Myanmar Policy Briefing Nr 15 July 2015

Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue: Consequences of the Kokang Crisis for Peace and Democracy in Myanmar

The renewed violence in the Kokang region after Pheung’s MNDAA had refused to of the northern Shan state in February 2015 accept the demand of the previous military has had serious repercussions for efforts to government to transform into a Border solve ethnic conflict in Burma/Myanmar1 and Guard Force (BGF).2 end the decades-old civil war. The fighting started when troops led by the veteran The outbreak of renewed conflict in the Kokang leader Pheung Kya-shin (Peng Kokang region has, in turn, clouded Jiasheng) resurfaced in the Kokang region the prospects of achieving a nationwide and attacked government and army positions ceasefire agreement (NCA) in Myanmar. after an interval of nearly six years. Pheung Battles broke out while negotiations were Kya-shin’s Myanmar National Democratic ongoing in Yangon. For while other ethnic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a former ceasefire armed organisations have called for peace group and government ally, was ousted talks and a halt to the renewed fighting, the from the Kokang region in 2009 by a rival quasi-civilian government under President Kokang leader with the help of the Tatmadaw Thein Sein has so far refused to address (national armed forces). This coup happened the Kokang crisis by political means. The

Recommendations The humanitarian consequences of the renewed fighting in northeast Myanmar The renewed violence in the Kokang region are profound. Since 2011, around 200,000 has serious repercussions for efforts to solve civilians have been displaced in the Kachin ethnic conflict in Myanmar and clouded and northern Shan states, many of whom the prospects for achieving a nationwide have fled towards the China border. Amidst ceasefire agreement. Fighting has spilled rising Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar, across the Yunnan province border and the Kokang conflict also raises the risk of strained relations with China, Myanmar’s anti-Chinese sentiment in the country. largest foreign investor. Failure to address the root causes of armed The return of conflict to the Kokang region conflict and to create an inclusive political follows an unaddressed pattern of increased process will have a detrimental impact on military operations and instability in the the prospects for peace, democracy and Kachin and northern Shan states since development. Military solutions to ethnic President Thein Sein assumed office in conflict must no longer be pursued, and an 2011. It is vital that peace is achieved and all inclusive political dialogue should start as nationality peoples, including the Kachin, soon as possible. Peace in Myanmar needs Kokang, Shan and Ta-ang, are included to move from arguments about process to in nationwide ceasefire talks and political agreements about delivery. It is time to end dialogue. Conflict in any part of the country military confrontation and to start political can quickly lead to national instability. dialogue.

Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue 1 Tatmadaw has responded with a large to be the Tatmadaw’s default strategy in military offensive, supported by air strikes, Myanmar’s resource-rich northeast. in an all-out effort to drive out the MNDAA from the Kokang region. Although the As a result, some 200,000 civilians have MNDAA declared a unilateral ceasefire now been displaced from their homes in in June, the conflict continues and the the China borderlands during the four MNDAA is still holding ground, with the years since President Thein Sein assumed Tatmadaw making rare public admissions of office.8 At a time of much-hoped for reform taking casualties.3 in the country, such suffering is furthering mistrust about the government’s intentions Fighting has also spilled across the border and its willingness to settle Myanmar’s long- into China, killing five Chinese citizens in standing ethnic challenges through political a mis-targeted airstrike by the Myanmar negotiations rather than battle-field means. air force. Such loss of life has put a severe A blame game is now underway as to who is strain on relations with China, Myanmar’s responsible for the latest spread in fighting. largest foreign investor, which has stepped But as another general election approaches up security, calling on the government later this year, it is vital to recognize that the of President Thein Sein to solve the crisis present conflict in the Kokang region is not through negotiations.4 The Kokang are ethnic unique or new. Rather, it is symptomatic of Chinese and enjoy good relations with their the failed policies of the past and the need cross-border cousins. In response, the Thein to find inclusive political solutions in what Sein government has publicly apologized. remains one of the most militarized and But amidst rising Buddhist nationalism ethnically-divided countries in Asia. in Myanmar, there are concerns that government officials are seeking to capitalize In a speech in London in July 2013 President on anti-Chinese sentiment among the general Thein Sein promised to bring a just and population. The Tatmadaw has portrayed the sustainable peace in the country: “Very fighting as a defence against foreign intruders possibly, over the coming weeks, we will have and mercenaries in the protection of national a nationwide ceasefire and the guns will go soil,5 even though the Kokang are officially silent everywhere in Myanmar for the first recognized as one of Myanmar’s “135 national time in over sixty years.”9 As clashes continue races”.6 in northeast Myanmar, such words have a very hollow ring. It is time for all parties to The resumption of fighting has already had redouble efforts to halt the fighting and seek grave humanitarian consequences. Over genuine national peace together. The need 80,000 people have been displaced by the has long been urgent to end Myanmar’s cycle Kokang conflict, most of whom fled across of conflict by political dialogue that will the border to China. Equally serious, the address ethnic aspirations and grievances, renewed combat in the Kokang region has bringing equality, peace and justice to all caused fighting to escalate in adjoining peoples. Kachin, Shan and Ta-ang (Palaung) areas of the northern Shan state where other ethnic armed organisations are in conflict The Present Conflict with the central government. For reasons never properly explained by the Nay Pyi On 9 February MNDAA troops, after several Taw authorities, fighting has reignited months of preparation,10 re-surfaced in the across northeast Myanmar since President Kokang region with a claimed 1,000-strong Thein Sein assumed office in March 2011. force and attacked Tatmadaw bases and police In contrast to peace initiatives in other parts stations in and around the regional capital of the country,7 the Tatmadaw has broken Laukkai. Pheung Kya-shin’s son, Pheung old and violated new ceasefires in both the Daxun (Peng Deren) is leading the MNDAA’s Kachin and northern Shan states. Military military operations. Since its ousting from security rather than political dialogue appears the Kokang region in 2009, Pheung Daxun

2 Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue has been in charge of regrouping and border airstrike, prompting Beijing to warn of reorganising the MNDAA, ostensibly with retaliation. support from other organisations.11 Taken by surprise, the Tatmadaw sent in Despite overwhelming military advantage, a large number of reinforcements to the Tatmadaw progress has continued to be slow. northern Shan state and launched airstrikes During May, fierce fighting was still reported by helicopters and fighter jets against to be taking place some 40 kilometres MNDAA positions. Unlike in 2009, however, north of Laukkai,19 while a month later the when MNDAA forces were defeated within government declared that it had gained a few days, protracted fighting has continued control of Laukkai and the surrounding area. across the Kokang region ever since. Since this time, fighting has moved into the mountains in the northern Kokang region A week after the fighting erupted, state media and, although the MNDAA announced reported that “sporadic fighting continued a unilateral ceasefire on 11 June after all day long” in Laukkai.12 On 17 February, coming under Chinese pressure, Tatmadaw President Thein Sein declared a state of commanders still appear to be striving for emergency and martial law in the Kokang military solutions. At the present time, attacks region, thereby ceding all administrative on MNDAA positions are still continuing.20 and judicial powers to the Tatmadaw for the first time in any part of the country since The renewed fighting has also escalated the 2008 constitution had been introduced.13 broader ethnic conflict across the northern Nevertheless in early March the state media Shan state, hindering the Tatmadaw’s advance acknowledged that “fierce fighting” was still in the rugged terrain. In its initial attack, taking place in the Kokang region,14 and, the MNDAA was supported by the Ta-ang in an unusual admission, reported that the National Liberation Army (TNLA: Palaung Tatmadaw had suffered 73 fatal casualties State Liberation Front) and the Arakan Army and 189 wounded, claiming that 86 MNDAA (AA) which agreed to join the operation.21 soldiers had also died.15 A few days later, In a joint statement released in early March, the Chinese state media reported that the three organisations stated: “Using “unconfirmed compiled statistics show that, fighter planes, tanks and armored cars, as of now, the government side suffered 100 Myanmar Tatmadaw (Army) has launched deaths with 246 wounded, while 104 bodies offensives against our ethnic armed resistance were seized from the MNDAA with 30 being organisations in Kokang, Ta’ang etc. arrested.”16 regions, which are regions of the indigenous nationalities in Northern Shan State, as if it As the fighting raged, the Myanmar state were against a foreign aggression.”22 Other media featured reports of President Thein ethnic armed organisations are also active Sein, Tatmadaw Commander-in-Chief in the surrounding territories, including Snr-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing and other high- the non-ceasefire Kachin Independence ranking government members visiting Organisation (KIO), ceasefire Shan State injured soldiers in hospitals. In a carefully- Army-North/Shan State Progress Party orchestrated public relations campaign, (SSA/SSPP) and ceasefire United Wa State a foreign threat to national sovereignty Army (UWSA). While the degree of military was implied, gaining the Tatmadaw some cooperation between the different forces rare public support for military operations is disputed, leaders of all these nationality among Myanmar’s majority Burman (Bamar) groups presently have close relations. Indeed population.17 For Kokang inhabitants, there government officials accused several of these was further resonance: as a special operations organisations of supporting the MNDAA in commander, Min Aung Hlaing had led the its revival, even though they are currently 2009 operation that had ousted the MNDAA involved in joint negotiations with the from regional control.18 The patriotic tone, Thein Sein government for the agreement however, was generally lowered after five of a nationwide ceasefire (see “Towards a Chinese civilians were killed in a cross- Nationwide Ceasefire?” below).

Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue 3 The spread of fighting in the Kokang were still displaced from their homes. Until region has also displaced a large number of a real peace is achieved, social and political people, inflicting humanitarian suffering disruption appears set to continue across the and causing a further deterioration in northern Shan state. community relations with the government. According to UNOCHA, over 13,000 people initially fled from the Kokang region to the Background town of Lashio in the northern Shan state, most of whom were migrant workers from The Kokang region is a mountainous and other parts of Myanmar who could return isolated area, located in the northeast Shan to their places of origin.23 However, the state, between the Salween river and the majority of people affected by the conflict China border. In 2003, the local population fled to neighbouring China, an estimated was estimated by the UNODC at just 70,000 people in total, including Chinese over 100,000 people,30 and in 2008 it was nationals residing in the Kokang region delineated under Myanmar’s new constitution for work or business. Since this time, the as the Kokang “Self-Administered Zone” Chinese government has been providing (SAZ). Historically, the region has had assistance to them but, to date, has prevented strong social and economic connections with access to international non-governmental neighbouring China. The main nationality organisations (NGOs). group, known as Kokang or Kokangese, are ethnic Chinese, the lingua franca is Chinese, Meanwhile, humanitarian access inside the the main currency is the Chinese Yuan, and Kokang region itself has been restricted. As there are many migrant workers from China. UNOCHA warned: “Limited information is While the Kokang Chinese make up the available on the humanitarian situation and majority population, there are also several on people displaced or affected by the fighting other nationality groups. Reflecting this in this area. The number of civilians killed or diversity, the MNDAA flag consists of seven injured due to the fighting is unconfirmed”.24 linked yellow rings against a red background, As hostilities have continued, there have representing the ethnic groups that inhabit been accusations of serious human rights the territory: Kokang, Shan, Ta-ang, Lahu, violations by both sides, including allegations Lisu, Wa and Hmong.31 of extrajudicial killings and the use of torture by the Tatmadaw25 and unconfirmed reports Earlier history is sketchy, but the former about revenge killings in Laukkai by the ruling Yang family claims that its ancestors MNDAA.26 Humanitarian workers, too, have can be traced back to the final years of the been affected by the conflict. Two volunteers Ming dynasty, and were Chinese Ming of the Myanmar Red Cross Society (MRCS) loyalists fleeing the new Manchu dynasty in were wounded when a civilian convoy came the 17th century. After residing in Yunnan under fire, one of whom later died.27 The province for a few years, they subsequently Tatmadaw and MNDAA accused each other settled in the Kokang borderlands.32 Here of responsibility for the attack.28 A month the Yang family ruled over the local territory later, a second MRCS vehicle carrying in a similar fashion to the neighbouring civilians came under attack. This time, five hereditary chiefs (sawbwa) in the Shan people were wounded, including a Myanmar sub-states. During colonial rule, the Kokang journalist.29 territory was demarcated in British Burma and administered as part of the northern Eventually, by the end of June, international Shan state of Hsenwi. In 1947, just before NGOs were preparing to return to Laukkai Myanmar’s independence, the Kokang sub- to try and resume existing programmes and state became the 34th principality of the provide support to the return of those who Federated Shan States. Its leaders agreed to had fled the conflict. But the Kokang region become part of the Union of Burma as long remained under martial law, sporadic fighting as “internal autonomy” is respected.33 “There was continuing, and many local inhabitants should be no external interference in our

