ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 307± 327, 1996

TheNicaraguan revolutionÐ six years afterthe Sandinista electoral defeat

GARYPREVOST

On25 April 1990 assumed thepresidency of , two monthsafter her National Opposition Union ( UNO)coalitionscored a decisive electoralvictory ending 11 years ofruleby therevolutionary Sandinista National LiberationFront ( FSLN).Thebackers of President Chamorro both inside and outsideof Nicaragua expected her administration to move quickly to dismantle therevolutionary projects of theSandinistas. This article will give an assessment ofNicaraguan society based on the questions: what gains of the Sandinista revolutionhave been overturned by the Chamorro administration and what gains havebeen protected by the Sandinistas and their supporters. Additionally, it will analysethe current relationship of political forces withinNicaragua with an eye towardthe prospects for social change in the coming years. 1

Sandinista achievements Toanswer the two questions that have been posed, it is ®rst necessary todraw abalancesheet on the11 years ofSandinistarule with an eye to cataloguingthe transformationof Nicaraguan society that did emerge during this time period. Transformationsin eight areas willbe discussed brie¯ y: agrarianreform, worker’s rights,creation of a moredemocratic economy, women’ s rights, eliminationof the historic repressive apparatus, democratic political processes, education,health care; AtlanticCoast autonomy process. In analysing the successes ofthe Sandinista revolution and ultimately assessing thesuccess and failureof the current government to overturn these gains, it is importantto acknowledgethat many of the gains of the Sandinista period had already been erodedby the effects ofthe contra warand the Sandinistas’ own policies even beforeChamorro assumed of®ce. This chapter does not seek todraw a balance sheeton theyears ofSandinistapower. That has beenaccomplished elsewhere, 2 ratherthis work begins with the accomplishments of the Sandinista revolution andanalyses those changes that have occurred since 1990. Agrarianreform is atthe top of the list of Sandinista achievements because itis oftencited as thesingle most important development of the 1980s in Nicaragua.Nicaragua is primarilyan agrarian country. By 1990 the agrarian reformhad affected more than half of thecountry’ s arableland, bene® ting some

Gary Prevost is atthe Department of Government, St John’ sUniversity, POBox2000, Collegeville, MN56321-2000,USA

0143-6597/96/020307-21$6.00 Ó 1996Third World Quarterly GARY PREVOST

60%of allrural families. Also, by 1990the majority of farms werein thehands ofsmall and medium size producers,in contrast to the historic maldistribution oflandgoing back to the colonial times. Initially the Sandinista land reform had concentratedon creating a signi®cant state sector for agro-export but beginning in1985 much greater emphasis was placedon land distribution to individual campesinos andby 1989 the small private producers and the cooperatives were responsiblefor 47% of allagricultural production (Baumeister, 1989: p 34).The campesino sectorbene® ted from the government’ s policyof easy creditterms andtechnical assistance alongwith state-run processing and storage facilities. Thisstep forward was partiallyoffset by commercialpolicies that kept producer priceslow. In oneof its® nalacts theoutgoing Sandinista-led National Assembly passed lawsdesigned to protectthe agrarian reform from its possible dismantling bythe Chamorro government. While the laws could not make up for 10 years offailure to grant the necessary titles,they have provided a legalbasis to strugglefor the maintenance of this gain. Asigni®cant expansion of workersrights, especially the right to form unions andengage in collective bargaining, was ade®nitive achievement of Sandinista power.Prior to 1979 only about 30 000Nicaraguans (less than10% of the workers)were trade union members andstrikes or even collective bargaining weremade virtually impossible by theSomoza regime. By theend of the1980s therewere more than 2000 workplace unions with some 55%of the working populationunionized ( BarricadaInternacional ,1989:p 2).New laws enacted by theNational Assembly guaranteed the right to strike and collective bargaining. Sometrade union rights, including the right to strike were, suspended during the contra war,but strikes occurred throughout the 1980s. Most labour confronta- tionswere settled through dialogue with the FSLN. Duringthe Sandinista years aconsiderabletransformation of the Nicaraguan economyoccurred in the direction of theinterests of Nicaragua’s poormajority. Throughgovernment intervention, unemployment was sharplyreduced, basic necessitiessuch as foodand clothing became accessible to a muchgreater proportionof the population, and the gap in the standard of living between the ruraland urban areas was narrowed.These gains were achieved through a combinationof government credit policies and a subsidisationof basic necessi- tieswith export revenues. This achievement, probably more than any other, was alwaysfragile and by 1990 the combination of the contra warand Sandinista economicpolicies undermined this transformation. Inthearea ofwomen’s rightsthe gains of the1980s were numerous including paidmaternity leave; equal access toeducation; legal equality in relation to divorce,adoption and parental responsibility; a measure ofeconomic indepen- dence,and the inclusion of sex educationin the school curriculum. Of course, thesegains occurred in the context of a traditionalmale-orientated society and witha Sandinistagovernment that often resisted women’ s demandsout of alack ofcommitment to women’ s rightsand a deferenceto the Roman Catholic hierarchy.However, even with those limitations, women had emerged by 1990 as muchgreater players in Nicaraguan society than ever before. Sometimesoverlooked in recitationsof revolutionaryachievements, especially byoutside observers, was theelimination of the repressive apparatus of the 308 THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION

Somozaregime and its replacement by an army and police force under civilian politicalcontrol. The brutality of Somoza’ s NationalGuard is wellchronicled andone of the Sandinista government’ s ®rst acts was theestablishment of the SandinistaArmy and the Sandinista police without any involvement of persons connectedto the National Guard. In many bureaucratic areas theSandinistas wereforced to depend on some Somozaholdovers, but not in the police and army.As aresult,when the Sandinistas handed over state power in 1990 they leftbehind army and police institutions imbued with a revolutionaryconscious- ness andinsulated from penetration by NorthAmerican institutions. The Sandin- istaarmy and police were not immune from human rights abuses. Rather they wereunder strict political supervision and their human rights record compared quitefavourably with their Central American neighbours. Disappearances and killingsby government forces werecommon-place in the 1980s in El Salvador, Guatemalaand . This simply did not happen on any comparable scale inNicaragua. AnotherSandinista achievement hailed by virtually all analysts was the establishmentof a democraticconstitutional and electoral process thatresulted inNicaragua’ s ®rst trulypeaceful and legal transfer of politicalpower from one partyto another.During the Somoza era andbefore Nicaragua had the facade of ademocraticconstitution and elections, but the political reality was adictator- shipthat rigged elections and operated outside the law. The 1987 constitution, whichcombined Western liberal democratic norms with a revolutionarysocial conscience,was thecentrepiece of the new political progress. In addition, Nicaraguaconducted two honest elections, in 1984 and 1990, the second of whichsaw theSandinistas defeated but committed to the democratic will. Inthe area ofeducation the 1980s saw signi®cant gains, particularly in the earlyyears. The 1980 Literacy Crusade, cited as amodelcampaign by the UnitedNations, dramatically reduced illiteracy, particularly in the rural areas. TheNicaraguan government also committed a greatershare ofresources to educationthan any previous administration. By 1989 the school population had grownfrom 300 000 to 1 millionand the government launched a follow-upto theLiteracy Crusade in the form of 17000 education collectives providing adult educationto 200 000 Nicaraguans (Norsworthy, 1991: p 109).Education was, however,undermined by the contra waras resources werediverted away to the militaryand schools were forced to close in areas ofheavy ® ghting. Provisionof healthcare tothewhole of theNicaraguan population was greatly expanded,especially during the early years ofthe revolution. For the ® rst time Nicaraguagained a truenational health system underthe Sandinistas. During the Somozaera onlyabout 15% of the population received care. Substantial expansionwas achievedin both curative and preventative medicine. More than 400new health clinics and several major hospitals were built around the country. Governmentexpenditures on health care morethan tripled (Norsworthy, 1991: p 116). Afterinitial serious mistakes, the Sandinista government enacted an autonomy statutefor Nicaragua’ s Atlanticcoast that is asigni®cant achievement for the rightsof theindigenous peoples of theAmericas. Nicaragua’ s easterncoast, rich inminerals and other natural resources, had long been exploited with no care for 309 GARY PREVOST theenvironment nor the non-Hispanic population that lived there. Initially the Paci®c coast-basedSandinistas continued the same patternof dominantrelations withthe coast. After serious confrontation with CIA-sponsoredIndian rebel groupsin the early 1980s, however, the government entered into discussions withthe Atlantic coast residents. These discussions resulted in a 1987Autonomy Statutethat guarantees the rights of theindigenous groups to theirown language, cultureand communal forms ofland ownership. In addition, the statute recog- nises therights of the different groups in regard to the development of natural resources.Also established were regional governmental assemblies withdirect representationfrom each ethnic group. The statute for the transference of considerableauthority to these governments, especially in the areas oftaxation andresource development.

