Not “Ready-To-Eat”
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How the Meat and Poultry Industry Weakened Efforts to Reduce Listeria Food-Poisoning Not Ready-to-Eat was prepared with the assistance of a grant from the Deer Creek Foundation, St. Louis, MO. The report was written by CFA staff Carol Tucker Foreman and Christopher Waldrop with the assistance of consultant Sandra Eskin. We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Karen Egbert, Felicia Nestor, Donna Rosenbaum, and Art Jaeger in preparing this report. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors. Copyright © 2004 by the Consumer Federation of America 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Executive Summary ………………………………………………… i II. Introduction ………………………………………………………… 1 III. Background ………………………………………………………… 4 A. Listeria Monocytogenes ………………………………………… 4 B. Listeria Food-Poisoning ………………………………………… 4 C. Listeria Contamination in “Ready-to-Eat” Products …………… 5 D. U.S. Department of Agriculture ………………………………… 5 IV. The Government’s Initial Response to Listeria ………………… . 8 A. Listeria Action Plan ……………………………………………. 10 B. The FDA/FSIS Risk Assessment ………………………………. 10 V. Meat and Poultry Industry Influence ………………………………. 11 A. Campaign Contributions ……………………………………… 11 B. Meat Industry Alumni Flock to USDA ………………………… 14 VI. The Proposed Rule on Listeria ……………………………………… 16 A. Publication of the Proposed Rule ……………………………… 16 B. Key Elements of the Proposed Rule …………………………… 17 VII. The Bush Administration’s Response to Listeria…………………….. 19 A. FSIS Risk Assessment …………………………………………. 19 B. Listeria Outbreaks in 2002 ………………………………………… 20 C. The Interim Final Rule ………………………………………… 22 D. Safety/Information Labeling for Ready-to-Eat Products ………. 27 E. OIG Audits and FSIS Response ……………………………… 29 VIII. Conclusion ………………………………………………………… 31 3 I. Executive Summary This report focuses on the development of a rule and related policies to control Listeria monocytogenes (Listeria) in ready-to-eat meat and poultry products, and provides a case study of the role that industry plays in the crafting of government policies to protect the public from food poisoning. During the Bush Administration’s first term, the approach taken by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to controlling Listeria shifted significantly to favor positions taken by the regulated industry. The Department first delayed regulations to control Listeria contamination in ready-to-eat meat and poultry products and then revised them to reflect industry positions. During the same period, the government abandoned its pledge to reduce by 50 percent the number of Listeria food- poisoning (listeriosis) cases by 2005. These events raise the question of whether a 22 percent increase in Listeria food-poisoning cases in 2003 can be attributed, at least in part, to the change in USDA policy and approach. Background While the number of Listeria food-poisoning cases each year is not large, Listeria is among the most dangerous and lethal foodborne pathogens. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that Listeria causes close to 2,500 cases of food- poisoning annually; over 90 percent of the victims are hospitalized and 20 percent die. Listeria food poisoning results in the highest rate of hospitalization of any foodborne pathogen, and has the second-highest fatality rate. The federal government first became aware of the danger posed by Listeria contamination in ready-to-eat meat and poultry products in the mid-1980s, and its first response was to initiate a government monitoring program in 1987 to test for the pathogen within meat and poultry plants. A major Listeria food-poisoning outbreak in the late 1990s, and consumer criticism of the Clinton Administration’s slow response to it, led the Administration to announce initiatives to address the problem, including conducting a joint risk assessment by USDA and the Food and Drug Administration, and establishing food- safety standards for ready-to-eat products. In May 2000, the Clinton Administration set a new public health goal of cutting the rate of Listeria food-poisoning cases in half by 2005. The Bush Administration’s Relationship with the Meat and Poultry Industry Three, notable factors illustrate the close relationship between George W. Bush and the meat and poultry industry: 1. The amount and distribution of campaign contributions strongly favor the Republican Party. