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University of Birmingham ‘Game over’? Abiy Ahmed, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front and Ethiopia’s political crisis Fisher, Jonathan; Tsehaye Gebrewahd, Meressa DOI: 10.1093/afraf/ady056 License: Other (please specify with Rights Statement) Document Version Peer reviewed version Citation for published version (Harvard): Fisher, J & Tsehaye Gebrewahd, M 2018, '‘Game over’? Abiy Ahmed, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front and Ethiopia’s political crisis', African Affairs, pp. 1-12. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ady056 Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal Publisher Rights Statement: This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in African Affairs following peer review. The version of record Jonathan Fisher, Meressa Tsehaye Gebrewahd; ‘Game over’? Abiy Ahmed, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front and Ethiopia’s political crisis, African Affairs, , ady056, https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ady056 is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ady056 General rights Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the copyright holders. 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Abiy Ahmed, the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front and Ethiopia's political crisis Journal: African Affairs Manuscript ID AfricAff-2018-198.R2 ManuscriptFor Type: ReviewBriefing Only Keywords: Ethiopia, Ethnic federalism, Ethiopian politics https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/africaff Page 1 of 18 Manuscripts submitted to African Affairs 1 2 3 4 BRIEFING 5 6 7 ‘GAME OVER’? 8 ABIY AHMED, THE TIGRAYAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION 9 10 FRONT AND ETHIOPIA’S POLITICAL CRISIS 11 12 13 JONATHAN FISHER AND MERESSA TSEHAYE GEBREWAHD 14 15 16 17 18 ON 15 FEBRUARY 2018, HAILEMARIAM DESALEGN, Ethiopia’s beleaguered 19 20 prime minister, resigned. Bowing to pressure from within his own party1, the 21 For Review Only 22 23 Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), Hailemariam declared 24 25 that he hoped to facilitate an end to ‘unrest and political crisis’ in the country by 26 27 leaving the national stage.2 If Hailemariam’s departure had taken observers by 28 29 30 surprise, however, what was to follow would defy all predictions. His successor, 31 32 Abiy Ahmed – whose elevation was unanticipated even by many within the EPRDF 33 34 Politburo itself3 – has, since his April 2018 inauguration, presided over a dramatic set 35 36 of iconoclastic policy shifts. Perhaps most high profile amongst these has been the 37 38 39 securing of a rapprochement with Eritrea, Ethiopia’s most bitter regional nemesis 40 41 since the outbreak of a border war in May 1998. 42 43 It is in the domestic sphere, however, where Abiy’s reform agenda – or, at least, its 44 45 46 stated ambitions – has been most radical. In particular, Abiy has sought to distance 47 48 Jonathan Fisher ([email protected]) is Reader in African Politics in the International Development 49 Department of the University of Birmingham. He is also a Research Fellow in the Centre for Gender 50 and Africa Studies at the University of the Free State. Meressa Tsehaye Gebrewahd 51 ([email protected]) is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Strategic 52 Studies at Mekelle University. He is also Director of the Gebrehiwot Baykedagn Center for Strategic 53 Studies, also at Mekelle University. The authors are very grateful to Cedric Barnes, Jason Mosley an 54 anonymous reviewer and the editors of African Affairs for helpful comments received on an earlier 55 draft of this Briefing. They are also grateful to the School of Government and Society at the University 56 of Birmingham for funding fieldwork which this Briefing draws upon. 1 Interview, EPRDF Politburo member, Mekelle, 20 July 2018. 57 2 Al-Jazeera, ‘Ethiopia prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn resigns’, 15 February 2018, < 58 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/ethiopia-prime-minister-hailemariam-desalegn-resigns- 59 180215115215988.html > (5 October 2018). 60 3 Interview, EPRDF Politburo member, Mekelle, 20 July 2018. 