SYDNEY’S DESALINATION PLANT: Lessons for critical infrastructure under the NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979

Stephanie Lum Bachelor of Planning University of NSW October 2009

ABSTRACT

Sydney’s Desalination Plant: Lessons for critical infrastructure under the NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979

Part 3A (Major infrastructure and other projects) of the New South Wales Environmental Planning and Assessment (EP&A) Act 1979 commenced on 1 August 2005. The objective was to facilitate large-scale infrastructure developments by streamlining the approvals process. Local governments, environmentalists and community groups have vehemently opposed this planning reform on the grounds that it reduces scope for public participation, judicial review and merit appeals. These rights are further restricted for projects deemed critical infrastructure. Under section 75C of the EP&A Act, the Minister may declare a project as critical infrastructure if it is deemed “essential for the State for economic, environmental or social reasons”. Critical infrastructure projects exclude appeal rights by proponents and objectors, the application of all environmental planning instruments (other than State Environmental Planning Policies), and third party appeals. The declaration by the NSW Minister for Planning of the Kurnell desalination plant as critical infrastructure in November 2005 ignited considerable opposition from the public. Through a review of both the Government’s justification for the plant to safeguard Sydney’s water supply and the critical infrastructure process applied to it, this thesis makes recommendations on how the planning approvals process for major projects under Part 3A could be improved.

Abstract i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to sincerely thank Mr Peter Williams and Ms Jackie Biro for their guidance, advice, time and constant encouragement. I would also like to acknowledge the EG Property Group for their support through the final year thesis scholarship. I wish to also thank my family and friends for their support throughout the thesis process.

Acknowledgements ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter One: Introduction 1.1 Problem Setting 1 1.2 Theoretical Framework 2 1.3 Context 2 1.4 Research Statement 3 1.5 Methodology 4 1.6 Research Limitations 7 1.7 Thesis Structure 8

Chapter Two: Australia’s Recent Urban Water Crisis 2.1 Introduction 10 2.2 Water Demand and Supply in Australian Cities 10 2.3 Options for Managing the Water Crisis 19 2.4 Summary 23

Chapter Three: The Desalination Decade 3.1 Introduction 24 3.2 Western Australia – Perth Seawater Desalination Plant (Kwinana) 24 3.3 Victoria – Victorian Desalination Plant (Wonthaggi) 27 3.4 Queensland – Gold Coast Desalination Project (Tugun) 29 3.5 South Australia – Adelaide Desalination Project (Port Stanvac) 32 3.6 Summary 34

Chapter Four: Part 3A and the Critical Infrastructure Process 4.1 Introduction 36 4.2 Developments Assessed Under Part 3A 36 4.3 Development Assessment Process for Part 3A Projects 37 4.4 Government Rationale for Introducing Part 3A 38 4.5 Major Projects As Critical Infrastructure 40 4.6 Responses to Part 3A – Views of Commentators 40 4.7 Summary 45

Chapter Five: The Kurnell Desalination Plant and the Critical Infrastructure Process 5.1 Introduction 47 5.2 Key Concerns About the Desalination Plant and Critical Infrastructure 48 Assessment Process 5.3 Key Lessons for the Critical Infrastructure Assessment Process 59 5.4 Summary 65

Chapter Six: Conclusion 6.1 Introduction 67 6.2 General Overview 67 6.3 Research Findings 68 6.4 Suggestions for Further Research 72 6.5 Final Remarks 73

References 75 Newspaper Articles 82 Submissions 85

Appendices 86

Table of Contents iii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1 Water usage in OECD countries 11 Figure 2.2 Change in water use in Australia (1983-84 and 1996-97) 11 Figure 2.3 Water consumption in Australia by sector (2000-01 and 2004-05) 12 Figure 2.4 Household water consumption per capita in Australia (2000-01 13 and 2004-05) Figure 2.5 Residential water consumption (kL/person/year) 13 Figure 2.6 Per capita per day demand trends (1991-2008) 14 Figure 2.7 Mean annual rainfall in Australia (1900-2008) 16 Figure 2.8 Sydney’s dam levels (1960-2006) 16 Figure 2.9 Annual mean temperature anomalies for Australia 18 Figure 2.10 Trends in annual total rainfall 1960-2008 (mm/10yrs) 18 Figure 3.1 Perth’s dam levels (2002-2009) 25 Figure 3.2 South East Queensland’s dam levels (2000-2007) 30 Figure 5.1 Themes raised in articles from the Sydney Morning Herald 50 Figure 5.2 Dam levels in the Sydney catchment area 60

APPENDICES

Appendix A Parliamentary Inquiry into Sydney’s Water Supply – Terms of Reference Appendix B Part 3A of the EP&A Act assessment process Appendix C Kurnell desalination plant timeline Appendix D Newspaper articles from the Sydney Morning Herald Appendix E Submissions to the Parliamentary Inquiry into Sydney’s Water Supply Appendix F Submissions to the Department of Planning on the environmental assessment of the Kurnell plant

List of Figures and Appendices iv

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

1.1 PROBLEM SETTING Strong public and stakeholder opposition to proposed developments has a recognised history in Australia. Noteworthy occurrences include the first green ban conducted in Australia in the 1970s by the New South Wales (NSW) Builders Labourers‟ Federation (BLF) in Hunters Hill to protect the undeveloped bushland of Kelly‟s Bush. The success of this ban led to more such bans, most notably the green ban in The Rocks, which successfully led to the protection of historic buildings from being demolished as part of the NSW Government‟s redevelopment plans. These green bans led to the inclusion of „public participation‟ as an object of the NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act) (Burgmann and Burgmann 1999).

Governments‟ assessment and approval of developments remains controversial to this day. A recent case in point is the NSW Government‟s insertion of Part 3A (Major infrastructure and other projects) into the EP&A Act on 1 August 2005. The stated aim was to encourage investment by streamlining the assessment and approval process for major projects. However, local governments, environmentalists, community groups and the general public have vehemently opposed the legislation since its inception on the grounds it reduces scope for public participation, judicial review and merit appeals.

Further opposition to Part 3A of the EP&A Act has erupted for projects deemed critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure projects are any development “that, in the opinion of the Minister [for Planning], is essential for the State for economic, environmental or social reasons” (section 75C). For these projects, the legislation excludes appeal rights by proponents and objectors, third party appeals and the application of all environmental planning instruments (other than State Environmental Planning Policies (SEPPs), which the Minister may not need to consider unless the SEPP specifically states compliance is required).

Sydney‟s Kurnell desalination plant was the first project the Minister deemed critical infrastructure under Part 3A, just three months after the legislation was introduced. The proposal to build a plant received overwhelming opposition from the public. Despite the strong public opposition, the Minister approved the application for the plant in November

Chapter One – Introduction 1

2006. The plant is expected to start producing desalinated water for Sydney this coming summer. The contentious project offers potential insights into Part 3A and the process of conceiving, assessing and approving critical infrastructure projects in NSW, and Australia more broadly.

1.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK This thesis draws on academic literature on Part 3A and the NSW planning system. The academic literature provides a critique of the NSW Government‟s rationale for Part 3A. However, much of this literature provides an overview of Part 3A from a conceptual or „philosophical‟ perspective, rather than a particular emphasis on critical infrastructure projects or any case study in detail to analyse the Part 3A process.

There is also limited academic literature on desalination within an Australian planning context as it is an emerging technology in Australia. The majority of the literature has been written from an engineering perspective. This thesis seeks to make a contribution to the small body of existing planning literature on desalination, with a particular focus on the assessment and approval process for critical infrastructure projects under the NSW planning system. It is a central conceptual view of this thesis that the critical infrastructure process should be governed by the key philosophical drivers behind the defining characteristics of the introduction of the Act, such as public participation, government transparency and accountability (for example, through access to the Courts to challenge government decisions) and the role of local government.

1.3 CONTEXT The NSW Planning System The EP&A Act 1979 sets the framework for the NSW planning system, including the assessment of development applications by local government, State Government and agencies. Development proposals that fall under Part 5 (Environmental Assessment) of the Act are assessed by local councils or State Government agencies. They are “often infrastructure proposals, such as roads, water supply dams and sewage treatment plants” and are called „development without consent‟ (NSW DoP 2009a).

Most development proposals in NSW are assessed by local councils or accredited certifiers under Part 4 (Development Assessment) of the Act (NSW DoP 2009a). These include local developments which require the lodgement of a development application with the local

Chapter One – Introduction 2 council. The development may also be complying development if it is considered a common or routine proposal. However, in limited circumstances, the NSW Minister for Planning may be the approval authority for Part 4 developments, which include those that fall under Schedule 6 of State Environmental Planning Policy (Major Projects) 2005.

The SEPP also encompasses major projects assessed under Part 3A of the EP&A Act. These include state significant developments, which are “major infrastructure or other development that, in the opinion of the Minister, is of State or regional environmental planning significance” (EP&A Act, s75B(2a)). Critical infrastructure projects are also listed in the SEPP under Schedule 5 (EP&A Act, s75B(1)(a)).

Since 5 December 2008 the Minister for Planning can delegate, to the newly formed Planning Assessment Commission (PAC), the assessment and approval of specific classes of Part 3A projects in which the Minister may have a conflict of interest (NSW DoP 2009b). However, delegation to the PAC does not apply to critical infrastructure projects (NSW DoP 2009b).

1.4 RESEARCH STATEMENT The declaration by the NSW Minister for Planning of the Kurnell desalination plant as critical infrastructure under Part 3A (section 75C) of the NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 in November2005 ignited considerable opposition from the media, stakeholders and the community at large. Concerns were raised regarding the need for desalination and the environmental assessment process for critical infrastructure projects. This thesis assesses the content of these concerns and recommends ways to improve the critical infrastructure process and legislation.

Specifically, through a review of the Government‟s rationale for the plant, the media and stakeholders‟ response to the plant and the critical infrastructure process applied to the plant, this thesis assesses how the existing process could be improved, and whether amendments may be needed to the legislation itself in order for the NSW Government to achieve greater community acceptance for critical infrastructure projects. The aim is to contribute to the existing literature on Part 3A of the EP&A Act and the emerging planning-focused literature on desalination in Australia.

Chapter One – Introduction 3

The thesis addresses the following research questions:  What was the context in which desalination became an option for Sydney and other Australian cities?  What were governments‟ rationales for investing in desalination in Australian cities, in particular the NSW Government‟s rationale for the Kurnell plant?  What environmental assessment requirements were necessary for the approval of these plants and government rationales for these processes, in particular the Part 3A and critical infrastructure process (section 75C) of the NSW EP&A Act for the Kurnell plant?  What were the views of the public on desalination and the environmental assessment process, in particular the media, key stakeholders and community‟s views of the Kurnell desalination plant and the Part 3A (critical infrastructure) process applied to it?  Based on these views, in what way could the NSW Government improve the implementation of the critical infrastructure assessment process, and what amendments may be needed to the legislation itself, to achieve greater community support for critical infrastructure projects?

I will argue that a key lesson arising from the desalination case is for the existing assessment process to be more transparent in order to attain greater community support. Transparency is needed both in terms of identifying the need for a piece of critical infrastructure per se, and in the identification of the specific infrastructure solution to address that need. This can be achieved within the current legislation if the Government articulates more clearly and effectively to the public its rationale for decisions on the assessment of developments. The legislation may also need to be reviewed to ensure that Part 3A is consistent with the objects of the Act, particularly those relating to governance, public participation and the protection of the environment. Whilst this thesis focuses on the critical infrastructure process as it applies to the Kurnell desalination plant, the findings are likely to be applicable to the assessment process as it would apply to other critical infrastructure projects.

1.5 METHODOLOGY The methodology for this thesis consists of examining qualitative and quantitative data. Methodologically, this thesis begins with an analysis of a range of existing literature and data on the urban water crisis, desalination and the Part 3A process. From here, the thesis progresses to primary research through assembling secondary data for the purposes of further (original) examination, and primary investigation of qualitative data from numerous sources.

Chapter One – Introduction 4

1.5.1 Qualitative Research This thesis has a strong foundation in qualitative research with the utilisation of a range of qualitative data sources. An analysis of the Part 3A legislation and critical infrastructure process was undertaken to provide the context for this thesis. This was supported by a review of academic literature and government publications on Part 3A and the planning system in general, including planning circulars and fact sheets. Government reports, such as the 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan, were also used to determine government positions on water supply options, including the investment in desalination.

To analyse the media and public‟s perceptions of both the Kurnell plant and Part 3A, new research was undertaken. The main method of research was an analysis of newspaper articles. All reports from the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) between 12 July 2005 and 22 December 2006 concerning the Kurnell desalination plant and/or Part 3A of the EP&A Act were examined – 45 articles in total. I have drawn on these newspaper reports as representative of media perceptions about desalination and its passage through the planning system. The articles cover the main events in the approvals process for the Kurnell desalination plant. They span the period from Premier Bob Carr‟s announcement that a desalination plant would be built in Kurnell (July 2005) through to the NSW Government‟s call for expressions of interest to build and operate the plant, in preparation for the possibility of it being built if dam levels dropped to 30% (December 2006).

The media articles from the 18-month period were grouped into four time periods to correlate with significant events in the Kurnell desalination plant approvals process:  12 July 2005–23 July 2005 – Premier Bob Carr announced that a desalination plant would be built in Kurnell as a long-term solution for Sydney.  20 August 2005–2 November 2005 – Premier Morris Iemma announced a desalination plant would be built „drought or no drought‟.  17 November 2005–19 January 2006 – Minister for Planning, Frank Sartor, declared the desalination plant critical infrastructure under Part 3A of the EP&A Act, and authorised the submission of a concept plan which was publicly exhibited for comment.  9 February 2006–22 December 2006 – Premier Iemma deferred the desalination plant „indefinitely‟ with construction dependent on dams falling to 30% of capacity. Dams later fell to a record low of 36.7% and in December 2006 the Government called for expressions of interest to build and construct a desalination plant. Chapter One – Introduction 5

Media perceptions often shape and correspond to public perceptions, but that cannot be assumed. Hence, to explain how media responses correspond to stakeholder and public views, I also analysed submissions from community stakeholders concerning the desalination plant. I analysed a sample of submissions to the Parliamentary Inquiry into Sydney‟s Water Supply, which was established (self-referred) on 1 December 2005 to report on the long-term sustainable management of Sydney‟s water supply (Legislative Council 2006). The Inquiry‟s terms of reference are reproduced in Appendix A. The public was asked to make submissions from 2 December 2005 to 17 February 2006. One hundred and thirty six submissions were received. The submission period coincided with drought and water consumption that reduced dam levels to below 40% during the second half of 2005 (Legislative Council 2006). The Committee‟s final report was published on 8 June 2006.

As media articles were the primary method of research, only a sample of submissions to the Inquiry was examined. Ten submissions to the inquiry that addressed desalination were chosen from a range of key stakeholders, including environmental groups, community groups, local government, members of parliament and academics. It should be noted that all but one of the 10 submissions analysed was submitted after Iemma‟s announcement of the deferral of the Kurnell desalination plant until dams reached 30%, providing stakeholders with a context to comment on the approvals process under Part 3A and alternative water supply options.

The submissions to the Parliamentary Inquiry into Sydney‟s Water Supply were supplemented by submissions to the Department of Planning (DoP). The public was asked to make submissions during the public exhibition of the Environmental Assessment (EA) on the Kurnell desalination plant from 24 November 2005 to 3 February 2006 (exceeding the 30- day statutory requirement). DoP received 762 submissions from a range of stakeholders. The small number of submissions made available (from environmental groups, local government and professional institutions) were analysed.

1.5.2 Quantitative Research The media and key stakeholders raised a range of issues relating to desalination and Part 3A within each newspaper article and submission. I categorised these issues into seven emerging themes: alternative water supply options, governance, public administration, Part 3A concerns, democracy, NIMBYism and conflicting advice. These themes reflect the concerns of the media and key stakeholders regarding the NSW Government‟s rationale for the

Chapter One – Introduction 6

Kurnell desalination plant and the critical infrastructure assessment process applied to it. These themes were analysed to determine their frequency, providing an indication of the media‟s and key stakeholder‟s main concerns in quantitative terms. Therefore, as a secondary source, the newspaper articles and submissions were uniquely analysed to become a primary source.

Additionally, the thesis draws on statistical data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Bureau of Meteorology (BoM), Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), and the Department of Climate Change. Data from the Sydney Catchment Authority (SCA) on dam levels were also examined to determine the extent of Sydney‟s water shortage problem and to understand the NSW Government‟s decision to build a desalination plant.

1.6 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS The following limitations were evident in the research process and need to be considered when reading this thesis:  The limited scholarly planning literature on desalination within the context of Part 3A meant that government publications, newspaper articles and submissions were relied upon to ascertain the views of the Government, media, key stakeholders and public on desalination and Part 3A. However, these sources were appropriate given the aims of the thesis.  Only newspaper articles from the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) were chosen as it is one of Sydney‟s premier newspapers. Therefore, the findings reflect the views expressed by SMH journalists and editors. Articles pertaining to desalination and Part 3A were chosen from an 18-month period corresponding to the peak period of media and stakeholder comment on these issues. The chosen period concludes in December 2006 when the Government had finally decided to construct the desalination plant with the commencement of the tender process, thereby ending the approvals process which is the focus of this thesis.  For the submissions to DoP on the EA of the Kurnell desalination plant, research was limited to submissions that were publicly available (four). I attempted to obtain more submissions by approaching DoP but there were alleged problems of confidentiality that prevented me from accessing them. As these submissions were intended as a cross check for the issues being raised in the newspaper articles, additional submissions were not sought through a freedom of information request. In addition, Chapter One – Introduction 7

an understanding of the common issues raised in the submissions has been ascertained from Sydney Water‟s Preferred Project Report which analyses the submissions to DoP.  The views of the minority in support of desalination and Part 3A have potentially been overshadowed by opposing views. However, to achieve the aims of this thesis, the concerns of the media and key stakeholders regarding the assessment of critical infrastructure projects need to be ascertained, in order to provide recommendations to improve it.  I have used submissions from a range of stakeholders to test whether the media‟s concerns align with those of stakeholders. I have found that they do and so have taken the views expressed by the media and stakeholders to be representative of the general public.  From an analysis of media and stakeholder views, this thesis makes recommendations that may be necessary pre-requisites for the Government to win community support for critical infrastructure projects. However, community reactions to Government policies cannot be predicted and so the recommendations made in this thesis are presented as a necessary pre-condition to, but not an assurance of winning, community acceptance.  As with any analytical work, the thesis is limited to my interpretation of the issues raised by the media, key stakeholders and community. This would have influenced how I categorised issues into themes for instance. Additionally, these issues were categorised into broad themes so some details may have been lost. However, I have tried to capture and refer to these where time and space allows.

1.7 THESIS STRUCTURE Chapter One: Introduction This introductory chapter has provided the context, purpose, scope and methodology of this thesis. It outlined the problem setting and theoretical framework used for this study. The research statement identified the purpose and objectives of this thesis while the methodology outlined how these will be achieved. This chapter also identified the limitations of the research and provided a brief description of the content of each chapter in this thesis.

Chapter Two: Australia’s recent urban water crisis Chapter Two sets the context in which desalination recently emerged as a water supply solution for Sydney and other Australian cities. It analyses the literature on the factors Chapter One – Introduction 8 influencing Australia‟s recent urban water crisis. Through an analysis of quantitative and qualitative data, this chapter investigates the impact of household water consumption, population growth and climate change on water shortages in Australia. Government options for managing the water crisis are also examined.

Chapter Three: The desalination decade Chapter Three investigates the introduction of desalination plants for Australia‟s major cities. The Perth, Victorian, Gold Coast and Adelaide desalination plants are examined in respect to their status, location, production capacity, rationale, community opinions and environmental assessment process. The chapter provides a context and points of comparison for discussion of Sydney‟s Kurnell desalination plant and its passage through the NSW planning system.

Chapter Four: Part 3A and the critical infrastructure process Chapter Four describes the legislation governing the environmental assessment process for major infrastructure projects in NSW. The chapter places a particular emphasis on section 75C of Part 3A of the EP&A Act, pertaining to critical infrastructure projects, to provide an understanding of the process applied to the Kurnell desalination plant. The chapter also outlines the NSW Government‟s rationale for introducing Part 3A and the various views of commentators.

Chapter Five: The Kurnell desalination plant and the critical infrastructure process Chapter Five analyses in detail the critical infrastructure process applied to the Kurnell desalination plant. It identifies the concerns raised by the media and key stakeholders about the desalination plant and critical infrastructure legislation. It proposes that the key lesson from the case study is a need for greater transparency in the environmental assessment process for critical infrastructure projects, within the current legislation and with amendments to the legislation, if the Government is to achieve greater community acceptance of these projects. It should be noted that this chapter is longer than the preceding chapters as it contains primary research and material that forms the core of this thesis.

Chapter Six: Conclusion The final chapter of this thesis revisits the relevant literature, research findings and recommendations examined in the previous five chapters. It examines how the research statement and questions provided in Chapter One have been addressed and identifies further research opportunities.

Chapter One – Introduction 9

CHAPTER TWO AUSTRALIA’S RECENT URBAN WATER CRISIS

2.1 INTRODUCTION The focus of this thesis is to provide the NSW Government with recommendations to improve the assessment and approvals process for critical infrastructure as it applied to the Kurnell desalination plant. This chapter aims to set the context in which desalination recently emerged as a water supply solution for Sydney and other Australian cities. The media, researchers and government have coined severe water shortages, the ‗urban water crisis‘ (Haertsch 2005). Through the analysis of literature, the factors influencing Australia‘s most recent urban water crisis are examined, including household water consumption, population growth and climate change.

2.2 WATER DEMAND AND SUPPLY IN AUSTRALIAN CITIES Australians are historically large water consumers. In 2003, Australia consumed the second largest volume of freshwater per person than any other OECD country (OECD 2003), as shown in Figure 2.1. The 1980s and 1990s were characterised by significant increases in water consumption across Australia. Between 1983/84 and 1996/97, for instance, the volume of water used increased by 65% (Farmhand Foundation 2004, Figure 2.2). Agriculture and the household sectors have typically been the largest consumers of water (see Figure 2.3, ABS 2006). Household use includes water for drinking, cooking, cleaning and outdoors (ABS 2006, 98). In 2004-05, household water use accounted for about 11% (2,108,263 ML) of total water consumed in Australia with the majority of household water being used for outdoor purposes (44%) such as watering gardens (ABS 2006). Notwithstanding Australians record of high water use, our per capita water consumption, including in the agricultural and household sectors, has been falling over the last decade.

Chapter Two – Australia‘s Recent Urban Water Crisis 10

Figure 2.1 – Water usage in OECD countries

Source: (OECD 2003).

Figure 2.2 – Change in water use in Australia (1983-84 and 1996-97)

Source: (NLWRA 2000).

Chapter Two – Australia‘s Recent Urban Water Crisis 11

Figure 2.3 – Water consumption in Australia by sector (2000-01 and 2004-05)

Source: (ABS 2006).

Residential water use typically accounts for over half the water consumed in cities in developed countries (NSW Government 2006) and as such, is a useful indicator of water demand in urban areas. During the first five years of this decade, household per capita water consumption fell in Australia by approximately 16%, from 120 kL/capita in 2000-01 to 103 kL/capita in 2004-05 as shown in Figure 2.4 (ABS 2006). Consumption fell in all states and territories. Residential water consumption in Australia‘s major cities has also been progressively declining, with the exception of Darwin (where there is no water supply shortage), as illustrated in Figure 2.5 (WSAA 2009). This decline may be partly attributed to mandatory water restrictions that have been in place in most states and territories since 2002, which predominantly focussed on reducing outdoor water use (ABS 2007a). The volume of water used for outdoor purposes fell by 8% (169,910ML) on 2000-01 usage levels (ABS 2006). The reduction may have also resulted from many Australians voluntarily conserving water by adopting water saving practices and installing water saving devices, such as dual flush toilets (ABS 2007a). The trend in per capita water use for Sydney illustrates both the declining household water use and the sensitivity of water use to restriction regimes (Figure 2.6). However, notwithstanding stable and declining per capita residential water use, Australian cities are experiencing water shortages.