4 Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue internal affairs,” Yang Cheje told the Frontier state during the Ne Win era. Under attack Areas Committee of Enquiry.34 from all sides, the Tatmadaw supported the creation of a large number of local militias After independence, the Kokang region as a key element in its counter-insurgency escaped most of the political and ethnic strategy. First launched in the 1960s under violence that spread across the country. the name ‘Ka Kwe Ye’ (KKY) in the Shan Armed struggle, however, began in earnest state, the main function of these militias after the 1962 military coup by Gen. Ne was to counter the threat posed by armed Win who sought to impose the “Burmese opposition groups. The militia programme Way to Socialism” on the country. The has since gone through several incarnations political landscape has remained highly and still exists today in many parts of the militarized ever since. In 1964 a short-lived country, where Tatmadaw-backed groups are Kokang Resistance Force merged into the known as ‘Pyithu Sit’ (People’s Militia) or, in present-day Shan State Army. Then in 1968, some cases, Border Guard Forces (BGFs). But following anti-Chinese violence in Yangon, in the Shan state the KKY programme was the insurgent Communist Party of Burma eventually abandoned in 1973, as most forces (CPB) opened a major new front by invading appeared more preoccupied with trading the northern Shan State with backing from opium rather than fighting on behalf of the communist China. With a decade of full- Tatmadaw. scale support, the CPB quickly expanded its control over most territory along the In the Kokang region, there was to be a China border in the Shan state, including the historically important fall-out from the Kokang, Wa and Mongla regions, as well as KKY debacle. The Kokang KKY was led a small area around Kambaiti in the Kachin by an influential local figure, Lo Hsing- state. han, who refused to give up arms and went underground, later resurfacing at the Thai In making these advances, the CPB, which border where he became known as the ‘King was led by ethnic Burmans, was supported of Opium’. Subsequently, Lo Hsing-han by a number of local nationality leaders, was arrested by the Thai authorities and including Pheung Kya-shin, an ex-officer in extradited to Myanmar, where he received a the local Kokang militia of the ruling Yang death sentence for his role in the Shan state family. In the following years, Pheung Kya- resistance.36 Later released under amnesty, Lo shin became an important field commander Hsing-han met together with Pheung Kya- in the CPB’s People’s Army. Like most shin in the late 1980s in an unexpected turn minority leaders, however, he was never in history that not only precipitated the CPB’s admitted to the party’s ruling Politburo, and demise but also transformed the political the CPB never won popular support in the landscape of the country. borderlands. Ethnic resistance continued and, although the People’s Army was able Following the 1988 democracy uprising that to build up extensive strongholds along brought down Ne Win’s military socialist the China border, the party failed to gain government, it was little secret that many new footholds in central Myanmar. By the inhabitants in the China borderlands were mid-1980s, China’s communist leaders disillusioned with the CPB. The new military had ended military support to their sister government of the State Law and Order party and normalized formal government- Restoration Council (SLORC: later State to-government relations. This marked the Peace and Development Council [SPDC]) beginning of the end for the CPB.35 was also hard-pressed, and Lo Hsing- han, sensing opportunity, suggested that As the CPB faltered, the People’s Army and Tatmadaw officials allow him to try and win Tatmadaw were by no means the only armed away local nationality leaders from the CPB. actors in the local region. Shan, Kachin and According to a former Military Intelligence Ta-ang armed opposition groups also made (MI) officer, Pheung Kya-shin replied that rapid territorial gains in the northern Shan he needed time, but he later succeeded in

Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue 5 convincing local commanders in the Kokang, ex-CPB groups committed themselves to Wa, Mongla and Kambaiti regions to join him ending this practice in their territories. in separating from the CPB.37 The NDAA formally banned opium cultivation in the Mongla region in 1997, In April 1989, Pheung Kya-shin made his followed by the MNDAA in 2003 and the move, leading the first revolt that precipitated UWSA in 2005. However, although opium the downfall of the CPB as other nationality cultivation generally declined, the groups leaders followed suit along the China border. continued to be accused of the production In a significant change in Tatmadaw policy, of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), the SLORC leaders responded quickly, particularly methamphetamine, and the offering ceasefires to the breakaway groups, trafficking of heroin.39 who had formed four new nationality armies of their own: the MNDAA in the Kokang Against this shifting background, the region, the UWSA in territories around the reputation of Pheung Kya-shin and several former CPB headquarters at Panghsang, other ceasefire leaders remained controversial the National Democratic Alliance Army in the China borderlands. Unlike most (NDAA) in the Mongla region, and the ceasefire groups, the MNDAA, which New Democratic Army-Kachin in the maintained a 1,500-strong force, made few Kambaiti region in the Kachin state. From political demands for ethnic rights and this uncertain beginning, the new ceasefire democracy during the SLORC-SPDC era, and policy became a central strategy in the was mainly involved in economic activities.40 SLORC-SPDC era of government, eventually Two new Kokang parties did stand in the expanding to include 16 of the main ethnic 1990 and, later 2010, general elections, but armed forces in the country. In recognition they failed to make much impact. Their aim of the MNDAA’s leading role as the first was to represent Kokang interests in the ceasefire signatory, the Kokang region was broader Shan state region.41For their part, designated as “Special Region No.1” in the MNDAA representatives took part in the Shan state. Meanwhile, Lo Hsing-han went on government-organised National Convention to co-found the Asia World company which to draw up a new constitution, joining a has since become one of Myanmar’s largest four-party “people’s” bloc with the UWSA business conglomerates. and its ex-CPB allies. Together they proposed autonomous regions similar to those in China In the coming years, Pheung Kya-shin and and, on the surface, this was delivered with leaders of the former CPB forces developed the creation of the new Kokang SAZ as one of close personal relationships with the SLORC- six “self-administered” territories, in addition SPDC authorities, especially Lt-Gen. Khin to the seven ethnic states, under the 2008 Nyunt, the Military Intelligence chief and constitution. But by then, relations between later prime minister. As the government the government, MNDAA and other ceasefire unfolded its “Border Areas Development groups in the Kachin and northern Shan Programme”, international NGOs and UN states had already begun to turn sour. agencies were invited to work in the Kokang region, and diplomats were flown in by This has led to puzzlement over the recourse helicopter to view development projects to violence in northeast Myanmar, the first and the impact of the ceasefire strategy. In ceasefire territories, and the motivations particular, the MNDAA was presented as of MNDAA and Tatmadaw officers in the a showcase for drug-control efforts in the Kokang region. For the most part, there has country, and various foreign visitors were been less sympathy over the years for the brought in, including participants to the MNDAA among the general population, Fourth International Heroin Conference as well as other nationality parties, because in Yangon in 1999.38 Historically, the of its activities close to the government in Kokang, Wa and Mongla regions were the post-1988 history. Instead, suspicion has main opium-cultivating areas in Myanmar, lingered that Pheung Kya-shin’s real aim has but a few years after their ceasefires the always been to control territory and lucrative

6 Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue business opportunities in the Kokang region, But relations swiftly deteriorated as the rather than to protect and promote the rights government, in an unannounced change in of the Kokang people.42 “When the MNDAA policy, sought to put pressures on opposition was still friendly with the Burma Army, groups in the Shan and Kachin state nobody liked them”, says a Shan political borderlands. In February 2005, the veteran analyst.43 For this reason, critics argue that head of the ceasefire SSA/SSPP, Hso Ten, was Pheung Kya-shin and his followers used the arrested together with a group of other Shan backdrop of nationwide ceasefire talks during leaders, and all were sentenced to long jail 2014-15 for the dramatic attempt to regain terms. Three months later units of the Shan control of the Kokang region. State National Army, an ally of the SSA/SSPP, were told to disarm, but their leader Sai Yi Sources close to the government, however, escaped to the Thai border with some of his admit that it is rather more personal and troops and merged with the non-ceasefire strategic than this. In particular, there Shan State Army-South/Restoration Council is bitterness among Pheung Kya-shin’s of Shan State (SSA/RCSS). Then in mid- supporters for the way the MNDAA has 2005, the ceasefire Palaung State Liberation been treated during the past decade, despite Organisation was also forced to surrender the leading role Pheung Kya-shin played in its arms.45 As the situation deteriorated, establishing the first ceasefires and opium Kachin, Shan, Ta-ang and the leaders of other bans in the Shan state. According to a former ceasefire groups complained that military MI officer: and economic issues they thought they had resolved with Khin Nyunt were being “I think Pheung Kya-shin is fighting overlooked, while their political views were back because he feels cheated. He started being ignored at the National Convention to the peace and convinced others to join draft a new constitution.46 him. After the MI was abolished, Pheung Kya-shin also lost his influence and main As the clock clicked down on the SPDC’s contacts in the government. Now he feels seven-stage roadmap, relations between that he is not recognized as a leader and Tatmadaw and ceasefire groups in northeast initiator of the peace process in the 1980s. Myanmar then took another turn for the He has a long history.”44 worse in April 2009 when, in another unexpected move, the head of the Military Two events appear to have prompted this Affairs Security Lt-Gen. Ye Myint announced remarkable breakdown in relationships: that all ceasefire groups were to transform firstly, changes in the Tatmadaw leadership; into “Border Guard Forces” (BGFs). An and secondly, changes in government strategy apparent precursor to the coming change over national reform and security control, in government, this controversial scheme especially in northeast Myanmar where the demanded that ceasefire groups break up, first ceasefires began a quarter of a century without negotiation, into smaller battalions ago. These developments were precipitated under Tatmadaw control, even though their by the 2003 announcement of the SPDC’s political goals had not been addressed. It was “seven-stage roadmap” towards disciplined little surprise, then, that most of the larger democracy. groups, including the UWSA, KIO, SSA/SSPP and MNDAA, immediately refused, and only The first turning-point was the unexpected some of the smaller groups came to accept arrest, as a result of an internal power this new status during the following months. struggle, of Lt-Gen. Khin Nyunt, prime minister and Military Intelligence chief, and Tatmadaw leaders, however, now appeared the dismantling of the entire MI apparatus to use this moment to try and take advantage in late 2004. At first, SPDC leaders claimed of a dispute within the MNDAA leadership that Khin Nyunt’s ousting would not affect to seize control of the Kokang region and the status of the ethnic ceasefires, of which impose its new BGF system. In August Khin Nyunt had been the main architect. 2009, the Tatmadaw occupied the Kokang

Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue 7 region after several days of fighting in an as the “Kokang SAZ” under the new 2008 offensive led by the then Lt-Gen. Myint Aung constitution. Hlaing, who has since been promoted to Commander-in-Chief. Over 200 fatalities In the following years, the once isolated were reported and over 37,000 refugees fled Kokang region took on a new geo-political into China, ending two decades of ceasefire in significance as a raft of new economic the Kokang region.47 Ostensibly, the fighting projects with China took shape across started after government troops wanted to northeast Myanmar. Outstanding among search what they claimed was an illegal arms these initiatives are the oil and gas pipelines factory near Laukkai. When MNDAA troops that pass across the northern Shan state from refused, a confrontation developed, and arrest the Rakhine state coast to Yunnan province. warrants were issued against Pheung Kya- But, in reality, the situation was far from shin and several family members, providing stable in the China borderlands. Grievances the pretext for Tatmadaw units to take still ran deep from the 2009 events, the risk control. of conflict was spreading, and it very much proved the calm before the storm. MNDAA leaders, in contrast, see the situation very differently. Among a number of accusations: the SPDC had long been aware Defending Myanmar Soil of the existence of the arms factory, and only used this as an excuse to occupy the Kokang Some very different views have been region;48 the conflict only started after the expressed about ethnicity, sovereignty and MNDAA rejected the BGF order, and was still conflict during the Kokang crisis. Both considering whether or not to take part in the government and Tatmadaw leaders have 2010 general election;49 and the Tatmadaw tried to portray the fighting as a battle used “divide and rule” tactics to put in against encroachment on Myanmar territory Kokang office the former MNDAA police by outsiders who must be repelled. At chief, Bai Xuoqian, who has himself been the outbreak of fighting, the state media accused of involvement in the drug trade50 reported that, during a visit to injured and went over to the government side after soldiers, President Thein Sein “vowed not to Pheung Kya-shin stripped him of power. lose an inch of Myanmar’s territory owned by the successive generations”, and that It should be stressed, too, that this was not “the state and people always honour and the first split to jeopardise MNDAA unity respect sacrifices of military personnel who after its 1989 ceasefire. In 1991, a short- are protecting sovereignty and ensuring lived conflict broke out between the leading territorial integrity.”52 Similarly, at an army Pheung and Yang51 families, and in 1995 press conference, a Tatmadaw spokesperson troops also mutinied in the Mongko area to stated that the military “never tolerates set up a local militia force that separated from attempts to encroach upon Myanmar’s the MNDAA. But this time, caught unaware sovereignty”.53 by Tatmadaw intentions, Pheung Kya-shin and his supporters were put to flight. In their For inhabitants of the Kokang region, in absence, the central government took control contrast, these remarks appear part of a of the Kokang region for the first time since campaign by government officials to rally Myanmar’s independence in 1948. Events nationalist support for the ruling USDP now moved quickly. Bai Xuoqian’s local and Tatmadaw in the November general militia were transformed into BGF battalion election by seeking to build up anti-Chinese 1006; Bai Xuoqian became a member of sentiment. There is a long history of anti- parliament for the military-backed Union Chinese feeling in the country. After Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) independence, Kuomintang remnants in the 2010 general election; and in March invaded the Shan state following the 2011, Kokang territory was distinguished for communist victory in China. Then in 1967 the first time on Myanmar’s political map anti-Chinese riots took place in Yangon,

8 Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue which China felt were instigated, or at least Ethnic Armed Organisations tolerated, by the Ne Win government. This prompted China to abandon its policy of Arakan Army (AA) 1 neutrality and non-intervention in other Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) 1 2 countries and provide support to the CPB Arakan National Council (ANC) 1 3 for its 1968 invasion of the Shan state.54 More Chin National Front (CNF) 1 2 3 recently, there has been growing resentment Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) 1 2 among the general population against Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) 1 3 major Chinese investments in the country, Karen National Union (KNU) 1 2 3 including the Myitsone dam, the oil and Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) 1 2 3 gas pipelines, and the Letpadaung copper KNU/KNLA Peace Council (KPC) 1 2 mine, as well as the cross-border influx of Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) 1 3 Chinese migrants to Mandalay and other Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army conurbations.55 (MNDAA) 1 3 National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) 2 Fears among Myanmar’s Chinese community National Socialist Council of Nagaland grew after a 60 year-old ethnic Chinese (NSCN-K) 2 4 businessman – reportedly the brother- New Mon State Party (NMSP) 1 2 3 in-law of MNDAA commander Pheung Pao National Liberation Organisation (PNLO) 1 2 3 Daxun – was arrested by the authorities on Shan State Army/Restoration Council of Shan 23 February. Li Guoquan, also known by his State (SSA/RCSS) 2 Myanmar name Hla Win, was the former Shan State Army/Shan State Progress Party vice chair of the Myanmar Chinese Chamber (SSA/SSPP) 1 2 3 of Commerce. He died a few days later Ta-ang National Liberation Army/Palaung in custody under unusual circumstances. State Liberation Front (TNLA) 1 3 According to the police, he had “suffered United Wa State Army (UWSA) 2 depression in custody and hit his head against Wa National Organisation (WNO) 1 3 the wall”, after which he was taken to the military hospital from where authorities All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF) 2 5 claimed he leaped from a window and subsequently died. This official version was doubted by members of the Chinese business community in Yangon, who felt the case 1 NCCT member “underscored their fears that the Kokang 2 conflict – which is whipping up nationalist 3 UNFC member 4 Present ceasefire with government tensions on both sides of the border – could Also operational in India have dangerous repercussions for Myanmar’s 5 Non-nationality force based in ethnic ethnic Chinese minority.”56 territories

Over the years, negative perceptions have also developed amongst the general population against ceasefire groups, notably N.B. This list should not be considered as final. the MNDAA, UWSA and NDAA, whose Other factions and splinter groups exist, and members include Chinese supporters (often further change can be expected. There are also business people), and who are accused of numerous Tatmadaw-backed Pyithu Sit and facilitating illegal migration into Myanmar.57 Border Guard Forces, some of which are former It should be stressed, too, that Pheung ceasefire groups, such as the Pao National Army Kya-shin himself raised the China card at Pyithu Sit. In the northern Shan state, the most the outbreak of recent fighting by issuing important groups include the Kutkai, Pansay and an appeal in an open letter to the Chinese Tar Moe Nye Pyithu Sits and BGF 1006 Battalion public in which he stated: “I am calling on (Kokang), all of which are led by elected USDP all fellow Chinese compatriots in the world, members of the legislatures, and the Kaung Kha who have the same roots as our family, to Pyithu Sit (ex-KIO 4th brigade).

Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue 9 give money and lend your hands to save our have never treated Kokang people as their fellow Kokang Chinese people, or to speak own people," a Kokang refugee in China out for our cause, to strengthen the prestige said. "They treat us like the enemy, and they of our army!”58 Against this backdrop, the steal our stuff."64 These sentiments have Tatmadaw’s “national sovereignty” rhetoric been echoed by other nationality leaders has had some rare public approval for its use who worry about increasing disputes over of military operations during the recent crisis. land and natural resources in Myanmar. “In Kokang, Tatmadaw comes in from cold,” Said the KIO Vice-Chairman N’Ban La at headlined the Myanmar Times in February.59 a recent ceasefire meeting: “[The Kokang] are among the groups included in the list For many minority communities, however, of 135 ethnicities officially recognized by the attempt to capitalize on patriotic Burma. But we can see that [the government] sentiments comes at a worrying time amidst is treating the Kokang as though they don’t rising Buddhist nationalism in the country. belong to our country.”65 To date, such nationalism has been mainly targeted against the Muslim population. To critics of the Thein Sein government, Anti-Muslim violence has been particularly there is also a deep irony about the violent in the Rakhine state, where over government’s depiction of the reasons for 100,000 Muslims, who often self-identify the Kokang conflict. For while government as “Rohingya”, have been displaced during and Tatmadaw officials have lately made the past three years.60 In general, they are strong statements about protecting Myanmar portrayed as foreigners and outsiders, who territory against foreigners in the Kokang should not be allowed Myanmar citizenship.61 region, during the same period they have also Despite persistent international criticism, apparently allowed the India army to conduct the Thein Sein government has appeared to a cross-border raid into Myanmar’s Sagaing follow this discriminatory view and, in some region against a base of the National Socialist parts of society, such policies have gone down Council of Nagaland’s Khaplang faction well, including a ban on inter-faith marriage. (NSCN-K) in early June. In a recent interview, a Buddhist monk leader of the hard-line Ma Ba Tha, known as the As in other borderland conflicts, the “Association for the Protection of Race and background is complex. But the Indian Religion”, called on people to “forget the bad government said that the operation was that they have done in the past” and vote carried out in response to the killing of 18 for representatives of the military-backed Indian soldiers in an ambush carried out by USDP party because, he argued, opposition the NSCN-K’s allies, the United Liberation parties were too inexperienced to govern Front of Assam and the National Democratic the country.62 As a result of such lobbying, Front of Bodoland, who have what the Times over one million holders of temporary of India describes as a “safe haven” on the identification cards, most of whom are Myanmar side of the border.66 For its part, Muslims, have now been disenfranchised the NSCN-K, which had a 14-year ceasefire from standing in the polls.63 with the India government, operates on both sides of the border, and in 2012 also Many Chinese in Myanmar, who include signed a formal ceasefire with the Myanmar a Panthay Muslim minority, have been government. But during the past two watching these events with concern. months, the NSCN-K ceasefire with the India Although the Kokang are officially recognized government has broken down amid mutual by the government as one of Myanmar’s “135 recriminations, with the Indian authorities national races”, Kokang people have also felt accusing the NSCN-K of sheltering armed treated as foreigners under military-backed opposition groups fighting against the New governments since independence, and now Delhi government.67 are fearful for the future with the loss of their homes. "They've been in charge of this While, however, some Indian media and country for several decades now, but they politicians publicly trumpeted the cross-

10 Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue border raid, the Myanmar government Relations with China quickly denied such an operation had taken place.68 Certainly, the promotion by The 2011 advent of the Thein Sein Indian nationalists of cross-border raids government has brought new uncertainties to protect India’s interest raised broader and challenges in China-Myanmar relations. security concerns among other countries in Many aspects of political and economic the region. “Pakistan is not Myanmar, and relationships taken for granted by both sides India should not think of repeating such an during the long years of SLORC/SPDC rule exercise inside Pakistani territory," warned no longer appear to be in place.71 In the the Pakistan interior minister Nisar Ali longer-run, the development of trade and Khan.69 The cross-border claims also drew political agreements between the Nay Pyi criticism from within India. According to Taw and Beijing governments is likely to the late Indian journalist Praful Bidwai: be the most important factor, with China, “Confident and prudent nation-states don't Myanmar’s largest investor, keen to develop casually violate their neighbouring states' its “One Belt, One Road” vision westwards sovereign borders; they know that healthy across Asia during the 21st century. In the relations with their neighbours are key to meantime, the outbreak of fighting along their own security. Crude military machismo the Yunnan border has brought a host of and cross-border "hot pursuit" adventures unexpected difficulties in China-Myanmar express not strategic confidence, but ties that, for the moment, do not appear to immaturity.”70 have quick or easy solutions.

