The State, Local Communities and Women; A Study of Women’s Organisations in Malang, East Java.

Kirsty Martin

A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Faculty of Arts and Social Science University of New South Wales April 2004 Abstract

This thesis is an ethnographic study of five women’s organisations in Malang, Indonesia. The contemporary significance of local women’s organisations in the lives of kampung women in Indonesia is revealed through an investigation of the relationship between the Indonesian state, local communities and women.

This study sets contemporary women’s organisations in the context of their changing historical role and relationship with the state. Women’s organisations have been a part of the Indonesian political and social landscape since the early twentieth century. They played an important role in mobilising women during the struggle for independence. Under Sukarno’s policy of Guided Democracy, restrictions were placed on the political mobilising role of all organisations, including those for women. These restrictions were taken much further under Suharto’s New Order government when many were proscribed. Only state-approved and controlled organisations were accepted.

The New Order era essentially undermined the credibility of women’s organisations as vehicles for promoting women’s interests, instead they were generally regarded as ‘tools of the state’. Indonesianists and feminists have been especially critical of state-run women’s organisations arguing they have offered Indonesian women ‘no path to female power’. This perception of state-sponsored women’s organisations has continued in the post-Suharto era even though their links to the state have changed radically. They now exist alongside a range of NGOs, religious and social women’s organisations. The crucial question that this thesis addresses is why these state-sponsored organisations continue to exist and what motivates women’s participation in these organisations?

Through membership in local women’s organisations women enter into a complex relationship with the state, local society and the socio-religious and political institutions within the wider society. The membership status women enjoy provides them with opportunities to engage in a social bargain. Through this bargaining process, local women make social, religious, personal and romantic gains for themselves. The results of the social bargaining process depend largely on the particular organisation to which women belong but they remain strongly oriented towards their local kampung worlds.

The thesis provides an alternative way of thinking about the complex role that women’s organisations play in Indonesian society and what function they may continue to have within Indonesia’s post-Suharto future.

ii Acknowledgements

This doctorate thesis is the result of five years of work. I am indebted to many people for their assistance and support during this time. I was granted an APA for three and a half years and I wish to thank the Australian government for this opportunity.

I would like to acknowledge those who inspired me to pursue my study of Anthropology during my undergraduate degree at the university of Newcastle. Thanks to the academic staff in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology. Special thanks go to my honours supervisor Santi Rozario who worked tirelessly with me and introduced me to research on Islam and women in Asia in 1995. Santi’s belief in me has not been forgotten.

My thesis is based on my twelve months stay in Malang. The research was successful mainly due to the help, assistance, support, friendship and patience that the Malang community offered me during my stay. I would like to thank the women who shared their stories, lives, dreams, secrets and homes with me. I thank the members of the local PKK organisation, the kampung’s Tahlilan group, members of the Saturday Morning Club, the women from the local NGOs and the local PSW members. I would like to thank the warm and friendly local women for answering my questions and persevering with my version of the Indonesian language. And for accepting this foreigner into their homes and heart so sincerely. Certain people were invaluable to my fieldwork year. I wish to offer a very special thank you to Ibu U, Ibu W, Sari, mbak D, Mbak Penni, Mbak Fitri and family, Bu Tuty, Bu Ali, Bu Su, Ibu Ka, Pak Widodo, Sander, Michiel, and the countless others who effortlessly helped me during my time in the field. I would also like to thank my support group back ‘home’ who made my time in the field possible.

One very special person, whose support and advice has been invaluable, is my friend Marie Preston. Marie has long been a continual source of love, inspiration and faith since I began my academic journey in 1994. Her belief in me has kept me going and led me to finish when even I wasn’t sure I would or could. Thank you to my New Zealand friend. May you one day know how much your wisdom guided me.

My mother and father (Margaret and John Martin) have always supported me during my study. Their quiet confidence in my abilities has not gone un-noticed or unappreciated. I wish to take this chance to express my gratitude to them both. I also wish to thank my sister Elisha and my Aunty June for their love and support.

Heart-felt thanks go to my dear friend Catherine, who just waited and knew. The conversations, hot chocolates, honest feedback and overwhelming kindness you have offered me since the journey began in 1999, will not soon be forgotten.

Thanks also to Annette and Fred in New Zealand for their love and hospitality during short and much needed visits across the Tasman. Warm appreciation is also felt for my dear friends, Verlie and Dave. It is hard for me to imagine how I could have got through the last twelve months without the kindness and support of my friends and family.

iii I would like to thank David Reeve for his diligent and conscientious editing of the last drafts of the thesis over the past twelve months. I appreciate your insight into Indonesia and am thankful for the help you have kindly provided. Thanks also go to Rochayah Machali for sharing her insight into Malang society and providing me with useful and much appreciated assistance whilst in the field.

I wish to offer my heart-felt thanks to my supervisor Michael Humphrey. No words seem to express my enormous debt of gratitude for the numerous hours of reading, commenting, discussions, gendering, debates and brainstorming sessions that have taken place over the last five years. A great big thank you to the man whose title really is ‘supervisor of the year’! Thank you for everything.

I also want to thank my best friend and husband Thorin Kerr. Thorin has been a wonderful objective editor, a silent sounding board, a loud cheer squad, and the never- ending positive voice behind this thesis. Thank you for never giving up on me and never allowing me to give up. Perhaps now we can do all those wonderful things we have talked about!

iv Table of Contents

Abstract...... ii

Acknowledgements...... iii

Glossary ...... ………………………………………………………………….... vi

Acronyms and Organisations...... ix

Introduction...... 1

CHAPTER ONE Mobilisation, the New Order Government and Gender Politics...... 24

CHAPTER TWO Indonesian Women’s Organisations ...... 58

CHAPTER THREE Membership and Participation as National Politics for Malang Women.....122

CHAPTER FOUR Membership, Social Bargaining and Malang Women...... 170

CHAPTER FIVE Social Taboos and The Limitations of Social Bargaining ...... 208

Conclusion...... 242

Bibliography ...... 249

Appendix I ...... 279 Appendix II...... 281 Appendix III ...... 283

v Glossary

Aborsi ...... abortion Akrab...... very closely related, close (friends) Aku...... I, me, mine Anak ...... child Angka...... statistics, figures Angket...... survey Anjing...... dog Arisan...... a saving club Asas Tunggal...... single basis (official ideological foundation) Asing...... strange, peculiar Babi ...... pig Bahasa ...... language Banyak teman...... many friends Bapak...... father, older male Becak...... tricycle taxi Belajar...... to learn, to study Berkumpul ...... to come together Besok ...... tomorrow Bhinneka Tunggal Ika ...... Unity in Diversity Bidan ...... midwife Boleh ...... may, can , possible Bule ...... white person, foreigner (informal) Cukup ...... enough, sufficient, completely Dakwah ...... religious propagation Dalam...... in Dengan ...... with Desa...... Village, rural area Desa wisma ...... groups of ten families Dua ...... two Dukun ...... healer, medical person Gengsi ...... prestige, standing Gotong royong ...... mutual aid Haj...... pilgrimage to Mecca Haji...... man who has undertake a pilgrimage to Mecca Hajjah...... a woman who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca Halal Bihal...... to ask and grant forgiveness at the end of Ramadan Halus ...... refined, delicate Hari Raya ...... holiday Hoko (Japanese) ...... obligatory service to the state Ibu ...... mother , older female Ibu Rumah Tangga...... housewife Idul Fitri...... local term for Lebaran Ikut...... to go along, to join Ikut Suami...... follow the husband Indonesia Raya ...... Great Indonesia Isteri ...... wife, wives Itu ...... that

vi Jamu ...... herbal medicine Jawa Timur ...... East Java Jelek...... ugly, bad,evil Kabupaten ...... district Kampung ...... rural or urban neighbourhood Kasar...... rough Keanggotaan ...... membership Kecamatan...... sub-district Kelurahan...... group of villages Kerudung...... Islamic head scarf Kesehatan ...... health Kewajiban ...... obligation Khitan...... circumcision Kodrat ...... God’s will Konstituante ...... The Constituent Assembly Kontrasepsi ...... contraception Kota...... town, municipality Lahirnya ...... birth Lebaran ...... religious feast which marks the end of the fasting month Lebih...... more Mahal ...... expensive Magrib...... evening prayer Malu ...... ashamed, shy, timid Mampu...... well-off, wealthy, to be capable of Mas...... Javanese word for elder brother Masyarakat ...... society Mau ...... will, shall Mbak...... Miss Membayar ...... to pay Menangis ...... cry Messhiboko (Japanese)...... selflessness Mikrolet...... form of local transport Mohon Maaf...... to ask for forgiveness Mufakat ...... to agree, agreement, consensus Mushola...... prayer room Nafsu ...... desires, passion, natural instinct Nepsu...... desires Nggak / Tidak ...... no, do not, not Ngrumpi ...... gossip, jest Menerima ...... to receive Orang ...... person Pagi ...... morning (until about 10 am) Panca Karya...... five guidelines Pancasila...... The Five Principles of the Republic of Indonesia Pangsit ...... little dumplings Pasar ...... market-place Pembangunan...... development (economic/social) Pembantu...... maid, servant Pemberdayaan ...... empowerment Pembinaan...... construction, founding, fostering vii Percaya Diri ...... Belief in self, confidence Pesantren...... traditional Islamic boarding school Pokja (Kelompok Kerja)...... working group Posyandu...... public children’s health organisation Pribadi ...... personal Pusat...... centre, central, focus Puskesmas ...... public health centre Raden Ayu...... An aristocratic title meaning principal wife Ramadan ...... The Islamic fasting month – the ninth month of the Muslim year Rewang...... helping out Rukun Tangga ...... ward organisation of households Rukun Warga...... municipal government administrative unit Rupiah ...... Indonesian currency Sekretaris ...... secretary Simpan / pinjam ...... save / borrow Selamat...... happiness, prosperity, salvation Slametan...... Islamic ritual Sombong...... conceited Sopan...... decent, neat, modest, polite Suami...... husband Suci...... pure, clean, holy Terlalu takut...... too scared, afraid Tidak...... no, not Tidak Boleh ...... not allowed Tinggal Sendirian...... to stand alone, to be socially isolated Wanita Karier...... career woman Zakat...... religious tax

viii Acronyms and Organisations

Aisyiyah Women’s section of the Islamic reformist movement Muhammadiyah.

Budi Utomo Noble Aspiration

Dharma Wanita Government created organisations for the wives of civil servants and female civil servants in Indonesia.

Forum Kajian Kitab Klasik Islam Forum for the Study of Classical Islamic Texts.

Fujinkai Japanese word for women’s association.

Gerwani (Gerakan Wanita) Indonesian Communist Party’s - Women’s Auxiliary

Golkar (Golongan Karya) Functional Groups The electoral vehicle for the New Order government (1966-1998).

ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia) Indonesian Muslim Intellectual’s Association.

Isteri Sedar Alert Wives

Keutamaan Istri The improvement of Women

KORPRI (Korps Pegawai Republik) Indonesian Civil Servants Corp

KOWANI Badan Kongres Wanita Indonesia The Indonesian Women’s Congress

KSW Kerja Studi Wanita The Working Study of Women

LBH Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Legal Aid Institute

LKBHWAK (Lembaga Konsultasi Bantuan Hukum Wanita dan Keluarga) Legal Aid Consultative Institute for Women and Families

ix LPSM (Lembaga Pengembangan Swadaya) Institution for Developing Community Self- reliance

LSM (Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat) Self Reliant Community Institutions

Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia) Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims.

Muhammadiyah Followers of the Prophet Muhamad.

Muslimat Women’s section of Nahdlatul Ulama.

Nahdlatul Ulama Revival of Islamic Scholars. The largest socio-cultural Islamic organisation in Indonesia.

Ormas -Organisasi Masyarakat Mass Organisation

Pawijatan Wanito The Educated Woman

Peta A Japanese initiated youth organisation

PKI (Partai Kommunis Indonesia) Indonesian Communist Party

PKK (Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga Family Welfare Development Program

PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia) Indonesian Nationalist Party

PPI Perikatan Perempuan Indonesia Federation of Indonesian Women

PPII Perikatan Perhimpunan Isteri Indonesia Federation of Indonesian Women’s Associations

PPP (Partai Pembangunan Persatuan) United Development Party

PRRI (Pemerintah Repolusi Republik Indonesia) The Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia x PSW (Pusat Studi Wanita) Centre For Women’s Studies

Putri Mardika The Independent Woman

REPELITA Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun Five Year Development Plan

Sarekat Islam Islamic League

SPII Sarekat Perempuan Islam Indonesia Federation of the Muslim Women of Indonesia

Sarekat Rakyat People’s Association

Tahlilan Islamic prayer group affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama

Wanito Hadro The Efficient Woman

Wanito Susilo The Well Bred Woman

Wanito Sworo The Voice of the Woman

YLBHI Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia Indonesian Organisation for Legal Aid

xi INTRODUCTION

Under President Suharto, Indonesian society was integrated through hierarchical organisations down to the local community. These women’s organisations continue to thrive during Indonesia’s present period of reformasi. This thesis investigates whether these organisations still play an integral role in preserving social traditions or whether they are now local expressions of resistance to national politics. This thesis questions the contemporary socio-political meanings of local women’s organisations in Malang,

Indonesia and how these modern day meanings are continually shaped by remnants of

Suharto’s nation-building policies?

Despite the end of the New Order rule in 1998, the impact that Suharto’s government had on the Indonesian community is still discussed today. This thesis also looks at how local women’s organisations form part of the larger social discussion about gender politics in Indonesia, including demands for women’s autonomy and legal representation. It also investigates how local organisations are vehicles which preserve traditional values and morals within local kampung society. Although I discuss the significance of the national political landscape in Indonesia, the other crucial component of this study is the way local kampung communities have continued to shape the social function of organisations. These topics will all be understood through this detailed study of women’s membership of and participation in local women’s organisations.

1 Contextualising the Study

The main focus of this study is an ethnography of contemporary women’s organisations in Malang. In order to understand their experiences this ethnography is contextualised in the existing literature on the historical role of women’s organisations in Indonesia.

Previous work pays attention to the government’s interest in gender roles during the

1970s and 1980s. In particular writers have focused on the change in gender roles during the New Order government’s rule, and the altered function of women’s organisations in Indonesia since 1966. This has led to women’s organisations being dismissed as conservative instruments of government policy.

This literature on women’s organisations is reviewed below focusing on their views about local women’s organisations as remnants of Indonesia’s nation-building era. This thesis attempts to complement and expand upon this perception by offering a new way of discussing women’s organisations. This research explains the meaning and significance of these organisations from the perspective of local women members.

New Order Government and Changed Gender Roles

Indonesian feminist writer Julia Suryakusuma argues that under Suharto specific attention was paid to the role of women in Indonesian society. To explain the government’s interest in women she coined the term State Ibuism (Suryakusuma,

1991:46). Based on the Indonesian term ibu, (mother), State Ibuism refers to the national recognition given to women in Indonesia for their roles as wives and mothers.

Throughout Indonesia’s history, it was common for “the state to alternatively employ the concept of women as wives and mothers, or both, according to the exigencies of the state and the nation” (Suryakusuma, 1991:47). She argues that the state imposed

2 domestic expectations on all Indonesian women and that this was crucial to the success of Indonesia’s development objectives. Her research is critical of the impact that this state gendered policy had on the lives of Indonesian women. Suryakusuma’s work does not extend beyond the negative consequences of the New Orders influence over gender roles.

Politically, socially and psychologically, State Ibuism has the effect of not recognising women’s autonomy as women: women as subjects rather than as objects. The notion of women as exemplified in the official social construction of womanhood in Indonesia has far-reaching and very real social consequences in all spheres of life. Not only does this hold women back, it holds back the entire society from being truly developed and emancipated (Suryakusuma, 1991:54)

New Order: End to ‘Real’ Women’s Organisations

Dutch feminist writer Wieringa (1988) takes an even longer historical perspective of the plight of Indonesian women’s organisations from the early twentieth century. Wieringa claims that Indonesian women’s organisations had made significant social and political advances before 1965 (Wieringa, 1988:70). For example she argues that women were active participants in the Indonesian Communist Organisation Gerwani after its inception in 1950 (Gerakan Wanita) (Wieringa, 1988:77). However, during the 1970s when second wave feminist movements were gaining strength in the west the opposite was the case in Indonesia.

According to Wieringa, after 1965 Indonesian women’s organisations were restructured to suit the Suharto government’s development agenda (Wieringa, 1988:85). Wieringa goes on to argue that only those women’s organisations created or endorsed by the state were allowed to function during the New Order era. She makes the controversial assessment of contemporary women’s organisations that “All we do know now is that 3 at present there is no organisation at all dealing with feminist concerns” (Wieringa,

1988:85).

The author contrasts the mobilising function of women’s organisations in the lead up to

Indonesian independence and the creation of state-sanctioned and controlled organisations after 1965. According to Wieringa, women’s organisations became less about women and more about being vehicles for economic development. Wieringa regards Gerwani as the ideal model for Indonesian women’s organisation.

Women, New Order and Critique of Development

In her study of women in West Java, Indonesian writer Agusni analyses the impact of a heavily bureaucratic system upon popular participation amongst women’s organisations in West Java. For Agusni, “women’s organisations once had great political influence, but their role declined after the New Order took power the 1960s” (Agusni, 1997:1). For

Agusni, the change in women’s organisations after the New Order came to power can be identified in terms of their lack of popular participation. The term ‘popular participation’ is used by Agusni to refer to “the majority involvement of individuals or groups in the whole process of planning resulting in major decisions agreed to by the majority of people” (Agusni, 1997:1).

Although Agusni concedes that certain women’s organisations continued to operate after 1965, she says, “their involvement does not affect the decision making of local government. Most activities of women’s organisations have now been taken over by government programs” (Agusni, 1997:6). The government is accused of putting political policies above social and community concerns. The political motivations, which sought

4 to influence political decision making, the premise of women’s organisations including

Gerwani, is not the basis of the state-sponsored women’s organisations which emerged from 1965.

Critique of State-Sponsored Women’s Organisations

Norma Sullivan (1994) researched urban gender relations in central Java. The results of her detailed study found that contrary to the New Order government’s portrayal of the sexes as separate but equal, in fact women and men are separate and unequal. A substantial section of her work discusses the way the New Order government shaped women’s lives in the kampung1 especially through the state-run organisations in the

1970s. As with Wieringa (1988) Agusni (1997) and Suryakusuma (1991), Sullivan

(1994) concludes that the state-sanctioned women’s organisations became mere tools of the state.

Women Under the New Order

Political scientist Susan Blackburn provides an overview of the major criticisms of the

New Order government’s gender policies (Blackburn, 1994). For Blackburn the main criticisms of Suharto’s politics is that it imposed “considerable restrictions on people’s freedom of organisation and expression” (Blackburn, 1994:173). The suppression of people’s voices reinforces Agusni’s argument that the government limited organisation’s abilities to influence decision-making (Agusni, 1997:1).

Blackburn also observes that the Suharto government brought women into its development plans. But in contrast to the other authors, she recognises a lot was ‘done’

1 A rural or urban neighbourhood

5 for women under the New Order (Blackburn, 1994:174). She shows how although women were restricted in their ability to organise themselves, they undeniably made gains in terms of their access to education and life expectancy (Blackburn, 1994:175).

While Blackburn notes (along with Suryakusuma (1991), Sullivan (1994) and Istiadah

(1995)) that the New Order government placed importance on women fulfilling their domestic role, she also argues that in addition to being good wives and mothers, women were encouraged to be engaged in the paid work force. For Blackburn, this led to “the double burden for women to bear” (Blackburn, 1994:176). Berninghausen and Kerstan

(1992) support this observation when they claim “it is emphasised that the accepted and desirable modern Indonesian woman should be a housewife, mother, wage earner, and activist for Indonesian development at the same time” (Berninghausen and Kerstan,

1992:31). For Blackburn the New Order philosophy was opposed to the notion that women might have interests of their own to represent in public (Blackburn, 1994:177).

The image of the versatile and multi-skilled ‘modern Indonesian woman’ was reinforced through media and cinema representations of the ideal Indonesian woman

(Sen, 1993:35). For Blackburn, these new demands made of women fail to acknowledge that women work long hours. She says that “rather than being encouraged to contribute more, they need to be relived of burdens such as fetching fuel and drinking water”

(Blackburn, 1994:177).

In line with the above authors, Blackburn argues that the existing state-sanctioned women’s organisations did not offer women opportunities. However, Blackburn sees opportunities arising for women from Indonesia’s ‘return to democracy’.

6 “Democratisation will enable women to form their own organisations independent of government control and thus work out their own agendas” (Blackburn, 1994:179). In short, Blackburn posits that if women are to escape these expectations which are placed on them they need to form their own independent organisations separate from the government.

Public Discourse and Women

The socio-linguistic study by Laine Berman (1998) is a different approach to the discussion of women and gendered identities in Indonesia. In her work she looks at the

Javanese concept of ‘self’ and how self is constructed through everyday practices of conversational narrative. She is concerned with the “dimensions of identity by focusing on the roles of discourses of power in the construction of women’s identity” (Berman,

1998:56). She focuses on the role of the individual and the way in which women define and redefine themselves through narrative.

Through her analysis of the formation of self, Berman explores the specific social, political, religious and personal influences that help shape the construction of self. One of the influences that she discusses in detail is that of the government. For Berman

(1998) it is not the direct influence of the government that affects women. Instead she argues that public discourse influences social knowledge and identity formation and that this has impacted on women and redefined their social positions.

Public discourses impose social knowledge that can be directly located in women’s speech. Such powerful discourses reproduce women’s positions as inferior while they also constitute societal knowledge regarding women and their roles in society. In ideological terms, Indonesian women are defined relationally to men. Rejection or attempts at breaking out of

7 gender boundaries are simply unacceptable, dangerous, equated with chaos and seen as a threat to the state (Berman, 1998:56).

For Berman, the government’s influence over the community and its vested interest in women, is a socially significant component of local women’s realities in Java. Berman argues that public discourse is imposed on Indonesian women and that it is extremely difficult for women to escape this influence (Berman, 1998:56). So dominant is this public discourse that alternative discourses are not readily available for women. In her work she does not explain how patriarchy is reinforced through local discourses.

This thesis does not deny that women’s roles were defined through state based organisations. It is well documented how the New Order government had a strong influence in all facets of social life in Indonesia after 1966. Local communities, gender roles and women’s organisations were undoubtedly shaped by its development policies.

