Cold War Scripts: Comparing Remembrance of the Malayan Emergency and the 1965 Violence in Indonesia
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Singapore and Malaysian Armies Conclude Bilateral Military Exercise
Singapore and Malaysian Armies Conclude Bilateral Military Exercise 13 Nov 2016 The Chief of Staff-General Staff of the Singapore Army, Brigadier-General (BG) Desmond Tan Kok Ming and the Deputy Chief of Army of the Malaysian Armed Forces, Lieutenant-General Dato' Seri Panglima Hj Ahmad Hasbullah bin Hj Mohd Nawawi, co-officiated the closing ceremony of Exercise Semangat Bersatu this morning. This year's exercise, the 22nd edition in the series of bilateral exercises between both armies, was conducted in Kluang, Johor from 3 to 13 November 2016. It involved around 980 personnel from both the 1st Battalion, Singapore Infantry Regiment, and the 5th Royal Malay Regiment. The exercise included professional exchanges and culminated in a combined battalion field exercise. In his closing speech, BG Tan said, "Today, the armies of Malaysia and Singapore enjoy a deep and abiding respect for each other. Through our defence relations, we find 1 greater areas of convergence between our two countries and therein forge the basis for a lasting bond… I am heartened to know that our soldiers took the opportunity to interact, to build relationships and achieve a deeper understanding of each other during the last two weeks. Through the professional exchanges and outfield exercise, our soldiers have truly demonstrated our armies' "unity in spirit", or semangat bersatu." First conducted in 1989, Exercise Semangat Bersatu serves as an important and valuable platform for professional exchanges and personnel-to-personnel interactions between the SAF and the MAF. The SAF and the MAF also interact regularly across a wide range of activities, which include bilateral exchanges and professional courses, as well as multilateral activities under the ambit of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting and the Five Power Defence Arrangements. -
The Australians in Vietnam 1962-1972
“They Were Hard Nuts”: The Australians in Vietnam, 1962-1972 A focus on the American failure to make maximum use of the Australians’ counterinsurgency tactics in South Vietnam Kate Tietzen Clemson University Abstract: Addressing the need for studies examining the relationship between Commonwealth militaries and the American military, this paper examines the American military’s relationship with the Australian military contingency sent to Vietnam between 1962 and 1972. Analyzing Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUSA) documents, Australian government documents and Australian primary sources including interviews, papers, and autobiographies, this paper argues that the Americans deliberately used the Australian army in South Vietnam for show rather than force. The paper also illustrates American efforts to discredit and ignore Australian counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics; this undertaking only hindered the overall American anti- communist mission in Vietnam. Australia (1) Met all day Sunday (2) They were hard nuts (3) They had a long list of their contributions to Vietnam already (4) Real progress was made with Holt when went upstairs alone and told of the seriousness of the matter (5) Holt told Taylor that he was such a good salesman that he was glad he had not brought his wife to the meeting —Dr. Clark Clifford, meeting with President Lyndon B. Johnson 5 August 19671 While the Viet Minh and the French fought each other during the First Indochina War in Vietnam, Australia was fighting a guerilla-style war in Malaysia in what has been dubbed the “Malayan Emergency” of 1948-1960. In October of 1953, the Australian Defence Committee, the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff and the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff met in Melbourne to air concerns regarding the possibility of Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia.2 The delegation feared Chinese determination for communist control in Southeast Asia, which would threaten the accessibility of strategic raw materials for western powers in the area. -
2 Managing Malaysian Border
Volume: 1 Issues: 3 [December, 2019] pp.-01-13] International Journal of Politics, Public Policy and Social Work eISSN: 2637-0980 Journal website: www.ijppsw.com 2 MANAGING MALAYSIAN BORDER: THE CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS IN MAINTAINING SECURITY Noor Azmi Mohd Zainol1 Department of Nationhood, Leadership and Civilization, National Defence University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. (Email: [email protected] / [email protected]) Anwar Zamani Jusop2 17th Royal Malay Regiment, Terendak Camp, Malacca, Malaysia. (Email: [email protected]) Ahmad Azan Ridzuan3 Department of Defence Human Resource Management, National Defence University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. (Email: [email protected]) Sofian Kamaruddin4 Department of Strategic Studies, National Defence University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. (Email: [email protected]) Received date: 21-09-2019 Revised date: 30-10-2019 Accepted date: 23-11-2019 Published date: 15-12-2019 To cite this document: Zainol, N. A. M., Jusop, A. Z., Ridzuan, A. A., & Kamaruddin, S. (2019). Managing Malaysian Border: The Challenges and Prospects in Maintaining Security. International Journal of Politics, Public Policy and Social Work, 1(3), 01-13. DOI: 10.35631/ijppsw.13001 __________________________________________________________________________________________ Abstract: This paper aims to examine the challenges encountered by Malaysia enforcement border agencies to protect the sovereignty of Malaysia and its prospects of integration among various agencies at the border. With a wide boundary, the Malaysian security is porous to various threats which not only mean a traditional military threat but also include multiple threats. Current threats have been broadening to include transnational criminals such as illegal immigrants, smuggling people or prohibited goods or even non-traditional threats such as terrorism. -
8Th Euroseas Conference Vienna, 11–14 August 2015
book of abstracts 8th EuroSEAS Conference Vienna, 11–14 August 2015 http://www.euroseas2015.org contents keynotes 3 round tables 4 film programme 5 panels I. Southeast Asian Studies Past and Present 9 II. Early And (Post)Colonial Histories 11 III. (Trans)Regional Politics 27 IV. Democratization, Local Politics and Ethnicity 38 V. Mobilities, Migration and Translocal Networking 51 VI. (New) Media and Modernities 65 VII. Gender, Youth and the Body 76 VIII. Societal Challenges, Inequality and Conflicts 87 IX. Urban, Rural and Border Dynamics 102 X. Religions in Focus 123 XI. Art, Literature and Music 138 XII. Cultural Heritage and Museum Representations 149 XIII. Natural Resources, the Environment and Costumary Governance 167 XIV. Mixed Panels 189 euroseas 2015 . book of abstracts 3 keynotes Alarms of an Old Alarmist Benedict Anderson Have students of SE Asia become too timid? For example, do young researchers avoid studying the power of the Catholic Hierarchy in the Philippines, the military in Indonesia, and in Bangkok monarchy? Do sociologists and anthropologists fail to write studies of the rising ‘middle classes’ out of boredom or disgust? Who is eager to research the very dangerous drug mafias all over the place? How many track the spread of Western European, Russian, and American arms of all types into SE Asia and the consequences thereof? On the other side, is timidity a part of the decay of European and American universities? Bureaucratic intervention to bind students to work on what their state think is central (Terrorism/Islam)? -
The Malayan Communist Party's Struggle for Hearts and Minds In
No. 116 ‘Voice of the Malayan Revolution’: The Communist Party of Malaya’s Struggle for Hearts and Minds in the ‘Second Malayan Emergency’ (1969-1975) Ong Wei Chong Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore 13 October 2006 With Compliments This Working Paper series presents papers in a preliminary form and serves to stimulate comment and discussion. The views expressed are entirely the author’s own and not that of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) was established in July 1996 as an autonomous research institute within the Nanyang Technological University. Its objectives are to: • Conduct research on security, strategic and international issues. • Provide general and graduate education in strategic studies, international relations, defence management and defence technology. • Promote joint and exchange programmes with similar regional and international institutions; and organise seminars/conferences on topics salient to the strategic and policy communities of the Asia-Pacific. Constituents of IDSS include the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) and the Asian Programme for Negotiation and Conflict Management (APNCM). Research Through its Working Paper Series, IDSS Commentaries and other publications, the Institute seeks to share its research findings with the strategic studies and defence policy communities. The Institute’s researchers are also encouraged to publish their writings in refereed journals. The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region. The Institute has also established the S. -
Decolonization in the British Empire at the End of the Second World War, Britain Still Controlled the Largest Empire in World History
Decolonization in the British Empire At the end of the Second World War, Britain still controlled the largest empire in world history. Thanks largely to the empire, Britain raised enough supplies to sustain its war effort and took its place at the top table of the victorious powers alongside the United States and the Soviet Union. It was, however, a Pyrrhic victory; the war drained Britain’s finances and significantly lowered its prestige in the colonies. Less than two decades later, the British had given up almost all of their empire. This reading examines the period from 1945 to 1963, when the British surrendered almost all of their overseas colonies. There will be special focus on India, Kenya, Malaya (Malaysia), and Egypt. Finally, we will examine the legacy of empire for today’s Britain. The Effects of the Second World War The experience of the Second World War was not the sole reason that Britain eventually lost its colonies, but without the war the decolonization process doubtless would have taken longer. It is worth noting, however, that the origins of nationalist and anticolonial revolt across the British Empire were often rooted in the early twentieth century. After the First World War, British imperialists still preached about the superiority of Western (especially British) civilization, but their arguments often fell on deaf ears. Many subject peoples, especially Indians, had fought on the Western Front in the First World War. They saw that the British were no more immune to machine guns than any other group of people. They also observed Britain’s weakened state after the First World War and during the economic crisis of the 1930s. -