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, agribusiness firms contributed a total of $59,431,422 to political candidates in 2000. Of this total, 74 percent of the money went to Republicans and 26 percent to Democrats. A similar breakdown was seen in the 2004 election. Republicans have consistently received a larger share of the total agribusiness contributions than Democrats. With each presidential election cycle, the gap continues to i widen. Companies and trade associations connected to the meat and poultry sector have been especially generous to Republican candidates in general and to President Bush in particular. Individual employees of meat and poultry companies and trade associations contributed significantly more money to the Bush campaign as well. In particular, senior- level executives have donated extensively to industry association political action committees (PACs) as well as the PACs of their own companies. Six of the top 20 meat and poultry processing companies and their chief executives, and the major trade associations, all of whom contributed to the Bush campaigns in 2000 and 2004, played an active role in shaping USDA’s Listeria policy. 2. There is evidence of an unusually close tie between the President and a meat company linked to a major outbreak of Listeria food-poisoning. There is a special relationship between George W. Bush and Pilgrim’s Pride, a Texas-based food processing company implicated in a major recall in 2002. Lonnie “Bo” Pilgrim, Chairman of the Board of Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation, began supporting George W. Bush when Bush ran for governor in 1998, and continued to be a significant fundraiser in the 2000 and 2004 presidential campaigns. 3. After the 2000 election, numerous meat industry alumni joined USDA in positions directly relating to food safety and nutrition. The list begins with Deputy Secretary James Moseley, co- owner of a large hog farm, and moves on to Veneman’s chief of staff, Dale Moore, who came to USDA directly from the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, where he was executive director for legislative affairs and Assistant Secretary for Congressional Affairs Mary Waters, a former ConAgra executive. Other former NCBA alumni and veterans of other meat related groups took over other top posts. In filling the key position of Under Secretary for Food Safety, the Bush Administration appointed Elsa Murano, a professor well known and liked by the industry. The Bush Administration also converted key positions, like that of FSIS Administrator, from career civil-service to political-appointee status. Changes in USDA Listeria Policy under the Bush Administration Consumer and public-health groups were optimistic when the Bush Administration decided to publish, without substantive change, the proposed rule on Listeria that had been developed by the Clinton Administration. In the proposed rule, USDA said it intended to establish pathogen-reduction “performance standards” for all ready-to-eat products and, under some circumstances, require final-product testing for Listeria to ensure that the standards were being met. A performance standard generally limits the amount of a particular pathogen in the final product. The proposed rule spelled out in detail the Clinton Administration’s view that performance standards were vital to protecting the public from Listeria in processed meat and poultry products. Under the proposal, establishments producing ready-to-eat meat and poultry products also would have been required to test food-contact surfaces to verify that they are controlling Listeria within the entire processing environment. If an establishment found ii contamination on one of its food-contact surfaces, it would have to take corrective action to demonstrate that its product was not adulterated with Listeria. The optimism of the consumer and public-health groups was dampened, however, when FSIS decided to launch a second risk assessment, which it said was made necessary by the comments to the proposed rule. The additional risk assessment allowed FSIS to delay finalizing the Listeria rule. The final risk assessment was published in February 2003; it was roundly criticized by consumer groups because its scope was limited to deli meats and ignored hot dogs and other high-risk meat and poultry products, and because it did not include sampling of non-food contact surfaces in the risk model. The groups also took issue with FSIS’s reliance on unpublished industry data. In October 2002, nineteen months after the proposed rule was published, there was a major Listeriosis outbreak that infected 131 people and prompted a major recall. It took the agency another nine months to issue an “interim” final rule on Listeria and ready-to-eat products. To date, USDA has not issued a permanent final rule. An analysis of the positions advocated by the regulated industry reveals a startling symmetry between industry positions and changes ultimately adopted by the USDA in the interim final rule. Every aspect of the original USDA proposal that was opposed by industry was reversed in the interim final rule. Moreover, in every instance where consumer groups and industry took an opposing position, USDA rejected the consumer position and