SYDNEY's DESALINATION PLANT: Lessons for Critical Infrastructure

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

SYDNEY's DESALINATION PLANT: Lessons for Critical Infrastructure SYDNEY’S DESALINATION PLANT: Lessons for critical infrastructure under the NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 Stephanie Lum Bachelor of Planning University of NSW October 2009 ABSTRACT Sydney’s Desalination Plant: Lessons for critical infrastructure under the NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 Part 3A (Major infrastructure and other projects) of the New South Wales Environmental Planning and Assessment (EP&A) Act 1979 commenced on 1 August 2005. The objective was to facilitate large-scale infrastructure developments by streamlining the approvals process. Local governments, environmentalists and community groups have vehemently opposed this planning reform on the grounds that it reduces scope for public participation, judicial review and merit appeals. These rights are further restricted for projects deemed critical infrastructure. Under section 75C of the EP&A Act, the Minister may declare a project as critical infrastructure if it is deemed “essential for the State for economic, environmental or social reasons”. Critical infrastructure projects exclude appeal rights by proponents and objectors, the application of all environmental planning instruments (other than State Environmental Planning Policies), and third party appeals. The declaration by the NSW Minister for Planning of the Kurnell desalination plant as critical infrastructure in November 2005 ignited considerable opposition from the public. Through a review of both the Government’s justification for the plant to safeguard Sydney’s water supply and the critical infrastructure process applied to it, this thesis makes recommendations on how the planning approvals process for major projects under Part 3A could be improved. Abstract i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to sincerely thank Mr Peter Williams and Ms Jackie Biro for their guidance, advice, time and constant encouragement. I would also like to acknowledge the EG Property Group for their support through the final year thesis scholarship. I wish to also thank my family and friends for their support throughout the thesis process. Acknowledgements ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter One: Introduction 1.1 Problem Setting 1 1.2 Theoretical Framework 2 1.3 Context 2 1.4 Research Statement 3 1.5 Methodology 4 1.6 Research Limitations 7 1.7 Thesis Structure 8 Chapter Two: Australia’s Recent Urban Water Crisis 2.1 Introduction 10 2.2 Water Demand and Supply in Australian Cities 10 2.3 Options for Managing the Water Crisis 19 2.4 Summary 23 Chapter Three: The Desalination Decade 3.1 Introduction 24 3.2 Western Australia – Perth Seawater Desalination Plant (Kwinana) 24 3.3 Victoria – Victorian Desalination Plant (Wonthaggi) 27 3.4 Queensland – Gold Coast Desalination Project (Tugun) 29 3.5 South Australia – Adelaide Desalination Project (Port Stanvac) 32 3.6 Summary 34 Chapter Four: Part 3A and the Critical Infrastructure Process 4.1 Introduction 36 4.2 Developments Assessed Under Part 3A 36 4.3 Development Assessment Process for Part 3A Projects 37 4.4 Government Rationale for Introducing Part 3A 38 4.5 Major Projects As Critical Infrastructure 40 4.6 Responses to Part 3A – Views of Commentators 40 4.7 Summary 45 Chapter Five: The Kurnell Desalination Plant and the Critical Infrastructure Process 5.1 Introduction 47 5.2 Key Concerns About the Desalination Plant and Critical Infrastructure 48 Assessment Process 5.3 Key Lessons for the Critical Infrastructure Assessment Process 59 5.4 Summary 65 Chapter Six: Conclusion 6.1 Introduction 67 6.2 General Overview 67 6.3 Research Findings 68 6.4 Suggestions for Further Research 72 6.5 Final Remarks 73 References 75 Newspaper Articles 82 Submissions 85 Appendices 86 Table of Contents iii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.1 Water usage in OECD countries 11 Figure 2.2 Change in water use in Australia (1983-84 and 1996-97) 11 Figure 2.3 Water consumption in Australia by sector (2000-01 and 2004-05) 12 Figure 2.4 Household water consumption per capita in Australia (2000-01 13 and 2004-05) Figure 2.5 Residential water consumption (kL/person/year) 13 Figure 2.6 Per capita per day demand trends (1991-2008) 14 Figure 2.7 Mean annual rainfall in Australia (1900-2008) 16 Figure 2.8 Sydney’s dam levels (1960-2006) 16 Figure 2.9 Annual mean temperature anomalies for Australia 18 Figure 2.10 Trends in annual total rainfall 1960-2008 (mm/10yrs) 18 Figure 3.1 Perth’s dam levels (2002-2009) 25 Figure 3.2 South East Queensland’s dam levels (2000-2007) 30 Figure 5.1 Themes raised in articles from the Sydney Morning Herald 50 Figure 5.2 Dam levels in the Sydney catchment area 60 APPENDICES Appendix A Parliamentary Inquiry into Sydney’s Water Supply – Terms of Reference Appendix B Part 3A of the EP&A Act assessment process Appendix C Kurnell desalination plant timeline Appendix D Newspaper articles from the Sydney Morning Herald Appendix E Submissions to the Parliamentary Inquiry into Sydney’s Water Supply Appendix F Submissions to the Department of Planning on the environmental assessment of the