Chamorro’svictory TheChamorro election victory, while not fully anticipated either by Chamorro orher Washington backers, laid the ground work for a fundamentalassault on theprojects of the Sandinista revolution. The Chamorro candidacy was a transparentpolitical initiative fostered in Washington when it became clear in 1988that the contra warhad fallen short of Reagan’ s intent.The 14 party UNO coalitionwas broughttogether under the auspices of the US embassy andwas unitedin itshatred for the Sandinistas. 3 Thecoalition contained political parties fromthe far rightto the far left.It became clear soon after the election that Chamorroand her closest advisors, would dominate the political decision making.Even Chamorro’ s runningmate, Independent Liberal leader Virgilio Godoy,was quicklymarginalised. The isolation of Godoyand his alliance with themost pro- contra rightwing elements led many observers to give Chamorro andher advisors, primarily Antonio Lacayo, a moderatelabel. In realitythey are deeplyconservative and have worked closely with the United States to reverse thepolicies of the Sandinistas. Chamorro and many of her advisers were members ofaright-wingfundamentalist Catholic cult called `The City of God.’ Chamorro’s conservatismmanifested itself very well in the appointment of fundamentalistHumberto Belli to the Ministry of Education. Belli, working closelywith the US Agencyfor International Development ( USAID), moved quicklyto marginalise Sandinista in¯ uence from the schools on thegrounds that theprevious government had promoted an `atheist humanist view of life.’With AID funding,the Ministry quickly replaced Sandinista-era text with books importedfrom the United States. The fundamentally conservative and anti- Sandinistastrategy was evidencedby the government’ s headlong drive to re-privatisethe economy. Within weeks after taking power, Chamorro and her advisorsmoved to privatise virtually all state-run property from farms to factoriesagainst the strong resistance of thelabour movement. In many instances theproperties were returned to former owners, including persons who had been closelyassociated with the Somoza dictatorship. The privatisation occurred withinthe framework of a neo-liberalpolicy of `structural adjustment.’ Such a policywas notunique to Nicaraguabut rather was partof aworldwideinitiative ofthe US andinternational lending agencies like the International Monetary 310 THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION

Fund (IMF).Itshould be noted that a formof `structuraladjustment’ was begun bythe Sandinistas in 1988 and 1989 under the pressure ofthe contra war and pressure fromthe West European donor countries. However, the policies pursued bythenew administration were qualitatively harsher and contained no safety net forNicaragua’ s majoritypoor. Sinceassuming of® ce, the Chamorro administration has introducedtwo stabilisationprogrammesÐ economic policies designed to reduce in¯ ation and eliminatethe balance of paymentsde® cit. (Nicaragua earns around$300 million ayearand spends about $700 million a yearon exports.) The programme involvedlarge cuts in publicspending, tight controls on credit to producers, and bigdevaluations. The initial programme was vigorouslyopposed by a renewed labourmovement in 1990 with a resultingretreat by the government. However, in1991 similar measures weresuccessfully implemented. Virtually all govern- mentcontrols of the economy have been lifted. Prices andcurrency have been signi®cantly stabilised, largely as theresult of massive foreignaid received in 1991±92 rather than any serious effort to reactivate production. Between 1990 and1994 Nicaragua received the highest per capita foreign aid of anydevelop- ingcountry: $182 annually, though it has droppedto $130.But the huge foreign debtservice the country was payingmeant that even that capital ¯ owcould not coverthe current payments gap, so thedebt kept growing. By 1994, 96% of all cash aidwent to service the foreign debt ( Envio,May1995: p 5). TheChamorro administration has hada veryimportant ally in its anti- SandinistacampaignÐ the government of theUnited States. A primevehicle for USinvolvementhas been USAID. AID of®cials saw Nicaraguaas anexcellent venuefor its strategy of counter-reform. AID’spro®le in Nicaragua was very politicaland ideological as itsought to place the Sandinistas in irreversible retreat.As partof itsCentral American strategy for the 90s US of®cials sought toeliminate governmental obstacles to trade, promote reform of political and militaryinstitutions to meet US needs,and to encourage Central American economicand political integration under North American dominance. AID usedits promises of assistance toin¯uence Nicaraguan government policy onall levels. US assistance was providedonly after Nicaragua had complied with all IMF rulesin regardto domestic economic policy. In addition the US has usedaid as aweaponto pressure thegovernment on issues whereWashington andManagua have been at odds. For example, in acknowledging the reality of thestrength of the FSLN innational politics, Chamorro decided to retain SandinistaHumberto Ortega as chiefof the army. The US governmentnever agreedwith this decision and for more than three years soughtto have it overturned.In so doingUS of®cials made a tacticalalliance with the far right forces ofGodoy. On theHumberto Ortega issue theChamorro government, with aidfrom the US temporarilysuspended, announced in late 1993 that Ortega wouldbe removed. US fundingwas renewed. Notsurprisingly AID moneyhas beenused to favourinstitutions of Nicaraguan societythat are anti-Sandinistaand pro-US government. Some of the recipients includeconservative trade unions, the Supreme Council of Private Enterprise, (COSEP)andconservative non-governmental organisations such as Savethe Childrenand Project Hope (Webbels, 1993: p 10).In the last two years US 311 GARY PREVOST pressure has takena newdirection. With Senate Foreign Relations chair Jesse Helmstaking the lead, the US governmentbegan to champion the demands for thereturn of con® scated land to former supporters of the Somoza dictatorship. Manyof these people became US citizensafter ¯ eeingNicaragua in 1979 and nowsupport for their claims is beingbased on thatcitizenship. US Ambassador JohnMaisto has statedon several occasions that future US aidwill be conditionalon the settlement of these land claims. AID of®cials have stated that noUS assistance canbe given to any land that may have been illegally con®scated ( Barricada,July1995).