Chapter Two – Australia‘s Recent Urban Water Crisis 12

Figure 2.4 –Household water consumption per capita in Australia (2000-01 and 2004- 05)

Source: (ABS 2006).

Figure 2.5 – Residential water consumption (kL/person/year)

Source: (WSAA 2009).

Chapter Two – Australia‘s Recent Urban Water Crisis 13

Figure 2.6 – Per capita per day demand trends (1991-2008)

Source: (Sydney Water 2007).

All things being equal, population growth increases the volume of water needed to support a population and reduces the effect of falls in per capita consumption. Population growth occurs as a result of natural increase (number of births less the number of deaths) and net migration (number of immigrants less the number of emigrants) (ABS 2007a). Natural increase and net migration contributed 38% and 62% respectively to total population growth in the 12 months to 2008 (ABS 2009). If current trends in fertility, life expectancy at birth and migration continue, Australia‘s population could range between 25 and 33 million people by the year 2051 (ABS 2007a), up from a current population of 22 million (ABS 2009). Population distribution is uneven within states and territories with trends in natural increase and migration patterns resulting in the majority of the population located in two widely-separated coastal regions (ABS 2007a). In 2006, the major cities of Australia were home to 13.6 million people or two-thirds of Australia‘s population, compared to just 506,000 people, or 2.5% of the total population living in remote or very remote areas of Australia (ABS 2007a). This trend is expected to continue with predictions for higher growth rates in all capital cities, compared to regional and rural areas (ABS 2007a). The increased demand arising from population growth thus must be serviced by the handful of water systems supplying Australia‘s major cities (ABS 2007a).

Chapter Two – Australia‘s Recent Urban Water Crisis 14

Population growth is one key factor in water supply-demand deficits now and into the future. The Queensland Government, for instance, stated that the purpose of the 2008 South East Queensland Water Strategy is: ―to lay down a responsible plan for providing new water supplies to prevent the development of any gap between supply and demand in the face of certain population growth and probable climate change impacts‖ (Queensland Government 2008, 11).

The NSW Government also acknowledges the importance of population growth in water planning, stating: ―[t]he major review of the [2006 metropolitan water] plan by 2009 will continue the plan‘s adaptive approach and will identify the most appropriate mix of measures to supply water for a growing population for the longer term‖ (NSW Government 2008, 7).

On the supply side, water management approaches in most Australian cities are fundamentally influenced by Australia‘s generally low and highly variable rainfall pattern. Australia is the world‘s driest inhabited continent with an annual average rainfall of 472 millimetres (mm) (ABS 2007a). Rainfall varies considerably within Australia from region- to-region, year-to-year and from season-to-season (ABS 2007a). Since ―annual rainfall variability is greater for Australia than any other continental region‖, it is important to examine trends in rainfall in Australia, comparing rainfall from year-to-year and season-to- season (Smith 1998 in ABS 2006, 1). Figure 2.7 illustrates that Australia‘s climate is characterised by high rainfall variability (ABS 2007a, 53). This rainfall pattern—of several years with above average rain followed by years of drought—is also experienced in cities. It translates to considerable variability in dam levels over time, as shown in Sydney‘s dam levels between 1960 and 2006 (Figure 2.8). Consequently, to secure water supplies, Australia stores more surface and ground water per person than any other country, at more than 4 million litres per person (ABS 2007a and NLWRA 2000). Australia‘s major urban centres, except for Perth, are overwhelmingly reliant on surface water sources, in particular large dams replenished by rivers (Marsden and Pickering 2006). Australian cities‘ dependence on rivers and dams for their water supply is problematic as these sources rely heavily on rainfall for their replenishment (ABS 2007a). According to Davidson (2008), water usage in Australian cities is unsustainable because urban populations have grown beyond the capacity of the catchments which are subject to variable patterns of rainfall. In any case, the most recent urban water crisis was due to the drought in many parts of Australia leading to

Chapter Two – Australia‘s Recent Urban Water Crisis 15 considerable (and often rapid) falls in dam storage levels, these low levels being unable to support typical (and even reduced) demand over the medium-term, and dams being the chief water supply for that city.

Figure 2.7 – Mean annual rainfall in Australia (1900-2008)

Source: (BOM 2009a).

Figure 2.8 – Sydney’s dam levels (1960-2006)

Source: (NSW Government 2006).

Chapter Two – Australia‘s Recent Urban Water Crisis 16

It is also generally accepted that climate change is impacting on water supply and demand in Australia. Some argue that the main cause of drought in Australia is El Nino, which is the warming of the surface water over the central and eastern tropical Pacific Ocean, altering weather patterns and causing drier conditions (ABS 2007a, 6). However, climate change (the long-term changes in climate caused by greenhouse gases in the atmosphere) is also commonly cited in relation to the urban water crisis (Department of Climate Change 2008). Climate change is associated with higher temperatures, changed rainfall patterns, increased evaporation (reducing run-off that flows into the water supply system), and longer and more intense droughts (increasing the demand for water – for example, watering gardens).

According to the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation‘s (CSIRO) climate change estimates, Australia is becoming hotter and drier (Department of Climate Change 2008). Figure 2.9 shows annual mean temperatures for Australia were predominantly above the standard 1961-90 average for almost the last 30 years. In 2008, Australia‘s annual mean temperature was 0.410C above the standard average, ―making it the nation‘s 14th warmest year since comparable records began in 1910‖ (BOM 2009a). The impacts of climate change are already evident in Sydney with temperatures rising by 0.80C since 1950 (CSIRO 2007). In relation to rainfall, Figure 2.10 shows that rainfall has declined over southern and eastern Australia over the last 50 years while increasing across the north-west (BOM 2009b). Inflows to the water storages of Australia‘s five largest cities have halved since 1997 (Department of Climate Change 2008). Increased temperatures and declining rainfall have reduced runoff into Sydney‘s dams by 43% of long-term average inflows since 1997 (Department of Climate Change 2008). Further declines in runoff and dam levels are expected (Department of Climate Change 2008) with more severe droughts predicted for Australia according to Australian National University researcher Dr Mike Gagan (ABC 2008). Tim Flannery (2007), Professor of Earth and Life Sciences at Macquarie University, Chair of the Copenhagen Climate Council and the 2007 Australian of the Year, supports the view that the gradual increase of the Earth‘s average surface temperature (global warming) is contributing to Australia‘s decline in rainfall, which has seen southern and eastern Australia lose about 20% of its rainfall over the past 50 years.

Chapter Two – Australia‘s Recent Urban Water Crisis 17

Figure 2.9 – Annual mean temperature anomalies for Australia

Source: (BOM 2009a).

Figure 2.10 – Trends in annual total rainfall 1960-2008 (mm/10yrs)

Source: (BOM 2009b).

Chapter Two – Australia‘s Recent Urban Water Crisis 18

As the impacts of climate change and global warming on increasing temperatures, evaporation and the frequency and severity of droughts develop, limited water supplies will dwindle as demand outstrips supply. State governments in Australia recognise the increasing severity of the water shortage problem in their water strategies. For example, in the 2008 Metropolitan Water Plan Progress Report, the NSW Government states that with the current measures in place, including recycling and water efficiency, supplies will only meet demand from a growing population to at least 2015 (NSW Government 2008, 7). To balance water supply and demand, governments must understand the impacts of climate change and respond accordingly (NSW Government 2008). It is in this context that most state governments have been looking at the options for managing the urban water crisis.

2.3 OPTIONS FOR MANAGING THE WATER CRISIS This section outlines the potential approaches, and some of the Australian governments‘ responses, to current or potential water shortages, with a particular focus on strategies that have been introduced in Sydney. In general, initiatives can focus on reducing demand for water and/or increasing or diversifying water supplies.

2.3.1 Demand reduction mechanisms Water restrictions Australia has a history of using water restrictions to address water shortages and the general public is in the main accepting of a reasonable level of water restrictions. To reduce consumption during periods of limited rainfall, governments in most states and territories have enforced mandatory water restrictions and introduced water saving education campaigns, with considerable success in terms of behavioural change. A study by Randolph and Troy (2008) explores the impact of water policies on attitudes to conservation and water consumption. The findings of a survey conducted between December 2004 and April 2005 of 2,179 Sydney households suggest that restrictions and associated media campaigns by the NSW Government had influenced internal water use, with 75% of households stating they had changed the way they used water inside their homes since the enforcement of restrictions (Randolph and Troy 2008, 450). While water restrictions may seem a cheap and easy option for governments to tackle the urban water crisis, they have direct economic costs, particularly for water-reliant industries such as horticulture, and indirect costs such as the additional hours people spend watering gardens with hand-held hoses. As dam levels have risen back to moderate levels, state governments have lifted mandatory restrictions, in many

Chapter Two – Australia‘s Recent Urban Water Crisis 19 cases introducing permanent water saving rules such as only allowing garden watering before 10am or after 4pm.

Water pricing Governments have also raised, or considered raising, the price of water and/or instituting differential water pricing to reduce water demand. Randolph and Troy (2008) also examined the public‘s opinions on these issues. More respondents believed that water pricing did not encourage conservation (44%) compared to those who thought it did (34%) (Randolph and Troy 2008). This is consistent with the view that demand for water is quite inelastic (not responsive to changes in price). Respondents were also asked whether increasing water prices to lower water use was reasonable. Sixty per cent did not think water prices should be increased to lower use, while, in a separate question, half (52%) did not agree with price increases to fund programs to improve water conservation (Randolph and Troy 2008). Those against increased water prices argued they had a ‗right‘ to water, that they ―should not be asked to pay more to meet conservation objectives or to reduce environmental stresses that they feel are primarily caused by others‖, or that education and behaviour would be more effective in reducing consumption (Randolph and Troy 2008, 449). Conversely, of those who agreed to increased prices to fund general policies to improve conservation (40%), half stated a 5% limit to price rises (Randolph and Troy 2008). Some argued the need to increase pricing to increase water supply, such as revenue to build new dams (Randolph and Troy 2008). By contrast, differential water pricing was widely supported with three quarters (75%) of respondents believing that consumers who use more than the average amount of water should be charged an additional fee while 70% believed those who used less should be offered discounts (Randolph and Troy 2008). Interestingly, in NSW, the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART), which regulates the price that Sydneysiders pay for water, recently replaced a two-tier price structure with a single usage charge on the basis that water was no longer in short supply (IPART 2008). Randolph and Troy (2008) argue that education and awareness programs are essential for pricing policies to be effective as people must know how much water they use and how much they are charged. This is proving true in reality, for instance, the NSW Government conducted a trial of individual metering of water use in multi-unit apartment blocks which proved successful in reducing water consumption compared to one meter for the whole apartment block (NSW Government 2008, 25). As a result, the Government is investigating the utilisation of individual metering for new multi- unit apartments (NSW Government 2008, 25). Many policy makers, environmentalists and economists would argue that governments have been reticent to use water pricing to reduce

Chapter Two – Australia‘s Recent Urban Water Crisis 20 supply because of the potential impacts and be politically unpalatable on low income earners. As a result, many would argue water remains under-priced.

Water saving devices Australian governments have encouraged households to install water saving devices through a range of incentive-based, regulatory, and education schemes. The Water Efficiency Labelling and Standards (WELS) Scheme, for instance, is a joint Commonwealth, state and territory governments scheme requiring product suppliers to place water efficiency information and star-rating labels on plumbing products (such as showerheads and taps), sanitary ware (including toilets), and white goods (for example, washing machines), helping households choose more water efficient appliances (Commonwealth Government 2008). The Commonwealth Government (2008) estimates that by 2021 Australians could reduce domestic water use by 5% or 87,200 ML each year through the scheme. WELS and similar incentive schemes, such as rebates for installing water-efficient products, and free plumbing fit outs of taps and dual-flush toilets, are increasing the proportion of Australian households using water conservation devices. Governments generally recognise that the additional water savings from these measures will decline once most households and businesses install these devices.

2.3.2 Supply increase and diversification mechanisms Providing fit-for-purpose water The recent drought has seen increasing commercial, householder and Government interest in supplying water that is fit for the purpose for which it is used, rather than using potable (drinking) water for all water needs. Alternative supply options that have garnered attention and funding include rainwater and stormwater tanks, and grey water treatment and diversion systems (NSW DoP 2009c). In 2007 almost all Australian households sourced water from the mains water supply but an increasing proportion of households also used rainwater (almost 20%) (ABS 2007a). However, recycled water (drainage, waste or stormwater that has been treated to some extent and reused without first being discharged to the environment) has been a relatively minor water source in Australia, accounting for under 4% of total water supplied by water providers (ABS 2006, 149). This may be an underestimate as recycled water is not always supplied back through the main water supply system. Even so, since the 1990s there has been a considerable increase in the use of recycled water across Australia, with consumption rising from 134 GL (1% of total water supplied by water providers) in 1997-97 to 425GL in 2004-05 (4%). Households were the smallest consumers of reuse water

Chapter Two – Australia‘s Recent Urban Water Crisis 21 in Australia but experienced a ten-fold increase (167 ML to 1,767 ML) from 2000-01 to 2004-05 (ABS 2006). Recycled water use is likely to continue to increase in urban areas over the medium term given significant state governments‘ investment in recycling schemes aimed at easing pressure on precious potable water supplies.

In NSW, for example, the NSW State Environmental Planning Policy (Building Sustainability Index: BASIX) 2004 now requires new dwellings and all residential developments with a total estimated cost of works of $50,000 or more to reduce potable water consumption by, amongst other things, installing rainwater tanks and grey water systems (NSW Government 2006). The NSW Government has also established the Western Sydney Recycled Water Initiative to service new large residential growth areas (North West and South West Growth Centres) and agricultural land (NSW Government 2006). The NSW Government estimates that 12% of Sydney‘s total water needs will be met by recycled water by 2015 (NSW Government 2008). The Government does not plan to implement large scale residential recycling schemes in existing suburbs as it ―would have major impacts on the community, including excavation and restoration of local roads, vegetation clearance and potential compulsory acquisition of community and private land‖ (NSW Government 2006, 37). In addition, the large sewage treatment plants (North Head, Bondi and Malabar) are located in densely urbanised coastal areas far from dams, providing significant cost barriers to indirect potable reuse (IPR) (NSW Government 2006). In any case, the NSW Government has also ruled out introducing recycled water into dams for Sydney‘s drinking water supply. As it will be discussed, the public‘s negative reaction to the desalination plant in Sydney focused to a large extent on the Government‘s inadequate consideration to non-potable water supplies.

Infrastructure solutions In some cases, existing water infrastructure such as transportation pipes or dams can be modified at relatively low cost to increase supply. For example, work at Warragamba and Nepean Dams allows 200 billion litres of previously inaccessible water to be pumped in a severe drought, providing Sydney with an additional five or six months supply if drought restrictions are in force (NSW Government 2008, 11).

Desalination The other water supply strategy that is increasingly being implemented by governments to drought-proof Australia‘s coastal cities is desalination (ABS 2007a). As Chapter Three

Chapter Two – Australia‘s Recent Urban Water Crisis 22 shows, desalination plants will account for 17-33% of Perth, Melbourne, Adelaide and the Gold Coast‘s water supply by the end of 2011. Governments claim that desalination plants provide significant volumes of potable water with a large capital outlay but relatively low operational costs, and can be carbon-neutral if powered by renewable energy. Importantly for the Australian context, unlike most other supply options, desalination is rainfall-independent (Rayan et al. 2001 and Kemeny 2006). However, there are substantial drawbacks with desalination. As we shall see, the introduction of desalinated water into Australian cities‘ water supplies has been far from painless for the public and governments.

2.4 SUMMARY Drought, population growth, high (but declining) demand, and climate change have all been factors driving the most recent urban water crisis in Australia. Given many of these factors were known (Australian cities are generally characterised by highly variable rainfall, for instance), it is perhaps surprising that governments were taken unaware by the depth of the recent drought. Nonetheless, they have responded by investing considerably in fit-for- purpose water systems and demand management mechanisms, and planning strategically for the future. However, most state governments have considered these measures alone are not sufficient to manage their respective urban water crises. Hence, many, like the NSW Government controversially, have invested in desalination plants. The following chapter examines the introduction of desalination plants for Perth, Melbourne, Adelaide and the Gold Coast.

Chapter Two – Australia‘s Recent Urban Water Crisis 23

CHAPTER THREE THE DESALINATION DECADE

3.1 INTRODUCTION During the last ten years, Australian state governments collectively committed billions of dollars to desalination plants to secure water supplies. The cities of Perth, Melbourne, Adelaide, the Gold Coast and Sydney will all be supplied with desalinated water by the end of this decade, providing up to a third of each city‟s water needs. This chapter examines the Perth, Victorian, Gold Coast and Adelaide desalination plants with respect to their status, location, production capacity, rationale, community opinions and environmental assessment process. In particular, it explores government and community views on desalination plants and the environmental assessment process that has governed them, thereby providing context and points of comparison for the subsequent discussion in Chapter Five of Sydney‟s desalination plant and its passage through the NSW planning system.

3.2 WESTERN AUSTRALIA – PERTH SEAWATER DESALINATION PLANT (KWINANA) 3.2.1 Background The Perth Seawater Desalination Plant in Kwinana, 40 kilometres (km) south of Perth, on the shore of Cockburn Sound, is the first desalination plant in Australia used for large-scale public consumption (Water Corporation 2008a). Owned and operated by the Government-owned Water Corporation, the $387 million reverse osmosis (RO) desalination plant began supplying 130ML (megalitres) a day of Perth Seawater Desalination Plant water or 45GL (gigalitres) per year in November 2006. Source: (Institute of Public Works Engineers Australia Ltd 2006). The facility provides 17% of Perth‟s water needs or 80L of water per person per day, making it the city‟s biggest single water source (Water Corporation 2008a).

3.2.2 Government rationale for approval The Western Australian (WA) Government approved the desalination plant in July 2004 in response to climate change which has caused runoff into Perth‟s dams to fall by 70% over the past 30 years (Water Corporation 2008b). This has forced the Water Corporation to rely

Chapter Three – The Desalination Decade 24 more heavily on limited ground water supplies (Water Corporation 2008b) which has potentially adverse impacts on the ecosystem (WAPF 2008).

The Government‟s announcement of the desalination plant in July 2004 may be partly attributed to particularly low dam levels at the time, as evident in Figure 3.1. With a Mediterranean climate, characterised by hot dry summers and wet winters, Perth‟s dam levels generally reach their lowest points at the end of autumn and only begin recovering during winter before peaking in spring and declining during the warmer months.

Figure 3.1 – Perth’s dam levels (2002-2009)

Source: (Water Corporation 2009).

Desalination is a component of the Government‟s „Security through Diversity‟ policy which emphasises using a range of water sources to ensure a safe and reliable water supply, such as industrial water recycling, smarter use of water, water trading, catchment management, surface water, ground water and desalination (Water Corporation 2008a). Additionally, then Premier Geoff Gallop highlighted the importance of desalination to the horticultural and related industries because the increasing threat of total sprinkler bans would soon lead to job and economic losses (Government of WA 2004).

Chapter Three – The Desalination Decade 25

3.2.3 Response to the plant The main issues concerning the desalination plant raised by industry and government agencies were greenhouse gas emissions/use of green energy, noise and the impact of saline discharge on the marine environment (Water Corporation 2002). Concerns by the community and environmental groups related to the marine environment, greenhouse gas emissions, noise and Aboriginal heritage (Water Corporation 2002).

Specifically, the Perth Seawater Desalination Plant‟s potential to meet Perth‟s water needs has also been questioned. The plant was approved because of its reliability as a climate- independent water source but has closed several times “due to low levels of dissolved oxygen in Cockburn Sound and its massive draw on power during the gas crisis” (WAPF 2008). Also, there have been ongoing concerns about the impact of the saline waste product and requests to extend the effluent outfall further into Cockburn Sound or the ocean, but the Water Corporation has not done so due to economic costs (WAPF 2008). Instead, the Corporation commissioned an intensive ocean monitoring program which claimed the discharge from the plant had not altered the marine environment (Water Corporation 2008c). However, the Government‟s Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) stated the impacts of the brine discharge were “still uncertain and the marine environment of Cockburn Sound continues to be under stress” (WA EPA 2009).

Environment agencies and stakeholders are also concerned as the plant produces 231,000 tonnes of greenhouse gases per annum (WA EPA 2002 and 2004). The plant is supposed to be powered by renewable energy from the Emu Downs Wind Farm (Harries 2008). However, the Water Corporation did not purchase the Renewable Energy Certificates for this energy (Harries 2008). Therefore, the desalination plant is essentially using fossil-fuel power (Harries 2008). The Corporation seems to have accepted they are using coal-fired power and have promised to use renewable energy for the Southern Seawater Desalination Plant (SSDP) in Binningup which was approved in May 2007 (Water Corporation 2008d). The SSDP will produce 50GL of drinking water annually with potential to double capacity (Water Corporation 2008b and 2008d). Upon the completion of the plant in late 2011, more than 30% of WA‟s water supply will come from climate-independent sources (Water Corporation 2008d).

Chapter Three – The Desalination Decade 26

3.2.4 Environmental assessment requirements Upon the request of the State Government‟s EPA, the proponent, Water Corporation was required to prepare an environmental protection statement (EPS) and conduct environmental studies, including on marine water quality and biota, atmospheric emissions, and terrestrial flora and fauna (Water Corporation 2002). The EPS was referred to the EPA who commented on the proposal and publicly released the EPS and comments (Water Corporation 2002). Appeals against the proposal were assessed by the Minister for the Environment and Heritage who consulted with the relevant decision making authorities before issuing a statement of approval (Water Corporation 2002).

3.3 VICTORIA – VICTORIAN DESALINATION PLANT (VDP) (WONTHAGGI) 3.3.1 Background On 19 June 2007, the Victorian Government announced the $3.1 billion RO Victorian Desalination Plant (VDP) scheduled to begin construction in October and be completed by the end of 2011 (VIC DPCD 2009a). The plant is intended Site of the proposed Victorian Desalination Plant to provide up to 150ML per year of water Source: (Ker 2009). from the Bass Strait, around a third of Melbourne‟s annual water supply, to Melbourne, Geelong, Westernport and South Gippsland, with capacity to later expand to 200ML/year (VIC DPCD 2009a and VIC Government 2009). The plant is proposed to be located on a 264 hectare site of mainly cleared farmland between the mouth of the Powlett River and Williamsons beach, approximately 90km south-east of Melbourne between Wonthaggi and Kilcunda in the South Gippsland region (VIC DPCD 2009b).

3.3.2 Government rationale for approval The Victorian Government proposed the desalination plant in accordance with its Our Water Our Future: The next stage of the Government’s water plan to secure Victoria‟s water supplies through a rainfall-independent source (VIC DPCD 2009b). Average inflow into Melbourne‟s dams has almost halved from 608GL/year (1913-1997) to 389GL/year (1998- 2008), a drop of almost 40% in the past 12 years (Melbourne Water 2009). Water supplies will continue to be under pressure with daily water consumption per person ranging from 130L in winter to as much as 200L in summer, and Melbourne‟s population expected to rise

Chapter Three – The Desalination Decade 27 to 4.6 million by 2050 (Melbourne Water 2009) from a current population of 3.8 million (ABS 2007b). It is expected that once desalination is implemented, water storages will begin to recover in 2012 and restrictions progressively eased (VIC Government 2009).

