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Northern Ireland: Political Developments January to June 2010

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Northern Ireland: Political Developments January to June 2010 Northern Ireland: political developments January to June 2010 Standard Note: SN/PC/05606 Last updated: 23 June 2010 Author: Oonagh Gay Section Parliament and Constitution Centre This Note should be read in conjunction with Library Standard Note 5350 The Hillsborough Agreement, published March 2010, which explains in detail the agreement reached on the devolution of policing and justice. This duly took place on 12 April 2010 and David Ford, the leader of the Alliance Party, became Policing and Justice Minister. New arrangements need to be agreed by May 2012. In the general election of May 2010, the DUP leader, Peter Robinson, lost his seat, as did the UUP leader Reg Empey. Lady Sylvia Hermon became an independent. The SDLP retained its three seats, and Sinn Fein its five seats. The Saville inquiry into the events of Bloody Sunday was published on 15 June 2010. This information is provided to Members of Parliament in support of their parliamentary duties and is not intended to address the specific circumstances of any particular individual. It should not be relied upon as being up to date; the law or policies may have changed since it was last updated; and it should not be relied upon as legal or professional advice or as a substitute for it. A suitably qualified professional should be consulted if specific advice or information is required. This information is provided subject to our general terms and conditions which are available online or may be provided on request in hard copy. Authors are available to discuss the content of this briefing with Members and their staff, but not with the general public. Contents 1 Background 3 2 Devolution of policing and justice 3 3 Decommissioning 4 4 The Hillsborough Agreement 4 5 General election May 2010 6 5.1 New Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 6 5.2 Allowances for SF MPs 6 6 Saville inquiry 7 6.1 Plans for publication 7 6.2 Publication of the Saville inquiry 15 June 2010 7 6.3 Issues arising out of the Saville inquiry 11 Prosecutions 11 Further Inquiries 11 2 1 Background The Northern Ireland Assembly was first elected in July 1998. Devolution, however, was suspended on 14 October 2002 under the terms of the Northern Ireland Act 2000. Following a number of attempts to do so, devolution was restored on 8 May 2007 after emergency legislation was passed in the House of Commons giving effect to a settlement reached between Sinn Fein and the DUP on 26 March 2007. At the most recent Assembly elections, held on 7 March 2007, no single party won a majority of seats. The DUP, with 36 seats, and Sinn Fein, with 28 seats, returned the greatest number of MLAs. The four-party executive formed following the election, using the d’Hondt system1, is headed by First Minister Peter Robinson, of the DUP, and Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness, of Sinn Fein. In November 2008 the First and Deputy First Ministers announced that they had come to an agreement that would facilitate the devolution of policing and justice powers to Northern Ireland. Despite this, a great deal of work, including gaining cross-community support for a financial package for the transfer, remained to be done. The Northern Ireland Act 2009 added to the options contained within the Northern Ireland Act 1998 for the method of appointing the Minister to head the department. The Department of Justice Bill passed all its stages in the Northern Ireland Assembly on 30 November.2 The Bill is of a preparatory nature, establishing a Department of Justice in Northern Ireland to oversee policing and justice and setting out the arrangements for the appointment of a minister to head that department. On 11 January 2010 Peter Robinson stood down as First Minister for six weeks to resolve the standards of conduct issues relating to himself and his wife Iris. Mr Robinson subsequently resumed his role as First Minister on 4 February, announcing that, following a ‘comprehensive’ examination, Paul Maguire QC had found no evidence to suggest that he had broken the ministerial code.3 2 Devolution of policing and justice Following a period of controversy over the devolution of policing and justice, on 12 January 2010, there were all party talks with the Northern Ireland Secretary at Stormont, with some indications of optimism as to a resolution.4 The question of abolishing the Parades Commission continued to be a barrier to resolution and on 25 January Gordon Brown and Brian Cowen held talks in Northern Ireland in an effort to save the talks.5 After three days the two Prime Ministers left the talks, which continued with the Northern Ireland Secretary and the Irish Foreign Minister present. Gordon Brown and Brian Cowen had announced that if agreement was not reached by Friday 29 January then they