Balancesheet onthe gains Abalancesheet on the defense of the gains of the revolution begins with agrarianreform. Key Sandinista leaders believe that this is themost important achievementthat remains in place six years afterthe loss ofSandinista state power.Their view may be overly optimistic, but it is basedon the fact that accordingto recentstatistics 70% of Nicaraguanfarm landremains in the hands ofsmall and medium producers. 4 Propertyis stillmore equitably distributed in Nicaraguathan before the revolution, and the number of large estates remains small,especially in comparison to other Central American states. However,the agrarian reform programme is underattack from the government andthis achievement remains in jeopardy. Formally, the new administration was committedto respecting the land tenure arrangements of the previous govern- ment.In practice the counter-reform began almost immediately. Decrees 10-90 and11-90 of May 1990 created a commissioncharged with reviewing the land con®scations of the previous government. Former landlords were given six monthsto petition for the return of their lands, though lands con® scated from Somozawere to beexcluded.By theend of June1990 the government approved requestsby 57 former owners to rent some 86000acres ofland on state farms (Norsworthy,1991: p 82). Thelarge scale returnof former owners, mainly self-exiles who had developed businessinterests in Miami, led to manyconfrontations and mobilisations. These mobilisationsled to the July 1990 general strike which demanded repeal of Decrees 10-90and 11-90. The National Workers Federation ( FNT) received assurances thatno furtherland would be returned,but in reality the government continuedits privatisation and land return policies behind the scenes. Theability oftheunion movement to carryout a resolutestruggle against the return of lands was undercutby crosscutting interests. In some instancesfarm workerswel- comedformer landlords hoping that their return would bring new capital into theirfarms. Inother instances the government’ s ®rmness inmoving forward with privatisationconvinced some farmers toaccept what they thought was thebest dealthey would get. Attheend of theSandinista period nearly 12% of thecountry’ s farmlandwas state-ownedunder the rubic of the Area of Peoples’ Property ( APP). This area was decliningslowly after 1985 as Sandinistaagrarian policy shifted toward the distributionof individual plots but it remained largely intact and became a key targetof the Chamorro counter-reform. Many of the 70 000 workers on state 312 THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION farms wereaf® liatedto theSandinista-led Rural Workers Association ( ATC) and wereseen as asigni®cant Sandinista power base tobe attacked. Initiallythe ATC soughtto prevent the privatisation process entirelybut retreatedfrom the position as theresult of the previously discussed division withinits ranks. Eventually, the union accepted the government’ s policywith severalstipulations. No property was tobe returned to people who had close linkswith Somoza, small holders and cooperatives who had bene® ted from agrarianreform would be protected. In the latter case formerowners were compensatedwith shares inpublic utility companies (water, electricity, and telecommunications).After considerable negotiation the union agreed to a formulafor the privatisation of the APP landsÐworkers (32%), demobilised army personnel(17%), ex- contra (21%),and former owners (30%). However, the workerson many farms thatwere to be returned to their former owners refused toaccept the agreement. They argued that they were the legitimate owners and fearedthe loss oftheir jobs, homes, and personal plots. This led to serious con¯icts in which former owners tried to take possession of the disputed propertieswith the aid of thepolice and army. According to 1993union ® gures thishas resultedin over 130 arrests andseven fatalities (Evans, 1993: p 10). Manyof thefarms are indisputeand cases are stillbeing fought out in the court system.The speed with which this privatisation was carriedout is demonstrated bythefact that by theend of 1993the ATC reportedthat the agricultural APP had been100% privatised. 5 Whileit is clearthat large numbers of medium and small producers retain controlof theirland, the longer term future of thispattern of land tenure remains indoubt. In what seems tobe a blatantgovernment tactic, many peasants still donot hold the actual title to their land. Without the title the current banking system willnot grant credit to such farmers inmost instances. This situation has leftmany farmers unableto plant their crops and facing bankruptcy and foreclosure.During 1995 many protests were staged to highlight the gravity of thesituation regarding land titles. In June more than 6000 small farmers from throughoutNicaragua marched on President’ s Chamorro’s of®ce and,the ATC stagedlong term occupations at two sites inManagua to underscoretheir plight. Theproblem of creditis notlimited to theuntitled farms. Creditcutbacks have fallenparticularly hard on the rural poor. The number of campesino families servedby theNational Development Bank, BANADES,hadexpanded from 16 000 in1978 to apeakof 102000 in 1988under the Sandinista government. By 1991 thiswas cutto 31 000 families (Baumeister, 1995: p 259).The combination of less moneyallotted by the government to smallproducers and the tighter lending policiesof thebanking system haveconspired to placemany small producers in aprecarious® nancialsituation where they are highlyvulnerable to being bought outby larger landholders. Current ® guresare notavailable, but it is clearthat a process oflandreconcentration is underway.Under the laws enacted during the transitionin 1990, no lands were to be returned to persons connected to the Somozafamily. In practice, however, this law has beenviolated and now the Somocistashave gained an important ally in the US governmentwhich is lobbyingon theirbehalf. Members ofSomoza’s ownfamily have become active inattempts to reclaim property, including farms. 6 Inthe face ofthese policies 313 GARY PREVOST andpressures, itis notclear how long Nicaragua’ s relativelydemocratic distributionof land can be maintained. Theprivatisation process has notbeen limited to the agricultural sector, state ownedmanufacturing and service industries were also targeted. As inthe rural areas, theinitial instinct of the union movement was totalopposition to privatisation,and large demonstrations, including factory occupations occurred duringthe summer of1990.Divisions within the working class andthe absolute commitmentof the government led to the privatisation process goingforward. Theunion movement concentrated on winning agreements allowing workers to purchaseall or partof theprivatised enterprises. This process offull and partial worker’s ownershiphas turnedout to be highly controversial and contradictory. Anagreement between the government and the FSLN in1991 established the principlethat when an enterprise is privatiseda minimumof 25% of the value oftheenterprise must be available for purchase by theemployees. No provision ofthe agreement blocked full purchase of the enterprise if the workers could raise thecapital. A goodexample of thecomplexity and dif® culty of thisprocess is thefood industry where the Sandinista Workers Federation ( CST)represents 1200workers in 11 enterprises that were previously state-owned. Bymid-1995 ® veof the enterprises were 100% worker-owned, three were mixedwith worker-owned shares from25 to 50%. The remaining three were completelyprivatised. The Secretary-General of the Food Workers section detailedhow government policies and the overall economic crisis havecombined tocreate a verymixed picture for the workers. 7 Onthe positive side food processorDelmor has beena success. Thefully worker owned company is pro®table. Having paid its debt to thegovernment, it is nowexpanding to export toother Central American countries. Even its relatively good position is threatenedby low-priced foreign competition and antiquated machinery. Other worker-ownedindustries in the food sector are notas fortunateas Delmor. Inone case, theEl Mejor coffee processing plant is fullyworker owned but carriedout no production for almost two years as thegovernment directed coffeeproduction to thoseprocessing plants that were wholly private. Production was resumedin 1994 after an agreement with a worker-ownedcoffee planta- tion,but production remains modest. In anotherworker-owned coffee processing plant,El Caracol,the government and the banks made operation of theenterprise almostimpossible during a lengthydispute over ownership. Basic services werecut off, vehicles were con® scated. Worker-owned enterprises have usually foundit very dif® cult to obtain credit with formal ownership. In many cases, particularlywith farm land,the government has beenslow in granting formal titleto the workers thus undermining their ability to get credit. The unions havesought to get ® nancingdirectly from abroad, but so far thisapproach has hadlittle success, inpart due to the overall chaotic economic situation in the country.8 Unionleaders that were interviewed remain convinced that full and partial workersownership represents an important achievement and primary battle- groundfor the union movement, but it seems tobe a questionableposition. By compromisingtheir initial demand against privatisation the union movement forfeitedthe momentum and bargaining power that it had in 1990. When the 314 THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION unionmovement enters the arena of ownershipand management it isnotplaying itsstrongest card. In thearena of ®nancecapital the government and the private sectorhave the money and the expertise. The unions are workinghard to adjust totheir new role, but it seems thatthe amount of timeand resources devotedto privatisationhas comeat the expense of their representation of workers in traditionalowner± management situations. Even if theunion movement can make some ofthe enterprises successful, it is estimatedthat these efforts can only bene®t 5±10% of theworkers. 9 Anyprocess thatbene® ts sucha smallpercentage onlyfurther divides the working class andultimately weakens the union movement.