By dismissing women’s organisations as largely instruments of state policy the above authors tend to see the political heyday of women’s organisations as limited to the era leading up to Indonesian independence in 1945. Within their work there is little exploration of the benefits or agency of women under the New Order or the present reformasi era. Nor is there much attention paid to the way local women have reacted to this influence. As Berman puts it, there is no room for the development of alternative discourses (Berman, 1998:56). Or if there is, as Blackburn offers, it must be divorced from the prevalent social structure and operate free from government constraint

(Blackburn, 1994:179).

8 This thesis will explore the social opportunities that arise for women by looking at the relationship between the state, local women and contemporary local women’s organisations. The relationship that defines this contemporary situation is premised on an assumption of the continuity of state and local community.

The Social Context

The choice of ethnographic location is a crucial part of any research project. In the past, ethnographers have been drawn to Indonesia’s cultural capital, central Java, as a place of scholarly interest. There is a plethora of literature written by anthropologists, linguists, political analysts and historians about the lives of women in central Java.

Scholars are drawn to Central Java as it is perceived (by the Javanese) as culturally refined or halus and representative of Indonesia’s ‘authentic culture’.

To write ethnographies about only halus locations, is in danger of overlooking the social, political, religious and cultural variations between different provinces in Java.

That is to say, local ethnographies focused on Central Java need to be understood as pertaining to Central Java, and should be very careful in making generalisations relating to other locations in Java.

In recent years there have been an increasing number of studies on women in areas besides central Java including West Java (Mather, 1985), Sumatra (Blackwood, 1995;

Krier, 1995 and Whalley, 1991), Central Sulawesi (Atkinson 1996), South Sulawesi

(Robinson, 1989) and Bali (Hobart, 1995 and Lansing, 1974). Other researchers ventured further from the centre to the outer islands of the archipelago to conduct research about women. These authors gave voice to regional and ethnic minorities.

9 Despite diversification of research locations, the nature of the research topics employed mirror those conducted in central Java. They reaffirm the tendencies of authors to discuss the way the state influenced women’s lives in Indonesia. These include the arguments that the New Order government transformed local society and took away decision making power from local communities.

For example Blackwood’s study (1995) of women in a village in the Minangkabau province of West Sumatra analysed the ways in which “various types of gender meanings are subverted and partially transformed by state policies as well as nationalist discourses” (Blackwood, 1995:124). The author also explores how local notions of gendered identities are changed or ‘partially transformed’ by state policies.

Robinson (1989) investigated the influence that the New Order government’s mining policies had on the gender roles of a traditional community in South Sulawesi.

Robinson seeks to identify changing gender relations as a core component of changes associated with the global order (Robinson, 1989:65). Cultural change throughout the

Indonesian islands is, once again, discussed by outlining how the New Order state changed the roles of women.

My study differs as it seeks to uncover local responses to national politics. Certainly, the influence of national politics is an unavoidable part of analysis. However, it seeks to critique the state-centered emphasis by drawing on the experience of women in a specific ethnographic location.

10 Women’s Organisations

This research includes a detailed analysis of five local women’s organisations that operate on the kampung level in the East Javanese city of Malang. The organisations include; the state created PKK (Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, Family Welfare

Development Program) a women’s Islamic prayer group (Tahlilan), the centre for women’s studies (Pusat Studi Wanita) a local NGO LKBHWAK (Lembaga Konsultasi

Bantuan Hukum Wanita dan Keluarga) – Legal Aid Consultative Institute for Women and Families) and a social club known as the Saturday morning Club (SMC).

That there are five different organisations analysed in this study sets it aside from previous work. Previous writers have limited the scope of their research to one of the various types of organisations in existence. Some authors have focused on state- sanctioned organisations and analysed their function (Sullivan, 1994). Alternatively, other writers have argued about non-governmental organisations (Berninghausen and

Kerstan 1992 and Eldridge 1995). In contrast, this study includes organisations that were once state-sanctioned, religious organisations, social clubs and non-governmental organisations.

Malang

Malang city, where this ethnographic study is set, is the second largest city in the

Indonesian province of East Java. The city is situated eighty-three kilometres south of the capital of East Java, Surabaya (Appendix I). Malang is 440 metres above sea level and is surrounded by mountains making the climate comparatively cooler to other cities in East Java. The Brantas River divides the central commercial and administrative area into two distinct regions (Grant, 1994:11). The city of Malang is situated within the

11 larger district known as Kabupaten Malang that includes a total area of 3,072,19 kilometers, squared (BPS, 2000). The ‘Malang’ in this thesis will be used in reference to the city of Malang.

According to the Central Bureau of Statistics or Bureau Pusat Statistik (BPS) the population of the city of Malang in 2000 was 756, 982. Malang has an area of 110.00 kilometers squared (BPS 2000) and consists of five districts (Brantas, Kedungkandang,

Blimbing, Klojen and Lowokwaru). These districts are divided into fifty seven villages

(BPS 2000 - Bureau Pusat Statistik for Jawa Timur or East Java Bureau of Statistics,

2000). Malang city’s boundaries include Singosari to the North, Pakis and Tumpang to the East, Tahinan and Paksaji to the South and Wagir and Dau to the west (BPS, 2000:1)

(Appendix I).

The political geography of Malang is shaped by its proximity (100km’s East) to the town Blitar. Blitar is the final resting-place of Sukarno, the first President of Indonesia and the father of the current president Megawati Sukarnoputri. The region derives a certain nationalist kudos from its association with the Sukarno family. This reinforces the identification of the region with Indonesian secular nationalism.

The Dutch came to Malang in the middle of the eighteenth century. From 1800 Malang came under the jurisdiction of the Netherlands government. One of the most significant effects of Malang’s urban development took place between 1850-1900. Roads were built in 1872 and the railway linking Surabaya and Malang was created in 1878. By the turn of the century, Malang was situated centrally within a region of vibrant plantation production. Malang was connected by rail and road to outlying areas of its hinterlands

12 and to Surabaya, Pasuran and beyond (Grant, 1994:48). Malang went from being a small administrative centre in the mid nineteenth century, to the 7th most populated city in Java and eleventh largest city in Indonesia (Grant, 1994:12).

Malang’s economic origins were premised on its cash-crop economy. The primary income source was from the production of coffee. Village life in Malang relied on a cash economy based on the income earned selling agricultural crops including coffee

(Grant, 1994:2). From the late nineteenth century there was an increase in private investment which led to urban development in Malang (Grant, 1994:ii). The main periods of urban development for Malang occurred “when private enterprise investment has driven the economy, 1870-1900, when the plantation economy expanded rapidly, the 1920s when the urban population itself supported development, and the late 1980s when the central government in Jakarta relaxed controls over investment” (Grant,

1994:299).

Today, Malang is predominantly supported by its primary industries including coffee and tobacco (Grant, 1994:13). The city lacks the financial investment from large-scale secondary industry which Surabaya is known for. Instead, the large-scale industries support the large population (2,599,796) of the port city of Surabaya (BPS, 2000).

Large portions of the population of Malang are first and second-generation migrants from East Javanese villages and other Indonesian islands. People from outer villages and islands are drawn to the city of Malang to work in one of the handful of cigarette factories situated on the outskirts of the city. As early as the 1930s people were drawn to Malang from other parts of the region and the whole island of Java. In 1930, 48.1%

13 of the resident population were immigrants, numbering 34,000 people (Grant,

1994:117). From the early decades of the twentieth Century, Malang was portrayed as

“a flourishing centre where one could expect to find employment opportunities and enjoy a lifestyle superior to that of rural areas or coastal regions” (Grant, 1994:118).

Modern-day Malang is made up of people who have moved from nearby towns and villages including Blitar, Kediri and Madiun (appendix I). The impact of the Indonesian monetary crisis of 1997 has witnessed intensified labour migration as people are forced to leave their home villages or cities in search of work, emphasising its role as a focus of rural and urban migration.

A second important reason people move to Malang is for primary, secondary and tertiary education. Malang boasts more than thirty universities comprising a mixture of state-run, private and Islamic institutions. In the 1930s people from outer islands of

Indonesia traveled to Java to obtain an education (Reid, 1974:3). The city not only provides learning institutions for prospective students, it also provides employment opportunities for teachers and academics. The social demographics of Malang resemble those of other University towns. There are a large percentage of young, unmarried and middle-class students who reside in the city during semester and return home for the

Islamic fasting month of Ramadan.

Malang is also well known for being an important centre for Islamic learning. The

Islamic organisation Nahdlatul Ulama or NU (Awakening of Religious Scholars) emerged in rural East Java in 1926. Statistics from the 1990 Indonesian census reveal that 97% of the population of East Java were Muslims (Cribb, 2000:51). Malang city

14 alone has 372 Mosques and 1132 prayer rooms or Mushola (BPS, 2000:47). There are a number of Islamic boarding schools in the city of Malang. In the year 2000 there were

23 pesantrens in the city of Malang (BPS, 2000:48).

Malang is not an exclusively Islamic city. In addition to Islam’s strong presence in

Malang other religious groups are also represented. The second largest religious denomination is Christian Protestant. In 1990 2% of the population were Protestant

(Cribb, 2000:51). The other religious denominations present in Malang include

Catholicism, Hinduism and Buddhism. There are sixty-three Protestant Churches and fifty-four Catholic Churches, six Shrines and six Nunneries (BPS, 2000:47).

There is no thriving tourist industry in Malang. Malang does not offer large shrines and temples like those found in Bali and Central Java. Nor does it attract large crowds of beach-loving foreigners, as do the islands of Bali and Lombok. There is no dense rainforest like those found in Sumatra that caters to trekkers and explorers. As opposed to the Indonesian capital Jakarta, Malang does not attract local or international political attention. As in the past, Malang serves as a centre from and “through which visitors moved to the real tourist attractions and tourists stayed only one or two nights in

Malang itself” (Grant, 1994:234).

Despite its lack of tourists and the small scale of the city compared to the capital

Surabaya, Malang’s specific social, political and religious past has contributed to the way local society operates today. This ethnographic study of five women’s organisations tells a story about the contemporary social, political and religious life of a local community in Malang.

15 Methodology

My fieldwork project was carried out between January 2000 and January 2001. The majority of the time was spent in one kampung, which consisted of approximately five hundred people. There is debate amongst scholars as to the definition of the term kampung. In their book Berninghausen and Kerstan (1992) refer to a kampung as a village settlement (Berninghausen and Kerstan 1992). In contrast, other researchers

(Eldridge, 1990, 1995 and Sullivan, 1994) refer to a kampung as either a village or urban neighbourhood. In her book, Sullivan (1994) outlines the looseness of the concept kampung when she states “the neighbourhoods themselves, called simply ‘kampung’ also correspond roughly to small, rather tight-knit predominantly lower class communities also known as kampung (Sullivan, 1994:6). The kampung referred to throughout this thesis is an urban neighbourhood located approximately four kilometers south of the centre of Malang.

After several visits with local kampung women, one local family invited me to live in their home. The hospitality that this family offered me was also extended from other kampung members who came to accept me and encourage my participation in local activities. The male head of the kampung known as Pak RW 2 was consulted about my stay in the kampung. A key respondent and myself spent considerable time visiting him in his home, drinking tea and talking together. He came to accept and endorse my year long visit.

Living with a local family afforded me the opportunity to share the lives of women in the kampung. This meant I also lived within the parameters of kampung life. The

2 The male head of the rukun warga - local municipality.

16 unmarried aspect of my identity was socially relevant. There is a local belief that unmarried woman should not travel alone, especially at night. On occasion the demands of my study saw me returning late at night from long day trips to villages. The unacceptability of this behaviour was illustrated one morning with the harsh chastisement from my house-mother. At times the demands of the project did clash with my need and desire to respect local traditions.

The research was carried out using a qualitative methodological approach and a variety of social research methods were implemented. The main research methodologies included participant observation, in-depth interviews and written surveys.

Participant Observation

Participant observation involved me in the full range of activities of kampung life including eating with local families, shopping at the kampung markets, and participating in preparations for local weddings. In addition to the everyday activities I also attended approximately seventy local community rituals including weddings, circumcision or khitan celebrations and death rituals.

Numerous hours were spent talking with and listening to the stories, gossip, secrets, fears and laughter of local kampung women. The information that was gained during the field-work year was the result of the rapport I built and maintained with the local people whose lives I shared It became well known that this newly Javanese girl (although theoretically still a foreigner or bule) was mbak3 Kris. I was given a local name and

3 Title given to young unmarried woman.

17 received as a daughter of the kampung. This insider treatment often included being made the subject of jokes within the local community.

The older women in the kampung would feed and look after me as if I was their daughter. I would stay overnight with other local families and they would have dinner waiting for me when I arrived. They would even buy coca-cola from the local stall to cater to what they imagined was their foreign daughter’s tastes. Younger women in the kampung confided in me as if I were their sister and often referred to me as such. With my name Mbak Kris I was known throughout the local community as the tall girl from

Australia doing a study on the importance of women’s organisations in Malang.

My interest in their lives was understood by local women as a chance for them to tell their life story. Throughout the entire fieldwork experience things were learned, realised, documented, taped and analysed. Local women and men provided invaluable information. This was offered whilst sharing a long ride in a mikrolet (local transportation), on the way to the market or in the kitchen preparing a meal. The unstructured nature of the research was as crucial to the outcome of this study as the official research methodological tools used.

I was recognised as a temporary local resident of the kampung, and was allowed to become a (temporary) participant in women’s organisations in Malang. I attended the meetings of the PKK, Tahlilan, PSW, SMC and LKBHWAK.

There are other organisations for women in Malang. Some of the other well-known ones include NGOs, University based women’s organisations, other Islamic organisations

18 including Ayisyah4 and the state-sponsored Dharma Wanita5. In the villages on the outskirts of Malang there are women’s farming co-operatives that run women’s organisations.

Out of the array of women’s organisations that exist in Malang, I selected the five organisations in this project because they represent the organisations which these kampung women attend. The women in this study did not participate in other organisations in Malang.

Interviews

I conducted ninety in-depth personal interviews with women in Malang. Eighty of these interviews were conducted with women who lived in the kampung and participated in at least one of the five organisations in this study. The remaining interviews were conducted with representatives of community services. These interviewees included; staff members at the local centre for public health Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat or

Puskesmas, a member of staff at the Malang birth clinic, staff at the centre for

Indonesian workers overseas, and a dukun6. Interviews were conducted at women- centred services to get further insight into the main concerns that women face. Only a couple of these formal interviews were with men7. Several informal discussions were held with local men throughout the field-work year. These discussions focused on many aspects of men’s lives. These included types of employment opportunities that existed

4 The Women’s organisation affiliated with the Islamic Organisations of Muhammadiyah. Established in 1912. 5 Civil Service Bureaucracy Women’s Auxiliary. Established in 1971. 6 Indonesian healer or medical person. 7 The worker at the centre for overseas workers was a male interviewee. Also one of the male members of PSW was interviewed.

19 for them in Malang, study, family and also the various men’s organisations that operated in Malang.

The interviews I conducted with women were semi-structured and lasted between thirty minutes and two hours. The respondents were asked to provide me with a brief personal biography. They were then asked a series of open-ended questions concerning their participation in organisations including what they perceive as the main benefits.

Members of the various organisations perceived different topics as significant. As a consequence, the focus of any given interview depended largely on the interviewee.

All of the interviews, except one, were conducted in the Indonesian national language.

The one exception was an interview where the respondent spoke in both Javanese and

Indonesian. In this specific situation, a key informant was able to aid in the translation into Indonesian.

During the early months of the field-work period local men and women were helpful in the translation of local concepts and behaviour. Every interview conducted in the field was taped on audiocassette with the permission of the interviewee. This data was later transcribed and coded.

An ethnographic approach was taken to the research project, as the aim of the research was to tell the story of the lives of local women in Malang. The focus on the role of local organisations provided the window through which this contemporary comprehensive study of women’s everyday lives could be conducted. This research methodology provided an opportunity for local women to express their views about life

20 in Malang in relation to their participation in organisations and the impact this has on their personal lives. On one level this study is a narrative of the lives of local women in

Malang.

Surveys

As well as participant observation and interviews, during the second half of the field- work year written surveys (appendix II) were administered to seventy women in the study8. The aim of conducting the survey was to collect general information concerning which organisation women attended, the average age of members and the main benefits women associate with their membership. Women were given the surveys during the meetings and completed them in their homes. Fifty women responded to the surveys.

Thesis Outline

The political context of Indonesia is an important factor to consider when talking about the contemporary socio-political role of contemporary women’s organisations. The opening chapter introduces the way in which Indonesian communities have historically organised themselves for political purposes. From this history of mobilisation emerges the concept of ‘organisation’ and what this has meant in Indonesia. The role that organisations played throughout Indonesia’s history is an important component of the contemporary role they have within Indonesian society.

The second chapter discusses the history of Indonesian women’s organisations. The five women’s organisations in this study are analysed in this chapter with reference to their relationship with the New Order government. The chapter outlines how women’s

8 Written surveys were administered to members of PKK who lived in the Kampung.

21 organisations were of political interest to the government and how this played a part in shaping the social meaning attached to local women’s organisations.

The fieldwork component of the project forms the basis of chapters three, four and five.

This part of the research bridges the gap between the political history of Indonesia and the contemporary functions of local women’s organisations. The fieldwork chapters show how local women’s lives are understood within the broader political context of

Indonesian society. It reveals why and how the Suharto government expressed an interest in the local kampung and how this shaped the contemporary meaning embedded in these organisations. The last three chapters reveal the nature of the relationship between the New Order government, local communities and women. The findings of the fieldwork section reveal the complexities inherent in deciphering the contemporary meaning of local women’s organisations.

Chapter four shows how women’s membership experience can change their life options in the kampung. The chapter problematises the assumption that women are simply oppressed by the state, by displaying findings that women have in fact been able to make gains for themselves.

The fifth chapter investigates the lived experiences of women in the kampung and juxtaposes these with women’s participation in local organisations. It questions the social issues facing women in the kampung and how these are addressed or not addressed through women’s participation in organisations. The relationship between these contributes to our understanding of the social meaning of organisations.

22 The conclusion will draw together the main themes of the thesis including political mobilisation, the New Order government’s development policies, gender politics, agency, and the field-work data. Through the combination of these issues, the thesis will show that women’s membership experiences are complex social realities. The social and political meanings affiliated with local women’s organisations are the product of the relationship between local women, the state, women’s organisations and umbrella organisations.

23 CHAPTER ONE

Mobilisation, The New Order Government, and Gender Politics

The contemporary socio-political meaning of local women’s organisations need to be understood as a product of Indonesia’s political history. This chapter outlines the role

Indonesian organisations played throughout the twentieth century in the lead up to independence in August 1945. During the first half of the twentieth century, organisations were motivated by predominantly nationalist sentiments. The chapter will begin by mapping the role Indonesian organisations played from colonisation, to occupation, to independence. Specifically it will show how these specific political periods created the forum for mobilisation of large-scale organisations.

The second half of the chapter details the period of Indonesia’s political history from

1966-1998, known as the New Order era. After assuming power, President Suharto’s policies of economic, political and social development implicated all levels of

Indonesian society. This section of the chapter will examine how the nation-building policies of the Suharto government shaped the way local organisations operate. It will show how politics came to circumscribe the local meanings embedded in local communities.

The chapter ends by discussing the gender politics of the New Order government. It explains how women and women’s organisations were specifically targeted in the government’s development politics.

24 The relationship between national politics and local communities throughout Indonesian history is framed here by the term ‘mobilisation’. Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (1984) give a sociological definition of the term ‘mobilisation’. This definition portrays mobilisation as being politically motivated to satisfy a specific agenda.

The process by which a population is brought into the political arena by the formation of new parties and other political institutions. The ‘mobilisation system’ is the ensemble of values, institutions and groups which are organised to achieve societal goals (such as the creation of a nation-state) (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 1984: 268).

This definition is utilised within this thesis to outline the changing role of local organisations and their relationship with the state within a given political era in history.

In this context, mobilisation refers to the way in which communities engaged in social, religious and political action.

Colonisation to Independence

Before the twentieth century the Dutch showed little interest in the inhabitants of the archipelago, viewing Indonesia as merely a trade centre for the Dutch East Indies

Company. At the turn of the century this began to change with a period of investment during the early twentieth century and the Netherlands Indies state coming into being

(Reid, 1974:1)

In 1903 the Dutch passed the Decentralisation Law which initiated the establishment of areas with a degree of self-government (Grant, 1994:74). During this time, some areas of Indonesia remained under direct Dutch control, whilst others were permitted to be

‘self governing’ (Reid, 1974:4). These distinctions diminished with the onset of

25 modernity (Reid, 1974:2). During the first two decades of the twentieth century Dutch troops marched throughout the archipelago.

Although the Dutch interest in the East Indies was premised primarily on trade and economic gain, significant socio-political issues surfaced during the early twentieth century. These issues are encapsulated by the concept of the ‘ethical policy’ (Vreede-De

Steurs 1960:48).

It was realised that the Netherlands interests called for a prosperous Indonesian people and demanded the modernisation of the country. The narrower aim of obtaining export produce, which had been held in olden days… widened itself under modern policy into a concern for the development of the whole society. With this in mind the colonial government intentionally sought after the welfare of the Indonesian people (Burger, 1957:7, cited in Vreede-De Steurs, 1996:49).

It was thought that the new ‘ethical policy’ would allow the population to achieve greater prosperity (Vreede-De Steurs, 1960). From 1925 the Dutch made a significant effort to improve the standards of literacy amongst the Indonesian society (Reid,

1974:2). Despite these efforts, improvements in education were slow. In 1930 only

6.4% of Indonesian children were reported to be literate (Reid, 1974:2).

The introduction of the Dutch education system helped create the environment that stirred nationalist sentiment throughout the archipelago. As Reid argues in his work, education brought literacy and exposure to political ideas that were unknown to

Indonesian people (Reid, 1974:3). Through education particular political ideas, such as

Marxism, encouraged the Indonesian population to think of political alternatives to their condition. Reid posits that the thought of mobilisation and political change came to

26 Indonesia largely as a result of attending western style educational institutions from the

1930s onwards (Reid, 1974:3).

Mobilisation during the early decades of the twentieth century was expressed by the emergence of various Islamic organisations. In 1912 the Sarekat Islam SI (Muslim

Union) was formed. The SI had a strong following from urban centres and a considerable following in rural areas (Grant, 1994:155). In 1921 Sarekat Islam organised a series of violent incidents in rural areas and became labelled, by urban

Islamic leaders, as a rough mixture of religion and radical politics (Reid, 1974:4). As a consequence of this affiliation with violence, urban-based Islamic leaders began to migrate from Sarekat Islam to the modernist association of Muhammadiyah (followers of Muhammad). Despite this decline in SI membership numbers, by 1923 “the SI was clearly a political party within Indonesia whose aim was a free nation based on Islamic precepts” (Grant, 1994:157).