The Government considers that any economic impacts on regional agriculture or on marine- based commercial activities from the development will be relatively minor compared to the economic and social benefits of the project (VIC DPCD 2009b). In addition, the Victorian Government has committed to offsetting 100% of the electricity used to operate the desalination plant and transfer pipeline through the purchase of renewable energy certificates (VIC DPCD 2009b).

3.3.3 Response to the plant Research commissioned by the protest group Your Water Your Say, has questioned the long term need for desalination (Doherty 2008). The research argues that even with population growth and climate change reducing rainfall, dams would be overflowing by 2014 if desalination was approved, and Melburnians would still be paying extra for water to recover the costs of building and running the plant (Doherty 2008). Protestors also claim to have found alternative sources of water to secure Melbourne‟s water supply, including the Tarago connection, Sugerloaf interconnector and Eastern Treatment Plant upgrade (Doherty 2008). They have also raised concerns that a reliance on desalination may hinder implementation of more sustainable alternative methods of water supply, such as recycling (Doherty 2008).

Four hundred and five written submissions were received in relation to the VDP (VIC DPCD 2009b). The major issues raised included environmental impacts on the landscape, native flora and fauna; energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions; visual impacts; and waste management and disposal (VIC DPCD 2008).

3.3.4 Environmental assessment requirements On 28 December 2007, the Minister for Planning decided that an Environmental Effects Statement (EES), which is intended to assess the potential environmental impacts of the desalination plant, was required under the Environment Effects Act 1978 (VIC DPCD 2009b). The proponent, the Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE) prepared an EES for public exhibition encompassing a broad range of issues, including energy efficiency and greenhouse gas emissions; marine and terrestrial ecology; visual impacts; waste management; management of environmental effects; and ecologically sustainable development (VIC

Chapter Three – The Desalination Decade 28

DPCD 2009b). Despite the apparent broad scope of the issues addressed in the EES, the community raised concerns that a number of key issues were excluded, such as the performance of the pilot plant, and investigations of alternative locations for the plant and alternative water solutions (for example, recycling and stormwater harvesting) (Bass Coast Shire Council 2008). The adequacy of the EES was further criticised for being completed in less than eight months despite it being the largest public infrastructure project undertaken in Victoria (Bass Coast Shire Council 2008).

Under Commonwealth Government legislation, the plant was granted approval under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (EPBC Act) 1999 in relation to wetlands of international importance and listed threatened species and communities (VIC DPCD 2009b).

3.4 QUEENSLAND – GOLD COAST DESALINATION PROJECT (TUGUN) 3.4.1 Background In 2005 the Queensland Government announced the $1.12 billion Gold Coast Desalination Project (SKM 2009) on a former landfill site, the Tugun Waste Management Facility (GCD Alliance 2008). The plant has the capacity to supply up to 133 ML of water a day, enough for 650,000 people, around

25% of Brisbane‟s daily water needs Gold Coast Desalination Plant (WaterSecure 2009a) with potential to Source: (Faversham House Group Ltd 2009). increase capacity to 170ML/day (SKM 2009).

3.4.2 Government rationale for approval Desalination is part of the South East Queensland (SEQ) Water Strategy, SEQ Regional Drought Strategy Contingency Supply Plan and the Gold Coast Waterfuture (GCWF) Strategy which provides a blueprint for sustainably managing the city‟s water supply over the next 50 years, particularly as population growth will increase demand for water from 185ML/day (2005) to 466ML/day by 2056 (GCCC 2009).

Chapter Three – The Desalination Decade 29

These strategies recognise that traditional water supply strategies have relied heavily on dams which have become less reliable due to reduced rainfall from climate change. Dam levels dropped considerably from 100% capacity in February 2001 to 17% in August 2007 (Figure 3.2) (Seqwater 2009), corresponding to the 2005/2006 period in which the desalination plant was proposed in response to the “worst drought on record” and “the fifth consecutive year of below average rainfall and inflow in the larger regional water storages” (GCD Alliance 2008, 1). However, dam levels have since steadily increased to 73.8% of capacity or 1,299,128 ML (21 October 2009) but may struggle to reach 2001 levels of 100% capacity (Seqwater 2009).

Figure 3.2 – South East Queensland’s dam levels (2000-2007)

Source: (Seqwater 2009).

Due to the impacts of climate change on dam levels, like other states‟ strategies, the SEQ Water Strategy emphasises the importance of a diverse water supply, encompassing rainwater tanks, recycling water, reducing consumption, augmenting existing surface water storages and desalination as an emergency climate-independent water source to reduce vulnerability to interruption (GCCC 2009).

In 2005, in response to prolonged drought conditions, Gold Coast City Council (GCCC) was required to implement an emergency bulk water source by the end of 2008 (GCCC 2009). Desalination and indirect potable reuse (IPR) were assessed (GCCC 2009). Desalination was chosen because it was a key component of the GCWF Strategy and could be implemented

Chapter Three – The Desalination Decade 30 within the 18 month timeframe since IPR would require extensive community consultation and research into treatment methods and water quality testing (GCCC 2009).

3.4.3 Response to the plant Further consultation by Gold Coast Water with 79 community members identified that 86% of respondents were supportive of desalination as an emergency bulk water source (Gold Coast Water 2005). The main concerns raised were environmental factors relating to energy use and the surrounding environment (flora and fauna), and the impact of construction and operating costs on residents (Gold Coast Water 2005).

Three hundred random telephone interviews were also conducted among Gold Coast residents who were generally supportive of desalination as an emergency water source (37%) rather than an everyday water source (3%) (GCCC 2005). The most important factors were minimising the ongoing impact on the surrounding environment (30%), and using alternative power sources to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (21%) (GCCC 2005). In response, the proponent, the State Government owned WaterSecure, powers the desalination plant using “energy recovery devices known as DWEERs to harness up to 92% of the unused energy from concentrated sea water rejected by high pressure RO units” (WaterSecure 2009a). They have also committed to offsetting greenhouse gas emissions “when assessing future power purchase agreements for the plant” (WaterSecure 2009a).

Considering the economic costs of desalination, it is of concern to the public and government that already the plant cannot be fully utilised. Since the Gold Coast Desalination Plant began operating on 26 February 2009 a number of defects have been encountered, including corroded and leaking pipes, landfill gas, and damaged and failed bolts (WaterSecure 2009b). Since opening at 33% of capacity and reaching 100% production in March, the plant was shut down for five weeks from late April to early June to rectify a number of defects, before resuming at 33% in early June (WaterSecure 2009b).

3.4.4 Environmental assessment requirements The Gold Coast Desalination Project was exempt from development approval under the GCCC town-planning scheme but was required to comply with all other approvals under Queensland‟s Integrated Planning Act (GCCC 2006). However, these approvals did not trigger the need for an EIS (GCCC 2006). Instead, the state‟s EPA was responsible for the assessment and approval of the application (GCCC 2006). The Queensland Government

Chapter Three – The Desalination Decade 31 claimed the EPA would ensure the application was rigorous and compliant with all relevant Queensland environmental legislation (GCCC 2006).

At the Commonwealth level, the desalination project was referred to the Department of Environment and Heritage under the EPBC Act but was not deemed a „controlled action‟ requiring an EIS (GCCC 2006). Since an EIS was not required by the Commonwealth or State Government, there were reports that the plant was approved without proper environmental assessment (GCCC 2006). However, to satisfy the environmental approvals process, GCD Alliance, a group of companies appointed to deliver the project, undertook a wide range of environmental studies which they claim are as extensive as those under an EIS (Gold Coast Water 2008). These included examinations of marine and terrestrial ecology; marine water quality; greenhouse gases; and visual amenity (Gold Coast Water 2008).

The Alliance was also required to prepare Construction and Operational Management Plans to minimise and manage potential impacts of the project on the environment (Gold Coast Water 2008). Gold Coast Water (2008) (bought by WaterSecure) argued the requirement for environmental studies and management plans was consistent with the requirements of an EIS. However, unlike a formal EIS, the proponent was not required to consult the community before approval and construction of the desalination plant due to the emergency timeframe for commissioning the project (Gold Coast Water 2008).

3.5 SOUTH AUSTRALIA – ADELAIDE DESALINATION PROJECT (ADP) (PORT STANVAC) 3.5.1 Background In December 2007 the South Australian (SA) Government announced its proposal to construct a seawater desalination plant (the „Adelaide Desalination Project‟ (ADP)) at Port Stanvac on the 60 hectare former Mobil refinery site, 30km south Adelaide Desalination Plant (concept plant) of the Adelaide Central Business District at Source: (SMEC 2009). Gulf St Vincent (SA Water 2008). The plant is proposed to be operational by December 2010 and increase to full capacity by June 2011 (SA Water 2008). The $1.374 billion RO

Chapter Three – The Desalination Decade 32 desalination plant will provide 150 ML/day of water or 50 GL/year (25% of Adelaide‟s needs) with capability for capacity upgrade to 300 ML/day (SA DPLG 2009a).

3.5.2 Government rationale for approval The ADP is part of the SA Government‟s Four-Way Water Security Strategy to secure metropolitan Adelaide‟s water supply through diverse measures encompassing reducing demand for water, recycling, improving river and catchment health and efficiency, and desalination (SA Water 2008). The Water Proofing Adelaide Strategy also promotes demand management and alternative water sources, including recycled wastewater, stormwater, the purchase of water licences from the River Murray and desalination (SA Water 2008).

Currently Adelaide draws on two major water sources; the Mount Lofty Ranges and the River Murray which supply 40%-90% of Adelaide‟s 200 GL/year supply of water (SA Water 2008 and 2009b). Both these sources are climate-dependent and their capacity has and is expected to continue to decline dramatically due to climate change and drought (SA Water 2008). The proponent, the government-owned SA Water Corporation, argues that the desalination plant will provide Adelaide with a contingency plan that will ensure the environmental, economic and social sustainability of the city and a guaranteed supply of water in drought (SA Water 2008). It will also prevent an increase in the frequency and duration of water restrictions (SA Water 2008). This is important considering an anticipated increase in demand for water driven by population and household growth, and industrial, agricultural and horticultural development (SA Water 2008). The water utility argues that water security will facilitate investment in the state‟s economy, including direct job creation, housing and business development, thereby increasing South Australia‟s Gross State Product (GSP) (SA Water 2008).

3.5.3 Response to the plant During the consultation process conducted in November and December 2008, 39 submissions were received, 15 against the proposal, 4 supporting, 9 raising no objections to the proposal in principle, 10 not stating an opinion but raising concerns, and one not commenting (SA Water 2009 and SA DPLG 2009a). The major issues raised included energy requirements; environmental impacts; economic costs; site selection process; rationale for desalination when alternative options had not been adequately explored; rigor of the assessment process when consultation was inadequate as it was based on a concept

Chapter Three – The Desalination Decade 33 design with insufficient details; and limited feedback by Government on the public‟s concerns (SA Water 2009).

3.5.4 Environmental assessment requirements In April 2008 the Minister for Urban Development and Planning declared the proposed desalination plant project a Major Development under the Development Act 1993 (SA DPLG 2009b). The development application was submitted to the Minister for referral to the SA Development Assessment Commission (DAC) who determined the need for an EIS and key issues requiring detailed investigation (SA Water 2008). These included an assessment of the economic and environmental impacts, encompassing energy, sustainability and climate change, and the marine and terrestrial environment (SA Water 2008).

Subsequently, the SA Water Corporation prepared an EIS for public exhibition before responding to the issues raised in the submissions in a Response Document prepared for the Department of Planning and Local Government (DPLG) (SA Water 2009). DPLG then prepared an Assessment Report (on behalf of the Minister) which was released publicly with the EIS and Response Document and forwarded to the Governor of SA who approved the plant on 26 February 2009 (SA Water 2009).

The Adelaide desalination plant was required to comply with local planning policies in the Onkaparinga (City) Development Plan, including those on sea level rise, design and appearance, energy efficiency, heritage conservation and waste management (SA Water 2008). Nineteen pieces of State Government legislation also applied and in accordance with this legislation, additional restrictions were imposed following consultation with relevant State Government agencies (SA Water 2008).

The desalination plant also required Commonwealth approval under the EPBC Act 1999 but was not deemed a „controlled action‟ and did not require an EIS (SA Water 2008). The plant was also required to comply with the Commonwealth Historic Shipwrecks Act 1976 and Native Title Act 1993 (SA Water 2008).

3.6 SUMMARY During this decade, state governments in Australia have been investing heavily in desalination to secure water supplies. In these states, desalination is expected to provide from 17% to 33% of each city‟s water supply by the end of 2011 with capability to expand

Chapter Three – The Desalination Decade 34 capacity to accommodate increasing demands from a growing population. State governments have billed desalination as a critical climate-independent water source in their water strategies.

This chapter has illustrated that there is strong negative feeling among the general public and key stakeholders in Australian cities to the introduction of desalination plants. The public‟s main concerns include economic costs, environmental impacts, and claims there are better alternative water sources that the government has not adequately explored. These concerns are summed up in Victoria‟s Your Water Your Say Action Group (2009) mission statement: “All future water provision in Victoria is achieved through environmentally sustainable means and therefore, desalination is rejected as an option for Melbourne‟s water management issues”.

In addition to raising concerns about the adverse impacts and rationale for desalination, the public have also criticised the assessment process. For example, in the case of the Adelaide desalination plant, the community criticised the rigor of the assessment process. They claimed a concept design (on which consultation was based) provided insufficient detail for meaningful comment and the Government offered only limited feedback on the public‟s concerns. These concerns possibly derive from the inappropriateness of one government‟s sole jurisdiction over desalination plants; conflict of interest issues may arise where the state government is both the proponent and approval authority for a proposal. The public have also believed that good governance was compromised where proposals were exempt from local planning controls and the state government determined the key issues to be addressed in the environmental assessment. Inconsistencies are also apparent in the requirement for an EIS under Commonwealth legislation and the resultant differences between states in the rigour and comprehensiveness of the environmental impacts assessment.

Finally, there were strong negative feelings among the general public concerning limited and inappropriately timed public participation in the environmental assessment process. For example, the proponent of the Gold Coast desalination plant was not required to consult the community before approval and construction of the plant on the basis of the importance of commissioning the project. With the strong negative reaction of the public to the Perth, Victorian, Gold Coast and Adelaide desalination plants and their respective planning processes in mind, the planning approvals system required for Sydney‟s Kurnell desalination plant will be examined.

Chapter Three – The Desalination Decade 35

CHAPTER FOUR PART 3A AND THE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROCESS

4.1 INTRODUCTION In the months before desalination first became a reality for Sydney, substantial amendments were made to planning legislation governing projects of State significance. The Environmental Planning and Assessment Amendment (Infrastructure and Other Planning Reform) Act 2005 (NSW) was passed by Parliament on 9 June 2005 and assented to on 16 June 2005. The Act amended the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act), introducing Part 3A (Major infrastructure and other projects) which commenced on 1 August 2005. The objective, according to the NSW Government, was to facilitate large-scale infrastructure developments by streamlining the approvals process through one assessment and approvals process by the State Government. The Government also claimed that the Part 3A reforms would “strengthen the rigour, transparency and independence of the assessment process, providing higher levels of up-front certainty for the proponent, the community and other stakeholders” (NSW Legislative Assembly 2005).

Local governments, environmentalists and community groups have vehemently opposed this planning reform on the grounds that it reduces scope for public participation, judicial review and merit appeals. These rights are further restricted for projects determined as critical infrastructure. Under section 75C of the EP&A Act, any development “that, in the opinion of the Minister, is essential for the State for economic, environmental or social reasons” may be declared critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure projects exclude appeal rights by proponents and objectors, the application of all environmental planning instruments (other than State Environmental Planning Policies), and third party appeals. This chapter summarises the legislation and describes the development assessment process under Part 3A with particular emphasis on critical infrastructure projects. The NSW Government‟s rationale for introducing Part 3A and the views of academics will also be examined, before discussing the application of the legislation to Sydney‟s Kurnell desalination plant in Chapter Five.

4.2 DEVELOPMENTS ASSESSED UNDER PART 3A Part 3A (Major infrastructure and other projects) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act 1979) (the Act) consolidates the assessment and approval regime for all major projects previously addressed under Part 4 (Development Assessment)

Chapter Four – Part 3A and the Critical Infrastructure Process 36 and Part 5 (Environmental Assessment). Part 3A applies to development formerly categorised as State significant development under Part 4 and projects that normally require an environmental impact statement (EIS) under Part 5 (NSW DIPNR 2005a). Once a project falls within Part 3A, Parts 4 and 5 of the Act no longer apply (unless Part 3A specifically says it does), giving the Minister for Planning control of these projects (EP&A Act, s 75R(1)).

Part 3A also applies to “major infrastructure or other development that, in the opinion of the Minister, is of State or regional environmental planning significance” (EP&A Act, s75B(2a)). These State significant developments are identified in State Environmental Planning Policy (Major Projects) 2005 (the Major Projects SEPP). Critical infrastructure projects are also listed in the SEPP under Schedule 5 (EP&A Act, s75B(1)(a)). Projects may also be declared critical infrastructure by the Minister making a Ministerial Order (EP&A Act, s75B(1)(b)).

4.3 DEVELOPMENT ASSESSMENT PROCESS FOR PART 3A PROJECTS All Part 3A major projects, including critical infrastructure projects require approval from the Minister for Planning (EP&A Act, s75D(1)) and undergo the same development assessment process (NSW DoP 2007a). However, since 5 December 2008 the Minister for Planning can delegate, to the newly formed Planning Assessment Commission (PAC), the assessment and approval of specific classes of Part 3A projects such as those in which the Minister may have a conflict of interest (NSW DoP 2009b). In these cases, the normal Part 3A development process applies with the PAC replacing the Minister as the approval authority (NSW DoP 2009b). In spite of this, delegation to the PAC does not apply to critical infrastructure projects (NSW DoP 2009b). The Part 3A development assessment process is described below and a flow chart is attached in Appendix B. The Part 3A process as it applied to the Kurnell desalination plant is also provided in Appendix C.

4.3.1 Step 1 – Preparation of the Environmental Assessment The Part 3A process commences with the Minister declaring a project to be assessed under Part 3A and may authorise or require the lodgement of a concept plan (EP&A Act, s75M). Concept plans provide a broad overview of the project to allow matters, such as site suitability and environmental issues to be resolved up-front (NSW DoP 2009d). The Minister may approve a concept plan (EP&A Act, s75P(1)(c)) or require further environmental assessment, such as a design competition (EP&A Act, s 75P(1)(a), (1A)). Alternatively, the Minister may require the proponent to obtain further approvals under Part 4 or Part 5 of the Act but the Minister can still control this process (EP&A Act, s75P(1)(b), (2)).

Chapter Four – Part 3A and the Critical Infrastructure Process 37

The Director General of DoP then issues the proponent with requirements to be addressed in the environmental assessment (EA) (EP&A Act, s75F(3)). To ensure that key issues are assessed, relevant public authorities, such as the Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water and local council(s) may be consulted and a planning focus meeting (PFM) may be convened by DoP (NSW DoP 2009d). The proponent must then prepare an EA in accordance with the Director General‟s requirements and a „statement of commitments‟ (if requested by the Director General) identifying how the environmental impacts of the project will be mitigated or managed (EP&A Act, s75F(6)). The proponent submits their draft environmental assessment and any statement of commitments to the Director General (EP&A Act, s75H(1)) who often consults with relevant agencies and local council(s) to determine whether the draft assessment adequately addresses the Director General‟s requirements (NSW DoP 2009d).

4.3.2 Step 2 –Exhibition and consultation If the draft environmental assessment adequately addresses the Director General‟s requirements, the EA must be advertised and publicly exhibited for comment for at least 30 days (EP&A Act, s75H(3), (4)). The Director General may then require the proponent to submit (EP&A Act, s75H(6)): a) “a response to the issues raised in those submissions, and b) a preferred project report that outlines any proposed changes to the project to minimise its environmental impact, and c) any revised statement of commitments.”

4.3.3 Step 3 – Assessment and determination At the conclusion of the public consultation process, the Director General must provide the Minister for Planning with a report assessing the proponent‟s EA, and any preferred project report and comments from other public authorities (EP&A Act, s75I). The Minister must then decide whether to refuse or approve a project with or without modifications or conditions (EP&A Act, s75J). The Department notifies the proponent of the Minister‟s determination and publishes the determination and Director General‟s report on the Department‟s website (NSW DoP 2009d).

4.4 GOVERNMENT RATIONALE FOR INTRODUCING PART 3A The NSW Government introduced Part 3A to make the planning system “simpler, more efficient and more effective” (NSW DIPNR 2005b, 1) by “cutting red tape” and bureaucratic

Chapter Four – Part 3A and the Critical Infrastructure Process 38 delays to deliver infrastructure “quickly and efficiently” (NSW Legislative Assembly 2005). The assessment and approvals regime for major infrastructure and other projects of State or regional significance is streamlined through a single integrated development assessment, a „one stop shop‟ (NSW DIPNR 2005c). One assessment and approval by the State Government replaced up to 31 separate and overlapping approval requirements in multiple Acts of legislation and elsewhere (NSW DIPNR 2005d). The Government considered that delays associated with obtaining multiple approvals from numerous agencies would be removed to ensure the timely delivery of infrastructure without compromising on environmental outcomes (NSW DIPNR 2005e). Through a streamlined and more certain assessment and approvals process, the Government intends to ensure that NSW remains economically competitive by reducing investment risk, “securing major investment projects” (NSW DIPNR 2005d) and providing opportunities for private sector involvement in the delivery of infrastructure (NSW Legislative Assembly 2005).

The Government also assured the public that community consultation would remain an essential part of the assessment process (NSW Legislative Assembly 2005). It stated that Part 3A provides “more practical opportunities for community participation than ever before” through community consultation at the concept plan stage (NSW Legislative Assembly 2005). This was also said to provide proponents with certainty up front, reducing investment risk and costs (NSW Legislative Assembly 2005).

Proponents of critical infrastructure projects are provided with additional certainty since the projects are deemed “essential for the State for economic, environmental or social reasons” by the Planning Minister. To ensure the timely and efficient delivery of these important infrastructure projects, in the environmental assessment process consideration is only given to comments on the construction, operation and maintenance of projects rather than if they should be approved (NSW Legislative Assembly 2005). Additionally, to ensure the public cannot delay the construction and operation of approved critical infrastructure projects (NSW Legislative Assembly 2005), the legislation excludes appeal rights by proponents and objectors, third party appeals and the application of all environmental planning instruments (other than State Environmental Planning Policies (SEPPs) if the SEPP specifically states that compliance is required).

Chapter Four – Part 3A and the Critical Infrastructure Process 39

4.5 MAJOR PROJECTS AS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

When introducing the legislation, the Government claimed the critical infrastructure provision would be seldom used, and only for projects requiring rapid implementation. In the second reading speech in the NSW Legislative Assembly (2005), for instance, the then Minister for Infrastructure and Planning, Craig Knowles, stated that the critical infrastructure provision would be used responsibly and sparingly for only infrastructure essential to the welfare of the State to ensure its „speedy‟ completion. For example, he stated that the Kurnell desalination plant may be declared critical infrastructure if Sydney‟s water crisis continues “because of its importance in providing drinking water to the people of Sydney if dam levels continue to fall” (NSW Legislative Assembly 2005).

