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Análise Multijurisdicional De Aquisições Centradas Em Dados: Diagnóstico Atual E Propostas De Política Pública Para O Brasil

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Análise Multijurisdicional De Aquisições Centradas Em Dados: Diagnóstico Atual E Propostas De Política Pública Para O Brasil 1 TEXTO DE DISCUSSÃO 2/2021 ANÁLISE MULTIJURISDICIONAL DE AQUISIÇÕES CENTRADAS EM DADOS: DIAGNÓSTICO ATUAL E PROPOSTAS DE POLÍTICA PÚBLICA PARA O BRASIL LUCAS GRIEBELER DA MOTTA 2 PREFÁCIO Após um ano de existência, a Associação Data Privacy Brasil de Pesquisa lançou a série “Textos de Discussão” com o objetivo de amplificar as vozes e os debates sobre temas emergentes da relação entre tecnologia, proteção de dados pessoais, privacidade e outros direitos fundamen- tais. Inspirados nos formatos comumente utilizados por centros de pesquisa e think tanks ao redor do mundo, os Textos de Discussão têm como objetivo mobilizar discussões de fronteira e acenar para novas formas de compreensão de problemas no emergente campo da proteção de dados pessoais e privacidade no Brasil. São textos que provocam e inspiram novas reflexões. Considerando que nossa missão institucional é reforçar a gramática dos direitos fundamen- tais e fortalecer uma cultura de proteção de dados pessoais no Brasil, optamos por convidar acadê- micos(as), professores(as) e demais profissionais não diretamente vinculados(as) à Associação para exporem suas ideias em formato de policy paper. Essa é uma forma de oxigenar os debates e colocar novas lentes de análise para problemas relacionados a um fluxo de dados que seja íntegro em favor do interesse público. Esperamos que os Textos de Discussão, como este que você está prestes a ler, inspirem discussões inovadoras, sofisticadas e construtivas em nosso país. A expectativa é que estes textos possam ser não apenas compartilhados, mas, também e principalmente, dialogados. A criação desse tipo de conhecimento coletivo é fundamental e vai ao encontro do que buscamos enquanto Associação de Pesquisa. Bruno R. Bioni Rafael A. F. Zanatta Mariana Rielli 3 FICHA TÉCNICA O Data Privacy Brasil é um espaço de intersecção entre a escola Data Privacy Ensino e a entidade civil Associação Data Privacy Brasil de Pesquisa. Este relatório foi produzido exclusivamente pela Associação. A Associação Data Privacy Brasil de Pesquisa é uma entidade civil sem fins lucrativos sediada em São Paulo. A organização dedica-se à interface entre proteção de dados pessoais, tecno- logia e direitos fundamentais, produzindo pesquisas e ações de incidência perante o sistema de Justiça, órgãos legislativos e governo. A partir de uma Política de Financiamento Ético e Transpar- ência, a associação desenvolve projetos estratégicos de pesquisa em proteção de dados pessoais, mobilizando conhecimentos que podem ajudar reguladores, juízes e profissionais do direito a lidar com questões complexas que exigem conhecimento profundo sobre como tecnologias e sistemas sócio-técnicos afetam os direitos fundamentais. A Associação possui financiamento de filantropias internacionais como Ford Foundation, Open Society Foundations e AccessNow. Para mais infor- mações, visite www.dataprivacybr.org. DIRETORES Bruno Bioni e Rafael Zanatta COORDENADORA GERAL DE PROJETOS Mariana Rielli COORDENADORES Bruna Martins dos Santos, Daniela Dora Eilberg e João Paulo Vicente PESQUISADORES Aline Hercocivi, Brenda Cunha, Gabriela Vergili, Helena Secaf, Izabel Nuñez, Jaque- line Pigatto, Júlia Mendonça, Marina Kitayama, Pedro Saliba e Thaís Aguiar ADMINISTRATIVO E COMUNICAÇÃO Ana Justi, Fabrício Sanchez, Gustavo Reis, Rafael Guimarães, Roberto Júnior e Victor Scarlato 4 LICENÇA Creative Commons É livre a utilização, circulação, ampliação e produção de documentos derivados desde que citada a fonte original e para finalidades não comerciais. IMPRENSA Para esclarecimentos sobre o documento e entrevistas, entrar em contato com a Associação pelo e-mail [email protected] APOIO Open Society Foundations COMO CITAR ESSE DOCUMENTO MOTTA, Lucas Griebeler da. Análise Multijurisdicional de Aquisições Centradas em Dados: diagnóstico atual e propostas de política pública para o Brasil. São Paulo: Associação Data Privacy Brasil de Pesquisa, 2021. 5 SUMÁRIO PREFÁCIO 02 1. APRESENTAÇÃO DO PROJETO 06 2. ESCOPO E METODOLOGIA DO PROJETO 08 3. PREMISSAS FÁTICAS DA PESQUISA 13 Dez mitos que devem ser descontruídos 13 Por que algumas empresas são mais ativas em aquisições centradas em dados? 