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Transcript of the New South Wales Liberal Leader's Comments Relating to Orange Grove and Was Very Deliberate and Calculating in the Language He Used

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Transcript of the New South Wales Liberal Leader's Comments Relating to Orange Grove and Was Very Deliberate and Calculating in the Language He Used CORRECTED REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE GENERAL PURPOSE STANDING COMMITTEE No. 4 INQUIRY INTO DESIGNER OUTLETS CENTRE, LIVERPOOL ——— At Sydney on Monday 11 October 2004 ——— The Committee met at 11.00 a.m. ——— PRESENT The Hon. J. A. Gardiner (Chair) The Hon. J. C. Burnswoods The Hon. A. R. Fazio Ms S. P. Hale The Hon. D. Oldfield The Hon. P. T. Primrose The Hon. J. F. Ryan The Hon. H. S. Tsang CORRECTED Inquiry into the Approval of the Designer Outlets Centre, Liverpool CHAIR: I welcome you to the eleventh public hearing of the General Purpose Standing Committee No. 4 inquiry into the approval process for the designer outlets centre on Orange Grove Road, Liverpool. During earlier hearings I made extensive comments on a number of procedural issues. I will make reference to these statements when the need arises during today's hearing. The protection afforded to Committee witnesses under parliamentary privilege should not be abused during these hearings, and I remind witnesses to ensure that the matters raised are directly relevant to the terms of reference. The Committee previously resolved to authorise the media to broadcast sound and video excerpts of its public proceedings. Copies of the broadcasting guidelines are available from the table by the door. In reporting Committee proceedings, the media must take responsibility for what they publish, including any interpretation placed on evidence before the Committee. In accordance with these guidelines, while a member of the Committee and witnesses may be filmed or recorded, people in the public gallery should not be the primary focus of footage or photographs. Under the standing orders of the Legislative Council, evidence and documents presented to the Committee that have not been tabled in Parliament may not, except with the permission of the Committee, be disclosed or published by a Committee member or by any other person. General Purpose Standing Committee No. 4 1 Monday 11 October 2004 CORRECTED Inquiry into the Approval of the Designer Outlets Centre, Liverpool JOHN GILBERT BROGDEN, Leader of the Opposition, New South Wales Parliament, before the Committee: CHAIR: Are you appearing before the Committee in that capacity at the invitation of the Committee? Mr JOHN BROGDEN: Yes. CHAIR: Are you conversant with the terms of reference of this inquiry? Mr JOHN BROGDEN: Yes. CHAIR: If you should consider at any stage that certain evidence you wish to give or documents you may wish to tender should be heard or seen only by the Committee, please indicate that fact and the Committee will consider your request. Would you like to commence with a short statement? Mr JOHN BROGDEN: It is my pleasure to appear before the Committee today in response to your invitation. Bob Carr has arrogantly refused to appear before this Committee. Like Diane Beamer, Craig Knowles and Joe Tripodi, the Labor Party has refused to front this Committee and answer questions about its involvement in the Orange Grove scandal. Orange Grove is a good, old-fashioned New South Wales Labor corruption scandal. Bob Carr has taken New South Wales back to the bad old days of Labor's abuse of power for its political mates. This fish stinks from the head to the tail. The stench of corruption surrounding Orange Grove extends from the Labor Party in Liverpool all the way to the Premier's office and Bob Carr himself. It extends from Labor party branches in Liverpool to Labor councillors in Liverpool, to Joe Tripodi, Diane Beamer and Craig Knowles, right up to Bob Carr himself. This is a scandal with victims: real people—450 of them—who have lost their jobs, and real businesses —60 of them— that have collectively lost millions of dollars, all because Bob Carr favoured Wes tfield over the workers. If Bob Carr had nothing to hide he would appear before this Committee and answer questions about his involvement in this scandal. The same applies to Beamer, Knowles and Tripodi. They might be able to hide from this Committee, but they cannot hide from the ICAC. If Bob Carr cared about jobs, small business and people's livelihoods he would not be hiding. He would be here telling the people of New South Wales why he and his Government ignored the advice of Gabrielle Kibble, the Labor-appointed administrator of Liverpool council and a former director of planning in New South Wales, to rezone the land. And why he and his Government ignored the advice of their expert planners within the Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources [DIPNR] to rezone the land. Why is it that right up until Westfield lobbied Bob Carr through