1 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/africaff Manuscripts submitted to African Affairs Page 2 of 18 1 2 3 himself from the past 27 years of EPRDF rule (or, at least, core dimensions of it), 4 5 6 condemning his immediate predecessors within weeks of coming to office as 7 8 overseers of ‘terrorist acts…and using force just to stay in power’ and announcing a 9 10 range of plans to overturn longstanding EPRDF positions on, for example, the role of 11 12 the state in the economy and multi-party politics.4 Leader of the recently-renamed 13 14 15 Oromo Democratic Party (ODP – formerly the Oromo People’s Democratic 16 17 Organisation (OPDO)) within the four-member EPRDF coalition, Abiy has also 18 19 looked to underline the ‘new broom’ character of his movement by rebuking the 20 21 For Review Only 22 Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the onetime senior partner within the 23 24 EPRDF, and rolling back their influence and place within the Ethiopian polity.5 25 26 More concretely, in June 2018 Abiy unexpectedly replaced perhaps the two most 27 28 29 powerful TPLF figures in Ethiopia since the death of long-serving TPLF chair and 30 31 prime minister Meles Zenawi (president and later premier from 1991 onwards) in 32 33 August 2012: Samora Yunis, army chief of staff, and Getachew Assefa, intelligence 34 35 chief.6 Indeed, it is the departure of Samora and Getachew – the latter removed in a 36 37 38 much more unceremonious manner than the former – that reportedly persuaded 39 40 Eritrean president Isaias Afwerki that the TPLF elite, Asmara’s enemy for two 41 42 decades, was being increasingly side-lined.7 In a speech twelve days later, Isaias 43 44 45 announced that he would respond to Abiy’s peace overtures by sending a delegation 46 47 4Al-Jazeera, ‘Ethiopia PM: Security agencies committed “terrorist acts”’, 19 June 2018, < 48 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/ethiopia-pm-security-agencies-committed-terrorist-acts- 49 180619051321984.html > (5 October 2018); Maggie Fick, ‘Ethiopia prime minister calls for multiparty 50 democracy – chief of staff’, Reuters, 22 July 2018, < https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ethiopia- 51 politics/ethiopia-prime-minister-calls-for-multiparty-democracy-chief-of-staff-idUKKBN1KC0MX > 52 (5 October 2018). It is worth noting that some of these issues had also been raised under the 53 premiership of Hailemariam although Hailemariam lacked the mandate to move further forward with 54 such discussions. 5 55 Argaw Ashine, ‘Cracks emerge in Ethiopian ruling coalition’, The East African, 14 June 2018, < 56 http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/africa/Cracks-in-Ethiopian-ruling-coalition/4552902-4611768- x71xd9z/index.html > (5 October 2018). 57 6 Aaron Masho, ‘Ethiopia’s prime minister replaces security chiefs as part of reforms’, Reuters, 8 June 58 2018, < https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-military/ethiopias-prime-minister-replaces- 59 commanders-in-security-reshuffle-idUSKCN1J40PU > (5 October 2018). 60 7 Interview, Senior Eritrean policy official, Asmara, 20 June 2018. 2 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/africaff Page 3 of 18 Manuscripts submitted to African Affairs 1 2 3 to Ethiopia, noting gleefully that ‘the people [of Ethiopia] said “enough is enough”’.8 4 5 6 This in turn precipitated the end of the TPLF’s shenanigans; which was aptly 7 8 described as “Game Over”.9 9 10 This Briefing takes a step back to place current, fast-moving political developments 11 12 in Ethiopia within a broader context. For while the pace and imagery of ‘Ethiopia’s 13 14 15 quiet revolution’ owes much to Abiy Ahmed’s personality and approach to politics, 16 17 its wider trajectory was set in motion long before his premiership. Abiy was not the 18 19 architect of the situation that led to his ascendancy. We argue that Ethiopia’s current 20 21 For Review Only 22 political dynamics derive from two longer-term phenomena. The first is the maturing 23 24 and solidification of the EPRDF’s ethnic federalism project, and the federal 25 26 government’s blunt engagement with this process. The second is the disintegration of 27 28 29 the TPLF into factionalism and self-criticism since the death of Meles. Both processes 30 31 have been brokered by political elites within the ODP/OPDO – and another EPRDF 32 33 coalition member, the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM)10 – to 34 35 rebalance relationships within the EPRDF, and between federal and regional 36 37 38 governments.