scientists (Latour and Wooglar 1986). Bird (1987) did meaningful work in that she applied the sociology of nature to the issue of nature and environmental problems. Thus, she criticizes the environmental discourses that have blindly accepted scientific knowledge. Ecology, in this respect, is a natural science of nature and environment. Although ecology provides us with important knowledge for dealing with environmental problems, we cannot presume that ecology alone provides a sufficiently accurate representation to accommodate social activities to the requirements of nature (Bird 1987). She points out that politics should intervene in the discussion of nature and environment, which is why we have to add “political” in ecology.

CONCLUSION

This chapter looked into the relations among political economy, political ecology and environmental justice. Political economy and political ecology were defined as an important apparatus to criticize the entire social framework of capitalism, especially the neoliberal transformation. In addition, the chapter worked to find the connections between political ecology and environmental justice in the context of theory and praxis, justice and scale. Studies of social structure and social relations from the perspective of political ecology can be useful in getting at the root of environmental injustice of the case study area. In addition, the political ecological critiques of neoliberal capitalism are also useful to examine a study area. Thus, in order to analyze the environmental and social problems in the Korean coal plant study area, critiques of capitalism, social structure and social relations effectively utilize the framework of political ecology.

CHAPTER 4

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN KOREA

The objective of this chapter is to focus the discussion of environmental justice on South Korea. Chapter 2 describes fundamental definitions and the history of environmental justice. Chapter 3 suggests a new alternative way of approaching the discussion of environmental justice from the political ecological perspective, and suggests that environmental justice must consider the theoretical framework of political ecology. The connection of environmental justice and political ecology was explained by the contexts of theory and practice, justice, and scale. In this chapter, I follow that framework to illustrate how the discussion of environmental justice has developed historically in Korea. A short history of the environmental movement and environmental justice is presented. Second, it observes the differences in the development of environmental justice issues between the Unites States and Korea. Finally, the supply and demand of coal energy in Korea (and in the world) is explained in the context of environmental justice.

A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN KOREA

The development of environmental justice as well as environmentalism in South Korea does not have a long history in comparison with those in the United States or the western world. Given that discourses are developed with environmental problems that arise from economic and industrial growth, Korea’s relatively late growth, economically and industrially, compared to developed countries explains the reason why it has a shorter history of environmental discourses, let alone environmental justice. Environmentalism has developed differently on a different ideological and strategic basis from that of environmental justice. In addition, it also has temporal precedence over environmental justice. However, the two are bound to each other. In Korea, as many environmentalists began to cling to and be interested in environmental justice, the discourses of environmental justice have progressed. Environmental justice did not abruptly and independently become an issue without environmentalism.

1. Short History of the Environmental Movement in Korea Korea’s environmental movement started in the 1980s (Ku 1996). This initiation of the environmental movement coincides with that of rapid economic growth of the country. After the

1970s, Junghee Park, a dictatorial president, pursued policies for economic growth that contributed to the industrialization in Korea. No environmental brakes were applied to industrialization, which encouraged the reckless construction of contaminating factories. Korea’s environmental movement, in this respect, began with anti-air pollution protests by victims. This trend continued until the late 1980s (Ku 2004). Air pollution is still one of the more important environmental issues in Korea. It is also effective in arousing public attention to existing environmental pollution. In the 1990s, as environmental groups started criticizing the government’s environmental policies, the majority of the environmental movement’s focus in Korea shifted from the response to existing pollution to the prevention of predicted pollution. Table 3 explains three case studies of environmental movements in Korea during 1990s to the present. Korea’s environmental movements have a propensity to change from individual health problems to policy issues, from existing pollution to the avoidance of predicted environmental problems, and from addressing immediate physical and local damages to philosophical and theoretical concerns. In other words, the environmental movements, which focused on air pollution on the industrial complexes in the 1980s, became more diverse in the 1990s. As a result, environmental discourses in Korea were enlarged to those of the living environment, environmental protection, global and long term environment, energy policies, and even culture and community campaigns (Ku 2004). Like the United States, educated elites seem to have led mainstream environmentalism in Korea, rather than the middle class, laborers, or victims. In the case of air pollution, the main victim was the population in urban areas. However, the environmental movement was initiated by environmentalists rather than by victims. Environmentalists aroused localized residents’ attention to environmental pollution. In addition, they extended the meaning of the environmental movement with a series of campaigns to raise environmental consciousness. In this case, environmental problems were focused on air pollution, which caused widespread damages. While environmentalism in Western Europe and the U.S. has also considered the preservation of ecosystems, Korea’s environmentalism, especially in the beginning during the 1980s to the 1990s, focused on the impact of pollution on human health. Therefore, warning of the pollution impacts preceded the dangers to biotic systems or biodiversity. Threats to the ecosystem related to reclamation and dam construction were not even discussed until the late 1990s.

Table 3: Case Studies of Environmental Movement in Korea.

Case Phenol Pollution Anti-Dong River Dam Anti-Reclamation in Saemangum

Year 1991 1991 – 2000 1998 – present

Flood and water shortage Citizens’ health Water pollution Main Issue Safety of dam Plutocratic immorality Protection of Tideland Ecosystem

Response Pollution abatement Pollution avoidance Pollution avoidance

Citizens Victims Citizens Environmental groups Movement Citizens Environmental groups Religious persons Identities Environmental groups Religious persons Artists Artists Civil organizations Labor union

Environmental Environmental conservation conservation Structural conversion Damage compensation Movement Improvement of dam from development-centered Improvement of Aims policies policies environmental policies Dissemination of Dissemination of ecological value ecological value

Partial damage compensation Intensification of conflict Improvement of policies Cancelation of the construction between developers and Movement Enforcement of Introduction of water environmentalists Results environmental movement management policy Dissemination of Dissemination of Dissemination of ecological value ecological value environmental-centered values

Sensational and intensive Separation of reports by Intensive report about the report media types between Media Type significant of the Dong River’s Stigmatization of the developmentalism and ecosystem development company environmentalism

Main Future generation Future generation Health Interests Ecosystem Ecosystem

Environmental Environmental Movement conservation Health-centered conservation Character Criticism for water Green life policies Source: Ku (1996).

However, Korea’s environmental movements have several weaknesses. The first is the excessive empowerment to the environmental organizations and their inefficient

46 bureaucratization (Ku 2005). Table 4 shows the skyrocketing establishment of environmental organizations between 1988 and 1992. During that period, twelve organizations on average were established annually. For example, Table 5 shows the growth of the Korean Federation for Environmental Movements (KFEM), which is the biggest environmental organization in Korea. The number of members in 2002 increased by six times over that in 1993, and the number of employees increased three fold. However, many environmentalists pointed out that the bureaucratization and empowerment of the organization due to surging numbers is excessive (Ku 2005). Consequently, it led to an uncomfortable and rigid bureaucratic atmosphere in the organization, according to some environmentalists.

Table 4: Number of Korean Environmental Organizations by Establishment Year (1988~1992).

Establishment 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Number 6 11 8 19 18 Source: (Ku 1996).

Table 5: Growth of the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM).

Regional Full-time Employed Annual Budget Members Organization Environmentalists (thousands of dollars) 1993 7,900 12 80 295 1994 8,900 17 100 402 1995 10,400 20 120 1,092 1996 12,200 24 150 1,035 1997 15,400 28 150 1,139 1998 26,800 32 180 1,242 1999 34,600 36 180 1,195 2000 43,011 42 210 2,090 2001 46,600 44 200 1,910 2002 50,600 47 220 2,324 Source: Ku (1996).

Second, the common practice of governments and developers to provide small sums to indemnify poor residents to compensate for environmental damages makes the environmental movement difficult (Ku 2005). Such superficial compensation circumvents the real issues of environmental problems without explaining the fatal dangers of pollution.

Superficial compensation only focuses on a tiny portion of the total environmental costs. Local residents, blinded by immediate gains, tend to lose their attention paid to the environmental problems. As a result, it is difficult to persuade them of the benefits of environmentalism. In the case of the Yeonghueng coal plant, the superficial compensation to local residents came to be a serious problem for this reason. Finally, Korea’s environmental movement seemed to lack a theoretical and environmental basis (Ku 2005), without which environmental practices failed to have real significance and could easily lose their persuasive power for environmentally affected residents. In the 1980s, environmental movements without theoretical bases concentrated on case-by-case protests against environmental pollution and the compensation for local residents. Although, environmental problems eventually came to include theoretical, philosophical, and ecological perspectives, today analyses of environmental problems still lack the political ecological perspective, which calls attention to Korean social relations. Therefore, a fundamental aim of this dissertation is to elevate the political ecological approach in discourses of environmental justice in Korea.

2. History of Environmental Justice in Korea The history of environmental justice in Korea is much shorter than the history of the environmental movement. The concept of environmental justice was introduced in Korea after the 1990s. Environmental justice in the United States is also a relatively recent environmental discourse that became popular after several environmental paradigms (Taylor 2000). However, in Korea, scholars who work in environmental studies acknowledge that the United States first embarked on the discourse of environmental justice. Korean studies of environmental justice began with the analysis of environmental pollution. More importantly, as the studies showed that the environmental damages were inappropriately concentrated on the socially and economically weak, they came to be discussed with much more gravity in the name of environmental justice, especially with the United States as a model (Park 2001). In the meantime, on a national scale, the approaches of environmental justice by the national government in the context of national policies and institutionalization have played a critical role in developing the discussion of environmental justice. The national government seemed to grasp the concept of environmental justice as an issue for all generations, from the present to the future, an idea related to sustainable development in the U.N.’s Rio Declaration in 1992. In other words, while considering the changing atmosphere of developed countries and the Rio Declaration, South Korea has tried to include environmental justice in its laws and policies (Lee 1999). The Korean Ministry of Environment was willing to accept the

48 concepts of sustainable development and environmental justice, and the goal of global environmental protection as a foundational principle for a fundamental law of environmental policy (Jeon 1999). Even though development and environmental justice are often incompatible with each other, in Korea the government treated the two concepts as though they were harmonized in order to show that it cared for environmental justice as well as environmentalism. In this regard, the existing law is expected to be modified with three articles. The first concerns sustainable development, the second relates to global environmental protection, and the third involves environmental justice, which means the environmental benefits should be equitably shared without discrimination according to region (urban or rural), income, or age (Korea Ministry of Environment 1999). In the case of Korea, unlike the United States, the ideas of environmental justice developed from both policy making and from practical research during the 1990s. In the 1990s, with policy making by the Ministry of Environment, several symposia for environmental justice in Korea were held, leading to the establishment of the Citizen’s Movement for Environmental Justice6 (CMEJ), which was founded in 1992. The nation’s sporadic studies of environmental justice clearly developed as a discourse or practice of environmental justice. Sporadic studies could not be integrated without an organization to play a role in the name of environmental justice. Therefore, discussions of environmental justice began with the Environmental Justice Forum established by the CMEJ in 1999 (Park 2001). Environmental justice has made various efforts to take a theoretical root in Korea as an alternative discourse of environment. However, the definition and concept of environmental justice has not yet come to the academic fore (Park 2001). The inauguration of the forum was a new means of looking at the environment. In 1999, the forum affirmed the declaration before the public and elucidated the aim of illuminating environmental movements in Korea from the perspective of environmental justice (Cho 2001). The declaration shows how environmental justice pursued its meaning in Korea:

Seen through the lens of environmental justice, the environmental problems in our contemporary era are provoked by human exploitation of nature and the natural world. Such exploitation and oppressions of human beings on nature originated from the view of world and sense of values which have an anthropocentric characteristic. This anthropocentric characteristic also led to problems of class, race and north-south (Two Koreas) within human society. In addition, it also raised intergenerational

6 http://eng.eco.or.kr/

problems between the present and the future. Therefore, to uproot environmental problems, it is necessary to adjust these wrong-going viewpoints, social systems and institutions as well as to protect the natural environment and wildlife. In this way, the main intent of environmental justice is to establish an ethical and just measuring stick of complicated environmental problems7.

Such a forum is challenges Korean culture. Most Korean conservatives usually think of the Left, socialists, and communists as a political group that threatens national safety and they attack such movements by associating all progressive movements with communism, i.e., red-baiting similar to McCarthyism. Therefore, in this conservative atmosphere, adding justice into discussions of environment is something sensitive and peculiar, especially because certain terms are contrary to conservative ideology, i.e., exploitation, oppression, class and north-south relations. Therefore, the establishment of the forum and CMEJ were a serious matter. However, to progressives, the catchphrase of the forum, which looks at the environment through the lens of justice, was attractive. The CMEJ also contributed to expanding environmental justice in civil and social movements as well as alternative environmental movements. In 2002, CMEJ had more than five times the members it had in 1999 and three times the budget (Table 6). Although the size of the CMEJ is relatively small in comparison with the Korea Federation of Environmental Movement (KFEM), the main stream of the environmental movement in Korea, the CMEJ (which later changed its name to simply Environmental Justice) has become as the primary organization for environmental justice in Korea.

Table 6: Trend of Citizen’s Movement for Environmental Justice (CMEJ).

Regional Full-time Employed Annual Budget Members Organizations Environmentalists (thousands of dollars) 1999 386 0 12 220 2000 508 0 18 610 2001 1,700 0 20 780 2002 2,033 0 24 900 Source: (CMEJ 2002).

Through several symposia and forums, several case studies of environmental injustice were conducted, including, for example, those concerning a canal

7 Establishment Declaration Letter of Environmental Justice Forum by CMEJ in 1999.

50 between Seoul and Incheon (Park 2001), the reclaimed land of Saemangum (Jeon 2001), the development of the city of Yongin without consideration for the environment (Seo 2001), and the construction of the industrial complex in the Weechun region (Lee 2001)8. These were approached from the perspective of environmental justice. Environmental justice in Korea is derived from theoretical research. Thus, active practice never came before theoretical studies. On the contrary, for academic research, scholars have tried to seek out individual and local cases of environmental injustice. Such theoretical studies can be divided into two branches. First, as a mainstream study of environmental justice, most studies focus on localized cases. Second, the political economic approach to environmental justice is done by relatively few scholars. Alternative studies combine these two branches of localized cases and theoretical approaches. For example, there is a case study of environmental justice from a legal perspective (Jeon 2000) and a political economic case study of environmental justice (Lee 2001).

DEBATES ABOUT ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN KOREA

This section explains several studies of environmental justice in Korea. The studies have two branches: localized case studies and theoretical examinations. However, they are not exclusive and independent of one another; rather, they are closely interconnected and interrelated.

1. Local Case Studies of Environmental Justice in Korea Localized case studies have been the mainstream of environmental study in Korea since the discourse was first introduced in Korea in the 1990s. Table 7 shows a trend and pattern of localized environmental injustice in Korea. It can be divided into four groups: rural areas, urban areas, industrial areas and the United States’ military camps in Korea.

8 In 1999, Environmental Justice Forum, which is titled “Environmental Conflict and Environmental Justice”, was held in Seoul by the Citizen’s Movement for Environmental Justice. Those case studies were presented at the Forum.

Table 7: Examples of Environmental Injustice in Korea.

Cases Problems Victims Causes Destruction of Low-income fishing Saemangum ecosystem for short-term people Resources Development-centered policies reclamation benefits of development Future Development Exclusive policy making Dong River Dam Deprivation of local resident generations living space Ecospecies Destruction of existing farm Illogical land use land Farmers Development permission Thoughtless Farming Exacerbation of local Low-incomers for the yield of taxes development of Development resident living space Local residents Speculative development farming land Residents’ damages Future generations by land owners and from natural hazards corporations Environmental exacerbation Redevelopment system for Redevelopment due to population density maximization of of settlement Urban low-incomers Destruction of living space commercial benefits Urban Transportation Local residents for the low-income citizens Lack of investment by public Development development Future generations Destruction of regional sector (Seoul-Incheon Ecospecies environment due to the Preference to the investment Canal) Canal logic of private enterprises Policies against Construction of environmentalism Ulsan City Local residents Lack of control of Industrial industrial Disease Old people and environmental damages Development complex and Water pollution Children Illogical decision making Daegu Industrial Reflection of regional complex enterprises Construction of Illogical decision making landfill Environmental degradation Local residents Lack of care for the local Contaminant Military facilities of regional living space Low-income residents Facilities (Yongsan U.S. Lack of compensation residents Unequal military treaty Armed Forces in Unfair land possession General citizens Insensibility to citizens’ Korea living space Source: Cho (2001).

The first forum for environmental justice by the CMEJ in 1999 reviewed the localized case studies of environmental justice, no matter whether they were rural or urban. Rural regions frequently experienced environmental injustice because they lagged behind urban regions. Developers alleviate the financial burdens for investment and compensation due to the lack of assertions of the rights of rural people. Therefore, rural regions are an attractive location for environmentally contaminant facilities. In addition, reclamation or canal plans are prone to be concentrated in rural areas for the same reason. In Korea, the Seoul-Incheon Canal (Park 2001), the Saemangum reclamation plan (Jeon 2001), and disregard for the environment during the Yongin development (Seo 2001) are clear cases of environmental injustice. Park (2001) analyzed the environmental injustice of Seoul-Incheon Canal

52 construction. Owing to the construction of the canal, local residents lost their basis of livelihood and farming was damaged by the exhaustion of water and local climate changes in the form of wet fogs (Park 2001). The environmental damages were fully born by local residents, who were socially and economically weak, while the profits of the canal went to the conglomerates that held political and economic power (Park 2001). Thus, large scalar development plans implemented by the combination of developers and the state caused harm to local residents. The Saemangum reclamation plan can be explained in the same manner as the Seoul-Incheon Canal. The Saemangum region is notorious for the largest reclamation plan in Korea. Jeon (2001) describes two types of injustice in Saemangum. First, there was the environmental injustice based on class. The interests of fishermen, farmers and developers were politically marginalized in the plan. In addition, she explains that there was intergenerational injustice. This means that in order for the present generation to seek profits, many future generations will lose their share of nature and environment (Jeon 2001). Seo’s study (2001), which points out the rampant development in the Yongin Area, is also regarded as environmental injustice in a rural region. From the viewpoint of environmental justice, the Yongin development plan, which enforced rampant development, shifted its environmental costs onto local farmers in order for housing builders and landowners to create excessive profits (Seo 2001). Several elements were the result of environmental injustice: the infringement of local residents’ rights, the unequal split of environmental costs and economic benefits, and damages to the socially weak rather than to the powerful (Seo 2001). However, this rural example does not imply that environmental injustice does not also occur in urban areas. Environmental injustices in urban regions are more often associated with the unequal distribution of pollution than with the location of environmentally contaminant facilities or industrial complexes. The research on the metropolitan landfill (Han 2001) is remarkable. Han (2001) shows that the procedure of changing the use of reclamation space into a landfill is very unjust to local residents. He asserts that environmental injustice occurs when the distribution and the result of benefits and costs for resource use are not procedurally democratic (Han 2001). In addition, there are also a few cases of environmental justice that are related to loss of urban livelihoods. For example, Seo (1991) studied the correlation between income and environmental pollution. According to him, dust density occurs in inverse proportion to income (Seo 1991). This case uses a quantitative approach to explain the numerical relations between income and density, and excludes the social structure or political economy. Industrial complexes are often located far away from urban areas. Environmentalists are interested in such complexes as a separate element from the rural or urban

53 area in question. Therefore, even if the complexes are usually located in rural regions, they are usually dealt with as a unique element. The conflict in the Weecheon region (Lee 2001) is derived from of the development plan to construct an integrated complex of dye houses, which were once sporadically located in the Taegu Metropolitan area. Lee (2001) views the conflict as a result of different ways of understanding the uncertain environmental risks of different groups. In addition, the conflict shows: (1) the different approaches to the Nackdong River, which were polluted by the complex; (2) the clashes between different senses of values of local residents, environmentalists, and developers; and (3) the suggestion of a bottom-up system from the local people instead of a top-down system starting from the central government (Lee 2001). He points out that the most relevant way of solving this environmental injustice is to be eco-democratic. His study, despite its localized case study, is also theoretical in that he also approaches the problems from the political economic viewpoint. Finally, in the unique political economic situation in Korea, the United States military camps are a sensitive political issue. Currently, although the U.S. military plans to move the bases to other countries, environmental problems are also occurring. Lee (2001) focuses on the unilateral environmental destruction due to the military. The issue was worsened by the camps’ move: previous places suffer from environmental pollution and consequently those costs are unfairly imposed on the local residents who live near the camps. However, Lee concentrates his study on environmental destruction rather than on environmental justice. Such localized case studies of environmental justice in Korea developed as a form of guerilla tactics and played a pioneer role in fomenting discourses of environmental justice. However, such studies tend to be limited to an artificial description of environmental damages without careful consideration of the causes and effects of the injustice. In other words, they overlook the complicated social structures and social relations that are fundamental factors that led to localized environmental injustice. The same weakness is found in the study of the United States’ military camps in Korea. The study does not prove successful in attacking the problem of social structures, which create environmental injustice. The phenomenon of the United States’ military camps is a result of the Cold War as well as a cause of environmental injustice. However, stressing only environmental elements derived from the movement of the camps tends to ignore the fundamental root and social relations between countries since the Cold War. Therefore, the study of environmental injustice of the camps should begin with the political relations between the United States and Korea. The study should have also related environmental injustice to the Cold War and even to the colonialism and imperialism that pre-existed such relations. Environmental issues do not simply have environmental causes. The study needs to analyze how economy and politics are involved there. In this respect, the political economic

54 approaches to environmental justice in Korea (Choi 1999; Choi 2000; and Yun 2000) are meaningful in that they are not restricted to localized cases.

2. Political Economy of Environmental Justice in Korea Choi (1999) looks at environmental justice from the Marxist perspective. As a geographer, Choi is affected by David Harvey’s interpretation. His study suggests the theoretical and political economic basis of environmental justice that is previously inclined to be found in case studies of environmental pollutions and inequality. To Choi, environmental justice is extended into the “justice of production” beyond distributive and procedural justice. Production justice means that justice should be realized the beginning – before other justices – to enables distributive justice and procedural justice (Choi 1999). Production is dialectically related to nature and society and justice should be considered in this relation. Thus, production justice implies the just relations between humans and nature and consequently between humans (Choi 1999). Choi seeks to extract the environmental discourses from the concepts of social justice that appear in Harvey’s work. Environmental justice is widely dealt with in the context of authoritarianism, national bureaucratism, plural liberalism, conservatism, communitarianism, ecological socialism, and ecological feminism. However, he asserts that the discourses and theories of environmental justice (as well as those of ecology) should be replaced or merged into the political economy of historical materialism (Choi 2000). However, environmental justice, in this respect, is too theoretical to care for the practical aspects. In addition, his approach is much closer to ecological justice than environmental justice. For instance, both workers (in Marx’s era and the socially weak in the contemporary era) and nature (or environment) are victims of environmental destruction in the capitalist context (Choi 1999). His concept is prone to exclude and dilute the key concept of environmental justice, which is to think that the socially weak (humans rather than nature) are the main victims of environmental pollution. Justice in production also is shown in the context of ecological justice, i.e., by production through the exploitation of nature, and the idea that the relations of human labor should be just. Consequently, his explanation of environmental justice in relation to capitalism becomes a criticism of neoliberalism. Yun (2002) relates the political economy of environmental justice to the discussion of climate change and conventions such as The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Her studies are remarkable in that they deal with the environmental justice of relations between developed and underdeveloped countries from a global scale, while others deal only with local

55 cases in Korea. She asserts that the phenomenon of climate change and its solutions have shown unequal outcomes from the perspective of environmental justice (Yun 2002). Such inequality says that the historical responsibility for climate change in the present rests with the developed countries, which experienced an earlier industrial revolution and have burned a great amount of fossil fuels during the process of industrialization for a long time (Yun 2002). Thus, treaties for climate change were criticized by the demands of uniform compliance of all countries without careful consideration of unequal historical contexts. Put differently, regarding environmental protection, the treaties are generous regarding the misuse of nature and environment by developed countries in the past (and even in the present). This is a global scalar environmental in justice. Yun also criticizes the influences of market-centered capitalism on environmental problems related to climate change. Developed countries, through the market-centered approach, pretend to function as managers to provide efficient solutions to control the threats of climate change by mobilizing advanced technologies and abundant funds (Yun 2002). Consequently, they prove themselves able problem-solving brokers with the leadership to urge underdeveloped countries to reconsider inefficient and wasteful uses of fossil fuels and to reduce Carbon dioxide emissions (Yun 2002). Underdeveloped countries degenerated into passive objects to be managed by developed countries, which dominate technology and the global market (Yun 2002). She also looks at the issue of environmental justice from the political economic perspective in the case of climate change. However, her studies do not include the connections between the global political economy with localized environmental problems. They are limited to the relations between global climate change and national unequal results and responsibility. Therefore, connecting the global and the local is another necessary task in the study of environmental justice.

3. Alternatives Localized case studies and theoretical analyses have developed in separate ways. However, a few studies occasionally include both a case study and theory. The Weecheon industrial complexes of dying houses are a representative example of environmental justice, which includes both aspects from the political ecological (rather than political economic) perspective (Lee 2001). Through a theoretical basis, Lee tries to explain the environmental injustice of the complexes. From a theoretical perspective, he emphasizes the structural context of justice and the equal distribution of power (Lee 2001). Such contextualization is mentioned in Young’s work (1995), who also stresses the significance of communitarianism. The contextualization deals with the structural conditions that create an unequal distribution of power – this discussion lies somewhat beyond

56 the consequential distribution – so that it enables the discourse of environmental justice to explain the structural reasons for injustice (Lee 2001). However, the political ecological approach was not effectively applied to the case study of the industrial complexes. While Lee’s study shows a detailed understanding of the concepts of political ecology and environmental justice, this conceptualization is not well connected to the case study of the Weecheon complex. First, the explanation about the abuse of capitalism is absent. He conceptualizes political ecology and its usefulness pertaining to environmental issues, but fails to show the political ecological critiques of capitalism. Second, there are few comments about the social relations between laborers, local residents, and developers in the Weecheon complex. The study, without the explanation of the social relations, suggests a conclusion that local residents are damaged by environmental problems. Nonetheless, this issue is meaningful for the theorization of political ecology in the study of environmental justice in Korea. Jeon (2000) also endeavors to combine the theory of environmental justice with specific case studies. Her explanation of environmental justice arises from a legal perspective. While Ku (2001) focuses on the historical change of the environmental movement and its shift from the environmentalist to environmental justice, Jeon (2000) stresses the legal changes of environmental policies. In sum, various projects, from practical case studies to theoretical research, have enriched the discussion of environmental justice in Korea. Environmental justice as well as environmentalism are actively involved in Korea’s environmental problems. Localized case studies that show the environmental injustice of polluted regions are the mainstream in this discipline in Korea. A small number of scholars perform separate theoretical studies. In Korea, environmental justice still has not been well conceptualized. Therefore, political economy and political ecology can be used to explain localized environmental injustices. This theoretical approach can explain environmental justice from localized phenomena to global and social structural contradictions in one continuum of social relations.

DIFFERENCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND KOREA

Studies of environmental justice in Korea have borrowed American research directions and theories. As the discipline has come to take root in Korea, however, it has developed in a very different way. This section examines the different aspects of environmental justice studies

57 between Korea and the United States.

1. Different Subjects The issue of environmental justice in Korea and the United States has different origins. Of course, environmental justice in both countries concerns localized environmental problems. In addition, activists in the two countries have the same general view that pollution is inappropriately concentrated on the socially weak. However, the significant difference between the two lies in who began to create the consensus by criticizing the unequal distribution of environmental pollution. In short, the debates on environmental justice began with discussions of different subjects in each country, who experienced the injustice, planned the protests, and tried to change the laws and politics. In the United States, the subjects consisted of local residents and local communities. These frequent occurrences of environmental debates on a local scale finally changed the policies and generated a new discourse of environmental justice. Thus, in the United States, social movements rather than academic studies triggered the academic prevalence of environmental justice. In 1982, Warren County, North Carolina (Bowen, Salling et al. 1995; Cutter 1995; Draper and Mitchell 2001) was a prelude to the environmental justice movement in the United States. Local residents of the county, who were mostly low-income African Americans, ignited to the issue of environmental justice by joining environmentalists, civil rights groups, and the Black Congressional Caucus (Cutter 1995). Consequently, these debates started the establishment of the discipline as well as the governmental policy-making organization. In contrast, environmental justice in Korea shows academic origins. In this context, environmentalists and environmental scholars suggested that local people were passive environmental victims who experience environmental injustice. Thus, in Korea, environmental justice was developed by academic elites. It means that local people rarely lead the movement. Rather, there were environmental movements in the regions where environmental pollution occurred and then environmentalists and scholars tried to understand the resulting environmental injustice. Ironically, environmental injustice existed, but it was hardly developed as a practical movement. The Environmental Justice Forum in 1999 was the initial attempt to form the academic roots of environmental justice in Korea. However, the subject of the forum was not the local residents and communities, but environmentalists and scholars. Even though local people were the victims of environmental injustice, academics did not believe they were ready to join in the debates and discussions. Various case studies were suggested, but they failed to

58 become part of the local people’s protests or movements. The reason seemed to be that there was little participation by the local people and that the academic studies were separate from their participation. These differences between the United States and Korea are derived from different ways of understanding the environment. Experiencing diverse environmental paradigms, United States’ citizens tend to react on environmental issues more sensitively than did Korean citizens. However, in the Korean case, most citizens continued to believe in development with economic growth rather than environmental preservation. Thus, it is difficult to expect active environmental debates (let alone environmental justice debates) given the citizens’ low level of environmental awareness, which regards economic growth or developmentalism (rather than equal distribution or environmentalism) as the most desirable social outcome. In sum, environmental justice in both the United States and Korea developed differently with different subjects who experience and protest the injustice. The elites and environmentalists led Korea’s environmental justice while local people and local communities initiated the environmental justice movement of the United States.

2. Different Victims The two countries have very different ethnic structures. The United States has pluralistic and multicultural characteristics. Race is a very sensitive issue in the U.S. and this is no exception in the discussion of environmental justice. Environmental justice movements in the United States directly reflect racism. In other words, in the racial atmosphere of the United States, environmental justice developed in the context of environmental racism. Many studies show that African Americans are the largest racial group that experienced severe environmental injustice. For example, the victims of PCB environmental pollution in Warren County, North Carolina in 1982, which was subject of the first debate on environmental justice, were mostly African American. Key terms of environmental justice in the Table 1 show that environmental racism (with environmental classism and environmental equity) is regarded as an important element in the discourse of environmental justice (Draper 2001). The United Church of Christ’s Commission for Racial Justice in 1987 was also the first case study of environmental justice in a racial context (Bowen, Salling et al. 1995; Cutter 1995; Heiman 1996; Lake 1996; Pulido 2000; Draper and Mitchell 2001; Bowen and Wells 2002; Harner, Warner et al. 2002). In the U.S., the debates about environmental racism were prior to those of environmental justice, and later race, class, and equity in environmental discourses began to integrate under the label of environmental justice.

In contrast, Korea has homogeneous ethnic characteristics. Recently, illegal residents who have immigrated from Southeastern Asia reached one million people, but the proportion pales in comparison to the U.S. and is but a tiny minority in comparison with the multicultural mixture of the U.S. Thus, ethnicity is insignificant to the issue of environmental justice in Korea. Instead, Korea’s environmental justice shows remarkable aspects of classism. In Korea, environmental injustice concentrates on the economically weak rather than the racially weak (in a larger context, there is a strong correlation between race and class). Environmental injustice occurs in the regions of the economically marginalized, such as the farmers, fishers, women in rural areas, and poor people in urban areas. In case of the U.S., racism rather than classism can be thought of as an origin and stimulus of the environmental justice movement.

3. Different Geographies Environmental justice is a geographical phenomenon that is deeply related to the location of environmental facilities and geographical inequality. For example, environmental pollution appears according to the geographic location of the contaminant facilities and consequently, they lead to unequal distributions. Such a difference also appears between Korea and the U.S. In the U.S., environmental justice is a relatively urban phenomenon. In spite of the fact that the environmental justice originated in Warren County, a non-urbanized area, the debates gradually moved to urban areas such as New Orleans (Bullard 1990) and Los Angeles (Pulido 2000). This issue is strongly correlated with the geography of environmental racism. Environmental injustice in the U.S. is a phenomenon that African Americans have disproportionately experienced. In Korea, environmental injustice mostly emanates from rural regions. Korea’s concentration of injustice in rural regions reflects rural people’s low incomes. Rural areas are still economically backward regions compared to urban areas. In addition, rural residents have little time to spare to consider quality of life, well-being, or environmental benefits. Consequently, the economic situation in rural areas is connected to the locations of environmental contaminant facilities, including the case of the Yeongheung coal plant. Regardless of the fact that electricity is mostly provided to metropolitan citizens, the facility was located in the island of Yeongheung. Regionalism is a significant element in Korea’s environmental justice issues. Thus, unlike the U.S., Korea shows different environmental justices between rural and urban areas. In the U.S., environmental injustice concentrates on race and class regardless of where it is located. On the other hand, in Korea, developers’ preferences (avoiding urban regions where citizens’ environmental awareness is relatively greater) to locate in rural areas is

60 paramount. In this respect, Korea’s environmental justice shows a strong regional inequity. Therefore, the debates about environmental justice in Korea, consequently, are concentrated in rural areas.

COAL ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN KOREA

The purpose of this study is to show environmental injustice concerning the Yeongheung coal plant. This section examines the political and economic connections from localized environmental justice and globalized coal energy issues. Thus, framing those chained relations from global coal energy via the national demands of coal to local environmental injustice into a continuum is useful for the case study of the Yeongheung coal plant. Figure 3 describes the frame of such relations including environmental justice in the context of coal energy. Thus, it reveals how environmental injustice on a local scale is connected to regional development, coal energy demands and necessity on a national scale, and the political economy of resources on a global scale.

Neoliberal Capitalism Global

National

Local Free Market Free Trade Privatization Deregulation WTO

Global Free Trade of Coal Political Economy Of High Oil Price Inter- Global WarmingClimateand Change generational Global EnvironmentalProblems Injustice Global Demand Of Coal Energy

National Demand of Coal Energy

Procedural Injustice

Developers’ Coal Plant Plan

Localized Environment Problems

Distributive Injustice

Local People’s Environmental Injustice

Figure 3: Diagram of Coal Energy and Environmental Justice.

1. Global Trends of Coal Energy Global energy needs are likely to continue to grow steadily for at least the next several decades (IEA 2005). Fossil fuels will continue to dominate energy supplies, meeting more than 80 percent of the projected increase in the primary energy demand (IEA 2005). However, the growth of energy demands and of fossil fuels use threatens the global environment and economy. Hence, the world is facing twin energy-related threats: of not having adequate and secure supplies of energy at affordable prices, and of environmental harm caused by consuming fossil fuels (IEA 2006). High prices are related to oil, which show volatile prices (Figure 4). New geopolitical tensions or, worse, a major supply disruption, could drive prices even higher (IEA 2006).

Figure 4: Alaska North Slope Crude Oil Price, 2005 to 2008. (Source: the California Energy Commission9)

Volatile oil prices make it useful to consider coal from another angle. The growing use of coal resources, which once experienced a decline, is a remarkable global trend. Coal has seen a large increase in demand in absolute terms, driven mainly by the need for power generation (IEA 2006). It is also predicted to grow further in the future. Consumption of coal

9 http://www.energy.ca.gov/oil/statistics/ans_crude_prices.html (Website of California Energy Commission)

63 worldwide is expected to increase by 71 percent between 2004 and 2030, driven by developing countries that use coal to generate about 75 percent of their power10. To make matters worse, the growing use of coal by China and India, which are undergoing industrialization and consistent economic growth, is a critical factor in the global growth of coal use. China possesses a large amount of coal and production (Table 8). Its production formed 46.2 percent of world output in 2006 compared with 18.7 percent in 1973 (Figure 5). The global scale of demand and supplies of coal will be balanced by China’s export of coal (IEA 2007). China’s coal fuels national industrialization as well as export production.

Figure 5: 1973 and 2006 Regional Shares of Global Hard Coal Production. (Source: IEA (2007) *Asia excluding China.)

10 http://www.energyliteracy.org/compare-coal-power.html (Website of Energy Literacy Advocates)

Table 8: Major World Producers of Coal in 2006 (millions of tons).

Producers Hard Coal (Mt) Brown Coal (Mt) China 2,481 * USA 990 76 India 427 30 Australia 309 71 South Africa 244 0 Russia 233 76 Indonesia 169 0 Poland 95 61 Kazakhstan 92 5 Colombia 64 0 Rest of the World 266 595 World 5,370 914 Source: IEA (2007) included in Hard Coal.

China’s production and export have a meaningful influence in Korea due to its geographic proximity to Korea. China’s coal is attractive to Korea, which suffers from high oil prices. In order for Korea to trade with China, coal trade between the two countries is necessary. Coal trade between China and Korea is dealt with in Chapter 6. Therefore, the issue of coal energy connects the global political economy and geopolitics of resources and energy to national demands and supplies of coal as well as coal plant construction.

2. National Trends in Coal Energy in Korea Korea is affected by changes in global energy demand and supplies. Volatile oil prices transformed Korea’s preference for energy to coal and coal plants. Accordingly, Korea has imported a large amount of coal from foreign countries, mostly from China. In the 1980s, Korea’s coal industry was at its peak (Table 15). However, as it transformed into a post- industrial structure, industry experienced structural adjustment. In the global context of free trade, imports of coal turned out to be more efficient than national production. Table 9 shows the countries that import coal. Korea ranks second after Japan in coal imports.

Table 9: Major World Importers of Coal in 2006 (millions of tons).

Importer Hard Coal (Mt) Japan 178 Korea 80 Taiwan 64 UK 51 Germany 41 India 41 China 37 USA 33 Russia 26 Italy 25 Rest of the World 243 World 819 Source: IEA (2007).

Table 10 illustrates electric production by energy source in 2007. It shows how coal achieved an important status. In Korea, coal functions as the biggest energy source and coal plants rank first, with the electrical production of 18,840 mega watts. In addition, mixed plants also partly utilize coal. As a result, the role of coal in Korea is massive.

Table 10: Korean Electricity Production by Energy Source in 2007.

Hydro LNG Oil Coal Mixed* Nuclear Total Electric 5,492 1,538 4,129 18,840 16,407 17,716 64,122 production (megawatts) Percent of 9 2 6 29 26 28 100 Total Source: Korea Electric Power Co. (2007) * Mixed with Coal and LNG.

The amount of energy use increased by 10 percent per year (KEPCO 1997). The increase of energy use is due to improvements in the standard of living and to

66 industrialization. Therefore, from the standpoint of KEPCO, additional construction of power plants is inevitable given the expectation of consistent growth until electrical consumption reaches the standard of developed countries. When considering economic efficiency, the coal plant is the most feasible. Thus, the reason for using coal plants is simply economic feasibility. The three attractive characteristics of coal are the abundance of reserves, its inexpensive price, and the possibility of a stable supply. These are the fundamental economic logics of cost and benefit, but the use of coal energy is connected to the political economy and the geopolitics on a global scale.

3. Coal Energy and Environmental Justice The use of coal, related to energy demands and supplies brings about two harmful results in the context of environmental justice. As mentioned earlier, Yun (2002) explains the environmental inequality associated with energy issues on a global scale between developed countries and underdeveloped countries. Thus, coal use (which can be applicable to oil and LNG) functions as the most serious cause of climate change by emitting large amounts of carbon dioxide. Recently, environmental awareness has tried to reduce emissions and protect the earth from global warming, and acts as the antipode of developmentalism, which gives a tacit consent for the continuing use of coal. Such environmental concerns about coal energy began on a global scale. The efforts of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) operate as part of an environmental plan. However, the efforts are likely to operate disadvantageously upon poor countries (Yun 2002). The developed countries have been in ecological debt to underdeveloped countries (Agarwal and Narain 1998). Any climate change plan that ignores this point makes underdeveloped countries experience global environmental injustice. Table 11 shows the comparison of energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions in 1999. It reveals that the consumption and emission are dissimilar. Therefore, the quantitatively equal burden of environmental responsibility for all countries denotes qualitatively unequal and unjust solutions for poorer countries. Environmental resources such as the atmospheric commons have been used disproportionately – unjustly – by wealthy people and countries (Yun 2002).

Table 11: Comparison of Energy Consumption and Carbon Dioxide Emission in 1999.

Energy Consumption Carbon Dioxide Emission Population (millions) Total Per capita Per Total(MTCO2) (MTOE) (MTOE) Capita(TCO2) 5,921.39 9,774.48 1.65 22,955.87 3.88 World (100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%) 1,116.41 5,229.45 4.68 12,238.95 10.96 OECD (18.9%) (53.5%) (53.3%)

Developing 452.66 1,258.77 2.78 2,513.01 5.57 Countries (7.6%) (12.9%) (10.9%) 4,352.32 3,286.26 0.76 8,203.91 1.88 Underdeveloped Countries (73.5%) (33.6%) (35.7%) Source: IEA (2001).

Local people experience global environmental injustice with heavy environmental burdens imposed on them. However, this is not the only injustice that they experience. They are also victims of localized contaminant facilities (e.g., coal plants), which are promoted by developmentalism. National governments instigate developmentalism and economic growth, especially under neoliberal capitalism. Thus, local residents experience localized and globalized environmental injustice simultaneously. The coal plant generates double the environmental injustice as other sources. In other words, a local coal plant not only causes direct harm through environmental pollution by its construction and the operation, but also imposes indirect damage of global warming continuing the demand for coal. Therefore, coal energy, coal plants and environmental injustice for local people cannot be explained separately. It means that environmental injustice should be recognized from the embedded conflicts of diverse social relations between the environment and development. In the same manner, environmental injustice in the case study of the Yeongheung coal plant can be explained by the social structure and social relations, which are intertwined in different spatial and temporal scales.

CONCLUSION

The development of environmental justice as well as environmentalism in Korea’s social context is different from the concepts, history, and principles of environmental justice in the U.S. Korea’s

68 environmental justice originated academically rather through popular movements. This chapter also addressed the issue of coal energy from the national Korean scale to a global one. Coal energy is an important element in describing the possibility of academic exchange between political ecology and environmental justice. Coal energy, from the simple viewpoint of local plant construction, seems to be limited to environmental injustice that affects local residents as the socially weak. However, local factors that explain local injustice are not helpful for grasping the real point of the problem. This is why political ecology is necessary. Political ecology helps to look at the problem by pointing to larger social structures. Therefore, coal energy connects the environmental injustice of local plant construction to the issues of national environmental and developmental policies and global capitalism and climate change. This dissertation tries to find out these connections. Thus, larger scales are utilized to assess localized environmental problems generated by coal. Figure 3 suggests the relations of coal from the local to the global scale. Coal plant construction and addition extension in Yeongheung Island is an adequate case study for looking at local environmental injustice from a political ecological framework. First, the case study examines that local residents, who are relatively poor fishers, are exposed to potential environmental pollution with the plant construction. Second, the case study shows a proper example of how crafty realization of distributive justice hides and ignores procedural justice. Finally, the case study shows that political ecology is a useful framework by describing that the plant construction is related to national developmentalism, free trade, and neoliberalism in shaping local environmental issues.

CHAPTER 5

RESEARCH METHODS

The previous chapters described several theoretical issues related to environmental justice and political ecology. Such issues include: (1) the failure of environmentalism; (2) controversies between distributive and procedural justice; (3) social and power relations between developers, environmentalists, governments and local residents, and (4) the social construction of nature and scale. In order to utilize methodological techniques such as qualitative interviews or text and document analysis, it is necessary to clarify how my methods are valid to explain these issues through a case study of coal plant in an island in South Korea. Issues related to environmentalist failure and distributive vs. procedural justice are meaningful to suggest the necessity and significance of environmental justice. Even though a coal plant in an island in South Korea cannot serve to generalize the controversy, the case study is valuable to put several issues together. Research methods, such as tracing historical documents about the environmental movement in the late 1990s, help to find out the failure of environmentalism in the case area. Historical facts, in written form of news and texts, show how environmental movements at that time began, developed, and finally failed. In addition, environmentalists’ recollections can explain their own environmental discourse, assertion and limitation. Controversy between distributive and procedural justice is also an issue in the case study. The coal plant construction in the island is an opportunity to point out the limitations of distributive justice and to suggest the significance of procedural justice. Such environmental injustice is a spatial phenomenon that is concomitant with environmental pollution. Field study of study area is necessary to correlate the spatial impacts of environmental pollution with the demography of the region. In addition, the elements of procedural injustice are revealed in the name of exclusion, isolation, disempowerment and marginalization through interviews with local residents. Unequal social and power relations between different groups also reveal the environmental injustice of local residents. Four groups that affect and are affected in study area are developers, environmentalists, governments, and local residents. Therefore, each group forms and asserts its own discourses to justify its own actions such as development, environmental protection, or exercise of public power. Research methods in the dissertation are designed to pursue the process of discourse making and to grasp the formation of unbalanced

70 discourses in the region. Interviews, public hearings, news and brochures reveal such discourses. Another element of the political ecological framework is the social construction of nature and scale. The case area shows various spectrums of environmental conflicts through the social construction of nature and scale. Environmental conflicts in the study area reveal the social construction of nature and scale, which means strategic manipulation by different groups to justify their actions. Research methods, in order to reveal such social construction, try to analyze different groups’ discourses and pursue the process of discourse making through interviews. Based on the research methods noted above, I used a qualitative approach. First, textual and document analysis was helpful in grasping the discourses of the debates about the coal plant. Second, the research includes in-depth interviews with environmentalists, stakeholders, and affected citizens of coal plant regions. Interviews with environmentalists and stakeholders provided a bigger picture of how environmental justice is manifested in the region. In addition, related communities' and citizens' attitudes suggested how different groups have different viewpoints toward environmental justice in coal plants. Third, I engaged in participant observation in the study area to understand the changes in landscape, air quality, and lifestyle of the region

THE QUALITATIVE APPROACH

Qualitative methods, according to The Dictionary of Human Geography, are a set of tools developed to pursue the epistemological mandate of philosophies of meaning (Johnston, Gregory et al. 2000). In other words, qualitative methods are a way of finding “meaning”. Thus, qualitative methods reflect particular understandings of social life and meaning (Limb and Dwyer 2001). Qualitative methodologies, which explore the feelings, understandings and knowledge of people through interviews, discussions, or participant observation, are increasingly used by geographers to explore the complexities of everyday life in order to gain insight into the processes shaping social worlds (Limb and Dwyer 2001). Therefore, qualitative methods in geography are not used to look for nomothetic patterns but to understand contextualized idiosyncratic issues. This does not simply mean that the aim of qualitative methods is to describe the daily lives of others. Finding meaning is not just describing what their daily lives look like but critically analyzing and explaining how and why they came to look the way that they do. Qualitative research is concerned with elucidating human environments and human experiences within a variety of conceptual frameworks (Winchester 2005). However,

71 individuals’ experiences are not isolated from society, but embedded in social structures. Individual experience and social structure, although sometimes hard to disentangle, are and should be combined. Therefore, qualitative methods deal with the individual’s daily life. However, from the social structural standpoint, these methods are concerned with how the world is viewed, experienced and constructed by social actors (Johnston, Gregory et al. 2000). In other words, the emphasis of qualitative methods is on analyzing the lived experiences of individuals in the social world. Qualitative approaches such as textual and discourse analysis, in-depth interviews, and surveys with local people tell a specific story of environment, development, environmental justice, and the political ecology of coal plants.

TEXT, DOCUMENT AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Textual and document analysis is an important way to answer questions related to environmental discourses. Textual analysis refers to the interpretation of texts and documents as a set of signs or signifying practices (Hay 2005). Most of the recoverable information about human thought and behavior in complex societies occurs in text (Bernard 2002). Texts in this analysis include: (1) newspapers that deal with the issue of the coal plant project; (2) websites managed by opponents and advocates of the coal plant; and (3) transcripts of city council meetings or public meetings. In addition, governmental reports from related ministry or, business programs, plans from the construction company of the coal plant, and public statements from environmentalist groups are helpful in recognizing what kinds of discourses were developed. Discourse analysis plays an important role in post-structuralism. Discourse analysis is a qualitative method of investigating rules and structures that govern and maintain the production of particular written, oral, or visual texts (Hay 2005). Foucault used the term “discourse” to refer to written and visual texts, individual or groups of texts, and a regulated practice of rules and structures that govern subjects (Hay 2005). In discourse analysis, knowledge, power, genealogy and regimes of truth are important. Thus, this research, through the discourse analysis of how different groups (i.e., environmentalists, governments and construction companies) have made their own discourses in order to be supported by local people without their active participation in policy making, examines hidden operations of discourses. Newspapers and pamphlets distributed by different groups as well as governmental reports were also analyzed.

INTERVIEWS WITH ENVIRONMENTALISTS AND LOCAL RESIDENTS

Interviewing is another method used to further explain the debates concerning the coal plant. Environmentalists and developers had severe debates about environmental degradation and economic benefits. Therefore, interviews with environmentalists focused on the issue of environmental justice as well as that of environment or economy. In other words, interviews are important to know how environmentalists consider social equity and justice operation of the coal plant. The interviews were carried out with an open-ended, in-depth approach. An interview guide is found in Appendix III to VI. Even though several questions can overlap with textual analysis, it is helpful to focus on the weaker parts of each method. It is possible to mix methods, and this process of drawing on different sources or perspectives is known as triangulation (Valentine 1997). For example, one fact could be also analyzed differently according to what methods researchers utilize. In addition, triangulation is not only useful to see one phenomenon from various perspectives, but also so that its interpretation might have useful validity and accuracy. Another important method that I utilize was interviews with residents living near the coal plants. If the citizens of Yeongheung take part in passive or minimal participation in the decision making process of the coal plants, environmental injustice having to do with the establishment and upkeep of the coal plant can be considered to exist. It is critical for citizens to voice their own opinions and ideas in deciding such environmental issues because the coal plant directly affects the health and quality of life of those citizens. Through the examination of contents from newspapers, little participation of the citizens was observable. Therefore, interviews with citizens play an important role in triangulation. Interviews were carried out with 20 residents, one environmentalist, and two developers. I made a dedicated effort to contact as many local residents as possible and found lodging at a private house near the coal plant for four days. I worked diligently reading cultural landscapes and understanding the residents’ lives in relation to the coal plant constructions. Never had I imagined that I would be able to speak with 20 persons at the beginning of the field work, nor had I been able to make set appointments. Some of the interviews would be conducted as impromptu interviews, going door to door and often catching the residents off guard. I had the opportunity of interviewing some fisherwomen, often speaking with them while they were resting from working a long day on the seashore. While conducting these interviews I was always cognizant of the fact that the interview might interfere with their livelihood. Twenty interviewees were the result of this process. Unscheduled visits to the resident’s houses allowed the interview to be neutral and general. Although, twenty interviewees

73 could be considered an insufficient sampling in order to have a statistical significance, each interview provided vivid details and insight on how the coal plant had affected their lives. While analyzing the residents’ experiences, I was able to discover the unique story of how the environment and development relate to the coal plant. This is not the result of cold and impersonal statistics but a poignantly personal subjective and idiosyncratic one. This is not nomothetic but still significant story from the residents’ voice. Thus, what this research gathers is not statistical patterns, but an initial representation of the opinions the local people have about the construction and operation of coal plants. Therefore, even though the interview questionnaire was somewhat structured, the actual questions and answers were more spontaneous but incredibly genuine. I was unable to obtain consent from some of the residents that I had wanted to interview, and in keeping with my personal code of conduct and ethical values, residents who adamantly did not want to hold any conversation about the coal plant were not pressed for interviews. There were about five residents who refused the interview. There were three main reasons for refusals. First, these residents were simply too busy to interview. The way these residents declined was to politely state that they were willing, but mainly due to timing issues even after following up several times with these residents, I was unable to secure an interview with these residents. Second, the interview was an unfamiliar and possibly uncomfortable experience. The one could come to the conclusion that the unfamiliarity and trepidation experienced with the thought of a possible interview could be attributed to the idea of sitting with a strange researcher, an outsider. Third, some persistently did not want to speak about the coal plant and would subtly mention that there was nothing to say about the coal plant. In these cases, the answer subtly suggested that the residents did not have a positive opinion about the coal plant nor did they want to further discuss the issue. I have no reason to suspect that the interview refusers held significantly different views of events than those expressed by the residents who did consent to be interviewed. Appendix III is the questionnaire intended for the locals, which shows how the survey was performed and what kind of questionnaire is used in order to examine the citizens’ experiences and opinions regarding the location and operation of the coal plant.