Kurnell plant List of Figures and Appendices iv CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1.1 PROBLEM SETTING Strong public and stakeholder opposition to proposed developments has a recognised history in Australia. Noteworthy occurrences include the first green ban conducted in Australia in the 1970s by the New South Wales (NSW) Builders Labourers‟ Federation (BLF) in Hunters Hill to protect the undeveloped bushland of Kelly‟s Bush. The success of this ban led to more such bans, most notably the green ban in The Rocks, which successfully led to the protection of historic buildings from being demolished as part of the NSW Government‟s redevelopment plans. These green bans led to the inclusion of „public participation‟ as an object of the NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act) (Burgmann and Burgmann 1999). Governments‟ assessment and approval of developments remains controversial to this day. A recent case in point is the NSW Government‟s insertion of Part 3A (Major infrastructure and other projects) into the EP&A Act on 1 August 2005. The stated aim was to encourage investment by streamlining the assessment and approval process for major projects. However, local governments, environmentalists, community groups and the general public have vehemently opposed the legislation since its inception on the grounds it reduces scope for public participation, judicial review and merit appeals. Further opposition to Part 3A of the EP&A Act has erupted for projects deemed critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure projects are any development “that, in the opinion of the Minister [for Planning], is essential for the State for economic, environmental or social reasons” (section 75C). For these projects, the legislation excludes appeal rights by proponents and objectors, third party appeals and the application of all environmental planning instruments (other than State Environmental Planning Policies (SEPPs), which the Minister may not need to consider unless the SEPP specifically states compliance is required). Sydney‟s Kurnell desalination plant was the first project the Minister deemed critical infrastructure under Part 3A, just three months after the legislation was introduced. The proposal to build a plant received overwhelming opposition from the public. Despite the strong public opposition, the Minister approved the application for the plant in November Chapter One – Introduction 1 2006. The plant is expected to start producing desalinated water for Sydney this coming summer. The contentious project offers potential insights into Part 3A and the process of conceiving, assessing and approving critical infrastructure projects in NSW, and Australia more broadly. 1.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK This thesis draws on academic literature on Part 3A and the NSW planning system. The academic literature provides a critique of the NSW Government‟s rationale for Part 3A. However, much of this literature provides an overview of Part 3A from a conceptual or „philosophical‟ perspective, rather than a particular emphasis on critical infrastructure projects or any case study in detail to analyse the Part 3A process. There is also limited academic literature on desalination within an Australian planning context as it is an emerging technology in Australia. The majority of the literature has been written from an engineering perspective. This thesis seeks to make a contribution to the small body of existing planning literature on desalination, with a particular focus on the assessment and approval process for critical infrastructure projects under the NSW planning system. It is a central conceptual view of this thesis that the critical infrastructure process should be governed by the key philosophical drivers behind the defining characteristics of the introduction of the Act, such as public participation, government transparency and accountability (for example, through access to the Courts to challenge government decisions) and the role of local government. 1.3 CONTEXT The NSW Planning System The EP&A Act 1979 sets the framework for the NSW planning system, including the assessment of development applications by local government, State Government and agencies. Development proposals that fall under Part 5 (Environmental Assessment) of the Act are assessed by local councils or State Government agencies. They are “often infrastructure proposals, such as roads, water supply dams and sewage treatment plants” and are called „development without consent‟ (NSW DoP 2009a). Most development proposals in NSW are assessed by local councils or accredited certifiers under Part 4 (Development Assessment) of the Act (NSW DoP 2009a). These include local developments which require the lodgement of a development application with the local Chapter One – Introduction 2 council. The development may also be complying development if it is considered a common or routine proposal. However, in limited circumstances, the NSW Minister for Planning may be the approval authority for Part 4 developments, which include those that fall under Schedule 6 of State Environmental Planning Policy (Major Projects) 2005. The SEPP also encompasses major projects assessed under Part 3A of the EP&A Act.