The alternative ‘modernist’ Islamic organisation Muhammadiyah was established in

Yogyakarta in 1912 and continued to flourish in the 1920s (Reid, 1974:4). The organisation extended its influence beyond the confines of mosques and village prayer houses to establish and support schools (Grant, 1994:156).

The presence of large-scale Islamic organisations including the SI and Muhammadiyah represented the first attempts at mass-based movements in the Indies (Schwarz, 1994:4).

They also illustrated the growing popularity of Islamic organisations, which acted as an organised challenge to the effects of Dutch colonialism (Reid, 1974:5). As a result of their perceived ‘political’ threat of the PNI, key Indonesian nationalist leaders including

27 Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir were exiled and imprisoned in the 1930s

(Schwarz, 1994:4).

The self-defined ‘traditionalist’ Muslim population in Indonesia criticised the modernist members of Muhammadiyah for ignoring the adherence to the Shafi school of law and for adopting a new form of worship (Reid, 1974:5). They saw this modernist approach to Islam in Indonesia as a challenge to the compromise that already existed between

Islam and Javanism (Reid, 1974:5). In response to the modernist thoughts of members of Muhammadiyah, the Islamic organisation NU was created in rural East Java in 1926.

Political organisations emerged alongside Islamic ones within the Dutch East Indies.

The Indonesian nationalist party or Partai NasionaI Indonesia (PNI) gained significant support during the late 1920s and it is during this time that Sukarno, a prominent

Indonesian nationalist, rose in popularity.

The Indonesian communist party (Partai Kommunis Indonesia) PKI also emerged in the

1920s. The PKI grew out of the more radical elements of SI with a focus on labour unions in the cities and presenting a radical form of nationalism (Grant, 1994:158). The

PKI was declared an illegal organisation in 1927. Consequently, its branches were closed down and its leaders interned.

Other politically motivated organisations, which existed in Indonesia from 1910, were the Indonesian trade unions. Unskilled workers, in particular women and children, suffered extremely bad working conditions and their hardships were exacerbated by the low wages they received (Grant, 1994:160). The government continually monitored the

28 Indonesian trade unions. Local officials were required to report regularly on both unions and other political activities. The PKI was known by the government to be linked with

Indonesian trade unions. To the government, communism and unionism were synonymous and needed to be kept under control (Grant, 1994:162).

By 1941 the Dutch maintained what Reid refers to as a ‘superficial air of calm’. Whilst the Dutch were not interested in mobilising the Indonesian population, they had managed to limit mobilisation of radical political individuals (Reid, 1974:9). The Dutch effort to limit the political organisations rife throughout Indonesia in the early 1940s was the closest they came to politically influencing the wider communities of what was later to be named Indonesia.

The Dutch initiated the progress of the Indonesian people towards modernity. However in so doing they invoked the political consciousness of the Indonesian people.

In part as a consequence of this onset of modernity, large scale political and religious organisations formed throughout Indonesia. At first they seemed like innocuous religious organisations, but their size provided a form of power to its constituents.

Indonesian trade unions became more vocal in asserting the rights of low-skilled workers. The Dutch recognised the political potential of these large-scale organisations.

Their response was to engage with the more radical elements that had the possibility of being uncontrollable.

Japanese Occupation (1942-1945)

The Dutch surrendered to the invading Japanese army on the 8th of March 1942. The new rulers of Indonesia dissolved all Dutch-era political parties in Java and replaced

29 them with their own. The exception to this was that Islamic organisations were permitted to remain (Reid, 1974:11). In an effort to gain support from the Indonesian population, the Japanese released Sukarno, Hatta and Sjahrir. The release of these key nationalist figures would help promote the restructure of the Indonesian economy and support the ideals of an Asian empire under Japanese occupation (Grant, 1994:167).

The period of Japanese occupation was a time of severe hardship for Indonesians.

Indonesian men were forced to work as ‘voluntary’ labourers. Hundreds of thousands never returned from working in Japanese military projects under appalling conditions

(Reid, 1974:16). According to Grant, it is likely that almost all able-bodied men and youths were working for the Japanese by 1945 (Grant, 1994:178). During the field work year one local Malang woman shared her memories of her life in Malang during the period of Japanese occupation.

I was only young (in my teens) when the Japanese came. I still remember little things though. The people in the kampung had to work for the Japanese. The people worked in a kind of concentration camp. They had to work so hard. Some of them worked so hard that they got sick. If they got sick no one was able to help them, they just died. That is how it was for the people of the kampung. It was not for women, it was a place just for men. They were forced to work. That’s what I remember of the Japanese people. They got paid only a little, not much. Every two weeks or so they would come back and choose more people. They were not allowed to refuse. They were forced to work and if they said no, then they were punished. The men worked at a place on the coast. The Japanese were here for three and a half years. This is what happened to the people in the kampung. Many people died you know. So many people died. We had our independence in 1945. Everyone was so happy here. We could eat. Whilst the Japanese were here the price of food was very expensive you know. Now my grandchildren are all free. All of them have their independence now. I felt sad for the men back then, poor them (Interview # 34).

30 Indonesian men were mobilised into servitude. While their men were away working in the forced labour camps, women were forced to perform such tasks as tilling the soil

(Grant, 1994:179). Both men and women were mobilised to achieve Japanese victory.

In contrast to the Dutch, the Japanese paid specific attention to the mobilisation of the

Indonesian population. The reality of mobilisation experienced under the Japanese forces bore little resemblance to the previous three centuries of Dutch rule.

For the Japanese military who ruled Indonesia, winning the war had to take priority over all purely colonial considerations. This is in marked contrast to the Dutch, who rejected the opportunity to mobilise the Indonesian population even when imminent defeat stared them in the face. The inhibitions of colonial tradition were too strong (Reid, 1974:11).

The attempt by the Japanese to mobilise Indonesian communities was premised on the principles of hoko (obligatory service to the state) and messhiboko (selflessness) which formed the foundation of their wartime ideology (Lucas, 1997:52).

In wartime Japan, the main thrust of this political and semi-religious ideology justified and intensified the mobilisation of every Japanese subject for the war effort. However according to Sato, the closest the Japanese could get to the spirit of hoko in Java was obligation or duty (kewajiban), which in practice for rural women included learning how to plant and harvest castor oil plants, and new ways of planting rice (Lucas, 1997:52).

During this era the occupying force transformed the perception of mobilisation (from one of opposition), to instead reflect the strength of the ruling political force. Under the

Japanese, mobilisation was propagated and used as a tool for a central authority. The form of mobilisation that the Japanese introduced was synonymous with the creation of

31 large-scale organisations. These enabled Japanese officials to keep a closer watch on indigenous activities (Grant, 1994:167).

The Japanese organisation Fujinkai (women’s association) was intended to be instrumental in supporting the Japanese war effort. Whilst primarily a Japanese wartime initiative, Fujinkai also set up courses “to counteract illiteracy, run cooperative kitchens and engage in other social work” (Vreede-De Steurs, 1960: 114).

However their lack of involvement with the local communities meant the Japanese did not have the social networks to make the Fujinkai structure effective for women in both rural and urban regions (Lucas, 1997:55). They relied instead on the colonial hierarchy that the Dutch had implemented, to incorporate lower class women into their association.

The Japanese instilled sentiments premised on nationalism. The nationalist party in

Indonesia found a common understanding in the principles that the Japanese projected.

The ideology proclaiming the good of the state above personal desires was already firmly entrenched in the minds of the Indonesian nationalists. Indonesians began to think about the notion of collective activity for the good of the state.

Sukarno undoubtedly found much to appreciate in the Japanese military style. The emphasis on mass mobilisation and unity, the heroic rhetoric of struggle towards final victory and the dramatic public ritual of the Japanese regime all found echoes in Sukarno’s own style (Reid, 1974:13).

The Japanese mobilisation of the Indonesian population extended beyond the women’s organisation Fujinkai. In addition, the Japanese initiated the organisation Peta. This

32 organisation saw Indonesian youth trained in combat skills (Grant, 1994:168). The

Japanese viewed this organisation as a vehicle to advance its nationalist objectives.

Independence to Guided Democracy

The Japanese surrendered control of Indonesia in 1945 and on the 17th August 1945,

Sukarno and Hatta declared the independence of Indonesia. Indonesians were predominantly supportive of the new republic, whilst it was unclear what it implied beyond the vague notion that it would be better (Grant, 1994:180). With the Japanese retreat, the Dutch attempted to reclaim their stronghold over Indonesia. For the next four years the battle for Indonesia was waged (Schwarz, 1994:5). The Dutch however lost the battle and in December 1949, the Dutch flag came down for the last time

(Schwarz, 1994:5).

The new government headed by Sukarno and Hatta codified into law five principles known as Pancasila. The five principles of Pancasila include; belief in one supreme

God, justice and civility among peoples, the unity of Indonesia; democracy through deliberation and consensus among representatives, and social justice for all (Schwarz,

1994:10). The Pancasila doctrine portrayed an image of a democratic government that ruled by consent. Initially the principle ‘Belief in One God’ was the fifth principle, but it was elevated to be the first principle following the elimination of the Jakarta Charter9 from the 1945 constitution.

9 The Jakarta Charter refers to a proposed amendment to the Pancasila doctrine, which added ‘the obligation of adherents to Islam to implement the Islamic law (Shariah)” to the principle of Belief in One God (Schwarz, 1994:10).

33 Sukarno believed the unifying principles contained in Pancasila would help Indonesia achieve a just and civil humanitarianism. These policies earned him various labels which included; ‘Father of the farmers’, ‘Mouthpiece of the Indonesian people’ and

‘Caretaker of the message of the people’s suffering’ (Wieringa, 1988:76).

The political organisations instrumental in mobilising the population toward independence believed the new nation would be built upon democratic ideals. The period immediately following independence saw the re-establishment of the large scale, self-governing political organisations. Many of the large-scale organisations that were active prior to Japanese occupation were immediately revived. The political context in which they re-emerged was markedly different. The political organisations sought to establish a prominent position within the new independent Indonesia.

The PNI was a strong force in the 1955 national elections. The political stronghold of the PNI was evident in Central Java where the PNI gained 34% of the votes. The results for the entire country saw the PNI gain 22% of votes (Cribb, 2000:163). In East Java the

PNI obtained 23% of the vote (Cribb, 2000:163).

In the 1950s East Java was known as the heartland of the PKI where it had its greatest political success. In the national elections of 1955, the PKI received only 16% of the national (37,785,299) votes but received 26% of the 9,685,711 votes counted for East

Java (Cribb, 2000:163). In the space of two years this popularity had grown and in the regional elections of 1957 the PKI achieved 34% of the vote in East Java. PKI was also significant in the province of central Java where it gained 26% of the votes in 1955

(Cribb, 2000:163).

34 The Islamic organisation Masyumi10 enjoyed a strong following since its emergence in

1943. In 1952 NU left Masyumi and continued as its own Islamic political party.

Masyumi maintained a strong presence in the 1955 national election. The organisation gained 21% of the overall votes (Cribb, 2000:163). They gained the most votes in west

Java with 27% of the votes. By contrast in East Java Masyumi only gained 11% of the votes in 1955 (Cribb, 2000:163).

After only three years NU had come to play a key role in the political landscape of East

Java. The 1955 national election saw the NU party gaining 35% of the votes for East

Java (Cribb, 2000:163). Compared to the 20% representation of votes cast in Central

Java and 18% cast nationally, the results reveal the localised significance that the political party NU held in East Java (Cribb, 2000:163).

The idea that Indonesia could become an independent Islamic state encouraged religious parties to campaign at the ‘grass roots’ level. Their grass roots popularity was reinforced through the existence of weekly prayer groups and regular neighbourhood activities.

Islamic parties used their support in the communities to further their political objective of securing a dominant political voice in the new nation.

Women were also a focus for mobilisation in these nationalist political parties. In 1950 the women’s organisation affiliated with the PKI, Gerwis - later named Gerwani

(Indonesian Communist Party’s Women’s Auxiliary) was formed. Gerwani played a key role in the early years of the new nation through lobbying popular support

10 The Japanese founded Masyumi (the Federation of Muslim Organisations) in 1943.

35 (Sullivan, 1994:59). Gerwani and its affiliations with the PKI showed the political potential of Indonesian women’s organisations.

There were numerous factions in the new government. The differing sectors of the new government disagreed about the priorities of the new nation. This variety made the job of governing the new nation increasingly difficult (Schwarz, 1994:11).

In official Indonesian history it was the failure of the Konstituante (Constitutional

Assembly) to arrive at a consensus on the new constitution that forced Sukarno to take control of the political process. The problems inherent in the Sukarno government came to a head and resulted in the collapse of parliamentary democracy in 1956-1957

(Mackie, 1994:35). This led to the disintegration of party government in Indonesia in early 1957 (Lev, 1994:39).

In July 1959 Sukarno passed a presidential decree initiating a change in the form of government. The change meant the cabinet was chosen by and responsible to the

President and not the parliament (Grant, 1994:205). The term given to Sukarno’s new form of government was ‘Guided Democracy’. Sukarno argued that his implementation of Guided Democracy was “democratic because everyone has given his comment”

(Schwarz, 1994:17).

In conjunction with his policy of Guided Democracy, in 1960 Sukarno banned the political organisation Masyumi for the support it gave to the PRRI (The revolutionary government of the republic of Indonesia) (Schwarz, 1994:13). This act marked a significant change in government attitude toward mobilisation.

36 The principles of Guided Democracy were justified in the name of preserving social harmony. An emphasis was placed on consensus rather than disharmony. However, consensus in this context was marked by conformity to group norms as opposed to the open airing of differing opinions.

According to Ong, in some parts of Asia, democracy is presented less in terms of individual rights than as the state’s ability to provide welfare benefits to citizens (Ong cited in Paley, 2002:475). Elements of this can be seen in the type of democracy

Sukarno was creating. Specifically, Sukarno was concerned with teaching, leading and preserving society (Paley, 2002:475).

The ramifications of this style of leadership initiated debate concerning the role the state should play in society. It raised questions as to why the political mobilisation, instrumental in the achievement of independence, should be replaced by a more conservative nationalist political strategy.

In the first half of the 1960s, the relationship between the government and the population of Indonesia was shaped by the constraints Sukarno imposed on political mobilisation. Both the Japanese occupiers and the Dutch colonisers had demobilised the nation through placing prohibitions on political organisations. During the Japanese occupation, Sukarno had claimed that ‘control’ had to be maintained in order to achieve the ultimate reward of independence. In the following decade the reward was national consensus.

37 The political limitations placed on organisations coincided with the President’s renewed interest in the national army. The republic’s army had been steadily growing in strength since independence. In 1957 the army successfully persuaded Sukarno to impose martial law to stifle opposition to national unity (Schwarz, 1994:15). With the enunciation of the ‘Middle Way’ doctrine in 1958, the army formalised its position as having a justified military role within society. From that time on the army was allocated the dual role of being a military and a social political force (Schwarz, 1994:16).

The increasing presence of the army dampened hopes of any remobilisation of political parties. Tension mounted against the Sukarno government in specific regions of

Indonesia. The most overt uprisings occurred in areas of Sumatra, Sulawesi, and West

Java between 1957 and 1959 (Grant, 1994:205). The army was increasingly present in these conflicts, justifying its involvement as that of supporting the Indonesian government.

The New Order Government and Suharto

On the 30th September 1965 six Indonesian military commanders were abducted and assassinated (Ramage, 1995:23). The PKI was held responsible for the ‘coup’ attempt and was depicted as a threat to the government. The months following the ‘coup’ saw the military annihilate the PKI and decimate its supporters. The massacre lasted for the remainder of 1965 and continued throughout 1966. The exact number of people killed is not known, although estimates range from between 100,000 and 2,000,000 dead

(Schwarz, 1994:20). The communist strongholds of Central and East Java were severely affected.

38 The man to emerge as the leading senior officer in the suppression of the attempted

‘coup’ was the commander of the strategic reserves, Lieutenant General Suharto

(Ramage, 1995:23). In the first half of the 1960s Suharto had been a major general and had led the successful West Irian military campaign of 1962 (Grant, 1994:238).

Suharto was sworn in as the President of the Republic of Indonesia in March 1967, following the deposition of Sukarno in 1966. President Suharto sought to establish a new political regime as the legitimate and constitutional successor to Sukarno’s ‘Old

Order’. His role entailed establishing stable political authority in an inordinately unstable political environment (Ramage, 1995:23).

Initially, the New Order government was a combination of Indonesia’s armed forces, student youth groups, Muslims, intellectuals, democrats, much of the middle class and an array of other groups. At the outset the government was represented by a variety of different interest groups.

It quickly became apparent that Suharto’s interest lay primarily with the nation’s armed forces. As a result, the army emerged as the most prominent force within Suharto’s New

Order and became the guarantor of its success (Ramage, 1995:24). The political favour paid to the Indonesian armed forces was not original to the New Order government but a continuing element of Sukarno’s Old Order, now developing into a dominant element.

As with Sukarno, Suharto’s vision of the modern Indonesian Nation-state did not include a place for large-scale organisations or political mobilisation. On the contrary,

Suharto’s nation-building objectives were threatened by the political potential of the

39 broadly based Islamic parties. Their growing popularity in the 1950s and early 1960s and their goal of an Indonesian Islamic state led Suharto to fear they could challenge him politically.

To curb this growth, the Islamic political parties were forced to merge into the single association of PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan the United Development Party in

1973 (Berninghausen and Kerstan, 1992:193). The legislation that Suharto passed sent a clear message that the New Order government saw itself as secular nationalist and not

Islamic. The passing of this law stifled Indonesian Islam’s political opportunities and strengthened the state’s control over organisations not sanctioned by the state.

The Islamic organisations reaction to the 1973 law has been described as ‘Indonesia’s cultural Islamic revival’ (Ramage, 1995:79). While the presence of political Islam in

Indonesia was not officially accepted in the government sector, there was a ‘revival’ of the practice, thoughts and beliefs of Islam in local communities.

The government’s powers to demobilise the community extended to cover students’ organisations with the 1978 ‘Campus Normalisation Law’. This law banned political parties from university campuses. This repressive policy appeared to silence opposition to the regime. It led to what Eldridge referred to as the `culture of silence’ (Eldridge,

1995:2).

Social and Economic Development

By 1967 Suharto had brought about substantial changes to Indonesia’s existing economic, political, and foreign policies (Ramage, 1995:23). President Suharto made a

40 commitment to modernise Indonesia with emphasis being placed on training, education, health and agriculture. Suharto envisaged that these changes would make Indonesia into a modern nation.

The term ‘development’ is used in Indonesia, and many other countries, to mean economic growth implying some degree of sharing of that increased wealth. From the early 1960s when inflation was rampaging out of control and starvation was a real and widespread problem, until the late 1990s, Indonesia managed to record generally good rates of economic growth, average incomes increased, and starvation resulting from poverty and mismanagement had become effectively non-existent although malnutrition was still a problem in some regions and especially among the very poor (Kingsbury, 1998:11).

REPELITA 1 11

The government’s development policies were outlined in official ‘five-year development plans’ known as REPELITA (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun). The government’s first development plan (1969-1973) gave priority to food provision, and set as one of its goals the nation’s self sufficiency in rice cultivation. Agriculture received much attention, as well as industrial infrastructure for textiles, mining and oil

(Grant, 1994:248).

The government focused on agricultural development with the goal of self- sufficiency within rural communities. President Suharto believed that these policies would lead to a reduction in the number of people who depend on agricultural employment. Improvements in agriculture and infrastructure required close co-operation with local areas (Grant, 1994:248). The initiation of nation-

11 Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun - Five Year Development Plan.

41 wide development schemes ensured that the national government was aware of the nation’s economic situation down to the activities in rural Indonesia.

Large amounts of funding were required to ensure the government’s economic development strategies were successful. One of the first decisions Suharto made was to enter into negotiations to borrow money from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Previously, Sukarno had had an antagonistic relationship with certain international leaders and had banned Indonesia from borrowing money from the IMF. Suharto re- negotiated with the IMF and between the years 1966 and 1968, Indonesia received an influx of foreign investment (Schwarz, 1994:33). In conjunction with the dependence on foreign loans, the government relied heavily on revenue from oil exports.

During the 1970s the surge in oil prices meant the national economy witnessed an unprecedented growth period. The influx of overseas investments, spurred on by mass economic growth, led to Indonesia’s insertion into the global capitalist economy

(Brenner, 1996:677). However, whilst Indonesia was seen as an emerging new and

‘modern’ nation, it was accumulating a massive foreign debt. Furthermore the supply and demand for oil was unpredictable which contributed to fluctuating prices, and an ultimately unstable economy.

REPELITA II

The aim of the government’s second five-year plan (1974-1979) was to reinforce the policies created in the first plan, in particular its focus on agricultural production (Grant,

1994:250). Additionally, the second development plan extended to include the goal of improving living standards and social welfare services within Indonesia. Suharto

42 desired Indonesia to be a modern democratic nation. In reality the government was increasingly controlling the community, society and economy through its development policies.

Education was an important focus of national development. The New Order

Government provided educational programs for both urban and village communities.

The instruction to children took place within the state-run schools closely monitored by the government. The curriculum was strongly focused on nationalist principles and foreign books and sources were prohibited. The motivation to improve society and modernise Indonesia was orchestrated by the nation’s president in the image he had of a developed and modern nation.

The central government had provided for almost complete compulsory education in

Malang. During the New Order regime the number of children attending school in the municipality increased annually by 2,000 (Grant, 1994:279). To cater for this increase, the number of government primary schools in the city rose from 247 in 1975 to 266 in

1978 (Grant, 1994:279).

The longer-term effect of the increasing interest in education is reflected in the figures of Malang children’s attendance at school. 198, 258 children aged between seven and twenty four years were attending school in the year 2000. During that same year only

738 children were reported to not be attending school or who had never attended school

(BPS, 2000:31). Such was the effect of the New Order government’s effort in educating its citizens that by 1990 the literacy levels for the adult population of Jakarta was up to

96% (Cribb, 2000:41). It is interesting to note that literacy figures for the same period in

43 the region of East Java were the lowest for the entire island of Java with 77% of the adult population of East Java being literate (Cribb, 2000:41).

Affordable health care was another state priority. Puskesmas became accessible for rural and urban poor. The public health centres carried out affordable medical consultations, provided below cost medication and doubled as birth clinics. In 1989 there were a total of twelve clinics in Malang (Grant, 1994:281). For those who could not afford to go to hospital or to pay a doctor for a private consultation, Puskesmas was an affordable alternative. The success of the national health care system can still be witnessed in

Malang. In the year 2001 a total of 1,132 015 people in the regency of Malang visited their local Puskesmas (BPS, 2001:92).