Neo-Liberalreforms Theoverall democratisation of the Nicaraguan economy that occurred in the Sandinistaera has beensigni® cantly undermined by the new government’ s neoliberaleconomic model. As notedearlier, the Sandinistas themselves had retreatedfrom a moredemocratic economy in 1988, but the counter reforms of Chamorro’s governmenthave deepened the process ofreconcentrationof wealth inthe hands of fewer people. The strategy has been`structural adjustment’ , a redistributionof resources tocapitalistsector as thefavoured way of reactivating thepost-war economy. Virtually all government controls of the economy have beenlifted. Food prices are nowalmost entirely market driven with all remaining governmentfood subsidies eliminated. Supermarkets have sprung up all over Managuawith well-stocked shelves of primarily imported foodstuffs. The price ofgoodsis comparableto North American standards and is, therefore, out of the reachof ordinary Nicaraguans. Because thestores are stockedwith imported goods,local producers are notthe ones to bene®t fromthis revival of commerce. Thebene® ciaries are primarilythe private commercial intermediaries who have reemerged. Thereconcentration of wealth has alsooccurred in other ways, particularly changesin the banking system. Existing state-owned banks could not be privatisedbecause of constitutional provisions. As aresult,the government encouragedthe establishment of aparallelprivate system andby 199510 private bankswere in existence. To prop up the new banks the government assigned mostof the foreign ® nancingto these institutions. Also, to undermine the viabilityof the state banks, a sharpreduction of personnel was carriedout. Progressivelending policies of the state banks that supported agrarian reform throughgenerous loans to poor peasants have been eliminated. The National DevelopmentBank now operates on strictly commercial criteria. The new economicpolicies also seek toreverse Sandinistaefforts for Nicaragua to becomemore self-suf® cientas partof a CentralAmerican common market. In 1990Chamorro cut import duties from an average of 80% to 30%. As aresult, therewas a¯oodof imported textiles, shoes, and metal goods with which domesticproducers could not compete. The subsequent closing of plants has onlymade worse the country’ s staggeringunemployment. Some 50% of the economicallyactive population was underemployedin 1992 and 1993 and ®guresrose tonearly 52% in 1994.Open unemployment also grew considerably 315 GARY PREVOST in1994, reaching almost 24% of the labour force. ( Envio,May1995: p 5)The jobcuts in the formal sector have been dramatic. The number of peoplepaying socialsecurity dropped 23% between 1990 and 1994 in absolute terms, without evenfactoring in the growth of the employable population. According to a UN study70% of the population is livingin poverty, with 40% in acute poverty 10 (Evans,1993: p 12).

Social reforms TheSandinista revolution received considerable international attention and praisefor its efforts in the ® eldof education, particularly the successful 1980 NationalLiteracy Crusade and the expansion of adult education. How is educationfaring under the new government? Education policy has beenhighly controversialunder Minister of Education Humberto Belli. Within the wider contextof reduced spending on education, the main feature of Chamorro’ s programhas beencurriculum revision and an offensive against the Sandinista- ledteachers union, ANDEN. Thecurriculum changes being implemented in Nicaraguan schools seek to marginaliseSandinista in¯ uence and to promote a worldviewcloser to the ideologicaloutlook of Chamorro and her advisors. Belli has spokenof the need tocreate an education system `permeatedwith Christian-inspired values’ . Within weeksof the government’ s arrivalin power thousands of new schoolbooks appearedin Nicaragua funded by US AID.Bythe 1991 school year these books andthe new school curriculum were well entrenched. Typical of the new curriculumis the`Civic Morals’ text that teaches conservative values of subservienceand obedience to church and state authorities. TheMinistry of Education recognised that there would be resistance to the changesbecause of strong Sandinista in¯ uence among the nation’ s 30000 teachersprimarily through ANDEN,theteachers’ union. The Ministry of Edu- cationused harsh tactics to break down ANDEN’sresistanceto the curriculum changes.Within the ® rst fourmonths of the new government ANDEN reported 420teachers had either been arbitrarily dismissed or transferred to schools far fromtheir homes (Norsworthy, 1991: p 108). ANDEN has foughtthe govern- ment’s actionsand some teachershave won reinstatement through the courts, but thestrong arm tacticshave largely succeeded in taming the resistance of the teachers.A six-weekteachers’ strike was conductedin early1995, but the union was onlyable to win a verymodest pay increase. Most teachers, including Sandinistasand their sympathisers, have been forced to implement the new curriculumin order to retain their employment in very desperate economic circumstances. 11 Thecombined impact of the years ofwar and the further cutbacksin education spending during the last ® veyears havealmost totally reversedany gains that may have been accomplished in theearly 1980s. In 1979, approximately22% of those students who began primary school completed sixth grade;in 1992 the same ®gurewas beingcited by theMinistry of Education.For bothyears less than10% of rural populations completed primary school. In anothertelling statistic the 1993 illiteracy rate was alreadyequivalent to or greaterthan the 54% rate in 1980, when the national literacy campaign took 316 THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION place.In absolute numbers there were approximately half a millionmore illiterateNicaraguans in 1993 than in 1980. 12 TheNicaraguan people had made a signi®cant health gains in the ® rst years oftherevolution, but the contra war began a process oferodingthose gains that continuesnow under the Chamorro administration. The current regime’ s dis- mantlingof the Sandinista system is againbased on a privatisationprocess. In partbecause of constitutional provisions requiring a publichealth system and inpart because of resistance from well-organised health care workers,the governmenthas notfully succeeded in implementing their privatisation plans. Notwithstanding,they are de®nitely moving forward. The system is clearly favouringthose who have the resources topayfor health care overthose that do not.This is beingdone in a varietyof ways.At publichospitals and clinics only thevisit to adoctorremains free, all other services includingdiagnostic tests and medicinesinvolve signi® cant charges, usually beyond the means ofthe majority ofthe population. Visits to a doctorare byno means guaranteedbecause the numberof appointments available has beensharply reduced as theresult of a sharpcutback in governmentfunding for public hospitals and clinics. The overall budgetof theMinistry of Healthhas beencut from $130 million in 1989to $70 millionin 1994 (Nicaraguan Ministry of Health, 1994). As aresultmany medicalpersonnel have been laid off from the public health system andforced toseek workin the growing private system. The government actually subsidised thetransfer of medical talent from the public to the private sector by giving doctorscash incentivesto leave the public system andmove into private practice.Many doctors remain committed to the public system but® ndit necessary tosplit their time between a presenceat the public hospital and a privatepractice. This obviously limits the number of appointments available in thepublic system. Otherprivatisation tactics also are beingemployed. Private doctors are permittedto rent space andequipment from the public hospitals at favourable rates.In some hospitalsa certainpercentage (up to 50%) of the beds are now reservedfor private patients. Many of thepharmacies in the public facilities are nowoperated by private concerns who own the drugs that they sell and, thereforegain a majorityof thepro® ts. The government is alsofunnelling money fromworkers’ health payments into the private sector. In the past, the social securitytax paid by workerswent entirely to support the public system. Now the SocialSecurity Institute is developingits own institutions in the private sector. Medicalworkers will no longer be state employees but rather organised into cooperativesselling services. This effort is aunion-bustingstrategy and dove- tailswith the ideological drive toward privatisation. Ending the status of medical personnelas publicemployees is allowingthe government to ®re thoseworkers whoare unionactivists. The Sandinista-led health workers’ union, FETSALUD, has foughtagainst the privatisation and the union-busting but its membership has beenreduced from 23 600in 1990 to 18000in 1995. 13 Finallyin mid-1995the Ministryof Health announced that it would begin charging for basic health services ona slidingscale. Allof these cutbacks have had an impact on the health of the Nicaraguan population.According to statistics released by the Of® ce ofNutrition of the 317 GARY PREVOST