Recommended publications
  • The Slow Death of a Salesman
    The slow death of a salesman Authors: Deborah Snow, Andrew West, Publication: Sydney Morning Herald Mathew Moore & Damien Murphy Section: News Review Date: 13/09/2008 Pages: 28-29 Words: 4,010 Source: SMH Like Kevin Rudd, Nathan Rees's ambition was enough to put him above other would-be contenders for political leadership. To those outside politics, Nathan Rees's installation as Premier came as a bolt from the blue. But forces working against Morris Iemma had been gathering for months. As a number of Labor insiders tell it, his unwavering support for privatisation of the state's power industry was not the only cause of Iemma's downfall. The NSW Labor headquarters in Sussex Street, under the leadership of its secretary, Karl Bitar, 37, had tu rned against Iemma months before when his disapproval ratings soared. Iemma told colleagues he detected a change in Bitar's attitude towards him from about Christmas. "By March you could see that Morris was doing worse than the party," a source said. "The punters out there thought they had been conned; Morris came in as premier and said it was a new government. They had given him the benefit of the doubt and progress had not been made. So the electorate was pissed off." Against the drum-beat of the polls, the privatisation debate was growing steadily more bitter. Party bosses had kept a tight lid on the festering tensions over electricity during last year's federal election campaign. But once that was out of the way, all bets were off. "Karl Bitar and Joh n Robertson [the UnionsNSW boss] did nothing else from the Monday after the federal election until the state party conference in May except try to manage the electricity debate," said a source.
    [Show full text]
  • Legislative Assembly
    4197 LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY Tuesday 28 October 2003 ______ Mr Speaker (The Hon. John Joseph Aquilina) took the chair at 2.15 p.m. Mr Speaker offered the Prayer. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL VACANCY Joint Sitting Mr SPEAKER: I report the receipt of the following message from Her Excellency the Governor: Governor Marie Bashir MESSAGE I, Professor Marie Bashir, AC, in pursuance of the power and authority vested in me as Governor of the State of New South Wales, do hereby convene a joint sitting of the Members of the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly for the purpose of the election of a person to fill the seat in the Legislative Council vacated by the Honourable Malcolm Jones, and I do hereby announce and declare that such Members shall assemble for such purpose on Wednesday the twenty ninth day of October 2003, at 4:00pm in the building known as the Legislative Council Chamber situated in Macquarie Street in the City of Sydney, and the Members of the Legislative Council and the Members of the Legislative Assembly are hereby required to give their attendance at the said time and place accordingly. In order that the Members of both Houses of Parliament may be duly informed of the convening of the joint sitting, I have this day addressed a like message to the President of the Legislative Council. Office of the Governor Sydney, 23 October 2003 The Honourable the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly I direct that the joint sitting with the Legislative Council in the Legislative Council Chamber for the election of a member of the Legislative Council be set down as an order of the day for 4.00 p.m.
    [Show full text]
  • Gooding Alex.Pdf
    How the west was lost – the causes and consequences of under- investment in Western Sydney’s infrastructure How the west was lost – the causes and consequences of under-investment in Western Sydney’s infrastructure Mr Alex Gooding Director, Gooding Davies Consultancy Pty Ltd 1 Park Road Lawson, NSW 2783 [email protected] Word count: 5,000 (not including abstract, tables or footnotes) Suggested running head: How the west was lost Suggested key words: infrastructure, planning, public transport, Western Sydney - 2 - ABSTRACT The post-war era saw major suburban expansion in most Australian cities. Unfortunately this was coupled with substantial under-investment in infrastructure, especially public transport. In most cities this pattern of under-investment has been reversed over the last two decades, with Brisbane and Perth investing in rail infrastructure to deal with continued population growth. However, Sydney has failed to follow this trend, with plans for lines in Western Sydney being continuously announced and withdrawn. At the same time several rail lines serving the eastern Sydney have been constructed, a pattern set to continue with the current CBD Metro proposal. Investment in transport infrastructure in Western Sydney has largely been limited to motorways – predominantly funded by tolls – and to bus transitways. A number of factors causing this pattern are common to many Australian cities, but several are unique to Sydney. These include the pattern of development of Sydney’s infrastructure prior to the 1950s, its post-war pattern of growth, the recent and current political and economic environment and continuing resistance in some quarters to investment in public transport, especially rail infrastructure.
