journal of jesuit studies 2 (2015) 451-470
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The Intellectual Pedigree of the Virtue of Magnanimity in the Jesuit Constitutions
Kevin Spinale S.J. Boston College [email protected]
Abstract
The article traces the development of the virtue of magnanimity in Aristotle, Cicero, and Thomas Aquinas in order to assess John O’Malley’s claim that Section 728 of the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus represents a paraphrase of section i.66 of Cicero’s On Duties. For Aristotle, the virtue represents individual’s striving for greater virtue and honor. In Cicero, the virtue takes on Stoic characteristics and is tempered with justice and concern for the common good. Thomas Aquinas links the virtue to hope in initiating great enterprises and accomplishing great virtue in accord with God’s will. Ignatius uses magnanimity to indicate a virtue that synthesizes Cicero’s atten- tion to the common good and Aquinas’s notion of hope in God’s providence. Ignatius combines this synthesis with his own inclination to take that which is excellent in others and generously incorporate it into the Society’s work in magnify- ing God’s glory.
Keywords magnanimity – Aristotle – Cicero – On Duties – Aquinas – Ignatius – John W. O’Malley – Jesuit Constitutions – superior general – virtue
Introduction
During the course of his address to the students of Jesuit schools of Italy and Albania in June 2013, Pope Francis urged his audience to recognize the impor- tance of the virtue of magnanimity, that is, “having a great heart, having great- ness of mind; it means having great ideals, the wish to do great things to
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1 “Address of Pope Francis to the Students of the Jesuit Schools of Italy and Albania,” Paul vi Audience Hall, Friday, June 7, 2013 (available at www.vatican.va). 2 Ibid. 3 Annotation 5: “al que recibe los exercicios, mucho aprovecha entrar en ellos con grande ánimo y liberalidad con su Criador y Señor, ofreciéndole todo su querer y libertad, para que su divina majestad, así de su como todo lo que tiene se sirva conforme a su sanctísima volun- tad.” Ejercicios Espirituales, trans. Manuel Iglesias (Collegeville, mn: Liturgical Press, 2006), 10. 4 “Address of Pope Francis to the Students of the Jesuit Schools of Italy and Albania.” 5 Several scholars argue something to this effect, including Michael Ivens in his commentary on the Exercises (Herefordshire: Gracewing, 1998), 6; as well as Howard Gray’s Alpha Sigma Nu Society address, “Ignatian Honor,” (March 5, 2011). 6 John O’Malley, “Jesuit History: A New Hot Topic,” in America 192, no. 16 (2005), http://ameri- camagazine.org/issue/530/article/jesuit-history-new-hot-topic; O’Malley, “Jesuit Spirituality: The Civic and Cultural Dimensions,” Review of Ignatian Spirituality 35 no. 1 (2005): 37–44, here 40–42; O’Malley, “The Pastoral, Social, Ecclesiastical, Civic, and Cultural Mission of the Society of Jesus,” in O’Malley, Saints or Devils Incarnate? Studies in Jesuit History (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 37–52, here 47; O’Malley, “Saint Ignatius and the Cultural Mission of the Society of
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Aristotle on megalopsychia (μεγαλοψυχια)
Aristotle’s account of megalopsychia or greatness of soul centers upon extraor- dinary virtue. Aristotle situates megalopsychia in the category of virtues of character, that is, those virtues which arise out of habituation. For Aristotle, human happiness “is equivalent to living well and acting well” (ne i, 4; 1095a).7
Jesus,” in O’Malley, Saints or Devils Incarnate?, 257–97, here 255; Robert Maryks, Saint Cicero and the Jesuits. The Influence of the Liberal Arts on the Adoption of Moral Probabilism (Burlington, vt: Ashgate, 2008), 77. 7 In an effort to be precise, I include the book, section citation, and the Bekker numbers. I use Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000);
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The human good entails, precisely, activity of the soul in accordance with vir- tue (ne i, 7; 1098a). Aristotle’s ethics combine a universal standard (virtue con- sists in the mean between excess and deficiency) with the relative aspect of the circumstances of each moral agent. Aristotle summarizes his basic structure of virtues in this way: “Virtue, then, is a state involving rational choice, consisting in a mean relative to us, and determined by reason – the reason, that is, by ref- erence to which the practically wise person would determine it” (ne ii, 6; 1107a). Any human being can become angry or spend money, but doing such things “in relation to the right person, in the right amount, at the right time, with the right aim in view, and in the right way – that is not something anyone can do, nor is it easy…[t]his is why excellence in these things is rare, praiseworthy, and noble (καλον)” (ne ii, 9; 1109a). The magnanimous or great-souled individual, who excels in all virtue, is