State Gender Ideology and PKK

The government’s interest in ‘social welfare’ extended to include the government’s interest in women’s roles. In 1959 Sukarno declared women a ‘functional group’. From the early 1970s Indonesian women played a part in national development. The Suharto government created the ‘Family Welfare Development Program’ (PKK) in 1973

(Sullivan, 1994:129). The PKK operated in the form of a hierarchical structure and a nation-wide bureaucracy. The state controlled the programs and activities of the PKK down to the local level. Specific views were prescribed on the role that women should play in Indonesian development. The government implemented its development- oriented agenda through the PKK’s ten-point program.

1. Comprehension and Practical Application of the National Philosophy and state ideology Pancasila 2. Mutual Self Help 3. Nutrition 44 4. Clothing 5. Housing and Home Economics 6. Education and Craftsmanship 7. Primary Health Care 8. Promotion of co-operatives 9. Protection and Conservation of the Environment 10. Appropriate Domestic Planning (Sullivan, 1994:133).

The creation of the PKK demonstrated the paternalised role that Suharto had created for himself. Provinces and regions throughout Indonesia could be administered via the state-created PKK. The state’s influence would extend into the kampung and family domains. With the establishment of the PKK, Suharto showed the success of his version of popular participation in development.

In addition to the government’s creation of state-run organisations, the way women and men understood their roles in society also became a political interest. Under Indonesia’s

New Order rule even the Indonesian family was of interest to the government and its development objectives.

The fundamental social institution in which were formed the crucial roles, values, attitudes and behaviours on which fruitful development depends. Women as the critical central agent of the family, in this capacity were attributed the following five major duties:

1. Woman’s duty as wife 2. Woman’s duty as mother 3. Woman’s duty as procreator 4. Woman’s duty as financial manager 5. Woman’s duty as member of society

Within the national development process women were responsible for the spiritual, moral, mental and physical welfare of their families, for producing good future citizens, and the concomitant duty of learning to be good citizens themselves (Sullivan, 1994:130).

45 The New Order programs transposed women’s roles from private concerns into instruments of national development. The primary task for women entailed morally and emotionally supporting their husbands. This domestic-centred role for women came to symbolise the official function of women during the ‘development’ era.

There is some debate surrounding whether women’s obligation to carry out domestic duties was a New Order government invention. Authors Locher-Scholten and Niehof have argued that the belief that women should be in the home is actually a legacy of

Dutch imperialism (Locher-Scholten and Niehof, 1987).

For Vreede-De Steurs, the traditional role of women is understood through their role as agricultural workers.

It is the wife who has to take care of the paddy, which she has planted, harvested, and will husk. It is she who prepares the rice and the spices… buys the household utensils... sells the products of her fields… dyes the clothes which she sells (Poensen, 1887:148 cited in Vreede-De Steurs, 1960:42).

Regardless of what the traditional roles for women were, it is clear that during Suharto’s development era, women and their roles were of considerable political interest to the government. The government’s state gender ideology was a political ideology and represented what the government envisaged women’s roles should be.

The Indonesian government published statements concerning the role of women in its development program. An official Government Publication was released by the

People’s Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia as late as 1993.

46 The development of women’s roles as separate partners of men shall be directed towards improving the active participation in development activities including the effort to bring about a healthy prosperous and happy family as well as the development of children, young people and youth in the framework of building up the Indonesian man in his entirety (1993:130).

It may appear contradictory requesting women to participate in the development process while at the same time reminding them not to forget their God given destiny or kodrat as wives and mothers. In fact it has been argued that it was an example of the state’s well-planned use of different models of womanhood (Suryakusuma, 1991:47).

Precisely how women fulfilling their task as wives and mothers would aid in the development of the modern nation remained unclear. The belief that the former would contribute to the achievement of the latter sufficed. It also excused men from the chores of domesticity and ‘officially’ defined the home as the responsibility of women.

The ideological involvement of women in nationalist development political movements is often based on biological deterministic arguments concerning gender roles

(Kandiyoti, 1997, 1988 and 1998; MacLeod, 1992; Moghadam, 1994; Najmabadi, 1991 and Tohidi, 1991). There are two characteristics that generally manifest themselves with these doctrines. Firstly women’s primary function is defined by their ability to bear children. This natural ability positions them as close to nature. By contrast men are seen as divorced from nature and represent culture and artifice. This biological determinist ideology is what second wave western feminist writers such as Firestone argued is the basis of sexual inequality. For Firestone all inequality that women experience is derived from the biological inequality of the sexes (Tong, 1989:72).

47 Secondly, and related to the first point, is that women are seen as the representatives of the community’s morality. The nationalist discourse that assigns women the role of upholders of tradition is an extension of this view. This conservative type of gender politics has been utilised for the politics of modernity, development and nation building around the world (Baykan, 1990; Boserup, 1970 and Chhachhi, 1991).

The role of ‘bearers of tradition’ becomes crucial to the realisation of development objectives. An example of this is argued by Lake concerning the forging of the

Australian national identity (Lake, 1992). Lake observes that “Though women might breed the population, giving birth to babies, only men it seemed could give birth to the political entity, the imperishable community of the nation” (Lake, 1992:307). Lake’s work reveals how women’s roles in national development are often defined by biology or their ‘nature’.

National Family Planning

Under the heading of the ‘preservation of social welfare’, policy makers saw

Indonesia’s large and increasing population as a threat to sustaining the nation’s prosperity. Through the state’s official development policy, various programs were implemented to help control population growth, including the national family planning program.

The Institute for National Family Planning was established by 1968 and was followed by the National Family Co-ordinating Board in 1970 (World Bank, 1990:54-55). The objectives of the program included increasing the number of couples using contraceptives and promoting the ongoing use of contraception. It also meant making

48 the “individual, family and community responsible for decisions about family planning”

(World Bank, 1990:56).

The five guidelines (panca karya) of the program were: · Women under 30 were to have a maximum of two children, with their first delivery over the age of 20 · Women over 30 or women with three or more children were to receive the most effective means of fertility control · Teenagers were to postpone marriage and their first pregnancy by being given activities that provide alternatives to marriage · Areas with high contraceptive use were targeted for programs to improve the economic well being of the community · Family planning motivation was to be strengthened by improving old age security (World Bank, 1990:56).

Family planning programs continued to be an important aspect of government policy

(Grant, 1994:262). Women were assigned the responsibility of upholding family planning targets. These targets focused on limiting the number of children a couple had to two, thereby reducing the increase in the size of the nation’s population. (World

Bank, 1990:56)

In addition to the PKK and the Family Planning Board, the Suharto government created

Dharma Wanita, an organisation for the wives of the nation’s civil servants and female civil servants. The organisation was created as the support for the KORPRI (Korps

Pegawai Republik Indonesia – Indonesian Civil Servants Corp). KORPRI and Dharma

Wanita would support the notion that civil servants and their wives should share the same ideology; this would eliminate conflict in regards to religion and ethnicity

(Buchori and Soenarto, 2000: 139).

As an agent of the state, it soon became clear that Dharma Wanita was another tool for implementing the New Order’s political objectives (Sunindyo, 1996:124). Through the

49 political mechanisms supporting Dharma Wanita, the ideal role for women prescribes obedience, conformity and strictly monitored and controlled behaviour (Suryakusuma,

1996:100).

The New Order’s gender ideology combined with the process of demobilisation meant women were deeply implicated in New Order politics. It highlighted Suharto’s policy on controlling through consensus rather than disharmony. These terms originated during

Sukarno’s leadership and were later reinforced with the policies Suharto put in place.

By the early 1980s the government had implemented most of its major political and economic changes. The New Order government’s subsequent five-year plans focused on industrial growth maintaining private investment. Some attention was paid to enhancing health and educational services (Grant, 1994:251).

Imagining an Indonesian Community

Benedict Anderson’s work conceptualises nationalism as a type of ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1991). Despite the political ideologies that the government promoted throughout the community Anderson argues that no nation could be anything other than imagined.

It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion...rules that ‘Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist (Anderson, 1991:15).

The PKK was one vehicle to realise the New Order government’s imagined community.

The state promoted the idea that membership of the nation-wide PKK was equivalent to

50 membership of the Indonesian nation. The government’s perception of women’s roles was administered to all levels of society through the institutionalised structure of PKK.

The government’s creation of the imagined national community did not supplant but coincided with the social and familial relations that existed within society. However, in

Indonesian communities that had large numbers of migrants, the national family was constructed with relative ease. Once in the city, many migrants lacked any immediate kinship ties. For example many of the migrant women in the city of Malang lack familial support within their immediate community. The PKK therefore acted as their surrogate family. The extended, albeit metaphorical, family is the only form of family many of these women have.

Suharto’s Indonesia was portrayed as a nation with a shared identity. Women’s participation in their local PKK meetings enacted their role in the construction of

Indonesia’s modern identity. Within the PKK women wore uniforms and they still wear them as an expression of their inclusion, homogeneity and identification as members of the nation. The ideology embedded through uniformity was that everyone is equal. The homogeneity effectively camouflaged inequalities based on wealth, education and status.

Membership of the nationwide PKK became a tangible expression for membership of the nation. It promoted a type of patriotism into these local spaces that influenced the entire population. Although they had been citizens since the proclamation of independence in 1945, there was a new dimension to that citizenship. Their objectives were no longer private, but political concerns.

51 The government’s interest in the kampung and local communities meant people were continually monitored and investigated by the government. Indonesianist Norma

Sullivan (1994) outlines the direct part that PKK played in implementing governmental policies.

According to official accounts, the primary function of PKK ward level units is to transmit state and PKK ideologies to the mass of urban and rural women (Sullivan, 1994:66).

While technically all women were supposed to be part of PKK, the reality is that actual meetings are only ever comprised of a portion of the female population. The ideology therefore was important to sustain the perception that this small group of women was in fact the entire community.

Through their participation in the new state-run organisations women were supposed to fulfil their roles in development and help construct the perception of a united community. As women were officially designated the upholders of tradition, they are implicated in the quest for national identity.

Alternatives to New Order Politics

Indonesian NGOs emerged in opposition to the political rule of the New Order government. From the 1980s Indonesia witnessed an increase in the number NGOs

(Non Governmental Organisations) in society, some of which were directly confrontational. The increase in NGOs coincided with mass student activism and the

Indonesian cultural Islamic resurgence of the 1970s (Eldridge, 1990:506).

52 In his comprehensive study of non-governmental organisations in Indonesia, Eldridge outlines the organisations that existed during the New Order era (Eldridge, 1995).

Broadly an Indonesian NGO is an organisation which forms part of civil society, is not connected to the state and has a voluntary basis. Eldridge explains that there are different types of NGOs in Indonesia. Two forms of Indonesian NGOs include LSMs

Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (self reliant community institutions) and LPSMs

Lembaga Pengembangan Swadaya or the institution for developing community self reliance.

LSMs are primarily groups of poor people or local groups, which work directly with them, whereas LPSMs are larger usually city based groups which support or assist the development of smaller groups (Eldridge, 1995:13)

An LSM has a self-appointed board that decides policy and no membership base. In contrast the social institution, Ormas or Organisasi Masyarakat (Mass Organisation)

(Berninghausen and Kerstan, 1992:194) has a large membership base.

In the past, Indonesian political organisations had relied on their large membership base.

Many of the LSMs in Indonesia, including the one included in this study, do not have a membership base. This does not suggest they are a-political or seek to instigate social reform. The existence of alternative social organisations and the local community’s participation in such groups represents a form of mobilisation. Even during the confining era of the New Order government, parts of the community mobilised themselves and opposed the government’s policies.

53 The continued existence of social, religious and political organisations during Suharto’s leadership was determined by the government’s acceptance of their policies. This circumstance was not unique to the Suharto regime. In the discussion of the Japanese occupation (1942-1945) it was shown how the occupying force decided which organisations could exist. The selection was determined upon what suited their specific political and militaristic goals (Reid, 1974:15).

Since the 1980s there has been a growing interest in the importance of NGOs in

Indonesia. Eldridge sees this as occurring due to society’s perception of the function of

NGOs. The first assumption is that NGOs are concerned with the concept of self- determination in social and economic development. Secondly he attributes it to NGOs being viewed as a catalyst for promoting democratic values in Indonesia (Eldridge,

1995:1). The awareness of the affiliation of NGOs to democratic principles of change is critical in the era of social reform in Indonesia.

Of course, none of the five organisations analysed in this thesis are directly linked to political parties any more. In this sense, all five organisations are NGOs. In this thesis, the Indonesian labels LSM and LPSM will refer to the contemporary organisations that are actively campaigning for social change. The other women’s organisations in this study will not be referred to as LSMs.

Islamic Organisations

Other organisations that were perceived as non-political during the New Order rule were religious prayer groups. Islamic political parties were discouraged from voicing oppositional politics to the new government from 1973. However, other forms of

54 Islamic expressions began to emerge in the community. Local prayer groups for the most part were accepted as ‘cultural forms of Islamic interest’ and were tolerated. Due to the acceptability of NU in Indonesian society, the prayer groups grew in number and spread throughout Java.

To complement the government’s tolerance of cultural forms of Islam, the Department of Religion engaged in a program of infrastructural development. According to Hefner

(2000) this process was focused on the construction of mosques, prayer halls and

Islamic schools. In East Java the number of mosques rose from 15,583 in 1973, to

17,750 in 1979, to 20,648 in 1984 and to 24,655 in 1990 (Hefner, 2000:121). In the province of Central Java a similar pattern emerged where the number of mosques increased from 15,685 in 1980 to 28,724 in 1990 (Hefner, 2000:121).

Women’s organisations on the local level, including the PKK, Islamic prayer groups, social organisations and the few LSM/LPSMs that remained, were able to do so for a few important reasons. The government allowed their existence as those organisations in particular did not have a political voice that would challenge the state’s ideals. In the case of the PKK, their political ideals were synonymous with the Suharto government’s and did not pose a threat. In addition, the government perceived that social and non- political religious prayer groups would not be the basis for an attempted political challenge. This assumption was based mainly on the fact that they lacked a strong political base following Suharto’s limitation of the Islamic political parties. The organisations themselves were well aware of the consequences of popular participation in the fashion of PKI. The government’s annihilation of the PKI (1965-1966) was based on the organisation’s broad popularity and political voice.

55 Suharto needed the organisations that operated under his reign to be seen as the heirs of

Indonesian nationalism. The success of this claim would see local communities more receptive to the newly created state-run organisations. For this to be convincing, a number of organisations had to exist and operate on the local level. The existence of women’s prayer groups, social clubs and (politically silent) LSMs furthered the perception of the continuation of popular participation.

Summary

Political and religious organisations within Indonesia since the early twentieth century played an important part in the anti-colonialist and anti-Japanese nationalist movement.

Large-scale organisations had a political voice within Indonesian society. The political organisations that played a crucial part in this period included the PKI, PSI and PNI.

The Islamic organisations SI, Muhammadiyah, NU and Masyumi also had political voices within Indonesia.

The coming to power of the New Order government witnessed the demobilisation of society in the form of the prohibition of many political, social and religious organisations. The Suharto government remobilised the community by supplanting local organisations with state-run organisations. These newly devised organisations inhabited the space of the local kampung.

The New Order’s re-appropriation of gender ideology, together with its approach to demobilisation, saw women implicated in the New Order’s political plans with the

56 creation of the PKK. The creation of state-sponsored women’s organisations brought the government’s political ideas regarding development to the community’s front door.

The 1980s witnessed LSMs/LPSMs emerge as examples of modern day mobilisation.

They exemplified a change in terms of the conceptualisation of Indonesian mobilisation.

Mobilisation was no longer illustrated by political parties campaigning for power, as was the case in the lead up to independence, or in the 1950s. From the 1980s grass roots activism stood in opposition to the state instead of large-scale political parties.

The Islamic organisations which continued to exist under the New Order’s rule, fuelled the cultural Islamic revival in Indonesia (Ramage, 1995:79). Whilst Islamic parties, outside the PPP, were prohibited from entering politics, the Muslim organisations NU and Muhammadiyah continued to attract large numbers.

The changing political leadership Indonesia has experienced since the early twentieth

Century has seen mobilisation understood in a number of specific contexts.

Mobilisation was manifested in these contexts according to the motivations behind those mobilisations including anti-colonialism and religious sentiments.

This chapter has described the significant social, political and religious organisations which fuelled mass political mobilisation within Indonesia throughout the twentieth century. The following chapter will discuss the part that Indonesian women’s organisations played within this period of mobilisation, and how this shaped the way

Indonesian women’s organisations are discussed in contemporary times.

57 CHAPTER TWO

Indonesian Women’s Organisations

Between 1900 – 1949, Indonesian feminists saw women’s organisations as politically active, primarily due to their involvement in the nationalist movement. The historical perception of these organisations came to shape contemporary perceptions of these organisations. This chapter will outline the way the meanings associated with women’s organisations changed with the coming to power of the Suharto government.

Under President Suharto, women’s organisations became a focus of social control and a vehicle for the implementation of the state’s development policies. The New Order socialised women’s organisations into gendered associations concerned with domesticity. Overtly political women’s organisations were either banned or controlled by the government.

The earlier assumption that women’s organisations are politically active was increasingly difficult to apply to state-run women’s organisations. From the 1970s it was popular to define women’s organisations as ‘tools of the state’. The contemporary women’s organisations in Indonesia continue to be measured according to their resemblance to the pre-independence organisations.

The use of the term ‘empowerment’ is too often reserved to describe women’s access to political power. This chapter highlights the problems that accompany labelling women’s organisations as either empowering or disempowering for women.

58 Certainly, there are contemporary feminist debates that have engaged in the complexities of the term empowerment. The modern feminist debates about women’s empowerment provide insight into how women’s organisations have been analysed and defined hitherto. They also show how research on alternative forms of empowerment to emerge over the last decade is relevant to understanding the function of women’s organisations. Likewise, this chapter challenges conservative arguments that frame women’s organisations as needing to be political and to motivate change in order to provide empowerment.

However, the contemporary social and political meaning of local organisations lies outside this political empowerment debate. The research question will not be concluded in terms of whether women’s organisations successfully empower or disempower women. Therefore this chapter introduces the way local organisations have become embedded with social meaning, divorced from a discussion of political power or liberation. This chapter talks about women’s organisations as local spaces for women.

What will be revealed is how organisations tell the story about local communities, the opportunities available to women, politics and the complex roles of contemporary women’s organisations. It also introduces the idea that women themselves have responded to the government’s involvement in local spaces.

This chapter introduces the organisations analysed in this study. The organisations include the PKK, Tahlilan, SMC, LKBHWAK and PSW. This section maps the creation of each of the organisations and the political environment within which they developed.

The analysis of the five organisations reaffirms the significance of different women’s organisations and shows how women’s experiences are complex social realities. It

59 shows how political, religious, social and moral discourses pervade local women’s organisations.

Women’s Organisations 1900 – 1949

From the early part of the twentieth century the history of the Indonesian women’s movement was linked to the nationalist movement. At the end of the nineteenth century prominent Indonesian women campaigned for the rights of Indonesian people. Specific women became known for their support of the struggle against the Dutch. Amongst these well-known women were Cut Nyak Dien and Cut Meutia in Aceh, Roro Gusik in

Java, Martha Tiahua in the Moluccas and Emmy Saelan in South Sulawesi (Wieringa,

1988:71).

One influential figure of the Indonesian women’s movement, at the beginning of the twentieth century, was the Javanese princess Kartini. Born in 1879, RA Kartini is known for the letters she wrote to Dutch women between 1899 and 1904. Within these letters Kartini expressed her dissatisfaction with the limitations placed on Indonesian women.

Kartini was an advocate for educating Indonesian women. In one of her letters, written in January 1901, she outlined her desire for Indonesian women to be educated.

But how can the native women teach their children when they themselves are so ignorant? … Not only for women but for the whole of Indonesian society, education for girls would be a blessing (Kartini, 139, cited in Vreede-De Steurs, 1960:53).

60 Kartini set about rectifying the concern of women’s lack of education by establishing schools for girls in the early years of the twentieth century. The first girl’s school was opened in 1903 and run by Kartini with seven students (Vreede-De Steurs, 1960:55).12

Kartini believed women should be given the opportunity to be wage earners. She wrote in her letters that women needed to be independent and that this independence could be realised once women obtained an education and / or when they had the opportunity to earn a wage. Her letters were published after her death in 1904.

The issue of polygamy was the third and arguably most controversial concern facing

Indonesian women according to Kartini (Wieringa, 1988:72). Kartini herself was the daughter of the Regent of Djapara and her own mother was not the Regent’s principal wife raden ayu. Vreede-De Steurs notes that this reinforced her strong views concerning the evils of polygamy (Vreede-De Steurs, 1960:54).

In 1912, eight years after Kartini’s death, the first Indonesian women’s organisation

Putri Mardika (the Independent Woman) was founded in Yogyakarta (Wieringa,

1988:73). It was created with the aid of the men’s group Budi Utomo (Noble

Aspiration). Putri Mardika was established to aid in providing funds to ‘intelligent girls’ in order that they might pursue or continue their studies. The organisation also had a clear interest in getting women involved in social life (Vreede-De Steurs, 1960:62).

12 Additional schools for Indonesian girls were also opened by Dewi Sartika in 1904 - Keutamaan Istri (Women’s Accomplishment) (Vreede-De Steurs, 1960:56).

61 Other women’s organisations established soon after the founding of Putri Mardika including Keutamaan Istri (The Improvement of Women) which focused on education.

Keutamaan Istri created and ran schools for girls. Other well-known women’s organisations to emerge around that time included Pawijatan Wanito (The Educated

Woman) which was created in 1915, Wanito Hadro (the Efficient Woman) also created in 1915, and the Wanito Susilo (The Well Bred Woman) created in 1918 (Vreede-De

Steurs, 1960:63).

Throughout the first two decades of the twentieth century Indonesian women’s organisations focused on improving women’s place in society13, but there were also some nationalist dimensions. The title of an article published in the independent publication Wanito Sworo (The Voice of the Woman) in 1919, read ‘The Javanese nation will not progress if Javanese women remain ignorant’ (Soendari, 1984:IXB3, cited Vreede-De Steurs, 1960:64). This title implied that women were important for success in the emerging nationalist struggle.

Religious women’s organisations also began to appear in Indonesia in the early decades of the twentieth century. Aisyiyah, the women’s section of the Islamic organisation

Muhammadiyah formed in 1917, was the first Indonesian Islamic organisation that involved women from the lower classes. The creation of Aisyiyah gave Indonesian

Muslim women a visible presence in society. Organised Islamic institutions became a new source of religious knowledge for women.

13 This entailed improving women’s access to education in household practices, dressmaking classes and gaining knowledge about child welfare (Vreede-De Steurs, 1960:64).

