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The Implications of Cold War on Malaysia State Building Process

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Asian Culture and History July, 2009 The Implications of Cold War on Malaysia State Building Process Md. Shukri Shuib College of Law, Government and International Studies Universiti Utara Malaysia 06010, Sintok, Kedah, Malaysia Tel: 60-4-928-6594 E-mail: [email protected] Mohamad Faisol Keling College of Law, Government and International Studies Universiti Utara Malaysia 06010, Sintok, Kedah, Malaysia Tel: 60-4-928-6594 E-mail: [email protected] Mohd Na’eim Ajis College of Law, Government and International Studies Universiti Utara Malaysia 06010, Sintok, Kedah, Malaysia Tel: 60-4-928-4249 E-mail: [email protected] Abstract The Cold War has affected the communities around the world. Malaysia was no exception in being affected by the turmoil the international world, particularly after the World War 2, due to ideological conflicts. Based on the domino theory, the ups and downs of particular country in terms of its, strong ideology, brings about network impacts to each country in the world. Thus, a freedom of Malaya and the establishment of Malaysia came from the history of Cold War which influenced the international scene. The establishment of Malaysia is seen as a mechanism to stop the influence of communism. The involvement leaders from Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak as well as Brunei Darussalam in the agenda to ‘build’ Malaysia with the approval from democratic countries showed a very strong cooperation that communism was a threat. This contributed to the creation of a new and bigger country. The wise Malaysian leaders in negotiating and being united in facing the global threats at that time, has shown that Malaysia’s ‘project’ in stopping the communist theory which is also known domino theory, was successfully carried out and maintained till today. Therefore, Malaysia as a case study, on how a country was ‘built’ on the basis of stopping the spread of communism in saving the Southeast Asia from falling into the hands of communists, is unique and its effectiveness should be studied. Keywords: Communism, Cold War, State Building 1. Introduction Malaya achieved its independence on 31 August 1957 in a unique way. Through unity, compromise and tolerance between Malays and the ethnic Indians and Chinese, who worked together hand in hand for an independent Malaya, it created a success story for its future. Multiracial Malaya had arisen and adopted a united front in support of self-government. With its spirit of ‘unity in diversity’, Malaya and later Malaysia has remained relatively stable until the present, and this in itself makes a unique and interesting study. Malaysian nation building history is packed with several concepts and significant events, which reflect internal and external influences of the region, the most amazing being the compromise and tolerance by which Malaysia has come into existence. When the Federation of Malaysia came into being 89 Vol. 1, No. 2 Asian Culture and History on 16 September 1963, through diplomacy and compromise with the British, it marked the conclusion of a successful cooperative venture. The 1950s to the 1970s, during Cold War, was a period of important transition for Malaysian national politics. A study this period will give a clear view of Malaysia’s significant role in the region during the Cold War era. This paper will analyze the important elements in the ‘clash of ideology’ between the democratic and the communist movements. This paper will also emphasizes the roles played by the United States of America and Britain in the Western front, in the fight against the emerging communists in Indonesia during Sukarno’s presidency, which had a significant impact on Malaya and the new Federation of Malaysia at that time. 2. The Malay Archipelago and European Expansionism The British and Dutch, until World War II, were the dominant colonial powers in the Malay Archipelago, nowadays, includes Malaysia and Indonesia. The colonization of these two countries created several changes in politics and culture in the Archipelago. A Treaty made in the 19th century between the Dutch and the British underlined the borders of influence between these two colonial powers. The 1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty had immense consequences for the national identity of the subject people. The Brunei and Sulu Sultanate in Borneo, together with several Malay Kingdoms in the Malay Peninsula, were placed under the influence of the British. Sumatra and Java, together with other parts of Nusantara (Malay- archipelago), were under the influence of the Dutch. (Mills, 1966). This division threw the indigenous politics of the entire archipelago into chaos, separated from the traditional sultanate influence, which formerly dominated the political and social system. For example, the Sultanate of Johor-Riau separated into two, Johor and Singapore under the British, and Riau-Lingga under the Dutch. Under the terms of the treaty, the Malay Archipelago was divided into two separate zones of influence between the two major powers. Again, in 