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF RESEARCH METHODS

Often, powerful story-telling in a descriptive and analytic manner is a positive characteristic of conducting qualitative interviews. Conducting qualitative interviews does have much strength. However, the lack of statistical representativeness of qualitative interviews should not be ignored.

Therefore, the discussion of research methods through qualitative interviewing plays a critical role in future research related to this issue. Interview as a qualitative method provides realistic evidence through vivid statements by the local residents. Diverse voices provide diverse opinions. Polyvocality by suggesting diverse literary genres (Dwyer and Limb 2001) is one of the most attractive strengths of qualitative interviews. Because the local residents are located in close proximity to the plant and are directly and indirectly connected to all the issues related to the plant. Descriptive statements about the environmental movements in the late 1990s and the plant expansion that took place in the middle of 2000s have a strong ground to express the significance of both environmental and developmental discourses. The subjective characteristic of storytelling analysis makes it difficult to generalize the findings to the entire population of islanders. My approach is far from such a statistical analysis. Such difficulty in generalizing is a fundamental vulnerability in qualitative case study analysis. In other words, the pattern of environmental conflict issue in the study area cannot be applied and generalized into other coal plant issues in Korea as well as in the world. Rather, through a case study, I try to draw a specific issue of environmentalism and developmentalism raised by a coal plant. Through a story, I try to utilize a new criterion of justice in the issue of environment and development. This is the meaningful justification of qualitative interview in the research. Interviews with the local residents were performed in parallel with participatory observation. Participation is important in the context of positionality and self- reflexivity. I stayed on the island for four days although it may seem too brief a stay to become familiar with and interact comfortably with the local residents during my stay I worked to alleviate the unfamiliarity by coming in contact with them. The demographics of the local residents were generally old generation fishermen living in the rural areas. They are inevitably prone to feel estranged from me, a young generation researcher from an urban area. Due to the different social positions, inevitable psychological barriers could be felt. Thus, such a boundary makes themselves as local residents by circumscribing identity, social position and belongings and by excluding me as an outsider researcher who do not belong them (Mohammad 2001). In addition, when I introduced myself as a student studying in America, the local residents came to recognize me as a strange outsider. As a result, such different social positions had the potential to distort their responses to the interview questionnaires by generating a critical fallacy. I still remember some residents who addressed themselves to me (as a student studying abroad) with a dubious look. This was same race but different social position. It means that I have different positionality as an outsider and as a researcher, by making the local residents feel unfamiliar with

75 me. This positionality had the potential to be reflected in the interview by the interviewee’s distortion of the facts. First, the refusal of the interview by several residents is a comprehensive and combined expression of three feelings, which centered around (1) the fact that the fishermen in the rural area were busy, (2) unfamiliarity with the researcher, and (3) negative trauma stemming from the failure of environmental movements in the late 1990s. Therefore, my social position as a student and a researcher might partially but importantly affect their refusal to the interview. Second, this positionality potentially causes a negative influence on the interview results even after the residents consent to an interview. As long as the residents regard the researcher as a stranger who is of a different social position, the authenticity of the story could be compromised which is telling in the residents’ voices. Generally speaking there is a problem with determining how many interviewees can and will tell the complete and untainted truth to the researcher, without distorting any of their experiences. Of course, I recollect with sensitivity, that the local residents’ explanations of their experiences were superficial and undeveloped. However, the more I would dig and drill-down searching for details concerning their complaints against the coal plant and their individual damages and benefits, the more some of the residents would hesitate to elaborate. For example, they tend portrayed themselves as a victim, not as a beneficiary to an outsider researcher by distorting the truth that they had, in fact, felt some benefits. The most desirable way to overcome the different social positionality was through participatory observation. This is an alternative way to find my place within the continuum of being an outsider in the form of a self-reflexive researcher in order to be neutral in the research and being an insider of the local community and assimilating myself with the local residents. While I tried to be involved in the community’s issues, I cautiously regarded myself as a researcher in the context of self-reflexivity by reflecting on self conscious analytical scrutiny of self as researcher (Mansvelt and Berg 2005). My opportunity to attend a public hearing was a positive result of having temporarily placed myself in the community. One of local residents covertly informed me of the date and place of the public hearing about the coal plant extension plans. The public hearing was crucial because I needed to obtain as much information pertaining to the environmental conflict, the developmental plans and the subtle relations between developers, environmentalists, governments and local residents. Perhaps a longer stay would have provided a more truthful story from the local residents. Four days may not have been enough time to gather effective results of participatory observation. With more time in the field, more local residents could possibly have opened up to me as a researcher and accepted my requests to interview. Another visit after

76 several years could provide more meaningful research in examining the temporal gap and spatial results of the additional construction of coal plant. Nevertheless, my triangulated data from interviews with representatives of the multiple factions in this environmental conflict, observations of a public meeting, landscape observations, and newspaper reports provide sufficient information to address my research questions.

CHAPTER 6

CASE STUDY OF THE COAL PLANT

In order to understand a specific case of environmental justice, I selected the coal plant at Yeongheung Island in Korea. In this plant, four units are currently in operation: two units were constructed in 2004 and another two in 2008. In 2007, additional construction of four units was planned. Accordingly, this case study area is a unique region where the diverse problems of construction, operations, and extension are intertwined with each other. The island has already experienced severe environmental conflicts and movements in the past. When the plan for additional construction was announced in 2007, the region caught environmentalists’ attention, even though the views of local residents were not taken into account. In this regard, the case study of the Yeongheung Island plant is relevant for issues of environmental justice, which can show the synergies of the local residents’ situation, potential environmental pollution, national policies, and global coal energy demand and supply. When the construction plan for the coal plant was declared for the first time in the 1990s, there arose a fierce environmental movement led by environmentalists with the active participation of local residents. Despite vehement protests, the environmental movement failed and four units of plants were constructed. Evidently, the failures of the environmental movement in the 1990s arose from several factors such as governments repression or the predominance of developmentalism. The critique of mainstream environmentalism can be another important factor helping to explain the failure of localized environmental movements. In so doing, with the critique of environmentalism, discussions of environmental justice might begin. This chapter begins with a geographic description of the case area, Yeongheung Island, the Yeongheung coal plant, and their cultural landscapes. Such landscapes show how the island has changed due to the construction and operation of the coal plant. Second, I reconstruct the historical scene in the 1990s, when the environmental movements were at their peak. Analysis of environmental movements can explain how environmentalism has affected the failure of the environmental movement. Thus, the section examines how environmentalism confronts developmentalism, which planned to construct the coal plant, manipulated legal processes, and managed coal plant operations. It also provides an opportunity to recollect how local environmentalism failed when faced with national developmentalism. Third, I reveal the existence of environmental injustice through

78 environmental pollution, which occurs in the study area. Thus, beyond environmentalism, which simply points out environmental problems, environmental justice is suggested as a new environmental discourse to view coal pollution and its impacts on different social classes. Fourth, the chapter uses the lens of political ecology to uncover the ways environmental injustice is hidden. Political ecology shows how powerful groups conceal environmental injustice. This investigation is a study of social relations, neoliberal capitalism, and the social construction of nature, environment and scale. I describe the conflicting structure and the social relations among developers, environmentalists, national and local governments, and local residents from that time the present. The chapter describes the social structure and social relations in which environmental and developmental discourses are asserted. This process excludes and marginalizes the local residents and creates environmental injustice. Through interviews with local residents and environmentalists, the discussion is extended to how they view the signs of environmental pollution. Ultimately, the study of social relations between groups and social construction of localized pollution is used to apply political ecology to the issue of environmental justice. In the following order, the chapter is composed of: (1) a geographical description of study area, (2) the failure of environmental movement in the late 1990s, (3) the existence of environmental injustice, and (4) the political ecology of environmental injustice.

DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA

1. Yeongheung Island Yeongheung is a small island located in Ongjin-Gun (Ongjin County) 11, Incheon City, in South Korea (Figure 6). The size of the island is 23.46 km² (5800 acres). Yeongheung has a length of 42.2 km (26 miles) of coastline and, as of 2007, had 4,135 residents (Table 12). The population of Yeongheung Island has been steadily increasing at five percent annually. Another change in the Island’s demography is that the older generation has not decreased.

11 Korea’s administrative system is composed of a special city (Seoul), six metropolitan cities, nine DOs (states) which have 77 SIs (city) and 81 KUNs (county). Incheon is one of the metropolitan cities and has Ongjin Kun. Kun, for the administrative efficiency, is also divided into Myeon, UB, and LI in order of size. Yeongheung Island is the capital of Yeongheung Myeon.

Figure 6: Map of South Korea and Satellite Image of Yeongheung Island. (Source: http://maps.google.com Google Map)

The island is located south of Incheon Harbor. The coastline is indented with fishing grounds. During ebb tide, residential fishers go fishing on the sea and gather marine products such as short-necked clams, oysters, turban shells, and octopi. Fishing jobs are segregated by gender: while males go to the sea to fish, females work in the tidal lands (Figure 7).

Table 12: Population of Yeongheung Island (Myun).

Year Population Increase (Number) Rate of Increase (%) Households 1994 2662 - - 1995 2577 -85 -3.2 1996 2577 0 0.0 1997 2666 89 3.5 1998 2820 154 5.8 1999 2926 106 3.8 2000 3016 90 3.1 2001 3122 106 3.5 1184 2002 3381 259 8.3 1305 2003 3545 154 4.6 1393 2004 3742 197 5.6 1518 2005 3986 244 6.5 1656 2006 4179 193 4.8 1818 2007 4135 136 3.3 1930 Source: Annual Report of Ongjin Kun (2007).

Figure 7: Fisherwomen Shucking Oysters in Tidal Land of Yeongheung Island. (Source: Hosuk Lee)

2. Yeongheung Coal Plant The Yeongheung power plant is located on the southwestern edge of the island in the city of Incheon (Figure 8). The plant was completed by the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) and Korea South-East Power Company (KOSEP) in 2004 after five years and four months of construction. Two units (800 mw per unit) are currently operating and two units (870 mw per unit) are being constructed, aiming to be completed in 2009. There are two rationales for the geographical location of the plant. The first rationale is the proximity to the Seoul metropolitan area. Even though the national capital of Korea (including Seoul, Incheon, and several satellite cities) generates 40% of the national consumption of electric power, power

82 supplies came from distant plants12. As a result, long distance power transmission tends to generate a large amount of electricity loss and cost. Proximity to China is another rationale for the plant’s location. All of its bituminous coal is imported from China. Yeongheung Island is the nearest coal plant to China in this respect.

Figure 8: Satellite Image of Yeongheung Coal Power Plant. (Source: http://maps.google.com Google Map)

3. The Cultural Landscape of Yeongheung Island During the construction and the operation of the plant, the island came to have a quite different cultural landscape. First, Yeongheung Bridge (Figure 9) is a newly built bridge, which is linked to Ongjin County and Incheon City. The construction on the bridge began in 1997 and was completed in 2001 connecting the island to the mainland. There was no previous bridge. The

12 http://www.kosep.co.kr/eng/introduction/plants_02.jsp (Website of Korea South-East Power Corporation (KOSEP))

83 bridge was closely connected with the construction of the coal plant, and it changed the map of Yeongheung and the connected inlands. The bridge was constructed with the support and the leadership of the Korea Electric Power Corporation and the Korea South-West Power Corporation in order to ease the traffic to and from the plant. KEPCO and KOSEP, however, veiled their hidden agendas by boasting that the bridge was built to ease traffic, and proudly stated that they made a noble effort to improve the transportation system of local residents. The two companies thus made it seem that they regarded the construction of the bridge as their contribution to the local community of Yeongheung Island:

In addition, we proudly contributed to the regional development through the construction of Yeongheung Bridge, provision of scholarships and educational equipments to local students, supporting plan to the local community. (Pamphlet of Korea South-East Power Corporation13)

13 http://www.kosep.co.kr/eng/introduction/plants_02.jsp (Website of Korea South-East Power Corporation (KOSEP))

Figure 9: Yeongheung Bridge. (Source: Hosuk Lee)

Second, the coal plant in Yeongheung changed and still is changing the rural landscape of the area. Yeongheung is traditionally known for its rural tidal flats, fisheries, and grape farming. However, the plant has caused changes to these phenomena in two ways. First, due to the improvement of accessibility to the island, tourism is increasing. The construction of condominiums, hotels, and restaurants owned by non-residents has risen after the construction of the bridge, and is supported by the coal plant company. An environmentalist points out the relations between the bridge and the changes of cultural landscape in the island:

After the construction of landfast bridge (Yeongheung Bridge) as well as the coal plant, it is true that the island is prone to be developed as a tourist resort. It means that the island has lost its own identity as a beautiful island with natural resources. This kind of development hurts and destroys the local people’s feeling. The symbolical characteristics of the island as a peaceful fishery and

farming village have been deprived. (Environmentalist Hyegyung Lee).

The second consequent change in the rural landscape is an increase in the real estate business (Figure 10). It is related to the increasing price of land due to the location of the plant and the construction of Yeongheung Bridge. Table 13 describes the price of land near the plant from 1990 to 2007. Local residents, who opposed the construction of the plant, did acknowledge that the increase in the price of land occurred with the inflow of capital in the form of restaurants, and condominiums. However, they also show a chilly reaction to the growth of real estate. They believe that real estate has a tiny influence on the residents’ economy and that it only affects the external economy that connects outsider investors.

Figure 10: Real Estate in Yeongheung Island. (Source: Hosuk Lee)

The landscape before the construction of the coal plant was relatively simple. Tourism before the construction had little impact on the island’s culture or

86 landscape. There were few commercial lodgings such as hotels and motels. The local residents are not rich people, but they, as a community, seem to have led a comfortable living. To them, the coal plant and bridge construction was a cultural and social shock that distorted their lifestyle into something completely different. After the construction, the island was no longer their own. Their simple and peaceful life became complicated and beyond their control.

THE FAILURE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE14

1. The Beginning of the Coal Plant Plan (1990-1995) The environmental story of the coal plant in Yeongheung Island can be traced back to the 1990s, when the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), a national company that deals with energy and electric power, began to perform a preliminary investigation of a suitable site. In 1991, KEPCO and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy amended the land use plans and commenced the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). In order to legalize construction of the plant, the first step KEPCO and the related ministries (the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy, the Ministry of Construction and Transportation, and the Ministry of Environment) took was to change existing laws that might have worked to inhibit future construction. In 1991, two public meetings were held to explain the coal plant plan. In 1994, the master plan for construction was confirmed after consultation with the Ministry of Environment (1992) through the submission of the EIA. However, the decision making procedure needs to be reconsidered from the standpoint of fairness. One important debate in environmental justice is about the differences between distributive and procedural justice. There is no doubt about the necessity and significance of distributive justice, since it is an important factor to achieve the realization of justice. However, distributive justice is not a necessary and sufficient condition for achieving justice. Distribution means the equal enjoyment and acquisition of rights. Therefore, environmental justice related to distribution is about the equal enjoyment of a healthy environment as well as the fair use of natural resources (Draper and Mitchell 2001). In the meantime, procedural justice, which was on the rise recently in comparison to distributive justice, points out the fairness of decision making and processes of environmental policies (Cutter 2005). It is not satisfied with the equal results of distributive justice. In this context, the decision making

14 See Appendix for more detail history of the environmental conflict.

87 of the coal plant construction by developers and armed intervention by governments can be regarded as unjust behavior that tends to keep local residents from active participation in decision-making processes and from the rightful exercise of their opinions through protests. This environmental injustice can be witnessed in several episodes in the island. First, prior to obtaining legal permission to start construction, KEPCO had already purchased the site for the plant, which means that the construction of the plant was meant to be an established fact without regard for the legal confirmation process. Thus, the construction of the plant was preordained despite whatever obstacles (i.e., environmental conflicts, illegal land use, or local residents’ opposition) occurred. Asking for the EIA before securing the land is a relevant process in which the developers show in their environmental interest. Carrying out the EIA after securing the land means that they did not care about the result of the EIA. A preliminary EIA before their land purchase, or a negative result of the assessment, would be unfavorable to the developers. Thus, their purchase of the land means they were ready to initiate the plant at the risk of environmental damage and conflict. Even though this kind of process is distorted, in Korea, a land purchase in advance of the EIA means that the plans and policies for development would reveal a bulldozer-style form of progress and that local residents would have to accept them powerlessly. Second, the process when the EIA was submitted and during the consultation with the Ministry of Environment was doubtful from a legal perspective. Even though in 1992 KEPCO began to conduct conversations pertaining to the environmental concerns with the Ministry of Environment, it was 1995 when both KEPCO and the Ministry of Environment finished the conference. Before 1995, the construction master plan was already confirmed. To make the situation worse, the environmental agreement between KEPCO and the City of Incheon was signed in 1997, which implies that the centralized policy was implemented and decision making occurred prior to any local concerns. Third, written consents from local residents is an important administrative input should have been performed by the company and submitted to the Ministry of Construction and Transportation. However, local residents testified that there was no public meeting that collected public opinions from local residents and that the two public meetings that took place in 1991 turned out to be parochial and partial.

There were public presentations of the plant, but the company (KEPCO) only let a few local residents who took interest in the plan of the plant participate in the meeting and obtained the written consents for the construction from them. I have no idea how many people have to agree with the plan in order for the company to legally construct the plant, but the company needed consent

from local residents. Village headmen came to change their minds to support the construction. I don’t know why, but I suspect that there was kind of subtle connection between them and the company. (Youngae Yun, Female, 56, preacher, local resident)

Regardless of these doubtful procedures in the construction process, KEPCO and related ministries tended to adhere to the principle of “construction first, environment later”. The coal plant construction already created procedural environmental injustice from the beginning. Apart from the question of distributive justice, which shows that local residents unequally bear several types of environmental damages, the procedural injustice they endured should not be ignored. These facts show how local residents were marginalized from the decision making behind development facilities in the context of procedural as well as distributive justice.

2. Environmental Conflicts (1995-1998) The most important role that the Yeongheung coal plant plays is to supply stable electric power to the National Capital regions, including parts of Seoul. However, this plant has been surrounded by severe environmental debates from its planning stages. It was 1995 when environmental concerns of the plant were recognized. An open forum for the impact assessment of the coal plant was held in 1995 and aroused public opinion against the coal plant construction by revealing the environmental impacts of air and ocean pollution. Environmental issues raised by the forum came to have an effect on local residents, who possessed hardly any formal knowledge about the environment. Local residents, with the support and knowledge of an environmentalist group, established committee, and local residents began to publicly protest in 1996. In addition, the demonstrations and oppositions against the plant began to enter a concrete and aggressive phase. The committee sent a letter that asked for reconsideration of the coal plant plan to the Ministry of Construction and Transportation; it also held several informal gatherings for discussions and forums. Public protests reached a peak in 1997 and aggravated the relations between local residents and the coal company. Dozens of local residents were arrested for illegal (according to the police) demonstrations during 1996 and 1997. Environmentalists worked together with local residents to stop environmental degradation. Five environmentalists groups participated in the committee established in 1996. Several environmentalists were also arrested for interference with a

89 government official in the execution of his duties as well as illegal demonstrations. At this time, mainstream environmentalism seemed to lead well-timed movements to halt the coal plant construction. The cooperation with local residents also seemed to be successful. To the residents who were apolitical and politically neutral, voicing their environmental consciousness must have been attractive. A statement by an environmentalist shows a well-built cooperative system between local residents and environmentalists. In addition, it says that environmental movements should be initiated in collaboration with the residents who are environmental victims:

The most important factor making the environmental movements is communication with local residents. At that time, local residents had seriously considered the environmental problems and they were ready to cooperate with us (environmental groups). This is the very beginning point of triggering environmental movements. Without local residents’ interest or cooperation, environmental issues cannot be developed as a significant social issue. In 1997, local people in Yeongheung actively expressed their opposition against the plant plan. (Environmentalist interviewed by author)

The national government repressed this movement. It jailed leaders and brought out riot police to intimidate demonstrations. Such acts by the national government meant an implied contract with developers. The Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), a national company, was a parent company of The Korea South-East Power Company (KOSEP). Therefore, the national government cannot help upholding the coal plant by the developmental discourse. In addition, the government needed to quell the environmental protests at the very beginning. The arrest and physical suppression by the riot police were too threatening for local residents to continue demonstrations. In addition, the residents could not abandon their daily occupations for a long time without obtaining any successful results. As a result, the conflict came to a state of lull in 1998. After that time, the failure of environmental movements due to physical repression created splits between environmentalists and local residents, which are discussed in the next section.

3. Construction of Four Units and Extensions (1999-2007) Although there were a few demonstrations and environmental movements in 1999, they could not obstruct the beginning steps toward construction. During the construction of the two units, the economic structure of Korea changed. Korea experienced an economic crisis with the

90 shortage foreign exchange holdings during the late 1990s. Structural adjustment policies forced national companies to take decisive action in the name of privatization, deregulation and financialization. The energy and power industry was not an exception. KEPCO, which was a monopolistic national energy company in Korea, was reorganized. First, KEPCO had to divide plant sections into six separate corporations15. The Korea South-East Power Company (KOSEP) 16 was established on April 2, 2001 as an autonomous power company after separating from KEPCO by the government’s structural reorganization of the power industry. KOSEP, as of 2004, operates and maintains power generation facilities with a total capacity of 7,195,400 kW, an equivalent of 12% of the nation’s 60 million kW (KOSEP 2007). It was a result of the privatization of the industry as a part of the structural adjustment program in Korea. However, KEPCO still has sections of electric power supply and power transmission. In 2004, two units of the plant finally began to operate and two more units began construction. The third and fourth units were established in 2008. Since 2004, four units in total have been commercially opened.

15 The section of plants and their construction, which was performed by KEPCO, was assigned to six separate companies. They are the Korea South-East Power Co., Korea Midland Power Co., Korea Western Power Co., Korea Southern Power Co., Korea East-West Power Co., and Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co. (KOSEP 2007). 16 KOSEP is composed of six power plants: Samchonpo Thermal Power Site Division in the Gosung district of Gyeongnam province; Bundang Combined Cycle Power Plant in the Sungnam district of Gyeonggi province; Youngdong Thermal Power Plant in the Gangreung district of Gangwon province; Yosu Thermal Power Plant in the Yosu district of Jeonnam province; Muju Pumped Storage Power Plant in the Muju district of Jeonbuk province; and Yeongheung Thermal Power Plant in the Ongjin district of Incheon City, which is the first nation-wide plant in the classified level of 800,000kW. Also, Unit 3 and Unit 4 power facilities in Yeongheung Thermal Power Plant and the 400,000kW –capacity Water Power Pump Plant in the Yeichun district of Gyungbuk province are currently under construction. In total, this will enable the company to reach a total capacity of 9,730,000kW (KOSEP 2007).

Figure 11: Energy Park in Yeongheung Island. (Source: Hosuk Lee)

In 2007, there were two important events. One was the construction of Energy Park and the other was a public hearing for the construction of the fifth to eighth units of the coal plant (Figure 11). Established in 2007, Energy Park is located right next to the coal plant. It was built in order to help citizens understand electricity and energy and to provide a better cultural life to local residents (KOSEP 2007). It is composed of an outdoor park (65,000 m²), ten energy-related theme parks, an outdoor exhibition hall, an outdoor auditorium, and a promenade. The public hearing for the construction of four more units in the same plant was held in a township office of Yeongheung in November 2007 (Figure 12), which I attended. The public hearing explained the outline of additional construction and the results of the environmental and transportation impact assessments. There were 50 local residents and several environmentalists. In this hearing, the vice-chief of the plant made an opening speech about the necessity to construct additional units. He suggested that the additional construction could meet electricity demand and provide an efficient power supply with innovative technology, be constructed in an environmentally friendly manner, and contribute to regional development.

However, the hearing did not proceed favorably for KOSEP. A local resident entered the room abruptly and turned off the projector that was presenting the results of the environmental impact assessment. He declared that the hearing was manipulated by the plant company and a few local residents after devious preparatory consultation.

Figure 12: Energy Park in Yeongheung Island. (Source: Hosuk Lee)

In sum, analyses of the study area tell the story of the failure of environmentalism in the 1990s. The environmental movement of the 1990s against the construction of coal plant was not successful due to: (1) the lack of the residents’ independent and active participation; (2) the narrow emphasis on pollution and habitat by environmentalists; and (3) the oppressive policies of developmentalism by central government and developers. Each factor shows the fragility of environmental theories. In addition, they suggest the necessity of environmental justice discussions. The weakness of environmental theories needs to be complemented or even replaced by the theory of environmental justice. The failure of environmentalism, perceived through such a historical scene,

93 is also revealed through social relations on the following section. Interviews with environmentalists, developers and local residents demonstrate the failure. Through interviews, different groups assert different discourses. This is a political ecological framework at which this dissertation aims. The failure suggests the necessity of environmental justice with the story of unequal social relations, capitalism and manipulation of scales. First, I arrange several local phenomena of environmental injustice through the interviews. This injustice is the tip of an iceberg. Continual section explain the main and fundamental factors of the phenomena

THE EXISTENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE

Environmental justice occurs when an unequal environmental burden is imposed on the socially weak. Therefore, it is imperative to investigate the symptoms of environmental pollution in Yeongheung Island. However, only five years have passed since the plant began operation in 2004. Therefore, not only is it difficult to utilize scientific data, but it is also too early to expect the environmental pollution or the health problems of the residents to be evident. However, through the interview process, it was clear that local residents have experienced environmental pollution. Apart from the question of the pollution’s seriousness, the residents revealed their complaints against three pollution sources: (1) dust; (2) noise pollution of power transmission towers; and (3) destruction of tidelands. As mentioned, qualitative approaches through such interviews are not verified scientifically. However, mentioning the pollutants in the interviews, even though they do not directly affect their health yet, means that the residents’ mental concerns and damages to the environment already began. Such environmental problems should not be limited to the simple description of pollution. Environmental justice attempts to relate them to social and demographic characteristics. Thus, such environmental problems can be connected to environmental injustice in that the local residents are relatively composed of older generations living in poverty. The starting point of environment injustice begins with the question of which social classes are exposed to environmental pollution. Therefore, three symptoms of environmental pollution reveal those of environmental injustice in the area.