62 The Muslim women’s movement of the last ten years has revealed what religious energy lay hidden in the hearts of Indonesian women, especially those of the lower and middle classes; this movement increased their religious consciousness and their knowledge of their religion (Fragmentica Islamica:27, cited in Vreede-De Steurs, 1960:66).

The Islamic organisation Sarekat Islam had a section for women originally named

Wanudijo Utomo later changed to Sarekat Perempuan Islam Indonesia (SPII Federation of the Muslim Women of Indonesia (Vreede-De Steurs, 1960:66). The large-scale

Islamic organisations made women a part of their large-scale mobilisation.

By the 1920s more politically radical women’s organisations began to emerge. One of the first women’s organisations in Indonesia to publicly voice concern for the difficulties of working class women was the organisation Sarekat Rakyat (People’s

Association). Sarekat Rakyat organised political demonstrations in Central Java in 1926 demanding higher wages and better working conditions for female workers (Wieringa,

1988:74). Their political protests, aimed at labour representation, continued into the

1930s.

The first Indonesian Women’s Congress was held in Yogyakarta in December 1928.

Two of the prominent topics raised at the congress included education and marriage.

One important outcome of the congress was the founding of a Federation of Indonesian

Women, Perikatan Perempuan Indonesia (PPI). The goal of the PPI was to improve the social position of women and family life as a whole (Vreede-De Steurs, 1960:89).

The PPI’s second meeting was held in December 1929. The organisation’s name was

63 changed in 1929 to Perikatan Perhimpunan Isteri Indonesia (PPII Federation of

Indonesian Women’s Associations).14

The women’s organisation Isteri Sedar (Alert Wives) created in 1930 has been identified as the most radical women’s organisation of its time (Wieringa, 1988:74).

This label was earned by its members’ outspoken criticism of the Dutch government, which was rare at the time.

The members of Isteri Sedar refused to compromise on the issues of polygamy and divorce (Wieringa, 1988:74). Isteri Sedar was increasingly disillusioned with the seemingly passive approach of the PPII. The political radicalism of Isteri Sedar began to provoke opposition from organisations including Sarekat Istri Jakarta.

In the opinion of Isteri Sedar, a federation such as the PPII, which brings together associations that vary considerably from each other in their ideas on religion, social land national problems, would never be able to make up its mind to take decisive steps to root out social evil (Vreede-De Steurs, 1960:91).

By 1932 women’s organisations joined with men’s organisations to support the nationalist struggle. Members of the organisation Isteri Sedar attached themselves to the

PNI. In Indonesia after 1945, women became an integral part of the nationalist struggle and were actively recruited by men in support of the nationalist struggle (Wieringa,

1988:75).

In December 1945 a national women’s congress was held in Klaten, and again in

February the following year in Solo. At the meeting in Solo it was decided to form a

14 (Vreede-De Steurs, 1960:90).

64 permanent organisation called The Indonesian Women’s Congress or Badan Kongres

Wanita Indonesia (KOWANI). KOWANI embodied “Perwari, PPII, the Protestant

Association Persatuan Wanita Kristen Indonesia and the women’s section of the

Indonesian Catholic Party” (Vreede-De Steurs, 1960:115). KOWANI acted as a federation of all women’s organisations supporting the liberation of Indonesian people

(Wieringa, 1988:76).

The second post-war congress of Indonesian women took place in June 1946. At this time members of KOWANI decided that they “would help the Republican army in every possible way against the Dutch, they would organise soup kitchens and mobilise columns between the front line and undertake other activities of this kind” (Vreede-De

Steurs, 1960:115). Women’s organisations and the Indonesian women’s congress officially aligned themselves with the nationalist cause.

Up until the end of the fighting in 1949, Kowani had been directed toward unifying and consolidating national strength and power. Differences of opinion on religious and political matters had not been raised. All energy had been centred on helping the revolutionary government to gain independence for the country (Vreede-De Steurs, 1960:117).

Members of KOWANI also agreed to operate under the five principles of Pancasila, which were devised by Sukarno in 1945. The acceptance of Sukarno’s nationalist sentiments further linked Indonesian women’s organisations to the nationalist fervor after 1945.

Women became conscious of the part they had to play as “mothers of their people” and fitted themselves for the task of educating the new generation. The second phase, which dates from the establishment of sovereignty of the Indonesian Republic, found the women’s movement active in the building up of the new independent state (Vreede-De Steurs, 1960:123).

65 The political activities of early Indonesian women’s organisations such as Gerwani,

Kowani and Isteri Sedar established them as politically active.

Women’s Organisations, Activism and Empowerment

Due to their involvement in Indonesia’s political mobilisation (1900-1949) women gained access to political decision-making power. This can be seen in the growing political messages of women’s organisations from the 1920s to the late 1940s. The historical role of women’s organisations has led to the assumption by local and foreign writers that early organisations were the vehicles for women’s access to political power in Indonesia.

The concept of power has long been of interest to scholars within the social sciences.

Ultimately, the concept provides a way of understanding the way individuals relate to one another. Development researcher, Jo Rowlands, observes that research about women and empowerment has favoured the idea of power as being political, related to decision-making and ultimately the notion of ‘power-over’15. This definition of power refers to the extent to which one is able to control in some way the actions or options of another (Rowlands, 1998:12). Within this definition, power is synonymous with the ability to control, influence, determine or change events. In these terms ‘to be empowered’ is measured in political terms.

This notion of power divides the category of its subject into either one who has power or as one who is powerless. Through action one has the power over another. Power

15 See Rowlands for further discussion and alternative definitions of women and power (Rowland, 1998:12-14).

66 infers the presence of domination and control over and, in its absence, that of subjugation or oppression. It sees “power as negative involving restrictions and deprivations for those subjected to domination” (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner,

1984:329).

This interpretation of power was popular with liberal feminists of the second wave feminist movement in the ‘West’. According to feminist writer Betty Friedan, if women have the same employment, education, and financial opportunities as men, they have access to power. In this instance women have power over resources, which leads to their accumulation of power. The acquisition of power for women thus came to be measured through their relationship with social structures (Tong, 1989:11). Women’s empowerment is evident when women secure access to the processes of policy-making at the local, national and international levels (Afshar, 1998:6).

Women’s engagement in nationalist political debates leads them to be seen as political agents (Afshar, 1998:7). If power is about politics, women’s involvement in politics is further acquisition of their control within society. Indonesian women’s empowerment was reinforced through the political clout women’s organisations held during the first half of the twentieth century. During this period women were engaged in politics, had voting rights and played a significant role in Indonesia’s nationalist struggle. These were all proof of Indonesian women’s access to political power.

The New Order and Empowerment.

The political function of women’s organisations underwent change after independence.

During the New Order government rule, sponsorship and control of organisations,

67 including women’s organisations led to the dismissal of their value as vehicles for women’s empowerment. Instead, the era of Indonesian development (1970s-1980s) saw the Suharto government utilise women’s organisations in its political agenda.

Given Indonesian women’s history of vocal political involvement in the nationalist struggle, how did it come to be that in the 1970s women were seen as in need of empowering?

Local and international feminists claim that the coming to power of the New Order regime in 1966 symbolised a detrimental change for women’s organisations in

Indonesia (Agusni, 1997; Sullivan, 1994; Suryakusuma, 1991 and Wieringa, 1988).

This detrimental change is most frequently illustrated with the New Order government’s prohibition of political women’s organisations.

Women’s organisations, which existed during the 1980s and early 1990s, became labelled as political tools of the state (Robinson 1989, Sullivan 1994 and Wieringa

1985, 1988, 1992). These tools, Sullivan argues, were used in the government’s implementation of the development policies of the 1970s (Sullivan, 1994:127). They were not ‘real’ women’s organisations, as they did not allow women to voice opposition to the government.

For Wieringa, the depoliticisation of Indonesian women’s organisations brought about the end to ‘real’ women’s organisations in Indonesia. For both Wieringa (1988) and

Sullivan (1994), contemporary Indonesian women’s organisation’s worth is measured

68 by their ability to empower women. The legacy of early political activism of women’s organisations has been the expectation of their full participation in political life.

Modern-day organisations are often judged in terms of what they are not. That is, they have been criticised by local and international scholars for their lack of involvement in national politics, their lack of political clout and for not accessing power for Indonesian women.

Development and Empowerment

The need for women in developing countries to be empowered has been the cornerstone of the women and development discourse since the 1970s (Rowlands, 1998:12). Within the development paradigm one of the responsibilities of overseas aid agencies is to empower women in developing countries.

There is an onus placed on local women to become involved in development policies.

The consequence of women’s involvement in development schemes is that they will have opportunities to be political agents.

The view is that women should somehow ‘be brought into development’ and become ‘empowered’ to participate within the economic and political structures of society. They should be given the chance to occupy positions of ‘power’, in terms of political and economic decision-making (Rowlands, 1998:12).

Within development discourse, the level to which women are empowered in developing countries is measured by the number of women in any given country who hold positions of power. Hancock (2001) outlined the impact of the 1994 Human Development Report and the inclusion of the ‘Gender Empowerment Measure’ (Hancock, 2001:75).

69 The GEM ranks nations according to the extent, to which gender equality has improved over time, using indicators based upon economic and political country data… The following indicators are used by the UNDP to create a composite gender empowerment measurement of GEM: · The proportion of seats held by women in parliament; · The proportion of female administrators and managers; · The proportion of female professional and technical workers · Women’s real GDP per capita (Hancock, 2001:75).

In the 1999 GEM, Indonesia was ranked 71st of 201 countries (Hancock, 2001:75).

Hancock criticises these methods of measuring and defining women’s empowerment.

Once again women’s empowerment is derived from the control they have over economic resources. That is, if women have access to financial gain, they are seen as political agents and thereby empowered. If women do not seek to obtain these positions they will not be thought of as empowered.

The problems surrounding this way of measuring power are obvious. It presumes that if certain women access economic wealth then this can be used as a measure of women’s empowerment. Hancock argues that certain women’s access to prestigious employment

“does not mean that all women in that nation would automatically become empowered”16 (Hancock, 2001:75). It does not consider the different social class, economic, religious and political differences that may hinder women’s access to certain forms of political power.

The question is never asked if most women have aspired to hold positions of power.

Measures such as the attainment of high paid jobs, and professional or political careers can only be of limited relevance for the majority of women who do not even share these aspirations. It therefore provides no reliable measure of power in everyday life. This

16 Also see Afshar, 1998:7.

70 conceptualisation of power “fails to recognise that non-decision-making may also be an exercise of power” (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 1984:330).

Empowerment as Local Gains

The discussion of women’s (political) empowerment shows how the socio-political meaning of women’s organisations needs to be understood within a specific political context. Even throughout the first half of the twentieth century Indonesian women’s organisations were still being understood in one way, that being, the extent to which they could act as vehicles for women’s political power.

The discussion of empowerment is mentioned here to problematise the nature of defining women’s empowerment as predominantly about women’s access to political power. This thesis argues that demanding women’s organisations instigate political change imposes a function on these institutions which may not reflect their own objectives. This particular conceptualisation of the term denies contemporary local organisations an opportunity to define themselves and to uphold their own identity.

The term empowerment needs to be understood in specific contexts. As Afshar points out, empowerment means different things for women in various locations at specific times (Afshar, 1998:9). A workable definition of empowerment needs to consider the life options and possibilities available to women in various locations. It should avoid making assumptions about how all women live. In particular it needs to reconsider the different ways women can be empowered. For example, can women experience a form of empowerment not based on notions of political power? Can women’s resistance, choices, opportunities and experiences be reflective of their own decisions that do not

71 inhabit the domain of politics? In short, can the local lives of women reveal as much or more about women as a quantitative analysis of how many women vote or hold executive positions?

The dilemma about how to define and measure empowerment in a culturally specific form is embedded in post-structural feminist debates about women and difference. The discourse of ‘women and development’ has been criticised by post-structural and third world feminists for its unitary understanding of power and lack of attention to difference (see Mohanty, Russo and Loudes Torres, 1991; Lazreg, 1994 and Karim

1995). In order to problematise the experiences of empowerment it needs to be considered how social issues including class, gender, politics, religion, ethnicity and history interconnect.

Women’s differences are brought to the forefront in this study of the socio-political meaning of women’s organisations. The organisations in this study are political,

Islamic, social and activist in their orientations. This work provides an alternative to talking about women’s organisations in a uniform manner. Rather than assume that women’s organisations should be political, it looks at how these organisations define themselves and what they seek to achieve.

Women’s membership experiences impact on their lives in the local kampung. The social meanings of women’s organisations are understood on the local level and not in political terms. The study places an emphasis on the origins of each organisation, the

72 way women view their participation, why local women join in organisations and the way the organisations offer women different experiences.

The aim of this study is to examine women’s organisations on the local level. However, this is not to lose sight of the fact that women’s organisations are influenced by national politics. This analysis of the contemporary socio-political meaning of women’s organisations considers both the local and national significance of women’s organisations.

Five Local Organisations in Malang

Women’s organisations are social places where members have the opportunity to meet together and participate in community-based activities, meetings and discussions. The term ‘women’s organisation’ used here refers to any group for women which inhabits a local space in society. A woman’s organisation may be social, religious or political in its motivation. The relationship between an organisation and the government or any other social, political or religious institution is not a determining factor in this definition.

PKK

The Department of Home Affairs was responsible for the nation-wide control and direction of PKK17. At the executive level, PKK was aligned with the central bureaucracy through the Jakarta-based central executive. The ex-officio head is the wife of the minister for home affairs (Sullivan, 1994:61).

17 The ministry of Internal Affairs is now responsible for the running of the PKK (Marcoes, 2001:15).

73 Women are appointed to leadership positions within the PKK based on their husband’s status. The wife of Pak RW, the male leader of the district, is known as Bu18 RW, (figure

1.0). She automatically becomes the leader of the RW level of PKK for that region. This method of allocating leadership positions was implemented at the organisation’s inception in 1973 and remains in place at the present time.

18 Bu RW refers to the female leader of the RW.

74 Hierarchy of PKK

Kelurahan (Ketua -Leader)

Sekretaris (Secretary)

Pokja (i-iv) Kelompok Kerja – Working Group

Rukun Warga (RW) municipal government administrative unit. Consists of between 8- 12 RT representatives.

Rukun Tetangga (RT) Neighbourhood Associations. Comprised of 10 families or Desa

Wisma

Desa Wisma (Groups of 10 families that make up one RT)

Masyarakat - Society

Figure 1.0

75 The PKK method of recruiting women according to their husband’s status is similar to the way women were recruited into the Japanese organisation Fujinkai. The patriarchal structure of the PKK and its leadership selection process restricts women’s capacity to choose their own representatives. For Sullivan, this patriarchal ideology and organisation undermines any claims it makes as being a real organisation for women’s interests and empowerment (Sullivan, 1994:80).

The state-created PKK is a vehicle for particular class and cultural interests.

Nevertheless the nature of the PKK hierarchy ensured that even the poorest women in

Indonesia were reached. Wieringa notes that poor women have resented the hierarchical structure.

Through the wives groups, the ruling military bureaucracy controlled women and men in the lower echelons of the Indonesian government hierarchy. The younger and lower members of these wives organisations often resent their enforced participation in the activities, as they have hardly any influence on what is going on (Wieringa, 1988:86).

The newly formed PKK placed an emphasis on the subordination of personal wants and desires to their social obligation to the family and the nation (Brenner, 1996:690).

Leaders of the PKK organisations encouraged women to participate in the family and social development process. The government’s policies encouraged women to develop by learning what was expected of them from their nation.

The government obtained in-depth personal information about members of the community through this structure. Personal details of women’s lives were known to the state. These details included a couple’s choice of contraception and a detailed record of all pregnancies (BPS, 2001:104). The information was gathered under the banner of

76 health and development. Indonesian writer Suryakusuma argues that the state’s creation of the nation-wide structure of PKK was a means by which the state could monitor women’s behaviour (Suryakusuma, 1991:46). This form of monitoring would ensure that women adhered to the principles governing the state family planning program. This was encapsulated in the government slogan “Dua Anak Cukup” (Two Children are

Enough).

At the outset each neighbourhood PKK was responsible for carrying out a series of programs and maintaining rules and regulations. Officials further up the hierarchy administered the rules. There were consequences if indiscretions occurred, such as a woman’s failure to attend monthly meetings. The process entailed the leader of the local

RT section was obligated to inform the leader of the RW level, who in turn would inform the leader of Kelurahan (Pak Lurah) (figure 1.0).

PKK’s connection with the New Order government gave the meetings and their activities a sense of social and political validity. The fact that the government endorsed women’s participation throughout the 1970s gave the PKK meetings ‘official’ recognition within the community.

The government’s connection to the PKK met with criticism from politically minded women throughout Indonesia. Members of two LSMs in Malang (‘Enlightment’ and

LKBHWAK), voiced their criticisms about what they saw as the ‘over-representation’ of the state in the administration of the PKK.

77 During the New Order period, the PKK was accused of displaying an active political role in the ruling party at the time Golongan Karya Golkar, (Functional Groups). The accusation was that PKK leaders were using undue influence persuading (through payment) their fellow PKK members to vote for Golkar at national elections.

The local members of the Malang LSMs I spoke with said that they believed women’s organisations should not be linked to government policy (fieldwork 2000). They reasoned that if the state was linked to women’s organisations, then women were less likely to put forward their own requests, ideas or complaints.

At the monthly PKK meetings women learn practical skills related to cooking, cleaning and purchasing essential food products. Within their local PKK (RT) meetings women learn how to take care of their families. It also offers women the opportunity to meet together, outside their own homes, to discuss issues relevant to their lives.

Members of PKK, especially those in positions of power, Bu RT or Bu RW, gained social mobility through their PKK affiliations. Access to leadership roles gave some women more social status and an identity otherwise absent within the New Order era.

Contemporary PKK

The last six years have been marked by social and political change for Indonesian society. The stepping down of Suharto in May 1998 and the subsequent changes in

President promised social reform and democratisation. The present era of reform has witnessed a decline in the government’s political interest in the running and operations of PKK. Nor has President Megawati Sukarnoputri, since her appointment on 23rd July

78 2001, shown an interest in PKK. Within the new era of reform, women are no longer obliged to participate in their local RT PKK organisation. Women continue to participate in their local PKK even though it is no longer compulsory.

Another change to come about for PKK was the acronym PKK itself. The P, which in the past stood for Pembinaan (construction or founding), was changed in 1998, after

Suhato’s resignation, to Pemberdayaan (empowerment).

The change of the name of PKK from pembinaan to pemberdayaan was more than cosmetic. The significance of the concept pemberdayaan reflects at least a conceptual change in the image of the nation-wide women’s organisation. This change in image was official, endorsed by the Indonesian government.

If PKK originated during the period of development, then it needed a new identity that would coincide with wider reform in Indonesia. With the utilisation of the concept empowerment, PKK was no longer linked to Indonesian development. Instead it was concerned about possibilities for women’s political power (empowerment) and social reform.

It is interesting to note however that what empowerment entailed, and how it would be implemented has never been explained. Whether or not the change of the acronym brought about an increase in women’s social status is more difficult to measure.

According to the women I interviewed in Malang, the conceptual change to include the term empowerment saw no real change in how the PKK was perceived within the community.

79 In addition to the name change, the financial basis of the PKK has also changed.

Funding for PKK is now received from a mixture of private and government sources.

Until three years ago, (1998) all their funding came from the Government, sustaining all their activities. Since the demise of the former New Order government however, efforts are made to find additional funding outside Government circles, and to support these relatively small and localised organisations more self - sufficient (Marcoes, 2001:42).

In Malang the members of the PKK organisation still participate in the local activities.

They continue their attendance at meetings and encourage communal participation. It is the local women themselves who sustain the social significance of the organisation in society.

The RT and RW meetings in Malang continue to draw large numbers. In the kampung where this study was carried out, women in the local community attended their local

PKK RT meetings. The meetings begin with the leader saying an Islamic prayer. The members then sing the PKK song in unison. The women enact the social ritual of berkumpul. Berkumpul refers to the Javanese tradition of coming together, which symbolises social solidarity, and belonging. Women’s attendance at local activities is one of the main reasons behind the continuation of the social organisation.

According to the survey responses from local members of the PKK (appendix II), one of the most important functions of the modern day PKK program is the kesehatan (health) program. The troubled condition of the Indonesian economy and high costs of medicine make it a highly valued service. Half of the Malang women surveyed said they could

80 not afford the high cost (at least 25,000 rupiah19) of a private consultation with a doctor.

They choose instead to go to Puskesmas to access medical treatment.

The local Puskesmas serves the entire community. During 2000, I conducted interviews with some of the women who worked at the local Puskesmas. The workers themselves are well aware of the financial difficulties in obtaining health care in Malang.

With Puskesmas nowadays you can get a card that says you are not rich and you can get medicine for 500 rupiah (Interview # 16).

The need to access affordable health-care and medication is vital for the poor communities in Malang. Without the local Puskesmas, poor women in the kampung could not access this cheap medical attention and would have no alternative but to rely on traditional remedies to cure their illnesses. The standard of health-care offered in these centres initiates a more complex debate that will not be entered into here. Suffice to say that the medicine provided is of a basic standard and complicated conditions or patients requiring specialised treatment or surgery are not treated at the Puskesmas.

Along with the Puskesmas, there is a second health program run throughout Indonesia called posyandu. Posyandu is a government health initiative whereby free health-care and information about women’s reproductive health is provided to poor communities.

Another of the main themes of the program is teaching pregnant women about postnatal care and nutrition.

19 At time of research $1 AU = 5,000 Rpp.

81 In Malang the monthly posyandu session takes place at the homes of the PKK members.

The members take turns hosting the activity. On any one day between one hundred and one hundred and thirty women arrive with their babies and small children to receive free check ups and vaccinations. Men are seldom present at posyandu. Family health care is seen as women’s responsibility.

In Malang the posyandu is a lively, fun and busy social activity. The paid officials in charge of posyandu are Indonesian civil servants. At the local posyandu there were only three paid staff members on duty. They were assisted by ten PKK (RW) women from the local area. The PKK women wore their brown PKK (social) uniform and assisted the paid staff in the weighing of babies, serving of tea and advising mothers how best care for their children.

It involves the implementation of a number of health related practices, foremost directed at pregnant women and newborn babies. This involves mostly practical efforts to improve babies health (and their mothers), by providing extra nutritional foodstuffs, and weighing regularly. In addition regular physical check ups are carried out, as well as the implementation of an immunisation-program, information concerning family planning. And the use of contraceptives (Marcoes, 2001:12-13).

The PKK, Puskesmas and the posyandu, which originated in the 1970s, are still utilised today by local communities to access basic medical attention. The continued reliance on these centres signifies the successful organisation of the PKK in kampung life.