An Analysis of the Underlying Factors That Affected Malaysia-Singapore Relations During the Mahathir Era: Discords and Continuity
An Analysis of the Underlying Factors That Affected Malaysia-Singapore Relations During the Mahathir Era: Discords and Continuity Rusdi Omar Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Discipline of Politics and International Studies School of History and Politics Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences The University of Adelaide May 2014 TABLE OF CONTENTS TITLE PAGE TABLE OF CONTENTS i ABSTRACT v DECLARATION vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS vii ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS ix GLOSSARY xii 1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.1. Introductory Background 1 1.2. Statement of the Problem 3 1.3. Research Aims and Objectives 5 1.4. Scope and Limitation 6 1.5. Literature Review 7 1.6. Theoretical/ Conceptual Framework 17 1.7. Research Methodology 25 1.8. Significance of Study 26 1.9. Thesis Organization 27 2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE RELATIONS 30 2.1. Introduction 30 2.2. The Historical Background of Malaysia 32 2.3. The Historical Background of Singapore 34 2.4. The Period of British Colonial Rule 38 i 2.4.1. Malayan Union 40 2.4.2. Federation of Malaya 43 2.4.3. Independence for Malaya 45 2.4.4. Autonomy for Singapore 48 2.5. Singapore’s Inclusion in the Malaysian Federation (1963-1965) 51 2.6. The Period after Singapore’s Separation from Malaysia 60 2.6.1. Tunku Abdul Rahman’s Era 63 2.6.2 Tun Abdul Razak’s Era 68 2.6.3. Tun Hussein Onn’s Era 76 2.7. Conclusion 81 3 CONTENTIOUS ISSUES IN MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE RELATIONS 83 3.1. Introduction to the Issues Affecting Relations Between Malaysia and Singapore 83 3.2. -
Singapore and Malaysian Armies Conclude Bilateral Military Exercise
Singapore and Malaysian Armies Conclude Bilateral Military Exercise 23 Nov 2017 Chief of Army of the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) General Tan Sri Dato' Sri Zulkiple Bin Haji Kassim (left) and Chief of Army Major-General Melvyn Ong co-officiating the closing ceremony of Exercise Semangat Bersatu. 1 Earlier this afternoon, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) Chief of Army Major-General (MG) Melvyn Ong and the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) Chief of Army General (GEN) Tan Sri Dato' Sri Zulkiple Bin Haji Kassim co-officiated the closing ceremony of Exercise Semangat Bersatu (XSB) at Lim Chu Kang Training Area in Singapore. This year's exercise, the 23rd edition in the series, saw the participation of around 750 troopers from the 3rd Battalion Singapore Guards and the 5th Royal Malay Regiment. The exercise, held in Singapore from 12 to 25 November 2017, included professional exchanges and culminated in a combined battalion field exercise. At the closing ceremony, MG Ong said, "The SAF lends heavy emphasis on this exercise as we value the opportunity to interact and to exchange professional military knowledge and expertise, with our friends from the MAF. The regional security environment that we face today is full of complexities and uncertainity, and that is why we need friends." GEN Zulkiple also added that "I believe that the most important aspect of this exercise is to foster a greater relationship between our armies despite all the challenges that we have to face. I am confident that as time goes by, the continuation of this bilateral exercise will bring us closer together as brothers in arms." First held in 1989, XSB underscores the warm and long-standing defence relations between Singapore and Malaysia. -
History of the Second Battalion of the Singapore Infantry Regiment
History of the Second Battalion of the Singapore Infantry Regiment by lWO Daniel Wee L579 History of the NCO Paper USASMA Faculty Advisor: CWO Kenneth Hodge Group Room LIO 3 March 2006 Outline I. Introduction II. Body A. Birth of the Second Battalion, Singapore Infantry Regiment (2 SIR) B. Internal Security C. Combat Operations during Confrontation 1. Operation Oak Tree 2. Operation Easy Chair 3. Operations in Sabah D. Sad sojourn at Farrer Park E. Reorganising after the departure ofMalaysian Forces F. Converting into National Service Battalion III. Conclusion WEE 1 HISTORY OF THE SECOND BATTALION, SINGAPORE INFANTRY REGIMENT I. Introduction The purpose of this research paper is to give an accurate and in-depth account of the history of the Second Battalion which by large the history of the Singapore Armed Forces. This paper will provide detail events and operations of the unit. When the Japanese invaded Singapore on 7th February 1942, she fell in a mere eight days. As a consequence of our over reliance on the British and allied forces to defend us, Singapore fell to the rein of the Japanese for three dark years. On 6th August 1945, two atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and thus ended Japan's attempt at imperialism. On 1i h September 1945 Singapore was once again free. It then became clear that Singapore needed to build her own defence force. So in 1957 the First Battalion, Singapore Infantry Regiment (l SIR) was formed. The history of the Second Battalion, Singapore Infantry Regiment (2 SIR) is inextricably linked to the formation of the First Battalion. -
Annualreport 2001
annual Profile Ofreport The Board Of 2001 Directors 10 TENGKU DATO’ KAMARUL ZAMAN IBNI ALMARHUM SULTAN SIR ABU BAKAR, aged 38, a Malaysian, was appointed as Chairman to the Board on 25 May, 2001. He is a holder of ‘A’ Levels from United Kingdom. From 1990 to 1995, Tengku Dato’ Kamarul Zaman was a Director of Kilang Papan An Sdn Bhd and at various period of time between 1988 and 1999, he was a Director of Astroflex Sdn Bhd, Jubilant Quest Sdn Bhd, Nuftah Corporation (M) Sdn Bhd and Latem Trade Sdn Bhd. He was appointed Chairman of the Board of Directors of Merces Holdings Berhad (formerly known as CCM Bioscience Berhad), a company listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange from September 1999 until October, 2000. Currently, he is Executive Chairman of TIDA (Pahang) Sdn Bhd since 1995 and Quantum Plus Sdn Bhd since 1997. In addition, he sits as an Executive Director on the Board of Premaflex Sdn Bhd and as Director of two (2) other private limited companies. He had served as the Deputy President of Pahang Club, Kuala Lipis from 1991 to 1993 and presently a member of Bentong Town Council and a senior officer of the rank of Major in Rejimen 505 Askar Wataniah Kuantan, Pahang. HO WEE LOCK, aged 42, a Malaysian, was appointed as Executive Director of the Board on 14 January, 1999. He is an associate member of CIMA and ICSA and a member of MIA. Between 1981 – 1986, he was a Senior Accountant with the Hong Leong Group and subsequently between 1987 – 1991, he was Chief Accountant with the Lion Group. -
Malaysia Singapore & Brunei
© Lonely Planet 30 History As the countries we know today, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei have been around since 1963, 1965 and 1984 respectively. The region’s history, of course, stretches back much further, although pinning down exactly how far back is a moot point due to a lack of archaeological evidence and early written records. What is known for sure is that early civilisation here was shaped by the ebb and Key Malay words like flow of the convergent sea trade from China and India. The following sketches bahasa (language), raja in the main events – see the history sections of the destination chapters for (ruler) and jaya (success) more-specific details of each region and p17 for the latest happenings. are Sanskrit terms imported to the area by ORIGINAL PEOPLE Indian visitors as early as The discovery of a 40,000-year-old skull in the Niah Caves of Sarawak in the 2nd century AD. 1958 (see p450 ) gives a notional starting point to pre-history in Malaysia. In Peninsular Malaysia, the oldest remains are of the 11,000-year-old skeleton, ‘Perak Man’, which has genetic similarities to the Negrito who now live in the mountainous rainforests of northern Malaysia. The Negritos were joined by It’s thought that the Malaysia’s first immigrants, the Senoi, who are thought to have slowly filtered word Malay (or Melayu) down from central and southern Thailand around 2500 BC. is based on the ancient A third wave, the Proto-Malay, ancestors of today’s Malays, came from the Tamil word malia, mean- Indonesian islands between 1500 and 500 BC. -
The Malayan Emergency As the Universal COIN Paradigm by MAJ Soh Yen Chu, Elizabeth
features 28 The Limits of The Malayan Emergency as the Universal COIN Paradigm by MAJ Soh Yen Chu, Elizabeth Abstract: The principles and policies put forth by the British administration during the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) have set the benchmark for counter-insurgency (COIN) situations. Optimal utilisation of a military force, the harnessing of a nation-state’s national unity and proper leadership techniques via command and control are key learning points to be taken away from the crisis. However, it is vital to note that each COIN situation is unique and depending on the scenario, these learning points need to be applied with some degree of exibility. Each situation can be unique based on the cultural dynamics and present ideologies pertinent in the local population. As such, each situation requires appropriate management, taking into consideration the key factors that contribute to the situation at hand whilst also noting past achievements and failures. Keywords: Counter-terrorism, Situational Flexibility, Insurgent Tactics, National Unity, Command and Control INTRODUCTION a literature review of four commonly drawn lessons from the campaign, namely: (1) 'population control', The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) has been (2) 'winning hearts and minds', (3) command and (4) frequently cited as a counter-insurgency (COIN) 'learning organisation.'3 These lessons demonstrated paradigm, whereby key concepts of utility of force, the application of a “total war” strategy by the 'winning hearts and minds' and effective command and control are deliberated.1 This essay will argue that British which ultimately brought about its success in the Malayan Emergency is indeed often regarded as the Malayan Emergency.