1. Coal Dust Coal dust was a symptom of pollution from the coal plant, often mentioned by almost all residents who live near the coal plant. Coal dust is particularly more evident in the village on the northeast side of the coal plant than in any other location. When the environmental damages

94 were raised in the interview, coal dust was the most serious problem for the residents. Even local residents had no idea about where, when, and how the coal dust spread. Therefore, in order to assess the coal dust, they agreed to pitch a large tent. They seemed to have a firm belief that the coal dust was absolutely correlated to the plant. In addition, several residents responded that they heard and witnessed the coal plant workers cleaning the chimneys of two units from midnight to dawn, which the developers preferred to daytime for illegal or polluting behavior. Therefore, the residents were suspicious of the coal plant for the black dust it created. They do not know how scientific their measurement is, but they plan to observe how much dust was going to cover the tent. It is the only action for them to take in order to protest. A resident responded to the dust on the roof with rage:

I never expected that the plant would affect our life so fast. There IS air pollution. On the roof, a great amount of dust had settled. On rainy days, the situation becomes much worse. Every time they [the Coal Plant Company] clean the chimney, the dust seems to fly down with the wind. (Anonymous old man, local resident)

We don’t have any health problems right now, but we are so worried about the coal dust. On rainy days, it is like black rain. However, we do not have any real proof. That is why we want to try to pitch the tent closer to the coal plant and observe the inflow of the dust from the plant. (Kim, female, 72, local resident)

These views are conflict with the assertions of the coal plant. First, the head of public relations department in the coal plant stated that there had never been a chimney cleaning after the construction of the plant. Therefore, according to the head, there exists no possible reason to cause the dust. Second, the smoke that the coal plant makes is white steam, the head asserted, which is spread out from the chimney after the plant removes all the contaminated pollutants, so it is harmless (Figure 11). Therefore, in his opinion, the white steam is not a pollutant but simply steam. The residents and the developers speak of the same phenomenon very differently.

We (the coal plant) never cleaned the chimney. If local residents say so, it must be misrepresented and it is wrong. (Pointing at the chimney) that is really white smog. We send it to the air after we remove every kind of pollutant.

What some may now call a pollutant is only steam or just droplets of water. Such white smog also appears when the temperature is lower than 55°F. (Male, head of public relations department)

Figure 13: Smoke in the Yeongheung Coal Plant. (Photo by Hosuk Lee)

2. The Noise and Vibration of the Power Transmission Towers The second symptom of pollution is related to the noise and vibration of the power transmission towers (Figure 14). It was a serious issue ever since the construction of the towers as well as the plant. The towers that are managed by KEPCO were intended to be built adjacent to the seashore. However, they were built about 50 meters farther from the seaside by the local residents’ request. Since that time, there have been conflicts between residents and the plant from time to time. Local residents complained that the towers have spoiled the beauty of the seashore. Even though the towers are built toward the seaside rather than the beach, local residents who work in the tideland to gather fish and shellfish stated that they experience a deafening noise from the towers.

In the interviews and the public hearing in 2007, the issue of noise emitted from the towers was mentioned. Especially on windy days, more noise and even vibrations can be experienced from the towers.

Everyday, I came here to the tideland to pick up short-necked clam. Around the tideland, there are some power transmission towers and I sort of worry about the noises. It is not actually environmental pollution, but it is true that I feel uncomfortable working here with all those noises. On windy days, it is much scarier because the towers make more noises and even vibrations. I really worry about them collapsing. (Several old women who were picking up clams, local residents)

The power transmission towers and lines are something we really worry about. Those mean the danger of accidents such as their collapse as well as environmental problems. KOSEP never touched on this issue saying it is none of their business (KEPCO actually takes charge of the power towers and lines). We (the local residents) want the developers to elucidate this issue clearly. (A local resident in the public hearing in 2007)

Figure 14: Power Transmission Tower in Yeongheung Coal Plant. (Source: Hosuk Lee)

3. Destruction of Tidelands The third environmental damage that local residents experience is the gradual destruction of tideland. The pollution of tideland is perceived to arise from two symptoms. The first symptom is that the color of the tideland is changing color from the natural colors to black. Of course, this change lacks a precise scientific explanation and basis. Although the change is the local residents’ sensed experience, they must be sensitive to the change. For them, the tideland is a place of life, where they work everyday. Therefore, in their estimation, something negative is happening in the tideland. The second symptom is a change in the marine products, which are harvested in the tideland, started to decrease or to be found irregularly. The most representative product in the tideland is short-necked clams. However, the production of the clams since 2000 has become very irregular. Local residents have a suspicion about the plant regarding the change even though they cannot provide a scientific explanation. Table 14 reveals that the production of the clams in 2004 when the two units of the coal plant began to be operated did not reach one-

98 third of the amount produced in 2003. With this decrease in clam production, the coal plant company began to support clam breeding. The result of the breed plan was successful enough to recover in other years. However, the decline relapsed in 2006.

Table 13: Changes in the Production of Short-Necked Clams.

Amount (Kg) Income (Dollars) 2002 1,333,125 2,107,450 2003 1,400,219 3,054,024 2004 388,434 811,663 2005 1,497,952 3,072,873 2006 396,698 856,579 Total 5,016,428 9,902,589 Source: Yeongheung Fishery Cooperative.

I do not have any health problems right now, but the important thing is not actually about health but about the tideland. I sometimes, no wait, often found several rotten clams. In addition, I think the color of the tideland is changing. It is really different from what it used to be. It becomes blackish. I heard the coal plant company sew the breed of the clams to maintain the production amount, but I am not sure what’s going on. (Kim, female, 61, Local resident)

There is a warm sewage effect, I am pretty sure. I know the temperature around the coal plant has increased seven or eight degrees. That water inflows from the coal plant to the near seashore and kills the marine products including short-necked clams. The coal plant denies this fact. (Anonymous old man, local resident)

The destruction of the tideland, according to the environmentalists’ assertion, might be affected by the warm sewage emitted from the coal plant. The warm sewage is a pollutant that the coal plant company acknowledged. However, the company underestimated the effect of warm sewage on the marine ecosystem by asserting that a small change of sea temperature would not cause any harm. This is the initial environmental impact assessment that was agreed upon by the developers and the two ministries (the Ministry of Construction and

Transportation and the Ministry of Environment) and consequently gave the coal plant authorization to begin to be construction and operation. The issue of warm sewage is understood from a relatively scientific approach in comparison with the coal dust and power transmission towers. The issue was often brought up in newspaper reports. In addition, environmentalists pointed out the warm sewage and the destruction of the tideland several times. The coal plant managers put down the critiques by responding that they would install the most advanced environmental facilities (desulfurizers or dust collectors) in order to remove the pollutants preliminarily.

Incheon City and KOSEP made a promise to recycle the warm sewage for the farming of marine biology by contracting the environmental agreement. In other words, they planned to utilize the warm sewage without discharging it directly to the sea. However, the plan fell apart. To make things worse, the coal plant with the first unit discharges 36 square meters per second. The temperature of warm sewage is seven degrees higher than that of input. If four units are fully operated, the discharge will be up to 144 square meters per second. As a result, the area where the temperature increases one degree will reach 10.9 Km². The change of marine environment is already predictable. (Incheon Times, 11/10/2007)

In sum, environmental problems are personally experienced by local residents even though they are not serious enough to generate worry about the residents’ health. Regardless of the exposure to environmental problems, the local residents are still excluded from the developmental measures such as financial support and compensation or the necessity of an energy supply. Accordingly, the significance of environmental risks is inclined to be curtailed or even ignored. Through the fieldwork in Yeongheung, it is noted that most local residents are the elderly and their houses were squalid in comparison with those in urban area (Figure 15). They also lack environmental knowledge even though they once participated in the environmental movement. They complain of the threat to their livelihood and simply smile at the financial supports. They are experiencing environmental injustice by being the environmentalists’ and developers’ subjects of discourses. This form of environmental injustice can also be interpreted in a neoliberal context on a global scale. Neoliberalism, which pursues the endless creation of surplus profits, polarizes the rich and the poor, celebrates the virtues of economic growth, and tries to push the issues of nature, environment, or poverty into a marginal corner where it is not seen.

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Figure 15: The Cultural Landscape of Low-Income Residents in Yeongheung Island. (Source: Hosuk Lee)

POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

Environmental justice considers justice in environmental discourse. The political ecological framework helps to investigate problems of environmental injustice and concealment. This framework directs a researcher’s attention to social structures and relations. Existing studies of environmental justice have focused on the unequal distribution of environmental pollution, describing the spatial aspects of the injustice but overlooking the larger framework which shapes the injustice. Political ecology, in order to overcome this weakness, analyzes the phenomena and causes of environmental injustice, which are embedded in social, political and economic structures. It is capable of observing environmental injustice almost everywhere that environmental problems occur. Pollution tends to be located where marginalized people live. High-ranking classes tend to block and move pollution to different places. The same is true in the study area. Environmental injustice can be easily identified, in that local residents are low- income farmers and fishers and that they are victimized by the environmental pollution. The clever concealment of environmental injustice by unequal social relations, neoliberal capitalism, and the social construction of nature and environment is one of the central points of this dissertation. As shown by the failure of environmental movement in the 1990s, the power of environmentalists, developers, governments, and local residents is unequal. The central government and developers tend to treat the legal processes with ease by adjusting existing policies and by manipulating the consent local residents. This kind of environmental injustice demands that studies of environmental justice consider procedural aspects of injustice. It also implies that environmental injustice has relatively been belittled in comparison with distributive

101 justice. Theoretically, this finding can be connected to the argument of procedural injustice which resulted from unequal power relations. Global neoliberal capitalism also hides environmental injustice. So far, neoliberalism has been regarded as a relevant apparatus to overcome an economic crisis or depression and it puts the state at the service of the market and business interests. This is no exception in the case of coal energy in Korea. In the name of the free trade-stimulus between Korea and China, the utilization of cheap coal from China was ensured, regardless of environmental concerns. Coal, similarly, from the perspective of global capitalism and developmentalism, has been justified as an energy source in Korea. Third, developers socially construct nature and the environment. The developers’ project for the breeding of short-neck clams and their manipulation of environmental impact assessments are good examples displaying the social construction of nature. These findings are assessed through the political ecological framework. In other words, the conflict of the coal plant in the study area, which reveals localized environmental injustice, can hardly be analyzed without consideration of political ecology, which explains social relations, capitalism and the social construction of nature and the environment.

1. Power Relations between Social Groups: Making Different Discourses In the location and the construction of the coal plant, various social relations are deeply and subtly intertwined. Some relations tend to hide environmental injustice, which appears in the construction and expansion of the Yeongheung coal plant. An individual member, irrespective of which social group she or he belongs to, is always affected by various other social groups. In this respect, local residents, even though they are individual citizens in Yeongheung, are seen as a social community to developers as well as to environmentalists. Therefore, for example, developers and environmentalists try to find a way to persuade local residents as a social group to act in concert with them. National, city and local governments (i.e., Korea, Incheon City, and Ongjin County) are also embedded in these social relations. Four different groups are intertwined in the social relations of the conflict in Yeongheung. They all attempt to make their own discourses to generate consensus in support of their interests. The most important issue is that such power relations have been unequally formed, from the weakest residents to the most powerful governments and developers. In addition, groups of powers such as the central government and developers have tried to hide environmental injustice through unequal power relations. Examining how these groups interact and affect each other through these social relations provides the clue to environmental injustice

102 and its concealment.

1.1 The Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) and the Korea South-East Power Company (KOSEP) as Developers The present energy situation gives developers the edge in environmental conflicts. Their fundamental aim in the plant construction is, indisputably, to make profits. However, for a long time, coal plants have been a controversial environmental issue. The environment is a challenging obstacle for developers to overcome by making effective discourses which are able to persuade environmentalists (hardly persuadable), local residents (somewhat persuadable), and governments (easily persuadable). The developers’ discourses are made in three different ways: (1) energy demands, (2) environmental concerns, and (3) supports for local residents. First, there is an inevitably growing demand (and consequently need for an efficient supply) for energy and electric power. According to KOSEP (2007), power consumption in the National Capital regions (including the capital, Seoul) reaches 40 percent of national consumption, but power supply which is generated in the regions does not come up to 22 percent. The shortage of 50 percent of the electrical power is transmitted from the southern area of Korea, which creates transmission costs and power losses. This is why the company insisted upon constructing the power plant in Yeongheung Island. Coal is the preferred fuel, as the developers consider alternative fuel costs. Regardless of the local residents’ request to use liquefied natural gas (LNG), the developers insisted on the coal plant. A developer who was involved in the construction of the coal plant emphasized the efficiency of the coal.

The difference of cost of fuel between coal and LNG is four times. We can save 800 Million Dollars if we use coal instead of LNG. The advantage of coal is that we can import all of coal from China and the estimated amount of coal deposits on a global scale can be usable for 200 years. The most we would be able to use LNG is for 30 years. The most advanced environmental technology we have makes the use of coal more desirable than LNG. (Developer in the public meeting in 2007)

The construction of Energy Park in 2007 can be understood in this context of developmentalism. The main aim of the park is to promote the importance of energy power and consequently the validity of the construction of power plants. Under the pretext of an

103 educational experience for children, the theme park emphasizes the criticality of energy and the coal plant. Of course, the park displays information in reference to global warming, natural resources, and environmental pollution. However, the park subtly hides its positive publicity for the coal plant. In this respect, developers assert that the power plant should be constructed (to satisfy the demand for electric power) in Yeongheung (to cover the demand in the National Capital region) as a coal plant (to efficiently reduce the cost for generating the electric power). Second, the developers attempt to pre-empt, co-opt, and obfuscate environmental critiques. They always make specific claims about their environmental concerns from the construction to the operation of the plant. Thus, their emphasis on developmentalism does not ignore environmental concerns. To improve the image of the coal plant company, acting concerned is another important strategy for developers. From its planning process, the developers began with the environmental impact assessment even though the results of the EIA are questionable due to the cozy relations between the coal company and the EIA research company. In other words, the environmental impact assessment assigned to a subcontracted engineering company by KOSEP was not conducted well. In addition, the EIA was criticized by environmentalists for being manipulated. The coal plant company had already purchased land large enough to construct twelve units of the coal plant, but the company only performed an EIA for two units17. In addition, according to the research group, which is composed of the city of Incheon and a private-public partnership, the environmental impact assessment for the coal plant used a simple numerical value instead of the actual environmental damage to surrounding regions (KFEM 2004). Several public relations brochures published by KOSEP give a lot of space to environmental concerns. For example, the company boasts of its enormous investment in environmental facilities, such as dust collectors, desulfurizers, denitrifiers, and waste water disposal plants. Through these environmental facilities, the developers make an attempt to argue that the company is doing its best to protect and preserve the environment around the coal plant. The public hearing for the construction of four more units in 2007 also dealt with the environmental topics. In the hearing, the developers explained the outline of the plan. However a large amount of time was allotted for explaining the company’s effort to care for the environment, covering topics having to do with the present environmental condition (air quality, oceanic environment, soil, and biodiversity), the results of another environmental impact assessment (air

17 According to the research material (1997) which was published by Urgent Committee against the construction of the coal plant in Yeongheung, KEPCO carried out the EIA for two units during 1991 to 1995, but the company not only purchased the land for twelve units but also destroyed the forest of the land for eight units.

104 quality, ocean environment and transportation), and company’s plan for reducing environmental impacts during construction and operation. The pamphlet for the public hearing also began with environmental concerns. The “Environment” is always placed in the front for the developers’ strategy to make self-rationalizing claims.

“For a clean environment and local community, we will construct the most advanced environmentally friendly plant.” (Front page of a pamphlet for the public hearing in 2007)

The scale in which developers are interested to show their environmental discourses is notable. Regardless of whether their environmental discourses are successful or not, they emphasize the local scale. Thus, while they are careful in dealing with the environmental impacts of coal plant on localized areas, they pretend to be ignorant about the environmental changes on a global scale. They firmly believe that local residents’ sympathy through their localized environmental concerns can offset environmentalists’ critiques of environmental pollution. Thus, as long as they convince the residents that there is no environmental problem, they can nearly guarantee the construction of coal plant without any opposition. Such developers’ localized environmental concerns stand in contrast with environmentalists’ national and global, as well as the local concerns. Therefore, it means that environmental injustice was seen differently from the perspectives of environmentalists and developers. Third, the support for local residents also functions as alternative discourses that developers use to try to cover up the conflict between developmentalism and environmentalism. Local residents who were interviewed mentioned the various types of support18 they received from the coal plant company. In addition, the plant-side also extensively advertises its economic and educational support for the local residents. According to the pamphlet for the public hearing, KOSEP has already spent over two hundred million dollars for residents during the construction and the operation of the four units, and plans to spend another 200 million dollars for an additional construction of four units. In the name of regional economic development and revitalization, KEPCO and KOSEP built two bridges (Sunjae Bridge in 2000 and Yeongheung Bridge in 2001) and constructed three new docks around the Yeongheung area. However, despite KOSEP and KEPCO’s façade of caring, the benefits from the bridges and

18 According to the interviews with local residents, financial support from developers is diverse, with (1) educational benefit for children, (2) health benefits through free medical checkup, (3) farming support with plastic greenhouse, and (4) haircut payments for older citizens over 60 years old. Developers try to prevent the local residents’ negative viewpoints of development in advance.

105 docks are not only for the local residents but mainly for the benefit of the coal plant. KOSEP also boasts of the public efforts they have made, such as the pavement of town roads, the formation of farming funds and the construction of a village hall. The general manager of the plant also mentioned the advantages for the local residents from benefits in education and work to the reduction of utility fees.

Annually, four million dollars are used for the support of the local residents. We (KOSEP) grant the money to the local government so that the government effectively spends it on local residents. In addition, on our own, we promote education and work through things like scholarship funds for children of local residents, provision of education materials (computers), and school meal services and so on. Another thing we do, is give a discount to local residents on their utility bills (ten dollar per month). We also try to employ the local residents as gardeners or janitors. And we always try to give the local residents a preference over employment in the plant. (A general manager of the coal plant, 2007 interview with the author)

The assertion from the coal plant corresponded with the interviews with the local residents to some degree. Local residents also acknowledged the various endowments from the plant. Almost of all of the residents mentioned the support they received from the plant, but they interpreted the intentions of the coal plant differently. While some of the residents still had an unfavorable impression of the coal plant, they admitted that KOSEP helped local residents’ economic status and their children’s educational opportunities. They expressed a wariness, almost a mistrust, of the plant. The local residents mentioned the general aversion to the coal plant, but emphasized the financial compensation from the plant. They are prone to be (or may intentionally become) disinterested in environmental issues of the coal plant and they are sometimes too aged to consider the environment. The local residents of the area are extremely poor and assistant from the plant can have a significant impact on their opinions. The company cleverly manages those residents:

My children received scholarships (from the coal plant company) for education. I received a plastic greenhouse for farming. A movement against the construction of the coal plant? I was opposed to the coal plant in the1990s because the coal plant was really threatening at that time, but now, the only way I’d oppose the plant is if I were to suffer any damages from the plant, but at this

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time and place I have no reason to oppose. I was never really damaged, no, if anything, I actually got benefits from the coal plant. (Local resident, female, 74)

Other residents do not simply assert they benefited from the support from the company. First, they claim that the supports for the local residents are very limited to a specific condition. For example, educational benefits are limited to households with children. A large amount of the population in Yeongheung consists of people over 60 years old. Second, they point out that the support is a form of enticement which strategically hides the intentions of the plant to continue constructing the additional plant.

They (local residents) were given jobs through the plant even though the number is minimal. They got financial and educational benefits through the plant. These supports finally led to a situation where the local residents could not oppose the additional construction of and the merciless operation of the plant. (Environmentalist, 2007)

When developers confront local residents, environmental discourse tends to disappear. Instead, they distort the essence of the problem related to the construction and operation of the coal plant by focusing on economic benefits or educational support for the local residents. The focus on environmental issues for environmentalists shifted to the financial support for the local residents. Local residents, being disadvantaged, are easily caught in a trap of financial support without concerns about the environment. In the 1990s, when discussion of the construction of the coal plant began, the process of policymaking excluded the local residents. This means we need to consider procedural justice. Without the consideration of procedural justice, compensatory support from developers makes the critique of environmental injustice powerless. Developers assert that there is no environmental pollution due to their environmental facilities. Regardless of their assertion, developers plan to compensate the residents for existing and expected pollution. In the context of distributive justice, local residents have already received compensation and financial distribution. If there is no environmental pollution in the future, the residents have been overcompensated, suggesting that environmental justice has been realized. In this case, however, procedural justice is not considered. It tells us why procedural justice should be recognized as an important element in environmental justice. Exacerbating the injustice, the local residents have had the unfortunate experience of a series of symptoms of environmental pollution, which are consistent with coal plant construction and operation. Under the present circumstances, compensation and

107 distribution fail to be the best way to realize environmental justice. Local residents, due to their poor situation, very often are unmindful of the environmental significance of the plant and are blinded by compensations and financial support. Therefore, environmentalists’ persuasion should be approached from the logic of political economy that reveals the residents as the socially weak victimized by economic hardship and political vulnerability. The procedural injustice comes from relations of class and geography related to the political economy of South Korea and East Asia. This logic lies beyond simple environmentalism, which focuses on environmental protection and preservation; it is environmental justice from a political ecological framework. In sum, through three discourses by the developers, which are made in three different directions (power demand, environmental concerns, and support for local residents), coal plant companies give an illusory impression that they themselves feel guilty for the environment as well as for the state the local residents find themselves in. Financial support for local residents can be understood in the same context. There is no reason for additional support for the local people if the public facilities are helpful for regional development and would improve the quality of life of local residents. The use of financial support indicates that the developers acknowledge “something wrong” is occurring. Consequently, this “something wrong” was an initial fuse that proved to be a controversial issue for the environment and the regional economy. The support on occasion began with a tiny gift for local residents and were captured in the lobby of public hearing in 2007. The developers distributed a gift set containing a toolbox among the local residents who attended and signed the hearing. Providing medical examinations by the company was another ironic form of support. Older residents who were interviewed responded that they received the benefits of annual medical examinations. By providing the examination, the company exposed the potential possibility of a connection between health problems and the coal plant, when they had clearly offered that the coal plant would not affect the health and livelihood of the local residents. In this regard, support from the company cannot exclude the compensation for the local residents and implies there was something for which the developers had to compensate. Through the financial support and employment opportunities, local residents are given a stake in the construction and continued operation of the plant. The developers for the coal plant are duplicitous. Even though the companies are the developers, they give off the pretense to be concerned with environmental problems in order to improve their public image. It means that they take a paradoxical stance by emphasizing both development and the environment. In other words, the contradiction becomes inevitable as they react differently to diverse opponents, from local residents to environmentalists. They confront the environmentalist’s criticism with environmental discourses. They also answer

108 to the complaints of the residents with economic and compensational discourses without considering environmental issues. However, in both cases, their ultimate goal is to make profit by constructing more plants.

1.2. The Korean Federation for Environmental Movements19 as Environmentalists Environmentalists, generally speaking, are inclined to be aggressive towards developers and cooperative with local residents. Environmental conflicts between the coal plant companies as developers and the Korea Federation for Environmental Movements as environmentalists were the most severe in the late 1990s, experienced a momentary lull during the beginning of the 2000s, and reignited after 2005 with the construction of four units of the plants and the additional proposed construction of four more units. Before the coal plant was constructed, the main environmental issues were air pollution, destruction of the foreshore, and sewage. The bituminous coal, which is imported from China, has eight times the higher discharging density of air pollution than liquefied natural gas (LNG) (KFEM 2004). In addition, scattering dust generated during the transportation of coal is expected to affect the National Capital region as well as the city of Incheon, forming a black belt of cloud with the prevailing westerlies in the Western Sea in Korea (KFEM 2004). Another problem, the coal plant causes is the destruction of the shore. The Korea Electric Power Corporation planned to reclaim the coal dust from the shore because of the poor technique of recycling (KEPCO 1997). In addition, there is the problem of warm sewerage that is utilized to operate the turbines of the coal plant. The warm sewerage is seven degrees higher than sea water and will certainly affect the marine ecosystem (KFEM 2004). Against the expectation of environmentalists, KEPCO and KOSEP, the main national companies in charge of construction of coal plants, suggested two different arguments in support of the coal plants. First, those companies attempted to portray the environmentalists’ assertions as regional selfishness by accusing them of engaging in the Not in My Back Yard (NIMBY) syndrome. They criticized the attitude of Incheon KFEM because of its shortsighted assertions. According to KEPCO and KOSEP, those environmentalists simply opposed the coal plant in their region. In other words, they argued that environmentalists agreed with the legitimacy of coal plants in general, but they did not agree with the construction of any coal plants “in their backyard” (KEPCO 1997). Second, the two companies asserted that they had already made

19 The Korean Federation for Environmental Movements (KFEM) has many regional branches in every city and county. Incheon KFEM is one of branches.