It is maintained until today by PKK - members that the programs addressing general health care, education, and household economics have been successful (Marcoes, 2001:13).

It is important to note that this contrasts with the role of the state in national health-care during the 1970s. Academic and activist Marcoes, argues that the PKK ignored basic

82 women’s rights by denying them autonomy over their own body and reproductive health

(Marcoes, 2001:14). The use of public health centres were once seen more as a vehicle to enforce the government’s family planning policies than of fulfilling an essential social service.

As well as increased health-care costs, Indonesian families have suffered from rising prices and stagnant wages since the 1997 monetary crisis. This economic situation has seen the need to borrow money become an everyday reality for some kampung women.

Families on low incomes utilise the facility within the PKK that permits members to borrow money. The facility is known as simpan pinjam (save/borrow). Women continue to use simpan/pinjam to borrow money in order to manage their households. The economic crisis and rising prices had reinforced women’s ties to the PKK.

The city of Malang does have official lending institutions including banks and credit unions. The majority of these are located within the city of Malang, only a short distance from the kampung. The topic of banks and credit unions arose during informal discussions and taped interviews with local women. I asked the women if they had ever thought about opening a bank account or applying for a bank loan. The women responded by saying they would never go to a bank. A few of the women said that they distrusted banks. Other women said that the bank would not lend them the small amounts of money that they needed to borrow (between 20,000 and 100,000 rupiah). All of the women I spoke with said that banks in Malang were only for orang mampu (well- off people) in the community. Therefore poorer women in Malang rely solely on their family or fellow PKK members to borrow the money they need. The women interviewed did not seem to have much understanding of, or interest in, how banks

83 operated. Many institutions and establishments including banks, insurance agencies, restaurants and shopping centres (as opposed to local markets) were perceived as outside the kampung and therefore not relevant to the lives of local women.

In addition to the simpan pinjam component of the PKK, is the lottery / saving system known as arisan. The arisan is a social activity that is based on women in the community each contributing a small amount of money at each meeting. The women take turns to shake two dice in a teacup. This process continues until each woman has had three turns. The one to get the highest pair from the three turns is the winner. The arisan can be based on cash, rice, sugar or anything else that the women choose. The activity doubles as a type of forced saving as the women can only win once.

Women seek credit and loans from within the local PKK simpan pinjam or arisan.

They borrow money to meet basic costs of food and educational expenses for their children. About twenty of the women I interviewed said that they have to borrow money every month. The PKK provides women with essential monetary help that is not easily accessed through other avenues.

Tahlilan

The Islamic organisations Muhammadiyah and NU have continued to attract large numbers of supporters since their founding in 1912 and 1926 respectively. Their strong membership base reinforces society’s perception of these organisations as important religious organisations. NU is the largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia. It has between twenty and thirty million members (Ramage, 1995:204). Similarly, the two largest women’s associations affiliated with large-scale Islamic organisations Aisyiyah

84 and Muslimat have always received considerable amount of popular support (Marcoes,

2001:16).

The women’s section of the nation-wide Islamic organisation Nahdlatul Ulama (NU),

Muslimat, was established in 1946, one year after the declaration of independence

(Marcoes, 2001:17). The kampung affiliate of Muslimat is the local prayer group known as Tahlilan which is centred on Islamic beliefs concerning praying for the deceased’s journey to the afterlife.

Tahlilan’s connection to Nahdlatul Ulama makes it respectable in the eyes of the wider society. Marcoes discusses the local women’s prayer organisations and the role that its umbrella organisation (NU) plays in maintaining their social significance.

The organisational structure of the women’s organisations from NU, Muslim and Fatayat, and Muhammadiyah, Aisyiyah, is not formally linked, and they are presented as autonomous organisations. However, in reality they can be seen as a particular division of their ‘umbrella’ organisations (Marcoes, 2001:39).

Tahlilan’s affiliation with NU ensures that it is never completely separate from the political debates surrounding Islam in Indonesia. The growing interest in Islam within

Indonesian society was strengthened and not damaged by NU’s withdrawal from national politics in 1984 (Schwarz, 1994:172). The increasing visual presence of non- political Islamic rituals and prayer groups acted as an unofficial statement about the role of Islam in local communities.

85 In contrast to Tahlilan, the women’s group Aisyiyah, affiliated with Muhammadiyah, claims to be ‘radical’ in its objectives. Marcoes finds that Aisyiyah runs more pro-active campaigns for women.

Aisyiyah, opened in 1917, has continued to concentrate its social programs in urban areas. It made the problems of tackling urban poverty one of its most clearly formulated issues. Underlying this pre-occupation with urban poverty, however was the belief that Muslims in urban areas were not always devout followers of Islam (Marcoes, 2001:19)

Members of Aisyiyah see themselves as crusaders demanding a modern Islam for a modern Indonesia. The less political members of the local prayer organisations Tahlilan represent those who want Islam to remain unchanged.

Although the Suharto Government attempted to politically silence Islam in the national arena, Islam’s “popularity as a source of social, ethical and spiritual advice began to rise” (Schwarz, 1994:173). The changing social, religious and political significance of

Indonesian Islam from the 1980s, including the growing cultural significance of Tahlilan as a religious organisation, has been referred to as Indonesia’s cultural Islamic revival.

Islamic Revivalism

According to Schwarz, the result of the national de-politicisation of Islam in Indonesia was that Indonesian people began to perceive Islam as “a safe alternative to the heavily circumscribed political structure” (Schwarz, 1994:164). The increasing number of people attending Islamic institutions represented the popular face of Indonesian Islam.

86 Throughout Indonesia’s ‘Islamisation process’, Islamic communities within Indonesia began to demand religious change to fit their changing world.

{Younger Muslims} are looking for a new understanding of their religion that gives them a more realistic set of guidelines, really a code of ethics, for private and family life and for dealing with the outside world. They want to know what are the rights and responsibilities of husbands and wives, how to raise their sons and daughters to be good Muslims and good Indonesians, how to relate to a modern banking system, whether and how to revitalise the concept of zakat (religious tax), and even how to deal with such exotica as test tube babies, organ transplants and homosexuality (Liddle cited in Schwarz, 1994:174).

Learning to be ‘good Muslims’ was of growing concern within Indonesia’s cultural

Islamic revival. This increasing interest in Islam is in part seen as a result of modernity.

Piscatori (1986) sees Islamic revivalism as a response to the need for meaning in a rapidly changing world.

Most Muslims, like virtually everyone else in the developed and developing world, are feeling ill at ease with a way of life that places less and less emphasis on loyalties to the family and seems to find religious institutions increasingly irrelevant. Religion precisely because in the past it answered questions on life and death and provided its followers with moral links to each other, becomes the means by which individuals hope to answer the new question of what it is to be modern, and in so doing to gain perhaps a reassuring common world view (Piscatori, 1986:31).

During a ‘universal crisis of modernity’ people hold tightly to their religious beliefs

(Piscatori, 1986). Emphasis is placed on religion in the hope of bringing stability to people’s lives through answering such questions as ‘what it means to be modern’. In times of confusion and suffering people turn to religion to help make sense of the crisis at hand.

87 Indonesia’s cultural Islamic revival in the 1980s was influenced by international Islamic events such as the revolution in Iran. The success of the Iranian Muslim political leader

Ayatollah Khomeini in the 1978-1979 revolution was a significant event for Muslims around the world.

The Iranian revolution provided lessons to awaken Muslims and to restore their confidence in their religion and their adherence to it, so they may assume the reins of world leadership of mankind once again and place the world under the protection of the esteemed civilisation (Esposito, 1992:20).

The effect of this political victory for Islam should not be underestimated. The influence it had on Indonesia, the largest Muslim population in the world, also needs to be acknowledged.

An important factor in the character of the Indonesian Islamic revival was the changed relationship between the government and Islamic leaders. The way the secular interests of the state and the demands of religious organisations clashed is not unique to

Indonesia. This argument is located within a larger discourse concerning international

Islamic revivalism and modernity. In his work, Hefner explores questions concerning what role Islam can, or should play amidst the process of democratisation. The questions raise concern how a secular state can attempt to satisfy Islamic voices and values. He looks at how Islam is currently implicated in Southeast Asian countries process of democratisation (Hefner, 1997:3).

Suharto’s new found interest in Islam had its roots back in the 1960s. Under Suharto’s leadership Islamic education was expanded under the Indonesian Ministry of Religions.

This was realised with the enormous expansion and funding of Indonesian State Islamic 88 Institute Colleges, IAIN (Hefner, 1997:88). The ministry also supported the need for religious propagation or dakwah in Indonesia. By the 1970s and 1980s Indonesia witnessed large numbers of graduates emerge, trained in Islamic theology20.

In addition to the increasing number of educated Islamic leaders, came the Indonesian

Ministry of Religion’s ‘Decision Number 70’ in the late 1970s to ban missionising. The

“decision banned missionising by members of any one religion (Christianity being the main target) among citizens who already professed, however nominally, another government recognised religion” (Hefner, 1997:87). The ban on conversion was seen as the President giving his support and preference to Indonesian Islam over other religious groups.

In 1984 Suharto passed a law demanding all social, political and religious organisations within Indonesia accept Pancasila as their asas tunggal (single basis) or sole philosophical foundation (Schwarz, 1994:36). The passing of this law challenged the government’s support for Muslims and Islamic education. Muslim communities within

Indonesia were divided by this act. The passing of the law in 1984 meant that Islam was no longer confined to specific political parties. It did however have the unexpected consequence of leading to what is called the ‘greening’21 of the Indonesian political campaign in the early 1990s (Hefner, 1997:89).

Although the government implemented laws limiting the political power of Islamic organisations, its actions fuelled the increasing popularity of Islam in society. Although

20 This parallels the argument in the first chapter whereby exposure to western thought and Marxism, influenced Indonesian nationalism of the 1950’s. The government’s sponsorship of Islamic institutions had the effect of producing highly educated and politically motivated Islamic theologans. 21 ‘Green’ is referred to as the colour of Islam (Hefner, 1997).

89 from 1978-1988 there was a general decline in the influence of Muslim parties, there was at the same time a great leap forward in the social and intellectual vitality of the community (Hefner, 1997:86).

To coincide with the government’s newfound interest in Islam many religious places of worship, some in the remotest areas, were erected with Government funding. Religious ceremonies ‘the bigger, the better’ were also generously funded.22

In December 1990 four Islamic students at the University Brawijaya, Malang, formed a new Islamic organisation was formed known as ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim

Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals’ Association). Other writers argue that in reality it was the result of many years of Indonesian Islamic leaders planning an intellectually based Indonesian Islamic organisation (Hefner, 1997:94).

The ICMI was initially comprised of a variety of Muslim leaders including technologists, moderate Muslim representatives and non-governmental Muslim leaders.

ICMI was divided from the outset. One of the major splits was between “those who wanted to work closely with the government and those who hoped to see ICMI act more independently” (Hefner, 1997:94).

The establishment of ICMI in 1990 is significant, as it was the only major Islamic organisation established during the New Order era. It was also the first time that

President Suharto directly supported the creation of a nation-wide Islamic organisation

22 This policy continued during the short period that Habibie was President (May 1998-October 1999) (Marcoes, 2001:20-21).

90 (Ramage, 1995:75). The support that Suharto gave to ICMI has been viewed as a means to further his political success.

In 1991, only one year after the establishment of ICMI Suharto and his family undertook the pilgrimage to Mecca, an obligation for all Muslims. President Suharto became known as Haji Muhammad Suharto. The much publicised renewed religiosity contributed to his marked acceptance of Islam in Indonesia.

Indonesia has witnessed an increase in the number of people embarking on the annual pilgrimage to Mecca (haj) (Blackwood, 1995:138). In the city of Malang alone more than 1600 people made the pilgrimage to Mecca (Haji) in the year 2000 (BPS, 2000:50).

The late 1980s saw Suharto being challenged from the military, hitherto his most important support base (Hefner, 1997:76). Suharto’s change of heart and newfound support for Islam has been linked to his desire to retain popular support and the presidency.

By the late 1980s the changing social composition of the Indonesian Muslim community meant it could no longer be ignored by political leaders … The government relaxed restrictions on the use of the jilbab headscarf at public schools, introduced more Islamic elements into the national school curriculum, and gave more authority to Islamic courts (Schwarz, 1994:175).

In the 1980s and 1990s the process of ‘Islamisation’ heightened ongoing tensions between Islamic factions including members of NU and Muhammadiyah. Those demanding change and reform towards a modernist Islam (Muhammadiyah) stood in

91 opposition to others who claimed that the way forward for Muslims in Indonesia was to hold onto their faith in a more traditional way (NU).

The 1997 Indonesian monetary crisis had a devastating impact on poor families. Large numbers of children have had to leave school because their families could no longer afford to pay their fees. Economic crisis and hardship saw many turn towards religion.

Tahlilan became a symbol of those who believe that by returning to Islam they find refuge and continue to help to safeguard communal values and morals.

Rural Muslim populations turned to the traditional Islamic organisation or Tahlilan to cope with the strain of financial hardship. Whereas the urban, modernist (santri)

Muslims supported Muhammadiyah and a modernist Islam for Indonesia. Hefner argues that modernist urban Muslims demand a modern Islam, in contrast to traditional

Javanese beliefs, which they see as increasingly failing to answer the issues of modernity (Hefner, 1997:92).

The desire for a modern Islam for Indonesia was one of the main forces behind the

Indonesian veiling movement. In her work, Brenner (1996) explains how since the

1990s an increasing number of self described ‘Modern Muslim Women’ have begun donning jilbab.23 Taking up jilbab saw women produce a new vision of a society which distanced itself from the past as it embarked upon a new modernity (Brenner,

1996:673). If Indonesian Muslims were demanding a new Islam then the veil acted as a clear symbol for this new identity.

23 Islamic head dress.

92 Malang’s Tahlilan 2000.

Indonesia’s cultural Islamic revival and the Suharto government’s changed attitude toward Islam led to the increasing cultural relevance of local prayer groups in Malang.

The women who attend Tahlilan are either married or widowed local women. There is a separate group for younger and unmarried women called Tibaan. The women pray together at Tahlilan every Monday night after the evening prayer Magrib. The local community perceives Tahlilan as an important organisation because it maintains the religious ritual of praying together.

The modern-day structure of Tahlilan is derived from the New Order state authorised model of the PKK. One Tahlil organisation consists of one RW, and is made up of RT groups. Those women, who choose to attend Tahlilan and not the PKK, remain identified in the PKK system through their RT and RW numbers.

Tahlilan is hierarchical but not as elaborated as the PKK. The leader conducts the group prayers at every meeting, regardless where the meeting is held. Some respect is given to the hostess of the meeting. The other members of the prayer group are not allotted any special responsibilities.

The Tahlil prayer meetings last approximately one hour. Before the meeting begins women socialise and discuss general matters and upcoming activities and gossip. The meeting begins with prayers in Arabic and the members recite the words from the prayer books they hold in their hands. Following the meeting the women share a meal together and drink hot tea. Through their continued attendance at Tahlilan prayer groups women continue the tradition of berkumpul (coming together).

93 Both the PKK and Tahlilan value berkumpul and their role in preserving communal values. When women meet together regularly at the meetings they are preserve the long- standing tradition of communal living. Women’s participation in the kampung PKK and

Tahlilan reinforce local perceptions of tradition in the kampung.

The other local tradition preserved through attending Tahlilan is that of the arisan.

Tahlil members participate in arisan. It is carried out in the same way as it is in the PKK organisation. The women are assured of winning and the act of coming together and knowing that one day they will take home the money entices women to participate.

Like the PKK, Tahlilan is respected within the wider Malang society. Men encourage women to take part in these organisations and their activities. The acceptability of the organisation is reinforced by the fact that Tahlilan prayer meetings are held in the homes of members. Each of the women will have a turn at hosting the meeting. The home is seen as women’s space in Indonesia (Sullivan, 1994:9), whereas the mosque is still very much a male space. Although increasing numbers of women are choosing to pray at mosques.

Because the weekly Tahlilan meetings take place within other member’s homes it gives women the chance to voice their religious beliefs outside of their own homes. Through their participation in Tahlilan, women have a legitimate space to publicly practice their religion.

94 Many of the female elders in the kampung are second-generation Tahlilan members.

They feel comforted by their adherence to tradition and it reaffirms the significance of communal living for people in the kampung. While the PKK unites women through its various activities and programs, Tahlilan binds women together through their faith and prayers.

New Islamic Organisations

A plethora of Indonesian Muslim women’s organisations have emerged since the 1990s.

In her recent study, Marcoes outlines some of the main Islamic women’s organisations to emerge. She discusses the organisation known as Fiqh An-Nisa formed in 1995. This was one of the first organisations formed to explicitly address the relations between

Islam, gender and reproductive health rights (Marcoes, 2001:6).

Marcoes also describes the formation of the Forum Kajian Kitab Klasik Islam (Forum for the Study of Classical Islamic Texts) in 1997. This organisation consists of a number of interested parties such as sociologists, anthropologists, gender specialists and other professionals. This organisation “attempts to formulate a less-gender biased – more just and fair reinterpretation of the classical Islamic texts” (Marcoes, 2001:6).

The organisation Puan Amal Hayati was established in 1999. This organisation has become known as the ‘brain child’ of Mrs Sinta Nuriyah Abdurrahman Wahid, the wife of former Indonesian president, Abdurrahman Wahid. The organisation focuses specifically on social and humanitarian aid and advocates women’s empowerment

(Marcoes, 2001:7).

95 The resignation of Suharto opened up the possibility for female voices to speak about

Islam and to form social institutions. Marcoes found that a lack of support, from what she calls umbrella organisations, which means that the community distrusts newly formed Islamic women’s organisations. Consequently they are limited in what they can realistically achieve for women (Marcoes, 2001:39). They do however provide a local space where women can meet together and discuss important issues they face.

Pusat Studi Wanita in Malang

Since the economic crisis of 1997, increasing poverty has seen an increase in demand for welfare. It has been increasingly difficult for women to buy food to feed their families. Rather than administering (non-profitable) welfare payments, the government decided instead to promote community based self-help initiatives. One such program was the Pusat Studi Wanita (Centre for Women’s Studies).

In contrast to the PKK and Tahlilan, PSW came into existence in 1997 and aims to address contemporary issues relating to Indonesian women. The economic programs it instigates promote women’s independence from men. In this way its goals seem removed from those focusing on social tradition in the PKK which was premised clearly on State Ibuism and the notion of follow the husband or ikut suami.

The predecessor of PSW was a Dutch administered program called KSW (Kerja Studi

Wanita - Working Study of Women). The KSW ran from the 1980s through until the early 1990s. KSW was one of the first organisations to analyse the impact of Indonesia’s period of economic development on the lives of women in poor, predominantly rural communities.

96 The first PSW program in East Java began in 1997. At that time there were six PSW’s in the province of East Java. By the year 2000 the number had risen to approximately twenty. The rise in the number of PSW’s reflects the growing poor in Indonesia and highlights the dependence that communities have on financial aid to ensure their survival.

The members of PSW are university lecturers holding Masters (S2) or Doctorate (S3) qualifications. The PSW members determine the main problems for women in the given location. They then proceed to devise strategies to improve village women’s lives by addressing these problems.

Each PSW is allocated four ‘target villages’ for their research projects. Each location has a five-year agenda. The first year is called Profile Women in the Village. The preliminary stage consists of the PSW members conducting visits to the target villages where they research the ‘problems for women’.

The second stage of the project is referred to as Gender Socialisation. This aspect of the program takes the form of an educational lecture concerning the definition of gender.

The lecture is followed by a series of short half-day workshops discussing the origins of gender. The women and men from the target villages are encouraged to participate.

According to members of PSW, gender socialisation is an issue for the whole society, not just for women.

97 The lectures about gender socialisation represent a change from the earlier state development policies of the PKK. This image of gendered change occurs despite society’s reluctance in implementing these altered gender roles.

The third, fourth and fifth years of the program are location specific. They depend on the program of a given target community. In one of the programs undertaken in 2000, the project consisted of helping local women to manufacture a drink made from coconuts. Once the women had made the drink, they were taught how to package the product. It is men’s job to sell the drink at the local market.

Even though PSW has been running for six years, the women from the city are only able to visit their target villages once or twice a year. The leaders of the PSW have other responsibilities in the city that requires their attention. These include teaching at the

University and the fulfilling the expectations placed upon them in their private lives as wives and mothers.

PSW members told me that their objectives are to analyse the effects of development on local communities. The implementation of PSW programs is premised on the financial, social and self-improvement of women. The assumption that women should be in the home with their children places pressure on women. This reinforces the gender roles, which were defined by the government (Branson, Chandler and Sullivan, 1988).

Social and economic problems in the village are translated into women’s problems. The very name of the organisation PSW or centre for women’s studies reaffirms the belief that familial, social and economic problems are women’s problems.

98 The PSW initiates educational and employment programs in the village, which do not contradict women’s role in the home as mother. The programs inadvertently reinforce the developmental ideologies they claim to be investigating and monitoring.

PSW, like the PKK is a government initiative. Officials in Jakarta approve instructions for the implementation of programs. Through the implementation of self-help initiatives, poor societies are accountable for improving themselves and do not place additional pressure on the struggling economy. In the PSW model, the government administered minimum funds and the local communities themselves were responsible for enhancing their own revenue earning capacities.

The PSW hierarchy operates with the government administering the funding to the PSW leaders. The women who run the programs are lecturers and their assistants and staff are undergraduate students or administration staff at the universities. Women who live in the target villages, which are studied within the PSW programs, are perceived as occupying the lowest position in the socio-economic hierarchy. This is largely due to their illiteracy and low incomes. Resonating with the New Order government’s development ideologies, these women are seen as not knowing how to improve themselves and thus needing to be told. The envoys from the city carry out this role.

The gendered space for women in PSW is experienced in the meetings between the coordinators, the staff who run the programs and the women in the target villages.

Similar to PKK and Tahlilan, PSW meetings take place in the homes of the village women. During these meetings the PSW staff provides the women with hot tea, fruit and

99 snacks. The members of PSW meet with local village women and inform them of recent developments relating to their programs. PSW meetings provides village women with an activity outside of their own homes and allow them time away from their routine domestic chores

The PSW organisations offer poor women in the ‘target villages’ a chance to improve their income without having to leave their own village. The alternative for poor village women is to seek paid work outside in larger cities or overseas. The pay for work

(pembantu) in a nearby town is only 100,000 rupiah a month, therefore it has become increasingly attractive to apply for positions in Saudi Arabia or other parts of Asia where they can earn between one and four million rupiah a month. Between 1997-2000 the number of women from Malang who applied to work overseas has risen by 20%

(Interview # 60),24 despite growing reports about abuse of foreign women workers.