    [Show full text]
  • Inquiry Into Electoral and Political Party Funding
    Submission No 83 INQUIRY INTO ELECTORAL AND POLITICAL PARTY FUNDING Organisation: Terrigal Area Residents Association “TARA” Inc Name: Ms Sue Edwards Position: President Telephone: 4385-6020 Date received: 13/02/2008 Terrigal Area Residents Association “TARA” Inc. 2007-08 Officers President: Sue Edwards Vice-President: Ted Sandeman Secretary: Mary Johnsson Treasurer: Ted Edwards P.O. Box 523, Terrigal 2260 Submission by email to: [email protected] 13 February 2008 The Legislative Council Select Committee on Electoral and Political Party Funding TARA welcomes the Legislative Council of NSW’s initiative on 27.06.07 in appointing a select committee to inquire into and report on the funding of, and disclosure of donations to, political parties, and candidates in state and local government elections. It is disappointing, however, that apart from the media release on 15.11.07 and a call for submissions on 19.11.07 little publicity has been given to this matter. The period 19.11.07 - 15.02.07 (closure of submissions) conveniently some might add, coincided with Federal Elections, Christmas and the January holidays. All media attention is currently on the return to Parliament of the new Federal Government and The Sorry Bill. One must ask the Question: Who could fund the advertising to raise awareness of the people of the Inquiry by this Select Committee into Electoral & Political Party Funding? The Liberal Party? The Labour Party? The Unions? The Development Industry? The Association of Hotels, The Gaming/Racing Industry? The Food Industry? The big Corporations? The answer of course is “NO” because all of the above are either major donors or major beneficiaries of electoral and political donations, and it would not be in their interest.
    [Show full text]
  • 13-Clune Nsw Election 07
    ‘Morris’ Minor Miracle’: The March 2007 NSW Election ∗ David Clune Carr Crashes Bob Carr was triumphantly re-elected in March 2003. Labor won 56.20% of the two-party preferred vote and 55 of the 93 electorates. The Government consolidated its hold on many of its marginal seats. The Opposition failed to regain any of the ground lost in 1999. Carr radically reconstructed his Ministry and began to implement his third term agenda. The Government looked unassailable. Then it all began to fall apart. In December 2003, a report by the Health Care Complaints Commission into allegations by whistleblower nurses confirmed alarming failings in relation to care and treatment of patients at Camden and Campbelltown hospitals. Up to 19 patients died unnecessarily between 1999 and 2003. Chronic underfunding and staff shortages had led to this disastrous situation. The revelations about Camden and Campbelltown were followed by a flood of similar allegations about other hospitals. 1 The confidence of the citizens of NSW in their health care system, and the Government’s ability to manage it, was severely shaken. In early 2004, there was a drastic decline in the quality of Sydney’s train service. The railway network’s ageing infrastructure had been causing problems for some time. The immediate crisis was triggered by a shortage of drivers, the medical retirement of a number of drivers as a result of strict new fitness tests, and the ∗ Manager, Research Service, NSW Parliamentary Library and Adjunct Lecturer in Government, University of Sydney. The opinions expressed are those of the author not the NSW Parliamentary Library.
    [Show full text]
  • 2003 New South Wales Election
    2003 New South Wales Election Antony Green * On 22 March 2003 the NSW Labor Government led by Premier Bob Carr became the first government in Australia to win three consecutive four-year terms. The election brought little change to the composition of the Houses or in the vote. This account analyses the election result in the light of the fortunes of both Government and Opposition in the previous four years. The New South Wales election on 22 March 2003 was the third in the State since introduction of fixed four-year terms. As with its two predecessors, the election produced a campaign that struggled to move out of first gear. With fixed terms having denied the media and political parties the adrenalin fix of early election speculation, a peculiar form of political ballet seems to have developed, where the Government denies it has begun campaigning, the Opposition insists the Government has, and the media avoid treating the contest as a real campaign for as long as possible. As in 1995 and 1999, the Parliament was adjourned at the end of the previous year to a notional sitting week in February, providing a safety net in case Parliament needed to be re-convened. Parliament was prorogued on 31 January, though the campaign could not formally begin until the fixed-term provisions dissolved the Legislative Assembly on 28 February. 1 Writs were issued on the same day producing a 23-day campaign, four days longer than the minimum allowed under legislation. Nevertheless, this was still shorter than the minimum period permitted in any other state, and 10 days short of the minimum for Commonwealth elections.