rare, praiseworthy, and noble. For Aristotle, greatness of soul or magnanimity (megalopsychia) implies vir- tue on a grand scale (ne iv, 3; 1123a32). He writes, “A person is thought to be great-souled, if he thinks himself worthy of great things – and is indeed worthy of them” (ne iv, 3; 1123b1). The great-souled person is extreme as virtue itself is an extreme. However, magnanimity is a mean between the excess of vanity— claiming honor when one is not worthy of it—and the deficiency of smallness of soul (micropsychia), that is, not claiming the honor one is due (ne iv, 3; 1123b12–15). Aristotle then moves quickly through the syllogisms of his portrait of the magnanimous person. Since worth (axios) is concerned with external goods and honor is the greatest external good because it is rendered upon the gods, the great-souled person is concerned with honor and dishonor in the right way (ne iv, 3; 1123b23). Then Aristotle makes a remarkable statement, as grand as the concept that he is presenting: “The great-souled person, since he is worthy of the greatest things [honor], must be the best person of all” (ne iv, 3; 1123b27–29). The magnanimous person demonstrates greatness in every vir- tue, and so, magnanimity represents a sort of crown or ornament of the virtues (kosmos tis einai ton areton). Aristotle completes his portrait by delineating various attributes of the mag- nanimous person. In all things, the great-souled person is superior, dignified, calm, self aware (ne iv, 3; 1124b5), courageous, does not complain, and is slow to act but for matters involving great honor or significance (ne iv, 3; 1124b24–25). The magnanimous person is isolated from his fellow men and women by his bearing. The excellence of his virtue is so extraordinary that it prevents him from interacting on equal terms with anyone but his peers in virtue—who are
for the Greek, I employ Ingram Bywater’s critical text Ethica Nicomachea, ed. Ingram Bywater (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1890).
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8 Because the ancient authors portray the magnanimous individual in masculine terms, I use the masculine pronouns and distinctions in order to cohere with the original texts. I try to be inclusive in my use of pronouns when it will not confuse the original sense of the text. 9 Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1952. This notion in expanded in Carson Holloway’s chapter, “Aristotle’s Magnanimous Man,” in Magnanimity and Statesmanship, ed. Carson Holloway (Lanham, md: Lexington Books, 2008), 13–28, here 19.
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Cicero on magnanimitas or animi magnitudo
During the last few, turbulent years of his life, 46–43BC, Marcus Tullius Cicero produced several works on moral philosophy including De finibus bonorum et malorum and De officiis.10 Throughout these works, Cicero is enthralled by the Latin term honestus denoting that which is moral, decent, honorable. Honestum is a rather complicated concept that becomes the core of Cicero’s ethics.11 In a world threatened by political violence, Cicero understands honestas as the prin- cipal motivation for any human action. Honestas entails conformity to nature. The notion of conformity to nature has its origin in the Stoic tradition, includ- ing Chrysippus’s own De finibus and Diogenes Laertius’s portrait of Zeno.12 The Stoics place the orientating point of their morality outside the soul. Happiness is not the soul’s activity in accordance with reason, but the individual’s harmo- nizing him or herself with the will or order of the universe. The center of ethical activity is not the soul of the agent but the wider universe and its divine order. The agent is a part of the order and endeavors to act in accord with it. In Book iii of his On Moral Ends, Cicero presents a summary of Stoic moral philosophy. It is the most complete account of Stoicism extant from the ancient world. Sections 21–26 of Book iii, spoken by Cato the Elder, are an expansion of Diogenes’s portrait of Zeno: “the final aim, then, is to live consistently and harmoniously with nature […] what is moral (honestum) is the only good” (On Moral Ends iii, 26).13 The Stoic system prizes that which is honestus over ordinary objects of affection (iii, 21). Wisdom ensures one’s orientation toward the moral over and against the mind’s desire and more basic affec- tions (iii, 23). Furthermore, as Cicero writes, “Wisdom embraces magnanimity
10 Henceforth, I refer to these works as On Moral Ends and On Duties. 11 I retain the neuter form in discussing honestus-a-um (an adjective used as a substantive to denote a concept) as a philosophical concept akin to “to kalon” or “to de ti”. 12 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, ed. and trans. Robert Drew Hicks (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 1935), vol. 2, book vii, sections 87–88. 13 Marcus Tullius Cicero, On Moral Ends, ed. Julia Annas, trans. Raphael Woolf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 73.