This, however, does not explain the apparent In the main, the Chinese authorities acquiescence by the Tatmadaw and Thein maintained good relations with the MNDAA Sein government to the activities of various and other former CPB groups following armed groups from India along Myanmar’s their 1989 mutiny, as well as with the KIO, northern frontier. Rather, for many citizens SSA/SSPP and other nationality forces in such selectivity is further evidence of the the northeast borderlands. This de facto “divide-and-rule” strategies by which acceptance was greatly helped by the Myanmar’s military leaders have long agreement of ceasefires during the SLORC- controlled the country by the timing, choice SPDC era, which saw the development of and use of its political opponents. To date, such thriving ceasefire towns as Laukkai, the Thein Sein government has given no Panghsang and Mongla along the Yunnan explanation as to why armed groups from province border. Generally, China is very India can operate across the Myanmar border cautious about ethnic nationality movements, with apparent impunity. but Beijing has always distinguished between inter-party and inter-government relations. In 2015, however, as the Kokang crisis continued, the India frontier was far from Border stability, however, began to unravel the most urgent of Nay Pyi Taw’s borderland during the 2009 “BGF crisis” in the Kokang worries. For although the conduct of the region when some 37,000 people, mostly Kokang campaign had won the government Chinese nationals, fled across the border some domestic support among Myanmar’s to escape the violence. As a sign of its Burman-majority population, the loss of displeasure, China issued a warning to the life and challenges to sovereignty had raised Myanmar government to protect the lives and much more pressing nationality sentiments property of Chinese citizens.72 The conflict on both sides of the Shan state border. This was also widely reported in the Chinese now brought the Myanmar government into press and on social media, generating public an unexpected crisis with its other great sympathy and support for fellow Chinese. neighbour, China, which had previously been Apparently surprised, officials in Beijing its closest ally. Indeed, for a brief moment, it blamed the Yunnan government for painting even appeared that China might take military an over-optimistic picture of the political action. situation in Myanmar in order to get approval

Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue 11 for investment schemes.73 Nevertheless, the further deteriorated after 13 March when Beijing authorities still assumed that they five Chinese citizens were killed and eight had re-settled relations with Nay Pyi Taw wounded in an airstrike by the Myanmar in the transition from the SPDC to Thein air force that landed across the Yunnan Sein governments by cementing a series of border. In response, Fan Changlong, deputy major investment deals before the SPDC head of the Central Military Commission, stepped down, including various hydro- made a strong statement warning that, if power projects and the oil and gas pipelines this happened again, China would “take to Yunnan. resolute and decisive measures to protect the lives, property and security of China’s Chinese expectations, however, were soon p e o p l e”. 75 The Thein Sein government had confounded, and borderland conditions little choice but to make a formal apology have continued to worsen since President for the incident, reportedly fulfilling all Thein Sein assumed office. In June 2011, Chinese demands, including the payment the Tatmadaw resumed large-scale military of compensation to the victims.76 But in operations, including airstrikes, against the May, China had to issue another protest ceasefire KIO in a dispute that initially began after artillery shells fired from the Kokang over a Chinese hydro-electric project. Then, region landed across the border, injuring five as fighting spread, ceasefires also broke Chinese citizens and damaging a number of down in Shan and Ta’ang nationality areas of houses and vehicles.77 The Chinese army has the northern Shan state before the Kokang now deployed troops along the border with conflict revived in February this year. Myanmar, and in June performed military exercises involving infantry, artillery, tanks The result has been the very instability and and aircraft in a full-scale show of force.78 threats to borderland security that China has long wanted to avoid. Amidst the heaviest There can be no doubt that there are fighting witnessed in decades, around strategists in the Thein Sein government 200,000 civilians have now been displaced who would like to loosen Nay Pyi Taw‘s in the Kachin and northern Shan states, close relationship with China, and taking with many of them wanting to seek refuge a strong patriotic position appears to have in China.74 At the same time, the renewed played out well in Myanmar politics. At first, conflict in northeast Myanmar has called into some officials accused China of supporting question the future of Chinese investment the MNDAA, claiming that its rank and projects in the country. The US$ 2.5 billion file included ex-Chinese soldiers who were pipeline projects to transport oil and gas providing military training.79 According to from the Bay of Bengal to Yunnan province Lt-Gen. Mya Tun Oo, head of the Military seem set to continue, despite having to Affairs Security: “Chinese mercenaries are pass through the Shan state conflict-zones. involved in Kokang troops’ [offensive]”, But the controversial Myitsone dam in the although he added that “the Chinese central Kachin state has been suspended by President government is very unlikely to be involved, Thein Sein for the duration of the current but some authorities from autonomous parliament, and popular opinion is very regions [in China] might be involved.”80 strong against it ever being restarted. Certainly, other reports also claimed that the MNDAA had recruited “Chinese nationals as Equally serious for Beijing and Nay Pyi mercenaries in Yunnan” and received cross- Taw, the Kokang crisis has also had a very border support, including from members negative impact on political and human of the local security forces.81 But during the relationships between the countries. There past two months, the diplomatic language has been a sympathetic response for the has generally softened and the government’s Kokang cause on the Chinese-language main call to the Chinese authorities has Internet in both China and Taiwan, been to prevent the MNDAA from gaining encouraged by Pheung Kya-shin’s open- support or supplies from across the Yunnan letter appeal for help. The situation then frontier.82

12 Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue For the moment, the Thein Sein government for the moment, inextricably interlinked with is hoping that it has contained the Kokang the country’s peace process. conflict by military means. To date, it has not responded officially to the MNDAA’s 11 June announcement of a unilateral Towards a Nationwide Ceasefire? ceasefire – other than to call on the MNDAA to surrender.83 Officials are undoubtedly Often overlooked during the recent months pleased that Chinese pressure was behind the of fighting, the resumption of conflict MNDAA decision, but this has not lessened in the Kokang region has also had very concerns – especially in Beijing – about negative consequences for broader peace what will happen next. Indeed both Chinese talks between the Thein Sein government and nationality leaders in Myanmar believe and ethnic opposition groups to achieve a that, regardless of ceasefire talks and this solution to Myanmar’s long-running civil year’s general election, military operations wars. The process has become much longer in northeast Myanmar may by no means be and more complicated than officials publicly over with, potentially, the UWSA, NDAA, anticipated. Since initiating this policy, the SSA/SSPP and SSA/RCSS next in the sights of Thein Sein government has focused on Tatmadaw commanders.84 signing a “nationwide ceasefire agreement” (NCA) as a first key milestone towards Such a scenario – of unending conflict – is establishing peace. But, as the months have of grave concern to the Chinese authorities passed by, this focus on an NCA has become in both Beijing and Yunnan province, who more of stumbling block, hindering the start are also very wary about the role of Western of political dialogue, which the government countries in Myanmar’s peace talks. There is says can come only after the signing of an especial sensitivity over the Yunnan province NCA. border. As fighting raged with the KIO along the Kachin state border, this caused China For their part, government negotiators to appoint a special envoy, Wang Yingfan, have been keen to finalise a binding NCA in March 2013 to try and hammer out a as soon as possible and have a grand new ceasefire deal while keeping Western signing ceremony with foreign dignitaries countries out of the process.85 When this to demonstrate that they are making failed, Wang Yingfan and other officials progress on achieving peace ahead of the remained involved in behind-the-scenes upcoming election. Equally important for lobbying to try and end the fighting and the government, once an NCA is signed, maintain China’s influence. international aid is expected to flow in to Myanmar’s war-torn regions. According to In the aftermath of the Kokang crisis, a Shan commentator Sai Wan Sai: “It is clear however, China’s position is no longer quite that the regime wants to cash in by signing so clear, and the spread of further border the NCA as soon as possible, which would instability is widely feared. In the past three make the regime's party looks good during months, this has led China’s government to the election campaigns and also benefit from embark on a two-track strategy to try and international humanitarian and development bring peace and stability to its borderlands. aid programs, promised by the donors, once For while People’s Liberation Army troops the NCA is signed.”86 In apparent support remain in battle-alert along the Yunnan for President Thein Sein, international actors border, Chinese officials have also stepped have also put pressure on nationality leaders up support for nationwide ceasefire talks to sign an imperfect deal now to ensure in Myanmar, including an unusual ethnic political dialogue will start under the present summit in UWSA territory (see “The government rather than risk an unknown Panghsang and Law Khee Lar Summits” negotiating partner after a new government below). In another unexpected turn in history takes office in 2016.87 originating from the Kokang region, China’s relations with Myanmar and its peoples are, In the ethnic borderlands, however, the

Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue 13 prospect of an NCA without firm political Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT). The and economic guarantees is seen very latter was formed in November 2013 at a differently. Among a number of concerns, meeting of 17 nationality forces in the KIO four stand out. First, a political solution headquarters at Laiza on the China border to has always been the main priority of most represent the different ethnic armed groups armed nationality groups. Second, many in the negotiations (see Chart: “Ethnic Armed of the larger forces have run their own Organisations”).91 Following long discussions, administrative departments for many agreement was finally reached on 31 March in decades, keeping alive very different visions Yangon during the 7th round of negotiations of political rights and identities, including on a 5th single text “draft NCA”, consisting health, legal and education programmes in of 7 chapters, 33 articles and 86 clauses.92 areas not covered by government services. According to an ethnic representative at the Third, grievance has been growing during meeting, the government’s chief negotiator the past four years over natural resource Aung Min said that the draft NCA contains exploitation, land-grabbing and major hydro- three main guarantees: commitment to form power and other investment programmes, a federal union; removal of the signatories about which there has been no participatory from the Unlawful Associations Act; and the consultation or benefit to the local peoples.88 promise of political dialogue.93 And, finally, while military transformation by armed opposition groups is anticipated, there In essence, the 5th draft NCA laid out a appears to be no mutual acceptance of the political roadmap after the signing of a final need for reform change by the Tatmadaw. NCA, including drafting and adopting a framework for political dialogue within 60 In consequence, without guarantees of days; starting a national political dialogue political reform and demilitarization by within 90 days; holding a Union Peace all sides, there is a fear among ethnic Conference; signing a Union Accord opposition groups that international aid (Pyidaungsu Accord); submitting the in any transitional period may come to Union Accord to the Union Parliament support the extension of central government (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) for ratification; and, structures and Tatmadaw presence in areas finally, the implementation of all provisions under opposition control or influence, contained in the Union Accord, and carrying by-passing and weakening local autonomy out responsibilities regarding security among nationality peoples who have long reintegration.94 struggled for the right of self-determination. Against this backdrop, because of differences The signing of the draft NCA was greeted of opinion over dialogue procedures and with an orchestrated welcome in government priorities, a defining process of ceasefire and diplomatic circles. Celebrations, inclusion and implementation has proven however, proved premature, as nationality difficult to achieve, despite international leaders quickly pointed out.95 A sustainable support and the apparent willingness of all agreement is regarded more essential than sides to talk.89 As the analyst Bertil Lintner an incomplete draft. Among a number of has asked: “Is it [the NCA] meant to find a objections: the agreement was only a draft; lasting solution to Myanmar’s decades-long the NCCT delegates still had to go back to ethnic strife, or is it just a clever divide-and- their respective headquarters for approval rule strategy to defeat the other groups by by their organisations; amendments were a variety of means, including wearing them still anticipated on key issues; apprehensions down at the negotiating table?”90 were growing over the attempts by Tatmadaw representatives to stall constitutional reform After a number of earlier starts, during the in the legislatures; and, finally, there were past year and a half the peace negotiations important differences of opinion between have been taking place between the the government and nationality leaders over government’s Union Peace Making who should sign an agreement that, after all, Committee (UPMC) and the Nationwide would be called a “nationwide” ceasefire.

14 Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue It was at this point that the continuing The killing of 23 ethnic cadets, including fighting in northeast Myanmar and on a TNLA and AA members, in an unprovoked new front in the Rakhine (Arakan) state Tatmadaw shelling of a KIO training school cast further doubt on the NCA process. In in the Kachin state last November was contrast to 20 nationality forces advocated by certainly a recent cause of grievance.101 But armed opposition leaders, the government while the AA and TNLA have admitted their only accepted 16 groups as dialogue partners support in the Kokang fighting, stronger for inclusion in the NCA.96 This included forces like the KIO, SSA/SSPP and UWSA NCCT members that have signed new have denied involvement, calling on all sides ceasefires with the government, as well as to use political means to solve the conflict.102 one NCCT member without a new ceasefire, Nevertheless, given the unexpected strength the KIO, and five non-NCCT members: of MNDAA, TNLA and AA forces during the UWSA, NDAA, SSA/RCSS, NSCN-K the February attack, suspicions have not and (non-nationality) All Burma Students gone away that such groups are receiving Democratic Front (ABSDF). Excluded, help from elsewhere, meaning that they however, by the government are three should be regarded as spoilers rather than NCCT members, the Kokang MNDAA, partners in President Thein Sein’s NCA the TNLA and Arakan Army, which are process. in armed conflict with the government, as well as nationality parties regarded as too The government projection, however, of small to include (see Chart: “Ethnic Armed the MNDAA, TNLA and AA as newcomer Organisations”). or opportunist groups is rejected by their supporters. Like other nationality In the case of the MNDAA, TNLA and movements in Myanmar, the Kokang, AA, the main reason given by government Rakhine and Ta-ang insurgencies have officials for rejecting their involvement in lineages that date back many decades, with the NCA is that they are considered to be roots in the same political failures and causes groups that have started armed struggle since that have underpinned state failure in the President Thein Sein took office: in essence, country since independence.103 The AA was they are viewed as enemies of the present announced in 2009, but it is only the latest government. But there were also two other in a long line of armed Rakhine factions factors. Firstly, according to a government that began in the late 1940s; the TNLA is in spokesperson, the heavy Tatmadaw losses many respects a field revival of the Palaung suffered in the fighting further reduced State Liberation Organisation that dates the willingness to resolve the Kokang back to the 1960s and, like the KIO and crisis through dialogue.97 And secondly, MNDAA, had a ceasefire (in 1991) with the government officials were very suspicious of previous SLORC-SPDC government; and the the timing of the MNDAA’s revival during the MNDAA, which includes veteran Kokang NCA process, accusing other ethnic armed nationalists, argues that it was the Tatmadaw organisations of providing military support that was responsible for breaking its 1989 to the MNDAA from nearby Kachin, Shan, ceasefire when it forcibly occupied the Ta-ang, Wa and Mong La areas.98 Indeed a Kokang region in 2009. military intelligence source claims that, in mid-2012, Pheung Kya-shin was granted an Certainly, other nationality forces have amnesty by the government.99 But MNDAA been quick to speak up for the inclusion of representatives had already called for talks the MNDAA, TNLA and AA in the NCA with Nay Pyi Taw in early 2012. “We are process, and they have not shown public willing to put the past behind and look to doubts about their representation or pedigree. the future,” said a close relative of Pheung In the Kokang case, MNDAA representatives Kya-shin. “We therefore want to stand were present when the main ethnic together with other ethnic brethrens and armed alliance, the then 12-party United open reconciliation talks with the Burmese Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), government.”100 was set up in Chiang Mai in 2011, and they

Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue 15 were subsequently invited to attend UNFC military and political worries were clearly conferences. Says a senior ethnic advisor: increasing in the ethnic borderlands. There was also added resonance in the UWSA’s “Later the MNDAA applied for appearance. As all sides recognised, the membership, and they were accepted at UWSA is also the nationality force most a small UNFC meeting, which was later closely connected to China.108 ratified at a larger UNFC conference. After that it was not difficult to become a NCCT member. Pheung Kya-shin and The Panghsang and Law Khee Lar other MNDAA members also attended Summits the Laiza conference where the NCCT was f o r m e d ”. 104 China, the UWSA and its close ally, the NDAA in the Mongla region, share many The UNFC and NCCT members were also concerns about the Kokang conflict, and they explicit in their political support for the responded quickly to the refusal of the Thein MNDAA after the fighting started in the Sein government to include the MNDAA in Kokang region in February. Stated the UNFC: the list of armed groups to sign a nationwide “The Kokang ethnic is included as one ethnic ceasefire accord. Following the draft NCA nationality in the official listing of ethnic agreement in late March, the UWSA caused nationalities in the Union of Burma… The surprise by hosting a summit of selected MNDAA is an organization that has been ethnic armed groups at their headquarters fighting to achieve their national rights. The at Panghsang on the China border in early Kokang ethnic has the same life experience as May. This was the first time that the UWSA the ethnic nationalities that are in the United had organized such a meeting. In the past, Nationalities Federal Council. Therefore, the UWSA has rarely joined meetings or the MNDAA became a member of UNFC alliances with other opposition groups, in 2014 and also involved in the Nationwide except with former CPB groups, and it is not Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT).”105 a member of either the NCCT or UNFC. And as fighting continued during the final Rather, based around the former CPB negotiations for the draft NCA in March, “capital” at Panghsang, UWSA leaders have both UNFC and NCCT representatives continued political and economic exchanges called for the inclusion of the MNDAA with their Chinese neighbours following their as a signatory to the latest version.106 The 1989 establishment, and they have always Vice-Chairman of the New Mon State Party, been very careful not to upset Beijing.109 Nai Han Thar, who led the NCCT in the The reality is that China, rather than the negotiations, warned that the NCA would central government in Myanmar, has always not be signed by other members without the been the most important presence for many participation of the MNDAA, TNLA and inhabitants of the Wa borderlands since AA. “Because we cannot say it is a nationwide independence in 1948. ceasefire agreement, we won’t sign it without these three groups,” he said.107 Differences of opinion between Beijing and Nay Pyi Taw permeated the Panghsang Importantly, too, it was not only among summit. Invited participants by the UWSA NCCT and UNFC leaders that doubts were consisted of 65 leaders and observers from beginning to grow about the future of the 12 ethnic armed organisations, including NCA without the inclusion of all their such key NCCT members as the KIO, members. During the first half of 2015, the KNU, SSA/RCSS and NMSP that are based spread of conflict from the Kokang region along the China or Thai borders. They did across the northern Shan state was now to not, however, include the Chin National unexpectedly bring the strongest ethnic Front and other India border-based groups. nationality force in Myanmar into the fray: This omission reflected the views of China the 25,000-strong United Wa State Army. which is very cautious about any potential Rather than the NCA process building trust, connections with India. In contrast, despite

16 Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue pressures from the Thein Sein government the TNLA, and finally resulted in the revival to exclude them, the UWSA publicly invited of MNDAA resistance in the Kokang region the MNDAA, AA and the TNLA to attend in February 2015. Regardless of who is to the summit. During the meeting, Chinese blame, UWSA leaders feel that Tatmadaw officials were discreet about their presence, commanders are tactically seeking to gain but participants recognized that the summit advantage from opposition weaknesses would not have been able to go ahead without and unrest, taking on nationality forces the official blessing from China. According one by one as government troops seek to to the veteran SSA/SSPP leader Hso Ten who occupy territory and build up new military attended the summit: “China gave the green bridgeheads towards the China border. As light, and facilitated travel to the meeting for they have the largest and best-equipped force, some of the delegates.”110 UWSA leaders believe that they will be the last to be singled out and attacked.113 After a week of deliberation, the final statement of the Panghsang summit came As early as January 2013, UWSA, SSA/SSPP up with conclusions that satisfied most of and NDAA leaders issued a joint statement of the participants. These included the future concern: involvement of all ethnic armed groups in the NCA; an end to all fighting before “[We] should not allow the comeback signing a conclusive NCA; and the need of the dark images of the past military to amend the 2008 Constitution.111 The dictatorship era. At the turn of the history MNDAA was also pleased. According to like now, priority should be given to the party spokesperson Tun Myat Lin, the cessation of fighting and building mutual MNDAA attended the summit hoping to trust between the central government and convince its allies to push the government the ethnic people of our nation… The to agree to a ceasefire in Kokang: “We don’t government army should stop making want to fight any more – now we are just attacks against the KIA immediately and defending ourselves. We decided to attend resume talks with them. If the government the meeting to find a way with our ethnic persists on fighting the civil war, things allies to stop the fighting.”112 will go back to as they were sixty years ago. There will be difficulties to preserve There was, however, rather more to the the present union, national stability would UWSA’s unexpected organisation of the be an impossible goal and the wheel of summit. Prompted by China and the Kokang history will turn back.”114 conflict, the UWSA now had a combination of military, personal and political reasons to A second reason for the UWSA to want seek dialogue and cooperation with other MNDAA inclusion in the NCA process nationality forces. is more personal. The nationality leaders of the former CPB groups in the China Firstly, UWSA leaders are very worried about borderlands shared many years of fighting the post-2011 resumption of fighting in the under the CPB, and subsequently two Shan state. Rather than the transitional peace decades of ceasefires with the SLORC-SPDC, process promoted by President Thein Sein, and they have maintained close personal they fear that a very different military strategy ties through all these years. The NDAA is being unofficially pursued by the Tatmadaw leader Lin Ming-xiang (aka Sai Lin), for in northeast Myanmar. This, they believe, example, married the daughter of Pheung started with the overthrow of their MNDAA Kya-shin. UWSA leaders, therefore, were very ally in the Kokang region in September 2009, concerned during the Panghsang meeting was followed by the breakdown of the KIO when MNDAA representatives suggested ceasefire by the Tatmadaw in June 2011, then that the organisation would join the AA and continued with spread of armed conflict TNLA in leaving the NCCT if it accepted in northern Shan State during Tatmadaw the draft NCA. According to Zhao Guo- operations against the KIO, SSA/SSPP and an, representing the UWSA at the summit:

Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue 17 “There will be no peace as long as Burmese and think their approach is too soft, and Big Nation chauvinism and arrogance persist. feel it is appeasing too much. The Wa said The key to the political dialogue phase is ‘appeasement is defeatism’, and they want to ceasefire in the whole country. Exclusion of unite all the armed groups and make them any group will not bring peace.”115 According stronger than the NCCT.”119 to the UWSA spokesperson Aung Myint: “Unless fighting stops in the whole of the Secondly, the UWSA demand for a separate country, a nationwide peace agreement is just Wa state is also a difficult issue for Shan a piece of paper”.116 politicians, who believe that this this could further reduce the political leverage of the The third reason for the UWSA’s political Shan state vis-a-vis the central government. emergence relates to national politics. Already they worry that the introduction Under the 2008 constitution, a Wa of SAZs and the Wa SAD under the 2008 Self-Administered Division (SAD) was constitution is part of a government strategy demarcated under the Shan state government. to undermine the historic integrity of the Although this is the first time since Shan state, Myanmar’s largest ethnic state.120 independence that such a Wa nationality In addition, while Shan parties might accept territory has been recognized in Myanmar a Wa state in principle,121 there are concerns (there are two Wa autonomous counties about the districts that the UWSA might in Yunnan), it has fallen short of UWSA claim, because since 1995 it has gained demands and expectations. The Wa SAD, for control of significant territories along the example, does not include all territory under Thai border, where it has relocated many UWSA control, such as the relatively fertile inhabitants from the northern Wa hills.122 Mong Pawk and Mong Phen townships, In reply, UWSA leaders say that they do which are mainly inhabited by other not have concrete plans about Wa state nationalities, including Lahu, Akha and Ta- demarcation, but, at present, they seem to ang.117 Equally criticized by Wa leaders, the exclude Thai border areas. According to capital of the Wa SAD has been designated Xiao Min Liang: “In principle, it should at Hopang, located outside UWSA territory, include the same areas as outlined in the 2008 and not at the UWSA capital of Panghsang. constitution (the Wa SAZ). But we also want For such reasons, UWSA leaders believe to include the two townships of Mong Pawk that autonomy and local development have and Mong Phen in a future Wa state; they been severely handicapped under the new have been under our control for over forty political system. According to the UWSA y e ar s .” 123 Vice-Chairman Xiao Min Liang: “The major controversy was that according to the new The UWSA, therefore, was pleased that most constitution the Wa area has been diminished representatives at the Panghsang summit significantly.”118 gave their approval to the future creation of a Wa state. However the government’s In response, UWSA leaders now want to reaction suggested not only alarm at political revive their main political demand for a events in the China borderlands but also Wa state that is directly under the central justification for UWSA concerns that they government, with the same status as the are being targeted for attack. Not only did the Shan state. But this is likely to become a very Tatmadaw issue a media gagging order on sensitive issue. MNDDA statements during the Panghsang summit,124 but a state-run newspaper carried Firstly, Wa leaders are already unhappy about an unprecedented attack on the UWSA, the current draft NCA as they feel it offers accusing the organisation of drug trafficking less to nationality parties than the agreement and being on the path towards secession from the UWSA already has with the government. the union.125 In a series of allegations, the According to the SSA/SSPP leader Hso article warned that the “erroneous behaviour Ten who attended the Panghsang summit: of the UWSA under the pretext of the Pang “The Wa are not satisfied with the NCCT, Seng [sic] conference is in total contrast to