his Chief of Staff every piece of professional planning advice within government recommended that the land at Orange Grove be rezoned? And why is it that after a meeting between Westfield and the Government, the Government rejected that advice and refused the rezoning? Bob Carr says that the Orange Grove development was illegal. If it was illegal, why did his own planning Minister, Craig Knowles, open it? Mark Ryan of Westfield said that the assistant planning Minister, Diane Beamer, was encircled by corrupt influences. But he referred nothing to the ICAC—not a thing. Because to make his case he would have been forced to refer Joe Tripodi to the ICAC. As a former chief of staff to John Cain and press secretary to Paul Keating, there was no way that Mr Ryan was going to damage the Labor Party. This Committee has established a number of facts. On 13 April 2004 Gabrielle Kibble, an expert planner and administrator of Liverpool council, not only recommended the Orange Grove rezoning but stated here that she regards it as having social and economic benefits to Liverpool. The expert planners in DIPNR recommended the rezoning on the same grounds. DIPNR went so far as to prepare a media release announcing the rezoning on 7 June. On 19 April Westfield's Mark Ryan lobbied Bob Carr through his Chief of staff, Graeme Wedderburn. A series of meetings took place at the ministerial level between Carr, Beamer, Knowles and/or their staff. DIPNR's Director-General, Jennifer Westacott, wrote a memorandum to Diane Beamer recommending that the land not be rezoned on 8 July. General Purpose Standing Committee No. 4 2 Monday 11 October 2004 CORRECTED Inquiry into the Approval of the Designer Outlets Centre, Liverpool This Committee has also established a close relationship between many of the figures involved in this scandal. Sam Bargshoon is a confessed Labor branch stacker and close personal friend of Joe Tripodi—so close that he arranged for Nabil Gazal's luxury motor cruiser to be used by Joe Tripodi, at no cost, for Mr Tripodi's brother's bucks night. Frank Mosca, the Orange Grove architect and leading advocate, is a close friend of Craig Knowles, president of Mr Knowles' Austral branch of the ALP and Mr Knowles' architect. Tony Bueck, sacked Liverpool councillor and leading advocate for Orange Grove, is an employee of Labor Party head office and of the commerce Minister, John Della Bosca. Bob Carr and Frank Lowy are friends, and Mr Lowy's Westfield Corporation has been and is a major donor to the New South Wales ALP. The Committee's evidence has exposed stunning discrepancies in evidence offered surrounding Westfield's lobbying and Bob Carr's subsequent meetings. Westfield claims that it warned the Government of a web of corrupt entrance surrounding Diane Beamer but made no reference to the ICAC. Graeme Wedderburn was so concerned about this web of corrupt influences that he raised the matter personally with Bob Carr. But neither Mr Carr nor Graeme Wedderburn referred any matters relating to these allegations to the ICAC. Graeme Wedderburn said that Bob Carr told him to advise Diane Beamer to "stick to the rules". Graeme Weatherburn called a meeting of Diane Beamer, her Chief of Staff Michael Meagher, and Craig Knowles' deputy Chief of Staff Emillio Ferrer, where Mr Weatherburn states he told all concerned to stick to the rules. Diane Beamer has stated publicly that Graeme Wedderburn "never gave that directive to me". Michael Meagher says that Graeme Weatherburn used that phrase but no directive was given. To top it off, Emillio Ferrer stated that he could not remember exactly what was said in the meeting. There are only three conclusions that can be made from these meetings. First, Bob Carr thinks that Diane Beamer is so incompetent that she needs to be told how to do her job, in which case she should be sacked. Secondly, Bob Carr thinks that Diane Beamer is so susceptible to corruption and needed to be told to stick to the rules, in which case Ms Beamer and Mr Tripodi should be sacked. Or, thirdly—and based on the weight of all the evidence and public statements—Joe Tripodi is telling the truth and Frank Lowy did ask Bob Carr to stop the rezoning of Orange Grove, and that message was delivered by Mark Ryan to Graeme Weatherburn, who confirmed it with the Premier and sent the instruction down the line, in which case Bob Carr should resign. I should advise the Committee that Westfield's displeasure with my stance on Orange Grove will have its sequel in the Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court. Westfield has commenced defamation proceedings against me in the Australian Capital Territory for comments I made about its involvement in the Orange Grove scandal. On 27 August Westfield issued a statement indicating that it would not pursue legal action against me. However, six days later Westfield changed its position and publicly threatened to pursue legal action unless I withdrew my statement.
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