Nonetheless, from the time of the Act‟s assent in August 2005 to January 2009, nine projects have been declared critical infrastructure projects by the Minister. In the 2006-07 financial year the following projects were declared to be critical infrastructure – Hunter to Queensland gas pipeline, Pacific Highway upgrade, Hume Highway upgrade, Royal North Shore Hospital upgrade, Liverpool Hospital upgrade, and the Western Sydney groundwater project (NSW DoP 2007b). During 2006-07, the Kurnell desalination plant, Royal North Shore and Liverpool hospital upgrades were approved as critical infrastructure projects, permitting the commencement of construction (NSW DoP 2007b). During 2007–08, electricity generation facilities with capacity above 250 megawatts and a Metro rail network were declared critical infrastructure (NSW DoP 2008). The Hume Highway duplication upgrade critical infrastructure project was also approved during 2007–08 (NSW DoP 2008). The Minister declared Tillegra Dam in the Hunter as critical infrastructure on 9 January 2009 (EDO 2009). Perhaps in response to the increasing number of projects considered as critical infrastructure by the Planning Minister, the quote, “the critical infrastructure provision is rarely used”, has been removed from the latest NSW Major Development Monitor (2007-2008).

4.6 RESPONSES TO PART 3A – VIEWS OF COMMENTATORS Despite the Government‟s intentions and rationale for introducing Part 3A, the planning reforms have received widespread public opposition. The public‟s main concerns regarding Part 3A is the discretion of the Minister for Planning and State Government in assessing and approving major projects, while reducing opportunities for public participation.

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Commentators, such as Ratcliff et al. (2007), claim that Part 3A removes the characteristics of a good decision making process – certainty, consistency, transparency and accountability. Lipman and Stokes (2008, 321) also present strong views, stating that Part 3A should be repealed and “critical infrastructure should be dealt with in a SEPP”. The concerns of these and other commentators can be broadly classified into four issues: governance, democracy, public administration and NIMBYism (Not In My Backyard).

4.6.1 Governance Governance is “the activity of governing, directing, achieving goals and also representing the people of a place or territory” (Gleeson and Low 2000, 13). Planning is an activity of „urban governance‟ and despite Australia‟s three tiers of government (local, state and Federal); the principal actors are the states (Gleeson and Low 2000). Gleeson and Low (2000) claim that in spite of the importance of the Commonwealth and local governments, the states have exercised considerable authority in the planning process. They argue that although “the Commonwealth Government…does not generally intervene directly in how state governments organise urban governance”, constitutional recognition of local government is needed (Gleeson and Low 2000, 70). Gleeson and Low (2000) accuse the NSW Government of overriding local government regulations in Sydney to increase densities and fast track major projects.

Lipman and Stokes (2008) share the concern at State Government jurisdiction over local governments, arguing that Part 3A undermines the object of the EP&A Act (s5b) – “to promote the sharing of the responsibility for environmental planning between the different levels of government in the State” – by increasing the ambit of State responsibility at the expense of local government. However, the NSW Government believes that Part 3A satisfies this object by re-establishing in the Act an appropriate delineation of developments to be assessed between State and local government (NSW Legislative Assembly 2005).

The power of the State Government is reflected in the provisions of the Act regarding the consideration of environmental planning instruments (EPIs) in the assessment and approval of Part 3A projects. In determining a Part 3A project the Minister is not required to consider the provisions of any EPIs, such as local environmental plans (LEPs), other than State Environmental Planning Policies (SEPPs) (EP&A Act, s75R(3)). However, for critical infrastructure projects, the Minister is not required to consider the provisions of any SEPP unless the SEPP specifically states (EP&A Act, s75R(2)(b)).

Chapter Four – Part 3A and the Critical Infrastructure Process 41

4.6.2 Democracy Commentators argue that there should be democracy in the planning system, as previously reflected in the EP&A Act when first introduced. Ratcliff et al. (2007) argue that the Act was introduced to encourage public participation in the planning process through merit appeal rights for objectors and opportunities to be heard in the Land and Environment Court to remedy or restrain a breach of the Act. These rights available to the public demonstrate that the “legislation recognises that the community can and should have a significant voice in planning decisions” (Ratcliff et al. 2007).

This belief that the law should ensure democracy is reflected in one of McAuslan‟s (1980) three competing ideologies of planning law. The radical or populist approach to the role of law states that the law exists and should be used to provide public “participation in the land use planning process…by virtue of the…principles of democracy and justice” (McAuslan 1980, 4). A democratic decision making process should provide anyone who is likely to be affected or has an interest or concern in a proposed development of land or change in the environment a right to participate in the decision making process (McAuslan 1980). The ideology further states that public servants should only act after the public have been given adequate opportunity to participate throughout the planning process (McAuslan 1980).

However, commentators argue that the NSW Government has undermined democracy through its Part 3A planning reforms, and that reflects environmental land use planning in NSW as it was before 1979. Lipman and Stokes (2008, 305) and Ratcliff et al. (2007) argue that planning in NSW is returning to the days “characterised by strong technocratic influences, with strategic land-use planning dominated by a central government, assisted by technical experts”, such as the assessment and determination of major projects by the State Government where ordinary citizens are given few opportunities to be involved in planning decisions. Therefore, as Carr (2007) states, the Part 3A reforms are inconsistent with the object of the EP&A Act relating to democracy in the planning process – “to provide increased opportunity for public involvement and participation in environmental planning and assessment” (EP&A Act, s5c).

Commentators argue that limited democracy in the environmental assessment process for Part 3A projects through a single assessment and approvals regime compromises environmental protection. Lipman and Stokes (2008) and Carr (2007) claim that Part 3A

Chapter Four – Part 3A and the Critical Infrastructure Process 42 undermines the following objects of the Act relating to the environment, given meaningful public comment is hindered by insufficient details in the environmental assessment:  “the protection of the environment, including the protection and conservation of native animals and plants, including threatened species, populations and ecological communities, and their habitats” (EP&A Act, s5a(vi)) and  “ecologically sustainable development” (EP&A Act, s5a(vii)). Furthermore, Ratcliff et al. (2007) argue that to some extent, the NSW Government is approving developments with limited regard to the “preservation or enhancement of the environment”, with limited capacity for the community to prevent inappropriate developments.

The public‟s rights in ensuring critical infrastructure projects comply with environmental laws are further restricted. The usual range of administrative orders that can be used by public authorities to enforce other environmental laws, such as interim protection orders and stop work orders to protect threatened species, cannot be issued against a critical infrastructure project (EP&A Act, s75U(3).

The Government‟s rationale for these limitations to public participation and democratic expression – to streamline the assessment and approvals process for major projects – may be counterproductive. Lipman and Stokes (2008, 321) argue that reduced democracy in the planning process may ultimately increase conflict and resentment in the planning system and public distrust of the Government, undermining the “speedy resolution of development issues”. They argue that “technocratic approaches to land use planning have failed in the past” and that although “democracy may appear chaotic at times…experience demonstrates that democratic approaches to land use planning are the most efficient and effective” (Lipman and Stokes 2008, 321).

If governments are to ensure adequate democracy in the planning process, this thesis argues that they must incorporate the procedural and substantive aspects of public participation in land use planning. According to McAuslan (1980, 5), public participation should be encompassed procedurally, with the provision of “more opportunities for ordinary people to be involved in decision making in land use planning”. Substantively, governments need to pay “greater attention...to social, community and ecological factors in decision making and less attention…to economic and technological factors” (McAuslan 1980, 5).

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4.6.3 Public administration Governments have justified the imposition of limitations to democracy and public participation by stating they are acting in the public interest. McAuslan‟s (1980, 1) traditional common law approach to the role of law states that “the law exists and should be used to protect private property and its institutions”. Conversely, the orthodox public administration and planning approach to the role of law states that “the law exists and should be used to advance the public interest, if necessary against the interest of private property” (McAuslan 1980, 1).

This public administration ideology of law is becoming increasingly prominent in land use planning legislation (McAuslan 1980). The ideology is reflected in the Part 3A planning reforms in which the State Government has unfettered discretion in the assessment and approval of major projects, and “land-owners need to be told little or nothing of the reasons for decisions in respect of property and their objections can be ignored” (McAuslan 1980, 3). For example, unlike other Part 3A projects, no merit appeals (Class 1) or third party legal challenges are permitted against decisions on critical infrastructure (EP&A Act, s75K, 75L and 75Q). In addition, judicial review proceedings (Class 4) are not permitted by anyone in the Land and Environment Court to challenge a Part 3A approval, or remedy or restrain a breach of the EP&A Act regarding the decision making process without the approval of the Minister for Planning (EP&A Act, s75T(2)). Since proceedings cannot occur without the approval of the Minister, they are unlikely to occur. These restrictions on appeal rights are enforced to prevent any delays to the construction and operation of approved critical infrastructure projects (NSW Legislative Assembly 2005). The exclusion of appeal rights for critical infrastructure projects further reflects the public administration ideology where planning law legitimately gives the administrators (i.e. the State Government) powers to act to advance the public interest (McAuslan 1980).

Gleeson and Low (2000) also note the impact of the public administration ideology on planning. They argue that the „public interest‟ in planning often reflects the interests or views of the powerful and technocrats (Gleeson and Low 2000). Ratcliff et al. (2007) agrees, stating that Part 3A “reflects the philosophy that „Government knows best‟ and the idea that planning decisions are technical matters that do not gain from substantial community involvement”. Lipman and Stokes (2008, 322) support this, stating that professional planners are “interpreting and implementing the public interest on the community‟s behalf”, minimising “the role of democratic expression by local communities”. Alternatively,

Chapter Four – Part 3A and the Critical Infrastructure Process 44

“planning must ultimately serve a broader public interest” by taking into equal consideration the welfare of all groups, rather than the interests of the powerful minority (Gleeson and Low 2000, 229).

4.6.4 NIMBYism (Not In My Backyard) In considering the broader public interest, the Government must consider the interests of residents who portray the NIMBYism (Not In My Backyard) ideology. Gleeson and Low (2000) recognise the importance of local residents, as a local defence, and often only defence, against the more powerful economic and political forces that claim to know what is in the public‟s interest. They argue that politics should not repress community opposition, such as sidelining objectors (Gleeson and Low 2000). Oppression of community opposition is relevant to Part 3A where applications for critical infrastructure projects, unlike other forms of development, can be lodged without the consent of landowners (EP&A Regulation, s8F(1)(b)).

Gleeson and Low (2000, 198) argue that governments should engage with local communities by giving them “greater power to plan for their areas and control unwanted development” but also “promote desirable developments to improve their environments and establish the services they need”. Ultimately, Gleeson and Low (2000) claim that the discretionary, technocratic form of decision making should be abolished in favour of a shared value system that unites communities and values local knowledge and concerns through the encouragement of widespread community involvement.

4.7 SUMMARY Part 3A (Major infrastructure and other projects) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act) commenced on 1 August 2005. Under Part 3A, the Minister for Planning is the approval authority for major projects (if the Minister does not have a conflict of interest and delegation is not given to the PAC) previously addressed under Part 4 (Development Assessment) and Part 5 (Environmental Assessment) of the Act, and “major infrastructure or other development that, in the opinion of the Minister, is of State or regional environmental planning significance” (EP&A Act, s75B(2a)). These projects include critical infrastructure projects which are deemed “essential for the State for economic, environmental or social reasons” by the Minister under section 75C of the EP&A Act.

Chapter Four – Part 3A and the Critical Infrastructure Process 45

The NSW Government introduced Part 3A to streamline the assessment and approvals process for major infrastructure. The Government intended Part 3A to prevent unnecessary bureaucratic and legal delays through a single assessment and approval authority (i.e. the State Government). It also aimed to increase certainty in the assessment and approvals process to ensure the efficient and effective delivery of infrastructure, encouraging investment in NSW. Despite the Government‟s intentions, commentators have argued Part 3A does not provide the certainty, consistency, transparency and accountability that the Government claims. They have also argued that it fails to incorporate the characteristics of a good and just decision making process – primarily public participation, appropriate jurisdiction and, appropriate checks and balances.

Chapter Four – Part 3A and the Critical Infrastructure Process 46

CHAPTER FIVE THE KURNELL DESALINATION PLANT AND THE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROCESS

5.1 INTRODUCTION As discussed in the preceding chapter, Part 3A has been widely publicly opposed since its inception on 1 August 2005. The declaration by the NSW Minister for Planning of the Kurnell desalination plant as a critical infrastructure project under Part 3A of the NSW EP&A Act in November 2005 ignited considerable opposition from the media, stakeholders and the community at large. As the first project to be assessed as critical infrastructure the desalination plant and its passage through the NSW planning system offers significant insights into the planning legislation and Government decision making.

As discussed previously, state governments in Australia are investing in desalination in response to the urban water crisis. The NSW Government is no exception, planning for desalination since January 2005 in accordance with a commitment in the 2004 Metropolitan Water Plan. Following announcements by successive Premiers for the construction of a desalination plant in Kurnell, the Minister for Planning declared the Kurnell desalination plant to be critical infrastructure Kurnell Desalination Plant under Part 3A in November 2005. At the time, Source: (Sydney Water 2009). the plant was to be built irrespective of dam levels. The Part 3A planning process for the plant then commenced with the preparation and public exhibition of the environmental assessment (EA) for the plant closing in February 2006. By this time, the Government viewed the plant primarily as a drought contingency measure, only building the plant if dam levels fell to 30%. Between February and August 2006, dam levels fluctuated between 40% and 45%. In November 2006, the Minister for Planning approved the application for the plant with dams levels rapidly dropping from almost 59% in September 2006 to 38% within three months. Upon the advice of an Independent Panel established to review the Metropolitan Water Plan and plummeting dam levels, the Government announced it would build a 125 million litre a day (ML/day) plant and called for expressions of interest to build

Chapter Five – The Kurnell Desalination Plant and the Critical Infrastructure Process 47 and operate the plant. Following the tender process, construction work began on a larger 250ML/day plant in August 2007 with capacity to upgrade to 500ML/day in future if required. It is expected to be operational by the summer of 2009/10 and provide up to 15% of Sydney‘s water supply. This reliance on desalination is slightly less than Perth, Melbourne, Adelaide and the Gold Coast in which desalination is expected to provide from 17% to 33% of each city‘s water supply.

This chapter examines the objections and concerns the media and key stakeholders raised about desalination and its declaration as critical infrastructure. It examines their response over an 18 month period – from Premier Carr‘s announcement of the plant in July 2005 to Premier Iemma‘s decision to build it in December 2006 – with a view to identifying how the Government could improve the implementation of the critical infrastructure legislation, and what amendments may be needed to the legislation itself. Based on my analysis of the media and stakeholders‘ reactions to the Kurnell desalination plant and the planning system governing its approval, I argue that a key lesson for the NSW Government is the need for greater transparency in the environmental assessment process for critical infrastructure projects. I then propose a range of measures that the Government could adopt to achieve this.

A complete chronology of the approvals process for the Kurnell desalination plant is attached in Appendix C. The timeline documents the events in the approvals process for the Kurnell desalination plant, including announcements and decisions made by Government, and events in the Part 3A planning process. I will refer to and analyse the key events described in the timeline in detail in the following section.

5.2 KEY CONCERNS ABOUT THE DESALINATION PLANT AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ASSESSMENT PROCESS 5.2.1 Overview of methodology and findings To analyse the response of the media and stakeholders, I examined the issues raised in the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) in the period spanning the initial announcement of the plant in July 2005 through to the Government‘s decision to build the plant in December 2006. These articles are referenced in a separate reference list. I supplement this media analysis with secondary evidence of stakeholder views about desalination and Part 3A as presented in ten submissions to the Parliamentary Inquiry into Sydney‘s Water Supply and four submissions to the Department of Planning (DoP) on the environmental assessment (EA) of

Chapter Five – The Kurnell Desalination Plant and the Critical Infrastructure Process 48 the Kurnell desalination plant. To analyse media and stakeholder reaction, I categorised responses by theme. I identified seven key themes, described in the table below.

Theme Description of theme raised Alternative water supply options Investigation of alternative water sources, such as recycled water, through a cost-benefit analysis of all possible water supply options before announcing desalination. Democracy Public consultation and participation in the planning process. Part 3A concerns Media and stakeholder concerns regarding the Part 3A process. Conflicting advice Government policy indecision and inconsistency in advice regarding the rationale for, and implementation of desalination. Public administration Government assumptions regarding what constitute the public interest. NIMBYism (Not In My Backyard) Opposition by Kurnell residents to the proposed location of the desalination plant. Governance Federal, State and local Government jurisdiction in the Part 3A process.

My typology draws on issues raised by academics on the Part 3A legislation, as previously analysed. Many articles and submissions contained a number of issues, for which each was assigned one of seven themes for analysis. In other words, I assigned more than one theme per article where appropriate.

The media‘s reaction became more apparent through my categorisation of media articles into time periods. From this, the frequency of themes and their relation to the chronology of events in the decision making process for the Kurnell desalination plant was determined – see Figure 5.1. In total, the seven identified themes were raised 74 times in the 45 articles examined. As shown in Figure 5.1, the number of articles and issues pertaining to desalination and Part 3A raised in each time period diminishes (right hand side y-axis). The findings of my research into media responses, including issue type, frequency and timing,

Chapter Five – The Kurnell Desalination Plant and the Critical Infrastructure Process 49 will be discussed in the following sections. Appendix D shows the spreadsheet categorisation of issues from the media articles into themes.

Figure 5.1 – Themes raised in articles from the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH)

Number of times theme raised in period Total number Theme 12 July 05- 20 Aug 05- 17 Nov 05- 9 Feb 06- of times

23 July 05 2 Nov 05 19 Jan 06 22 Dec 06 theme raised Alternative water 7 4 6 4 21 supply options

Democracy 4 5 6 1 16

Part 3A concerns 3 6 1 3 13 Conflicting 2 2 3 3 10 advice Public 5 3 1 0 9 administration NIMBYism 2 1 0 0 3 Governance 1 0 1 0 2 Total number of 24 21 18 11 74 themes raised Source: (Lum 2009).

Chapter Five – The Kurnell Desalination Plant and the Critical Infrastructure Process 50

I also identified and categorised the issues that stakeholders raised in the sample of submissions to the Inquiry and DoP on the environmental assessment. Appendices E and F show the spreadsheet categorisation of issues from the submissions into themes.

An understanding of the representativeness of the issues raised in the DoP sample was ascertained from an examination of Sydney Water‘s Preferred Project Report, which states that 91% of the 762 submissions received objected to the proposal (3% supported it and 6% did not clearly state a position (Sydney Water 2006). According to the report, the most common concerns were the inadequacy of the environmental assessment process and the Government‘s justification for desalination and the consultation process (Sydney Water 2006). On the latter matter, the most frequent issues related to the scope and effectiveness of the consultation process (raised 206 times) and an inadequate consultation process (raised 175 times) (Sydney Water 2006). These concerns mirrored those found in the media articles and submissions to the Parliamentary Inquiry into Sydney‘s Water Supply, as discussed below.

5.2.2 Alternative water supply options ‗Alternative water supply options‘ was the most frequently and consistently raised theme in the media articles and submissions. In total, the theme was raised 21 times out of 74 in SMH during the period, appearing more than any other theme in three of the four time periods. The theme was also frequently raised in the submissions, and accounted for almost half of the concerns (48 of the 102 themes raised in the submissions to the Parliamentary Inquiry into Sydney‘s Water Supply and 11 times out of 39 in the submissions to DoP on the EA). A key concern was the absence of a convincing Government rationale for desalination.

The media and key stakeholders‘ (including scientific experts) main objections were the adverse environmental, social and economic impacts of desalination. In particular, economic costs, greenhouse gas emissions, high energy use and impacts on the marine environment were the most frequently raised issues. Concerns were also raised that desalination will encourage increased water consumption with greater water availability, and that alternative options such as recycling, will be abandoned. These concerns are consistent with those expressed by the Perth, Melbourne, Adelaide and Gold Coast communities when respective state governments proposed desalination.

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The strong community opposition to desalination is clearly evident in the media articles and submissions. Based on these concerns, the media and key stakeholders argued that desalination should be a last resort. As was the case with communities in Melbourne and Adelaide, the media and key stakeholders criticised the Government for choosing desalination as a quick fix solution rather than adequately investigating alternative water supply options, such as recycling and stormwater harvesting. The need for the Government to undertake a cost-benefit analysis was shared by former Prime Minister John Howard who stated (12 July 2005): ―[The] NSW Government has been a little too ready to dismiss…the options of recycling, and I'm not convinced that the case for preferring desalination has been strongly enough made‖ (SMH Frew and Davies 2005).

In the submissions, many key stakeholders also expressed concern that the Government did not undertake a cost-benefit analysis of all possible water supply options before announcing desalination. They claimed that the absence of a cost-benefit analysis made it difficult to comment on the viability of desalination compared to alternative options, such as recycling. The following statement made by John Brown, a retired civil engineer and hydrology specialist, sums up the widely-held view well (14 July 2005): ―there should be an open and public debate in which the pros and cons of all the alternatives are clearly presented so that a rational and economic choice can be made‖ (SMH Devine 2005).

Relatedly, the media and key stakeholders were generally concerned about the lack of justification by the Government for desalination. The main benefit cited by Government in the media for desalination was that it is not rainfall-dependent. This rationale is consistent with those offered by other state governments. Anne Davies (2006), state political editor for SMH, stated on 9 February 2006 in the article ‗The Great Carr Crash‘ that: ―In support of desalination, Mr Carr and Mr Iemma had repeatedly argued that Sydney needed a new source of water which was not rain-dependent, and that desalination was the only viable option‖. However, without a cost-benefit analysis, the media and public deemed this argument for desalination inadequate, particularly given the scale of investment at stake. In other words, the Government did not adequately counter the view that alternative options could provide even greater benefits than desalination with fewer environmental, social and economic costs.

Chapter Five – The Kurnell Desalination Plant and the Critical Infrastructure Process 52

The other rationale provided by Government for desalination stated in the media was the need for an additional water source to secure water supplies and address water shortages, which is again consistent with other state governments. Indeed, both Carr and Iemma, and their Ministers, said desalination was required to address water shortages when they announced a desalination plant was to be built. However, a lack of quantitative scientific data on climate change modelling, dam (supply) levels or projected demand for water in the media suggests a deficiency in data provided by the Government. The absence of this data in the media rendered this, in the public‘s mind at least, an unsubstantiated claim. The absence of a publicly available, detailed and defensible rationale by Government for desalination led to strong community opposition against desalination.

5.2.3 Democracy ‗Democracy‘ was the second most frequently raised theme in the newspaper articles as well as in the submissions. In total, the theme was raised 16 times in the media during the chosen period, appearing relatively frequently in the earlier time periods. The theme was also frequently raised in the submissions, appearing 27 out of 102 and 25 out of 39 times respectively in the submissions to the Parliamentary Inquiry and to DoP. The media and key stakeholders were concerned that the NSW Government did not adequately consult the public on the Kurnell desalination plant. This lack of attention by Government to community consultation was perceived as conflicting with the objective of the EP&A Act 1979 for increased opportunities for public involvement and participation. Encompassing public consultation and participation in the planning process, democracy was consistently raised in the media and submissions.

One of the main concerns raised by the media and key stakeholders regarding democracy was the limited scope for public comment. Concerns were raised that Government consultation was in the form of information provision rather than listening to and responding to comments from the public. Consultation was restricted to the environmental assessment (EA) and on the construction, operation, and maintenance of the plant rather than whether it should proceed. The media frequently repeated the quote, ―beyond public debate‖, by the then Minister for Infrastructure and Planning, Craig Knowles, throughout the second half of 2005 to illustrate the intention of the Government to proceed with desalination regardless of public opinions. In response, the consultation that did occur was scorned by the public. Clean-Up Australia's founder, Ian Kiernan, described consultation as ―token if not farcical‖

Chapter Five – The Kurnell Desalination Plant and the Critical Infrastructure Process 53 at a community meeting. ―I don't know why we are here tonight when the Government has already made up its mind‖ (SMH Frew 2006).

