• Abstract and Figures
• Public Full-text

USMC photo by LCPL Christopher H. Fitzgerald In Gulf War II, Air Force and Marine airmen devised an informal pact that paid big dividends. Marine Air N O PERATION Iraqi Freedom, Ma- tion organization, equipment, and rine Corps aviation was inte- training. The whole point is to send grated into a joint force as never the MAGTF into battle as a coherent before. Take, for example, the whole, with aviation bound to it. i Marine aviation has six canonical concept of urban close air sup- port. Gen. T. Michael Moseley—the roles, ranging from offensive air sup- air boss of the war—credited it to “a port to reconnaissance. Still, Marine Marine major” working in his air aviators think the main task is to operations center. support Marines on the ground. Marines took an active role in joint force air component planning, com- Roles and Missions Fight mitting all Marine Corps aircraft to History shows that Marine avia- fulfilling the daily air tasking order. tors have done many things as part The Marines also won praise for of a joint force, as was true in World controlling air support to the 1st War II (see box). However, Marine Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) aviation survived the fierce roles and area east of the Euphrates River in missions battles of the late 1940s by Iraq. emphasizing close air support (CAS) This result was not foreordained. for Marines. In Marine Corps doctrine, the Ma- Marine aviator and historian Fred rine air-ground task force (MAGTF) Allison described the postwar moves reigns supreme. Any expeditionary in this way: “For the Marine Corps outfit—whether a small Marine ex- to say it needed airpower to support peditionary unit (MEU) or huge Ma- its infantry was a risky argument, rine expeditionary force (MEF)—can especially when one considered that, be a MAGTF. Whatever the unit’s in many cases in World War II, the size, it will always have command, Marines made do with ‘generic’ air aviation combat, ground combat, and support. But it [the argument] worked, combat service support elements. and the Marine Corps was allowed to The MAGTF concept governs avia- keep its aviation.” 60 AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2004 IN THE MAINSTREAM By Rebecca Grant Two Marine Corps AV-8B Harriers pass each other on the flight lines at Al Jaber AB, Kuwait, during Operation Iraqi Freedom. During OIF, Marine airpower was integrated into the joint air campaign as never before. In Korea and Vietnam, Marine The Generals’ War. As they told it, Storm experience did not shake the aviation made contributions under Marine leaders worried that the Corps’ faith in the MAGTF con- joint command but tended to focus JFACC setup would lead to “a drain cept. Nor was that faith affected by on needs of Marine ground forces. on their resources.” the work of Marine airmen in joint Later, Cold War strategies of the That view was particularly strong operations of the 1990s—Bosnia, 1970s and 1980s favored indepen- when it came to strategic air attacks Kosovo, the no-fly zone enforce- dent operational concepts for naval and other attempts at battlefield ment over Iraq—even though Ma- forces. The formal adoption in 1983 shaping. One Marine colonel cited rine aviators flew as small detach- of the MAGTF concept reconfirmed by Gordon and Trainor argued that ments at forward Air Force bases or the requirement for organic Marine Marine aircraft should not drop any launched from aircraft carriers. aviation. bombs in Iraq before Marine ground When the US went to war in Af- It is true, though, that a 1986 agree- forces started their attack. ghanistan in 2001, no MAGTF was ment left room for a joint force com- In a compromise, the Corps agreed even in the theater; one arrived rela- mander to employ all US assets— to put under JFACC authority all its tively late in the campaign. At the including Marine aviation assets—as A-6 medium-attack aircraft and EA- peak phase of Operation Enduring he saw fit. 6B electronic warfare aircraft plus Freedom, Marine pilots did most of Planning for Desert Storm in 1991 half of its F/A-18 fighters. However, their flying from Navy carrier decks. put the MAGTF concept to the test. the Corps kept control of all AV-8B US air assets were to be organized Harriers and half of the F/A-18s to Run-Up to War under the control of a joint force schedule and direct as they chose. In the run-up to the Iraq War of air component commander (JFACC) It was an extraordinary deal, and 2003, the Marines worked hard on —in that particular case, USAF Lt. it was not an entirely successful one. urban