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Tf2015ciotola Redacted.Pdf (772.0Kb) TOWSON UNIVERSITY OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES Constructivism in Unlikely Places: How National Identity Influences Chinese and Russian Behavior in Areas of Core Interest and the Sino-Russian Relationship by Louis John Ciotola Jr. A thesis Presented to the Faculty of Towson University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Science Department of Social Science Towson University Towson, Maryland 21252 December 2015 Abstract Constructivism in Unlikely Places: How National Identity Influences Chinese and Russian Behavior in Areas of Core Interest and the Sino-Russian Relationship Louis John Ciotola Jr. While realism provides an explanation for the nature of international relations within an anarchic arena, it sometimes falls short in explaining and predicting state behavior, including the foreign policy behavior of states with leadership of a realist orientation within their areas of core interest. Realism holds power as its key variable, proclaiming that states behave in ways so as to maximize their material capabilities in order to survive in an anarchic international setting. There is an additional variable, however, that must also be considered in order to effectively understand the foreign policy behavior of states with realist-oriented leadership. That variable, emphasized by the constructivist school of international relations, is national self-identity. Through the examples of China and Russia, it is the purpose of this work to reinforce the value identity contributes alongside material capability both for explaining and predicting the foreign policy behavior of states with leadership of a realist inclination. iii Table of Contents Chapter 1 1 Introduction 2 Objective and Methodology 6 Literature Review: 10 Progression 49 Chapter 2: China and the South China Sea 55 The Situation in the South China Sea 57 The Realist Perspective 70 The Role of Identity 84 Conclusion 103 Chapter 3: Russia and the ‘Near Abroad’ 106 The Situation in the ‘Near Abroad’ 108 The Realist Explanation for Russia’s Behavior 118 The Role of Identity 133 Conclusion 152 iv Chapter 4: Sino-Russian Relations 155 Sino-Russian Cooperative Balancing 157 The State of Sino-Russian Relations 170 The Realist Explanation for a Failure to Balance 178 The Constructivist Argument 189 Conclusion 196 References 200 Curricula Vitae 218 v 1 Chapter One While realism provides an explanation for the nature of international relations within an anarchic arena, it sometimes falls short in explaining and predicting state behavior, including the foreign policy behavior of states with leadership of a realist orientation within their areas of core interest. Realism holds power as its key variable, proclaiming that states and great powers alike behave in ways so as to maximize their material capabilities in order to survive in an anarchic international setting. There is an additional variable, however, that must also be considered in order to effectively understand the foreign policy behavior of states with realist-oriented leadership. That variable, emphasized by the constructivist school of international relations, is national self-identity. Through the examples of China and Russia, it is the purpose of this work to reinforce the value identity contributes alongside material capability both for explaining and predicting the foreign policy behavior of states with leadership of a realist inclination. China and Russia possess long historical memories that emphasize both a tradition of superiority as well as national humiliation. As a consequence, assertive behavior within areas of core interest as the primary means to vindicate their great power status both at home and abroad is necessary in order for their respective regimes to maintain ruling legitimacy. Thus, the Chinese and Russian identities, much more than power alone, determine their aggressive postures and inability to compromise within their areas of core interest. The decisions a state makes, even a realist state, are not always rational in the sense that the material ends justify the material means. Understanding why states act as they do is fundamental for creating a more stable and therefore safer international environment. 2 Introduction The primary objective of the following work is to establish that both realist and constructivist theories of international relations are needed to fully understand the foreign policy behavior of states with realist-oriented leadership within their areas of core interest. Realist theory provides the most basic understanding. Relying exclusively on power, realism portrays the rudimentary motivations of these states, that being the pursuit of relative parity with international rivals by balancing against power in order to obtain the security necessary to survive within the anarchical international arena. A core interest can best be defined as an issue that a state maintains as fundamental to its national interest in which it has little or no desire to compromise. In realist terms, areas of core interest are places in which balancing can and must be achieved. The material and security benefits that they offer are why states designate them as core interests. In short, a key objective of states with realist-oriented leadership is to increase their power within their areas of core interest. The necessity of utilizing identity as an independent variable for explaining and predicting foreign policy behavior is challenged by realist scholars who contend that material power is the only determining variable. Hans Morgenthau writes that the pursuit of national interest is the primary objective of a state and that national interest is defined in terms of power, which is in turn defined by material capability.1 Furthermore, fellow realist John Mearsheimer argues that the primary goal of the state is to maximize its 1 Hans J. Morgenthau, “Six Principles of Political Realism,” in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, ed. Robert Jervis and Robert Art (New York: Pearson Education Inc., 2009), 8. 3 power as a means to ensure its own survival.2 While constructivists do not dispute that the pursuit of power is a fundamental objective of states, they argue that it is not the only determining variable, objective, or interest. While realism provides a basic understanding, it falls short in providing a complete understanding. Crucially, it does not fully explain motivation, which informs behavior. Why do some states, including those with realist leadership, practice core interest diplomacy and thus knowingly create a situation in which they are unable to compromise? Where does the sense of nationalism originate that is needed by realist leaders to pursue such interests? Why do states feel their security is threatened in their areas of core interest by certain other states? Finally, why do some states with realist leadership defy realist logic by failing to cooperatively balance against a mutually perceived hegemon? In order to answer these questions, national identity as defined through the theory of constructivism must be inserted into the equation. Simply put, constructivism provides context. Constructivism shows that, unlike in realist theory, not all states behave the same. Situations beyond those that relate solely to power matter a great deal. Identity is the context each state gives itself and others within the international arena. The state consequently acts in accordance with that identity as identity, alongside material power capability, creates national interest. Identity is the historic and cultural narrative of a state. It differs from state to state contrary to realism, which holds all states to have a single, rigid identity. Power is the means by which a state pursues its already existing interests. As Ted Hopf explains, 2 John J. Mearsheimer, “Anarchy and the Struggle for Power,” in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, ed. Robert Jervis and Robert Art (New York: Pearson Education Inc., 2009), 51. 4 there is a great power identity and certain norms are particular to that identity, but that identity runs parallel to and is informed by each individual state’s specific national identity so that while there are similar trends in behavior, no two great powers behave alike.3 As will be seen, this is extremely evident with China and Russia. Furthermore, threat perception, or the degree to which a state feels endangered by another, is also informed by national identity. Exactly what is identity? “In a social sense,” explains James Fearon, “identity refers to a social category, a set of persons marked by a label and distinguished by rules deciding membership and characteristic features or attributes.”4 Here, social is key, for while there exists both personal and social identity, it is social identity upon which constructivist theory rests. Gerald Chan offers up that identity constitutes the substance of being while Hopf writes simply that it tells you who you are and who others are.5 Michael Wearing writes, “The concept of social identity helps us self-consciously realize that society is intricately involved in shaping our being and our identity.” It is constructed by social interactions, meaning connectedness and communication with others, and forms the society we live in. There is no single identity. Identities are continuously contested and molded. Some are accepted, others rejected, and still others left in the void of uncertainty.6 Identity or social categories run deep, bound together with its members’ sense
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