In the city of Malang tertiary qualifications bring social mobility and high social status.

The women who co-ordinate the PSW programs are well respected among their university colleagues. For the members of PSW their participation is a way for them to achieve the social goal of improving the plight of poor women. Members see themselves as pioneers whose job it is to ‘empower’ poor village women.

Approximately half of the leaders of the Malang-based PSW groups migrated from poor villages close to Malang. They have their own self-imposed obligation to improve their home villages and shape them into communities, which mirror their own new urban

24 Interview # 60 was conducted with the manager of one of the offices of the ‘Department of Overseas Workers’ ten kilometers from the city of Malang.

100 lifestyle. One woman, a vocal and prominent member of PSW at a local University, described her role as one of society’s moral guardians.

God gave me this task. I believe he asks me to do this and do it I shall. To the best of my ability, because God asked me to do it (Interview # 5).

The moral obligation she feels is connected to her memory of growing up in a poor village. Education and a well-paying university position has made her socially upwardly mobile. She now lives in a large house on the outskirts of the kampung in Malang with her husband and three adult children. The villages that she visits as a member of PSW represent her past and the obligation she feels to assist local women to improve themselves.

PSW programs aim to assist women to become financially independent. From the PSW perspective gender is a social issue and not a woman only concern, is taught in the seminar. Yet this is not reinforced through the programs that PSW initiates nor in the everyday lives of the individuals in the local communities. The programs involve women making beverages or clothing and preparing to sell them at local markets. The men in the villages are not directly involved in this time-consuming activity. It is women who are called upon to invest many hours in producing the goods.

Additionally, the socially and politically defined gender roles, which define caring for and raising children as women’s concerns, remain unchanged. This seems ironic given that the second year of the PSW program talks specifically about gender socialisation.

The women attending these workshops are housewives with young children. If poor women are expected to be primary care givers for small children, there is no spare time for them to be involved in activities which will allow them to become financially 101 independent. This means the regular involvement in programs and being engaged in employment outside of the home is not an option for women in the ‘target villages’.

The PSW organisations operate from a development framework similar to the PKK that came of age in the 1970s. As mentioned above, PKK no longer acts as a vehicle to further national development. The PSW was taken over by the government in 1997 and secured overseas funding after Suharto stepped down in 1998. The connection between women and ‘development’ was already deeply entrenched. Although on a smaller scale and with fewer members, to some extent the modern-day PSW fulfills the same role for the government as PKK did twenty five years earlier

PSW organisations do not have sufficient funds to offer employment opportunities to all village women. This limits the impact that any PSW can have in a community. There are limitations to the employment and educational programs that the PSW organisations devise. The increasing population of poverty-stricken people in Indonesia means that many villages will not be able to access help like the PSW offers.

Women in high social positions run the PSW programs rather than the kampung women who participate in the PKK. The PSW’s short (seven year) history means that the public often perceived it as anti-tradition. Contrary to the upholding of local traditions, PSW promotes change. For example, members often campaign to change women’s economic dependence on men.

This leads to the organisation as largely mistrusted in society. Members of other women’s organisations including PKK view PSW with skepticism. In contrast to PSW,

102 Tahlilan and PKK offer women the security of the preservation of social values and morality.

The derogatory perception of PSW women is one way in which they are punished for challenging traditional gender roles placed on them. An interview with a local newspaper reporter in Malang illustrates this with a comment about one PSW leader.

Oh yeah Bu W. If I am not mistaken that is the really crazy woman (Interview # 65).

The antagonism is reciprocated, as women who participate in PSW perceive the PKK and its activities as ineffectual. Such criticisms claim that PKK is nothing more than a tool for the nation-building objectives of the state. One member of PSW told how she would not waste her time joining PKK.

The women there are not learning anything and all the women who attend those groups are illiterate and ignorant anyway (Interview # 5).

Labelling a woman as ‘ignorant’ is indicative of a term used during development. The first part of the chapter showed how during Indonesia’s development era the government targeted women specifically. It was seen as imperative that women be improved in order that they not remain ignorant and powerless. The PKK was not seen as encouraging change for women. On the contrary, it was labelled a ‘tool of the state’.

This labelling of PKK women as ignorant reflects its previous connection with the government policies of the 1970s.

This woman’s comment also highlights the differences in goals between the PSW and

PKK. The PKK promotes continuity of local traditions. In contrast, the PSW members I

103 interviewed voice their demands for social change. This change is embedded in the programs they run. The motivations behind the organisations differ and this in turn reflects the different social-class position of the women.

This quote also illustrates class divisions between members of these two women’s organisations. The level of education of the PSW members differs to the kampung women in the PKK and from the poor women they seek to empower25 in the villages. In this way the depiction of PKK members, by PSW women, as ignorant reaffirms the latter’s high social standing. The differences between the women’s organisations reflect the different class positions that women occupy.

The PSW member’s judgement was that if the PKK did not educate women then they should not attend (Interview # 5). The same woman said that an organisation for women could only earn that name as long as it promised to improve the lives of women through empowering them (Interview #5). This woman’s perception that Indonesian women’s organisations must empower is influenced by the historical role of women’s organisations. In the past women’s organisations were political and aimed to improve the lives and roles of Indonesian women.

The PSW members see themselves as gender activists campaigning for change. The validity of this claim to ‘change’ should be viewed in the context of earlier government development initiatives. The criticisms PSW members make about PKK women ignore

25 In this context ‘empowerment’ refers to the control women have through political ‘power over’. It is deliberately used to reflect how the PSW members talk about empowerment.

104 the parallels between the organisations, in particular, the relationship they both have with national development.

Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat in Indonesia

From the late 1970s through to the 1990s LSMs with overt political agendas had their offices raided by the armed forces and activists were often incarcerated. The government saw politically minded LSMs as a threat to the national order. Government officials closed down LSMs that campaigned openly for workers rights in the 1970s and

1980s. The military was relied upon to enforce the government’s stance on such oppositional groups.

In 1978, all political parties at the university were forbidden. As a result, activist students formed small organisations, which started community and educational projects in both rural and urban areas. Today most well known NGO leaders are from this student activist generation. Representatives of the NGO movement name both sterility of the political parties and pressing socio-economic problems as the impetus for the sudden founding of so many community projects. The socio-economic problems stemmed from population growth, the rise in unemployment and so on, but also from the state-sponsored modernisation of the agricultural sector (Berninghausen and Kerstan, 1992:193).

LSMs that did not attempt to challenge the state were perceived as politically docile and were tolerated. However the majority of LSMs were politically oppositional by nature and the New Order government found it increasingly difficult to silence them.

Despite the view of LSMs as alternative political forum for the community, skepticism from within the wider society remained strong about LSMs. These views were based on the controversial nature of the programs they implemented and the repression they

105 received from the state. They also attempted to challenge the patriarchal nature of

Indonesian society.

In the recent past women have been organised on a massive scale to fight for their interests, defined by themselves, interests which do not appeal to the present male holders of power in society (Wieringa, 1988:87).

Indonesian LSMs are not a unified force. As mentioned in the previous chapter there are many different kinds of NGOs, of which, LSMs are one (Eldridge, 1995:24). Some authors argue that this is the reason why grass-roots based organisation never posed a real threat to the state.

Because they lack a broad base, the NGOs bargaining power with the system is negligible, and the only way to ensure their existence in the climate of constant control and observation is by establishing good relations with government representatives. Due to the lack of pressure from below, the NGOs have a relatively weak position in this, and the government uses this imbalance to restrict the NGOs political potential and to channel their activities into the desired directions (Berninghausen and Kerstan, 1992:200).

In contrast to the PKK and Tahlilan, the foundation of Indonesian LSMs was aimed at challenging the status quo by increasing individual’s access to decision-making power.

The oppositional stance of LSMs is based on the idea that the local community will form a collective. The assumption is that social responsibility will develop if the villagers are treated as individuals and given an opportunity to make their own decisions about their situation (Berninghausen and Kerstan, 1992:194).

At the outset LSMs campaigned and represented agricultural communities. The early

LSMs implemented programs premised on improving human rights, the social condition of villagers and the rural poor. In the year 2000, there were still Malang-based LSMs that focused specifically on agriculture and protecting the ‘farmer’ in land disputes. 106 However over the past fifteen years, LSMs focus on helping poor rural communities has shifted to address the concerns of the growing number of urban poor.

Indonesian LSMs began to secure increasing amounts of international funding with which to build offices. Funds saw LSM offices equipped with desks, computers, internet access, fax machines, telephones, and for the first time paid staff who could embrace their particular agendas.

The newfound economic independence of many LSMs has had the undesired effect of distancing them from their grass-roots origins in the 1970s. Modern day LSMs are often viewed as new capitalist corporations. Many Jakarta based LSMs secure their funding from overseas, often from Canada and the United States of America.

The increase in funds has been portrayed by the LSM community as a victory for the

LSM movement in Indonesia. The increase in funds allows for more programs to be devised for longer periods. They operate more like bureaucratic consultants submitting tenders for projects. Certainly, the funding of these organisations has seen them transform to become recognised and legitimate organisations in their own right.

However the amount, use and origin of funding for LSMs has prompted questions from the wider Indonesian society. The fact that a large amount of money is managed by only a few individuals has (perhaps inevitably) contributed to the perception that corruption exists within the LSM circle.

107 LSMs emerged in the late 1970s and quickly gained momentum. However, due to the government’s hostile attitude towards LSMs, society’s view of LSMs was one of apprehension. Similarly, members of these organisations were perceived as deviant.

During the 1980s and early 1990s it was problematic to be connected with LSMs.

Large LSMs function as national organisations and not just local organisations. In their nation-wide appeal they reproduce the organisational structure of the PKK. As with

PKK, Tahlilan and PSW, there is a hierarchical structure in place within LSMs. Tertiary educated elitist leaders, as with the PSW, speak on behalf of the poor and disadvantaged.

The perception of LSMs in the 1970s and 1980s as grass-roots organisations has been challenged by their access to funds and the increasing number of university students involved in activities. The role that upper middle class leaders play in helping the poor in such a hierarchical structure resonates more with the PSW objectives than it does with any type of mobilised grass roots organisation.

LSM programs consist of consciousness-raising aimed at changing the traditional hierarchical patterns of society. They promote open communication, democratic decision-making, and conflict resolution. In Java such changes are difficult to achieve especially since “differences in status, avoidance of public criticism and conflict processing, as well as the traditional leadership principle are still being held in high esteem” (Berninghausen and Kerstan, 1992:207).

108 LKBHWAK - A Malang Case Study

A prominent social woman’s organisation in Malang is LKBHWAK (Lembaga

Konsultasi dan Bantuan Hukum untuk Wanita dan Keluarga (The Organisation for

Legal Consultation and Assistance for Women and Families). LKBHWAK has functioned in Indonesia since 1979 as an offshoot of the Indonesian Organisation for

Legal Aid (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia - YLBHI). YLBHI originated from the Jakarta-based Legal Aid Institute (Lemabaga Bantuan Hukum – LBH) founded in 1971 (Eldridge, 1995:100).

The organisation LKBHWAK has been active in the city of Malang since the 1990s. Its aim is to secure legal representation for women. One of the programs that the Malang- based LKBHWAK runs is assisting and protecting Indonesian women working overseas as domestic helpers. The LKBHWAK representatives undertake field-trips to ‘poor’ villages close to Malang. Members talk with the village women who plan to work overseas and discuss the dangers and pitfalls that occur due to the lack of legal protection available for domestic workers. These dangers include incidents of the violation of labour contracts, exploitation, and physical or mental abuse. The

LKBHWAK members provide information and at times warnings to women about possible outcomes of their decision to work overseas. They draw women’s attention to the specific problems they could face when they are no longer ‘protected’ by Indonesian law.

Their visits to the poor villages are similar in nature to those of the PSW organisations.

PSW and the women-centred LKBHWAK members often work together on various

109 programs aimed at helping poor village women. Both are organisations run by educated middle class city women with the aim of ‘improving’ the lives of poor women.

The function of LPSMs and the PSW organisations appear similar as they share the objective of improving poor women’s circumstances. Despite this similarity, one of the main differences between the two is that PSW operates within a development framework. PSW members inform poor women how they can help themselves while not challenging the political system. Whereas the politically motivated LKBHWAK’s aim on the other hand is to alter the inequities that the poor communities face.

LSMs position themselves as an alternative to the ‘state’ and claim to be ‘radical’ by talking about taboo issues. LKBHWAK operates with its own internal hierarchy and class distinction. Rather than standing in opposition to the state, one could argue it reinforces the status quo of Malang’s social hierarchy.

Other programs run by the Malang-based LKBHWAK include providing legal-aid for women before the courts. Members provide free legal advice and moral support for victims of domestic violence, rape or other forms of abuse. The lecturers, who are the prominent leaders of the Malang branch, work within the law faculty of a local university and use their social status to promote women’s issues.

Court cases concerning violence against women in Malang are often initiated through inquiries made via the local LPSM network and specifically through LKBHWAK. The members of this LPSM encourage the court to prosecute by lobbying and using the local and national press to publicise their issues. The members argue that the Indonesian legal

110 system fails to protect women. As a result crimes committed against women including domestic violence, rape and discrimination are not incorporated into the official legal system.

The opinions voiced by members of the LKBHWAK in Malang are seen as controversial and are resented by conservative members of society. The main office of the

LKBHWAH was located in a largely middle class area of Jakarta but had to be moved in

1986 as a result of ‘oppositional pressure’ (Eldridge, 1995:162). No organisation was permitted to discuss political issues in public under the New Order government’s leadership. When they attempted to do so they were met with repression. Women are the main voices raising ‘women’s issues’ and leading the campaigns for change. This is resented by male authority figures as it represents women challenging the patriarchal values that the society is premised upon.

In Malang there is some concern from LKBHWAK members about the future of the organisation. Membership numbers of the organisation have been decreasing. The members explain that, due to their perceived radical agenda, younger women, especially those who value their career prospects, are hesitant to join.

There are not a lot of people that want to help us. They do not have the time to help and they can not so that is our problem. In our campus alone - there are a lot of people who do not want to help. They worry about their privacy and they do not want to be labelled like us, as radical (Interview # 20).

Despite the fact that there is no law in place prohibiting women’s participation in

LPSMs, a stigma continues to surround women’s membership of LKBHWAK. The ramifications of their participation can earn them the label of troublemaker. Not

111 surprisingly this deters young women from becoming involved. As a result membership numbers for this particular organisation have decreased.

The LPSMs have larger followings in the cities of Surabaya and Jakarta. Members are more anonymous in the bigger cities and thus their participation and identities are safeguarded.

In 1988, sixteen full-time staff were located in Jakarta, assisted by a team of volunteers, including several professionals. There were approximately forty staff in the regions (outside Jakarta) at that time but only five or six were full time (Eldridge, 1995:163 – author’s parenthesis).

In contrast to the PKK and Tahlilan, PSW and the LKBHWAK emerged in Malang in the

1990s. The latter are thought of as modern and less concerned with the traditions inherent in PKK and Tahlilan. LKBHWAK, like PSW, attempts to address contemporary concerns facing women in the town by advocating social reform with a focus on women.

Despite an increase in the number of LSMs in existence since the 1980s, their efforts to voice political views have been constrained (Eldridge, 1995:2). This mistrust exists despite the fact that LSMs are increasingly associated with the move toward democracy in Indonesia (Eldridge, 1995:1).

The reason behind this is that LSMs lack an umbrella organisation, to give them validity in the community. As a result they are respected less than more structured organisations including the PKK and Tahlilan. Connection to umbrella organisations have become so important that organisations which lack one are viewed with mistrust.

112 By contrast, despite the controversy surrounding its government connection, PKK has remained social respectability. Members perceive themselves to be affiliated with a

‘significant’ social institution. Of the women I lived with the majority said they prefer the conservative but reliable PKK system. They claim to feel more comfortable attending their PKK organisation where they know what to expect. They said they were not interested to experiment with newer women’s organisations that they know little about.

Unlike the PKK, PSW was not created by the state, and in fact, PSW only existed one year prior to President Suharto stepping down. So, the affiliation of the government is seen as less direct. What is important however is that not only was PSW not closed down, but also that it was ‘endorsed’ by the state. Therefore the state still acts as the umbrella organisation providing legitimacy to PSW. PSW mirrors the older state development objectives which has helped it to maintain its standing in the local community.

Similarly, Tahlilan’s connection to NU earns it prestige and respect in the kampung.

The Sukarno and Suharto government’s acceptance of Tahlilan has contributed to the modern day respect provided to both the organisation and its members.

One of the factors, which limits the complete autonomy of LSMs, is their financial reliance on overseas agencies for funding. On the one hand this allows LSMs to be independent of the Indonesian state, on the other it draws them into a specific

113 relationship with their donor agency. In the case of LKBHWAK roughly forty percent of its revenue comes from the Ford Foundation and the Asia Institute (Eldridge, 1995:163).

The relationship that LSMs / LPSMs have with overseas aid agencies is not without its limitations. One important drawback is that some of the local LSM activities may contradict the aims and goals of the donor organisation. Therefore the political pressure from their original organisations sometimes weighs more heavily than their own vision and mission (Marcoes, 2001:39).

The interests of the overseas organisations do not always correspond with those of the local community. If local and foreign interests clash, the women who work for the LSMs are seen as serving foreign interests ahead of local ones. The change LSM members try to implement is seen as one divorced from local tradition and instead representative of imported loose values of the west.

LKBHWAK’s connection with an overseas aid agency exemplifies its disassociation from local tradition. At the same time its lack of connection to the local community means it faces adversity and opposition in the Malang community. This mistrust is fuelled by the ‘controversial’ nature of the projects they facilitate.

The women who participate in LKBHWAK see their organisation as the only one that represents the interests of women. Members attempt to gain popular support and get pertinent legal issues concerning women heard. Like the members of the PSW, members of the LKBHWAK believe that an ‘organisation for women’ must empower women, and have grass roots support. This last point remains contentious, as LSMs in Indonesia are

114 increasingly less representative of the grass-roots than they are advocates for poor communities. Despite these limitations imposed upon local LSMs, it needs to be recognised that they offer women one of the few alternatives to state or religious organisations.

Malang’s SMC

The final organisation for women included in this thesis is the elite social organisation known as the Saturday Morning Club (SMC). The SMC has its origins in Malang during Sukarno’s leadership in the 1950s. Not officially affiliated with the state (either under Sukarno or Suharto) the SMC’s emphasis on ‘self education’ paralleled the state’s development ideals and its goals. The SMC’s goals did not challenge the ‘development policies’ of the New Order government

The SMC’s founders were Indonesian-based Dutch academics who remained in

Indonesia during the post-colonial era. As with the PKK, women in the SMC were originally appointed to their position in the club on the basis of their husbands’ status in the community. The first members of the SMC were the wives of local doctors and university professors.

Since its inception in the 1950s the Saturday Morning Club has provided a regular social space for women to meet together. The SMC includes only fifteen women in their organisation and activities. Although some of the members of the SMC are close friends, others are only acquaintances.

115 The present members of the SMC are upper class women in Malang, some of whom are married to prominent men in government or business. A few are active businesswomen with their own careers. A woman’s employment status has no bearing on the women’s membership of the SMC. The original purpose of the SMC was to provide a place where upper class women could meet together and practice their English language skills in an elite social space.

To be able to converse in English is perceived as a symbol of modernisation. An individual’s fluency in the English language brings high social status. Through participating in the SMC, women become role models for other local women by signifying social mobility and the achievement of status.

The club’s fortnightly meetings begin and end with the ritual singing of the SMC opening and closing songs. Lyrics of both these songs use the phrase ‘We want to be loyal to our Club’. The use of the word ‘loyal’ resonates with Indonesian independence and how citizens of the new nation were called upon to be loyal to the nation. The club can be seen here as a metaphor for the Indonesian nation.

The Saturday Morning Club has strict rules regarding membership which define it as exclusive and elitist. The SMC is even more restrictive in regards to its criteria for membership than the PSW. The SMC demands a high level of competency in English language as a pre-requisite for membership. While women need to be poor to be considered for the PSW projects, the opposite is the case for women who want to be members of the SMC. The annual membership fee effectively excludes all but affluent women from joining the SMC in Malang. SMC members are recognised by the social

116 elite and they are invited to become English tutors of primary and secondary students.

The fifteen women who are members of the SMC enjoy the privileges that their high social ranking affords them.

Specific roles are allocated to the club’s members. The chairperson (leader) of the club is appointed by election and maintains this position for two years. There is a club researcher (known as the ‘reporter’) for each meeting. It is their role to compile a story pertaining to a topic of their choice and present their findings at the subsequent meeting.

The SMC has a treasurer responsible for collecting the membership fee (50,000 rupiah per annum) from members. The SMC runs a fortnightly arisan identical to those in the

PKK and Tahlilan meetings. The fifteen members of the SMC are disciplined by club rules that require them to attend each of the organisation’s meetings and to respect their fellow members.

The emphasis that the SMC members place on local tradition and halus culture, is lived out through their continued attendance at meetings, which they have done so for more than half a century. Many of the women who attend the SMC are women in their late seventies or older.26 Half of the women who attend SMC now are the original members of the organisation.

Similar to other non state-sponsored women’s organisations, the SMC’s tradition of berkumpul is maintained by the enthusiasm of its members. The SMC notion of berkumpul tradition predates the PKK organisations and its ritual of berkumpul. The

26 The age bracket for members of the SMC contrasts with the women in the local PKK where the average age of members is fifty years.

117 women who attend the SMC also attend the PKK and their local Tahlilan group. Each of the organisations; the PKK, Tahlilan and SMC value the concept of berkumpul.

As with PKK, Tahlilan and PSW, the members of the SMC meet together in the member’s homes. Each woman has a turn hosting the meeting. The members feel comfortable to meet in each other’s homes and it is viewed as a good opportunity to show off material possessions collected over the years, which are prominently displayed around their homes.

The fact that the SMC is not affiliated directly with the state, a nation-wide Islamic organisation, or a political organisation may have led to it be viewed with skepticism. In contrast to LSMs, the SMC presents itself as apolitical. This has led to the SMC as being viewed as acceptable by the Sukarno and later Suharto governments. The SMC encouraged self education, learning of the English language and members were all elite members of society. Thus the SMC was not challenged by the state but was rather seen as a favourable cultural outlet for members of the community.

Due to the limited number of women who participate in the club, the SMC is labelled an elite club. This restriction on membership means the social impact the club has in terms of the benefits it offers women is limited. This limitation distinguishes it from the nation-wide structure of the PKK that extends to include all women.