Contrary to the Government‘s apparent emphasis on ensuring a sufficient EA process, as evident in the timeline (such as the Planning Focus Meeting, public exhibition of the EA, independent panel established by the Minister for Planning, and Sydney Water Preferred Project Report), the inadequacy of the EA and its restrictions on public comment and democracy was a significant concern raised by the media and key stakeholders. As was the case with the Adelaide desalination project, the EA was highly criticised for being inadequate as it was based on a concept plan rather than a detailed plan. The adequacy of the EA is further threatened by the fact that the content is subject to the discretion of the Director General of the Department of Planning under section 75F(5) of the EP&A Act. Furthermore, Part 3A consolidates 15 approvals under 8 Acts, bypassing independent expert analysis of specific environmental issues. Due to the vagueness of the EA and reduced scope of the assessment of environmental impacts, key stakeholders argued their capacity to comment on the proposal‘s environmental impacts and effectiveness of potential mitigation measures were hindered.

The consultation process was further scrutinised by the media and key stakeholders for its lack of transparency. Under Part 3A the Government is not required to re-exhibit proposals for public comment even if significant changes are made when the proposal is amended. Furthermore, stakeholders criticised the submissions process on the EA for occurring during the Christmas period despite being on exhibition for two months, double the time required by statute.

Key stakeholders also considered that the democratic process was hampered by the inadequate provision of information. In particular, one stakeholder in their submission to DoP on the EA accused the Government of refusing to make environmental studies used to identify key environmental issues available under a freedom of information (FOI) request. These key environmental issues may have assisted the public in understanding the EA. The lack of information provision is also reflected in the planning process and Government indecision. The media criticised the Government‘s many reversals in policy decisions, which encompassed inconsistencies in the size of the plant, and rationale for desalination as a drought contingency measure irrespective of dam levels. At each point, the Government provided limited information for the change in policy. For example, there was limited public

Chapter Five – The Kurnell Desalination Plant and the Critical Infrastructure Process 54 knowledge of the events occurring between February 2006 when Iemma deferred the Kurnell desalination plant until dams reached 30% and April 2006 when Sydney Water issued a preliminary tender for the construction of the plant. The Government did not communicate to the public the reason for the apparent reversal in decision to proceed with the plant. It is evident that the stakeholders‘ concerns regarding the deficiency in information provision and the Government‘s reluctance (or at least an oversight of the need) to make such information publicly available, was perceived by the media and stakeholders as a breach of their democratic rights in the decision making process.

5.2.4 Part 3A concerns ‗Part 3A concerns‘ was the third most frequently raised theme in the media and submissions. In total, the theme was raised 13 times in the media during the chosen period. The theme was also frequently raised in the submissions, appearing 12 times in the submissions to the Parliamentary Inquiry but only once in the submissions to DoP due to the predominance of ‗alternative water supply options‘ and ‗democracy‘. The frequency and consistency of the theme in the media and submissions reflects the widespread opposition to the major projects legislation which had only been introduced on 1 August 2005. As discussed previously, the NSW Government introduced Part 3A of the EP&A Act to streamline the approvals process for major projects and increase investment and jobs in NSW. However, the environmental assessment process through which projects are fast tracked has been widely opposed by the public. The legislation has been highly criticised for its ambiguity with no firm details of the way in which major projects are assessed. This is because the Minister for Planning has discretion over Part 3A projects, including the classification of a project as critical infrastructure and the approval of a project with minimal opportunities for public participation, including no appeal rights. In the case of the Kurnell desalination plant, the Minister for Planning declared the desalination plant the first critical infrastructure project on 16 November 2005 before consulting the community on its ‗criticalness'.

Elements of the Part 3A process are evident in the environmental assessment process of desalination plants in other Australian states. State government jurisdiction over desalination plants was apparent in Perth, Melbourne, Adelaide and the Gold Coast where the State Government was both the proponent and approval authority. Similarities can also be drawn between the limited opportunities for public participation under Part 3A to fast track desalination projects and the environmental assessment process for the Gold Coast desalination plant. The proponent, the Queensland State Government, was not required to

Chapter Five – The Kurnell Desalination Plant and the Critical Infrastructure Process 55 consult the community before approval and construction of the plant, to prevent delays in commissioning such ‗critical‘ infrastructure.

5.2.5 Conflicting advice ‗Conflicting advice‘ was the fourth most frequently raised theme in the media articles. In total, the theme was raised 10 times in the media. The frequency of the theme in the media increased marginally towards the end of the time period, reflecting the increased inconsistencies in the policy position of the NSW Government. This theme reflects the media and stakeholder‘s concerns and confusion about the Government‘s policy decisions regarding the implementation of desalination. The Government‘s indecision about whether the desalination plant should be constructed is clearly evident in the chronology of events. The inconsistency began on 11 July 2005 when the then Premier Bob Carr announced with limited details that a desalination plant would be built in Kurnell despite previous opposition to desalination as ‗bottled electricity‘. Prior to Carr‘s announcement, the Government portrayed desalination as a drought contingency measure if Sydney‘s dams fell below 30% of capacity. However, a report released on the day of Carr‘s announcement by Sydney Water and GHD Fichtner (2005) suggested that desalination was a long-term solution for Sydney. Carr‘s announcement was supported in principle by his replacement, Morris Iemma, who stated on 19 August 2005 that a desalination plant of a yet undetermined size would be built ‗drought or no drought‘. However, Iemma reversed his decision on 8 February 2006, announcing the deferral of the desalination plant ‗indefinitely‘. ‗Indefinitely‘ in this case meant as long as dam levels stayed above 30% of capacity—potentially then not indefinitely at all. Despite the ‗Morris Dilemma‘, desalination was back on the Government‘s agenda by December 2006 when the Government called for expressions of interest to build and operate a 125ML/day desalination plant in preparation for its construction with dam levels plummeting to record lows. However, in June 2007, when the successful consortium was announced, Iemma declared the plant‘s capacity would be 250ML/day (see timeline in Appendix C). These fundamental reversals and changes to policy by the same State Government within a two-year period demonstrated, in the public‘s perception at least, a lack of Government foresight and planning for a large and significant project.

The Government‘s indecision and changes were highlighted and criticised by the media. There were reports that Iemma‘s decision in August 2005 to construct the desalination plant ‗drought or no drought‘ was contrary to the advice of David Evans, the Managing Director of Sydney Water Corporation, who publicly stated the day before that dam levels would have to

Chapter Five – The Kurnell Desalination Plant and the Critical Infrastructure Process 56 fall considerably before Sydney needed desalination. There were also reports that the Government‘s own expert water panel opposed desalination in favour of demand management and improved stormwater harvesting.

The Government‘s policy confusion may have been partly attributed to changes in Government leadership. It is interesting to note that Bob Carr announced his resignation as Premier 16 days after announcing that a desalination plant would be built in Kurnell. Craig Knowles also resigned as the Minister for Infrastructure and Planning early the following month. The lack of stability in leadership may have contributed to the policy indecision and the inconsistent advice communicated to the public on the introduction of desalination. The Government‘s indecisiveness confused the public with decisions made in haste without public consultation, creating more conflict in the community and less confidence in Government decision making.

5.2.6 Public administration ‗Public administration‘ was raised a total of nine times in the media throughout the chosen period, making it the fifth most frequently raised theme. Concerns about public administration were raised by the media and key stakeholders who were dissatisfied with the Government for deciding what was in the public‘s best interests without conducting adequate public consultation. Public administration was raised in the earlier time periods in the media when the Government first announced desalination. This is because the Government was, according to the media, quick to rule out recycled water as an alternative water supply option, assuming the public would not accept the consumption of recycled water and instead preferred desalinated water. On 13 and 23 July 2005, the then Minister for Planning, Frank Sartor, was quoted in the media stating that research showed that Sydneysiders would not drink recycled water. However, he refused to provide details. Based on this assumption, the Government justified the implementation of desalination as in the public‘s interest with the then Utilities Minister, Carl Scully stating (26 November 2005): ―I rely on the vast silent minority, who I think quietly support this Government getting on and delivering infrastructure that secures our quality of life‖ (Frew and Moore 2005).

Public administration was also illustrated in the Government‘s proposal for the location of the desalination plant. This is consistent with the theme arising in the media in the earlier time periods. On 11 July 2005, Carr announced from Dubai that a desalination plant would

Chapter Five – The Kurnell Desalination Plant and the Critical Infrastructure Process 57 be built in Kurnell without prior consultation with the local council and community. Carr was adamant that Kurnell was the best site for a desalination plant, stating (13 July 2005): ―I can't think of a better site than next to an oil refinery…No one will notice it‖ (Frew and Davies 2005).

5.2.7 NIMBYism The Government‘s assumption that it was in the public‘s interest to locate a desalination plant in Kurnell is related to NIMBYism. The term NIMBYism is derived from the acronym NIMBY (Not In My Backyard). As discussed earlier, the term is used to describe opposition by residents to development proposed in their local area. ‗NIMBYism‘ was the second least frequently raised theme in the media. It arose in the first two periods, correlating with the Government‘s announcement of a proposed desalination plant in Kurnell. The announcement received strong opposition from Sutherland Shire Council and the residents of Kurnell who felt angry the Government had not consulted or notified them prior to the announcement. NIMBYism was apparent in communities in other Australian cities who criticised the inadequacy of the site selection process.

5.2.8 Governance Since the EP&A Act gives the Minister for Planning unfettered discretion over Part 3A projects, the issue of governance, specifically the reduced powers of local and Federal Government in the decision making process, was raised in the media. However, it should be noted that ‗governance‘ was the least raised theme in the newspaper articles I examined possibly due to the media‘s interest in reporting on the other aspects of Part 3A and other issues relating to the desalination plant. Governance was raised by the media and key stakeholders with concerns regarding State Government jurisdiction over the approval and assessment process for the Kurnell desalination plant, and bypassing local and Commonwealth legislation including local environmental plans (LEPs) and the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (the EPBC Act) respectively. Comparably, through state government jurisdiction over the environmental assessment process for desalination plants in other Australian states, some proposals were exempt from local planning controls and an EIS under the EPBC Act.

Chapter Five – The Kurnell Desalination Plant and the Critical Infrastructure Process 58

5.3 KEY LESSONS FOR THE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ASSESSMENT PROCESS The media and stakeholder reactions analysed in this thesis suggests that community and stakeholder acceptance of critical infrastructure projects may only occur if the Government improves the transparency of the environmental assessment process and amends some aspects of the legislation.

5.3.1 Government should present a detailed rationale for critical infrastructure projects The analysis in this thesis revealed the most frequent and consistent response to the desalination plant was the absence of a detailed Government rationale for the plant. The analysis strongly suggests that to win greater support, the NSW Government should have conducted a cost-benefit study of the strategies available to address Sydney‘s water shortage. This study could have been similar to the analysis of alternatives required for developments assessed under Part 4 (Development Assessment) and Part 5 (Environmental Assessment) of the EP&A Act – under which Part 3A developments were formerly assessed. Specifically, an analysis of alternatives is required under Schedule 2 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 2000, which deals with the content of environmental impact statements. Clause 3 of Schedule 2 requires: ―an analysis of any feasible alternatives to the carrying out of the development or activity, having regard to its objectives, including the consequences of not carrying out the development or activity‖.

It was unclear if the NSW Government had undertaken a cost-benefit analysis. If the Government did not conduct a cost-benefit analysis of all possible water supply options before announcing desalination, the Government should have undertaken such a study, perhaps by commissioning independent experts given likely public opposition to desalination. If the Government had in fact conducted a cost-benefit analysis of all possible water supply options and demand reduction mechanisms before announcing desalination, this analysis was not easily available to the public. The Government may have benefited from publicly exhibiting this analysis and inviting comments from the public

To complement the cost-benefit analysis and support the Government‘s justification for desalination, the analysis conducted in this thesis suggests that the Government should make publicly available quantitative scientific and socio-economic data related to the critical

Chapter Five – The Kurnell Desalination Plant and the Critical Infrastructure Process 59 infrastructure project under consideration. The desalination case illustrates the importance of making such data easily accessible in gaining public support. As shown in Figure 5.2, the dam levels of Sydney over the period provide some explanation of Government decisions. For example, former Premier Morris Iemma‘s deferral of desalination in February 2006 corresponds with dam levels reaching one of the highest points over 2005-06 at 44.6% of capacity. Conversely, the Government‘s call for tenders to build and operate the desalination plant occurred during periods of low dam levels during June 2005, April 2006 and December 2006. More readily available public information on the correlation between dam levels and Government decisions may have increased public acceptance of desalination.

Figure 5.2 – Dam levels in the Sydney catchment area

Source: (SCA 2009).

5.3.2 Government should impose requirements in the environmental assessment process The media and stakeholder reaction that I have analysed in this thesis also suggests that community acceptance will only occur if the Government provides adequate opportunities for public consultation throughout the assessment process of critical infrastructure projects. For example, the Government could require with amendments to the current legislation, the re-exhibition of significantly amended proposals for public comment. This would be in

Chapter Five – The Kurnell Desalination Plant and the Critical Infrastructure Process 60 accordance with developments assessed under Part 4 (Development Assessment) of the EP&A Act. Re-exhibition of proposals will ensure that the public are notified of any significant amendments to the original proposal, increasing the transparency of the assessment process.

The desalination case suggests that if the Government is to gain public acceptance and confidence in the EA process, it should impose legislative requirements to overcome non- specific requirements of an EA. As also evident in other states, state government jurisdiction over the assessment and approval of desalination plants often permits government to determine the key issues to be addressed in the EA. The issues required to be addressed in the EA were generally consistent between states but covered broad environmental impacts on marine and terrestrial ecology rather than considering all environmental issues in detail. To provide the public with certainty that EAs cover all environmental impacts and the effectiveness of potential mitigation measures, the NSW Government should establish mandatory requirements, through an amendment to the current legislation, for the content of EAs, in consultation with the public. It should be noted that the Government has established guidelines for EAs but these are not enforceable. The requirements should state that the EA is to be based on a detailed plan to determine the full impacts of the proposal before it is constructed and begins operating. Mandatory requirements for EAs will help ensure the environmental impacts and effectiveness of potential mitigation measures are publicly available for comment.

Alternatively, the Government may require an environmental impact statement (EIS) instead of an EA. This would be consistent with the assessment and approval regime for all major projects under Part 4 (Development Assessment) and Part 5 (Environmental Assessment) of the EP&A Act – through which Part 3A projects were formerly assessed. Under Part 4, an EIS is required for all developments that constitute a significant effect (i.e. designated developments) as stated in Schedule 3 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 2000. Under Part 5 of the Act, all proponents must prepare an EIS if the activity ―is likely to significantly affect the environment‖ (EP&A Act, s112). The requirements of an EIS are listed under Schedule 2(4) (Environmental impact statements – Environmental assessment) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 2000. The EIS must contain an analysis of the development, including a ―detailed description of those aspects of the environment that are likely to be significantly affected‖ (cl. 4b), ―the likely impact on the environment of the development or activity‖ (cl. 4c), and ―a full description of the measures

Chapter Five – The Kurnell Desalination Plant and the Critical Infrastructure Process 61 proposed to mitigate any adverse effects of the development or activity on the environment‖ (cl. 4d). In addition to the requirements in clause 4d, a compilation of measures to mitigate adverse effects (cl. 5) must also be provided. These legislative requirements for an EIS, as opposed to an EA, for Part 3A projects would ensure that an assessment of the environmental impacts would generally be prepared based on a more detailed design. An EIS would also consider all environmental issues in detail, rather than only focussing on selected key environmental issues. Furthermore, the Government should also reinstate the requirement for approvals under various Acts (i.e. integrated development assessment) to ensure assessment by experts from other agencies on individual issues. Therefore, an EIS and requirement for individual approvals through an amendment to the current legislation would provide a more transparent and detailed assessment of the environmental impacts and effectiveness of potential mitigation measures.

5.3.3 Greater transparency of the Part 3A process The analysis of media and stakeholder responses in this thesis also implies that greater public support for critical infrastructure projects will only be won with increased transparency of the Part 3A process. To achieve this, the Government could establish detailed criteria for the declaration of critical infrastructure under section 75C of the EP&A Act. In accordance with the Act, a project may be declared a critical infrastructure project ―if it is of a category that, in the opinion of the Minister, is essential for the State for economic, environmental or social reasons‖ (s75C(1)). According to a fact sheet on Part 3A – critical infrastructure projects: ―The new Part 3A also establishes provisions for the Minister to declare projects to be ‗critical infrastructure projects‘. Prior to making such a declaration, a preliminary risk assessment will be required to consider the financial, economic, social and environmental risks of declaring the project a critical infrastructure project‖ (DIPNR 2005).

Despite these claims, no preliminary risk assessment is mentioned in the Act. Therefore, if such an assessment exists, the Minister has no obligation to abide by it. Hence, the Government could develop enforceable and mandatory requirements to be inserted in the EP&A Act for the determination of critical infrastructure projects. Set criteria for the classification of proposals as critical infrastructure would provide the public with certainty as to the need for such infrastructure to be assessed as a major project by the State Government.

Chapter Five – The Kurnell Desalination Plant and the Critical Infrastructure Process 62

Governance for Part 3A projects is generally restricted to the State Government to streamline the environmental assessment process, particularly since significant projects need to be implemented quickly, such as desalination to secure water supplies. However, in fast tracking developments, public support will only be won with a rigorous environmental assessment process. Part 3A and similar major projects legislation in other Australian states have been criticised by the public for its use by State Governments to fast track major projects and create less transparency by eliminating the usual planning and environmental impact assessment regimes (Fanning 2008).

The Commonwealth legislation governing the development of desalination plants, the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (the EPBC Act), restricts an environmental impact statement (EIS) to specific ‗controlled acts‘ that trigger a matter of national significance (Fanning 2008). The matters of national significance are: world heritage sites, national heritage places, wetlands of international importance (called ‗Ramsar‘ wetlands), nationally threatened species and ecological communities, migratory species, Commonwealth marine areas and nuclear actions (DEWHA 2009). As discussed in Chapter Three, some desalination plants in Australia did not require an EIS at the Federal level.

Considering the lack of consistency in environmental assessment between states and that the EPBC Act does not always require an EIS, greater transparency in the environment assessment of critical infrastructure projects could be achieved by amending the EPBC Act to automatically require an EIS at the Federal level for desalination plants, and potentially all critical infrastructure projects, and remove State Government jurisdiction on EA. This would only be advisable where the impacts of a particular category of critical infrastructure had the potential to traverse state boundaries (see Fanning 2008) or impact on issues of national environmental significance. With the independent review of the EPBC Act underway in accordance with section 522A of the Act, stricter assessment requirements for critical infrastructure or major projects could be required. However, such an amendment to the EPBC Act may encounter constitutional difficulties.

Much of the criticism of Part 3A examined in this thesis was raised by local governments which have expressed concern the State Government is the determining authority for major projects located in their local government area with no requirement for the consideration of local planning controls. However, it must be recognised that it may not be practical or desirable for local governments to have jurisdiction over the determination of large and

Chapter Five – The Kurnell Desalination Plant and the Critical Infrastructure Process 63 significant projects, such as a desalination plant for the whole of Sydney. Considering that local governments are at the community level and typically represent the views of the local community, it is unlikely that a project, such as a desalination plant, would receive much support from the community – and therefore the council – for it to be located in its local government area. Although it may be impractical and inappropriate for local government to be a determining authority for such projects, the analysis of media and stakeholder responses in this thesis suggests that councils‘ views need to be sought if broad public acceptance is to be won.

5.3.4 Government should have a plan that is clearly communicated to the public for the implementation of critical infrastructure The evaluation of media and stakeholder views in this thesis also advocates that community approval of critical infrastructure projects will only occur if a project is part of a broader plan that is clearly communicated to the public for the implementation of critical infrastructure. In other words, to prevent both hasty decisions and indecisiveness, the Government would need to formulate a clear plan for infrastructure projects that are ―essential for the State for economic, environmental or social reasons‖ (EP&A Act, s75C), either for the State as a whole or by portfolio areas. For example, a hypothetical plan for the implementation of desalination could have encompassed a staged approval and development process in accordance with dam levels. This could have outlined that construction of a desalination plant would commence when dams fall to 30% of capacity but preparation, such as the invitation of tenders, may occur when dams reach 40%. Through this planned approach for the implementation of desalination, the Government could have provided the public with constant updates on climate change modelling, dam (supply) levels, and water consumption. In this way, the public could follow dam levels and anticipate Government announcements on the implementation of desalination.

5.3.5 Government should consult or notify the public before proposing critical infrastructure projects To win public confidence and support, the analysis in this thesis suggests that the Government should consult or at least notify the public before proposing critical infrastructure projects. The findings counsel that community support could have only occurred had the Government consulted Sutherland Shire Council and the residents of Kurnell, and the public more generally. My findings indicate that consultation by Government should also involve informing the public about the importance of the

Chapter Five – The Kurnell Desalination Plant and the Critical Infrastructure Process 64 infrastructure proposal and consequences of not proceeding. Justification for the proposal should be supported by independent scientific and socio-economic studies.

To further reduce community opposition, my evaluation suggests that the Government should consult the public for data to support their assumptions. For example, the Government could consult media opinion polls or commission independent polls, and publicise polls on which they base their views on public perceptions and acceptance, before stating what the public want. In the case of Kurnell, unsupported claims made by Government about what the public wanted only fuelled public opposition to desalination and Government.

5.4 SUMMARY The Kurnell desalination plant was the first project deemed critical infrastructure (section 75C) by the Minister for Planning under Part 3A (Major infrastructure and other projects) of the EP&A Act 1979. Since its inception on 1 August 2005, Part 3A has received widespread public opposition because it gives the Minister for Planning unfettered discretion over major projects, and is perceived to give developers benefits by ‗fast tracking‘ developments, with limited environmental assessment and opportunities for public participation. These concerns regarding Part 3A as well as those on desalination were raised in the Sydney Morning Herald, submissions to the Parliamentary Inquiry into Sydney‘s Water Supply and submissions to DoP on the environmental assessment of the Kurnell desalination plant. I grouped the various responses into seven themes – alternative water supply options, democracy, Part 3A concerns, conflicting advice, public administration, NIMBYism (Not In My Backyard), and governance. The main issues raised by the media and stakeholders related to the first three themes and specifically concerned the lack of transparency in the critical infrastructure assessment process, including the Government‘s rationale for desalination, limited public consultation and the inadequacy of the assessment of environmental impacts. The analysis of media and stakeholder response has been taken to broadly reflect the general public‘s views, since the type and frequency of issues raised in the Sydney Morning Herald articles generally reflected those of a broad range of stakeholders presented in submissions in two separate processes.

Many of the concerns raised in NSW were also raised by communities on the introduction of desalination plants in the other states. This suggests that the drivers of the strong negative feeling in the general public about the environmental assessment process for desalination

Chapter Five – The Kurnell Desalination Plant and the Critical Infrastructure Process 65 plants, particularly regarding the adequacy of government investigation into alternative water sources and government jurisdiction with limited public consultation, are not unique to NSW.