    [Show full text]
  • Front Matter
    Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-13832-1 - Power Crisis: The Self-Destruction of a State Labor Party Rodney Cavalier Frontmatter More information Power Crisis The self-destruction of a state Labor Party Written by former minister and Labor historian Rodney Cavalier, Power Crisis is an explosive account of the self-destruction of the New South Wales Labor government, which has seen a turnover of four premiers in five years, and is heading for rejection and even humiliation by voters at the next state election. While the catalyst was the thwarted attempt to privatise elec- tricity, Cavalier reveals that the real issue is the takeover of Labor by a professional political class without connection to the broader community or the party’s traditions. Drawing on history to illumi- nate the crisis, this book spans the ALP’s history from its origins as a party for the workers, the bitter split over conscription in 1916, the triumph of 24 years of unbroken rule and the policy innovation of the Wran era, to the rise of values-free careerism. Featuring interviews with ex-premiers Iemma and Rees, Power Crisis contrasts the current turmoil and self-indulgence with the stability within New South Wales Labor over generations before, and asks, ‘What went wrong?’ Rodney Cavalier is a political historian. He was Minister for Educa- tion in the Wran and Unsworth governments and writes frequently for the press and in academic publications on politics, the ALP and sport. He remains an active and despairing member of the Labor Party. © in this web service
    [Show full text]
  • Working Paper Itls-Wp-11-24
    WORKING PAPER ITLS-WP-11-24 The impact of discontinuity in governance: How transport planning went off the rails in Sydney. By Rhonda Daniels December 2011 ISSN 1832-570X INSTITUTE of TRANSPORT and LOGISTICS STUDIES The Australian Key Centre in Transport and Logistics Management The University of Sydney Established under the Australian Research Council’s Key Centre Program. NUMBER: Working Paper ITLS-WP-11-24 TITLE: The impact of discontinuity in governance: How transport planning went off the rails in Sydney. ABSTRACT: The impacts on transport planning of discontinuity in governance within the same political administration are illustrated through a case study of NSW, Australia. The Labor government in power in NSW for 16 years from 1995 to 2011 was committed to public transport in its strategic plans. But from 2003, unprecedented changes in the premier, ministers, and departments responsible for transport planning, disrupted public transport planning and delivery. The impacts of discontinuity included delays to public transport projects, waste of scarce funds, and loss of trust and confidence amongst stakeholders including the community, planning professionals, and the federal government. The impact is best seen with the North West Rail Link project for a major growth area: originally identified in 1998 for delivery in 2010, it was in 2010 proposed for completion in 2024. Conflict over funding of transport contributed to the changes in premiers and ministers and the subsequent impacts on transport planning with compounding effects over time. The NSW experience shows that a strategic commitment to public transport must be accompanied by long- term funding sources to ensure the public transport goals articulated in strategic plans are delivered.
    [Show full text]
  • Report to the Honourable Craig Knowles Mp Minister
    REPORT TO THE HONOURABLE CRAIG KNOWLES MP ____________________________________________________________ MINISTER FOR INFRASTRUCTURE AND PLANNING MINISTER FOR NATURAL RESOURCES LAND USE PLANNING FOR CERTAIN LAND AT SANDON POINT, WOLLONGONG CITY KEVIN CLELAND, DEPUTY CHAIRPERSON DR MARK CARLETON, COMMISSIONER COMMISSIONERS OF INQUIRY FOR ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING SEPTEMBER 2003 Cover Photograph: Photograph of the Sandon Point locality from Bulli Lookout CIR 260 ISBN 1 920717 02 1 September 2003 The Hon Craig Knowles MP Minister for Infrastructure and Planning Minister for Natural Resources Dear Minister, Landuse Planning for Certain Land at Sandon Point, Wollongong City Under Section 119(l)(b) of the Environmental Plannin g and Assessment Act 1979 the former Minister for Planning directed a Commission of Inquiry be held to make recommendations on the preferred land uses, planning outcomes and management options for certain land at Sandon Point, having regard to its values and constraints in the broader context of the surrounding urban and non urban environment. Kevin Cleland, Deputy Chairperson and Dr Mark Carleton, Commissioner were appointed to constitute the Commission of Inquiry. The Sandon Point land has multiple values and constraints in the broader context of the surrounding urban and non urban environment as canvassed by the Commission under Values and Constraints of the CoI Area and Preferred Land Uses, Planning Outcomes and Future Management (Options) in this report. The Commission has undertaken a thorough consideration of the relevant planning policies together with cultural, ecological, social and developmental factors. The Commission’s terms of reference clearly direct it to consider a wide range of issues. Submissions referred extensively to the importance of the cultural, social, natural and built aspects of the environment, together with the broad range of opportunities the Sandon Point lands provide.
