2 Language rights and social cohesion: A balance for inclusion and stability Fernand de Varennes One of the greatest problems facing the world today is the growing number of persons who are excluded from meaningful participation in the economic, social, political and cultural life of their communities. Such a society is neither efficient nor safe. (UNESCO 2003) Introduction Ensuring social cohesion, in the sense of reducing inequalities and exclusion while at the same time strengthening social relations, is both a challenge and a vision for Sri Lanka as well as for many other parts of the world. It is, however, a challenge which is feasible if one keeps in mind the lessons, both good and bad, that have been learnt in this regard in other countries. While Sri Lanka in many respects is quite different from the case studies referred to in this chapter, it actually faces challenges which are similar to those which had to be addressed in other countries. This chapter considers three essential points concerning how language rights and preferences may help social cohesion. While no single approach fits all situations, there may still be processes for determining the right balance to ensure inclusion and stability in a manner which is appropriate in very different countries and circumstances. To do this, it will be necessary to understand first of all why language is so important in terms of social inclusion, then to consider how language policies, such as having only one official language in a country, can actually be a source of exclusion and instability, and finally to explain how an appropri- ate, proportional application of language and other rights can help to facilitate the inclusion of minorities in the wider society to the extent that they can flourish as never before. It is with these elements in mind that the following sections will attempt to begin the ambitious search for the right balance for an inclusive society, especially in the area of language. 22 Language rights and social cohesion 23 Finding the right language balance for social inclusion While nothing in international law affects the actual choice of a state’s official language or languages (or choice of an official religion for that matter) … this does not mean states can use official languages – or legislate against the use of other languages – in complete disregard of international law, and in particular in breach of human rights which may impact on language matters. (de Varennes 2012a, 23) A State can be inclusive through its language policies or, in effect, it can increase inequalities and contribute to the exclusion of part of its population through language preferences which in areas such as education and employ- ment – particularly in the civil service – may exclude or disadvantage many individuals. The premise for such a broad statement needs to be elucidated, for in a number of respects it contradicts some widely held presuppositions, such as the fairly common assumption that, by imposing a single official language upon the entire population of a state, a government can ensure a fair deal for all. From the outset, it needs to be emphasised that language choices and policies can be central determinants in terms of opportunities and access. State language policies and preferences can at times be disastrous because they can result in social exclusion of large segments of the population of a country. Language preferences by state authorities can thus determine whether a minority is included or excluded from political, social and economic power by requiring fluency in a particular employment or political position. The minority group may even be denied the opportunity to vote or to be elected because of the existence of such language preferences. Linguistic barriers like these are often a leading factor in the occurrence of social conflicts in many countries. In such circumstances, it should be emphasised that it is not language differences – or religious differences in some other contexts – which cause conflicts; rather, it is the exclusion or disadvantaging of large groups of individuals by governments through their language preferences and policies. These issues give rise to situations of tension and even conflict. It is therefore arguable that, in many cases of ethnic strife where a minority or indigenous people is pitched against the power of the state, the deep-laid sources of these conflicts can be linked in the early periods to practices which excluded these segments of society from employment, education and other opportunities. These conflicts can today be easily recognised as at least poten- tially involving violations of rights in relation to language, as now understood in international law and, in particular, the prohibition of discrimination. As the following case studies will demonstrate, this hypothesis can be sub- stantiated very clearly in different parts of the world. Case studies in inclusion, exclusion and linguistic (im)balance The unequal distribution of power between languages is a recipe for permanent language insecurity, or outright language oppression, for a large part of the world’s population. (Universala Esperanto-Asocio 1996) 24 Fernand de Varennes Three case studies are examined here, from Pakistan, Bangladesh and the German-speaking population of the region of Bolzano/Bozen in Italy. Pakistan: Exclusion through language [T]he state is more than a passive register of citizen preferences, and in policy delibera tion state leadership and initiative are critical. … Here we encounter another paradox: the state is the arbiter and broker of cultural difference, yet the state is unlikely to be wholly neutral in ethnic terms. In the distribution of power within their structures, states inevitably reflect the dominant groups within civil society (by class and interest, as well as ethnic derivation). As noted earlier, many states invest their national personality with the cultural attributes of the leading ethnic community. Even in countries with predominantly civic forms of national- ism, such as the United States, the argument that different communal segments (racial in this instance) were neutrally treated would be impossible to sustain historically. States are thus asked – figuratively speaking – to leap out of their own skins, to transcend their own cultural nature. Notwithstanding the intrinsic dif- ficulties of this task, and the improbabilities of complete success, we contend that the larger requirements of statecraft – the imperative necessities of stability and comity within the polity – make partial realisation possible. (Young 1994) The state of Pakistan after independence in 1947 was a country split into two separate regions, east and west, on opposite sides of India (Figure 1). There was of course much more than just physical distances separating the two: Figure 1: Pakistan, 1947-1971: East and West Source: www.mtholyoke.edu/~khan23n/classweb/worldpolitics116/Templates2/ LiberationWar.html Language rights and social cohesion 25 there were more importantly major linguistic and cultural differences, the most significant one being that while the vast majority of the East Pakistan population spoke Bengali – in the vicinity of 90 per cent – the West Pakistan population spoke mainly Urdu, Pashtu, Punjabi and Sindhi. Even though East Pakistan probably contained slightly more than half of the country’s population, de facto the state was administered and ruled from West Pakistan. The army, police and civil service1 – all branches of the state – tended to be dominated after independence by West Pakistanis. It did not take long after the creation of the new state in 1947 for frustrations to simmer into unrest, with serious trouble finally erupting in 1951–1952 when the Pakistani Government announced that ‘Urdu and only Urdu’ would soon become the national and official language of Pakistan (Table 1). Table 1: Language mobilisation and movement towards secession in East Pakistan: A timeline Year Events 1951 Urdu becomes only national/official language Students protesting against language policy killed by Pakistani army; Bangla 1952 Language Movement becomes prominent in nationalist mobilisation Bengali political party wins almost all seats in East Pakistan; results ‘denied’ by 1971 Pakistani President Riots in East Pakistan, followed by rampage by Pakistani army. War results 1971–72 in perhaps one million victims, the intervention of India and eventually the creation of Bangladesh It is at times assumed that such a choice of a single, even exclusive state language is highly desirable for the sake of national unity, creating – so it is believed – a citizenship sharing a common national identity. However, if one sets aside what could be described as an ideological stance and considers what such a choice actually represented in concrete terms for individuals in the particular circumstances of Pakistan after independence, this so-called desirable unifying linguistic choice had quite a contradictory impact. Instead of instilling a sense of ‘national unity through one official language’, the announcement that only Urdu was to be used as the country’s official language was perceived to have extraordinary consequences for the popula- tion of East Pakistan. Since the vast majority of the Bengali population were not fluent in Urdu, the use of Urdu as the one official language for the whole country meant in effect the virtual exclusion of almost all of the population of East Pakistan from many areas of employment and positions of power. Thus,