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(animi magnitudo) and justice, and judges itself superior to anything that might befall a person” (iii, 25). According to Cicero speaking through Cato, the Stoic differs from the Peripatetic in that external goods do not affect one’s happiness or the actuation of one’s virtue (iii, 43). Nor do bodily goods contribute to one’s overall happiness (iii, 45). Magnanimity, at least for Cicero’s Stoic character Cato, is an aspect of wisdom that recognizes and clings to that which is hones- tus as superior to anything that might come about, good or bad, in one’s life. Cicero offers a detailed account of magnanimity in the first book of On Duties, a work of philosophy addressed to his son Marcus.14 In it, he states that he writes on moral philosophy because he sees it as having the widest practical application (i, 4). Cicero draws “chiefly” (potissimum) from Stoicism in his pre- sentation of practical philosophy (i, 6). Some sections later, he addresses his son directly and claims that all that is morally right (quod est honestum) flows from one of four sources: theoretical consideration of truth; the conservation of organized society in which every individual is rendered his or her due and obligations are carried out faithfully; the greatness and strength of a noble and invincible spirit; or, finally, the orderliness that consists in temperance and self control (i, 15). In expanding on the third of four sources of the good, Cicero argues that the largeness and nobility of soul (animi excellentia magnitudoque) is revealed not in the accumulation of resources and expansion of personal advantage (i, 17), but in contributing to the common good (i, 22).15 Furthermore, in Cicero’s political thinking, one’s country claims a share of one’s being , and citizens have a responsibility to contribute “to the general good by an inter- change of acts of kindness, by giving and receiving, and thus by our skill, our industry, and our talents to cement human society more closely together, man to man” (i, 22). Like the Aristotelian sense of magnanimity, Cicero understands the virtue as an extraordinary manifestation of virtue in an individual that elevates him or her above concern for wealth, good fortune, and, as Cicero has it, the vicis- situdes of life. Cicero acknowledges the honor of great-souled individuals; however, he warns that exaltation of spirit (animi elatio) can devolve into lust for power and injustice (i, 62). Justice and concern for the common good (pro salute communi) must be integral to magnanimity or greatness of soul becomes vicious (in vitio est) (i, 62). Justice and concern for the common good displace the Aristotelian notion that the great-souled person acts on a grand scale to
14 Marcus Tullius Cicero, On Duties, eds. Miriam Tamara Griffin and E. Margaret Atkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 15 O’Malley makes an interesting point about this section in his article, “Jesuit Spirituality: The Civic and Cultural Dimensions,” 41. He compares On Duties i, vii, 22 with Annotation 23 of the Spiritual Exercises.
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16 The Peripatetics clearly take issue with the truth of this claim. Aristotle makes a strong case in ne i, 9 (1100a) that such a view of the summum bonum is quite flawed. After all, would anyone call Priam happy at the end of his life seeing his son’s corpse disgraced and his city conquered?