Ministryof Healthmore than 60% of Nicaragua’ s childrenunder the age of one yearare anaemicand 4% of all children under ® veyears oldsuffer from irreversiblemental retardation because of malnutrition. In 1988 more than 40000children received nutritional attention in government day care centres. Manyof those centers are nowclosed and only 7000 children are receivingthe same attention.Infant mortality rates haveincreased from 62 deaths per 1000 livebirths in 1987 to 107 in 1994. 14

Women’srights Howhave the gains in women’ s rightsachieved in the Sandinista years fared duringthe last ® veyears? Onthe positive side the legal framework has largely beenmaintained. The UNO partiesand the Catholic Church have sought to restrict theright to unilateral divorce by either party but so far theSandinista-era law has beensustained. However, the legal framework put in place by the Sandin- istas hadmany serious limitations for women’ s rightsand now Nicaraguan women’s organisationsare seekingto strengthen their rights but are doingso in agenerallyunfavourable political climate. Examples of loopholes in the legal codeof the revolutionary period included abortion, violence against women, democratisationof thefamily, lack of anequal pay provision, and protections for gaysand lesbians. In spite of pressure fromsome women,abortion was never decriminalised.The Sandinista leadership made clear it was unwillingto go up againstthe Catholic Church on this issue. During the 1980s abortion became widelytolerated and few prosecutions occurred. In the last ® veyears the Managuawomen’ s hospitalstopped performing therapeutic abortions, and the procedurehas beendriven entirely underground. The pro-government media havepresented powerful anti-abortion measures, andthis has dovetailedwith the CatholicChurch’ s widercampaign of promoting a moretraditional role for women.Nicaragua has alsogone backward with the recent passage ofanti- sodomylaws. Prior to this new measure Nicaraguanlaw has beensilent on such questions.After a heatedinternal debate the Sandinista bench opposed the sodomylaw in the National Assembly, but the conservative forces prevailed. TheWomen’ s Commissionof the National Assembly dominated by Sandinista legislators,has proposeda democraticfamily code and a lawforbidding violence againstwomen, but the passage oftheseproposals seems unlikely.The conserva- tiveframework of laws on women and the family allowed the Nicaraguan delegationat the UN PopulationConference in Cairo in 1994 to line up withthe Vaticanagainst the mildly progressive majority document. Nonetheless,the greater involvement of women in the public life of Nicaragua, animportant advancement of the80s, remains strong. The women’ s movementis probablystronger today than 10 years agowith the Nicaraguan Women’ s Associ- ation (AMNLAE)strengthenedand many new organisations on the scene, including severalwhich have clearly labelled themselves as feminist. AMNLAE operates 57 centresthroughout Nicaragua that promote programmes in health, economic development,gender consciousness, political involvement, the environment, andlegal rights. In 1994 the programmes reached 108 000 women. 15 318 THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION

Thatthese centres continue to functionand provide services towomenthat were notavailable prior to 1979 is asigni®cant achievement. Onmany fronts the position of women is understrong attack in today’ s Nicaragua.The country’ s economiccrisis bears heavilyon women because so manyare headsof households and because they bear a disproportionateburden ofhousehold production and reproduction. Desperate economic circumstances haveresulted in the greater occurrence of prostitution. AMNLAE’sserviceorien- tationhas bene®ted some womenbut there seems tobe littledefence of women’s rightsin the political arena. The Catholic Church and its allies in government seem tohave the upper hand in implementing their anti-feminist agenda. Counteringthis trend are avarietyof new groups organised around concrete issues likeviolence against women and women’ s healthissues includingabor- tion.

Atlantic Coastautonomy Theautonomy process is underdirect challenge from the Chamorro government. Basically, has used¯ ankingtactics to undermine the rights of the residentsof Nicaragua’s AtlanticCoast. Rather than seeking any formal reversal oftheAutonomy Statute the central government has simplyignored the law and createdits own approach to the region. In April 1990 Chamorro created the Institutefor the Development of the Atlantic Coast ( INDERA)andappointed formerMiskito contra leaderBrooklyn Rivera as itshead. For four years the meagerresources allottedfor the coast were channelled through INDERA rather thanthe regional Autonomous Councils. The Managua government used INDERA todivide the different coast groups by pitting them against each other. With shiftingpolitical alliances, both regional governments passed motionsrejecting INDERA in1994, and the central government eliminated the agency and pro- ceededto carry out all programs for the coast through national level ministries. Thisstrategy is aidedby the control of the South region government by the anti-autonomyLiberal Constitutional Party ( PLC).TheFebruary 1994 regional electionsbrought the PLC topower in the south, while an FSLN/Yatamaalliance governsin the north. Yatama’ s commitmentto autonomy, in spite of its contra roots,has allowedtactical alliances with the FSLN againstthe anti-autonomy parties. Thegreatest challenges to thecoast today are growingenvironmental destruc- tionand the lack of control over its natural resourcesÐ ®shing, forestry, and mining.According to the spirit of the autonomy law, control over the coast’ s resources wereto be vested with the regional governmental bodies. In the last fouryears thecentral government has eitherignored this aspect of the law or usedlocal leaders sympathetic to the central government to cut deals on the exploitationof resources thatare detrimentalto the region’ s interests.Virtually allof the ® shingrights for the coast have been placed in the hands of Oceanic, acompanyrun by Diego Lacayo, brother of the presidential advisor. Oceanic doesnot actually carry out signi® cant ® shingoperations. Rather it subleases its rightsfor an exorbitant pro® t toprimarily US-based ® shingcompanies who do theactual work. Because theUS operatorshave their own processing plants in 319 GARY PREVOST

Hondurasand Costa Rica, the Blue® elds processing facility is operatingwell belowcapacity with more than 250 people out of work. Another previously government-ownedfacility, the COMABLUSA saw millhas beenprivatised to aUS owner.Its levelof operation is stillin doubt. Its futuremay hinge, in part, by aneffort of the central government to sell 150 000 acres offorested communal landsthat indigenous people claim should be protected by the Autonomy Statute.16 Effortsin the National Assembly to achieve constitutional reform come from avarietyof political directions and may yet prove to be an important battle- groundfor the legal and political future of the autonomy project. The Sandinista years endedwithout the passage oflawsto fullyimplement the process outlined ingeneral principles in the 1987 statute. This failure gave the anti-autonomy forces inthe Chamorro government and the National Assembly the handle with whichto stall the process. Atlantic Coast National Assembly members, Mirna Cunninghamand Ray Hooker of the Sandinista Renovation Movement ( MRS) haveembarked on aneffort to raise the1987 statute to thelevel of constitutional status.If theeffort eventually succeeds itwill be a stepforward for autonomy, butconstitutional reforms are atwo-edgedsword. In a politicalcontext domi- natedby conservative forces, constitutional principles could be established that wouldexplicitly block further autonomy for the coast. Strong sentiment clearly continuesto existamong the indigenous residents of thecoast, but it isfar from clearthat their hopes for autonomy and sustainable resource development will be achieved.

