The Slow Death of a Salesman
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The slow death of a salesman Authors: Deborah Snow, Andrew West, Publication: Sydney Morning Herald Mathew Moore & Damien Murphy Section: News Review Date: 13/09/2008 Pages: 28-29 Words: 4,010 Source: SMH Like Kevin Rudd, Nathan Rees's ambition was enough to put him above other would-be contenders for political leadership. To those outside politics, Nathan Rees's installation as Premier came as a bolt from the blue. But forces working against Morris Iemma had been gathering for months. As a number of Labor insiders tell it, his unwavering support for privatisation of the state's power industry was not the only cause of Iemma's downfall. The NSW Labor headquarters in Sussex Street, under the leadership of its secretary, Karl Bitar, 37, had tu rned against Iemma months before when his disapproval ratings soared. Iemma told colleagues he detected a change in Bitar's attitude towards him from about Christmas. "By March you could see that Morris was doing worse than the party," a source said. "The punters out there thought they had been conned; Morris came in as premier and said it was a new government. They had given him the benefit of the doubt and progress had not been made. So the electorate was pissed off." Against the drum-beat of the polls, the privatisation debate was growing steadily more bitter. Party bosses had kept a tight lid on the festering tensions over electricity during last year's federal election campaign. But once that was out of the way, all bets were off. "Karl Bitar and Joh n Robertson [the UnionsNSW boss] did nothing else from the Monday after the federal election until the state party conference in May except try to manage the electricity debate," said a source. "They must have had 500 meetings over it. Bitar wasn't opposed to privatisation per se; he just wanted a compromise, he didn't want the party tearing itself apart." Key unions had targeted Iemma from as early as September last year , following the unveiling by his treasurer, Michael Costa ,of a report from Professor Tony Owen advocating power privatisation. The feisty railways union boss, Nick Lewocki, signalled the union movement's plan in unambiguous terms. "We are going to stir up a bit of a backbench rebellion," he told the Herald at the time. Just after Christm as, Ben Kruse, the general secretary of the United Services Union, escalated the campaign by promising union support at the next election for Labor MPs who defied the privatisation. The ball was gathering velocity as it hurtled towards Iemma. When Parliament resumed in February, 15 Labor MPs - half from Iemma's own right-wing faction - took part in a mass demonstration outside Parliament against the sell-off. But it was not until two key Labor figures effectively licensed a split in the party that privatisation truly imperilled Iemma's grip on the caucus. The first was the party's Left assistant-secretary, Luke Foley, who in March told left-wing MPs that they should consider themselves bound more by party policy than caucus solidarity. Then on the eve of the ALP's critical state conference in May, the party president, Bernie Riordan, explicitly promised to protect MPs from expulsion or other disciplinary action if they defied Costa and Iemma. The state conference is the party's supreme policy-making body. Riordan told the Herald yesterday that Iemma had promised him five months previously he would resign if the conference did not support him on privatisation. He recalls Iemma insisting: "If I cannot get this plan through conference I will take it as vote o f no confidence in me and resign." Iemma flatly denied this to the Herald yesterday. Whatever the truth, by the time the conference came around Iemma and Costa were resolute. Each side attempted many last-minute compromises, and each side blames the other for those failures. At the conference Iemma and Costa lost, 702 votes to 107. Costa's abusive performances helped seal Iemma's fate. Bitar, Foley and the former state secretary Mark Arbib had already begun the serious work of reviewing options for a rep lacement leader. On the list were John Watkins, Carmel Tebbutt, Nathan Rees, and less seriously, Frank Sartor and the then police minister, David Campbell. It was, as one source said, a clear-eyed look at succession planning, "which every business has to engage in". Sartor, Campbell and even Watkins were ruled out as too tainted by failures of government. Watkins, in any case, was uninterested. That left Rees and Tebbutt, but Tebbutt made plain to Foley, a friend, and to others, that she would never be available for the leadership. Rees, the officials decided, was the only one hungry enough. And Kevin Rudd had shown the importance of that quality in a leader. "Notwithstanding Carmel's shining political talents, what tipped it Nathan's way was his hunger ve rsus her reluctance," a senior party observer confirmed. Relations had sunk so low that those in head office believed either Bitar or Iemma had to go - the stand-off between Sussex Street and the parliamentary leader was unsustainable. " You could not hav e the party and the union movement separated from the government," said one source. 