The findings of the original qualitative and quantitative research into media and stakeholder reactions to the desalination plant in Sydney presented in this chapter suggest that community and stakeholder acceptance of critical infrastructure projects in NSW (and perhaps more broadly) may only occur if the State Government improves the transparency of the environmental assessment process and amends key aspects of the legislation. The media and stakeholder views analysed in this thesis suggest that within the current legislation, the Government should clearly articulate its rationale for the general need for a piece of critical infrastructure, the reason for the choice of a particular infrastructure solution and its classification as critical infrastructure under the EP&A Act. Through an amendment to the legislation, the analysis of responses also implies that the Government should increase the transparency of the assessment process by inserting requirements in the EP&A Act for the re- exhibition of significantly amended proposals for public comment; establishing criteria for the classification of proposals as critical infrastructure; and mandatory requirements stating the issues to be addressed in EAs, or requirements for an EIS to be conducted instead. The analysis suggests that these recommendations may be necessary pre-requisites for the Government to win community support for critical infrastructure projects. However, community reactions to Government policies cannot be predicted and so the recommendations made in this thesis are presented as a necessary pre-condition to, but not an assurance of winning, community acceptance.

Chapter Five – The Kurnell Desalination Plant and the Critical Infrastructure Process 66

CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION

6.1 INTRODUCTION This final chapter revisits the relevant literature, research findings and recommendations examined in the previous five chapters. The chapter examines how the research statement and questions provided in Chapter One have been addressed and identifies further research opportunities.

6.2 GENERAL OVERVIEW This thesis discussed the critical infrastructure process as it applies to Sydney‟s Kurnell desalination plant. In November 2005 the Kurnell desalination plant was deemed critical infrastructure under section 75C of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act) by the NSW Minister for Planning who considered it “essential for the State for economic, environmental or social reasons”. The desalination plant was considered „critical‟ in securing Sydney‟s water supplies as dam levels plummeted in response to the factors influencing the urban water crisis. Despite the Government‟s intentions, the desalination plant and environmental assessment process received overwhelming public opposition. Ninety one per cent of the 762 submissions received by the Department of Planning (DoP) in response to the public exhibition of the environmental assessment (EA) objected to the proposal, only 3% supported and 6% did not clearly state a position (NSW DoP 2006).

As the first project to be deemed critical infrastructure under section 75C of the Act, the Kurnell desalination plant and its passage through the NSW planning system offers significant insights into the planning legislation and Government decision making. Through a review of the Government‟s rationale for the plant, the media and stakeholders‟ response to the plant and the critical infrastructure process applied to the plant, this thesis has assessed how the existing process could be improved, and whether amendments may be needed to the legislation itself. The aim is to contribute to the existing literature on Part 3A of the EP&A Act and the emerging planning-focused literature on desalination in Australia.

The methodology of this thesis consisted of three elements: analysis of academic literature, legislation and government publications; original qualitative analysis of all articles published in the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) from 12 July 2005 to 22 July 2006, and submissions to both the Upper House Inquiry into Sydney‟s water supply and the environmental assessment (EA) for the Kurnell desalination plant; and original quantitative analysis of the

Chapter Six - Conclusion 67 issues raised in the SMH articles and submissions. The main component of the methodology was the examination of newspaper articles and submissions to ascertain the media‟s, key stakeholders‟ and the general public‟s responses to Part 3A and desalination.

6.3 RESEARCH FINDINGS The research sought to address the following research statement: The declaration by the NSW Minister for Planning of the Kurnell desalination plant as critical infrastructure under Part 3A (section 75C) of the NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 in November2005 ignited considerable opposition from the media, stakeholders and the community at large. Concerns were raised regarding the need for desalination and the environmental assessment process for critical infrastructure projects. This thesis assesses the content of these concerns and recommends ways to improve the critical infrastructure process and legislation.

In order to examine the above, it was necessary to pose several questions which in general terms covered the following;  The context in which desalination became an option for Sydney and other Australian cities.  The environmental assessment requirements necessary for the approval of these plants, in particular the Part 3A and critical infrastructure process (section 75C) of the NSW EP&A Act for the Kurnell plant.  The governments‟ rationale and the public response to desalination and the assessment process, in particular the Kurnell plant and the critical infrastructure process.  What the media and stakeholder response to the desalination plant suggests the NSW Government needs to do in order to gain community acceptance of critical infrastructure projects.

The controversy surrounding Part 3A has prompted a general availability of academic literature on this legislation (Ratcliff et al., Gleeson and Low, Carr, and Lipman and Stokes). However, much of this literature provides an overview of Part 3A from a conceptual or „philosophical‟ perspective, rather than a particular emphasis on critical infrastructure or any case study in detail to illustrate the assessment process. There is also limited academic literature on desalination within an Australian planning context as it is an emerging technology.

Chapter Six - Conclusion 68

This thesis seeks to make a contribution to the small body of existing planning literature on desalination, with a particular focus on the assessment and approval process for critical infrastructure projects under the NSW planning system. The research findings of this thesis are demonstrated in the following discussion.

6.3.1 Australia’s recent urban water crisis Chapter Two explored the factors influencing Australia‟s recent urban water crisis, the context in which desalination became an option for Sydney and other Australian cities. It demonstrated that climate change (which has increased rainfall variability, reduced rainfall and consequently water availability), a growing population and Australian cities‟ reliance on dams for their water supply, have contributed to the urban water crisis, where in drought, and into the future, water demand will outstrip supply. For example, Sydney‟s current water supplies will meet a growing demand from population growth to at least 2015 (NSW Government 2008). In response, it was discussed that Australian governments have introduced initiatives to reduce demand for water and/or, to increase or diversify water supplies. Within the last decade, desalination has emerged in Australia‟s major cities as an emergency bulk water source in response to the effects of the urban water crisis.

6.3.2 The desalination decade Chapter Three investigated the introduction of desalination plants in Australia‟s major cities. In the last ten years state governments have invested in desalination to secure water supplies in the major cities of Perth, Melbourne, Adelaide, and the Gold Coast. State governments consider desalination a valuable climate-independent water source. However, in each case the public have raised concerns about the adverse economic and environmental impacts of the technology, and claimed the government has not adequately explored alternative water sources. The public have also criticised the rigor of the assessment process and the adequacy of the public consultation process.

6.3.3 Part 3A and the critical infrastructure process Chapter Four provided a conceptual analysis of the NSW EP&A Act governing the approval of major projects in NSW. Part 3A (Major infrastructure and other projects) of the EP&A Act consolidates the assessment and approval regime for all major projects previously addressed under Part 4 (Development Assessment) and Part 5 (Environmental Assessment). Part 3A also applies to “major infrastructure or other development that, in the opinion of the Minister, is of State or regional environmental planning significance” (EP&A Act, s75B(2a)). These

Chapter Six - Conclusion 69 include critical infrastructure projects “that, in the opinion of the Minister, [are] essential for the State for economic, environmental or social reasons” under section 75C of the EP&A Act. Critical infrastructure projects are listed in the State Environmental Planning Policy (Major Projects) 2005 (EP&A Act, s75B(1)(a)) or may be declared critical infrastructure by the Minister making a Ministerial Order (EP&A Act, s75B(1)(b)).

All Part 3A major projects (except projects referred to the PAC in which the Minister may have a conflict of interest), including critical infrastructure projects, are determined by the Minister for Planning (EP&A Act, s75D(1)) and undergo the same environmental assessment process (NSW DoP 2007a). However, the Government has introduced some legislative exemptions to critical infrastructure projects due to their „essential‟ nature to ensure their timely and efficient delivery. For example, in the consultation process consideration is only given to comments on the construction, operation and maintenance of projects rather than if they should be approved (NSW Legislative Assembly 2005). Furthermore, to prevent delays, the legislation excludes appeal rights by proponents and objectors, third party appeals and the application of all environmental planning instruments (other than State Environmental Planning Policies (SEPPs) which the Minister may not need to consider unless the SEPP specifically states compliance is required).

The NSW Government claims it introduced Part 3A to streamline major projects through a single integrated development assessment to ensure that the State remains economically competitive. However, an analysis of academic literature has shown that the Government‟s rationale for Part 3A has been rebuked. Commentators, such as Ratcliff et al. (2007) argue that Part 3A does not provide the certainty, consistency, transparency and accountability of a good decision making process. Gleeson and Low (2000) accuse the NSW Government of overriding local planning regulations to fast track major projects, undermining the governance objective of the EP&A Act that promotes the “sharing of the responsibility for environmental planning between the different levels of government in the State” (s5b). Ratcliff et al. (2007), Lipman and Stokes (2008) and Carr (2007) also claim that Part 3A undermines the object of the EP&A Act relating to democracy in the planning process, stating it is a return to a technocratic approach to planning in which the State Government is the approval authority, giving limited opportunities for community involvement in the decision making process. These limitations to public participation reflect McAuslan‟s (1980) public administration ideology in which the Government states they are acting in the public

Chapter Six - Conclusion 70 interest (Ratcliff et al. 2007). However, Gleeson and Low (2000) disagree with this ideology, and instead promote the value of community involvement to achieve shared outcomes.

6.3.4 The Kurnell desalination plant and the critical infrastructure process Through an analysis of newspaper articles from SMH on desalination and Part 3A, supplemented with secondary evidence of stakeholder views as presented in submissions to the Parliamentary Inquiry into Sydney‟s Water Supply and to DoP on the environmental assessment of the Kurnell desalination plant, Chapter Five analysed in detail the critical infrastructure process as it applied to the Kurnell plant. The frequency of issues raised in the media generally corresponded to that of stakeholders, encompassing environmental groups, community groups, local government, members of parliament, professional institutions and academics. Therefore, I took the media and stakeholders‟ responses to broadly reflect those of the general public. The media and key stakeholders also draw on similar issues raised by other states, as discussed in Chapter Three and academics on Part 3A, analysed in Chapter Four. These issues fall under the following seven themes in order of frequency raised in the newspaper articles: alternative water supply options, democracy, Part 3A concerns, conflicting advice, public administration, NIMBYism (Not In My Backyard), and governance. In summary, my thesis research revealed that the leading public concern was the absence of a publicly available, detailed and defensible rationale by Government for desalination, which led to strong community opposition to desalination. The other main public concern was the limitations to public participation in the assessment process due to limited details on the assessment of environmental impacts in the EA which limits the scope for public comment, and no requirement for the re-exhibition of the EA.

The media and stakeholder reaction analysed in this thesis suggests that in order for the Government to gain greater community and stakeholder acceptance of critical infrastructure projects it needs to improve the transparency of the environmental assessment process and amend some key aspects of the legislation. These should be considered as necessary pre- requisites for the Government to win community support for critical infrastructure projects, but cannot be taken as an assurance of community acceptance.

Changes required to the environmental assessment process within the current legislation The evaluation of media and stakeholder views in this thesis suggests that the Government could undertake simple but important procedures in the environmental assessment process within the current legislation to increase the chance of achieving public approval of critical

Chapter Six - Conclusion 71 infrastructure projects. Most importantly, in response to the most frequent and consistently raised concern by the media and stakeholders, the Government should clearly articulate its rationale for the general need for a piece of critical infrastructure per se and its classification as critical infrastructure under the EP&A Act because of its economic, environmental, or social importance to the State. The Government‟s rationale should also include the public exhibition of quantitative scientific and socio-economic data. Additionally, the Government should devise a clearly formulated plan for its implementation and communicate this to the public, which would discourage both hasty decisions and indecisiveness. This plan could incorporate hypothetical statements so decisions could be made in response to foreshadowed situations.

Amendments required to the current legislation In addition to these procedural changes, the analysis of media and stakeholder responses in this thesis implies that the Government may achieve greater public support for critical infrastructure projects if it amends the current legislation to increase the transparency of the environmental assessment process. To supplement the public exhibition of data to demonstrate its rationale for the implementation of critical infrastructure, the Government may attain greater public acceptance of projects through an amendment to the EP&A Act requiring an analysis of alternatives, such as a cost-benefit analysis.

The evaluation of media and stakeholder views in this thesis also suggests that greater public acceptance of and confidence in the Part 3A process may occur if the Government increases the transparency of the assessment process by inserting requirements in the EP&A Act for the re-exhibition of significantly amended proposals for public comment; establishing criteria for the classification of proposals as critical infrastructure; and mandatory requirements stating the issues to be addressed in EAs, or requirements for an EIS to be conducted instead.

6.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH This thesis aimed to contribute to the small but growing literature on the critical infrastructure assessment process and desalination with an Australian planning perspective. Given the limitations of time and length available to an undergraduate thesis, the analysis suggests the following areas for further study:  This thesis only examined newspaper articles from SMH and as such, my conclusions on the media‟s response reflect the views expressed in and by SMH. Analysis of local newspapers, such as the St George and Sutherland Shire Leader, could also be Chapter Six - Conclusion 72

undertaken to ascertain local community views of desalination. This could potentially result in a different frequency of themes raised by the media, such as NIMBYism.  Since this thesis is limited to my interpretation of the views of the media and key stakeholders, and submissions from stakeholders are taken broadly to reflect views expressed beyond the media, there is scope to initiate or use existing surveys of Sydney residents regarding desalination and the critical infrastructure process.  Due to the limited research available examining the critical infrastructure process as it applies to particular projects, further research could examine the legislative process for other critical infrastructure projects, such as hospitals (Royal North Shore and Liverpool Hospital upgrades) or major roads (Pacific and Hume Highway upgrades). Through the analysis of case studies, comparisons could be made between projects, allowing identification of the public‟s major concerns regarding the assessment and approval process of critical infrastructure projects.  There is scope for a more in-depth analysis of desalination plants in other Australian states using a method similar to the one used in this study. Newspaper articles and submissions to state governments on desalination proposals would allow a comparison of issues raised by the media and key stakeholders on desalination and the assessment process across states.

6.5 FINAL REMARKS Through an analysis of media and stakeholder opinions on the Kurnell desalination plant and the critical infrastructure process applied to it, this thesis has shown that the NSW Government might achieve greater community acceptance of critical infrastructure projects if it improves the transparency of the environmental assessment process. This could be achieved within the current legislation if the Government articulates more clearly and effectively to the public its rationale for the implementation of critical infrastructure. Fundamentally, the NSW Government did not successfully make the case to the public that the desalination plant was “essential for economic, environmental or social reasons”. My research findings also suggest that in order to win community support, the legislation needs to be reviewed to ensure that Part 3A is consistent with the objects of the Act, particularly those provisions relating to governance, public participation and the protection of the environment.

Whilst this thesis focuses on the critical infrastructure process as it applies to the Kurnell desalination plant, the findings are likely to be applicable to the assessment process as it Chapter Six - Conclusion 73 would apply to other critical infrastructure projects. Overall, to ensure greater transparency of the environmental assessment process and attain greater public support for critical infrastructure projects, the Government needs to communicate more clearly and effectively to the public its rationale for critical infrastructure, and provide more opportunities for public consultation and participation.

Chapter Six - Conclusion 74

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‘Bottled folly’, The Sydney Morning Herald (no author), 12 July 2005, viewed 17 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Frew, W. and Davies, A. (2005) ‘Cold water on the salt solution’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 12 July 2005, viewed 17 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Frew, W. and Davies, A. (2005) ‘Brogden tries to rain on Carr's parade’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 13 July 2005, viewed 17 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com ‘Carr's remedy goes through like a dose of salts’, The Sydney Morning Herald (no author), 13 July 2005, viewed 17 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Frew, W. (2005) ‘Two big pluses for the salt solution, and one is money’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 13 July 2005, viewed 17 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Devine, M. (2005) ‘Carr's trick: turn water into whine’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 July 2005, viewed 17 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com ‘Rubbing salt in the wounds of troubled water system’, The Sydney Morning Herald (no author), 14 July 2005, viewed 17 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Frew, W. (2005) ‘Questions in the solution’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 15 July 2005, viewed 17 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Davies, A. (2005) ‘Water solution doesn't wash’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 23 July 2005, viewed 17 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Clennell, A. (2005) ‘Desalination plant to go ahead, drought or no drought’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 August 2005, viewed 17 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com ‘Fresh water at Kurnell’, The Sydney Morning Herald (no author), 24 August 2005, viewed 17 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Clennell, A. (2005) ‘Water bills may rise $120 a year’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 23 September 2005, viewed 17 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Frew, W. (2005) ‘Perils of protest in the new age’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 1 October 2005, viewed 17 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Goodsir, D. (2005) ‘Sartor will overrule councils on growth’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 8 October 2005, viewed 17 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Frew, W. (2005) ‘Water plant runs into sea of resistance’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 8 October 2005, viewed 17 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Malkin, B. (2005) ‘The point of pressure’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 18 October 2005, viewed 17 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com

References – Newspaper Articles 82

Frew, W. (2005) ‘Coalition vows to scrap minister's powers on big projects’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 October 2005, viewed 17 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Farrelly, E. (2005) ‘3A projects add a new dimension to rules’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 25 October 2005, viewed 17 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Frew, W. and Moore, M. (2005) ‘Pay for private water even if dams are full’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 1 November 2005, viewed 17 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com ‘No tap at the waterworks’, The Sydney Morning Herald (no author), 2 November 2005, viewed 17 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com ‘Salt in a wound still stinging over private contracts’, The Sydney Morning Herald (no author), 2 November 2005, viewed 17 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Davies, A. (2005) ‘Failure to table deals under fire’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 17 November 2005, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Mitchell, A. (2005) ‘Scully aims for public support on water plan’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 November 2005, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Pryor, L. (2005) ‘Taste tests for plant’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 November 2005, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com ‘Taking the easy option’, The Sydney Morning Herald (no author), 24 November 2005, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Frew, W. and Moore, M. (2005) ‘Murky waters’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 November 2005, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Glendinning, L. (2005) ‘Councils urge desalination alternatives’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 30 November 2005, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Goodsir, D. (2005) ‘Public will get a say on water plant’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 13 December 2005, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Frew, W. (2005) ‘City desalination plant is not the solution – poll’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 December 2005, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Malkin, B. (2006) ‘Sydney Water warned against desalination strategy’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 January 2006, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Frew, W. (2006) ‘Residents boiling over water plans’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 19 January 2006, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Davies, A. (2006) ‘The great Carr crash’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 9 February 2006, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Carlton, M. (2006) ‘Battle-scarred street that needs fixing’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 11 February 2006, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Essery, C. (2006) ‘Wasted gigalitres are just water down the drain’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 15 February 2006, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Mitchell, A. (2006) ‘Insecure and indecisive: Labor's Iemma dilemma’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 5 March 2006, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com

References – Newspaper Articles 83

Stokes, R. (2006) ‘How the planning system stifles debate’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 17 March 2006, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Davies, A. (2006) ‘Water recycling wins priority treatment’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 9 May 2006, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Essery, C. (2006) ‘Short on solutions, the new water plan will leave Sydney high and dry’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 15 May 2006, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Nixon, S. (2006) ‘Developers beat a path to Sartor's doors as critics query powers’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 5 July 2006, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Grennan, H. (2006) ‘New powers are working: Sartor’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 17 October 2006, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com ‘Wait till March, then panic’, The Sydney Morning Herald (no author), 6 November 2006, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Frew, W. (2006) ‘Saltwater plant gets approval just in case’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 17 November 2006, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Frew, W. (2006) ‘City in hot water: dams at record lows’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 8 December 2006, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Pearlman, J. (2006) ‘Iemma given backing for saltwater plant’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 11 December 2006, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com Frew, W. (2006) ‘Record dam low brings new talk of desalination’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 22 December 2006, viewed 22 September 2009, http://global.factiva.com

References – Newspaper Articles 84

REFERENCES SUBMISSIONS

Submissions to the Parliamentary Inquiry into Sydney’s Water Supply Essery, C. (2006) Inquiry into a Sustainable Water Supply for Sydney (No. 133), University of Western Sydney (8 March 2006). Harvey, P. (2006) Inquiry into a Sustainable Water Supply for Sydney (No. 126), Sydney Coastal Councils Group (SCCG) Inc (21 February 2006). Khan, S. (2006) Inquiry into a Sustainable Water Supply for Sydney (No. 22), Centre for Water and Waste Technology, University of NSW (10 February 2006). Martin, L. (2006) Inquiry into a Sustainable Water Supply for Sydney (No. 52), Total Environment Centre (TEC) (17 February 2006). McCaffery, G. (2006) Inquiry into a Sustainable Water Supply for Sydney (No. 32), Local Government Association of NSW (15 February 2006). Moore, C. (2006) Inquiry into a Sustainable Water Supply for Sydney (No. 131), Clover Moore (3 March 2006). O’Brien, E. (2006) Inquiry into a Sustainable Water Supply for Sydney (No. 14), Coast and Wetlands Society Inc (30 January 2006). Recsei, T. (2006) Inquiry into a Sustainable Water Supply for Sydney (No. 45), Save Our Suburbs (SOS) NSW Inc (17 February 2006). Walshe, R. (2006) Inquiry into a Sustainable Water Supply for Sydney (No. 37), Combined Community Groups of Sutherland Shire (17 February 2006). Wong, H. (2006) Inquiry into a Sustainable Water Supply for Sydney (No. 130), Manly Council (24 February 2006).

Submissions to the Department of Planning on the environmental assessment of the Kurnell desalination plant Dearing, D. (2006) Submission to DoP – Kurnell desalination plant and associated infrastructure (05_0082), Royal Australian Institute of Architects (RAIA) NSW Chapter (3 February 2006). Faehrmann, C. (2006) Submission to DoP – Kurnell desalination plant and associated infrastructure (05_0082), Nature Conservation Council (NCC) of NSW (3 February 2006). Holden, T. (2006) Submission to DoP – Kurnell desalination plant and associated infrastructure (05_0082), Environmental Defender's Office (EDO) Ltd (3 February 2006). Sutherland Shire Council (2006) Submission to DoP – Kurnell desalination plant and associated infrastructure (05_0082), Sutherland Shire Council (January 2006).

References - Submissions 85

APPENDIX A PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY INTO SYDNEY’S WATER SUPPLY – TERMS OF REFERENCE

The General Purpose Standing Committee No. 5 was required to report on:  The environmental impact of the proposed desalination plant at Kurnell;  The environmental assessment process associated with the proposed desalination plant;  Methods for reducing the use of potable water for domestic, industrial, commercial and agricultural purposes, including sustainable water consumption practices;  The costs and benefits of desalination and alternative sources of water including recycled wastewater, groundwater, rainwater tanks and stormwater harvesting;  Practices concerning the disposal of trade waste;  The tender process and contractual arrangements, including public-private partnerships, in relation to the proposed desalination plant; and  Any other relevant matter. (Legislative Council 2006)

Appendix A – Parliamentary Inquiry into Sydney’s Water Supply (Terms of Reference) 86

APPENDIX B PART 3A OF THE EP&A ACT ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Source: (NSW DoP 2009d).

Appendix B – Part 3A of the EP&A Act Assessment Process 87

APPENDIX C KURNELL DESALINATION PLANT TIMELINE

19 October 2004 – 2004 Metropolitan Water Plan – Meeting the Challenges: Securing Sydney’s Water Future – was released to secure water supplies over the next 25 years. In the Plan, the Government committed to planning for a desalination plant, envisaging that a 100 megalitre per day desalination plant may be required in the future.

January 2005 – Planning for desalination commenced.

April 2005 – Sydney Water confirmed that desalination was a feasible option for Sydney.

June 2005 – Sydney Water called for expressions of interest from organisations capable of designing, constructing and operating a desalination plant.

16 June 2005 – The Environmental Planning and Assessment Amendment (Infrastructure and Other Planning Reform) Act 2005 (NSW) which introduced Part 3A of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 was assented to.

11 July 2005 – Premier Bob Carr announced that a desalination plant would be built in Sydney with Kurnell as the selected location.

12 July 2005 – NSW Minister for Infrastructure and Planning Craig Knowles deemed the Kurnell desalination plant to be “beyond public debate”.