109 environmental arrangements with the city of Incheon. According to the arrangement between the two companies and the city of Incheon, the regulation criteria of sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxide, and dust are much stricter than those of other countries such as Japan or Germany (KEPCO 1997). In addition, they pointed out that in order to conform to the environmental arrangement, they planned to invest thirty percent of their working expenses in establishing pollution control facilities (KEPCO 1997). There is some truth to the developers’ assertion. A local environmental group (Incheon Federation for Environmental Movements, or IFEM), located close to Yeongheung Island, stirred the discussion concerning environmental issues of the coal plant. The position of IFEM was unconditional objection against coal plant construction on the island. It is a typical expression of NIMBYism. Maintaining their objection against the coal plant, IFEM began to contact local residents without considering what types of social classes live in the island. In other words, their environmental discourses ignored the social and economic situation of the residents. Environmental discourse, which is often monotonous and uses stereotyped assertions of environmentalism and unconditional objections of developmentalism, can hardly obtain residents’ long-term consent. The most sensitive issue of local residents, according to the interviews, is about their livelihood rather than the environment. It was true that there was a synergy when the environmental movement was initiated in the late 1990s for the first time in this island. Environmentalists involved local residents in the movement with the issue of residents’ livelihoods affected by future environmental pollution. The synergy seemed to lead the residents to environmental movements. However, those movements failed to stop the plant construction because of government oppression, local residents’ arrests and their need to return to their livelihoods, and environmentalists’ continuous and unilateral assertion of environmentalism. To make things worse, environmental discourses lost the power of persuasion because of developers’ appeasement measures in the name of support and compensation. The same approach to environmentalism used in the 1990s can no longer persuade local residents in the present. Nonetheless, environmentalists still assert the importance of the environment exclusively without careful consideration of local residents’ livelihood. According to an environmentalist in IFEM, the environmental movement against the additional plant construction is very difficult to organize without the consistent cooperation with local residents. However, during an interview, the environmentalist emphasized environmental concerns rather than residents’ livelihood. The good relations in the late 1990s disappeared and new relations among environmentalists, developers, local residents and governments have been formed. Local residents are not as inspired by environmental consciousness as are environmentalists. For the local residents of Yeongheung, devoting their efforts to the environmental protest and movement

110 is harder than just having an environmental consciousness. The environmental movement in the 1990s revealed well-organized cooperation with local residents. However, the cooperation inevitably had limits regardless of whether the cooperation came from internal reason such as a split between the two groups or from external reasons such as repression by the government. Despite the movement against the coal plant in 1999, the construction of the plant commenced as planned and in 2004 it was completed. In 2004, there was another environmental debate because of a violation of the environmental arrangement. During a test operation in July and the first regular operation on August, 2004, the discharging density of air pollutants exceeded the criteria of the environmental arrangement (KFEM 2004). Regardless of this incident, two more units (a third and fourth) of the plant are under construction with the goal of starting operations by 2009. The master plan established by the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy in 2006 includes the construction of two more units (a fifth and sixth) of the coal plant in Yeongheung Island (KFEM 2004). This plan failed to be discussed with the city of Incheon. Good relations between environmentalists and local residents were not established. While the environment is an important agenda for environmentalists, it is not quite as important for local residents. The ways in which local residents form their opinions of the coal plant are complicated and highly dependant on their economic situation rather than environmental issues. Environmentalists perceive the local residents from two different perspectives. First, they regard local residents as collaborators to assist environmental movements. While criticizing the construction of the plant, environmentalists made efforts to cooperate with local residents. Indeed, the partnership between the two groups was very successful in the late 1990s even though they could not stop the construction of the plant. When they had opposed the construction of the plants, both were proud of their performance.

From 1997 to 1998, the environmental movement against the plant was full of vigor. After that time, the movement was on the wane. The most important factor to promote the movement is the communication between environmentalists and the local residents who think that their region is environmentally polluted. At that time, the local residents were seriously considering the environmental problems that related to the coal plant and were ready to talk about it with environmentalists. At that time, it was a very important starting point for the environmental movement. (Environmentalist, 2007)

However, after the construction of the four units of the coal plant, the

111 situation had no resemblance to the conflict in the late 1990s. Environmental conflicts and consequently the environmental movement became inactive during the beginning of the 2000s. Local residents failed to contact environmentalists and had enjoyed the several benefits that the plant had provided. Environmentalists asserted that they were unable to advocate any social and environmental issues without the residents’ cooperation. A lack of cooperation with local residents essentially means that there is no success to overcome local environmental problems. Environmentalists theoretically developed environmentalism; however, what environmentalists failed to understand is that without the people involved, the successful achievement of the environmental movement’s goals is impossible. The second perception environmentalists have of local residents is that the residents are not environmentalists regardless of the fact that they would be willing to cooperate with them. As long as developmentalism does not hurt the residents’ daily occupations, and in addition comes with benefits such as support or compensations, local residents are unable to declare their political stance between developmentalism and environmentalism. Environmentalists became cynical of the residents’ environmental consciousness. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that local residents are thought to be entrapped by an inescapable economic and developmental bridle, especially after the construction of the four units of the coal plant, when local residents had accepted financial and educational “gifts” from the coal companies. In addition, environmentalists criticize the local people because they are the socially weak, and for being the ones always damaged the most by economic development. The rights of the local people have increased compared to the rights they had and utilized in the past. The nation’s state and developers, accordingly, spend time and thought on how they can compensate and create programs to support the local residents in order to avoid infringing on the rights that the local residents have come to exercise. However, environmentalists are apprehensive of the residents’ environmental indifference in comparison with their economic interests. Indeed, in some respects, local residents are not regarded as a victim any more in the context of development without environmental consideration.

Rights for local people, whether is the right to speak, to live or to vote, grow considerably after a couple of decades. However, their environmental consciousness does not, in comparison, grow during that same period of time. The influence of their voices is becoming significant. In addition, the residents’ ardent desire for economic (re)development is another antagonistic relationship with us and to environmentalism. To make matters worse, they’re ready to give up their

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occupations and be compensated and sometimes the compensation is big enough for them to abandon their farming and fishery. (Environmentalist, 2007)

It has been a rough and difficult journey establishing environmentalism in Korea, where economic growth was a great virtue. Ignoring environmentalists’ efforts in earlier decades means negating the progress of environmental history in Korea. Especially in such a growth-driven nation, the environmentalists’ efforts are more fruitful than in most other societies. Governments are prone to have justified developmentalism and industrialization to overcome poverty as an underdeveloped country. Confucianism also gave the government an advantage when persuading citizens to agree with the nation’s economic direction toward developmentalism and industrialization. Environmentalism in Korea has blossomed and grown despite such political, cultural, and economic challenges. Environmentalism sometimes is sensitive to civil rights in order to collaborate with citizens. However, paradoxically, such an improvement of civil rights has impeded mainstream environmentalism. As cited in the above interview with an environmentalist, no matter that the growth of civil rights derives from the environmental movement or citizens’ campaigns, citizens have had political power more and more. Their political power includes both desires for environmental benefits through environmentalism and for economic benefits through developmentalism at the same time. Thus, at first, elite and mainstream environmentalism created political, as well as environmental awareness in the people, but later political awareness began to assert not only environmentalism but also civil rights. This is the paradox and contradiction of Korea’s environmentalism. In this respect, environmentalism seems to be beyond its capacity to share its critiques of the coal plant with local residents and to succeed in protesting additional construction at the plant. In this respect, environmentalists’ unconditional and unqualified environmental discourses can operate upon local residents as a burden. First, environmental discourses are hardly associated with the local residents’ direct and tangible benefits. The environment is something to be protected and preserved, but this priority does not, from the local resident’s view, directly benefit them. Environmentalists failed to explain the scales of time and space in their worldview. Rather, they approached the environmental issues of the coal plant emphasizing the grave effects of construction to emotionally gain the residents’ support. In other words, they failed to approach the discourses with the significance of various contextual scales of time and space to change and reinforce the residents’ environmental consciousness. In addition, the benefits of environmental preservation are not physically tangible to local residents. This intangible aspect of environmental benefits is insubstantial compared to the direct supports

113 and compensation of developmental strategies. Without awareness of the substantial benefits or even potential benefits, environmentalism hardly works. Environmentalists also failed to suggest the solution for the economic hardships of the residents, and were unsuccessful in protecting the residents’ livelihood from the exercise of public power. In the late 1990s, when the environmental conflict was the severest, local residents were threatened by government repression and consequently their occupations were distracted due to the arrests of a few residents. Some residents vividly remembered the involvement of state power and the traumatic experiences of tear gas fired by helmeted police. They are still haunted by memories of the past.

More than three hundred riot police came on this island. It was a dreadful experience. It was a physically stressful and frightening experience. In front of my eyes, I saw my friends being beaten and arrested. We also experienced tear gas, and that was just bad. Farming land was left without cultivating and fishing was not being carried out regularly. We were out of work, but it was all for nothing. We got nothing, no compensation, not anything to show for our efforts. (Yun, female, 56, preacher, local resident)

Developers often cleverly utilize physical intervention from the national government. Their direct contact with local residents seems to be virtuous. They convince the residents that developers advocate for the residents and they are lavish with economic support for the residents. However, they are callous in their use of the repression by governmental authority. Thus, it follows that residents might not have been allowed to get wind of the cooperation between developers and central government. In addition, the government’s repression was threatening enough to change resistant citizens into obedient and conservative rural dwellers. The two-pronged strategies of developers, carrot and stick, create great difficulty for mainstream environmentalism. As a result, local residents were discouraged by repression and became skeptical about environmentalism. A second angle of environmental discourses is that environmentalism was thought of as fruitless and local residents pessimistically recognized this position. The residents had environmental consciousness unlike the environmentalists’ assertion. They tried to cooperate with environmentalists, but stated that the environmental movement could not stop bulldozer-like developmentalism. Here, many residents mentioned the impossibility of the movement against the national industries. Therefore, residents’ pessimism should include submission and resignation. In conclusion, the residents felt that in the name of a practical environmental movement, conscious environmentalism could never withstand developmentalism and never do

114 away with the projects of national industry, and their past experiences proved that truth.

Coal plant companies, even though they were privatized from national control, are still a form of state policy corporation. We can’t change state policies. I know, and you know it’s impossible. Out of consideration for the obstinate construction of the plant, the state emphasized the policies for energy supply and development more than the environmental issues. If that’s the case, what do we can do? There is nothing for us to do or to oppose. Absolutely not, there’s nothing that can change it. No matter how much we protest, the plant will be constructed because the national government wants it to be. The state is has all the power, it is omnipotent. (66, male, local resident)

One nation’s intervention has an enormous effect on the process from the initial step of conflicts between developmentalism and environmentalism to the residents’ decision to participate in the environmental movement. Korean culture and the Korean political economic situation should be considered in this process. Local residents were still enthralled by the hypnotic trance of Confucianism, which emphasizes national safety and development over individual freedom and rights. Aged and conservative residents agree with the nation’s industrialization and developmentalism. It is true that environmentalism in the 1990s was new and attractive to such residents, in that it gave them a sense of sovereignty and independence. However, they are still powerless in the face of national repression. Therefore, a nation government’s intervention in the coal plant construction is meaningful among the complicated relations between different groups.

1.3. National and Local Governments as Fair or Unfair Arbitrators? In a resident’s phrase, the national government is omnipotent. Under the cloak of national interests, the national government advanced with various plans. Once the government decides to execute the plan, it is not arduous to put it into practice. The government concentrates on existing laws and policies. When the plan violates the existing law, the government will attempt to change the law. When there is no legal basis, it may enact new laws in order to support the plan. This law-related strategy was revealed by the state’s enactment to construct the coal plant in the late 1990s. In this way, the nation state aims to lay all social, legal and institutional foundations for the new plan regardless of the fact that the plan might produce negative consequences. In other words, the nation state manipulates and embellishes the agenda for the plan in advance as though

115 the plan must be implemented by right. The construction of the coal plant was a national-scale decision before KEPCO was divided into several privatized plant companies. It was suggested as a solution for a nationally effective energy supply. As mentioned, environmentally related policies (i.e., clean water management) were pigeonholed by construction related policies (i.e., the Master Plan for Energy Supply). Korea’s capitalism was born and developed by the state’s role and state- centered control. This shows a somewhat different aspect of origin and development from that of Europe and the United States. Harvey (2007) defines this as state capitalism or embedded capitalism. Korea’s state capitalism was maintained until the late 1990s, when it was faced with the financial crisis. Afterwards, in order to overcome the IMF crisis, neoliberal capitalism in the name of privatization and deregulation with small government began to make its appearance. In 2001, the establishment of several private plant companies can be interpreted as a part of neoliberal direction in that contemporary era. As Harvey (2007) and Harman (1995) point out, the relations between private companies and state reveal the role of state. At least in Korea, even though aspects of capitalism are moving toward neoliberalism, the authority of the government tends to maintain superiority in power over anything else in the context of social relations. The policies of the state have connections to key industries that took charge of social infrastructures. The national state is still able to control developers under the name of privatization, which hides significant state involvement. However, relations between the national and local governments (especially the city government of Incheon) seem disconnected on the issue of the coal plant. After the discussion of additional construction at the plant began in the mid 2000s, conflicts seemed to arise between the two governments. While the national government tends to support the construction of the coal plant from the initiation of the construction, Incheon city did not show a consistent approval. In the 1990s, Incheon City also played an important role in the construction the coal plant. The local government’s sanction as well as the national government’s sanction makes the construction likely be confirmed. Incheon City, which was already infamous for its concentrations of environmentally contaminated facilities, was finally persuaded to construct another facility of the coal plant after the national government’s intervention. However, Incheon City declared its stance against additional construction20. According to the Hankyoreh newspaper (11/16/2007), Incheon City professed a strong opposition to additional construction. The city government asserted that under

20 http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/area/250711.html (6/1/2008) (Website of Hankyoreh Newspaper in Korea)

116 the present air pollution control bill, which limited the total amount of air pollution for each company and in each region, the additional construction was entirely unreasonable and inappropriate. By presenting a written opinion which opposes the additional construction to the Ministry of Environment, the city government pointed out that 65 percent of electric power of the National Capital region was provided by the coal plant in Incheon and could not permit another one. In addition, the national government had already dispatched an official document rejecting consultation for an environmental impact assessment, which was required by KOSEP. This conflict stems from the different scales between two governments. Incheon City’s standpoint is deeply related to environmental concerns and gives a sharp admonition to developers, who only emphasize developmentalism without any consideration of the environment. The local government applies the brakes to the development-centered strategy of the coal plant that counts on the political supports from the national government. The comment of Incheon City shows the improved authority of the local government since the establishment of the Local Government Act. The relations between the local government and the local residents are ambiguous. Some residents, who actively participated in and were arrested for the environmental movement in the late 1990s, became municipal assembly members. However, the Incheon City government does not always seem to side with the local residents. The logic that Incheon City is interested in local environmental problems is more persuasive even though the political participation of local residents cannot be ignored. Unlike the local government, the standpoint of the national government is still unclear. The national government maintains that local environmental problems cannot take precedence over the national energy supply. It sides with the developers, who also focus on the urgency of energy supply. In this respect, existing laws and policies were revised and new ones were enacted. The developers requested amendments and the government established acts. Political conflicts between the national and local governments and the local residents were vividly portrayed through the voices of local residents who were interviewed. The social relations between government (in this case, mostly the national government) and local residents can be explained from two perspectives. First, the state functions as an explicit leader for regional development or as an implicit advocate for the developers. Therefore, local residents sometimes regard the government in the same light as public enterprises and even privatized companies. In the case of the coal plant in Yeongheung Island, local residents have a tendency to be confused between the private KOSEP and public KEPCO (it seems difficult to distinguish their roles). The local residents do not recognize privatized KOSEP, which separated from the national company of KEPCO, in 2001. They still misunderstand that the coal plant is operated by

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KEPCO, which was continued as a national enterprise. KOSEP, however, is still not emancipated from the involvement of the state. As mentioned, the local people’s expression about the national policies tends to be ignorant. The fruitless efforts of the environmental movement in the 1990s deepened their despair. Local residents expressed their despair by describing the traumatic experiences of the repression of the environmental movement. In addition, local residents, despite their opposition to the construction of the coal plant, are very pessimistic.

Well, (hesitantly) we went through all sorts of problems and really experienced the bitterness of life at that time (the environmental movement in the late 1990s). We even abandoned our occupations. And look, what do we have now for that? It doesn’t matter what we did the coal plant is there and is being operated. Another movement…again? I am not really sure how many people who once participated in the movement are deciding to do something again. Maybe it is impossible and useless. (56, female, local resident)

The second perspective, which looks at the relations between the state and the local people, can be explained by a physical oppressor and the oppressed. Through the exercise of public power, the national government is thought to be an intimidator to local residents. In rural regions such as Yeongheung, tear gas and riot police are not familiar to the residents. Therefore, local residents remember the crackdowns on protests as harrowing and frightening experiences. In this respect, to residents, the state is thought to have a back- scratching alliance with coal plant companies and to exercise the power to carry out developmental projects. Environmentalists are more critical than desperate toward national developmentalist policies. From the development-centered decisions to the bulldozer-like construction of infrastructures to the disregard for the local people, the national state was a significant target of environmentalists.

The government should have given the local residents time and chances to discuss the location of the coal plant because Yeongheung is their land and their living grounds for fishery and farming. The discussion of local residents themselves about the contaminated facilities should be an important part of the decision-making processes. Regardless, in the case of Yeongheung coal plant, there was no sincere discussion and consequently the construction plan for the coal plant came to be unpersuasive to local resident at its initial step. (female,

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environmentalist)

Environmentalists, in cooperation with the local residents, criticized the project by concentrating on the discourses on the environmental impacts of construction and the operation of the plant when the project was discussed in the late 1990s. Thus, conflicts between environmentalists and the government derive from KEPCO, the national electricity company, which initially planned to construct the coal plant in Yeongheung. Therefore, the strategic target for the environmental movement in the 1990s was KEPCO. KEPCO, as a monopoly as well as a conglomerate, from the perspective of environmentalists, was a hotbed of crime, irregularities and corruption.

Among the countries which are about to step up to the industrialized state, there are few countries in which the electrical industry is monopolized by a (national) company. Korea is an exception. If we particularly want to pick a country where the same thing is happening, Taiwan would probably be it. (Pamphlet of the Urgent Committee against the Coal Plant 1998)

However, environmentalists already recognized that KEPCO, with the support of the national state, tried to manipulate the legal basis in order to acquire a more advantageous position for its developmental strategy. Because environmentalists realized that KEPCO and related developers are in a cozy relationship with the government, which tends to disregard the environment, focuses on development, and consequently tries to revise existing laws and policies, they also criticized and targeted the government’s amendment and enactment of the related laws.

Incheon city as a local government which was elected by popular vote is the only administrative agency to protect the rights of local residents from environmental problems and threats in opposition to KEPCO’s omnipotence. We knew the mayor of Incheon had, at first, clarified the opposition to the construction of the coal plant. However, he gradually sat on the fence about it and finally abandoned the most important right and advocate for the local residents by tacitly permitting a ‘reclamation master plan for public surface of the seawater’ to KEPCO and its developers. The outcome that Incheon City boasted was a fruitless environmental agreement which had no mandatory enforcement. (Pamphlet of the Urgent Committee against the Coal Plant 1998)

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Of course, environmentalists who were victims of by governments criticized the physical and nonselective suppression.

The developers who want to solve the conflict with peaceful conversation seem to think that the main purpose of the conversation is to persuade. They (KEPCO and related developers) will try to persuade the last local resident so that they may prefer the construction (to environmental preservation) by misusing the term, conversation. And the final solution for environmentalists and local residents who are not able to be persuaded is through the use of massive commitment of public power. (Pamphlet of the Urgent Committee against the Coal Plant 1998)

In consequence, the government (in this case, especially the national government) functions as a leader or supporter of the key industries for national infrastructures rather than as an arbitrator between developmentalism and environmentalism. Even though the government is not an ardent developer, it has been primarily concerned with national undertakings. In addition, in environmental conflicts, the government tried to physically suppress the environmental movement. Environmentalists and several old people in Yeongheung were not a sufficiently powerful group to be able to disturb the public order. Regardless, the government did not want to have such a tiny riot (which was not even a riot but rather a reasonable movement to express residents’ rights to live without the threat of the contaminated facility). In a neoliberal system, both the state and the companies tend to emphasize economic growth as the basis of a “free market”. In this logic, the government should leave the matter to privatized companies. However, in this case, the government is still physically, politically and economically involved in the environmental conflicts of the coal plant in the name of the national energy supply.

1.4. Local Residents: Victims or Profiteers? Local residents are the direct party to the controversy concerning the construction and operation of the coal plant in Yeongheung Island. They are socially and geographically related to the issue from the beginning of the construction to the present. The cost of environmental pollution and compensation by development directly affect their quality of life. Therefore, local residents are an important group with whom environmentalists mush share environmental discourses. They

120 are essential social actors needed to achieve social change. In addition, they are also important for the developers in that the written consent by the residents, regardless of whether it is perfunctory or substantial, is a critical process for the final permission of the construction. However, local residents are prone to be vulnerable to the economic compensation of developers. Therefore, the social relations between environmentalists, developers and governments are very complicated. The relations are also flexible depending on how and whether the environmental or developmental issue is profitable or not to them. In different periods, local residents have shown varying standpoints. In addition, they have sensitively reacted to the localized issue of the coal plant. The first reason for the flexible stance of local residents is that they could not express their independent voices. In other words, in the fight between environmentalism and developmentalism, local residents were never given the opportunity to shape their own discourse. Coal plant construction was an environmental issue to examine how local residents, who are direct and potential victims of environmental pollution, were excluded and marginalized from environmental discourses. However, mainstream environmentalism ignores ideas of social exclusion and marginalization. Environmental justice needs, at this point, that the victim be the socially weak. Environmental conflicts were made by environmentalists to form environmental movements. In addition, discourses of development were made by the developers, and they were attractive to local residents using economic support and compensations. From such an antagonistic relationship between environmentalists, developers, and local residents were confused and therefore they could not choose a firm political stance. Another reason for the flexible stance of the residents was that their standpoints were associated with the benefits from the coal plant. The benefits are not as simple as environmental preservation or economic growth. The benefits from environmental concerns in the late 1990s seemed to be guaranteed in the residents’ opinion. However, when the coal plant was constructed and began operations, local residents came to receive substantial benefits from the developers in the form of support and compensation. Local residents inevitably draw a picture of the costs and benefits, walking the high wire between the two discourses. At least from the local residents’ perspective, there were few conflicts between themselves and e environmentalists during the planning, construction, and operation of the coal plant. However, environmentalists sometimes criticized the residents’ hypocrisy, which was focused on the benefits and compensation to get something for the economic damages. Local residents are neither environmentalists nor developmentalists. They are only unfortunate fishers or farmers who are entangled in the debates between environmentalism and developmentalism. An important point by environmentalists is that such poverty alone cannot

121 justify the title of the socially weak for them. Environmentalists assert that even though local residents do not have any opportunities to take part in the process of policymaking and that they suffer the costs of environmental pollution, they also receive benefits and compensations that are equivalent to the costs in monetary terms. In comparison with the critical stance of environmentalists toward the residents, local residents seem not to have any ill feelings towards environmentalists. They were, on some levels, very proud of the cause they fought for and of the environmental movement and struggle for their village in the late 1990s. Therefore, they remembered their cooperation with environmentalists as something to be cherished.

There were many demonstrations because of the expectations of air pollution from the construction and operation of the coal plant. We actively participated in the environmental movement in 1997 and 1998. We could not help joining the demonstration because we were young. At every door, at least one householder participated in the demonstration with environmentalists. We went to demonstrate in front of the township office and sometime went to Incheon with them. (Kim, female, 74, local resident)

After the environmental conflicts quieted down in the beginning of the 2000s, the local residents hardly contacted environmentalists. Environmentalists also realized that environmental movements were not useful any more due to the ruthless construction and the physical public power. Another reason for the lull was that the local residents became more interested in the developers’ compensations than environmental concerns. After the middle of the 2000s when the additional construction was disquieting, local residents started to question and raise environmental concerns once again. Interviews show diverse and complex layers of the residents’ views of environment. First, local residents still tended to rely on the environmentalists. Even though the environmental movements in the 1990s did not stop the construction, they felt anxiety over the additional construction. Several residents are positive about joining another movement to oppose the additional construction but have negative views about the success of the movement. In other words, they asserted that they are ready to cooperate with environmentalists and to join an environmental movement. However, they expect that the results of the movement will not be different from those of the past.

I’m interested in the environmental problems that will come from the additional construction. We (local residents) are willing to establish an

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environmental organization. (With a sigh) however, nothing’s really going to change. In the past, when we opposed the construction, the state and developers already decided to construct. (Kim, female, 61, local resident)

Opposition to the additional construction is reasonable. We have no idea about the coal plant which was already constructed, but we cannot stand another unit, but I’m almost positive that (demonstration or environmental movement) it won’t be successful. (Park, male, 59, local resident)

Second, regardless of their relations with environmentalists, several residents pointed out that another movement would be useless from the beginning. They tended to avoid serious discussions about the environmental movement. Although they were also concerned with the pollution that the coal plant caused, they try not to think of an environmental movement without making their livelihood by fishing or farming.