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(i, 72–73). He advocates for public life over the life of philosophy because mag- nanimity emerges in and through the rigors of political struggle (i, 73). Magnanimity is magnified in the politician because he is vulnerable to so many worries and intense emotions (i, 72–73). It is not only in war that one can dis- tinguish oneself through magnanimous action (i, 74–75). Those who serve the state garner the same honor – including Cicero himself (i, 76–78), for it is moral, not physical strength that denotes greatness of spirit (i, 79). Magnanimity, as Cicero writes, “requires strength of character and great singleness of purpose to bear what seems painful, as it comes to pass in many and various forms in human life, and to bear it so unflinchingly as not to be shaken in the least from one’s natural state of the dignity of a philosopher” (i, 67). Magnanimity bears all ills for honestum. Lastly, justice is integral to magnanimity: “It is our duty, then, to be more ready to endanger our own rather than the public welfare and to hazard honor and glory more readily than other advantages.” (i, 84) Service in political office makes one vulnerable to the stress of public life, but it also affords one the opportunity to demonstrate and grow in one’s magnanimity. Five basic Aristotelian elements of megalopsychia remain a part of Cicero’s virtue of magnanimity. Greatness of soul concerns extraordinary virtue and activity on a grand scale. Second, the magnanimous man, indeed, is self-aware, but he is also cognizant of a greater, more comprehensive natural order of which he is apart. Third, the magnanimous individual is indifferent to the many realities or vicissitudes of life. In fact, perhaps by dint of his own experi- ences at the end of the Roman republic, Cicero insists on the inclusion of indif- ference at the core of magnanimity. Fourth, the magnanimous man knows the distinction between what is truly virtuous and that which the masses identify to be virtuous and honorable. The great-souled man is ready to suffer the con- sequences that stem from the ability to discern more adeptly what is actually honorable and to cling to it. Fifth, Cicero’s small-souled man is one who avoids political life for the safety of a life insulated from the turbulence of public ser- vice. Cicero also adds to the concept. He fuses magnanimity to justice, concern for the common good, and political life, while shedding Aristotle’s emphasis on honor and the necessary aloofness of the magnanimous man. Cicero’s modifi- cations of the virtue of magnanimity certainly stem from his own political experience and his exposure to Stoicism.
Aquinas on Magnanimity
Within his account of fortitude – its components and contraries – in Questions 123 to 129 of the Secunda Secundae of the Summa theologica, Thomas Aquinas
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17 Craig Titus, Resilience and the Virtue of Fortitude (Washington, dc: Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 174, argues that Thomas is quoting On Duties i, 22, but it could well be from section i, 78.
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Ignatius, for the public witness of one’s faith that may also result in death or tre- mendous personal loss. In Thomas’s schema, magnanimity is a potential part of fortitude, that is, a virtue limited in scope. Magnanimity coheres with fortitude in that it aligns the parts of the soul to reason and virtue in some great and difficult circumstance. Yet, magnanimity “falls short” of fortitude because it burgeons the soul in some circumstance less trying than imminent death (Q. 129, Art. 5). Ultimately, magnanimity concerns human initiative and resolve in an enterprise that proclaims God’s goodness and indicates the work of God’s grace. In addition to Thomas’s distinction of the virtue of magnanimity from fortitude, one begins to see a departure from Cicero’s presentation of magnanimity when Thomas intro- duces the notion of hope as the passion perfecting and elevating magnanimity, as I will show below, Ignatius seems to incorporate this Christian departure from classical magnanimity in a key phrase of Section 728 of the Constitutions. Aquinas offers a general account of magnanimity in Q. 129 of the Secunda Secundae. Like Aristotle and Cicero, magnanimity entails the inclination to and desire for undertaking great things, as Thomas writes: “Magnanimity by its very name denotes stretching forth of the mind to great things” (Q. 129, Art. 1). The magnanimous individual tends to great things that are deserving of honor (Q. 129, Art. 3), and, thus, magnanimity is oriented toward great honor. Here, in his discussion of honor, Thomas does not show the same concern regarding ambition and injustice that Cicero expresses throughout On Duties. Thomas simply offers the following: “magnanimity, which observes the mode of reason in great honors, is a virtue” (Q. 129, Art. 3). Honor denotes virtue; virtue denotes excellence. Great honors denote magnanimity, which manifests great virtue. If one is presumptuous (inordinately confident in divine mercy), overly ambitious, or vainglorious, one is not magnanimous. Pusillanimity represents the privation of magnanimity. Though the pusillanimous person is capable of great things, he or she shrinks from great things and great honor out of littleness of soul (Q. 133, Art. 2). Human honor that recognizes God as the ultimate source of virtue is good and beneficial to others in that such honor can draw others to God. In Aquinas’s account of the virtues, a Christian justly anticipates honor as concomitant with great virtue. Thomas clarifies this in regard to mag nanimity: “Magnanimity is about honors in the sense that a man strives to do what is deserving of honor, yet not so as to think much of the honor accorded by man” (Q. 129, Art. 1 ad. 4). Magnanimity orients the individual to proper self-awareness (an element in Aristotle and Cicero) and shapes him or her to be appropriately disposed to such honor, as Thomas writes, “The magnanimous man looks upon great honors as a thing of which he is worthy.” (Q. 129, Art. 2, ad obj. 3) Furthermore, for Thomas, the saving work of Christ in the incarnation, death, and resurrection opens humanity to a flood of God’s
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18 Josef Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, trans. Sr. Mary Francis McCarthy, snd (San Francisco: Ignatius Press 1986), 119. 19 Sancti Ignatii de Loyola Constitutiones Societatis Jesu, vol. 3, Textus latinus, ed. Arturo Codina (Rome: Monumenta Historica Societatis Iesu, 1938), 245.