18 Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue peace process of the [government]” and that meeting on the draft NCA took place in its behaviour could lead to resumption of early June at Law Khee Lar in territory war: controlled by the Karen National Union (KNU) on the Thai border. It was attended “The Government allowed the Wa’s by representatives from 17 ethnic armed an autonomous region due to their organisations, including the MNDAA, TNLA population base. Getting stronger and the AA and other NCCT members. everyday with drugs money and other The non-NCCT members but potential illegal business, they now have the NCA signatories, the UWSA, NDAA and confidence to challenge the central SSA/RCSS, were absent, but there was an government by demanding for a state. important international presence, including With this last demand it cannot be wrong the Chinese diplomat Sun Guoxiang and to assume that UWSA is in total defiance the UN Secretary-General Special Advisor of the government of the Union of Vijay Nambiar. Sun Guoxiang was quoted Myanmar and willing to engage a military as saying: “There is a Chinese saying: Grasp challenge.”126 opportunity when it appears, because it will not appear again.”130 In another provocative claim, the article also raised the anti-Chinese card again Despite such international encouragement, by claiming that administrative positions delegates at the Law Khee Lar meeting in the UWSA “are being taken by ethnic decided not to accept the current draft Chinese and local culture is being swallowed NCA but to introduce proposals for and overwhelmed by the Chinese one”.127 amendments.131 These included clauses Subsequently, military tensions rose further relating to humanitarian aid and when a 15-day military standoff developed development programmes in conflict between the UWSA and the Tatmadaw areas, with nationality representatives keen due to a conflict over logging. The dispute to prevent negative impact on existing was eventually resolved, but it was another health and education structures in local indication that trust levels between the communities.But in a general toughening government and UWSA had reached a very of mood, a number of other important low ebb.128 decisions were agreed: to form a new committee led by KNU Vice-Chair Zipporah For nationality parties, such a dramatic Sein to continue the negotiations at a higher change in official language and government level with the government’s Union Peace mood was nothing new in their dealings with Making Committee; to demand all the top Myanmar’s Tatmadaw leaders. In its latest government and Tatmadaw leaders sign the narcotics report, the S.H.A.N. media group NCA to ensure it is binding on all parties; to commented how, in a drugs trade in which have international witnesses co-sign the final many sides have been complicit (including NCA, including the UN, ASEAN, China, Tatmadaw-related groups), the government India, Japan, Thailand, Norway, the USA only makes accusations against parties that it and UK (until now, the government has only has fallen out with: accepted the UN, ASEAN and China); and to only sign the NCA if all 16 NCCT members “Another example is that of the Wa are included.132 Following this NCCT group. These people made a ceasefire decision, the MNDAA, TNLA, and AA agreement with the government 26 members announced that they would remain years ago, yet recently have requested in the NCCT, retracting resignation letters to become their own state, no longer sent earlier to the alliance. under the government’s control. Now this ethnic group is being accused of drug In the light of the Panghsang and Law Khee trafficking.”129 Lar meetings, the way ahead is now unclear. The day after the Law Khee Lar meeting Against this backdrop, the next NCCT concluded, the leader of the opposition

Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue 19 National League for Democracy, Aung San found to bridge the current divisions over Suu Kyi, arrived in Beijing for her first official the NCA process.136 But there is clearly still visit to China. The next day the MNDAA a long way to go, and acceptance by the announced a unilateral ceasefire, following Tatmadaw of the need of political reform will what representatives admitted was Chinese be essential.137 pressure.133 The timing of these three events may have been coincidental, but together As the senior NCCT negotiator Nai Hong Sar they were more evidence of Chinese efforts to warned, the first priority of the ethnic forces engage more broadly with different parties in is to achieve a “secure situation” for dialogue, Myanmar’s political transition. and this means ceasefires in every part of the country, including the Kokang region: Prompted by the Kokang conflict, the days “We can’t disarm and demobilize all of our appear to be over for Beijing’s reliance on troops given that [the military] was not government-to-government relations with trustworthy for more than 60 years. Our Nay Pyi Taw for its economic and strategic country does not fully enjoy democratic plans in Myanmar. During Aung San Suu rights…much will depend on whether or Kyi’s visit, a spokesperson from the Chinese not a federal union will be established, Foreign Ministry drew attention to China’s and whether or not the military will be role in peace efforts, saying: "We hope that restructured in line with that federal union. the conflicting parties meet each other They [the military] do not seem open to halfway, exercise restraint, stop the war as changing at all and we can’t accept that.”138 soon as possible and restore normal order in the China-Myanmar border area"; that China supports "early realization of peace Conclusion: managing conflict or and national reconciliation"; and that solving conflict? “China has actively promoted the peace process in northern Myanmar, (and) played During the past four years, the quasi-civilian a constructive role in accordance with the government under President Thein Sein wishes of Myanmar and has been welcomed has introduced the most significant period by Myanmar".134 of reform and national transition in many decades. By this process, the initiative to As always, however, progress on the ground promote ethnic peace and end decades is slower and more complex. For many of civil war has become a key element, participants in the NCA process on both and the government has concluded new the government and opposition sides, it is ceasefires with a majority of ethnic armed an achievement that peace talks have been organisations in the country. However, for sustained for so long and come so far. But reasons never adequately explained by the this is hardly the perspective in the Kachin government, armed conflict has resumed and Shan states where daily conflict continues again in the northeast of the country, where and more fighting is feared. Equally serious, Tatmadaw offensives are continuing and with the clock ticking down towards a long-standing peace agreements have broken general election later this year, the prospect down, bringing serious loss of life and great of political dialogue and tangible reforms suffering to many inhabitants in the Kachin appears to have been pushed further again and northern Shan states. into the future. In the aftermath of the Law Khee Lar meeting, government reactions The resumption of fighting in the Kokang initially seemed negative, with reported views region is only the latest evidence of the spread that the draft NCA should not be changed of conflict in the new political era, and there and that the MNDAA should surrender.135 are now local fears that the Tatmadaw has Following, however, another meeting an undeclared strategy to expand its military between government and NCCT negotiators operations into the Wa and Mongla regions in Chiang Mai in early July, optimism was in the near future. Not only are these conflicts reported to be rising again that ways can be threatening to jeopardize the government’s

20 Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue efforts to achieve a nationwide ceasefire but The Tatmadaw has a long history of such they have now caused China to publicly step tactics. When internal divisions occur within in as a concerned international actor seeking opposition forces, the Tatmadaw has very to support peace. Instability has spread to often allied with the breakaway factions. many districts along the China border where To government critics, recent events in some 200,000 civilians have become refugees the Kokang region are a classic example of or internally displaced during the past four such strategies. When Pheung Kya-shin’s years. In consequence, with a general election supporters rebelled against the then powerful scheduled for later this year, the exclusion CPB in 1989, the SLORC government quickly rather than inclusion of minority peoples in responded by offering the new MNDAA national politics appears set to occur once a ceasefire. But when Pheung Kya-shin again. Even with the signing of an NCA, appeared to have outlived his usefulness in dialogue on political reform will not begin 2009, the Tatmadaw supported his rival Bai immediately, and there are no guarantees Xuoqian to try and drive Pheung Kya-shin about which subjects will be allowed for and the MNDAA out of the Kokang region. discussion. Equally tactical, far from seeking to In its reporting of the Kokang conflict, the demilitarize the Kokang region after Pheung government and the Tatmadaw have blamed Kya-shin’s ousting, the Tatmadaw instead the fighting on the MNDAA.139 However, attempted to replace the MNDAA with a new such an analysis fails to take into account Border Guard Force, Battalion 1006. This earlier events in recent Kokang history, and is a key part of a long-standing Tatmadaw the long-standing policy of shifting alliances strategy to create government-controlled by the Tatmadaw, which has been practising “Pyithu Sit” (people's militias) and BGFs in “conflict management” rather than “conflict areas where armed opposition groups have resolution” strategies for many decades. The control or local influence. aim of this strategy is not to eliminate armed opposition groups and resolve conflict, but The record, however, of the dozens of Pyithu instead to contain and divide these groups, Sit and BGFs presently in the Shan state is both internally (by creating or stimulating historically poor, dating back to the days conflict within groups) or between them (by of the now defunct KKY in the 1960s and preventing strategic alliances and pursuing 70s. For while some forces, such as the Pao different policies with different groups). National Army Pyithu Sit, have politically transformed from ceasefire groups and Given the scale of political and ethnic are keen to take part in reform dialogue,140 opposition to Tatmadaw rule during the past most of them – including several currently five decades, government strategists have led by USDP MPs – appear to have no preferred to take on groups one by one, and other political objectives than to promote by focusing on weakening them, not only the status quo on the Tatmadaw’s behalf by military means but also by political and and are mainly involved in economic economic pressures. As a result, since a new activities, including the drug trade.141 There ceasefire policy was introduced in 1989 by the are presently a number of government- former SLORC-SPDC government, although backed Pyithu Sit fighting alongside the a “nationwide ceasefire” has always been the Tatmadaw in the northern Shan state, declared aim, the government has persistently which is increasing rather than reducing concluded ceasefires with some groups militarization, exacerbating social division, while conducting military operations against and compounding the sufferings of the local others. Not only has this caused instability population. These include the Pansay Pyithu and considerable civilian displacement, Sit in Namkham Township and the Kutkai this has also resulted in the fragmentation Pyithu Sit in Kutkai Township. of nationality movements, making socio- political and economic dialogue very difficult The consequence, therefore, of Tatmadaw on equal terms. tactics and the resumption of fighting in

Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue 21 northeast Myanmar during the past four Therefore, at a time of critical political years has been very negative for many transition in the country, failure to address citizens, greatly undermining public the root causes of armed conflict and to confidence in the new era of transitional create an inclusive political process to solve reform. Not only has it raised suspicions nationality grievances is only likely to have that the government is not really serious a very detrimental impact on the prospects about peace but it has also raised questions for peace, democracy and development. If about the government’s ability to control the the government is serious and determined national armed forces. As opinion across to bring peace to all Myanmar’s peoples, the country increasingly reflects, there can military solutions to ethnic conflict must no never be any real winners on Myanmar’s longer be pursued, and an inclusive political battlefields. The desire for a genuine and dialogue should start as soon as possible. nationwide peace can be heard in many Experiences from other countries entangled communities. According to the Shan leader in decades of civil war around the world have Hso Ten, who has been involved in peace long shown that ceasefires are not a necessary initiatives during three eras of government precondition to start political negotiations. dating back to 1963: Peace in Myanmar needs to move from arguments about process to agreements about “The MNDAA has declared a unilateral delivery. In short, it is time to end military ceasefire, but the Burmese want total confrontation and to start political dialogue. military annihilation in Kokang. But in the world I have not seen any case where military operations can do this. Endnotes We want this problem to be solved on the negotiation table.”142 1. In 1989 the then military government changed the official name from Burma to In summary, the return of the MNDAA to Myanmar. They are alternative forms in the the Kokang region is a result of the failed Burmese language, but their use has become a policies of the past and set in motion a series politicised issue. Myanmar is mostly used within of unprecedented events. These include the country and in international diplomacy, but a deterioration in relations with China it is not always used in the English language which, as a result, has become more focal abroad. For consistency, Myanmar will be used in Myanmar’s peace process, and a hastily- in this report. For a discussion of the difficulties arranged ethnic summit at the headquarters in using “ethnic” or “nationality” terms in the of the UWSA, the country’s largest armed country, see, “Ethnicity without Meaning, Data opposition group, which until now had shied without Context: The 2014 Census, Identity and away from becoming involved in alliance Citizenship in Burma/Myanmar”, Transnational political affairs. Institute (TNI)-Burma Centrum Nederland (BCN), Burma Policy Briefing Nr 13, February The renewed hostilities have also negatively 2014. impacted on prospects for the signing of a 2. See e.g., Tom Kramer, “Burma’s Ceasefires nationwide ceasefire agreement. Excluding at Risk: Consequences of the Kokang Crisis for some groups from an NCA and future Peace and Democracy”, TNI Peace & Security political dialogue is a high-risk strategy. It Briefing, September 2009. will continue divisive, and unsuccessful, 3. “Fierce fighting continues near strategic practices from the past whereby some hills in Kokang SAZ”, Myawaddy News, 10 March nationality forces have ceasefires with the 2015. government, while the Tatmadaw pursues military tactics against others. As Myanmar’s 4. See e.g., Yun Sun, “After Border Bombing, tragic experience since independence has What’s Next for Burma and China?”, Irrawaddy, frequently warned, conflict in any part of 18 March 2015; Lun Min Maung and Ye Mon, the country can quickly lead to national “Myanmar apologises to China over cross-border instability. bombing”, Myanmar Times, 3 April 2015; Ankit