Yes, we have some air pollution of dust from the plant. A protest against the coal plant and additional construction? No way. No matter how much we say no, they (government and developers) are invincible. They always say that it is important business and it has to do with national policies. Additional construction? As long as they held the public hearing in 2007, in keeping with their logic, they already acquired a written consent from the residents. It is not that hard, easy, really. After that, the only thing they will do is to construct another unit of the coal plant. (Seo, male, local resident)

There is no justification to oppose. Nope, definitely not. If you wanted to oppose, you should have to be able to stop it at all costs when they (developers) planned to construct first four units. It’s already located here, our opposition won’t matter. If they want it to be, it will be established. If they don’t, it won’t. Of course, environmental pollution will be worse than before, but I don’t think anything more serious can happen, the situation is that four units of the plant are already here and it won’t affect us in the near future. (Noh, female, 62, local resident)

The relationship between the local residents and the developers is more delicate and complicated than that between residents and environmentalists. In the late 1990s,

123 local residents who cooperated with environmentalists and launched the movements had a tendency to be hostile to the developers. The exercise of governmental public power also derived from the emotional clash between residents and developers. However, through the interviews, a few residents were thought to have an intimate connection with the coal plant side even in the 1990s. Most of the residents who were interviewed stated that those “connected” residents do not represent all the local residents. As a local resident mentioned, the connections were very covert and devious. Therefore, most residents complained of the connected residents (mostly village headmen who were easily led astray) and criticized their close relationship with developers. Such connections seem to have been successful. In the beginning of this decade, local residents who put forth all of their energy into the movements began to be distracted. In addition, at the same time, many residents came to turn to the developers. Through this revolution, various issues such as the environmental resignation of the local residents, the threat of public power, and the developer’s financial support were deeply entangled with each other. Two more economic benefits of development paved the way for the residents’ change of heart toward the developers and developmentalism: the enormous growth of tourism and skyrocketing land prices. From the developmental perspective, the growth of tourism and rising price of land was a positive result. Yeongheung Bridge connected the island to the mainland for the first time. The bridge was influential to the island as accessibility led to money from outsider investors. They began to invest in land and constructed restaurants and lodging facilities for tourism. However, questions from the local residents are, “who benefits from the development of the island?” Accessibility via the bridge was made the commute easy for power plant employees. In this regard, the economic growth of tourism and increase of land price paradoxically hid the negative externality of the plan. Tourism functions as a double-edged sword. The construction of Yeongheung Bridge to connect the coal plant to the land, which was built by the coal company, was enough to attract the attention of tourists, who revitalized the local economy and stimulated population growth in this small island. With the new cultural landscape, restaurants, motels, and day cruises brought additional economic effects. However, when the impacts of tourism are calculated, the results are mixed. The environmentalists and residents stated as the bridge and the coal plant were constructed, the influx of outsiders who came to the island for economic reasons increased. One interviewee came to the island with the hopeful expectations of making profit from the large number of laborers working on the construction of the plant.

During the construction from 1999 to 2004, it was a lucrative

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business due to many laborers. Now? After all the workers slipped out of the island, the income dwindled. In 2004, the income was at its peak. Additional construction will be positive for restaurant businesses like mine. (Noh, female, 62, local resident and restaurant owner)

Most of all, most residents regret that people of the village became rough- tempered with the change from a small and beautiful island into a tourist resort. The economic benefits made the environmental pollution seem tolerable. Even so, the local residents are not the primary recipients of the economic benefits. Local residents seem to be frustrated that their island was losing its beautiful landscape and that they themselves did not see a substantial growth in income at the same time.

It was a good-hearted island, but after the construction of the bridge (Yeongheung Bridge) and the coal plant, it became an unlivable place. Traffic conditions are getting worse; crime rate is rising, and garbage has increased causing a nuisance to the local people. (Kim, male, 55, local resident)

Skyrocketing land prices are also a concern to the residents. The growth of land prices, according to the staff of the village office in Yeongheung, was closely correlated with the construction of the bridge and the coal plant. Table 13 shows the publicly announced price of land in Yeongheung Island for the past 18 years using data extracted randomly from seven spots (Yeonghen Myun Yui Li) located near to the coal plant from 1990 to 2007. The land prices have risen quickly in the past few years. The initial price of two or three dollars (per square meter) in 1990 soared to 160 dollars in 2007. The point in time where growth can be observed coincides with the construction of the plant in 2000. The highest growth in the land price can especially be seen when the two units of the plant were constructed and two additional units began to be constructed in 2004.

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Table 14: Publicly Announced Prices of Land in Yeongheung Island (US dollars per m²).

Year A B C D E F G Mean (Village)

1990 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 3.2 2.8 3.2 2.6 1991 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.0 1992 3.4 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 1993 3.3 2.4 3.3 3.3 2.9 3.6 3.7 3.2 1994 3.6 2.3 3.3 3.3 2.8 3.4 3.7 3.2 1995 4.5 4.3 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.9 4.1 1996 5.0 5.8 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.1 1997 5.5 7.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.3 5.7 1998 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 11.5 6.9 1999 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 9.2 5.9 2000 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 8.8 5.7 2001 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 9.8 6.7 2002 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 8.5 10.9 7.8 2003 12.7 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 15.4 15.7 50.2 2004 19.6 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 24.5 25.0 67.0 2005 44.1 169.0 169.0 169.0 169.0 68.6 70.0 122.7 2006 58.8 184.0 184.0 184.0 184.0 127.0 130.0 150.3 2007 66.6 199.0 199.0 199.0 199.0 137.0 140.0 162.8 Source: Incheon Bureau of Land (2007).

In the context of such growth in land prices, the relation between local residents and developers became a touch-and-go situation. Environmentalists made fierce attacks on this relation. Rising land prices, tourism, and financial support tend to blur the justification for local residents to oppose the additional construction of the plant, environmentalists assert. Consequently, the blurred justification also makes it difficult for the environmental movement to be stirred.

In relation to the price of land, it’s hard to persuade local residents with the logic of environmentalism. They are sometimes beyond the discussion of how environmentally harmful the facilities are. Rather, they sometimes seem to

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focus on how high the facilities increase the price of land. To make things worse, in the case of development which affects the growth of tourism, local residents even instigate the development. (Lee, female, environmentalist)

After the middle of the 2000s, with the prospect of additional construction at the coal plant, the relationship between local residents and developers showed signs of coming under question. Considering the recent benefits and compensations during the past several years, local residents are in a complex and difficult situation and are unable to unconditionally oppose the additional construction. Environmentalists also have a difficult time persuading the residents. In the meantime, in 2007, through the public hearing, the plan for additional construction was almost settled regardless of the political friction between the two groups. As the construction begins, the conflict will quietly disappear, as it did in the 1990s. This is a typical example of how environmental concerns are rendered irrelevant. The social relations between local residents and the governments (both national and local) are not as complicated as those between residents and developers. The residents of Yeongheung who are comparatively older than residents of urban areas tend to show their stance in two ways. First, grounded in Confucianism, which emphasizes the stratified hierarchy between citizens and government, the local residents’ attitude toward the government is obedient because the national state is an absolute existence that protects every citizen. Local residents – the more rural the area that they live in and the older they are – tend to have conservative beliefs. Second, as in Yeongheung’s case, when the national state or its enterprises causes damage to the individual, such confidence and obedience has the possibility of facing defiance. In Yeongheung, the protest was passive because it was initiated by environmentalists rather than being independently initiated. The demonstrations occurred in the late 1990s. It was the first time for local residents to experience an armed clash (more precisely put, physical repression). In comparison to the national government, the local governments of Incheon City and the Ongjin County are much more closely connected with the residents. This trend became more obvious after the implementation of the Local Government Act. Local residents sometimes exert their political power by electing fellow residents, who were occasionally arrested for environmental demonstrations in the 1990s, as members of the municipal assembly. Therefore, Incheon City and Ongjin County can sometimes function as advocates for the residents. In sum, local residents are located in a vulnerable and passive (and sometimes physically oppressed) role within the multiple layers of Korean social relations. In addition, they are also perilously positioned between two discourses made by the two contrasting groups of environmentalists and developers. They do not have enough political and economic

127 power to make their own discourses, and tend to passively respond to the discourses constructed by others. The response sometime works to their advantage. For example, through environmentalists, their environmental consciousness is instilled. Through developers, their regions are economically revitalized and consequently see a rise in land prices. In addition, financial support from developers is also attractive economic factor for local residents. However, the negative effect of the passive responses is formidable. During the environmental movements in the late 1990s, the residents experienced the threat of government force. This experience still remains a political trauma for them. However, environmental conflicts between environmentalists and developers overlook the significance of who has a right to live there without environmental threats and developmental encroachment. Local people and communities are totally excluded from the discourses produced by environmentalists and developers. Both groups strategically tend to utilize the local people. Environmentalists have their own catch phrases such as local air pollution, destruction of the ecosystem and global warming design to elicit support. Developers have promised to provide local employment and educational provisions. There are no local residents as the subject of discourses related to the construction of the coal plant, regardless whether it is environmental or economic. This is exactly the discourse of environmental justice, which could not be simply communicated through the two contrasting discourses.

2. The Neoliberal Capitalism of Coal Energy The analysis of Korean environment and development, which are related to coal and energy use, can be approached in context of neoliberal capitalism. As noted, local residents are excluded or manipulated by the discourses of environment and development. Social relations tend to be invisible in the water of neoliberal capitalism. However, neoliberalism tends to make social relations clearer, classes more stratified, and wealth and poverty more polarized. As neoliberalism has shown everywhere, it can be applied as a measuring stick in the case of the issue of coal and energy. This project examines local(ized) environmental problems in the bigger social, political and economic context because it explains why such issues occur. Energy and coal are a very sensitive issue, especially in the contemporary era with growing attention paid to issues like global warming and carbon dioxide emissions. The same is true with the Yeongheung coal plant. One of the most significant questions asked at the public hearing of 2007 were also about the reason for additional construction at the plant. As explained below, it seemed that the developers responded carefully to the questions, but there are several points of doubt regarding the utilization of coal.

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Not only the coal plant in Yeongheung, but most coal plants in Korea make use of coal imported from China. This process of imports should be understood in the context of trade and commerce between the two Koreas and China. In 1992 the two countries’ ideological conflict unraveled and they formed a relationship as economic partners. It implies that they began to pursue the economic imperatives of neoliberalism rather than political ideology. Even though China quietly developed a different form of neoliberalism from that of Korea, Japan, the United State, and Europe, it also changed its national direction from socialism to neoliberalism under Dèng Xiopíng’s power (Harvey 2007). In an opportune time of imports of cheap coal, Korea’s coal industry began to decline. The coal industry underwent the structural adjustment in the late 1980s. Table 15 shows the trend of Korea’s coal industry from the middle of the 1970s to the beginning of the 2000s. The coal industry in Korea was at its peak in 1987 and 1988 with the largest number of mines (362), the largest number of employees (over 68,000) and the largest production (over 24,000,000 tons). This steady growth curve of the industry came to a halt in the late 1980s. After the middle of 1990s, the coal industry collapsed to one-thirtieth of its size in 1987 when it was at its peak.

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Table 15: Trends of the Coal Industry in South Korea.

Number of Mines Employees Production (Tons)

1976 226 40,095 16,426,725 1977 191 48,779 17,267,977 1978 173 51,631 18,053,942 1979 201 53,098 18,207,767 1981 219 60,302 19,864,954 1983 346 59,923 19,860,775 1985 361 67,136 22,542,698 1987 363 68,491 24,273,112 1988 347 62,259 24,294,686 1989 332 47,934 20,785,028 1990 215 38,101 17,216,528 1991 170 32,561 15,057,721 1992 115 26,021 11,969,922 1993 70 19,461 9,442,673 1994 45 14,925 7,438,349 1995 27 11,735 5,719,637

2001 13 7,169 3,816,831

2002 10 6,624 3,318,402 Source: Ministry of Construction (2004).

After independence in 1945, Korea experienced the Korean War (1950- 1953), which was a tragic result of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, with the aid of western societies, the dictator Junghee Park (1963-1979) strived for capitalist growth by establishing development-led and export-led capitalism. In turn, the coal industry served to remove opposition against economic growth. In addition, the industry played a significant role in allowing South Korea to overcome two oil crises in 1973 and 1978. The coal industry also functioned as a contributor to attracting foreign currency and economic development due to the utilization of national energy sources. With coal production, South Korea became an export-led country and succeeded in achieving unprecedented economic growth in manufacture. In the late 1980s, the growth of the coal industry to provider energy to run

130 manufacturing factories reached its peak. Entering into the 1990s, the decline of the coal industry in Korea became conspicuous. This decline can be explained by two factors. The first is the decrease in coal demand on a national scale. Since the late 1980s, the spread of environmental preservation and the preference for high-quality energy sources led to a decrease in coal demand. In addition, the production in coal mines was enfeebled by serious foreign competition. Accordingly, the government began to perform structural adjustment by working out a long-term policy regarding the demand and supply of coal energy since 1989. Consequently, due to the large number of abandoned mines, production saw a decreasing trend. In 1996, the coal production reached only 4,951 tons (13.4 percent decrease in comparison with the previous year) and in 2000, production was merely 4,150 tons (1.1 percent decrease). The second factor is the growth of free trade that makes the import of cheap coal from China possible. Commerce and trade have a propensity to pursue the pragmatic and utilitarian. Therefore, exports and imports are organized strategically depending on the net profits for the country. From this neoliberal perspective, there are a number of gains, such as cheap coal, and simultaneously there are losses, such as the national coal industry. The imports of coal from China can be interpreted in this context. Most of all, Chinese coal has not only the strong merit of inexpensiveness but also the strategic advantage of opening a means of exports to China. The biggest merit of the plant that uses cheap coal is that the initial investment is not costly. The coal plant vividly points to the effects of low cost and high income. The privatization of the coal plant is like adding fuel to the fire of neoliberalism. Even before privatization, KEPCO was a critical target of environmentalists because of its energy- monopolistic characteristic. However, after privatization, nothing changed. Privatization highlights a free market rather than state control and consequently the plants made a frantic search to improve their profit margin. The change from KEPCO to KOSEP means the addition of privatization in a previously existing situation of monopoly. There is no reason for the plant to construct a liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant, which means expensive investments as well as purchases of the gas itself. This issue was the severest conflict between the local residents and the developers during the public hearing of 2007. The developers explained how they chose coal in the name of making a profit.

A local resident: The plant (in Yeongheung) was supposed to be constructed with two units of coal and two units of LNG. However, the developers broke the agreement and they stubbornly enforced the coal plant with four units. Now, you (the developers) are even urging us (local residents) to consent to this

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plan of additional construction. I have no idea why you broke the promise and did this to us.

A developer: The plan for the coal plant of four units was already established (there was a general stir in the audience as they seemed to think he was lying). There is big difference between coal and LNG from the perspective of cost (he meant the initial investment and the purchase of resources). Coal is one hundred percent imported from China and is deposited enough to use 200 years in comparison with the LNG for 30 years. We built the environmental facilities so that you do not have to worry about environmental pollution . And the eight units will complete the plant. We do not consider any additional construction. (From the Public Hearing for the additional construction of four units of the plant, 2007)

In an interview with the general manager of the plant, he stated that 10 units of the coal plant were already planned, with the consideration of additional facilities. However, the developer, who was in the public hearing, stated differently. It seems that the developers already had a firm plan, which the local residents never recognized. They said one thing and they did another. The reason for this manipulation is that they had to obtain the local residents’ consent gradually without allowing them to notice that the coal plant already had an enormous plan. Environmentalists assert that the site, which was purchased by the KEPCO and the KOSEP, is enough to construct twelve units of the coal plant.

3. The Social Construction of Environmental Injustice In the neoliberal system, which manipulates coal, energy, the environment, and development, the coal plant in Yeongheung reveals environmental injustice. From every process of discussion, decision making, planning, and implementation of the coal plant, local residents were excluded, taken away from their own geography and cultural landscape, and inappropriately exposed to environmental pollution simply for the reason that they are poor and old. Their voice in favor of LNG instead of coal was ignored. The two discourses of environment and development confused the local residents and destroyed their authority to decide and to choose their lives. The social relations among developers, environmentalists, the governments, and local residents put environmental injustice on the residents’ shoulders. Even if the local residents stated that it is not just, nothing seems to have changed. Other actors manipulated the local residents so that they are

132 incapable of being aware of the environmental injustice they suffered. In other words, unequal social relations hide environmental injustice. Financial support also functions in this way. Educational provisions function in this way. In addition, facilities such as the Yeongheung Bridge, which created inconveniences for the local residents, also function to hide the environmental injustice. Looking into socially constructed processes in order to expose injustice is a useful means to study environmental justice. Paradoxically, the Korean social structure, which tries to conceal environmental injustice, makes injustice much more noticeable. In other words, social structure and construction play a critical role in creating the discourse of environmental justice. The social construction that tries to hide environmental injustice in Yeongheung can be viewed from three angles; coal and energy, nature and environment, and scale.

3.1. The Social Construction of Coal Energy First, environmental injustice is hidden by the social construction of coal energy. The developers and the governments tend to emphasize energy demand and supply. They fabricate public opinions as if the country will fall into a state of disorder unless the current demand is fulfilled. In this fashion, through coal, developers emphasize the necessity of energy demands. The strategy of the social construction of coal and energy is different from other strategies. Developers already established two strategies to mitigate the conflict with local residents and environmentalists. To local residents, the developers utilized the strategy of financial support and compensation. To environmentalists, they asserted that the plant is clean and harmless due to its up-to-date environmental facilities. However, their necessity of coal energy is a global and national-scaled social construction. In this manner, coal and energy are discursively conceptualized beyond the simple object or material that they are. Instead, they are represented as something which generates electricity and is used to run factories. Second, they are conceptualized as an additional and symbolic image by the developers. In other words, coal is symbolized as a tool of national safety, global free trade and commerce.

The capital region consumes the largest amount of electricity. Therefore, somewhere around the region, the coal plant should be constructed in the context of efficiency. Because of the proximity to the China, where all coals are imported, the construction of coal plant in Yeongheung Island is an inevitable decision for us, and Yeongheung is the only place for the coal plant. (KEPCO 1997)

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Of course, the social construction of coal and energy, which was interspersed with the significance of energy demands and supplies, has a propensity to be juxtaposed with environmentalists’ efforts in various ways. With images of black smoke belching up from coal plant, environmentalists try to make the coal plant and environmental pollution – especially air pollution – equivalent to each other. This is still a useful image that environmentalists construct and that the majority of people perceive. Conversely, the image of black smoke – even white steam that is thought to be harmless according to the developers’ assertion – is excluded from the public relations brochures or pamphlets published by the coal plant (Figure 16). Therefore, local residents are bewildered by the images of coal energy made by the environmentalists and developers. In other words, their subjective perception of coal as a simple energy source becomes blurred. This conceptualization hides the environmental injustice that is experienced by local residents, i.e., the social construction and reproduction of coal energy. Social constructions are a political economic process to extend localized environmental phenomena into a larger framework of social, economic, and political discourses. Therefore, to interpret environmental injustice as socially constructed processes within conflicting social relations is to utilize the lens of political ecology in the discussion of environmental justice.

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Figure 16: Contrary Images of the Coal Plant: Environmentalists’ vs. Developers’ Portrayals. (Source: http://www.stopthecoalplant.org21, https://www.kosep.co.kr22)

3.2. The Social Construction of Nature Second, environmental injustice was also hidden by the manipulation of nature and environment. For example, the environmental impact assessment (EIA), which was a mandatory process, was from the beginning written with the intent of constructing the coal plant. There is a legal loophole in Korea that permits the developers to select an EIA company. Therefore, to manipulate the EIA advantageously, the developers endeavored to seek a company conducive to their political tastes. Thus, the process enables the developers to confer with the chosen EIA company for the political manipulation of environmental impacts in advance. In this respect, the EIA can be socially constructed and manipulated. The EPA was not correctly assessed in order to decide or reject the establishment of coal plant, but politically manipulated as an apparatus to support developmental strategies.

First, the EIA was manipulated by the developers who

21 http://www.stopthecoalplant.org (Website of SEED Coalition against Coal Plant, ‘Stop the Coal Plant’) 22 https://www.kosep.co.kr (Website of Korea South-East Power Co.Ltd)

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distorted the fact that the polluted air from the coal plant would fly away to China. However, in Yeongheung the wind toward the inland is more dominant. Second, the EIA distorted the aspects of water pollution due to the heavy metals such as chrome, cadmium, and copper. The developers, with an air of concern, in order to avoid environmental conflict, raised the environmental criteria of such heavy metals. Third, the EIA excluded the research for plant plankton that affect the marine ecosystem and which is affected by the warm sewage. Fourth, the EIA applied the disqualified model to minimize the impacts of air pollution. Fifth, the EIA did not consider the collective impacts from adjacent coal plants. (Pamphlet of the Urgent Committee against the Coal Plant 1998)

The remarkable fact about the EIA is how it constructs nature, such as in the coal plant company’s project for breeding short-necked clams. Through this project, nature is not only socially produced but also reproduced. Table 14 shows how the production of short- necked clams became irregular since the 2000s. The developers of the plant were concerned with the irregularity of the production and in turn, activated the project. The project requires that the coal plant purchase the eggs for the clams and scatter them into the sea. After several months, the eggs grow big enough for clams to be dug up by the local residents and be sold. The local residents have no objection to the breeding project as long as the production of the clams is consistently maintained. They are likely to regard the project as the developers’ compensation to the local people. From an ecological perspective, what is necessary is the preservation of nature that is naturally sustainable and durable. Produced (and reproduced) nature in order for developers to maintain their enterprises is unnecessary and even dangerous. Here, nature has become social, economic, and political.

In my lifetime, it is the first time experiencing the scattering of seeds of clams. The plant side purchased all the seeds for the project. Now, we just earned money from the project at least for the production of short-necked clams. To be frank, it is good to increase income. The yearly mean reached ten million won [ten thousand dollars]. However, if they (the developers) quit the project, no clams are going to be dug up. Many fisherwomen are satisfied with the project, but I don’t know much about the near future. (Yun, female, 56, local resident, preacher)

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3.3. The Social Construction of Scale Third and finally, environmental injustice is concealed by the social construction of scale, i.e., it was socially constructed via different scalar strategies. Scale, in this context, is not just a direction with absolute distance and sizes shown on the map. Each group seems to combatively utilize the concept of scale in its own way. The pre-existing scale tends to become meaningless and new scales are constructed and manipulated by each group to transform the environmental phenomena into social ones. In order for groups to justify their actions, they subtly employ different kinds of scales. The scale on which developers insist brings environmental injustice upon the local residents. They make a choice of scale for the advantage of constructing and operating the plant by forcing the local residents to become indifferent to local environmental problems. The most important scale for the developers is the national one, which focuses on the national supply of electricity from the coal energy to comply with the national demands. This national scale explains the reason why developers have deeper relations and connections with the national government rather than with local governments such as Ongjin County or Incheon City. Therefore, to the developers, localized environmental problems are not seriously taken into account. Even if they are concerned with the problems, they overlook them in the name of a national project. However, it does not mean that they simply ignore the environmental issues because their ignorance can possibly generate environmentalists’ and local residents’ protests. They assert the necessity of development and devise an alternative to show their environmental concerns simultaneously. For example, before the construction of the coal plant, they submitted the environmental impact assessment to the government although this is a mandatory process for the construction. After construction, they have operated self-managed environmental facilities – but there are still symptoms of environmental pollution – in order to minimize the environmental impacts. However, the local environmental problems never take precedence over national environmentalism. In addition to the superficial consideration of a localized environment, the developers also utilize the global scale. It is associated with the fact that the use of coal energy is an inexorable global trend given volatile oil prices. However, the issue of carbon dioxide emission or climate changes caused by coal on a global scale is never discussed by the developers.

Due to economic growth, many countries need to construct coal plants. In addition, the problems of carbon dioxide emissions are also being solved gradually in this contemporary era. (Developer in the public meeting in 2007)

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Because of oil-dependent energy policies, we experienced two economic crises. High oil prices are a global trend and will continue to increase in the near future. Therefore, it is imperative to maintain the ratio of coal energy supplies at 30% to avoid such crises. (KEPCO 1997)

The significance of the coal plant described by the developers on a national scale stands in contrast with the dangers of the coal plant, described by the environmentalists on global and local scales. Fundamentally, environmentalists have a propensity to oppose national environmental policies in Korea because the national government tends to establish environmental policies with a developmentalist direction. In addition, they express environmental concerns, which are generated by globalization or globalized free trade. Even so, it does not mean that environmentalists fail to pay attention to the localized environmental problems. Rather, their environmental discourses always begin with the local environmental pollution and end with the critique of how global and national social structures affect localized pollutions. However, their concerns for localized pollution are not expected to be suitable to the local residents’ interests. In the context of environmental justice, unsuitability was a negative result of environmental discourses until now. Environmentalists failed to capture the inequality or injustice that was inflicted on the local residents. They did not look at the environment through the lens of justice. This is an existing estrangement between environmentalists and local residents.

Of course, the local residents’ opinion and participation are very important. I regret that current environmental movements tend to overlook the identity of the local people and the concept of justice. Relatively, the redistribution of wealth or equal distribution of environmental impacts is prone to be out of discussion in environmentalism. However, we begin to think about it. For example, we try to include the environmental issues of the socially weak such as poor people, females, children, old people, and the disabled. (Lee, environmentalist)

In comparison with developers or environmentalists, local residents do not use scale strategically. Their experiences and recognitions are limited to a local scale. Their connections to developers and environmentalists are also locally confined. For example, even though the developers suggest the problems of an energy supply from a national perspective,

138 they are not very important issues for local residents. Rather, local residents concentrate more on the localized strategies of financial support and compensation by the developers. This indicates that they are accustomed to localized livelihoods rather than utilizing the localized scale. The same scalar phenomena take place when the residents confront environmentalists. In the late 1990s, environmentalists suggested that localized environmental pollution was directly linked to their daily lives. In this way, different spatial scales encounter, conflict, and struggle with each other. Different scales are produced, manipulated and utilized by different groups. Scales’ role is not restricted to explaining the ratio of absolute distance any more. Scale is not just an expression of geographical rigidity. It is relative, flexible and changeable in the context of social construction. The case of the Yeongheung coal plant describes the scalar manipulation and social construction of an environmental issue. Even though the geographical dimension of scale is not explicitly exposed, the two discourses always use the discussion of scale. While developers underline a national scale, environmentalists simultaneously mention Yeongheung Island on a local scale and the coal plant on a global scale. However, within these kinds of conflicts of scale, local residents are socially excluded from the conflicts. Their own scale is localized, which directly relates to their livelihood and daily life and is relatively passive. Developers and environmentalists socially construct scale to hide environmental injustice. Thus, without the consideration of scale, local residents overlook how environment and development influence their unjust treatment. The national scale of developers and the global scale of environmentalists contradict each other, thereby veiling environmental damages and injustice. Local residents are excluded by this contradiction. Not only geographical scales but also temporal scales should also be considered. Especially with environmental problems, the most considerable issue is the temporal scale of the future. Thus, the intergenerational perspective begins to be involved as well as the intragenerational one. Developers do not have an appreciative eye for intergenerational issues. The most noteworthy temporal scale for them is the present, i.e., the present energy supply. Of course, developers sometimes care about the future from the perspective of resource economics. For example, they take the estimated amount of remaining resources deposited into account. The fact that coal deposits are bigger than oil deposits functions efficiently for the developers’ coal plant construction. Conversely, environmentalists are said to have the most future-oriented way of thinking; their environmental discourse always includes the future. No matter which resources are used, they must disappear because they are non-renewable, and as a result future resources are less important than current pollution. Instead, environmentalists concentrate on the resources that have little effect on the environment or on forms of electricity production that use little

139 energy. Local residents’ attitudes to the temporal scale are somewhat pessimistic and cynical. The local residents in Yeongheung Island – the same pattern can be seen in other rural areas – show characteristics of an aging community. Their abandonment of individual hope for the future as old people is linked directly with that of place. Such a conception works negatively in articulating their opinions toward the construction and the operation of the coal plant. In other words, their abandonment of their own place is prone to increase their expectations for financial support and compensation. Some residents even think about migration from the place where they lived for their lifetime with the developers’ compensation if it were possible. The environmental movements that they participated in also stand for the livelihood- centered urgency rather than the environmental concerns for the future. They are simply too old to contemplate the future, future generations, and the future environment. This view works advantageously for developers and consequently reinforces the results of environmental injustice.