Changesin the Police andArmy Theelimination of Somoza’ s NationalGuard and the repressive police force of hisrule was clearlyan importantachievement of theSandinista revolution. How has thisgain fared during the last six years? Maintenanceof Sandinistain¯ uence inthe army and the police was atthe centre of the transition negotiations after Februaryelections. Sandinista leaders were fearful that the Chamorro adminis- trationwould bring former contras directly into the government apparatus and exactrevenge on their people for the military defeat that the contras suffered at thehands of the Sandinista Army. Aware of the importance of the issue tothe FSLN andmindful of theirconsiderable power even in defeat,Chamorro allowed SandinistaHumberto Ortega to remain as thehead of the army. The president herselfassumed theposition of Minister of Defence. Chamorro argued that retainingHumberto as headof the army would maintain social peace and allow foran orderly reduction of the size ofthe military. The reductions have been dramatic.At the time of the elections there were about 96 000soldiers and by mid-1994the number stood at 17 000(Evans, 1993: pp 16± 17). The retirement ofHumberto Ortega in early 1995 and his replacement by a less controversial Sandinistaof® cer GeneralJoaquõ ÂnCuadrahas beenhailed by manyas afurther depoliticisingof the armed forces. Cuadra is froma Nicaraguanoligarchic family,and is acousinof Antonio Lacayo. By the end of 1995 the label of Sandinistahad been removed from the organisation. Themaintenance of the armed forces as aprogressiveforce has metwith 320 THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION mixedresults. On the positive side up until late 1995 the army has notbeen absorbedinto the framework of USdominationthat is truefor every other Latin Americanarmy except for Cuba. Nicaraguan of® cers are nottrained at the infamousSchool of Americas in Georgia. US leadersclearly hope for the long termintegration of theNicaraguan army into their sphere of in¯uence but remain scepticalabout the character of an army still dominated by Sandinistas. Nicaraguanmilitary of® cials have sought full participation in Central American militarymanoeuvres but so far theyhave been rebuffed. Alsoon thepositive side the army has notengaged in systematichuman rights abuses so commonto Nicaragua’ s northernneighbours in Central America. Nicaraguancitizens do not have to fear arbitrarydeath or detention as theydid duringthe Somoza era. The army also remained strictly neutral during the protractedpolitical stalemate between the executive and legislative branches in 1994and 1995. The professionalism of thearmy helped to defusethe potentially volatileconfrontation. There were also some disturbingtrends that led many Sandinistasto question the leadership of Ortega and the trajectory of the army. Innumerous incidents the army has beenemployed in labourdisputes, especially inthe countryside where it has actedin support of formerlandowners attempting torecover their land from occupying workers. There is alsoa developing bitternesswithin the Sandinista ranks toward senior army of® cers whohave apparentlyacquired considerable amounts of land. Senior army of® cials also haveestablished a numberof private companies including a banklocated in the former EPS press headquartersin front of the Intercontinental Hotel in Managua. Thedeterioration of the police as aprogressiveforce has occurredwith even greaterspeed. The Ministry of Interior was renamedMinistry of Government andthe Sandinista Police became the National Police. Chamorro appointee, CarlosHurtado, became the new high of® cial replacing Toma ÂsBorge.New uniformswere issued, and police units in riot gear were commonly deployed in thecapital, a departurefrom the Sandinista era. In 1992 Managua mayor ArnoldoAlema Âncreateda newmunicipal police force (highly visible in the capitalwith their red berets). After initial hesitation the police increasingly have cometo be used as strikebreakers.In the most dramatic confrontation to date threepeople were killed when a forceof over600 anti-riot policemen opened ® re onprotesters in the Managua neighborhood of Villa Progresa during a trans- portationstrike in May 1995. ( La Prensa 19 May 1995; Barricada, 20 May 1995).Earlier in 1995 police used force against a peacefuldemonstration of the LaFosforera match workers and also against the national teachers’ strike ( El NuevoDiario ,15February1995). During the 1980s the Sandinista Police gained areputationfor honesty and discipline. Much of that reputation is nowgone. Briberyand corruption have developed on a widespreadbasis inthe context of thedesperate economic situation and low police salaries.

Theruling coalition Sixyears intothe presidency of Violeta Chamorro, what is thestate of herruling coalitionand how is herprimary opposition, the FSLN,faring?Chamorro’ s UNO 321 GARY PREVOST coalitionhas beenfractured almost from the beginning. The electoral alliance thatincluded Vice President Virgilio Godoy of the PLI didnot even last until the governmentassumed powerin April 1990. Godoy never actually assumed any realduties as vicepresident. Along with his party and several others, Godoy has movedinto the opposition on the grounds that Chamorro and Lacayo were makingtoo many concessions to the Sandinistas during the transition process. Godoywas joinedin his withdrawal of politicalsupport from the government by twoother prominent political figures on the rightÐ Alfredo Ce Âsar andArnoldo AlemaÂn.Ce Âsar, leaderof the conservative Social Democratic Party, was acontra politicalleader and was electedpresident of the National Assembly in 1991. However,his presidency was controversialand in January 1993 the Sandinista members ofthe Assembly allied with a smallgroup of pro-Chamorro delegates tooust Ce Âsar fromhis position. After his ouster Ce Âsar declaredhimself officially inopposition to the government, a furtherdeepening of the division in the UNO. Inthelast three years, Godoy’ s prominencehas declinedand Managua mayor ArnoldoAlema Ânhas emergedas theleader of Nicaragua’ s conservativeforces. Formerlya supporterof Somoza,Alema Ânhas achievednotoriety for his attempts toeliminate symbols of the Sandinista revolution such as streetnames, public murals,and the eternal ¯ ame atthegrave of CarlosFonseca. He used AID money andnew local taxes to ® nancesplashy public works projects, aimed at gaining popularbacking for himself. In the tradition of CookCounty, Illinois politics, the mayor’s of®ce appearsprominently on billboards near all of hisnew projects in Managua.Even Sandinista of® cials admit that his efforts in Managuahave made grass rootsorganising there more dif® cult. 17 AlemaÂnformallyannounced his presidentialcandidacy in mid 1995, encouraged by the performance of his LiberalConstitutional Party ( PLC)inthe 1994 Atlantic Coast elections. Running independentof UNO the PLC emergedas thelargest single party in both regional councilswith 19 seats inthe North and 18 seats inthe South. Public opinion pollshave shown him to be the leading candidate one year before the election. AMarch1995 poll gave him 43.4% of the vote with no other candidate garneringas muchas 20%. 18