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The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus, Part IX, Section 728
In his essay, “Ignatius of Loyola (c.1491–1556)” in Saints or Devils Incarnate?, John O’Malley claims that though the Constitutions were principally inspired by Ignatius, the text’s wording, structure, and many of its details come from the pen of Ignatius’ secretary, Juan Alfonso de Polanco.20 Carlos Coupeau corrobo- rates O’Malley’s claims regarding the collaboration between Ignatius and Polanco in the composition of the Constitutions.21 Polanco studied in Paris and Padua. Though Ignatius received his master of arts degree from Paris when he was forty-three years old, he had begun his studies by attending Latin classes in Barcelona in 1524 and classes at Alcalá in 1526. In his initial attempts to educate himself, Ignatius was exposed to classical Latin as well as ancient works such as Aristotle’s Physics.22 Later, as he continued to improve his Latin while studying at Paris, Ignatius encountered the work of Livy, Caesar, Pliny, Virgil, Ovid, and Horace in addition to Cicero.23 As he progressed in studies at Paris, he became immersed in the Aristotelian inspired theology of Thomas. Particularly influ- ential was Thomas’s moral theology of the pars secunda of the Summa. In fact, Ignatius and his fellow Jesuits referred to the Secunda Pars as a useful resource
20 John O’Malley, “Ignatius of Loyola (c. 1491–1556)” in O’Malley, Saints or Devils Incarnate?, 99–114, here 99. 21 Carlos Coupeau, From Inspiration to Invention: Rhetoric in the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 2010), 12–14. 22 John O’Malley, The First Jesuits (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 1993), 27. 23 George Ganss, Saint Ignatius’ Idea of a Jesuit University (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1956), 13.
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24 O’Malley, First Jesuits, 249. 25 Coupeau, From Inspiration to Invention, 12. O’Malley also remarks that Polanco had a fine rearing in Thomistic ideas as well. O’Malley, “Ignatius of Loyola (c.1491–1556),” 104. 26 Annotation 363 of Ignatius’s Spiritual Exercises seems to indicate such attention to patris- tic authors; John O’Malley, “Renaissance Humanism and the Religious Culture of the First Jesuits,” in O’Malley, Saints or Devils Incarnate?, 181–98, here 181. 27 Ibid., 190. 28 Ibid., 191. 29 Ibid. 30 O’Malley, “The Pastoral, Social, Ecclesiastical, Civic, and Cultural Mission of the Society of Jesus,” 48; John O’Malley, “The Ministry to Outsiders: the Jesuits,” in O’Malley, Saints or Devils Incarnate?, 89–97, here 93. 31 O’Malley, First Jesuits, 249.
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One text that demonstrates a particularly clear instance of the synthesis between Renaissance Humanism and Thomistic thought is Part ix, Section 728 of the Constitutions. In three different instance in his recent scholarship, O’Malley identifies this text as a paraphrase of Cicero’s On Duties (i, 66). In “Saint Ignatius and the Cultural Mission of the Society of Jesus,” he claims that Section 728 is based on On Duties (i, 66).32 In an article for America Magazine, O’Malley identified Section 728 as “loose paraphrase” of On Duties (I, 66).33 He makes the same claim in an article for Review of Ignatian Spirituality (2004).34 In his 2004 article, O’Malley offers two reasons why the recognition of Section 728’s origins in Cicero is important: it betrays the humanistically trained Polanco to be the author, and it hints at how much Renaissance Humanism influenced the document that formed the Society of Jesus as an institution.35 O’Malley (2013) makes a further, remarkable claim, regarding the concept of magnanimity in Section 728: “It is significant for our topic that Ignatius found the best expression of this breadth of vision, which he wanted to be characteristic of every member of the Society, not in the Bible but in Cicero.”36 This claim neglects the Thomistic account of magnanimity that is also quite clearly part of Section 728 of the Constitutions. Nor does such a claim seem to take into consideration the Thomistic tradition’s inclination to incor- porate truth from thinkers outside of Christianity. Thomas’s Summa itself rep- resents an instance of great magnanimity that considers the expanse of Western and Arabic philosophical and theological thought in order to present a coherent account of Christianity.
Analysis of the Texts
Drawing from the analyses of Aristotle, Cicero, and Aquinas above, I now con- sider On Duties (i, 66) with Section 728 of the Constitutions.
32 O’Malley, “Saint Ignatius and the Cultural Mission of the Society of Jesus,” 255. 33 O’Malley, “Jesuit History: A New Hot Topic.” 34 O’Malley, “Jesuit Spirituality: The Civic and Cultural Dimensions,” 40. Coupeau, From Inspiration to Invention, 207, cites this article in his own analysis of Part ix, 728 in no. 26. Robert Maryks, in his work, Saint Cicero and the Jesuits, 77 also cites this line of argument from O’Malley. 35 O’Malley, “Jesuit Spirituality: The Civic and Cultural Dimensions,” 40. 36 O’Malley, “Saint Ignatius and the Cultural Mission of the Society of Jesus,” 255.
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Cicero – Book i, xx.66 Constitutiones, Part ix, Chap. 2 (728)37
Omnino fortis animus et magnus Animi etiam magnitudo ac fortitudo {la duabus rebus maxime cernitur, quarum magnanimadad y fortaleza de animo (both una in rerum externarum, despicientia Text A and Text B – the Spanish Version of ponitur, cum persuasum est nihil Monumenta)} est ei perneccessaria ad hominem, nisi quod honestum infirmitatem multorum ferendam et res decorumque sit, aut admirari aut magnas in divino servitio aggrediendas, in optare aut expetere oportere nullique eisque constanter, quando id convenit, neque homini neque perturbationi perserverandum;38 non propter contradic- animi nec fortunae succumbere. Altera tions (licet a magnis et potentibus excitatas) est res geras magnas illas quidem et animum despondendo, nec ab eo, quod ratio maxime utiles sed [ut] vehementur et divinum obsequium postulat, ullis eorum arduas plenasque laborum et periculo- precibus aut minis separari se sinendo; ut rum cum vitae, tum multarum rerum, omnibus demum casibus, qui incidere quae ad vitam pertinent. possunt, sit superior, nec prosperis efferri, nec adversis deiici animo sese permittat; paratissimus, cum opus esset, ad mortem pro Societatis bono in obsequium Iesu Christi Dei ac Domini nostri subeundam. A brave and great spirit is in general Magnanimity and fortitude of soul are seen in two things. One lies in disdain likewise highly necessary for him to bear for things external, in the convictions the weaknesses of many, to initiate great that a man should admire, should undertakings in the service of God our choose, should pursue nothing except Lord, and to persevere in them with what is honorable and seemly, and constancy when it is called for, without should yield to no man, nor to losing courage in the face of contradic- agitation of the spirit, nor to fortune. tions, (even though they come from The second thing is that you should, persons of high rank and power) and in the spirit I have described, do deeds without allowing himself to be moved by which are great, certainly, but are their entreaties or threats from what above all beneficial, and you should reason and the divine service require. He vigorously undertake difficult and should be superior to all eventualities, without letting himself be exalted by those
37 Sancti Ignatii de Loyola Constitutiones Societatis Jesu, 3:245. 38 Sancti Ignatii de Loyola Constitutiones Societatis Jesu, vol. 2, Textus hispanus, ed. Arturo Codina (Rome: Monumenta Historica Societatis Iesu, 1936), 664.