27 July 2005 – Premier Bob Carr announced his resignation from politics.

1 August 2005 – Part 3A commenced.

3 August 2005 – Morris Iemma became Premier of NSW.

3 August 2005 – Craig Knowles announced his resignation from NSW politics and Frank Sartor became Minister for Planning.

19 August 2005 – NSW Government confirmed that a desalination plant would definitely be built to safeguard Sydney‟s water supply. Premier Morris Iemma announced his commitment to desalination “drought or no drought” in recognition of the need to secure Sydney‟s future drinking water with an additional source of water. Iemma stated that the size of the desalination plant was yet to be confirmed but could be smaller than a 500 megalitre per day plant. The announcement occurred as dam levels were at 41.2%.

August 2005 – A Planning Focus Meeting (PFM) was convened by the then Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources (DIPNR) (now the Department of Planning (DoP)). The PFM was attended by representatives from Sydney Water (proponent); Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC); Department of Primary Industries (DPI); Department of Energy, Utilities and Sustainability; Energy Australia; TransGrid; Sutherland Shire Council; and Department of Environment and Heritage (DEH). The PFM reportedly provided statutory authorities with the opportunity to be briefed on the project to help them identify key environmental issues that would need to be addressed in the environmental assessment, prior to its finalisation by DIPNR‟s Director General.

Appendix C – Kurnell Desalination Plant Timeline 88

September 2005 – NSW Government selected a final site at Kurnell for construction of a desalination plant. Also in that month three consortia were short-listed to develop detailed designs and plans to build the desalination plant; Sydney AquaSolutions, Freshwater Alliance and Pure Solutions. Sydney AquaSolutions subsequently withdrew from the bidding in November 2005.

25 October 2005 – The Minister for Planning declared the Kurnell desalination plant a major project under Part 3A of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 pursuant to clause 6 of State Environmental Planning Policy (Major Projects) 2005 for the purpose of development described in Schedule 1 in the SEPP (clause 25(2) – Development for the purpose of desalination plants that has a capital investment value of more than $10 million for drinking water supply).

8 November 2005 – the Commonwealth Minister for Environment and Heritage advised in writing that the desalination project did not require an environmental impact statement (EIS) as it was not likely to trigger one of the seven matters of national significance (i.e. world heritage sites, national heritage places, wetlands of international importance (called „Ramsar‟ wetlands), nationally threatened species and ecological communities, migratory species, Commonwealth marine areas or nuclear actions) under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999.

10 November 2005 – Sydney Water lodged a Major Projects application (Project application No. 05_0082) with the Department of Planning (DoP).

16 November 2005 – the Minister for Planning declared the desalination plant to be critical infrastructure under section 75C of the EP&A Act. The Minister also authorised submission of a concept plan pursuant to section 75M(1) of the Act.

18 November 2005 – the Director General of DoP issued Sydney Water with requirements for the preparation of an environmental assessment of the desalination plant based on the concept plan for the project.

23 November 2005 – Premier Iemma announced that the Government would commission a 125 megalitre a day plant, compared to the mooted 500 megalitre plant. The plant would be funded by Government rather than a public private partnership, providing flexibility in production capacity in accordance with dam levels.

24 November 2005 – the environmental assessment prepared by Sydney Water Corporation went on public exhibition. Utilities Minister Carl Scully and Planning Minister Frank Sartor extended the pubic exhibition period to 71 days (exceeding the 30-day statutory requirement) to persuade Sydneysiders that desalination was in the city‟s best interests. The public were invited to make submissions on the proposal.

29 November 2005 – the Minister for Planning directed that an independent panel be established under section 75G (Independent Hearing and Assessment Panels) of the EP&A Act (repealed) to assess the submissions to the publicly exhibited environmental assessment report prepared by Sydney Water. The Minister appointed Emeritus Professor Rolf Prince AO (Chair), Mr Tony Wright and Dr Gary Cox to constitute the panel.

3 February 2006 – Submissions to the DoP closed (762 submissions received).

Appendix C – Kurnell Desalination Plant Timeline 89

8 February 2006 – Premier Iemma announced that construction of the desalination plant had been deferred „indefinitely‟ (due to the discovery of ground water supplies). Construction is now dependent upon Sydney‟s water supply falling to 30% of dam capacity.

April 2006 – Sydney Water issued a preliminary tender for the construction of the plant, so that construction could begin if dam levels reached 30%.

8 May 2006 – 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan was released, stating that the desalination plant would only be built as „an extreme drought‟ measure, reflecting Iemma‟s statement (of 8 February 2006).

17 August 2006 – In accordance with section 75H (Environmental assessment and public consultation) of the EP&A Act, the proponent, Sydney Water, submitted its preferred project report for the proposal, which included responses to issues raised in public submissions, and made a number of amendments to the proposal.

8 September 2006 – The Independent Panel (established 29 November 2005) issued its final report stating that it was satisfied that all issues in the public submissions to the environmental assessment had been adequately addressed through the assessment process.

16 November 2006 – the Minister for Planning approved the application for the Kurnell desalination plant under Part 3A. Sartor stated, “What it does is to ensure that should the need arise for such an option to be exercised, it will be able to proceed”.

December 2006 – Independent Panel established to review the Metropolitan Water Plan urged the State Government to be ready to build a desalination plant as soon as dam levels hit the 30% trigger (expected February-April 2007). With dam levels falling to a record low of 36.7%, the Government called for expressions of interest to build and operate a 125 million litre a day plant.

6 February 2007 – Sydney Water requested two consortiums to tender to design, build, operate and maintain a 125 million litre a day desalination plant. The consortiums were Blue Water (consisting of Veolia, John Holland, Sinclair Knight Merz, and Maunsell), which built the Gold Coast desalination plant and DMT (consisting of Degremont, Multiplex Engineering and Thiess), which built the Perth desalination plant.

Late May 2007 – Public submissions for the tender process closed. Some early site work began.

June 2007 – Bluewater consortium announced as the successful consortium. Premier Morris Iemma announced the plant's capacity will be 250 million litres a day.

August 2007 – Construction work began on the Kurnell desalination plant. Construction is expected to be complete by the summer of 2009/10.

Compiled from: The Sydney Morning Herald Parliamentary Inquiry into Sydney‟s Water Supply

Appendix C – Kurnell Desalination Plant Timeline 90

APPENDIX D - NEWSPAPER ARTICLES FROM THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD Date Headline Issues Themes Howard concerned about proceeding with desalination before options such as recycling 12-Jul-05 Bottled folly have been exhausted. Alternative water supply options 12-Jul-05 Bottled folly Economic concerns. Alternative water supply options 12-Jul-05 Bottled folly Environmental concerns. Alternative water supply options 12-Jul-05 Bottled folly Government rationale for desalination - water shortage. Alternative water supply options 12-Jul-05 Bottled folly Carr once memorably dismissed desalination as 'bottled electricity'. Conflicting advice

Water is now a national problem. If the State Government will not do it, perhaps it is time 12-Jul-05 Bottled folly for the Federal Government to step in and set up an inquiry into our water supplies. Governance Government appears to fear that recycling water will incur greater political costs than 12-Jul-05 Bottled folly paying a huge amount to extract the salt from seawater. Public administration Howard - "…NSW Government has been a little too ready to dismiss…the options of recycling, and I'm not convinced that the case for preferring desalination has been strongly 12-Jul-05 Cold water on the salt solution enough made". Alternative water supply options 12-Jul-05 Cold water on the salt solution Economic concerns. Alternative water supply options Environmental concerns - energy consumption, greenhouse gas emissions and impact on 12-Jul-05 Cold water on the salt solution marine life. Alternative water supply options 12-Jul-05 Cold water on the salt solution Government rationale for desalination - water shortage. Alternative water supply options Carr announced 3 sites at Kurnell, near the Caltex oil refinery, had been identified as suitable - because they had fewer residents and had large industrial areas so construction 12-Jul-05 Cold water on the salt solution could proceed with little delay. Public administration

Brogden tries to rain on Carr's Government ministers yesterday dismissed residents' concerns about the construction of a 13-Jul-05 parade plant at Kurnell, saying the issue was so important it was "beyond public debate". Democracy Brogden tries to rain on Carr's 13-Jul-05 parade Opp. Leader Brogden criticises Carr for announcing desalination from Dubai. NIMBYism Brogden tries to rain on Carr's Part 3A - declared 'critical infrastructure', allowing it to bypass many environmental checks 13-Jul-05 parade and be fast tracked. Part 3A concerns Brogden tries to rain on Carr's 13-Jul-05 parade Knowles said Kurnell was already heavily industrialised. Public administration

Note: some issues have not been assigned a theme as they cannot be accurately categorised but are important events in the introduction of the Kurnell desalination plant Carr - not worried about Sutherland Shire Council's negative reaction to the proposed Brogden tries to rain on Carr's Kurnell site - "I can't think of a better site than next to an oil refinery…No one will notice 13-Jul-05 parade it". Public administration Carr's remedy goes through like a 13-Jul-05 dose of salts Public opinions against desalination and for recycling. Alternative water supply options Carr's remedy goes through like a 13-Jul-05 dose of salts Public opinion - "Let the voters decide". Democracy Engineering experts say it would take the same amount of time to build recycling plants as Two big pluses for the salt desalination. But institutional barriers, such as convincing the health department the water 13-Jul-05 solution, and one is money was safe would prolong the process. Alternative water supply options Two big pluses for the salt 13-Jul-05 solution, and one is money Desalination is a quick fix solution. Alternative water supply options Two big pluses for the salt 13-Jul-05 solution, and one is money Desalination protects government revenue from electricity suppliers. Alternative water supply options Two big pluses for the salt 13-Jul-05 solution, and one is money Part 3A - abandon stringent environmental requirements and fast track developments. Part 3A concerns Two big pluses for the salt Sartor said research showed Sydneysiders wouldn't drink recycled water. He refused to 13-Jul-05 solution, and one is money provide details. Public administration

14-Jul-05 Carr's trick: turn water into whine Sartor - desalination is a component of a number of water supply options. Alternative water supply options

Expert - "There should be an open and public debate in which the pros and cons of all the 14-Jul-05 Carr's trick: turn water into whine alternatives are clearly presented so that a rational and economic choice can be made". Alternative water supply options

14-Jul-05 Carr's trick: turn water into whine Sartor - desalination is a "contingency plan". Alternative water supply options

14-Jul-05 Carr's trick: turn water into whine Carr once damned desalination as "bottled electricity". Conflicting advice Rubbing salt in the wounds of 14-Jul-05 troubled water system Public opinions - "by the people for the people". Democracy Rubbing salt in the wounds of Public opinions - Suggests holding a referendum to choose between desalination and 14-Jul-05 troubled water system recycling. Democracy Rubbing salt in the wounds of 14-Jul-05 troubled water system Public opinions - Knowles: desalination plans "are beyond public debate". Democracy

Note: some issues have not been assigned a theme as they cannot be accurately categorised but are important events in the introduction of the Kurnell desalination plant State Government should be funding alternative options, such as rainwater tanks, capturing 15-Jul-05 Questions in the solution and treating stormwater and large effluent treatment plants. Alternative water supply options Environmental concerns - energy consumption, greenhouse gas emissions and impact on 15-Jul-05 Questions in the solution marine life. Alternative water supply options 15-Jul-05 Questions in the solution Economic concerns. Alternative water supply options 15-Jul-05 Questions in the solution Carr says drought contingency plan. Alternative water supply options 15-Jul-05 Questions in the solution Knowles - "beyond public debate" because water is critical for life. Democracy 15-Jul-05 Questions in the solution Part 3A - bypass environmental checks and EA at Minister's discretion. Part 3A concerns 23-Jul-05 Water solution doesn't wash Environmental concerns - energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. Alternative water supply options

23-Jul-05 Water solution doesn't wash Carr's announcement from Dubai criticised as a "politically expensive stunt". NIMBYism

23-Jul-05 Water solution doesn't wash Sartor - potential to use recycled water is limited because people don't want to drink it. Public administration Desalination plant to go ahead, Managing director of Sydney Water, David Evans stated Sydney dam levels would have to 20-Aug-05 drought or no drought drop more before a desalination plant would be considered. Conflicting advice Desalination plant to go ahead, Iemma ignored the advice of experts and reversed the Government's position that a plant 20-Aug-05 drought or no drought would only be built if dam levels fell below 30%. Conflicting advice Desalination plant to go ahead, 20-Aug-05 drought or no drought Iemma declares desalination plant "drought or no drought". Public administration 24-Aug-05 Fresh water at Kurnell Desalination plant should be a last resort. Alternative water supply options 24-Aug-05 Fresh water at Kurnell Environmental concerns - energy consumption. Alternative water supply options 24-Aug-05 Fresh water at Kurnell Iemma announcement made in haste. Conflicting advice 24-Aug-05 Fresh water at Kurnell Government did not consult residents before desalination in Kurnell was announced. NIMBYism 24-Aug-05 Fresh water at Kurnell Government dismissed recycling, claiming residents will not accept recycled water. Public administration 24-Aug-05 Fresh water at Kurnell Iemma declares desalination plant "drought or no drought". Public administration 24-Aug-05 Fresh water at Kurnell Need to secure water supplies due to drought, climate change and unknown future. Government - desalination is a precautionary measure so it will be there to use if needed 23-Sep-05 Water bills may rise $120 a year during drought (negotiate production capacity). Alternative water supply options 1-Oct-05 Perils of protest in the new age Knowles - "beyond public debate". Democracy 1-Oct-05 Perils of protest in the new age Part 3A - reduces community involvement in the approval of major developments. Part 3A concerns

Note: some issues have not been assigned a theme as they cannot be accurately categorised but are important events in the introduction of the Kurnell desalination plant Part 3A - Government rationale - allow one agency (i.e. DoP) to resolve issues quickly, 1-Oct-05 Perils of protest in the new age while maintaining public consultation and EA. Part 3A concerns

1-Oct-05 Perils of protest in the new age Part 3A - stop-work orders, interim protection orders and appeal rights are made invalid. Part 3A concerns Sartor will overrule councils on Part 3A - Government rationale - boost building and jobs, cater for growth, and provide 8-Oct-05 growth certainty for developers with a clear and continuous approvals process. Part 3A concerns Sartor will overrule councils on 8-Oct-05 growth Part 3A - State Government control of suburban projects. Part 3A concerns Water plant runs into sea of 8-Oct-05 resistance Environmental concerns - greenhouse gas emissions and impact on marine life. Alternative water supply options Water plant runs into sea of 8-Oct-05 resistance Economic concerns. Alternative water supply options Water plant runs into sea of 8-Oct-05 resistance Government rationale for desalination - water shortage. Alternative water supply options Water plant runs into sea of Part 3A - excludes rigorous EA despite claims by State Government that EA will be 8-Oct-05 resistance thoroughly conducted. Part 3A concerns Harder to fight the State Government than councils, since it is a more distant planning 18-Oct-05 The point of pressure authority from democracy and is harder to influence. Democracy 18-Oct-05 The point of pressure Knowles - "beyond public debate". Democracy Part 3A - consultation relegated to how the project proceeds rather than whether it should be 18-Oct-05 The point of pressure approved. Part 3A concerns 18-Oct-05 The point of pressure Part 3A - Government claims EA will be rigorous. Part 3A concerns

Coalition vows to scrap minister's Part 3A - reduces local involvement, could lead to corruption (political donations) and does 20-Oct-05 powers on big projects not always provide 'certainty or timeliness for development approvals'. Part 3A concerns 3A projects add a new dimension Part 3A - gives the minister unprecedented discretion and suspends other planning 25-Oct-05 to rules legislation. Part 3A concerns 3A projects add a new dimension Part 3A - Government rationale - councils consult too wide and long, impeding development 25-Oct-05 to rules projects and shrinking the economy. Part 3A concerns Pay for private water even if dams Government - desalination is a precautionary measure so it will be there to use if needed 1-Nov-05 are full during drought (negotiate production capacity). Alternative water supply options Pay for private water even if dams 1-Nov-05 are full Public expects full disclosure of all documents, including contractual dealings. Democracy

Note: some issues have not been assigned a theme as they cannot be accurately categorised but are important events in the introduction of the Kurnell desalination plant Pay for private water even if dams Government unsure if the public will view the contract before it is signed and unclear who 1-Nov-05 are full will pick up the bill for the Government's offset of greenhouse gas emissions. Democracy 2-Nov-05 No tap at the waterworks Public concerned whether the plant will be built and operated with private funds. Democracy 2-Nov-05 No tap at the waterworks Scully - future contracts (after Cross City Tunnel) will be made public. Democracy 2-Nov-05 No tap at the waterworks Government believes the community won't accept recycled water. Public administration Salt in a wound still stinging over Public opinions - No consultation undertaken to ask people what the best solution 2-Nov-05 private contracts (economically, environmentally and socially). Democracy Auditor-General, Bob Sendt, recommended Iemma to make government and private sector 17-Nov-05 Failure to table deals under fire deals transparent to the public. Democracy Federal Government did not have jurisdiction over the project and could not overrule NSW 17-Nov-05 Failure to table deals under fire State Government planning authority. Governance

Scully announced Government undertaking community consultation (to win public approval) (eg. increasing the consultation period on the EA to 2 months, establishing an Scully aims for public support on information centre in Kurnell, holding public meetings, offering desalinated water samples 20-Nov-05 water plan and promising to write to community groups offering face-to-face briefings). Scully announced yesterday Government was increasing the consultation period on the EA 21-Nov-05 Taste tests for plant to 2 months and include taste tests for the public. Opp. Leader Debnam said the Government had extended the consultation time only because 21-Nov-05 Taste tests for plant it knew the public was angry about the plant and did not want it in Kurnell.

24-Nov-05 Taking the easy option "We do not know the options because the Government hasn't bothered to do the sums". Alternative water supply options

24-Nov-05 Taking the easy option "Desalination is a quick fix; finding water to waste instead of saving the water we have". Alternative water supply options Labor will argue that it would be irresponsible to take the gamble and not proceed with 24-Nov-05 Taking the easy option desalination. Alternative water supply options "…the Premier owes the people of NSW an explanation of why desalination is the best way 24-Nov-05 Taking the easy option to spend $1.3 billion of their money". Alternative water supply options Critics of desalination say it makes more sense to pursue a wider range of conservation, reuse and recycling schemes than to spend vast sums on a plant that does nothing to break 26-Nov-05 Murky waters the habit of using water once before flushing it out to sea. Alternative water supply options

Note: some issues have not been assigned a theme as they cannot be accurately categorised but are important events in the introduction of the Kurnell desalination plant 26-Nov-05 Murky waters Cost of desalination, including cost to keep a plant idling for long periods are unknown. Alternative water supply options Experts are united in their view that desalination should be a last resort because of construction costs, high energy demands, and fears a new source of water will discourage 26-Nov-05 Murky waters users from conserving water. Alternative water supply options

26-Nov-05 Murky waters Iemma - "Sydney needs a new source of clean drinking water, drought or no drought". Alternative water supply options

In August when dam levels were hovering around 40%, MD SWC, David Evans said desalination was an option but Sydney was still a long way from the crippling drought conditions that would force him down that path. Dam levels had fallen 3% during the year 26-Nov-05 Murky waters and Evans reckoned it would have to fall 10% before he would commit to desalination. Conflicting advice 26-Nov-05 Murky waters Knowles - "beyond public debate". Democracy

26-Nov-05 Murky waters Decision to build the plant was made almost before people knew what desalination was. Democracy Scully can't nominate a single independent expert who supports the desalination plan. "I rely on the vast silent minority, who I think quietly support this Government getting on and 26-Nov-05 Murky waters delivering infrastructure that secures our quality of life". Public administration Desalination is a quick fix solution, with a firm delivery date, a guaranteed outcome, no 26-Nov-05 Murky waters health risks, passes taste test, no stigma attached. Councils urge desalination SCCG wanted an open debate on Sydney's water crisis and a chance to discuss the 30-Nov-05 alternatives environmental impact of desalination compared with recycling. Alternative water supply options Councils urge desalination Government's own expert water panel opposed desalination in favour of demand 30-Nov-05 alternatives management and improved stormwater harvesting. Conflicting advice Public comment will be accepted on the construction, operation and maintenance of the 13-Dec-05 Public will get a say on water plant plant rather than whether it should proceed. Democracy

13-Dec-05 Public will get a say on water plant Knowles - "beyond public debate". Democracy Part 3A - truncate previously existing environmental studies and ban "stop the clock" legal 13-Dec-05 Public will get a say on water plant devices used by activists to slow or halt projects. Part 3A concerns Sartor established an Independent Review Panel to ensure that public concerns and 13-Dec-05 Public will get a say on water plant comments on how the plant should operate were taken seriously.

Note: some issues have not been assigned a theme as they cannot be accurately categorised but are important events in the introduction of the Kurnell desalination plant Sartor - "I have instructed my department to undertake a comprehensive public consultation process, including target community meetings". "All issues raised by the community must 13-Dec-05 Public will get a say on water plant be comprehensively addressed".

City desalination plant is not the Of the 34% in favour of the plant, almost half changed their minds in favour of water reuse 14-Dec-05 solution - poll and recycling initiatives when asked where they thought the money would best be spent. Alternative water supply options City desalination plant is not the Environmental concerns - two-thirds of respondents were worried about greenhouse gas 14-Dec-05 solution - poll emissions. Alternative water supply options City desalination plant is not the 56% of 400 Sydneysiders surveyed opposed the State Government's decision to build a 14-Dec-05 solution - poll desalination plant. Alternative water supply options City desalination plant is not the Government - desalination is a rainfall independent water source that is a component of a 14-Dec-05 solution - poll diverse and well-balanced plan to solve our water needs. Alternative water supply options Sydney Water warned against Environmental concerns - high energy demand, greenhouse gas emissions, brine waste 16-Jan-06 desalination strategy product and land required for the plant. Alternative water supply options Sydney Water warned against Sydney Water told the State Government two years ago that desalination should not be 16-Jan-06 desalination strategy pursued as a solution to Sydney's water crisis. Conflicting advice Public opinion - difficult to evaluate the desalination plant when Sydney Water had offered little information about alternatives such as stormwater harvesting or recycling. "We have 19-Jan-06 Residents boiling over water plans nothing to compare [desalination] with". Alternative water supply options

Clean-Up Australia's founder, Ian Kiernan - described consultation as "token if not farcical". 19-Jan-06 Residents boiling over water plans "I don't know why we are here tonight when the Government has already made up its mind". Democracy Iemma - "The people were giving us the message that they wanted us to explore and continue exploring alternatives and recycling, and we've never stopped looking for those 9-Feb-06 The great Carr crash alternatives". Alternative water supply options Carr and Iemma - repeatedly argued that Sydney needed a new source of water which was 9-Feb-06 The great Carr crash not rain-dependent, and that desalination was the only viable option. Alternative water supply options Iemma announced yesterday he was putting desalination on hold indefinitely - it will be reviewed only if dam levels fall to 30% - due to the "discovery" of two large aquifers under Sydney. However, $130 million will be spent on the project, including buying the site and 9-Feb-06 The great Carr crash building a pilot plant. Conflicting advice Battle-scarred street that needs 11-Feb-06 fixing Iemma announced this week that desalination was being deferred.