Thestate ofthe FSLN Keyquestions on theminds of mostNicaragua watchers are: Arethe Sandinista maintainingtheir base ofsupport and do they have any prospect of returning to power?These are dif®cult questions to answer but some patternsare beginning toemerge. The FSLN remainsthe largest and best organised political party in Nicaragua,but the election defeat and its aftermath have taken a heavytoll on theorganisation making its long term prospects unclear at this time. Sandinistasuccess inthewar against Somoza and in the years ofstate power was nurturedby abroadunity around certain basic principles. This unity emerged from years offactional warfare in the 1970s and held up fairly well until the election defeat.However, since 1990 the divisions have reemerged though not along thesame linesas inthe 1970s. After a bitterlydivisive party congress 322 THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION inMay 1994, the FSLN brokeinto two separate political organisations in January 1995with the departure from the party of several key ® guresincluding former VicePresident Sergio Ramõ Ârez andNational Directorate members DoraMaria TeÂllez,Luis Carrio Ân,and Mirna Cunningham. Also many prominent intellectu- als,including Ernesto and Fernando Cardenal left the party. Many of those who leftformed the Sandinista Renovation Movement ( MRS)whichwas formally launchedas apoliticalparty at a congressin May1995. The gulf between those whostayed in the FSLN andthe newly formed MRS isquitewide. Reconciliation seem unlikelyand both parties will likely ® eldcandidates in the 1996 elections. The MRS claimsa membershipof 24 000 ( ElNuevo Diario ,22May 1995) comparedto the current membership claim of 350 000 for the FSLN (Barricada Internacional ,February1995: p 3).At any rate the MRS nowdominates the Sandinistabench in the National Assembly. Of the 38 Sandinistas in the Assemblyonly seven are clearlyaf® liatedwith the FSLN.Whilenot all the rest haveformally joined the MRS,theytend to vote with them on key legislative mattersincluding the 1995 reform of the constitution. Itis tooearly to draw de® nitive conclusions about the split in the FSLN, but areviewof some developmentsin theparty since 1990 may shed some lighton thedivision. During 1992 and 1993 divisions developed within the party over the politicalcourse that the party’ s NationalDirectorate was pursuingas anoppo- sitionparty. Arguing that the main threat to the gains of therevolution was the activityof the far rightGodoy-Alema Ânforces,the FSLN leadershippursued a tacticalalliance with Chamorro and Lacayo against the far right.The policy was implementedthrough an ongoing National Dialogue and through an alliance in theNational Assembly that removed Ce Âsar as parliamentaryleader in January 1993. Itis theview of many Nicaraguan political observers that this alliance had considerablepolitical cost for the Sandinistas. The alliance gave the FSLN no real controlover Chamorro government policies (it was notco-governance), but it meantthat the FSLN was seen as bearingsome ofthe responsibility of the dire economiccircumstances of thecountry. In practice the FSLN’ssupportfor social andeconomic stability meant that the economic interests of the popular sectors havetaken a backseat inthe political priorities of the FSLN.Importantelements inthe resurgent popular movements, especially the trade unions have shown markeddispleasure with the FSLN leadership. Theparty’ s alliancestrategy is notthe only target of discontentwith the FSLN. Theparty is stillsuffering from the widespread belief, both inside and outside ofthe party that individual members ofthe party unfairly bene® ted from the distributionof goods that occurred during the transition to the Chamorro government.Known as thepin Äata,this process apparentlyresulted in thetransfer ofconsiderableproperty and goods to the leadership ranks of the FSLN through- outthe country. Many of thetransactions may well have been justi® ed by years oflow-paid services, but it was ultimatelyviewed as unjustby many rank-and- ®leSandinistas who did not materially bene® t duringthe transition and by the widerpopulation. 19 Thelong term impact of the pin Äatais dif®cult to assess, but itappears to have signi® cantly undercut the moral authority of the Sandinista movementand has alsohelped to magnify class divisionswithin the FSLN that 323 GARY PREVOST makeit nearly impossible for the party to mount a sustainedalternative to the neo-liberaleconomic policies of the government. Thesplit, combined with the FSLN’sloss ofmoral authority and failure to articulatea crediblealternative to the neo-liberal economic policies of the government,makes areturnto power through the 1996 elections unlikely. The FSLN leadershipseems ®xatedon preventing an Alema Ânvictoryat all costs and seems readyto make whatever electoral alliance in necessary todeny Alema Ân thepresidency. Remarkably the alliance which seems leastlikely would be with RamõÂrez and the MRS.Formingan electoral alliance with Antonio Lacayo has a muchgreater probability in spite of its obvious political opportunism and Lacayo’s verylow standing in the current polls. The 1996 election remains dif®cult to predict because of the high level of political alienation on thepart of theNicaraguan populace. At one time the strength of the FSLN was itsimage as representinga challengeto the old political elites that had ruled Nicaragua for decades.Today most Nicaraguans see the FSLN as partof thatpolitical elite that has failedto solve their problems. Now it will be hard for the FSLN to change thatimage, at least in theshort term. Widespread alienation plays into the hands ofan Alema Âncandidacyand to a potentialmarginalising of the Sandinista movement.

Popularorganisations Itshould be noted that the organised defence of the revolutionary gains is not limitedto the formal activity of the FSLN party.Since the 1990 electoral defeat theactivities of thepopular sectors haveactually been strengthened. This activity is adirectlegacy of the Sandinista era andis oneof the most enduring realities oftherevolution. Most of thepopular organisations were set upbythe FSLN but since1990 they have become increasingly independent of the party. This independencehas re¯ected the growing maturity of some ofthe organisations butalso discontent with the alliance strategy of the FSLN’snationalleadership. 20 Thestrongest of the popular organisations are theunions. The Sandinista unions, organisedunder the National Workers Front ( FNT)haveemerged as theprincipal opponentsof the government’ s economicpolicies. The union’ s powerhas been weakenedby widespreadunemployment and concentration on theestablishment ofª `areas ofworkers’ propertyº within privatisation. In spite of these limita- tionsthe unions are stilla potentforce and a factorfor positive social change. Thestrongest of thepeasant organisations is theNational Union of Farmers and Ranchers (UNAG).Althoughit has tiesto the FSLN,thisorganisation has hadan independentpower base amongsmall landholders form its origins in the early 1980s. UNAG has alwayshad a privatesector orientation and they are now establishingtheir own bank. There have always been class divisionswithin the UNAG andthis tended to favourthe large farmers overthe marginalised ones. As aresult,it would not necessarily be astrongvoice as governmentpolicies drive marginalisedfarmers offtheir land. It has speci®cally opposed takeovers by the landlesspeasants (Evans, 1993: p 16). Inmanyways the organised women’ s movementhas beenstrengthened since 324 THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION

1990.Many new initiatives were launched in the late 1980s as aresponseto AMNLAE’scloseidenti® cation with the FSLN’svacillationon women’s rights.The growthof a women’s movementindependent of AMNLAE was highlightedby a women’s conferencein 1992 that drew over 800 activists. The new organisations are workingon avarietyof women’ s issues rangingfrom reproductive rights to legalservices (Quandt,1993). Many grassroots organising campaigns have been launchedin the last four years. Some of themore successful havecome from the CommunityMovement ( CM),areincarnationof theSandinista Defence Commit- tees.While still an FSLN-dominatedoperation, the organisation has anewvitality basedaround struggles to defend property rights and neighbourhood develop- ment. The CM has apparentlyachieved its greatest successes insmallertowns and citieswhere the FSLN is wellorganised. 21