1909, The Anglo-Siamese Treaty significantly divided the Malay Kingdoms in the northern part of the Malay Peninsula under Siam and Britain with the British gaining control of the states of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Terengganu, (Mills, 1966). As described by Turnbull in his chapter ‘regionalism and nationalism’, the expansionism of European colonialism had fundamentally affected the region where previously, ‘no single empire had dominated the whole region’ (Turnbull, 1999:258). European expansionism created frontiers of influence in the region, which have virtually continued until the era of the Cold War. Similar crisis situations were later demonstrated in the modern world and can be studied and evaluated in the Middle East, India-Pakistan, Korean Peninsula, Vietnam in 1970’s, and presently in Iraq and Palestine-Israel. The Malay Archipelago was the first region to face the problem of interference by foreign superpowers, which left the region entirely in disarray. 2.1 Formation of the Southeast Asian Region Southeast Asia was first brought into conception by grouping the countries of the region together during World War II for military purposes. The idea was brought up by accident at the Quebec Conference in August 1943, when the Western Allies decided to introduce a regional zone of command that would make it easier to monitor during the war. South East Asia Command, (SEAC), first came into being, with the combination of Burma, Malaya, Sumatra and Thailand, which at that time were mostly under British influence. Later, at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, SEAC included the Netherlands East Indies and Indochina, south of the sixteenth parallel. Only the northern part of Vietnam, Laos and the Philippines were not included into this concept of SEAC (Turnbull, 1999:258). During World War II, all of the Southeast Asian countries were under Japanese influence. This was the first time in history that a colonial power, Japan, was able to form a single entity of domination in the region. The Japanese defeat of the European empire in Southeast Asia at that time significantly raised the spirit of nationalism of most of the Southeast Asian leaders. After World War II, and the surrender of the Japanese, many of the countries in the region claimed independence from their former European colonizers. Most amazingly, ‘within ten years of the Japanese withdrawal, all Southeast Asia countries achieved independence’, except the Kingdom of Brunei Darussalam. 3. The Cold War 3.1 The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) Following World War II, a new problem emerged for Malaya. After the Japanese surrendered the Malayan People’s Anti Japanese Army, (MPAJA), which was supported by the British to fight the Japanese invasion, was asked to withdraw their weapons and integrate in the society as civilians. Before the British reestablished their authority however, the Parti Komunis Malaya, (PKM), or Malayan Communist Party, (MCP), tried to force Malaya into anarchy, by attempting to gain control of the police stations in order to free Malaya from colonialism. In 1948, Chinese Communist guerrilla fighters, (who had been armed by the British during the war), emerged from the jungle and under the rule of Chin Peng (Secretary General of the MCP), began their terror campaign to take over the country by force. British Military Administration (BMA) had been established by then, and the communist MCP had aggressively turned their attention to the new slogan of anti-imperialism. This had a significant effect on Malayan ethnic groups with disputes erupting among Muslim Malays and Chinese Communists. The Malayan Government at that time, along with many others in the Western 90 Asian Culture and History July, 2009 bloc, was apprehensive about the spread of international communism. Thus, an intense jungle war began, fought by the Malay forces and British Commonwealth forces, against the MCP. During the first period after the emergency was declared, there was not much coordination between security forces. This situation continued until Lt. Gen. Sir Harold Briggs was appointed by British Malaya as Director of Operations in March 1950. Under his strategic program, called the Rancangan Briggs (Briggs Plan), by taking over the land of the Malays, he, along with his war executive committees (including Sir Henry Gurney, later assassinated by communist loyalists), coordinated emergency operations, and created 500 “Kampung Bharu” (new villages) for Malayan populations who lived in remote areas beyond government protection (Miller, 1965: 177). Under the plan introduced by Briggs and Gurney, the foundation was laid for eventual victory and political progress, which came much sooner than anyone expected (Miller, 1965: 177). Briggs Plan by the British had given 400,000 Chinese a residence (Utusan Malaysia, 16 January 2009). According to Raja Muda of Perak (the Crown Prince of Perak) Raja Dr Nazrin Shah, the Briggs Plan was displease the Malay Rules as showed by the statement of the Conference of Malay Rulers which took place on 24 Mei 1950 (Utusan Malaysia, 16 January 2009).
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