would set out their own proposals. However, the talks were allowed to continue through and past this deadline.6 Following ten days of intense negotiation, it was announced just before midnight on 4 1 An explanation of the d’Hondt system is available on the Northern Ireland Assembly website at http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/io/summary/d'hondt.htm 2 “NI justice bill passes last stage”, I December 2009 BBC News 3 “Peter Robinson back as Northern Ireland first minister”, 4 February 2010 BBC News 4 “Back devolution, unionists urged” 13 January 2010, BBC News 5 “Late night policing and justice talks ‘hard going’ 26 January 2010 BBC News 6 “The road to a deal on devolution has been long and hard, strewn with crises, stand-offs and compromise”, 6 February 2010 Belfast Telegraph 3 February that the DUP and Sinn Fein had reached an agreement, with Peter Robinson stating that it had gained unanimous support from the DUP’s Assembly Members.7 3 Decommissioning On 3 March 2010 the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning presented a six month report to the Government, which confirmed that since September 2009 decommissioning events had been carried out with the Ulster Defence Association, the Official Irish Republican Army, the Irish National Liberation Army, the UDA South East Antrim Group and the Shoukri Paramilitary Element. The report stated that in all cases the IICD were informed that the weapons decommissioned constituted all those under the control of the particular organisation. As noted in the report’s conclusion, the mandate of the IICD was terminated with effect from 9 February and it will now complete its final report before standing down.8 On 26 May the Independent Monitoring Commission presented its 23rd report.9 It warned of the continuing threat posed by dissident republicans. The Northern Ireland Secretary made the following written ministerial statement: The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Mr Owen Paterson): I have received the 23rd report of the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC). This report has been made under articles 4 and 7 of the international agreement that established the Commission and it reports on levels of paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland. I have considered the content of the report and I am today bringing it before Parliament. I have placed copies in the Library of the House. The IMC reported on the continued and significant threat posed by dissident republicans and concluded hat they remain highly active and dangerous. During the six months under review, RIRA were responsible for a ruthless and intensive campaign of violence; they committed and publicly claimed one murder and tried, but failed, to murder many others. The IMC notes the positive progress on decommissioning by both loyalist and republican paramilitaries prior to the end of the amnesty in February this year. This, combined with the ending of the remit of the IICD by the two Governments, marks an extremely important change, and is a tribute to the great work carried out by the Commission. The Commission also notes that the devolution of policing and justice means that the criminal justice system is accountable to the people of Northern Ireland and as such offers a potent response to paramilitaries by encouraging greater public support and confidence.10 4 The Hillsborough Agreement Under the agreement made at Hillsborough on 4 February 2010, the First Minister and deputy First Minister tabled a joint resolution for a cross-community vote in the Northern Ireland Assembly on 9 March. Further detail is given in Library Standard Note 5350 The Hillsborough Agreement, published March 2010. 7 “Dramatic midnight briefing signals a done deal”, 5 February 2010 Belfast Telegraph 8 The IICD report is at http://www.nio.gov.uk/iicd_report.pdf 9 http://www.independentmonitoringcommission.org/documents/uploads/23.%20Twenty-Third%20Report.pdf 10 HC Deb 26 May 2010 c7WS 4 The motion was agreed by parallel consent. As expected, the UUP voted against the proposals. Their leader, Sir Reg Empey, defended this decision: As a democratic political party pledged to make power-sharing work in an inclusive manner for all the people of Northern Ireland, we exercise our rights, refusing to bow to the blackmail and bullying to which we have been subjected in recent weeks.”11 Out of the 105 votes cast in the Assembly, a total of 88 supported the move, with 17 Ulster Unionists voting against. Once agreed to, three motions were put before the House of Commons on 22 March to approve three statutory instruments relating to Northern Ireland devolution. The Northern Ireland Secretary, Shaun Woodward emphasised that the process marked full devolution to Northern Ireland: Mr. Woodward: Today's business will enable the completion of devolution in Northern Ireland through the transfer of policing and justice powers to Stormont.
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