'It was the worst position for us to be in … cut off from the root and branch, it was not a Labor government any more." Rees's name was floated immediately after the failed privatisation vote. Party sources say he was approached in May. His response, reportedly, was to state he was a Iemma loyalist, that he had worked for Iemma, that Iemma had backed him in a tight preselection, that Iemma had put him in the ministry and " if they were looking for someone to plunge the knife in, I am the wrong guy". However, he said that if Iemma left the scene he would be willing to take over. Other sources claim Rees also pledged loyalty to Iemma publicly and privately. In July, when wor d seeped out that Bitar was talking to backbenchers about replacing Iemma, Rees sought out Iemma and told him the talk of revolt was not his doing, that he would not move against him and he had not spoken to any caucus member about his ambitions. Iemma is said to have told Rees he was supportive of him eventually taking over but that he intended to lead the party to the 2011 election. Importantly, Iemma had protected Rees during the electricity debate in May by striking Rees's name off the list of speakers who were going to stand up and support privatisation at the state conference. It is said by Rees's backers that Rees maintained his loyalty to Iemma right up until the morning of eight days ago, when Iemma fell. At 7.30 that morning, Bitar, who was visit ing Disneyland, California, at the time, called Rees and told him to make his move. Foley made a similar call. Rees was advised to wear a good suit. During July, Sussex Street sounded out MPs about replacing Iemma. Bitar liaised with MPs on the Right, Fo ley with the Left. It was clear support for Iemma within his right-wing power base was collapsing. Ian West and Linda Voltz had publicly flagged crossing the floor in Parliament to vote against power privatisation. Now, by August, nearly 20 were ready to d o the same. Some were influenced by union threats to withdraw support from them at the next election. One observer, said, however, "there remained a lot of goodwill towards Morris" and many MPs hoped "that if he just ditched Costa, he would resurrect himself". Critical in the later negotiations were two of Iemma's inner circle, the ports minister, Joe Tripodi, and his fellow right-wing powerbroker, Eddie Obeid. By the end of August, they, too, were said to be aboard the Rees bandwagon. "Bitar convinced E ddie and Joe that Rees was the eventual successor," said a source. "Eddie and Joe understood that the real power in NSW Labor resided with Sussex Street, and they got with the strength. But Joe and Eddie still understood [the transition] to be at a time of Morris's choosing." Iemma began what was to be his final fortnight in politics by taking soundings on who to drop, demote or promote in a ministerial reshuffle. It was his last throw of the dice to turn around the Government's fortunes. Eric Roozendaal, the former party secretary and Iemma roads minister, was involved in consultations. So were John Hatzistergos, Tripodi, Obeid and some of Iemma's staff. Costa put to Iemma that he and Iemma resign together. Iemma has told others he laughed at the idea. Bu t then came two events in quick succession which sent the process into a nosedive. Watkins is understood to have signalled to Iemma some weeks ago that he wanted out of politics. His departure was brought on early by one last bruising row with the incendia ry Costa and by imminent news Watkins had sought a senior job with the Alzheimer's Association. The second development that Wednesday of last week - two days before the Iemma departure - was the police clearance of John Della Bosca over the Iguanas restau rant affair. It's understood Della Bosca wanted an immediate announcement from Iemma that he would be returned to the ministry. Iemma was now on the horns of an excruciating dilemma. Should he go for an easy nip and tuck of his ministry, getting rid of Co sta and replacing Watkins and Phil Koperberg, who had left earlier in the year? Or should he go for something much more dramatic? Tripodi argued for minimalism, including the dumping of the planning minister, Frank Sartor, who had drawn the ire of developer interests associated with the Urban Task Force, a group run by a former Tripodi staffer.