    [Show full text]
  • State Significant Sites and Part 3A of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act
    State Significant Sites and Part 3A of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act. University of New South Wales Faculty of the Built Environment Bachelor of Town Planning Thesis Project 2008 Wilfred Espinoza Nino 3131443 Contents Page Chapter 1: Part 3A and matters for the State.............................................................3 1.1 Introduction .........................................................................................................4 1.2 Problem Setting...................................................................................................5 1.3 Problem Statement and Objectives: ....................................................................6 1.4 Theoretical/Conceptual Context: .........................................................................7 1.5 Research Methodology........................................................................................8 1.6 Chapter Summaries ............................................................................................9 Chapter 2: Theory and Policy ..................................................................................11 2.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................11 2.2 Government Objective.......................................................................................12 2.3 Political donations and the planning system ......................................................14 2.4 The Beginning of Part 3A and State Significant Sites ........................................15
    [Show full text]
  • The 1998 Sydney Water Crisis (A)
    CASE PROGRAM 2005-22.1 The 1998 Sydney Water Crisis (A) On 21 July 1998, the Sydney Water Corporation learnt that routine samples collected from the Prospect Water Filtration Plant and Potts Hill Reservoir contained low-levels of Cryptosporidium and Giardia contamination. Both parasites posed a potentially serious risk to public health. Sydney Water began investigating the incident immediately, in consultation with the New South Wales Health Department. Over the next few days, further testing revealed that several central city areas were also affected, and by Saturday 25 July, some very high readings had been recorded. Although Sydney Water believed that the situation was probably the result of cleansing the system, it was still unable to identify the exact cause or extent of the problem. That evening, Sydney Water Managing Director Chris Pollett was informed of the situation. On Sunday, the following day, as he waited for independent verification of the initial test results, further high readings were obtained. He knew that the next morning he was due to attend his regular monthly briefing with Sydney Water Chair David Hill and their Operating Licence Minister Craig Knowles, both of whom were unaware of what had transpired. Pollett had to decide what, if anything, to tell his superiors and how to manage the situation. Sydney’s water supply In 1998, approximately 85 percent of Sydney’s water was processed through the Prospect Water Filtration Plant (Exhibit 1). One of the largest of its kind, with the capacity to process 3,000 megalitres of water per day, it was located on a greenfields site in Sydney’s west and supplied in excess of three million people.
    [Show full text]
  • Government Gazette of the STATE of NEW SOUTH WALES Number 237 Friday,New 29 Southnovember Wales 2002 Published Under Authority by the Government Printing Service
    10061 Government Gazette OF THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES Number 237 Friday,New 29 SouthNovember Wales 2002 Published under authority by the Government Printing Service LEGISLATION ProclamationProclamations under the New South Wales Community Services Legislation Amendment Act 2002 No 42 New South Wales , Governor ProclamationI, Professor Marie Bashir AC, Governor of the State of New South Wales, with the advice of the Executive Council, and in pursuance of section 2 of the underCommunity the Services Legislation Amendment Act 2002, do, by this my ProclamationProclamation, appoint 1 December 2002 as the day on which that Act Communitycommences. Services Legislation Amendment Act 2002 No 42 underSigned the and sealed at Sydney, this day of 2002. Community Services Legislation Amendment Act 2002 No 42 By Her Excellency’s Command,MARIE BASHIR,, Governor I, Professor Marie Bashir AC, Governor of the State of New South Wales, with the advice of the Executive Council, and in pursuance of section 2 of the Community Services Legislation Amendment Act 2002, do, by, Governor this my Proclamation, appoint 1 December 2002 as the day on which that Act commences.I, Professor Marie Bashir AC, Governor of theMinister State of for New Community South Wales, Services with the advice of the Executive Council, and in pursuance of section 2 of the CommunitySigned andand sealedsealed Services atat Sydney,Sydney, LegislationGOD this this SAVE 27th Amendment day THE of QUEEN! dayNovember Act of 2002 2002., do, by 2002. this my Proclamation, appoint 1 December 2002 as the day on which that Act commences. By Her Excellency’s Command, Signed and sealed at Sydney, this day of 2002.
    [Show full text]