If the plant is willing to pay for the moving expenses, why wouldn’t I move to another place? I am possibly willing to move. Coal dust, alien peoples, polluted tideland … It was a beautiful place to live in when there was clean seawater and air; but I don’t feel any sense in living in this place anymore. It is really time to move. (Shin, 77, female, local resident)

In sum, the social construction of environmental (in)justice distracts from the significance of the environment and consequently environmental justice. The environmental injustice that takes place in Yeongheung Island can be shown in an individual experience of the local residents. Through the interviews, local residents are personally concerned with their livelihood, recognize the changes in the environment, and seriously contemplate the environmental impacts of the coal plant. However, the experiences of the local residents can be described in the bigger framework of social relations. Social construction binds individual experiences and behaviors into the social framework. The local residents’ own social construction, in order to recover from passive and oppressive social relations and to create their own social discourse, is absolutely imperative.

CONCLUSION

Through the case study of the Yeongheung coal plant, I approached environmental injustice from

140 the political ecological perspective; this calls for looking at environmental pollution from simply an environmentalist perspective. Political ecology includes the discussion of social structure, social relations, and social construction in the study of environmental justice. Political ecology overcomes the parochialism of environmentalism and environmental movements in the study area in the late 1990s. Political ecology allows one to approach environmental injustice from social, economic and political perspectives. Fundamentally, the political ecological framework of environmental injustice is a study of the failure of environmentalism. In addition, it is a study of the way of hiding environmental injustice through the social construction of nature, environment and scale. The political ecological approach helps to overcome the parochial consideration of the environmental problems seen in the conflict in the 1990s. In other words, it contextualizes the various social relations associated with the additional construction of coal plants in the 2000s. Local residents are victims of environmental injustice derived from social relations. Even though financial support and compensation seem to set the issue of injustice apart from the discussion, the residents continue to experience environmental injustice in the form of environmental pollution and the exclusion from the process of policy-making. Economic compensation for local residents cannot replace environmental justice. Neither can the environmental logic of environmentalists. Justice is never realized without the consideration of both distributive and procedural justice. Distributive justice tends to make justice be realized through developers’ compensation for environmental damages. However, from the context of procedural justice, local residents never participated nor were given the opportunity to participate in any of the decision making processes of environmental policies and never given the opportunity to claim any rights to their own home town. Simply stated, the aforementioned failures are prime examples of social injustice and environmental injustice. In the 21st century, when environment is truly important to the quality of life that people live, environmental justice is the accomplishment of social justice. Social justice should be applied to the environment. When the discussion is limited to environmental problems, injustice can be overlooked. In other words, the discussion should be beyond environment and include justice. So far, the discussion has always singularly focused on the “environment”. To developers, the environment was an unmanageable responsibility to assume, it failed to be a matter they actually gave deep thought or pretended to ponder. To environmentalists, the environment is everything to which they devote their life. However, in their focus on the environment, there fails to be room for justice. Environmental and development discourses attempt to hide the issue of justice. Each group functions to hide the justice issue. The unequal social relations between different groups work in order to hide the injustice. In other words, environmental issues should not be simply

141 examined by environmental analysis. Environmental issues should be viewed in a comprehensive way in the social, the economic and the political realms. In this respect, when local pollution is seen through the lens of political ecology, it becomes a problem of justice, politics, and economy. When the Yeongheung coal plant is investigated from localized pollution to national policies to global trends, it finally becomes an explainable phenomenon of environmental injustice. The last piece of the puzzle that solves the conflict between environmental and developmental discourses in the Yeongheung coal plant is “justice”.

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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS CHAPTERS

The dissertation began with a review of previous studies to explain the general concepts, contents and history of environmental justice. Environmental justice, in comparison with environmentalism, is a relatively recent issue. Environmental justice provides a scathing critique of mainstream environmentalism in the U.S., which attempts to raise the issue of environmental protection with the modern environmental movements. According to the environmental justice critique, mainstream environmentalism was led by elite, white, Christians and upper classes (e.g., the Sierra Club), and it failed to engage social justice considerations of minorities, women, the poor, and other marginalized groups who disproportionately suffer from environmental problems. Environmental justice has been successful in raising an important question of justice in environmental problems, which has been overlooked in environmentalism. Environmental justice reflects the goals of the broader social justice movement. Therefore, many scholars tend to look at environmental justice as practical and activist-oriented rather than theoretically grounded in scholarly manner. This perspective limits the development of environmental justice as a theoretical discipline. The rationale of this dissertation was to apply a theoretical framework of political ecology to the analysis of environmental justice in environmental controversies surrounding a major Korean coal plant complex, and draw out the implications for the environmentalists’ approach to energy policy in a context of global climate change. In the U.S., the environmental justice movement, which was triggered by PCB pollution in Warren County, North Carolina in 1982, led to the founding of the Office of Environmental Justice as a part of Environmental Protection Agency in 1992. Since then, environmental justice has played an important role to complement environmentalism. The complementary role of environmental justice, however, corroborates the fact that environmentalism suffered critical weakness and failures. Partial participation of upper social classes shows the conscious deficiency of environmental issues that affect African Americans and low income people. Consequently, it led to the discussion of environmental justice, which asserts that social justice must be

143 considered in environmental issues. Taylor (2000) explains this trend as a paradigm shift from mainstream environmentalism centered on “romanticism” and “limits to growth” to environmental justice centered on power, class, and public policy. The failure of environmentalism was an initial research question of this dissertation and it was vividly detected in the case study of the coal plant in South Korea. The most controversial topic in environmental justice is the theoretical conflict between distributive and procedural justice (Lake 1996; Dobson 1998; Holifield 2001). Not only in environmental justice studies, but also in social justice studies, there is a constant controversy concerning these two types of justice. For example, according to which context is being considered – egalitarianism, utilitarianism, libertarianism, Marxism, and communitarianism – justice can be seen from various angles (Young 1990; Smith 1994). In environmental justice, the discussion of these justice issues has been compressed into the conflict between distributive and procedural justice. Satisfaction with one part does not necessarily mean the realization of environmental justice. In other words, distributive justice, which means equal endowment of environmental right and burden (Draper and Mitchell 2001), and procedural justice, which means self-determination through a fair process of decision-making and enforcement related to environmental policies (Cutter 1995, 1996; Lake 1996), should be achieved at the same time. In a case study in South Korea, environmental justice seems to be realized through the consideration of distributive justice, such as financial support paid to islanders to compensate for environmental harms they suffer. However, the real state of environmental injustice is graphically disclosed by revealing how seriously procedural justice is ignored. Previous studies related to environmental justice show descriptive characteristics of the results of environmental injustice without engaging in structural explanations (Bullard 1990; Bowen et al. 1995; Cutter and Solecki 1996; Heiman 1996; Ishiyama 2003). In other words, they tend to explain the distribution of environmental damages by correlating them with income and ethnicity. They ignore the fundamental structural factors that lead to environmental injustice. A political ecological framework is able to approach environmental justice from the context of social structure. Political ecology refers to the political economy of nature and the environment (Bryant 2001; Paulson et al. 2003; Zimmerer and Bassett 2003; Robbins 2004; McCarthy 2005; Walker 2005). Political ecology makes it possible to explain environmental injustice and its concealment through the investigation of unequal social relations, a series of capitalist processes that generate the relations – i.e., neoliberalism – and the social construction of nature, environment, and scale. Thus, another important phenomenon, which can be observed through the political ecological framework, is about the

144 ways governments and developers subtly hide environmental injustice. This was another key research question of the dissertation. I explored the complementarity of environmental justice and political ecology in the context of an environment/development controversy in South Korea. Environmental justice studies in South Korea started later than those in the U.S. The Environmental Justice Forum in 1999 was an initiative of Korean studies of environmental justice. However, these literatures tend to be divided between localized case studies (Park 2001; Seo 2001; Jeon 2001; Han 2001; and Lee 2001) and political economic studies (Choi 1999; Choi 2000; and Yun 2000). Localized case studies could not overcome their shortcomings that simply describe and explain environmental injustice rather than investigate the causes of the injustice. Political economic studies are too global to analyze local cases of injustice. Both types of studies are not effective to connect different scales between the local and the global. Thus, there were few studies that applied political economy to localized cases of environmental injustice. The case study of the coal plant in Korea was able to provide a critical clue to find out how environmental injustice occurs from the local, national and global scale and how neoliberal capitalism generates environmental injustice.

ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

A series of research questions in the dissertation addressed the main issues suggested in the literature review. Such research questions were answered through the case study of coal plant in South Korea. Thus, simply put, the case study is a localized research which: (1) explains the failure of mainstream environmentalism to mount a more successful campaign against a coal plant project; (2) establishes the existence of environmental injustice at several geographical and temporal scales; (3) demonstrates the conflict between distributive and procedural justice in campaigns to engage the local people in environmental activism; and (4) examines environmental injustice through political ecological frameworks that explain social structures of social relations, capitalism, and the social constructions of nature, environment and scale.

1. The Failure of Mainstream Environmentalism The initial research question was about the failure of mainstream environmentalism. How can the failure of environmentalism be observed through the construction of the coal plant in the small island in South Korea and concomitant environmental movements in the late 1990s? Analysis of the study area told the story of the failure of environmentalism in the 1990s. The environmental movement in the 1990s against the construction of coal plant was not to be successful due to: (1)

145 the lack of the residents’ independent and active participation; (2) the failure of the mainstream environmental movement to engage the concerns and goals of local people; and (3) the oppressive policies of developmentalism by the national government and developers. Even though initial environmental movements in the late 1990s failed to impede the construction of the plant, they seemed to obtain the cooperation of local residents. At that time, in fact, the local residents not only took an active part in environmental movements, but they also came to be interested in the environment. However, environmentalism failed to motivate them to future participation because it did not adequately represent their interests. In other words, one-sided assertions of environmentalism were not persuasive enough to address residents’ environmental concerns. In addition, according to the interviews with local residents, the national government showed unbalanced support for the developmentalist discourse of developers rather than the environmental discourse of environmentalists. Environmentalism cannot be successful without the constant participation of local residents. Local residents seemed not to be interested in developmentalist discourses. However they were sensitive to the compensation and financial and educational support from developers, which extinguished residents’ environmental concerns. In sum, residents’ participation in environmental movements in the late 1990s was discontinued by the national government’s repression on the one hand and compensation and support, which enchanted the residents made their participation in environmental movements more difficult, on the other hand. This issue was discussed in the context of distributive and procedural justice. Environmental discourse, which often uses stereotyped assertions of environmentalism and unconditional objections to developmentalism, can hardly obtain the residents’ long-term consent.

2. The Geography of Environmental Injustice The failure of environmentalism brought up an important question about the necessity of environmental justice. The weakness of environmental theories needs to be complemented or even replaced by the theory of environmental justice. It was not a difficult task to relate a series of environmental problems in the study area to environmental justice in the Korean context. Even though environmental problems that were experienced by the local residents were not yet serious, residents began to complain about their environment. Their gloomy complaints and expressions reflected the negative impacts of coal dust, polluted shoreline, decrease in clam production, and noise from power transmission towers. In the context of environmental justice, such environmental problems should not be limited to the simple issues of pollution. They were suffering from environmental injustice in the dominant conflicting structures between

146 environmental and developmental discourses. In sum, environmental injustice was a conclusion that could be easily drawn in that local residents are low-income farmers and fishers victimized by environmental pollution. The injustice they suffer is both procedural and distributional. Observation of environmental injustice in the study area was not simply from the residents’ exposure to pollution. Here, we have to consider the reason why procedural justice as well as distributive justice should be treated as important issues. Procedural injustice happened from the first step of the construction plan for the coal plant. Thus, the manipulated environmental impact assessment and consent from the residents have resulted in the hidden collusion between the national government, developers and environmental assessment companies that were employed by developers. In this collusion, local residents were thoroughly excluded from this process. In this respect, procedural injustice occurs on the island. The local residents’ opinions were never reflected in the environmental and developmental policies related to the coal plant construction and operation. Furthermore, the injustice left no room for improvement in that the central government ended the protests in a repressive manner. This means that there was no consideration for procedural justice issues. Furthermore, the environmental injustice of coal plant construction on Yeongheung Island also occurs at larger scales and larger times. As described in Figure 1, the islanders’ environmental injustice was not limited to localized pollution. Their environmental injustice was derived from the unequal distribution of localized environmental pollution and the unfair process of national decision making for environmental policies. This injustice also encompasses globalized environmental problems such as global warming and other climate changes. These globalized problems were explained as a result of the structural contradiction of neoliberal capitalism, which led to the use of cheap coal resulting from free trade between China and South Korea. Therefore, the local islanders bear dual environmental burdens from local pollution to global warming. In addition, the temporal scale also negatively affects the island’s future generations. This is environmental injustice in a temporal-scalar manner.

3. The Political Ecological Framework of Environmental Injustice Environmental justice still needs the consideration of the political and the economic. In this regard, environmental justice is an important discourse in that it provides a useful clue to environmental problems from a social, economic and political framework in the name of justice. It was repeatedly emphasized that political ecology is the political economy of nature and environment. The framework of political ecology focused on how environmental injustice is hidden in the study area. Thus, the clever concealment of environmental injustice by unequal

147 social relations, neoliberal capitalism, and social construction of nature and environment was one of the more important points of the dissertation. Social groups related to the environmental conflict around the coal plant can be classified into four actors: (1) developers who initially planned and are operating the coal plant; (2) the central government that supports the coal plant; (3) environmentalists who unconditionally oppose the coal plant from its planning step to the current operation; and (4) local residents who were excluded from both developmental and environmental discourses. Local residents seem as if they benefited from developmentalism in the context of compensation and distribution with financial support, but they are direct sufferers of the potential environmental pollution. In addition, their compensation and distribution are just minimal expenses for the developers in comparison with their enormous incomes. The problem is that the social relations among them were unequally formed. Unequal social relations were observed in the economic power of developers and the political power of government. Developers could entice the residents with money in the form of support and the central government could bring them under its control with the power of repression. As a result of these social relations, the local residents came to move at the beck of developmentalism and environmentalism without any kind of self-determination. Such unequal relations tended to block the way environmental injustice became a critical issue in the conflict. The local residents’ insensitivity to environmental injustice does not always mean the realization of environmental justice. The process of decision making from the first planning steps of the coal plant showed environmental injustice. The manipulated environmental impact assessment and consent procedures both produced and hid environmental injustice. Capitalism is the most comprehensive and essential apparatus to hide environmental injustice. The analysis of capitalism explained the environmental injustice found in the contradictory structure of unequal relations between different social groups, including developers, environmentalists, and the local residents. Neoliberalism assumes the theoretical bases that human welfare can be achieved only from the institutional frame consisting of entrepreneurial individual ownership and freedom, the free market, and free trade (Harvey 2006). In practice, neoliberal capitalism polarizes the economy and increases inequality. In addition, it was seen that neoliberalism tends to legitimate environmental injustice through compensation schemes that deepen inequalities. Neoliberalism suggests an important discussion related to compensation in the controversy of distributive and procedural justice. Schroeder (2000) regards money-centered compensation of neoliberalism as the limitation of distributive justice. Once environmental justice is seen through distributive justice, compensation dilutes the significance of justice by hiding procedural justice. Once again,

148 distributive justice can be a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition. From the neoliberal logic, we could confront the question “Is neoliberal environmental justice just?” In order for such a question to be answered affirmatively, neoliberalism should answer another question, “Is neoliberalism universally liberal to all human beings?” Harvey (2007) points out the false and confusing use of the term “liberal” in neoliberalism. Thus, the liberty means not universal freedom for all people but “free” market open to corporations and nation state as economic actors. Once recognizing the linguistic misuse and fallacy of neoliberalism, we can rephrase the question like this: “For whom is neoliberal environmental justice most favorable?” Neoliberal environmental justice is no better than any other issue that can be solved and reduced to monetary terms. Therefore, in this context of neoliberalism, consequential chains from neoliberal capitalism of free trade of cheap coal via global warming to local pollution in a small island reflected environmental injustice at both the global and local scales. Neoliberal capitalist processes intervene at various scales. Developmentalism by the national state and developers is one of the important strategies of neoliberalism. Under this developmental strategy, localized environmental issues are excluded, localized pollution is ignored, injustice is hidden, and local residents are marginalized. In addition, venerating economic growth through free trade, the global scale of neoliberalism led to the collapse of several countries’ industries, which lost in international economic competition. In the case of South Korea, one example is a coal industry. Imports of cheap Chinese coal resulted in the local pollution in the environmental context and the collapse of Korea’s coal industry in the economic context. Not only the coal plant in Yeongheung, but most coal plants in Korea make use of coal imported from China. These imports should be understood in the context of trade and commerce between the two Koreas and China. In 1992 the countries’ ideological conflict changed when they formed a friendly relationships as economic partners. Finally, another way environmental injustice is hidden is through the social construction of nature, the environment and scale. Nature and the environment are socially constructed by developers. The breeding of short-neck clams was a plan of the coal plant company, indicating that developers are manipulating the coastal ecosystem. The fishery industry of the local residents is not dependant on the natural ecosystem but on the manipulated ecosystem created by the developers. The developers’ abandonments of stock enhancement plans have the capability of directly causing the disappearance of clam production. The disappearance of clam production would ultimately cause the end of the residents’ economy. The manipulation of the environmental impact assessment is another dimension of the social construction of the environment. In the short term, this seems to be an elaborate strategy effective to reduce

149 environmental conflict and to maintain the residents’ economic product. However, this manipulation tends to ignore the broader discussion of environmental injustice by justifying and creating an artificial nature and environment, which fit in perfectly with the construction and operation of the coal plant. Scale is also socially constructed. For example, the coal energy use and coal plant construction, justified by the issue of volatile oil prices, is also justified as one of global trends. To developers, localized environmental problems are tiny issues compared to the national necessity of energy supply and the global trend of coal energy. They utilize the national and global scales to mollify localized environmental objections. Ironically, environmental injustice is also hidden by environmentalists. Under the environmentalists’ obsession with local pollution and their focus on global environmental issues, local environmental justice had no room to be discussed. The social construction of scale has occurred by developers and environmentalists at the same time. In this process, local residents’ environmental injustice came to be beside the point. In sum, these findings can be measured through the political ecological framework. The conflict of the coal plant shows that localized environmental injustice is incomplete without careful consideration of the political ecology that explains social relations, capitalism, and the social construction of nature, the environment, and scale.

IMPLICATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN KOREA

The analysis presented above has several implications for Korean environmental policy. First, the vitalization of environmental justice movement is urgent in Korea. There was no historical environmental justice movement in Korea. The successful realization of environmental justice comes with an academic and theoretical basis and practical social movements. Practical movements for environmental justice mean giving rights to the socially weak local residents, such as self-determination or self-empowerment. In addition, such a movement is the only and best way for victims to express their complaints and protests against injustice. Of course, the final goal of the movements should aim towards changing and institutionalizing environmental policies. Second, the case of Yeongheung Island also has several implications for the global movement for climate change justice. The most controversial environmental issue in this contemporary era, without doubt, must be climate change. I found two applications to global warming. First, we have to consider the element of justice in this phenomenon. Justice is a way

150 to add a qualitative perspective to the studies of the global warming. Of course, climate justice has played an important role to include justice in the discussion. For successful cooperation between climate justice and environmental justice, the environmental justice discussion needs to be extended towards global issues rather than only local and urban issue. Second, mainstream environmentalism’s disproportionate emphasis on global climate change issues should be questioned. As seen in the case study of Korea, the failure of environmentalism lies in the lack of local residents’ individual participation and consequently the absence of a collective cooperation system. It means that globalized environmental problems cannot be solved without each nation’s participation and internationally collective cooperation. Each country – especially underdeveloped countries that are often excluded from global environmental discourses – should be considered in the search for successful solutions to environmental problems. Global environmental organizations, operating in leading countries, hardly solve the global problems with a meta-discourse of environmentalism. Therefore, considerations of individuals, the socially weak, low income people, marginalized regions, and underdeveloped countries are necessary to global environmental problems. In this respect, low income people in an underdeveloped country could be dual victims of local and global environmental injustice. Thus, local people frequently suffer from the injustice of global environmental policies as well as that of local environmental pollution. Since replacing Keynesianism, which recognized the direct intervention of national state, neoliberalism has become the apparatus to address economic crisis or depression. However, neoliberalism, which won successive victories, is recently confronting sudden attacks. Consumption worldwide is shrinking, employment is unsafe, and production without consumption becomes meaningless. Many large enterprises that never seemed to be in danger of collapse are going bankrupt. Some predict the collapse of neoliberalism itself. Even though the collapse of neoliberalism does not directly mean the end capitalism, there is the possibility that capitalism might be transformed. The transformation of capitalism means a new direction for political ecology and environmental justice, which have criticized neoliberalism for its ruthlessness toward nature and the environment. Nobody can tell how the collapse of neoliberalism will reorganize the geography of nature and environment, but geographical reorganization must occur. In conjunction with the geographic changes, political ecology and environmental justice have to be transformed. For example, in the geographical context, neoliberalism and globalization have been remarkably interdependent relations. Thus, to countries that pursue neoliberalism – of course, the United States was the first instance of the neoliberal trend and pursuit might be the tacit enforcement by the U.S. – free trade is the bitter poison of globalization, which has to be

151 swallowed. However, the collapse of neoliberalism can restructure the geography of globalization and consequently globalized environmental problems. Therefore, the collapse of neoliberalism and the transformative alternative of capitalism must be a valuable topic in future discussions about nature, the environment and environmental justice.

TOWARDS A POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

It has been said that money floats upward and pollution sinks downward. The image of money gracing the upper class, while pollution afflicts the lower class, illustrates the results of a capitalist society where environmental costs are distributed unjustly. For that reason, money and pollution are thought to be separate but connected. Lack of money is the cause for the downward drop of pollution toward the poor. As stated in Harvey’s citation from Engels in the very beginning of this dissertation, pollution cannot be severed from money. We are negligent in seeking the causes of environmental problems from extended social structures, social relations, and larger systems. Of course, one of the systems is capitalism, specifically, neoliberal capitalism. In this regard, environmental justice succeeds in pointing out the unequal and unjust elements of pollution. In this study, such issues were traced back to capitalism as a place of origin within a political ecological framework. To realize environmental justice means changing the structure and relations of neoliberal capitalism. Finally, it is my desire is to end the dissertation with the assertion of our need for an environmental justice theory combined with a political ecology approach. The combination of political ecology and environmental justice can be considered as a criticism as well as a positive solution to environmentalism. A sustainable society must be combined with justice in order to exist. Now is the time to concentrate on including justice issues that have been brushed aside. This can be effectively approached through the political ecology of environmental justice, which was the central theme of this dissertation. Thus, the reinvigoration of an improved environmentalism requires the examination of contradictory social structures that have generated injustice and associated problems. Without a reinvigorated environmental movement able to make clear the local and global injustices of situations such as Yeongheung Island, the struggle to preserve the global climate and address local environmental justice will be lost, one coal plant at a time.

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APPENDIX I

THE PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

Principles of Environmental Justice23

Delegates to the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit held on October 24-27, 1991, in Washington DC, drafted and adopted 17 principles of Environmental Justice. Since then, The Principles have served as a defining document for the growing grassroots movement for environmental justice.

Preamble

WE, THE PEOPLE OF COLOR, gathered together at this multinational People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, to begin to build a national and international movement of all peoples of color to fight the destruction and taking of our lands and communities, do hereby re-establish our spiritual interdependence to the sacredness of our Mother Earth; to respect and celebrate each of our cultures, languages and beliefs about the natural world and our roles in healing ourselves; to insure environmental justice; to promote economic alternatives which would contribute to the development of environmentally safe livelihoods; and, to secure our political, economic and cultural liberation that has been denied for over 500 years of colonization and oppression, resulting in the poisoning of our communities and land and the genocide of our peoples, do affirm and adopt these Principles of Environmental Justice:

1) Environmental Justice affirms the sacredness of Mother Earth, ecological unity and the interdependence of all species, and the right to be free from ecological destruction.

2) Environmental Justice demands that public policy be based on mutual respect and justice for all peoples, free from any form of discrimination or bias.

3) Environmental Justice mandates the right to ethical, balanced and responsible uses of land and renewable resources in the interest of a sustainable planet for humans and other living things.

23 http://www.ejnet.org/ej/principles.html

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4) Environmental Justice calls for universal protection from nuclear testing, extraction, production and disposal of toxic/hazardous wastes and poisons and nuclear testing that threaten the fundamental right to clean air, land, water, and food.

5) Environmental Justice affirms the fundamental right to political, economic, cultural and environmental self-determination of all peoples.

6) Environmental Justice demands the cessation of the production of all toxins, hazardous wastes, and radioactive materials, and that all past and current producers be held strictly accountable to the people for detoxification and the containment at the point of production.