Note: some issues have not been assigned a theme as they cannot be accurately categorised but are important events in the introduction of the Kurnell desalination plant Expert - myths: desalination is a viable option; Sydney is short of water; recycling is unsafe, unhealthy and unacceptable; rainwater is not a practical solution; using groundwater is short- Wasted gigalitres are just water term and unsustainable; we should build another dam; water utilities are run by government 15-Feb-06 down the drain for the benefit of the people. Alternative water supply options Morris Dilemma' - Iemma indecision whether to pursue desalination. Shelved the project Insecure and indecisive: Labor's indefinitely in the face of widespread public opposition to the water crisis proposal but still 5-Mar-06 Iemma dilemma allocated $120 million to keep the plan alive. Policy confusion. Conflicting advice

How the planning system stifles Public participation is a fundamental element of good planning - achieve better results with 17-Mar-06 debate local knowledge and interest and let the public feel confident they have received a hearing. Democracy The Government will only exacerbate conflicts in the system, as residents realise How the planning system stifles meaningful opportunities to participate in decisions that affect their environment are 17-Mar-06 debate illusory. Democracy Government says this is all about moving from a "process-driven approach to an outcomes- How the planning system stifles focused service". However, planning is a process, it is a process that produces good 17-Mar-06 debate outcomes. Democracy How the planning system stifles Increased opportunities for public involvement and participation was an objective of the 17-Mar-06 debate EP&A Act 1979. Democracy During the past decade the State Government has progressively gutted opportunities for How the planning system stifles public participation from the planning process. Public participation was further eroded with 17-Mar-06 debate the introduction of Part 3A. Part 3A concerns 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan released on 8 May which relegates the politically unpopular Water recycling wins priority desalination plant plans to "an extreme drought" measure, and instead highlights recycling 9-May-06 treatment and demand management. Short on solutions, the new water plan will leave Sydney high and With the release of the 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan, it confirms that desalination has not 15-May-06 dry been shelved despite Iemma's announcement in February 2006. Conflicting advice

Developers beat a path to Sartor's Part 3A - undermines the openness, transparency and accountability of the development 5-Jul-06 doors as critics query powers process, does not adequately protect the environment and can ignore community concerns. Part 3A concerns

Developers beat a path to Sartor's Part 3A - Government rationale to slash approval times, provide a one-stop shop and a 5-Jul-06 doors as critics query powers flexible approach to the development assessment process as opposed to councils. Part 3A concerns

Note: some issues have not been assigned a theme as they cannot be accurately categorised but are important events in the introduction of the Kurnell desalination plant While the minister says he is becoming more selective about using his powers, he has Developers beat a path to Sartor's declared about 230 developments "major projects" or "state-significant sites" in the 11 5-Jul-06 doors as critics query powers months since he was appointed. Part 3A concerns Part 3A - allows the minister to take over projects through one policy document, replacing 17-Oct-06 New powers are working: Sartor 85 planning instruments. Part 3A concerns Part 3A - Government rationale - cut red tape and streamline the planning process to 17-Oct-06 New powers are working: Sartor facilitate new investment and jobs. Part 3A concerns

6-Nov-06 Wait till March, then panic No decision expected on desalination plant until after the State election in March 2007. 16 November 2006 - Sartor approved the development application for the Kurnell desalination plant. "What is does is to ensure that should the need arise for such an option to be exercised, it will be able to proceed". Government did not need to built the plant yet Saltwater plant gets approval just because it was implementing recycling schemes and because of increased subsidies for 17-Nov-06 in case rainwater tanks and water-efficient washing machines. Alternative water supply options Sydney dam levels dropped to a record low of 37.5% yesterday and could be as low as 30% City in hot water: dams at record by next year's election, when the State Government is expected to begin building its 8-Dec-06 lows desalination plant. Independent Panel established to review the Metropolitan Water Plan urged the State Iemma given backing for saltwater Government to be ready to build a desalination plant as soon as dam levels hit the 30% 11-Dec-06 plant trigger (expected February-April 2007).

Iemma given backing for saltwater Delays on construction could add to the cost because other cities in Australia and overseas 11-Dec-06 plant are preparing to build plants and will be competing for materials and experts. Record dam low brings new talk of Government criticised for not tightening water restrictions due to the upcoming election 22-Dec-06 desalination despite worsening water shortages. Alternative water supply options

Sydney's dams fell to a record low yesterday (36.7%), prompting the State Government to Record dam low brings new talk of push ahead with the desalination plant by calling for expressions of interest to build and 22-Dec-06 desalination operate it. This will ensure that the plant will be ready to be built.

Note: some issues have not been assigned a theme as they cannot be accurately categorised but are important events in the introduction of the Kurnell desalination plant APPENDIX E - SUBMISSIONS TO THE PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY INTO SYDNEY'S WATER SUPPLY Submitter Type Submitter Issue Theme The Government must implement large-scale effluent recycling, programs to better harvest our Alternative water supply MP Clover Moore rainwater, and incentives to reduce demand for water. options The Government should immediately abandon planning, land purchase and construction of trial desalination projects and redirect funds to urgently investigate, plan, and implement sustainable long-term solutions to ensure Sydney's water supply for our growing population, now and in the Alternative water supply MP Clover Moore future. options Alternative water supply MP Clover Moore Economic concerns. options Environmental concerns - greenhouse emissions, and impacts on marine life and surrounding Alternative water supply MP Clover Moore ecosystems. options The Government's desalination proposal is environmentally and financially costly, unsustainable Alternative water supply MP Clover Moore and short-sighted. options Alternative water supply MP Clover Moore The proposed desalination plan was ill considered, irresponsible and unsustainable. options Environmental Government needs to reduce water use through education, pricing mechanisms and incentives, but Alternative water supply Group Coast and Wetlands Society Inc also a change in philosophy. options Environmental Alternative water supply Group Coast and Wetlands Society Inc More research on developing recycling and re-use strategies. options Environmental Alternative water supply Group Coast and Wetlands Society Inc Economic concerns. options Environmental Alternative water supply Group Coast and Wetlands Society Inc Environmental concerns - greenhouse emissions and impacts on marine life. options Combined Community Groups Alternative water supply Community Group of Sutherland Shire Water-saving and water recycling should be implemented instead. options Combined Community Groups Alternative water supply Community Group of Sutherland Shire No comparable costings of alternatives such as recycling. options Combined Community Groups Environmental concerns - energy and greenhouse gas emissions, terrestrial ecology, indigenous Alternative water supply Community Group of Sutherland Shire heritage, marine environment and spoil management. options Sydney Water should be required to undertake open and informed studies of the potential direct and indirect impacts of desalination plants, and in particular with respect to the sustainable social, Alternative water supply Academic Dr Charles Essery (UWS) environmental and economic balance that is required for secure water supplies. options The data and reports on the costs and benefits of desalination and alternatives in the hands of government agencies need to be released publicly, with time given to equal analysis of the alternatives through appropriate independent experts, not appointed by the current interests and Alternative water supply Academic Dr Charles Essery (UWS) partisan groups. options

An independent review should be conducted of the demand forecasts, water consumption data and basic measurement accuracy of Sydney's water utilities (SWC, SCA or any future bodies) be commissioned and used to enforce better internal management of the various operational and Alternative water supply Academic Dr Charles Essery (UWS) planning activities that are currently under the control of closed, internal groups within government. options Alternative water supply Academic Dr Stuart Khan (UNSW) Potential to increase water reuse. options Desalination may increase available supply but not decrease the ongoing discharge of sewage into Alternative water supply Academic Dr Stuart Khan (UNSW) the ocean. options Alternative water supply Academic Dr Stuart Khan (UNSW) Environmental concerns - energy intensive, impact on the marine environment options The environmental implications of increased consumption with the implementation of desalination Alternative water supply Academic Dr Stuart Khan (UNSW) needs to be adequately assessed. options Local Government Association Individual options have been pursued without meaningful consultation and adequate analysis. Alternative water supply Local Government of NSW options Local Government Association No public, in-depth, cost-benefit to justify the Kurnell desalination plant as the most economically Alternative water supply Local Government of NSW and environmentally responsible option. options Local Government Association Full and rigorous cost-benefit analysis should be conducted on options for Sydney's long term water Alternative water supply Local Government of NSW supply, such as grey water and effluent reuse, stormwater management, education/demand options Reviewmanagement of the programs. Metropolitan Water Plan should be undertaken in consultation with local government Local Government Association and that this review considers outcomes of the inquiry into a sustainable water supply for Sydney Alternative water supply Local Government of NSW and outcomes of the cost-benefit analysis recommended above. options Desalination may possibly be unnecessary if a combination of alternative solutions is applied to Alternative water supply Local Government Manly Council provide a sustainable water source for Sydney. options Further investment in public education would assist in the implementation and improve the Alternative water supply Local Government Manly Council effectiveness of demand management options. options Difficult to accurately assess the costs and benefits of desalination with alternative sources of water Alternative water supply Local Government Manly Council because a comparison of these options has not been undertaken. options

Ongoing identification of possible solutions to Sydney's water will benefit from a more open Alternative water supply Local Government Manly Council consultation process prior to development of future concept plans and environmental assessments. options The opportunity for public debate on the value of desalination compared to other options has been Alternative water supply Local Government Manly Council limited. options Alternative water supply Local Government Manly Council Viability of alternative options needs to be meaningfully assessed and compared. options Alternative water supply Local Government Manly Council Economic concerns. options Alternative water supply Local Government Manly Council Environmental concerns. options Save Our Suburbs (SOS) NSW Alternative water supply Community Group Inc All water supply options should be considered and evaluated as objectively as possible. options Environmental Sydney Coastal Councils Group Desalination is possibly unnecessary if a combination of alternative solutions is applied to provide a Alternative water supply Group (SCCG) Inc sustainable water source for Sydney. options Environmental Sydney Coastal Councils Group Further investment in public education would assist in the implementation and improve the Alternative water supply Group (SCCG) Inc effectiveness of demand management options. options Environmental Sydney Coastal Councils Group Alternative water supply Group (SCCG) Inc An accurate comparison between alternative solutions to desalination needs to be undertaken. options Environmental Sydney Coastal Councils Group Assessment process failed to identify the need for the plant by not providing a comparison between Alternative water supply Group (SCCG) Inc the financial, environmental and social impacts of other options. options Environmental Sydney Coastal Councils Group Need an open and transparent environmental, financial and social assessment of all possible Alternative water supply Group (SCCG) Inc options. options

Environmental Sydney Coastal Councils Group Ongoing identification of possible solutions to Sydney's water will benefit from a more open Alternative water supply Group (SCCG) Inc consultation process prior to development of future Concept Plans and Environmental Assessments. options Environmental Sydney Coastal Councils Group Opportunity for public debate on the value of desalination compared to other options has been Alternative water supply Group (SCCG) Inc limited. options Sydney Water and the NSW Government need to acknowledge that much of the public comment surrounding this proposal has identified that the majority of Sydney's community consider Environmental Sydney Coastal Councils Group desalination should only be implemented as a solution to a water shortage in Sydney after all Alternative water supply Group (SCCG) Inc possible options have been compared and considered. options Environmental Sydney Coastal Councils Group Alternative water supply Group (SCCG) Inc Economic concerns. options Environmental Sydney Coastal Councils Group Environmental concerns - terrestrial and aquatic ecology, water quality, matters of national Alternative water supply Group (SCCG) Inc environmental significance, and greenhouse gas emissions. options Environmental More formal and independent public consultation on alternative options, such as recycling is Alternative water supply Group Total Environment Centre warranted. options Environmental Desalination reinforces 'one use' of water - the most devastating impact on water cycle Alternative water supply Group Total Environment Centre management. options Environmental Alternative water supply Group Total Environment Centre Economic concerns. options Environmental Environmental concerns - energy intensive, greenhouse emissions and impact on marine Alternative water supply Group Total Environment Centre environment. options Environmental Alternative water supply Group Total Environment Centre Fear will encourage increased demand and future recycling options would be abandoned. options Despite the Premier referring to desalinated seawater as 'bottled electricity', serious consideration of Academic Dr Stuart Khan (UNSW) large-scale seawater desalination schemes began to grow during 2004-05. Conflicting advice MP Clover Moore Lack of consultation about the need for, location, scale and cost of a desalination plant. Democracy MP Clover Moore The only opportunity to comment on the proposal was in response to the proponent's EA. Democracy MP Clover Moore Inadequate EA. Democracy Planning approval for the desalination plant should be withheld unless the proponent provides Democracy MP Clover Moore detailed plans for mitigating these environmental impacts. Democracy The EIS is based on a concept design for the plant, and the detail of how the proponent will address the majority of the assessment criteria identified by the Minister remains "to be developed", "still to be determined" or "yet to be identified". It is a serious flaw in our legislative framework that the community will have no input into the planning approval process for this enormous and costly MP Clover Moore project, later in the process when these details are determined. Environmental Proposal on public display over the Christmas-New Year period, coinciding with the main holiday Group Coast and Wetlands Society Inc period. Democracy Environmental Democracy Group Coast and Wetlands Society Inc EIS is inadequate to be certain of the impacts of the proposal. Combined Community Groups Community Group of Sutherland Shire No clear public notice of how the project shall be paid for. Democracy Combined Community Groups EA contains insufficient information to reach the conclusion that the desalination plant can proceed Democracy Community Group of Sutherland Shire without any significant environmental impacts. Combined Community Groups Lack of confidence in the consultation process with Government going against the advice of the Community Group of Sutherland Shire public. Democracy Local Government Association Requests transparency in tender and contractual process Local Government of NSW Democracy EA (concept plan/proposal) too vague to determine environmental impacts – uncertainties about Democracy Local Government Association major aspects of plant’s construction and operation, including site layout, delivery infrastructure Local Government of NSW routes and method of construction. Investment of public funds for project where environmental and social impacts have not been fully Democracy Local Government Association determined to the satisfaction of the scientific community or affected local communities. Local Government of NSW Local Government Association Detailed EIS should be delivered by the NSW Government for public evaluation prior to any works Democracy Local Government of NSW on the desalination plant being progressed or approved. Local Government Association Involvement has been in the form of presentations and briefings rather than meaningful two-way Local Government of NSW dialogue on the issue. Democracy NSW Government should conduct meaningful consultation with local government and the wider Local Government Association community on the initiatives detailed in the Metropolitan Water Plan prior to commencement. Local Government of NSW Democracy Sceptical of State Government claims they are having an open and meaningful public consultation Local Government Association (eg. independent panel) due to actions and statements prior to November 2005. Local Government of NSW Democracy Lack of certainty surrounding environmental assessment of major infrastructure solutions such as Democracy Local Government Manly Council desalination must be addressed by State Government.

Local Government Manly Council Expects the tender process and contractual arrangements occur in an open and transparent manner. Democracy

Any information provided occurs after public announcements through the media. Manly does not Local Government Manly Council consider this to be an appropriate level of consultation for an issue of this significance. Democracy Provision of information rather than meaningful consultation with local government and broader Local Government Manly Council community. Democracy Environmental Sydney Coastal Councils Group EA failed to identify the full extent of environmental impacts and potential mitigation measures of Democracy Group (SCCG) Inc the proposal which was still at the concept stage. Environmental Sydney Coastal Councils Group Group (SCCG) Inc Expects the tender process and contractual arrangements occur in an open and transparent manner. Democracy

Environmental Sydney Coastal Councils Group Any information provided occurs after public announcements through the media. SCCG does not Group (SCCG) Inc consider this to be an appropriate level of consultation for an issue of this significance. Democracy Environmental Sydney Coastal Councils Group Provision of information rather than meaningful consultation with local government and broader Group (SCCG) Inc community. Democracy Environmental Democracy Group Total Environment Centre Government has not adequately addressed environmental concerns. Environmental Group Total Environment Centre State Government - "beyond public debate". Democracy Review of Sydney Water as a monopoly service provider is required to ensure that the community Academic Dr Charles Essery (UWS) is involved in decision making processes. Governance Local Government Association Local Government not consulted during process (Carr announcement, Iemma confirmation and Governance Local Government of NSW Sartor critical infrastructure) Local Government Association Loss of council planning powers and representation of local communities Governance Local Government of NSW As local government is often best placed to communicate to diverse communities and is responsible for the majority of planning decisions that occur in the urban coastal areas. It is therefore in a position to play an integral role in community consultation and finding localised solutions which Local Government Manly Council satisfy multiple objectives unique to each LGA. Governance As local government is often best placed to communicate to diverse communities and is responsible for the majority of planning decisions that occur in the urban coastal areas. It is therefore in a Environmental Sydney Coastal Councils Group position to play an integral role in community consultation and finding localised solutions which Group (SCCG) Inc satisfy multiple objectives unique to each LGA. Governance Combined Community Groups Condemns the NSW Government's decision to build the plant without consulting the Sydney Community Group of Sutherland Shire community in general and the Sutherland Shire community in particular. NIMBYism Local Government Association Decision to proceed made without transparency and disregard for the affected LGA. NIMBYism Local Government of NSW Part 3A - there are no third party appeal rights, except with the consent of the Minister, who also MP Clover Moore determines community consultation requirements. Part 3A concerns MP Clover Moore Part 3A could be a recipe for environmental degradation, urban chaos, and social dysfunction. Part 3A concerns

Part 3A removes the community's recourse to interim protection orders, stop work orders, MP Clover Moore environmental protection notices and orders under s124 of the Local Government Act 1993. Part 3A concerns Requirements for "critical infrastructure projects" should be strengthened in order to ensure that MP Clover Moore projects are examined in detail and subject to full public scrutiny. Part 3A concerns Environmental Group Coast and Wetlands Society Inc Part 3A - bypasses formal requirements of other legislation. Part 3A concerns Environmental Group Coast and Wetlands Society Inc Part 3A - carries an assumption of approval. Part 3A concerns Environmental Group Coast and Wetlands Society Inc Part 3A - no appeal rights. Part 3A concerns Local Government Association Part 3A – bypass/overrides legislation Part 3A concerns Local Government of NSW Local Government Association Part 3A - Critical infrastructure – lack of definition and its open-ended nature. Part 3A concerns Local Government of NSW Local Government Association Part 3A – critical infrastructure – proceed in the absence of council approval or meaningful and Part 3A concerns Local Government of NSW comprehensive community consultation. Local Government Association Part 3A – does not require EIS, DG prepares EA requirements, lack of detail for EA leaves the Part 3A concerns Local Government of NSW process open and less rigorous. Local Government Association Part 3A – Minister discretion for environmental and community issues Part 3A concerns Local Government of NSW Environmental Group Coast and Wetlands Society Inc Questions the point of public submissions when the Government appears to have made up its mind. Public administration A transparent survey of the community acceptance of recycled water and an accurate comparison Local Government Manly Council between alternative solutions to desalination needs to be undertaken. Public administration Sydney Water and the NSW Government need to acknowledge that much of the public comment surrounding this proposal has identified that the majority of the Sydney community consider desalination should only be implemented as a solution to a water shortage in Sydney after all Local Government Manly Council possible options have been compared and considered. Public administration Environmental Sydney Coastal Councils Group Group (SCCG) Inc A transparent survey of the community acceptance of recycled water needs to be undertaken. Public administration Environmental Sydney Coastal Councils Group Community acceptance of recycled water and water restrictions is much greater than the EA Group (SCCG) Inc suggests. Public administration APPENDIX F - SUBMISSIONS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF THE KURNELL PLANT

Submitter Type Submitter Issue Theme Environmental Nature Conservation Council (NCC) Alternatives to desalination have not been properly assessed or publicly discussed by Alternative water supply Group of NSW the State Government or Sydney Water. options Environmental Environmental Defender's Office Cost-benefit analysis of alternative water management options should be undertaken by Alternative water supply Group (EDO) Ltd an independent body of experts and make publicly available. options Environmental Nature Conservation Council (NCC) Alternative water supply Group of NSW Failure to consider alternative options. options Environmental Environmental Defender's Office Alternative water supply Group (EDO) Ltd No publicly available cost-benefit analysis of alternative water management options. options Environmental Environmental Defender's Office Environmental concerns - energy use, greenhouse gas emissions, plants, animals and Alternative water supply Group (EDO) Ltd marine environment. options Environmental Nature Conservation Council (NCC) Alternative water supply Group of NSW Environmental concerns - greenhouse gas emissions, plants, animals and marine life. options Environmental Environmental Defender's Office Alternative water supply Group (EDO) Ltd No proper justification of the need for desalination. options Environmental Environmental Defender's Office Planning process justifying desalination was a viable option has not been made publicly Alternative water supply Group (EDO) Ltd available. options Alternative water supply Local Government Sutherland Shire Council Insufficient justification for the proposal over alternative options. options Professional Royal Australian Institute of Alternatives to desalination have not been properly assessed or publicly discussed by Alternative water supply Institution Architects (RAIA) NSW Chapter the State Government or Sydney Water. options Professional Royal Australian Institute of Alternative water supply Institution Architects (RAIA) NSW Chapter Environmental concerns - greenhouse gas emissions. options Environmental Nature Conservation Council (NCC) Government needs to establish clear consultation framework to guarantee inclusive Group of NSW consultation at all stages of the development process. Democracy Environmental Nature Conservation Council (NCC) Group of NSW EA does not provide any detail of cost. Democracy Environmental Nature Conservation Council (NCC) EA is inadequate as it is based on a concept plan so extent of environmental impacts Group of NSW and mitigation measures are unclear. Democracy Environmental Environmental Defender's Office EA is inadequate as it is based on a concept plan so extent of environmental impacts Group (EDO) Ltd and mitigation measures are unclear. Democracy Environmental Nature Conservation Council (NCC) Insufficient detail in terms of the exact nature and form of the proposal on which to base Group of NSW an accurate and informed comment. Democracy Environmental Nature Conservation Council (NCC) Sydney Water should undertake appropriate and detailed EA, including extent of Group of NSW impacts, and supply additional information referencing scientific papers. Democracy Environmental Nature Conservation Council (NCC) Group of NSW Lack of attention by government to community consultation. Democracy Environmental Nature Conservation Council (NCC) Group of NSW State Government - "too important to debate" Democracy Environmental Nature Conservation Council (NCC) Group of NSW Consultation by Sydney Water has been one-way dialogue. Democracy EA is inadequate as it is based on a concept plan so extent of environmental impacts Local Government Sutherland Shire Council and mitigation measures are unclear. Democracy Government states aim of consultation is to "minimise impacts" but minimised impacts Local Government Sutherland Shire Council do not always translate to acceptable impacts. Democracy

Local Government Sutherland Shire Council Inadequate description and assessment of the desalination process in the EA. Democracy

Local Government Sutherland Shire Council Inadequate justification of selected site in the EA. Democracy

Local Government Sutherland Shire Council Insufficient details on greenhouse emission reduction in the EA. Democracy

Issues raised in Planning Focus Meeting are not addressed in EA, potentially due to the Local Government Sutherland Shire Council short timeframe between receipt of the DG's requirements and release of the EA. Democracy Lack of consideration of off-site impacts in the EA and environmental impacts (eg. Local Government Sutherland Shire Council animals, plants, marine environment and heritage impacts). Democracy

Local Government Sutherland Shire Council Lack of data and detail on which to base risk assessments. Democracy

No certainty to the proposed route, or the proposed construction methodology in the EA Local Government Sutherland Shire Council to assess the impacts of the proposed delivery infrastructure. Democracy Sydney Water refused to make environmental studies used to identify key Local Government Sutherland Shire Council environmental issues available under a FOI request. Democracy Given the tight timeframe for the project, there is no guarantee that consultation (in the true sense of the word) will be undertaken early enough in the process, so that concerns Local Government Sutherland Shire Council of the community can genuinely be incorporated into designs and work practices. Democracy Value of consultation questioned when the Minister consistently says "it will be built" Local Government Sutherland Shire Council regardless. Democracy

Local Government Sutherland Shire Council Information presentation rather than consultation. Democracy

Local Government Sutherland Shire Council Little value in information provision when it occurs after the fact. Democracy Professional Royal Australian Institute of Institution Architects (RAIA) NSW Chapter No consultation about the need for the plant. Comments only invited on EA. Democracy Professional Royal Australian Institute of EA is inadequate as it is based on a concept plan so extent of environmental impacts Institution Architects (RAIA) NSW Chapter and mitigation measures are unclear. Democracy Environmental Nature Conservation Council (NCC) Part 3A - proposal bypasses legislation that would normally trigger the full EA required Group of NSW for such large projects. Part 3A concerns