Conclusion Tosummarise thebalance sheet on theNicaraguan revolution six years afterthe electoraldefeat, it can be said that the future course of Nicaragua has yetto be de®nitively determined but the prognosis is notgood. At this time the counter- revolutionaryforces haveclearly gained the upper hand in the context of a world situationfavourable to the neoliberal programme and the continuing failure of the FSLN leadershipto provide a coherentalternative. The ® nalchapter of the Nicaraguanrevolution has yetto be written. Some crucial gains of the revol- ution,especially in land tenure and democracy, remain alive. Nicaragua’ s population,while beaten down, has shownconsiderable willingness to struggle. Thebiggest question mark may be the FSLN itself.The split in the party makes itsreturn to powerhighly unlikely in theshort term. It is notclear that the party canrecover to again become an inspiration for the majority of Nicaraguans seekingfundamental social change. At the base ofthe party remain many dedicatedpeople through which the organisation may be ableto recover its lost credibility,but it is notclear that a nationalleadership exists to formulate a strategyfor the return to power. The FSLN is nowseen as partof the political problemby most Nicaraguans and therefore not looked to as asolution.Those wholeft to form the MRS believethat they can rebuild the people’ s trustbut their limitedbase amongthe country’ s intellectualsmakes thisunlikely. The grass- rootsmovements alone, however well organised, are notcapable of defending thegains of Sandinista revolution. The organisations like unions, cooperatives, women’s movementsare allcapable of militantstruggle within their own sectors butthey face anenemy that has controlof the state apparatus and the backing ofpowerfulforeign governments and international organisations. Because ofthis relationshipof forces thegrass-roots organisations can be isolated and in some instancesplayed off against each other. Because ofNicaragua’ s unsolvedsocial andeconomic problems, radical change can return to the agenda in Nicaragua andbuild off the gains of the Sandinista period. However, it will require a new politicalforce that does not now exist. It could be arevitalised FSLN or it could bea newpolitical movement that comes fromthe militancy of the current grass-rootsorganising. 325 GARY PREVOST

Notes 1 Theconclusions drawn here are primarilybased on ® eldwork conducted in Nicaragua in1991, 1994, and 1995.The research focusedprimarily on studies done by Nicaraguan social scientists andinterviews with theleaders andrank-and-® le ofthe political parties andgrass-roots organisations. 2 See Harry Vanden& Gary Prevost, Democracy andSocialism in Sandinista Nicaragua ,Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1993;and Vanessa Castroand Gary Prevost, The1990 and Their Aftermath,Savage,MD: Rowmanand Little® eld, 1992. 3 Fora complete review ofthe 1990 election campaign see Harry Vanden& Gary Prevost, Democracy and Socialismin Sandinista Nicaragua ,pp129± 151 and William I.Robinson, AFaustianBargain: US Interventionin the Nicaraguan Elections and American Foreign Policy in the Post Cold-War Era ; Boulder, CO: Westview,1992. 4 Interviewswith Luis Carrio Ân,Director ofthe Institute for the Development of Democracy, Managua,6 January1994 and also Henry Ruiz, FSLN NationalDirectorate, 10January 1994. 5 Interviewwith Lily Soto, of® cial ofthe Rural Workers Union ( ATC),Managua,5 January1994. 6 Ina 25March 1995 interview in ElNuevo Diario LuisRamon Sevilla Somoza, the ® rst ofthe Somoza familywho is publiclyreclaiming his family’ scon®scated property,stated thevalue of the claim at over $250million. The claim has beenmade inpart through a formal petitionto the Interamerican Commission onHuman Rights in Washington. 7 Interviewswith Leonidas Pulidas, Secretary General ofthe Food Workers Section of theSandinista Workers Federation,Managua, 7 January1994 and 5 July1995. 8 Ibid. 9 Interviewwith Trevor Evans, CRIES,4January1994. 10 Evans,p 12.A similar studyreleased bytheNicaraguan Centre forHuman Rights in February1995 reported ®guresof 44% and 75%. 11 Interviewwith William Schwartz, FSLN RegionalSecretary andformer ANDEN of®cial, Blue®elds, 8 January 1994. 12 Figuresquoted from Robert Arnove, Educationas Contested TerrainÐ Nicaragua 1979± 1993 ;Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1994,p 207.Arnove’ s bookis adetailedanalysis of Nicaraguaneducation under both the FSLN andChamorro. 13 Interviewwith Dr AndresZamora Peralta, FinancialDirector, FETSALUD,Managua,5 July1995. 14 NicaraguanMinistry of Health Statistics quotedin Barricada, 5 May 1995. 15 1994Report of the National Executive Committee of AMNLAE andInterviews with Dora Zeledon,National Coordinatorof AMNLAE,7January1994 and 5 July1995. 16 Interviewwith Francisco Campbell, Secretary-General oftheAutonomous University of theCaribbean Coast (URACCAN),Blue®elds, 8 January1994. 17 Interviewwith Enrique Picado, Head ofthe Community Movement, Managua, 5 January1994. 18 La Prensa,15March 1995. The poll was conductedby Borgesand Associates, arespected pollingservice. 19 Thisview was con®rmed bymany interviews especially RamoÂnMeneses, Sandinistajournalist and former DRI of®cial andFranciso Campbell, Secretary-General of URACCAN. 20 Fora goodoverview of thepost-1990, popular sectors see MidgeQuandt, Unbindingthe Ties: ThePopular Organizationsand the FSLN inNicaragua ;Washington,DC: Nicaragua Network,1993. 21 Picadointerview, 5 January1994.

Bibliography BarricadaInternacional, May 1989. EduardoBaumeister, `Farmers’ Organizationsand Agrarian Transformation in Nicaragua’ in:Minor Sinclair, ed. TheNew Politicsof Survival: Grass RootsMovement in Central America ;NY: MonthlyReview/ EPICA, 1995. EduardoBaumeister, `ylas Tierras Cambiaronde Duen Äos,’ PensamientoPropio , July 1989. Vanessa Castro& Gary Prevost,eds, The1990 Elections in Nicaragua and Their Aftermath ;Savage,MD: Rowmanand Little® eld, 1992. Envio, May 1995. TrevorEvans, `Nicaragua: AnIntroduction to the Economic and Social Situation’ , CRIES WorkingPaper, Managua,October 1993. NicaraguanMinistry of Health, `Spending on Health 1980±1994’ Managua, 1994. KentNorsworthy, NicaraguaÐACountry Guide ;Albuquerque:Inter-Hemispheric EducationResource Centre, 1991. ElNuevo Diario ,15February 1995. 326 THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION

La Prensa,15March 1995. La Prensa,19May 1995. MidgeQuandt, Unbindingthe Ties: ThePopular Organizations and the FSLN inNicaragua ;Washington,DC: Nicaragua Network,1993. Harry Vandenand Gary Prevost, Democracy andSocialism in Sandinista Nicaragua ;Boulder,CO: Lynne ReinnerPublishers, 1993. ErikWebbels, `Misguided Aid Policy Toward Nicaragua’ , NicaraguaMonitor ,November1993.

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