7) Environmental Justice demands the right to participate as equal partners at every level of decision-making, including needs assessment, planning, implementation, enforcement and evaluation.

8) Environmental Justice affirms the right of all workers to a safe and healthy work environment without being forced to choose between an unsafe livelihood and unemployment. It also affirms the right of those who work at home to be free from environmental hazards.

9) Environmental Justice protects the right of victims of environmental injustice to receive full compensation and reparations for damages as well as quality health care.

10) Environmental Justice considers governmental acts of environmental injustice a violation of international law, the Universal Declaration On Human Rights, and the United Nations Convention on Genocide.

11) Environmental Justice must recognize a special legal and natural relationship of Native Peoples to the U.S. government through treaties, agreements, compacts, and covenants affirming sovereignty and self-determination.

12) Environmental Justice affirms the need for urban and rural ecological policies to clean up and rebuild our cities and rural areas in balance with nature, honoring the cultural integrity of all our communities, and provided fair access for all to the full range of resources.

13) Environmental Justice calls for the strict enforcement of principles of informed consent, and a halt to the testing of experimental reproductive and medical procedures and vaccinations on people of color.

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14) Environmental Justice opposes the destructive operations of multi-national corporations.

15) Environmental Justice opposes military occupation, repression and exploitation of lands, peoples and cultures, and other life forms.

16) Environmental Justice calls for the education of present and future generations which emphasizes social and environmental issues, based on our experience and an appreciation of our diverse cultural perspectives.

17) Environmental Justice requires that we, as individuals, make personal and consumer choices to consume as little of Mother Earth's resources and to produce as little waste as possible; and make the conscious decision to challenge and reprioritize our lifestyles to insure the health of the natural world for present and future generations.

The Proceedings to the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit are available from the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, 475 Riverside Dr. Suite 1950, New York, NY 10115.

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APPENDIX II

PROGRESS REPORT OF THE COAL PLANT CONSTRUCTION

1. Coal Plant Side

1990 Mar 7: Preliminary investigation of the Yeongheung Coal Plant (March - December) 1991 Jan 29: Detailed investigation of the site Feb 4: Establishment of reclamation master plan for public surface of the seawater Apr 3: Amendment of land use plan for prearranged site of development Jun 1: Commencement of environmental impact assessment (EIS) Jun 28: First business presentation for the coal plant (for local residents) Jul 27: Second business presentation for the coal plant (for local governors and government official) 1992 Sep 8: Amendment promulgation of land use plan Oct: Consultation of EIS with a minister of Environment 1993 Dec: Submission of complementary report of EIS 1994 Mar: Confirmation of the construction master plan 1995 May 18: Completion of consultation for EIS with the Ministry of Environment 1997 Mar 15: Contract of environmental agreement with Incheon City Mar 19: Authorization of reclamation master plan for public surface of the seawater for the unit 1 and unit 2

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2. Environmental Groups and Local Residents Side

1996 Feb 9: Demonstration of opposition by local residents (in Yeongheung) Feb 14: Public meeting by Incheon City Assembly Feb 23: Petition of reconsideration for the construction of the coal plant to the Ministry of Construction and Transportation Feb 23: An informal gathering for discussion with civil society groups Mar 7: A street demonstration of local residents (in Incheon City) May 19: A political rally (in Yeongheung) Apr 8: A political rally (in Kwacheon City and in Incheon City) May 10: An open forum to obstruct the construction of the plant (Three local residents were arrested) Jun 5: First sit-down strike began Jul 23: A street demonstration of the urgent committee (in Incheon City) Aug 2: A street demonstration (in Incheon City) Aug 6: Revocation of a sit-down strike Aug 9: An executive officer was arrested Sep 5: The bill for the problem the coal plant was on the table as in Incheon city government A street demonstration by local residents (in front of Incheon City Hall) Oct 14: Veto on the local residents’ petition against the coal plant construction Oct 17: Urgent committee’s first meeting and resubmission of the petition Oct 22: Assembly of local residents Oct 23: Demonstration (in Yeongheung), Speakers from environmental groups Oct 24: Urgent committee’s second meeting Oct 26: Demonstration (in Incheon City) Oct 29: Construction of active urgent committee Nov 8: A talk with Mayor of Incheon City, Submission of revised petition Nov 9: A street demonstration of the committee members (in front of Incheon City Hall) Nov 22: A panel discussion by Incheon Civil Society Union about the problems of EIS Nov 26: Commencement of street signature-collecting campaign Dec 7: A street demonstration of the committee members (in Incheon City) Dec 17: A demonstration by Incheon Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM) and local residents

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1997 Feb 28: A protest visit (200 people) to the headquarter of Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) Mar 9: First balloon-flying (600 balloons) event in order to measure the impact of air pollution spread (11 postcards inside the balloons were returned from different regions) Mar 19: A protest visit to Mayor of Incheon City to argue about the authorization of reclamation master plan for public surface of the seawater for the unit 1 and unit 2 Mar 29: A street demonstration (100 people) for withdrawal of reclamation master plan for public surface of the seawater for the unit 1 and unit 2 Apr 3: Second sit-down strike began, Second balloon-flying event Apr 9: Third balloon-flying event (300 people, 400 balloons) (18 postcards were returned from different regions) May 14: Six committee members (environmentalists and local residents) were arrested May 15: Commitment of riot police (600) unit to the island and physical suppression with tear bombs (tens of local residents were injured) May 16: A protest visit to the police office (all of 25 people were arrested) May 17: Local residents’ sit-down strike began May 19: Urgent conference, a local resident were arrested May 20: Five local residents and three environmentalists were arrested May 24: A rally denouncing the coal plant construction and the treacherous act by public power May 27: Physical conflict between local residents and the construction staffs May31: Street signature-collecting campaign Jun 10: Inauguration of Incheon Citizen Opponent Committee against the coal plant Jun 18: Court decisions began for arrested local people and environmentalists (Most of local residents were a stay of execution, but some leaders and environmentalists were sentenced to imprisonment) July 11: Local residents’ suit for the fishery damage and for menace to the rights to live by the construction of the plant Jul 16: Two committee representatives were sentenced to three year-imprisonment Jul 22, 24: Three leaders of the committee were sentenced to imprisonment Jul 31: A civil discussion to argue for the problem of KEPCO’s energy projects and solutions Aug 7: Street signature-collecting campaign in front of the Yeongheung Harbor Aug 14: Street signature-collecting campaign in Incheon City Aug 30: Grand street signature-collecting campaign in Incheon City (7000 signed) Sep 5: Two representatives of the committee were released

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Sep 27: Grand street signature-collecting campaign in Incheon City (5000 signed) Oct 2: Nov 15: Street signature-collecting campaigns

1998 Jan 16: A demonstration (200 people) (in front of KEPCO) Feb 12: An officious talk with a member of parliament and with a vice-magistrate of Ongjin County Feb 15: Hunger strike of the committee Feb 24: TV broadcasting of illegal reclamation of public surface of the seawater Mar 5: The petition submission to local government’s policy makers, civil affair center, and the president (Daejoong Kim) Mar 11: 300 days of strike Mar 28: Rally to oppose the construction of the plant (40 local residents and 300 college students) May 7: A forum for the dissolution of monopolistic KEPCO (in the National Assembly) July 20: A petition for the pardon for environmentalists and the representatives of the committee Aug 8~ Sep 30: Most environmentalists and representatives were released as a stay of execution Oct 14: A Government party’s decision not to constitute the subcommittee for the plant issue and transfer to KEPCO for the establishment of the subcommittee Oct 29: KEPCO tried to constitute the subcommittee with local residents’ representatives and Incheon City’s relevant authorities

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APPENDIX III

OPEN-ENDED IN-DEPTH INTERVIES

WITH ENVIRONMENTALISTS (ENGLISH)

1. Personal Information (1) Name and gender (2) Experience as an environmentalist (3) Field of environmental debates 2. General Issue of environment (1) General work as an environmentalist (2) Current issues of environmental groups 3. Environmental Issues of Coal Plant (1) Development of issue for coal plant (2) Involvement of the issue (3) Environmental pollution of coal plant (4) Energy issue (5) Climate change issue 4. Economic Issue of Coal Plant (1) Benefits and costs of coal plant (2) Changes of economic situation of the region (Employment, Financial support of education, fishery in Korea, job opportunity) (3) Capitalism and coal plant 5. Political Issues (1) Policy making of coal plant (2) Cooperation between government and companies (3) Legal/illegal change of law and policy of coal plant (4) Change of public consensus 6. Environmental Justice Issue of Coal Plant (1) Contact with local people and local communities (2) Participation of local people in environmental movement (3) Participation of local people in policy making process (4) Site selection, location and operation

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(5) Benefits and burdens of local people of coal plant’ 7. Further Discussion (1) Expected situation of coal plant (2) Future direction of environmental movement (3) Alternative of coal plant

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APPENDIX IV

INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

FOR LOCAL PEOPLE (ENGLISH)

I am doctoral student in geography at Florida State University. I am studying the environmental justice of the coal plant as my dissertation. This questionnaire is to examine how the local people think about the construction of the coal plant in your region. Please answer the following questions. All of your answers will be absolutely confidential and will be used only for academic research

Personal Information

1. How old are you? ______2. What is your gender? (1) Male (2) Female 3. Are you married? (1) Yes (2) No 4. What do you do for a living? ______5. What is the highest level of education you completed? (1) High school (2) Undergraduate (3) Graduate 6. How long have you lived in this region? ______

Environmental Issues

7. Are you interested in the environmental issues of the coal plant? (1) Yes (2) No 8. Is your occupation affected by the coal plant? (1) Yes (2) No 8.1. If yes, how? ______

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9. Do you think the coal plant has an environmental impact? (1) Yes (2) No 9.1. If yes, what kind of environmental pollution do you think it has? (1) Air (2) Water (3) Both (4) Other ______10. Do you feel your health has gotten (will get) worse after the construction coal plant? (1) Yes (2) No 10.1. If yes, what kind of health problem do you have? ______11. Do you think if there would be any other alternatives other than the coal plant? (1) Yes (2) No 11.1. If yes, what kind of choice can you suggest? ______12. Is there any change in the amount of fishery (In Korean Case) (1) Increase (2) Decrease (3) No changes

Economic Issues

13. Has your income changed after the construction of the coal plant? (1) Increase (2) Decrease (3) No changes 14. Do you think there has been an effect on the employment since the coal plant was built in your community? (1) Yes (2) No 15. Do your children receive any financial aid from the companies of coal plant? (1) Yes (2) No 16. Have there been any changes to your occupation? (1) Yes (2) No 16.1. If yes, how was it changed? ______

Political Issues

17. Are you interested in the law and policy of energy and the coal plant? (1) Yes (2) No 18. Do you think the national government is more interested in the construction of the coal plant rather than the environmental problem of the coal plant? (1) Yes (2) No 20.1. If yes, in what respect? ______19. Do you think your local government is more interested in the construction of the coal

163

plant than the environmental problems of the coal plant? 21.1. If yes, in what respect? ______20. Do you think that your neighbors will agree to the construction of coal plant? (1) Yes (2) No 21.2. If yes, why? ______

Environmental Justice Issues

21. Do you think you really want to participate in the process of policy making? (1) Yes (2) No 22. Have you ever met any environmentalist who works against the coal plant? (1) Yes (2) No 23. Have you ever heard anything about the detailed construction of the coal plant from the developers? (1) Yes (2) No 24. Have you ever heard anything about the detailed construction of the coal plant from the local government? 25. Do you think you are involved in the environmental issues of the coal plant? (1) Yes (2) No 26. Do you really want to be involved in the environmental movement against the coal plant? (1) Yes (2) No 27. Do you think the site of the coal plant is unequal to you and your community? (1) Yes (2) No 28.1. If yes, in what respect? ______28. What kind of benefits do you think you receive from the coal plant? ______29. What kind of costs do you think you have from the coal plant? ______

Further Discussion

30. Ultimately, do you think the coal plant is helpful you and your community? (1) Yes (2) No 30.1. If yes, in what respect? ______30.2. If not, in what respect? ______

164

31. Do you think that environmental movement against the coal plant is valid? (1) Yes (2) No 32. If you have any comments for or about the coal plant, please let me know what they are if any ______

Thanks for your responses. They will be very helpful for my study and again it will be fully credential and confidential

165

APPENDIX V

OPEN-ENDED IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

WITH ENVIRONMENTALISTS (KOREAN)

1. 개인정보 (1) 름과 성별 (2) 환경주의로서의 경험 (3) 관련 환경 분야 2. 환경과 관련한 일반인 쟁 (1) 환경주의로서의 일반인 무 (2) 환경단체의 최근 논쟁 및 사례 3. 흥력전소의 환경분야 쟁 (1) 력전소 논쟁의 시과 전개 (2) 논쟁에 참정도와 참방법 (3) 력전소의 환경오염문제 (4) 에너 쟁 (5) 기후변 쟁 4. 흥력전소의 경제분야 쟁 (1) 력전소의 비용편측면의 쟁 (2) 주변의 경제상황의 변 (고용창출, 교에 대한 재정원, 고용기회, 한사례의 경우 어) (3) 본주의와 력전소 5. 흥력전소의 정치분야 쟁 (1) 력전소의 정책결정과정 (2) 정부와 회사간의 착관계 (3) 력전소 건설을 위한 법 및 정책의 변양상 (4) 력전소에 대한 주민 론의 변 및 양상 6. 흥력전소의 환경정의분야 쟁 (1) 주민 및 공동체와의 교류정도 (2) 환경운동에 대한 주민의 참정도 (3) 정책결정과정에 대한 주민의 참정도 (4) 부 설정, , 운과 관련한 사항

166

(5) 력전소에 대한 주민들의 과 피해사례 7. 앞으로의 쟁 (1) 력전소 쟁의 예상되는 전개상황 (2) 환경운동의 방향 (3) 력전의 대안

167

APPENDIX VI

INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

FOR LOCAL PEOPLE (KOREAN)

는 플로리다 주립대교에서 리을 전공는 사과정의 생니다. 는 사논문으로 력전의 환경정의에 대해서 공부고 있습니다. 설문는 주민의 신의 에 건설되고 또 운되는 력전소에 대한 견해를 물어보기 위한 것니다. 다음 질문에 답해주시기 랍니다. 설문은 전으로 명성 보장되며, 문인 연의 목으로만 사용될 것니다.

< 개인 정보> 1. 당신의 연는 어떻게 되니까? ______2. 당신의 성별을 어떻게 되니까? (1) 남 (2) 3. 당신은 기혼니까? (1) 네 (2) 아니오 4. 당신의 은 무니까? ______5. 당신의 력은 어떻게 되니까? (1) 고졸 (2) 대졸 (3) 대원졸 상 6. 에 얼마나 오랫동안 살고 계니까? ______

< 환경분야 쟁 > 7. 력전소의 환경문제에 관 있습니까? (1) 네 (2) 아니오 8. 력전소 당신의 에 변를 주습니까? (1) 네 (2) 아니오 8.1. 네 라고 답신 경우, 어떤 변 있습니까? ______9. 력전소과 환경에 향을 미친다고 생니까? (1) 네 (2) 아니오 9.1. 네 라고 답신 경우, 어떤 환경오염문제 있다고 생니까?

168

(1) 대기 (2) 수질 (3) 둘다 (4) 기타 ______10. 력전소의 건설 및 운후 당신의 건강에 변 생기셨습니까? (1) 네 (2) 아니오 10.1. 네 라고 답신 경우, 어떤 건강문제 생기셨습니까? ______11. 력전소 외에 다른 대안에 대해 생해 보셨습니까? (1) 네 (2) 아니오 11.1. 네라고 답신 경우, 어떤 대안을 생니까? ______12. 어과 어생산량에 변를 경험셨습니까? (1) 증 (2) 감소 (3) 변동음 < 경제분야 쟁 > 13. 력전소 건설후 당신의 소에 변 있으니까? (1) 네 (2) 아니오 14. 력전소 건설후 당신의 공동체에 고용효과 있다고 생니까? (1) 네 (2) 아니오 15. 력전소 건설회사 및 로부터의 녀교에 대한 재정 원을 으니까? (1) 네 (2) 아니오 16. 력전소 건설 후 당신의 뀌셨습니까? (1) 네 (2) 아니오 15.1 네 라고 답신 경우, 어떻게 뀌셨습니까? ______

< 정치분야 쟁 > 17. 력전소와 에너정책관련법에 관 있으니까? (1) 네 (2) 아니오 18. 정부 환경문제보다 력전소 건설에 더 치중신다고 생니까? (1) 네 (2) 아니오 18.1. 네 라고 답신 경우, 어떤 관에서 렇습니까? ______19. 방정부 환경문제보다 력전소 건설에 더 치중신다고 생니까? (1) 네 (2) 아니오 19.1. 네 라고 답신 경우, 어떤 관에서 렇습니까? ______20. 당신의 웃들 력전소의 건설에 찬성고 동의한다고 생니까? (1) 네 (2) 아니오 20.1. 네 라고 답신 경우, 왜 렇다고 생니까? ______

< 환경정의분야 쟁 > 21. 당신의 에너 및 력전 정책 결정과정에 으로 참시길 원니까?

169

(1) 네 (2) 아니오 22. 력전소 건설을 반대는 환경주의들을 만나본 있으니까? (1) 네 (2) 아니오 23. 력전소 개로부터 건설에 대한 정한 정보나 설명을 해보신 있으니까?’ (1) 네 (2) 아니오 24. 방정부로부터 력전소 건설에 대한 정한 정보나 설명을 해보신 있으니까? (1) 네 (2) 아니오 25. 력전소의 환경논쟁에 실질으로 참고 있다고 생니까? (1) 네 (2) 아니오 26. 력전소를 반대는 환경운동에 으로 참시기를 원니까? (1) 네 (2) 아니오 27. 력전소의 부선정과 건설 당신과 당신의 공동체에게 부당고 불공평다고 생니까? (1) 네 (2) 아니오 28. 력전소의 건설과 운으로부터 어떤 종류의 생습니까? ______29. 력전소의 건설과 운으로부터 어떤 종류의 피해 생습니까? ______

< 앞으로의 쟁 > 30. 궁으로 력전소 당신과 당신의 공동체에 도움 되다고 생니까? (1) 네 (2) 아니오 30.1. 네 라고 답신 경우, 어떤 측면니까? ______30.2. 아니오 라고 답신 경우, 어떤 측면니까? ______31. 력전소의 건설과 운을 반대는 환경운동 타당다고 생니까? (1) 네 (2) 아니오 32. 력전소와 관련 신의 견해 있으시다면, 편게 말씀 주시요. ______

당신의 친절한 답변에 감사합니다. 답변들은 희 연에 매우 큰 도움 되며, 다시 한번 설문은 명성 보장되며 문인 연 외에 다른 어떤 용도로도 사용되 않을 것을 말씀립니다.

170

APPENDIX VII

CONSENT FORM FOR ENVIRONMENTALISTS (ENGLISH)

171

Study Costs/Compensation There is no cost and compensation of .study participation. Confidentiality The records ofthis study will be. kept private. and confidential. to the exte-Ut allowed by law. In any P.ublications or presentations. we will not include any infonuation that will make it pos.s1ble to identify you as a subject. In addition. the data of interview will be saved only in my personal computer and I will use my own password to open the. file which includes your personal interviews and I will keep those data until my dis.senatiou is defended. Voluntary :'!ature of the Study ...... ｐ｡ｲｴｊ｣ｬｰｾｵｯｮｭ＠ th1s study 1s voluntary. Your ､ｾＮ｣ｬｓｴｯｮＮｷｨ･ｩｬｩ･ｲ＠ C!T ｮｯｾ＠ to parllctpate ｾｴｨｩｳ＠ study ｾｶＱｬｬ＠ not affect your CtlJ!ent or future re:latloD? w1th the ｕｾｵｶ･ｲＮｳｴｴｹＮ＠ｉｦｹｾｵ＠､･ｾｊ､･＠ to paniclpate-. you are free to wtthd.raw at any ume. without affectmg those relat10uships. Contacts and Que--stions The researchers conducting tbh study are Hosuk Lee. You may ask any questions you have now, or if you have qUestions liner, you are encouraged to c.ontact me at 850.656- 9579. In addition you can contact Dan Klooster (Florida State. University, Department of Geography), my faculty advisor with 850-644-8382 Ifyo u have any questions or c.oncerus regarding the. study and would like to talk to someone. other tlia.n the researcher(s), you are encouraged to contact the FSU IRB at telephone ｮｵｭｾｲ＠ 850-644-8673. You may also contact this office by email at [email protected], or by miting or in person at2010 Levy Stree.t, Research Building B, SUite 276, FSU Human SUbjects CoJDJDittee, Tallaha;;ee, FL 32306-2742 - You will be given a copy of thh form for your re.cords. Statement of Consent I have. read the above infonnation I have asked questions and have received answers. I consent to panicipate in this srudy.

Date

SJguanu-e of Iiivesugator Date.

FSU Htnnan Subject• Committee approved 4/9/2008. Void after 4/8/2009. HSC#2007.798.

172

APPENDIX VIII

CONSENT FROM FOR LOCAL PEOPLE (ENGLISH)

173

174

APPENDIX VIIII

CONSENT FORM FOR ENVIRONMENTALISTS (KOREAN)

175

176

177

APPENDIX X

CONSENTFORM FOR LOCAL PEOPLE (KOREAN)

178

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179

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WEBSITE REFERENCES http://www.kosep.co.kr/eng/introduction/plants_02.jsp (9/2/2007) (Website of Korea South-East Power Co.) http://www.ejnet.org/ej/principles.html (9/5/2007) (Principle of Environmental Justice) http://www.me.go.kr (9/7/2007) (Website of the Korea Ministry of Environment) http://eng.eco.or.kr/ (9/2/2007) (Website of Korea Citizens’ Movement for Environmental Justice) http://www.census.go.kr/ (9/10/2007) (Website of Korea Population and Housing Census) http://www.cwd.go.kr (5/1/2008) (Website of the Office of President in Korea, Cheong Wa Dae) http://www.wto.org (5/1/2008) (Website of World Trade Organization) http://www.hdr.undp.org (5/2/2008) (Website of United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports) http://www.e-park.co.kr (5/20/2008) (Website of Energy Park, operated by KOSEP in Yeongheung Island) http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/area/250711.html (6/1/2008) (Website of Hankyoreh Newspaper in Korea, Incheon City’s Opposition to the Additional Construction of the Coal Plant in Yeongheung Island) http://news.itimes.co.kr (6/1/2008) (Website of Newspaper Incheon Times) http://www.stopthecoalplant.org/ (6/5/2008) (Website of SEED Coalition against Coal Plant, ‘Stop the Coal Plant’) http://www.iea.org (4/5/2008) (Website of International Energy Agency) http://www.energyliteracy.org/compare-coal-power.html (6/1/2008) (Website of Energy Literacy Advocates) http://www.energy.ca.gov/oil/statistics/ans_crude_prices.html (6/7/2008) (Website of California Energy Commission) http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-syr.htm (3/10/2009) (Website of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Hosuk Lee

EDUCATION Ph.D.in Geography, Florida State University, Department of Geography, College of Social Science, Tallahassee, Florida; successfully passed the defense, July 13, 2009 GPA: 3.77/4.00 Dissertation title: The Political ecology of Environmental Justice: Environmental Struggle and injustice in the Yeongheung Island Coal Plant Controversy M.A. in Geography, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, Department of Geography and Urban Planning, Indiana, Pennsylvania; Graduated, May 2, 2003 GPA: 3.53/4.00 M.A. Coursework in geography, Kyunghee University Department of Geography Seoul, Korea; Completed (of a Masters course), August 31, 2001 GPA: 4.44/4.50 B.S. in Geography, Kyunghee University, Department of Geography, Seoul, Korea; Graduated, August 31, 1998 GPA: 3.60/4.50

RESEARCH INTEREST Political ecology Human-Environment Relations Social and Environmental justice Sustainability Economic geography Environmental study Asian study Globalization

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CONFERENCE PAPERS Hosuk Lee. Political Ecology of Environmental Justice: With a Case Study of Coal Plant in South Korea. Presented at the annual meeting of the Association of American Geographers, Las Vegas, NV, 2009

TEACHING EXPERIENCE GEA 1000 World Regional Geography, Lead instructor, Spring 2008 ~ Summer 2008 GEO 4930 East and South East Asia, Lead Instructor, Summer 2009 GEO 4930 (5934) East and South East Asia, Lead Instructor, Fall 2009 and Spring 2010 GEO 4930 (5934) Globalization, Lead Instructor, Fall 2009 GEO 4930 (5934) Economic Geography, Lead Instructor, Spring 2010

INVITED PRESENTATION & LECTURES “Justice Issues in Sustainable Development” presented in Sustainable Development Class (GEO 5908) Fall 2006. “Political Geography of Territorial Conflict: Research Trends and Dokdo Study” presented in Workshop for Dokdo Study by Northeast Asian History Foundation in Korea, Washington D.C, June 25, 2009

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE August 2009 ~ Present Visiting Lecturer, Department of Geography, Florida State University August 2009 ~ Present Graduate Program Coordinator, Department of Geography Florida State University December 2006 ~ Present Web Master, Department of Geography (http://www.coss.fsu.edu/geography), Florida State University December 2007 ~ August 2009 Lead Instructor and Teaching/Research Assistant, Department of Geography, Florida State University October 2006 ~ December 2006 GIS Laboratory Assistant, College of Social Sciences, Florida State University

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January 2006 ~ December 2006 Counselor and Advisor (Volunteer), Florida Association for Community Action April 2004 ~ August 2004 Invited Researcher at Korea Maritime Institute (http://www.kmi.re.kr) in South Korea Research Projects participated: (1) Analysis of Coastal Area in South Korea (2004) (2) Sustainable Estuarine Management Planning (2004) August 2001 ~ May 2003 Graduate Teaching Assistant, Department of Geography and Regional Planning, Indiana University of Pennsylvania

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIP Association of American Geographers (AAG), 2002 ~ Present The Korean Geographical Society, 1998~2000, 2008~ Present

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