15 Antitruste e mercados de preço zero que produzem receitas bilionárias 27 4. DIAGNÓSTICO DA SITUAÇÃO ATUAL DO BRASIL 33 Critérios defasados de notificação de atos de concentração 33 Regras processuais e procedimentais que comportam melhorias 44 5. EXPERIÊNCIA INTERNACIONAL 52 Panorama comparativo de critérios de notificação 52 Análise crítica de casos 56 Facebook/Instagram (2012) 56 Google/Waze (2013) 65 Facebook/Whatsapp (2014) 70 Apple/Shazam (2018) 78 Google/Fitbit (2020-2021) 84 Desafios identificados 100 6. SUGESTÕES DE POTENCIAIS MELHORIAS 105 7. CONCLUSÃO 108 6 ANÁLISE MULTIJURISDICIONAL DE AQUISIÇÕES CENTRADAS EM DADOS: DIAGNÓSTICO ATUAL E PROPOSTAS DE POLÍTICA PÚBLICA PARA O BRASIL Lucas Griebeler da Motta 1 1. APRESENTAÇÃO DO PROJETO O presente estudo foi elaborado a pedido da Associação de Pesquisa Data Privacy Brasil (“DPB”). Houve financiamento do projeto pela Open Society Foundations (“OSF”), uma entidade do terceiro setor que fornece suporte financeiro a várias instituições independentes ao redor do mundo para realização de pesquisas de impacto social. A OSF possui diferentes eixos temáticos e um deles é voltado para proteção de informações e direitos de privacidade de indivíduos e empresas na era digital. Apesar do financiamento da OSF e da parceria com a DPB, não houve qualquer influência por parte dessas instituições com relação às conclusões e/ou opiniões apresentadas neste trabalho. As questões concorrenciais e regulatórias trazidas neste relatório de pesquisa são resultado da análise e da reflexão independente do autor sobre os artigos acadêmicos, casos e relatórios utilizados para preparação deste trabalho. Houve apenas alinhamento com a DPB no que tange ao escopo e à metodologia da pesquisa; os resultados da pesquisa foram discutidos com Instituto de Defesa do Consumidor (“Idec”), o qual não exerceu ingerência sobre os temas aqui tratados. 1 Bacharel em Direito pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (“PUCRS”). Master of Laws Candidate da Univer- sidade de Chicago (Class 2020-2021). Durante seu período como associado a escritórios de advocacia no Brasil, representou empresas de tecnologia, incluindo algumas das mencionadas neste trabalho, no âmbito de consultorias concorrenciais e regulatórias. Entretanto, o autor nunca representou tais empresas no âmbito de atos de concentração no Brasil e, desde 2017, não mais teve interações profissio- nais com elas. Apesar de ter representado outras empresas de tecnologia até julho de 2020, o autor não recebeu suporte financeiro de quaisquer empresas com interesse no assunto abordado neste trabalho. As opiniões apresentadas neste trabalho decorrem de pesquisa acadêmica independente do autor e, em nenhuma hipótese, representam o entendimento de clientes passados ou de escritórios de advo- cacia dos quais o autor tenha feito ou venha a fazer parte. O autor agradece aos comentários feitos por Bruno Bioni, Bruno Braz, Bruno Renzetti, Camila Leite, Diogo Moyses, Mariana Rielli, Michel Souza e Rafael Zanatta no âmbito de seminário realizado em 26 de fevereiro de 2021 pela Associação Data Privacy Brasil de Pesquisa. 7 Os principais objetivos desta pesquisa são: (i) contextualizar discussões recentes suscitadas pela academia, por autoridades concorrenciais estrangeiras e entidades do terceiro setor sobre temas concorrenciais relevantes relacionadas a atos de concentração para aumento de capacidade para coleta de dados (aquisições centradas em dados; data-driven mergers); (ii) demonstrar que os atuais critérios de notificação previstos na Lei nº 12.529/2011 são insuficientes para captura de operações potencialmente sensíveis nos mercados de tecnologia; (iii) evidenciar que, como resultado da defi- ciência indicada no item anterior, o Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (“CADE”) deixou de analisar operações societárias importantes que foram objeto de escrutínio no exterior; (iv) cons- tatar que, mesmo se o CADE tivesse analisado os atos de concentração examinados neste relatório, tal análise tenderia a ser incompleta e superficial; e (v) propor, à luz dos materiais estudados e dos resultados empíricos desta pesquisa, algumas melhorias institucionais e legislativas para correção de gargalos institucionais no Brasil. Para tal, este relatório está estruturado da seguinte maneira: (i) a primeira seção é esta apre- sentação; (ii) a segunda seção descreve o escopo e a metodologia deste projeto; (iii) a terceira seção estabelece as premissas sobre as quais esta pesquisa será realizada; (iv) a quarta seção aborda o regime de notificação de atos de concentração no Brasil e as lacunas para capturar aquisições centradas em dados; (v) a quinta seção examina criticamente cinco operações que foram objeto de investigação por autoridades antitruste estrangeiras (Facebook/Instagram, Google/Waze, Face- book/WhatsApp, Apple/Shazam e Google/Fitbit) e identifica deficiências no processo de análise desses casos; (vi) a sexta seção propõe mecanismos para correção das lacunas encontradas e propostas de advocacia da concorrência; e (vii) a sétima seção conclui o trabalho. Não é objetivo desta pesquisa advogar a favor ou contra atos de concentração específicos ou interesses qualquer empresa de tecnologia. Elas possuem o mérito de terem investido capital e esforço humano para o desenvolvimento de produtos e serviços outrora inexistentes que são úteis a empresas,
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