22 Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue Panda, “After Myanmar Bombing, China Deploys Kokang region”, RFA, 14 May 2015. Jets, Warns of 'Resolute Measures'”, The Diplomat, 14. “Fierce fighting continues near strategic 15 March 2015. hills in Kokang SAZ”, Global New Light of 5. “Tatmadaw never tolerates attempts to Myanmar, 9 March 2015. encroach upon Myanmar’s sovereignty: Army 15. “Army says 8 soldiers dead, 51 injured holds press conference”, Global New Light of fighting Kokang rebels”, The Irrawaddy, 10 March Myanmar, 21 February 2015; and “President U 2015. Thein Sein vows not to lose an inch of Myanmar’s territory, honours military personnel who fight 16. “Heavy fighting continues in Myanmar's against Kokang renegades”, Global New Light of Kokang, gov't forces capture five more strategic Myanmar, 16 February 2015. hilltops”, Xinhua, 19 March 2015. 17. “Well-wishers donate cash and kind 6. TNI, “Ethnicity without Meaning, Data without Context”. for soldiers”, Global New Light of Myanmar 16 February 2015; “More Questions than Answers in 7. TNI, “Ending Burma’s Conflict Cycle? Kokang Dilemma”, The Irrawaddy, 25 February Prospects for Ethnic Peace”, Burma Policy Briefing 2015. Nr 8, February 2012. 18. See e.g., Aung Zaw, “Min Aung Hlaing’s 8. After the breakdown of the Kachin Putsch”, The Irrawaddy, 17 February 2015. ceasefire in June 2011, over 100,000 civilians were displaced: UNHCR, “2015 UNHCR country 19. Nang Mya Nadi & Echo Hui, “Kokang operations profile – Myanmar”, http://www. conflict intensifies north of Laogai”, DVB, 13 May unhcr.org/pages/49e4877d6.html. Following 2015. the outbreak of fighting in the Kokang region 20. Guy Dinmore & Wa Lone, “Fighting in February 2015, some 13,000 people fled to persists in Kokang despite rebels’ ceasefire offer”, Lashio in northern Shan State, and some 60,000 Myanmar Times, 15 June 2015; and Naw Noreen, people sought refuge in China. UNOCHA, “Artillery assaults continue, say Kokang rebels”, “Humanitarian Bulletin Myanmar”, Issue 2, 1-28 DVB, 26 June 2015. February 2015. WFP estimates that 70,000 people 21. Yee Mon & Lun Min Mang, “Ethnic allies from the Kokang region fled to China. WFP join Kokang fight”, Myanmar Times, 13 February Myanmar, “Situation Report: Kokang Response”, 7 2015. April 2015. 22. Myanmar National Democratic Alliance 9. Speech by President Thein Sein, Army (MNDAA), Palaung State Liberation Front “Myanmar’s Complex Transformation: Prospects (PSLF/TNLA), Arakan Army (AA), “Position and Challenges”, Chatham House, 15 July 2013. Statement on Cold-blooded Offensives”, 1 March 10. For an interview with Pheung Kya-shin, 2015. see, “Kokang chief Pheung Kya-shin returns to 23. See n.8. fight Myanmar government”, Want China Times, 24. UNOCHA, “Humanitarian Bulletin 30 December 2014. Myanmar”, Issue 2, 1-28 February 2015. 11. “Kokang wants to join ceasefire talks”, 25. Shan Human Rights Foundation, Shan Herald Agency for News (S.H.A.N.), 29 “Shooting, killing and torture of civilians by February 2012. Burma Army during Kokang conflict”, 4 March 12. “Government troops seize arms, 2015; and, “Myanmar Army Commits Rapes, ammunitions in effort to secure Laukkai”, Global Beatings, Killings of Kokang People: Refugees”, New Light of Myanmar, 16 February 2015. RFA, 25 March 2015. 13. “Govt Declares State of Emergency, 26. Communication with Chinese aid worker Martial Law in Kokang Region”, The Irrawaddy, familiar with the situation, 22 March 2015; see 17 February 2015. The state of emergency and also, Guy Dinmore, “Fog of war shrouds truth on martial law were extended for another three civilian casualties”, Myanmar Times, 28 February months on 15 May by the parliament upon 2015. request from President Thein Sein: “Myanmar’s 27. Kyaw Phyo Tha, “Victim of Red Cross Thein Sein calls for extension of martial law in Convoy Ambush in Kokang Dies”, The Irrawaddy,

Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue 23 30 March 2015. the Kokang autonomous region”: United States 28. “Myanmar, Kokang Rebels Spar Over Red Department of State, “International Narcotics Cross Attack”, VOA, 18 February 2015. Control Strategy Report”, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 1 March 29. “Second Red Cross Convoy Attacked in 2010. According to another US report: “The Kokang”, The Irrawaddy, 22 February 2015. The ethnic drug-trafficking armies with whom the second attack was reported by the state media government has negotiated cease-fires (but not ‘The Mirror’, and later confirmed by the MRCS on permanent peace accords), such as the United Wa Facebook. State Army (UWSA) and the Myanmar National 30. UNODC, “Replacing Opium in Kokang Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA-Kokang and Wa Special Regions, Shan State”, Myanmar, Chinese), remain armed and heavily involved in Joint Kokang-Wa Humanitarian Needs the heroin trade”: United States Department of Assessment Team, March 2003. State, “International Narcotics Control Strategy 31. Ibid. Report 1998”, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Washington DC, 32. Yang Li (Jackie Yang), The House of Yang, February 1999. Guardians of an Unknown Frontier (Sydney: Bookpress, 1997). 40. Interviews with MNDAA Chairman Pheung Kya-shin, 3 March 2009, and with 33. Report of the Frontier Areas Committee MNDAA Vice-Chairman Pheung Daxun, 26 of Enquiry (Rangoon: Government Printing and February 2009. Stationery Office, 1947), Part II, Appendix I, p.32. 41. The Shan State Kokang Democratic Party 34. Ibid. and Kokang Democracy and Unity Party. 35. For more details, see Bertil Linter, Rise 42. See for instance: Joshua Lipes, “Who Are and Fall of the Communist Party of Burma (Ithaca: Myanmar’s Kokang Rebels And What Are They Cornell University Southeast Asia Program,1990); Fighting For?”, RFA, 23 February 2015. and Tom Kramer, “The United Wa State Party: Narco-Army or Ethnic Nationalist Party?”, East 43. Interview with Khuensai Jaiyen, 13 May West Center, Washington, Policy Studies Nr 38, 2015. 2007. For a background history of armed ethnic 44. Interview with ex-MI officer, 28 June 2015. and political movements, see, Martin Smith, 45. S.H.A.N., “Hands in Glove, The Burma Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity Army and the Drug Trade in Shan State”, Chiang (London: Zed Books, 1999). Mai, 2005, p.36. 36. Adrian Cowell, “Anarchy in the Shan State 46. Tom Kramer, “Neither War nor Peace; The of Burma”, in: Jelsma, M., T. Kramer and P. Vervest Future of the Ceasefire Agreements in Burma”, (eds.), Trouble in the Triangle, Opium and Conflict TNI, July 2009. in Burma (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2005). 47. Kramer, “Burma’s Cease-fires at Risk”. 37. Interview with ex-MI officer, 28 June 2015. 48. Ibid. 38. The participants of the Fourth International Heroin Conference were flown to 49. Interview with MNDAA Vice-Chairman the Kokang capital Laukkai for a one-day trip, Pheung Daxun, 26 February 2009. where they met MNDAA leader Pheung Kya-shin: 50. S.H.A.N., “Druglords in Parliament”, Shan “The Fourth International Heroin Conference Drug Watch Newsletter, Issue 4, October 2011. Record Book”, 23-26 February 1999, Yangon, 51. Not related to the Kokang sawbwa. Myanmar. 52. “President U Thein Sein vows not to lose 39. According to a US State Department an inch of Myanmar’s territory”, Global New Light report published a few years after the of Myanmar, 16 February 2015. implementation of the opium bans: “A growing amount of methamphetamine is reportedly 53. “Tatmadaw never tolerates attempts to produced in labs co-located with heroin refineries encroach upon Myanmar’s sovereignty”, Global in areas controlled by the UWSA, the Shan New Light of Myanmar, 21 February 2015. State Army-South (SSA-S), and groups inside 54. Tom Kramer, “The United Wa State Party”.

24 Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue 55. John Buchanan, Tom Kramer and Pakistan says 'we are not Myanmar'“, Times of Kevin Woods, “Developing Disparity: Regional India, 11 June 2015. Investment in Burma’s Borderlands”, TNI-BCN, 70. Praful Bidwai, “Why gloating over Amsterdam, 2013. Myanmar raid isn't in India's best interests”, Daily 56. Wa Lone, Toe Wai Aung and Guy O, 24 June 2015. Dinmore, “Detained businessman ‘leaped to death 71. For a detailed discussion, see: TNI, from window’: police”, Myanmar Times, 11 March “China’s Engagement in Myanmar: From Malacca 2015. Dilemma to Transition Dilemma”, forthcoming. 57. Jane Perlez, “Myanmar’s Fight With Rebels 72. Kramer, “Burma’s Ceasefires at Risk”. Creates Refugees and Ill Will With China”, New York Times, 21 March 2015. 73. Interviews with Beijing-based Western researcher, August 2011. 58. “Letter from Peng Jiasheng to all the Chinese people globally”, 12 February, unofficial 74. See note 8. translation from Chinese by TNI. 75. Lun Min Maung & Ye Mon, “Myanmar apologizes to China over cross-border bombing”, 59. Wa Lone, “In Kokang, Tatmadaw comes in from cold”, Myanmar Times, 23 February 2015. Myanmar Times, 3 April 2015. 76. Ibid. 60. UNOCHA, “Humanitarian Bulletin Myanmar”, Issue 2, 1-28 February 2015. 77. “China lodges protest with Myanmar after artillery shells injure five”, Reuters, 20 May 2015. 61. See e.g., ICG, “The Dark Side of Transition: Violence Against Muslims in 78. Tim Collard, “Myanmar and the Myanmar”, Asia Report No. 251, 1 October 2013; importance of peace on China's borders”, China. ICG, “Myanmar: The Politics of Rakhine State”, org.cn, 18 June 2015. Asia Report No. 261, 22 October 2014; Fortify 79. Associated Press, “Myanmar Says Kokang Rights, “Policies of Persecution: Ending Abusive Rebels on the Run Despite Allies' Help”, New York State Policies Against Rohingya Muslims in Times, 21 February 2015. Myanmar”, February 2014. 80. “Second Red Cross Convoy Attacked in 62. Lawi Weng, “Support Incumbents, Ma Ba Kokang”, The Irrawaddy, 22 February 2015. Tha Leader Tells Monks”, The Irrawaddy, 23 June 81. “Kokang Rebels Recruiting Chinese 2015. Nationals as Mercenaries in Yunnan: Sources”, 63. “Myanmar Authorities Step Up Collection RFA, 24 March 2015. of Temporary Identification Cards”, RFA, 6 April 82. Ye Mon & Guy Dinmore, “Myanmar 2015. Call on China to Strengthen Border Control”, 64. “Myanmar Army Commits Rapes, Myanmar Times, 19 May 2015. Beatings, Killings of Kokang People: Refugees”, 83. Guy Dinmore & Wa Lone, “Fighting RFA, 25 March 2015. persists in Kokang despite rebels’ ceasefire offer”, 65. Lawi Weng, “Kachin Leader Deals Dose Myanmar Times, 15 June 2015; and Naw Noreen, of Reality at Ethnic Ceasefire Summit”, The “Artillery assaults continue, say Kokang rebels”, Irrawaddy, 3 June 2015. DVB, 26 June 2015. 66. “Myanmar reluctant to aid India in rebel 84. See e.g., “Army Commander wants to crackdown”, Times of India, 5 July 2015; Bertil attack UWSA, NDAA AND RCSS/SSA”, S.H.A.N. Lintner, “Mysterious Motives: India’s Raids on the 5 March 2015. Burma Border”, The Irrawaddy, 30 June 2015. 85. Bertil Lintner, “Powers Seek Influence in 67. Namrata Goswami, “Peace again at stake Burma’s Conflict”, YaleGlobal, 18 March 2013. in Nagaland”, The Hindu, 11 April 2015. 86. Sai Wansai, “In the aftermath of Law Khee 68. Prashanth Parameswaran, “The Truth Lar Summit, Peace Process looks dim”, S.H.A.N., About India’s Militant Strike in Myanmar”, The 9 June 2015. Diplomat, 12 June 2015. 87. For different accounts of peace events, 69. Omar Farooq Khan & Indrani Bagchi, see e.g., Buchanan, Kramer and Woods, “India warns terrorists after cross-border raid;

Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue 25 “Developing Disparity”; Martin Smith, “Ethnic different ideas on the different sides as to the Politics in a Time of Change”, in David Steinberg designations of the 16 or 20/21 groups. (ed.), Myanmar: The Dynamics of an Evolving 97. Wai Moe “Why Kokang Rebels Are Giving Polity (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Fits to Burma’s Military”, Foreign Policy, 6 May 2015), pp.135-57, and Ashley South, in Ibid., 2015. “Governance and Political Legitimacy in the Peace Process”, pp.159-90; MPSI, “Lessons learned 98. Associated Press, “Myanmar Says Kokang from MPSI’s work supporting the peace process Rebels on the Run”. in Myanmar”, Myanmar Peace Support Initiative 99. Interview with ex-MI officer, 28 June 2015. (MPSI), March 2014; Burma News International, 100. “Kokang wants to join ceasefire talks”, Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process: A Reference S.H.A.N., 9 February 2012. Guide 2014 (Chiang Mai: BNI, 2014); and 101. The cadets came from three nationality for the Myanmar Peace Center, http://www. forces, AA, TNLA and Chin National Front, and myanmarpeace.org the ABSDF. 88. For TNI analyses on economic issues, 102. Paul Vrieze, “Wa, Mongla Rebels Deny see, Buchanan, Kramer and Woods, “Developing Involvement in Kokang Conflict”, The Irrawaddy, Disparity”; TNI, “Linking Women and Land in 17 February 2015; “SSPP Deny Involvement in Myanmar: Recognising Gender in the National Kokang Fighting”, S.H.A.N., 26 February 2015; Land Use Policy”, February 2015; TNI, “The Lawi Weng, “Govt Wrong to Suggest Wa, China Challenge of Democratic and Inclusive Land Involvement in Kokang Conflict: UWSA”, The Policymaking in Myanmar: A Response to the Irrawaddy 27 February 2015. Draft National Land Use Policy”, February 2015. 103. See e.g., Smith, Burma: Insurgency, passim. 89. For a detailed analysis, see e.g.: TNI, “Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Myanmar: 104. Interview with senior ethnic The Need for Clarity and Achievement”, Myanmar representative, 13 May 2015. Policy Briefing Nr 14, April 2015. 105. “UNFC Statement on the Fighting in 90. Bertil Lintner, “A ‘Nationwide Ceasefire Kokang Region”, UNFC, 21 February 2015. Agreement’–for What?”, The Irrawaddy, 30 April 106. “Heavy fighting continues in Myanmar's 2014. Kokang”, Xinhua, 19 March 2015. 91. The 16 NCCT member signatories were: 107. Ei Ei Toe Lwin, “Ceasefire accord in AA, ALP, ANC, CNF, DKBA, KIO, KNU, KNPP, danger, warns chief ethnic negotiator”, Myanmar KNU, LDU, MNDAA, NMSP, PNLO, TNLA/ Times, 14 May 2015. PSLF, SSA/SSPP and WNO. Representatives of the 108. See e.g., Bertil Lintner, “Same Game, SSA/RRCS attended the meeting but did not sign Different Tactics: China’s ‘Myanmar Corridor’”, the 11-point common position. The Irrawaddy, 13 July 2015. 92. “The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement 109. Tom Kramer, “The United Wa State Party”. between the government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and Ethnic Armed 110. Interview with SSA/SSPP leader Sao Hso Organizations”, (Fifth Draft). Ten, 16 June 2015. 93. Interview with ethnic representative 111. “The Panghsang Summit: Excerpts from a present at the meeting, 2 April 2015. journal”, S.H.A.N., 20 May 2015. 94. “The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement”. 112. Ei Ei Toe Lwin, “Kokang rebels to push for peace deal in Wa capital”, The Myanmar Times, 22 95. See e.g., Sai Wansai, “Behind the regime’s April 2015. over-dramatization of nationwide ceasefire agreement draft”, S.H.A.N., 10 April 2015. 113. “Wa say they’re next on Naypyitaw hit list”, S.H.A.N., 12 July 2011. This view has also 96. See e.g., Joshua Carroll, “Analyst dismisses been privately expressed to TNI by several UWSA Myanmar’s draft cease-fire deal“, Anadolu Agency, officials. 3 April 2015; “UPWC and NCCT leaders talk about NCA final draft”, Independent Mon News 114. “Joint Statement of Special Region No.2 Agency, 2 April 2015. There also appear to be (Wa State), Shan State Special Region No.3

26 Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue (SSPP/SSA) and Shan State Special Region No.4 135. Lawi Weng, “Govt Summons Ethnic Peace (Mengla) on the Escalating War in Kachinland”, Team, Defends Ceasefire Draft”, The Irrawaddy, 23 10 January 2013. June 2015. 115. “Wa leader: Arrogance will not bring 136. The Irrawaddy, 23 June 2015. peace”, S.H.A.N., 5 May 2015 137. Sai Wansai, “Optimism soars as 116. Lawi Weng, “At Ethnic Summit, UWSA government and ethnic groups renewed peace Backs Rebels in Conflict With Govt”, The talks”, S.H.A.N., 6 July 2015. Irrawaddy, 1 May 2015. 138. For a recent overview, see e.g., Sai Oo, 117. Interview with UWSA Vice-Chairman “Burma’s Peace Process: Matching Words with Xiao Min Liang, 6 September 2013. Deeds”, The Irrawaddy, 13 July 2015. 118. Interview with UWSA Vice-Chairman 139. Kyaw Kha, “Nai Hong Sar: ‘If They Xiao Min Liang, 23 February 2009. Continue to Hold a Hard Line, Peace Will Be 119. Interview with SSA/SSSPP leader Sao Hso Difficult’”, The Irrawaddy, 3 July 2015. Ten, 16 June 2015. 140. See e.g., “Fighting breaks out between 120. Interview with SNLD General Secretary Tatmadaw, Kokang renegade troops”, Global New Sai Nyunt Lwin, 3 April 2015. Light of Myanmar, 9 February 2015. 121. Interview with SSA/SSPP leader Sao Hso 141. Interview with Pao National Organisation Ten, 16 June 2015. Chairman Aung Kham Hti, 5 April 2015. 122. Tom Kramer, “The United Wa State Party”. 142. TNI, “Bouncing Back; Relapse in the Golden Triangle”, Amsterdam, June 2014, pp.32- 123. Interview with UWSA Vice-Chairman 33. Xiao Min-liang, 6 September 2013. 143. Interview with SSA/SSPP leader Sao Hso 124. Kyaw Phyo Tha, “Burma Army Issues Ten, 16 June 2015. Media Gag Order on Kokang Rebel Statements”, The Irrawaddy, 4 May 2015. 125. Aung Zeya, “Outcome of Pang Seng Conference and the true identity of UWSA”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 18 May 2015. 126. Ibid. 127. Ibid. 128. “Wa and Burma Army resolve logging tension”, S.H.A.N., 19 June 2015. 129. “Opium is overtaken by a popular pill”, S.H.A.N. Drug Report 2015, p.5. 130. Wa Lone, “Ethnic military leaders urged to sign ceasefire accord”, Myanmar Times, 3 June 2015. 131. "Ethnic Armed Organizations’ Summit Statement", Law Khee Lar, Karen State, 9 June 2015; Confidential briefing by observer of the meeting, 11 June 2015. 132. Ibid. 133. “China told MNDAA to declare ceasefire”, DVB, 13 June 2015; and “China calls for border This publication was made possible through the stability after Myanmar ceasefire”, Reuters, 12 June financial support of Sweden. The contents of this 2015. publication are the sole responsibility of TNI 134. “China calls for border stability after and can under no circumstances be regarded as Myanmar ceasefire”, Reuters, 12 June 2015. reflecting the position of the donor.

Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue 27 TNI Myanmar programme Burma Policy Briefing series ISBN/ISSN: 2214-8957

The advent of a new quasi-civilian Burma in 2010: A Critical Year in Ethnic Politics, Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 1, June 2010 government in Myanmar has raised hopes for fundamental reforms and for an end Burma’s 2010 Elections: Challenges and Opportunities, Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 2, June 2010 to one of the longest running armed conflicts in the world. TNI’s Myanmar Unlevel Playing Field: Burma’s Election Landscape, Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 3, October 2010 programme aims to strengthen (ethnic) civil society and political actors in dealing A Changing Ethnic Landscape: Analysis of Burma’s 2010 Polls, Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 4, December 2010 with the challenges brought about by the rapid opening-up of the country, while Ethnic Politics in Burma: The Time for Solutions, Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 5, February 2011 also working to bring about an inclusive and sustainable peace. TNI has developed Burma’s New Government: Prospects for Governance and Peace in Ethnic States, Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 6, May a unique expertise on Myanmar’s 2011 ethnic regions and it is in its Myanmar Conflict or Peace? Ethnic Unrest Intensifies in Burma, programme where its work on agrarian Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 7, June 2011 justice, alternative development and a Ending Burma’s Conflict Cycle? Prospects for Ethnic humane drugs policy comes together. Peace, Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 8, February 2012

Burma at the Crossroads: Maintaining the Momentum for Reform, Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 9, June 2012 Transnational Institute The Kachin Crisis: Peace Must Prevail, Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 10, March 2013

The Transnational Institute (TNI) is an Access Denied: Land Rights and Ethnic Conflict in international research and advocacy Burma, Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 11 May 2013

institute committed to building a just, Burma’s Ethnic Challenge: From Aspirations to Solutions, democratic and sustainable planet. For Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 12, October 2013

more than 40 years, TNI has served as a Ethnicity without Meaning, Data without Context: unique nexus between social movements, The 2014 Census, Identity and Citizenship in Burma/ engaged scholars and policy makers. Myanmar, Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 13, February 2014 Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar: The Need for Clarity and Achievement, Myanmar Policy Briefing Nr 14, April 2015

Other reports

Assessing Burma/Myanmar’s New Government: Challenges and Opportunities for European Policy Responses, Conference Report, Amsterdam, 22 & 23 February 2012

Prospects for Ethnic Peace and Political Participation in Burma/ Myanmar, Seminar Report, Bangkok, 23 August 2012

Political Reform in Burma/Myanmar and Consequences Transnational Institute (TNI) for Ethnic Conflict, Seminar Report, Chiangmai, 20-21 February 2013

Developing Disparity, Regional Investment in Burma’s De Wittenstraat 25 Borderlands, February 2013 1052 AK Amsterdam Linking Women and Land in Myanmar: Recognising The Netherlands Gender in the National Land Use Policy, February 2015 Tel: +31-20-6626608 The Challenge of Democratic and Inclusive Land Fax: +31-20-6757176 Policymaking in Myanmar: A Response to the Draft E-mail: [email protected] National Land Use Policy, February 2015

See for all our work on Myanmar: Towards a Healthier Legal Environment: A Review of http://www.tni.org/work-area/burma-project Myanmar's Drug Laws, February 2015

28 Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue