CHAPTER EIGHT

STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF THE LONG WALLS

After the Persian Wars, the Athenians famously surrounded with a circuit wall and restarted work on the defenses at . While these major fortification projects markedly improved the security of both cit- ies, for nearly two decades thereafter a dangerous paradox threatened the Athenians’ safety. In these years, they continued to pursue the naval strategy implemented during the 480s, but at the same time they maintained an urban center located 6 to 7 km inland from its harbors. Should an enemy cut off direct communication between the asty and its port cities, the Athenians would lose access to their all-important ships. At the end of the 460s, in a climate of mutual hostility between Athens and following the Ithome debacle, the Athenians sought to remedy this defensive “Achilles’ heel.” Resorting to an extraordinary solution, they built two Long Walls (Ia) across the broad coastal plain between Athens and the harbor cities of Phaleron and Piraeus. The coastline between the structures remained unfortified, because ca. 460 the Athenians believed that no enemy could defeat their navy so as to put troops ashore from the Bay of Phaleron. Fundamentally, the new structures would link the asty securely with its harbors during an inva- sion by land. The strategy incorporating the Long Walls (Ia) probably included the expectation of abandoning the chora. Nevertheless, when they built the structures, the Athenians possessed a powerful army and maintained an aggressive military posture, so they will not yet have pursued a strategy predicated upon voluntary abandonment of Attika and avoidance of enemy land forces. Down to the second half of the 440s, when the Athenians built a third structure across the plain, the Long Walls (Ia) never became involved in military developments. In fact, they were probably not even regarded as a priority in strategic planning for most of that period. From the completion of the structures in 458/7 down to 454, the Athenians were actively engaged in warfare abroad, and their control of central Greece meant that an attack by land was highly unlikely. After 454, Athens’ shifting naval fortunes likely ruled out a standing defensive strategy based on the Long Walls (Ia). Having recovered from the catastrophe in

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Egypt by the late 450s, the Athenian navy demonstrated renewed strength in its victory at Cypriote Salamis ca. 450. It soon became evident, however, that at midcentury the Athenians’ naval power was not absolute. At this time they experienced discontent among their allies (early 440s), the revolt of Euboian cities (446), and further trouble in the alliance (following the Thirty Years’ Peace in 446/5). Not long thereafter, the Long Walls (Ia) would again assume the prominent position in Athens’ defensive planning which they had occupied at the time of their construction. By the later 440s, the Athenians had brought their Delian League allies back into line. Although the navy had firmly reestablished its naval superiority by this time, nevertheless the Athenians were a less confident sea power than they had been earlier in the fifth century. Accordingly, they now modified the system of fortifications which depended on control of the sea lanes. The phase Ia Long Walls had improved the Athenians’ ability to preserve the vital connection between Athens and its harbors; however, the city’s fortification system remained vulner- able. Should a seaborne enemy successfully force a landing along the unfortified coastline of the Bay of Phaleron—i.e. between the walls joining Athens with its harbors—it could sever the link between the asty and its ships. In order to rectify this defensive weakness, the Athenians might have walled off the Bay of Phaleron or built a second structure between Athens and Phaleron. Instead, due to the growing importance of Piraeus relative to Phaleron, they built another wall beside the phase Ia Long Wall connecting Athens and Piraeus. This phase Ib structure provided a secondary line of defense behind the Athens-Phaleron Long Wall. In the event of a successful amphibious invasion along the Bay of Phaleron, Athenian troops would fall back to the new structure, the Middle Wall. So long as they held that structure along with the phase Ia wall just to the north, the asty would remain securely connected with the ships in the harbors of Piraeus. After lying dormant down to the end of the 430s, Athens’ fortifica- tion system was put to the test. With the outbreak of the , the Athenians implemented Perikles’ radical military strategy, in which the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) played a central role. Originally the Athenians had expected to depend on their fortified connection to Phale- ron and Piraeus only after a failed confrontation with enemy troops. According to the new concept, they would abandon the countryside as a first option—conceding primacy on land—while the navy carried out military actions abroad. Thus, with enemy troops preparing to invade

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