CAS. They had substantial Gen. Charles A. Horner. As the war approached, it was appar- organic air assets in 3rd Marine Air The Marines, however, preferred ent to JFACC’s officers that the Wing and firm ideas on how to em- independence for their air arm. Marines on their own had not hit ploy them—joint campaign or not. “Warplanes were an integral part Iraqi forces hard enough. Horner, in For example, a direct air support of Marine Corps combat power, no a book he authored with Tom Clancy, center (DASC), on its own, could different from artillery and tanks,” noted that he “shifted air over the run the air defense, airspace coordi- explained Michael R. Gordon and eastern sector” to help them out. nation, and air strikes for the 1st Bernard E. Trainor in their book, Despite the problems, the Desert Marine Division. But imposing strict AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2004 61 MAGTF doctrine was not in the on the ATO (although the CFACC making sure that ... the final product interest of the joint force. It would would not have tactical control of ... supported MAGTF combined arms fence off Marine Corps air assets. organic Marine air assets). The Ma- operations, and we feel it pretty much For one, Moseley would not be able rine Corps aircraft might be tasked did.” to use Marine air to strike targets to work deep targets as team players The air component also backed up near Baghdad early in the war. in the air component, but there would 3rd MAW with extensive Air Force Worse, it could leave the Marines be no intent to siphon off sorties. base support in Kuwait. without full benefits of reconnais- Moseley remembered telling the Taking the time to plan, rehearse, sance assets such as the U-2 and group, “I am not worried about you and prepare paid off. So did devel- Global Hawk, and it would deprive giving me excess sorties. I’m going opment of personal relationships, the Marine sector of the added strike to give you excess sorties because, from the generals on down. Paro- power of attacks delivered by other when they come through the CAOC chial views gave way to dialogue. coalition aircraft. and back out, you’re going to get Hilberer said: “I’ll be very blunt. In fall 2002, top Air Force and Global Hawk, you’re going to get We don’t normally get a terribly warm Marine Corps leaders met at NAS Rivet Joint, you’re going to get reception when we go talk to CFACC Miramar, Calif., for their annual JSTARS, you’re going to get Preda- about Marine air command and con- warfighter talks. Moseley said he tor, you’re going to get everything trol, but this CFACC staff was differ- wanted to figure out a way to run 3rd that the air component can bring to ent. They were very positive.” MAW air operations for OIF “through bear on this problem.” In turn, the Marines brought to the the CAOC (combined air operations Moseley wanted the MAGTF con- table a sophisticated system for air center) and then back out,” and he cept to work, but “I wanted it to command and control over a battle wanted to make sure the Marines work in the construct of a bigger air area, one which won high marks from were comfortable with the arrange- effort,” he said. other airmen. ment. Moseley asked the Corps leaders Key to it all was the direct air At a special session, Moseley took to assign a first-class Marine aviator support center or DASC. “Primarily Marine briefings. He declared that, to his CAOC staff as a liaison. He what it does is coordinate [air] at the while Billy Mitchell at St. Mihiel in also asked for a senior Marine to senior ground combat element level,” 1918 was the first US combined force become the CAOC’s CAS expert in said Hilberer. air component commander (CFACC), the A-3 operations division. “He was In Iraq, the DASC had four unique Marine Brig. Gen. Roy S. Geiger, com- the CAS guy for the whole theater,” traits. manding general of the Marine wing Moseley said. It controlled rotary and fixed- on Guadalcanal, was the second. “Gei- wing assets: attack helicopters like ger did it right on Guadalcanal be- Getting a “Marine Injection” the AH-1 Cobra, fixed-wing aircraft cause he was meshing ashore Navy The Marines readily accepted, ac- such as AV-8B Harriers and F/A- squadrons, Army squadrons, and Ma- cording to Marine Maj. Rich Hilberer, 18s, and medevacs and other utility rine squadrons,” as Moseley put it. an I MEF planner in the war. At aircraft operating with the division. Moseley recalled, “We spent three every planning meeting, he said, “we It had organic Marine air assets or four hours locked up in that room.” had some Marines there, ..

Load more

  6

Copy Link