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Cicero – Book I, xx.66 Constitutiones, Part ix, Chap. 2 (728) laborious tasks which endanger both which succeed or depressed by those which life itself and much that concerns life.39 go poorly, being altogether ready to receive death, if necessary, for the good of the Society in the service of Jesus Christ, God and our Lord.40
In the Part ix, Chapter 2 of the Constitutions, Ignatius offers an account of the kind of person the superior general should be. Sections 725–28 concern the character that the superior general should possess: excellence in all the virtues, charitable, humble, independent of all passions, patient in authority, magnani- mous, and courageous.41 These are the virtues of a major religious superior. Magnanimity stands out among them as an Ignatian innovation.42 The superior general of the Society of Jesus—like the exercitant beginning the Spiritual Exercises—initiates great things (res magnas in divino servitio aggrediendas: approaching or going toward great things in the divine service), and he remains constant in his undertakings guarding against the despair of the soul in difficult circumstances (animum despondendo).43 Ignatius acknowledges the possibility
39 Cicero, On Duties, 21. 40 Ignatius of Loyola, The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1970), 310. 41 Antonio M. de Aldama, Part ix: The Superior General, trans. Ramon E. Delius and Ignacio Echaniz (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1999), 28–45. 42 The first General Congregation of the Society of Jesus also emphasizes magnanimity as a virtue proper to the superior general: “What of his natural greatness of soul, his habitual initiative, the constancy of his perseverance?” For Matters of Greater Moment: The First Thirty Jesuit General Congregations, eds. John W. Padberg, Martin D. O’Keefe, and John L. McCarthy (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1994), 68. 43 Ignatius of Loyola, The Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius: Based on Studies in the Language of the Autograph, trans. Louis J. Puhl (Chicago: Loyola Press, 1950), Annotation 5: “It would be very profitable for the one who is to go through the Exercise to enter upon them with magnanimity and generosity toward God his Creator and Lord […]”. Oddly enough Coupeau, in From Inspiration to Invention, argues that the only instance of magnanimity in the Ignatian corpus appears in Section 728. However, both the Spanish and the Latin version (magno animo) of Annotation 5 certainly represent instances of magnanimity outside 728. Furthermore, Ignatius seems to have magnanimity in mind when he writes Teresa Rejadell (June 18, 1536) warning her of false humility that diminishes proper Christian hope and discourages deeds done for the glory of God; see Letters of St. Ignatius of Loyola, trans. William J. Young (Chicago: Loyola Press, 1959), 18–24.
journal of jesuit studies 2 (2015) 451-470 Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 01:10:07AM via free access
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Conclusion
Jesuit magnanimity, as delineated in Section 728 of the Constitutions, is an expansive concept that incorporates Aristotelian, Ciceronian, and Thomistic concepts. Essentially, Jesuit magnanimity is the inclination to initiate great works in order to glorify God. In Cicero, magnanimity is moral courage in the service of the common good. In Thomas, the concept comes to mean proper confidence and fitting hope in initiating works on behalf of others and in mag- nifying God’s glory. In Aristotle, Cicero, Thomas, and Ignatius and Polanco, magnanimity implies fortitude and constancy in difficult circumstances. Magnanimity counters pusillanimity, and it strengthens one in the pursuit of obtaining a great good. It requires self knowledge so as to inspire individuals to excellence that corresponds to their capabilities. From Cicero onward, the con- cept comes to have at its core an outward or, even, apostolic orientation for the greater good of a community. From Thomas onward, magnanimity also has hope at its core because it is the virtue that guards against despair and seeks great things like the salvation of souls. Finally, with Ignatius, magnanimity comes to define the disposition of a religious institute and its superiors. This disposition extends to the exercitant—he or she who commits him or herself to prayerful consideration of the interaction of the God with God’s creation. Such an institute strives to reconcile men and women and their cultures with the God of Jesus Christ. This is exactly what Pope Francis conveyed when he spoke to the youth of Italian and Albanian schools—the fruit of the magnani- mous dedication of the early Society to the ministry of education. Essentially, Jesuit magnanimity, communicated to the students in Jesuit schools, entails a big heart open to Christ and the human ideals that correspond to the Gospel.
44 O’Malley “Renaissance Humanism and the First Jesuits,” 194.
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