It is not uncommon for parents to pay SMC members substantial amounts of money to tutor their children in the English language. The high income that women receive from

English teaching reaffirms their status and prestige through their social status and

118 mastering of the English language. Their membership of the SMC is one way wealthy

Malang women display their high social standards. At the same time the identification of women as members of the SMC reinforces their social standing and secures them income, in the form of English language tuition.

The SMC has maintained its original connection with the university community and continues to provide its members with the opportunity to make the acquaintance of university academics and other professionals. The exclusivity of the SMC is maintained through the program of visiting guest speakers. The members of the SMC view these visits as additional opportunities to enhance their general knowledge. The women are often vocal within the meetings and ask their guests complicated questions following their presentations.

As past beneficiaries of the colonial era SMC members are concerned more with upholding Javanese tradition than they are with promoting social change. Members’ high social class position and their lives under Dutch colonisation were divorced from the realities of the lower class women. The aims of the SMC differ greatly from those of the LPSM LKBHWAK. Whilst LSMs and to an extent the terminology utilised in PSW, refer to the need to ‘empower’ women, these sentiments are not contained within the

SMC. Women’s independence through education is not a goal of SMC members as it is for LKBHWAK. However, the attainment of education for the purpose of improved social standing is a very important dimension of the SMC membership. Members of the

Malang-based SMC favour development ideals of self-improvement. The emphasis that

SMC members place on ‘self education’ parallels the policies sponsored under the

119 development agenda. This marks the SMC as a product of the Sukarno and later

Suharto nationalism.

Summary

Indonesian women’s organisations played a key part in the nationalist struggle of the first half of the twentieth century. This led to the connection between Indonesian women’s organisations and political activism. As a result, measuring women’s organisations ability to politically empower women, has become a popular way of talking about Indonesian women’s organisations.

The discussion of women’s organisations as either politically empowering or disempowering ignores the multiplicity of functions of today’s organisations. These include their local cultural and social significance and the way organisations continue to attract large memberships which is no longer compulsory. It also fails to consider what the different organisations offer women and how participation in organisations shapes women’s lives and the society’s ideas about gender. It overlooks how these organisations remain significant in the present context, and why LSMs struggle to be regarded as socially relevant by members of the local community.

There are alternative ways to discuss women’s organisations other than in terms of their

‘power over’ decision making processes. This chapter has introduced this discussion by examining PKK, Tahlilan, PSW, LKBHWAK and SMC in turn, and identifying what these organisations claim to be.

120 The social significance of organisations depended on their relationship to international umbrella organisations. Under the New Order government those women’s organisations not connected to respectable umbrella organisations were banned or closed down.

While Suharto is no longer in power the legacies of his thirty three year leadership mean the organisation’s affiliation with umbrella organisations continue to define their social validity. The following chapter will investigate why these meanings continue to remain valid through a discussion of the specific political policies which influenced the kampung.

121 CHAPTER THREE

Membership and Participation; National Politics and Malang Women

Malang women’s participation in local organisations is a story of the complex social, political, religious, personal, cultural and familial issues which influence their lives in the kampung. The social meaning attributed to local organisations is a result of women’s continuing participation in these organisations. This includes their participation in local rituals and communal activities including arisan, posyandu, simpan pinjam, visiting the local Puskesmas and attending kampung weddings, markets, khitan and slametan27. The story of women’s participation tells of their local lives in the kampung, it also reveals how local communities have been influenced by nationalist politics.

This chapter brings together the historical role of Indonesian women’s organisations within the nation’s political history. It also shows the relationship between the

Indonesian government, women’s organisations and the local kampung women. The aim of this chapter is to explain how local beliefs and concepts became appropriated for use by the New Order government’s nation building policies, and re-introduced into the community.

Beyond prohibiting political women’s organisations and establishing the PKK and

Dharma Wanita in the 1970s, the government gave renewed meaning to local community traditions which will be examined in more detail throughout this chapter.

27 An Islamic ritualised meal shared with neighbours, relatives and friends.

122 These traditions include membership, berkumpul, gotong royong28, the preservation of the social order, belonging, social taboos and participation. As well as entering the vocabulary of nationalist discourse these traditions also related to women’s participation in local organisations.

The New Order government borrowed rather than created the concepts of membership, participation, berkumpul and gotong royong. The government utilised concepts already familiar to local communities thereby building development ideologies upon familiar practices in the kampung. On the surface, the community had been asked to do what it had always done. What had changed was the meaning behind these activities.

This chapter begins with a discussion of each of these concepts and how they came to influence women’s experiences of local organisations. It will describe the way in which government policy, legislation and nationalist sentiments infiltrated into local kampung life with the aid of these concepts.

Comments from local women about their experiences as members of local organisations are discussed alongside the analysis of Suharto’s political policies. The second part of this chapter discusses what membership of local organisations means for the women in this study. The women spoke generally about how organisations provide them with many friends, practical and social benefits and a place where they can solve their problems together. The women emphasised how local organisations offered them the opportunity to get out of the house and allow them to ‘learn together’.

28 Mutual aid.

123 During my field experience, women did not comment on nationalism or nation building.

They put forward localised understandings about their participation and how their lives are changed, challenged, improved and altered through their membership of these organisations. Through an analysis of these women’s stories, the second half of this chapter presents women’s understandings of their participation in terms of the gains that their membership facilitates. It will become apparent that women’s engagement with these organisations is contiguous with their relationship with the state. In fact it is impossible to separate women’s experiences in organisations and the state’s involvement in the community. Ultimately this chapter will show that women’s experiences are directly implicated in the government’s nation building objectives.

Nationalism and Citizenship

One way in which citizenship can be understood is through the political ideology of nationalism.

Nationalism is an ideology based on the belief that a people with common characteristics such as language, religion or ethnicity constitutes a separate and distinctive political community. Nationalists attempt to preserve this social distinctiveness to protect the social benefits which follow from national identity and membership. Nationalism locates the political legitimacy of the state in self-government by co-nationals (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 1984:276).

The Indonesian nationalist party played a prominent role in the nation’s political landscape since the early twentieth century. Symbols of Indonesian nationalism included the creation of the Indonesian national anthem, Indonesia Raya (Great

Indonesia), composed in 1928 by Wage Rudolph Soepratman (appendix III). The song was composed for the congress. As is common with anthems, the lyrics celebrate the

‘United Indonesia’. 1928 was also the year that an Indies-wide youth congress declared 124 that a future independent republic would form “satu bangsa, satu bahasa, dan satu tanah air” (one people, one language and one nation) (Ramage, 1995:11).

Other symbols of early Indonesian nationalism included the establishment of the

Indonesian national language. Derived from Malay, the Indonesian language bahasa

Indonesia was first encouraged during the Japanese occupation as a replacement for the old colonial language (Reid, 1974:10). The nationalist movement from the late 1920s also adopted it. The continued use of bahasa Indonesia after the declaration of independence in August 1945 reinforced the national identity of Indonesia. Use of the national language saw Indonesia exemplify one of the main characteristics of the nationalist ideology whereby Indonesian citizens were identified by the use of their own national language.

Five months prior to the declaration of independence, a committee was established called the ‘Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesia’. The role of the committee was to establish a philosophical basis of the state. Divisions existed concerning what would be presented as the basic principle of the new nation. The most notable contentions existed between those who wanted Indonesia to be an Islamic state and those who demanded a secular state. In an attempt to bridge the gap between these factions, Sukarno addressed the committee on June 1, 1945 with his now famous speech known as the Birth of Pancasila (Ramage, 1995:11).

The five principles of the Pancasila discourse were described in the first chapter. It is mentioned here to show how Sukarno’s creation and implementation of Pancasila was

125 proposed to favour national unity over difference. Sukarno claimed that national unity should be paramount (Ramage, 1995:12).

Between the years 1950-1959 the various components of the government, including the

PKI, PNI and the religious parties, had their own specific ideas about what democracy should be (Sunarto, cited in Lucas, 1994:104). Tensions were obvious between 1957 and 1959 with a series of anti-Sukarno uprisings occurring in Sumatra, Sulawesi and

West Java (Grant, 1997:205). More than a decade after the declaration of independence the political turmoil within the Indonesian parliament was threatening the unity of

Indonesia. With the objective of preserving national unity Sukarno passed the presidential decree in 1959. At the forefront the decree placed emphasis on conformity and avoidance of disharmony. In order for Indonesia to be a united nation, the citizens also needed to be united. This emphasis on unity was in part an influence of the

Japanese rule. One of the goals of the Japanese occupiers had been to make diverse organisations answer to common leadership and to build unity movements to support the government in every locality (Reid, 1974:15).

Nationalism prescribed an Indonesian citizen as a certain type of person. Citizens did not include those who did not share ‘common characteristics such as language, religion or ethnicity’ (Abercrombie Hill and Turner, 1984:276). Those who deviated from the politically constructed norm were deemed outsiders.

Coinciding with the government’s effort to promote conformity was its efforts to contain diversity within Indonesia. One example of early intolerance toward difference in terms of ethnic minorities was the treatment of Chinese Indonesians. As early as 1945

126 Chinese Indonesians were the victims of racially motivated attacks. In 1959 a law was passed which prohibited ‘alien-owned’ retail stores from operating. Chinese Indonesians were thought of as alien and not members of the nation. The law was aimed at Chinese business people and effectively reinforced the anti-Chinese nationalism prevalent in

Indonesia at the time (Schwarz, 1994:105).

Their prominent role in business has seen Chinese Indonesians made the scapegoats during economic downturns. Chinese Indonesians own and/or manage Indonesian businesses, which account for approximately 70% of all private economic activity

(Schwarz, 1994:99). Their association with the nation’s economic inequality is one of the main reasons why Chinese Indonesians have been the victims of violent attacks.

Chinese Indonesians continued to be targeted as ‘alien’ and anti-Chinese violence continued sporadically throughout the Suharto era. Racial protests came from lower socio-economic classes challenging the more affluent Chinese communities. These protests have at times erupted into violent political riots, such as in Ujungpandang and

Aceh in central Java in 1980 and 1981, or the 1984 Tanjung Priok riots orchestrated by

Muslims groups protesting against the government’s economic policies that were seen to favour the Chinese (Budiman, 1994:230).

In addition to anti-Chinese riots numerous violent clashes have occurred between ethnic groups and the nation’s armed forces in the outer regions of Indonesia. Regional clashes have been fuelled by the local community’s desire for autonomy in areas including

Aceh, Irian Jaya, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan. The protests also include local people’s demands for control over regional resources, Muslims demands for an Islamic state, and

127 campaigns against anti-Chinese violence. Each of these reasons represents a challenge to the assertion of national unity and the concomitant subordination of all religious and ethnic differences.

Ideology of Membership

Like Sukarno before him, Suharto sought to create Indonesia as one united modern nation. Under President Suharto, the population was seen as members of the Indonesian state. The Suharto government saw membership (keangotaan) as synonymous with citizenship. A member of the state was required to fulfil a particular ideal of citizenship.

A citizen’s membership of the nation had to contribute to the goal of national development, modernisation and economic prosperity.

The ideology of membership included member’s respect for the social and political status quo, conformity to social traditions and avoiding challenging the government with individualistic pursuits. The ideology of membership for Suharto was premised on inaction.

This ideal contrasts with the nationalist endeavours in the first half of the twentieth century. Nationalist sentiments within Indonesia had been premised on political opposition. The goal being to overthrow the Dutch and later Japanese forces. This form of nationalism was premised on action and opposition to the status quo.

The New Order government’s interest in making membership a nation-wide reality was realised with the state’s creation of the PKK in 1973. Women were encouraged by the government to become members and participate in their local PKK RT group. By being

128 a member of PKK, one was a ‘good’ citizen of the nation. When women took part in the

PKK, the New Order government’s ideology of membership was reinforced. The political rules governing membership of the nation therefore extended to include participation in organisations.

The state’s influence over local communities encompassed the way membership of local community-based organisations was viewed as a citizen’s moral obligation. Women’s organisations became representative of communities in their own right and it became the obligation of all members to participate.

The Suharto government’s enforcement of Pancasila in 1984 reinforced the belief that the community (and all the organisations that it was comprised of) was based on producing a homogenous nation (Schwarz, 1994:36). After 1984 all organisations shared the same ideology despite their varied objectives, values and activities. The

Tahlilan, SMC, the PSW and the LKBHWAK were each influenced by the government’s political notion of membership and its enforcement of Pancasila.

Under Suharto, the ideology of membership was used to encourage national participation in development. Difference was obvious, yet it was downplayed in an effort to make society look socially harmonious and homogenous. It may be more accurate to say that not everyone was accepted as legitimate Indonesian citizens. The archipelago’s inhabitants were made citizens through consent or coercion.

Suharto used the Indonesian national motto Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity) as a political strategy to legitimise its new, united national community. The slogan itself

129 dates back to independence. Suharto’s use of it reinforced the presumption of national unity. Given the varied social, ethnic, political and religious cultures that make up the

Indonesian nation, diversity was inescapable. The social reality measured by the experience of the various ethnic, social, religious and political minority communities tell of anything but unification.

The political use of the phrase ‘Unity in Diversity’ was an attempt by the government to officially recognise Indonesian diversity and incorporate differences into the national community. A variety of strong oppositional politics persist in different regions of

Indonesia including the ethnic and religious conflict since May 1998 in East Timor and demands for independence from Aceh, Papua and Riau.

There are a number of tangible symbolic aspects to membership. Membership of the nation was symbolised through the national language, the national anthem and adherence to Pancasila. Women’s membership of organisations is also identified by the use of symbols. These include the uniforms and distinctive insignia they wear.

Particular symbols identify women as members of specific organisations.

PKK women proudly wear an aqua green uniform. Today the PKK uniform identifies women as being members of a traditional neighbourhood organisation. The local women’s decision to wear the uniform in Malang is an indicator of local tradition and respectability in the kampung. The wearing of the aqua green uniform in the kampung has taken on the new meaning of indicator of local social status.

130 Members of the Tahlilan organisation in Malang wear a brown uniform which includes brown trousers and a matching long sleeve brown blouse. All of the women who attend the local prayer groups are also required to wear kerudung29. Unlike the PKK, the wearing of a uniform by members of the Tahlilan was not a long lasting tradition but a recent decision made by members. The Malang members of the Tahlilan organisation only decided to wear the uniform in late 199930. The women told how they liked wearing a uniform as it gave their organisation more recognition in the community.

The social organisation SMC does not have its own uniform but instead has a song. The lyrics of the club song, mentioned in the previous chapter declare, ‘we want to be loyal to our club’. The club’s opening and closing song includes the words “loyalty”,

“faithful” and “true”. The statement expresses the values that reflect the way a citizen should feel toward their nation. Just as a citizen of the nation should adhere to the rules governing the state, members of the SMC should also be faithful, true and loyal to their club. These attributes of the members are captured in the lyrics of the song.

Unlike the members of the Tahlilan, SMC and PKK the PSW and LKBHWAK members do not use tangible symbols. The status women gain from participating in the University run PSW, is as philanthropists working for the good of their local community. The members of LKBHWAK derive their status through their campaigning, which gains them publicity for social justice. The wider community identifies these organisations by their demands for social change and the campaigns they undertake, more than how they look.

29 The Javanese term for Islamic head scarf. 30 During the field work year (2000) members were still ordering the material and having their uniforms made.

131 The use of symbols identifies women as legitimate members of a particular organisation and over time these symbols have become local knowledge. The use of uniforms and songs produce feelings of social belonging and ways to be publicly recognised.

Berkumpul

Suharto demanded Indonesian people subordinate their personal desires to those of the society or masyarakat. One way the community could be preserved was if members of the national community join together. The importance of membership in the state-wide

PKK was built upon the pre-existing traditional Javanese ritual of berkumpul.

Throughout the neighbourhood organisations the government’s use of the tradition berkumpul helped to give new state-created organisations a sense of validity.

All of the local women’s organisations in this study are premised on the social ritual of berkumpul. The members of the prayer group Tahlilan meet together every Monday night after Magrib to pray together. When women meet together every week for the purpose of prayer, they simultaneously reinforce the local tradition of berkumpul.

The SMC members meet together and improve their English language skills. The women said that they enjoy being together and participating in the club and its social activities. When women attend the social club and continue local rituals they reinforce the tradition of meeting together and learning together.

One of the members of the SMC explained to me that during any one year a SMC member is only allowed to miss two meetings. If a member is not able to attend a meeting, she must provide an ‘acceptable’ reason and also find someone to take her

132 place (Interview # 19). It is not only polite to attend the club meetings, it is an essential component of women’s membership status and solidarity.

Members of the PSW and LKBHWAK meet with women in the target village and discuss various programs and campaigns. Even though the members of these organisations must travel long distances to fulfil their membership duties, emphasis is still placed on berkumpul.

Malang women told how even before the PKK was established they would often meet to participate in activities such as arisan. The government recognised that the creation of the PKK could have the appearance of reinforcing tradition, by maintaining berkumpul and even arisan. Although the model of the PKK had more in common with the

Japanese created Fujinkai than any local women’s organisation in the past.

The local women’s organisations continue to reinvent the importance of the (national) community through their respect for kampung meetings which are based on the idea of berkumpul. The importance of tradition is realised in the ritual berkumpul. Preservation of society is continually reaffirmed when women ‘come together’.

Gotong Royong

The social significance of women’s organisations was further validated through borrowing the concept gotong royong. Gotong royong refers to mutual aid and the way the community works together for the greater good. Gotong royong emphasises communal values over individual pursuits and was adopted as a desirable national value. Suharto’s belief in the national family and a united Indonesia was complemented

133 by this idea of mutual aid. These values of berkumpul and gotong royong served to preserve the community and thereby support the government’s project of nation building and unity.

The Social Order

The importance of community has its roots in religious and spiritual beliefs including animism. The animistic belief in a cosmic order, and knowing one’s place within that order, has dominated local Javanese belief systems (Mulder, 1996:49). Within animism all individuals have specific tasks to carry out to ensure the cosmic order is respected and maintained. The denial of self is a pre-requisite to show respect for spiritual harmony and the order of the universe.

The ordered social relations within the community are seen as the product of a larger cosmological order. The Javanese social hierarchy ensures that everyone knows their place within the society. Further, people have the moral duty to respect life’s order

(Mulder, 1996:49). Understanding how things should be is encapsulated within the term keselarasan (harmony / conformity).

Accepting (menerima) means knowing one’s place, means trust in fate and gratefulness to God, because there is a satisfaction in fulfilling one’s lot in the consciousness that all has been destined (Mulder, 1996:50)

According to Mulder (1996) emphasis is placed on smooth interpersonal relationships and the necessity of getting along well with each other, which means letting the group prevail over the individual. The Javanese believe “Impulsive actions, or yielding to one’s lusts and desires by giving free reign to passions, are reprehensible because they

134 upset the personal, social and cosmic order” (Mulder, 1996:49). Social rules are based on respect for the status quo and avoidance of controversy.

Brenner (1998) argues that within contemporary Javanese society the denial of the self for the sake of the family prevails. Her specific argument is that men’s (sexual) desires cause financial distress for women and families in Indonesia. As individual desires can harm the family “women are expected (by men and women alike) to be able to keep their desires under control for the sake of the family” (Brenner, 1998:154). It is therefore women’s responsibility, more than men’s, to control their desires and thereby protect their families.

The denial of selfish desires and the respect for the social order corresponded to the

New Order government’s belief in the (national) community. The New Order government remoulded and re-invented the existing hierarchical community. The cosmological order was renamed the 'social order' and the community became the

'nation'.

The social hierarchy was easily mapped onto the religious, social and political organisations throughout Java. During interviews members of the local women’s organisations continually reported with pride that they put the needs of the organisation before their own. They would deny their individual desires in order to preserve the organisation.

Membership in this context entails adhering to social rules by playing ones part in the cosmological order. Belonging involves conforming to communal rules, adhering to larger social prescriptions concerning

135 communal living and respecting existing spiritual values and beliefs (Mulder, 1996:49).

Women’s acceptance of their roles within the organisations exemplify the respect they show for the organisation’s own social order. The previous chapter outlined the social hierarchies within each of the organisations. In the case of the PKK there is a clear bureaucratic hierarchy (see page 76). Members of the local Tahlilan group know not to challenge their prayer ‘leader’. The SMC women listen to the Chairperson and accept that it is she who makes decisions on the group’s behalf. The women involved in the various PSW organisations are aware that the university lecturers are in charge of the programs in their village.

Within the organisations each member knows her place. They not only know their place but at the same time they are aware that this prescribes a certain type of respectful behaviour. Women’s acceptance of their role within their organisation mirrors the words of Mulder “One should consciously follow the path of destiny from which, anyhow, there is no escaping” (Mulder, 1996:50).

Social Taboos

Respecting social morality in the community includes the prohibition of ‘taboo topics’ in public. Taboo topics include; premarital sex, unwanted youth pregnancies, substance abuse, marital disputes, domestic violence, rape, homosexuality and abortions. These topics are defined as taboo as they represent an image of society as disharmonious. As outlined above, social harmony relies on everyone respecting and preserving the status quo. The public discussion of taboo topics challenges the moral fabric of society and

136 they are therefore deemed taboo. Thereby revealing the social and political dimension of taboos.

The classification of topics as public or private, acceptable or taboo is derived from the nation’s political history since independence. Sukarno’s Guided Democracy era from

1959, witnessed an increase in the state’s control over access to ‘information’. The control that Sukarno maintained over the media was tightened during the New Order rule. The state’s legitimacy is very sensitive and seemingly above criticism.

In addition to the government’s censorship of published information, the national media was heavily controlled during the New Order era. In 1974, for example, in the months following anti-Japanese riots, twelve Indonesian newspapers were shut down (Schwarz,

1994:35). This signalled the government’s attempts to maintain order and continue to control the population through control over the media and information.

The government’s control over access to information tightened during the following decades. In 1994 the government banned three major Indonesian news weeklies including Tempo, Editor, and Detik. In particular ‘Editor’ was labelled by the Suharto government as responsible for ‘destabilising society’ (Ramage, 1995:111).

The socially taboo nature of certain topics and the state’s control of information during the New Order rule officially forbade controversial topics from entering public space.

The government’s control of information influenced local communities and defined certain ‘taboo’ or pribadi (personal) problems unacceptable. This was seen in Malang, as women indicated they do not feel comfortable to discuss their problems within the

137 space of the formal meetings of their organisations. The meetings are understood to take place in society and therefore inhabit public space.

Participation

Formal and informal social rules govern women’s participation in organisations.

Adhering to social rules includes being a faithful member through respecting the social order, remaining silent about socially taboo topics and upholding the traditions of berkumpul and gotong royong. Local organisations function according to these rules.

Whilst all organisations have social rules, the functionality of the organisations differ.

The social change oriented policies of the PSW and LKBHWAK challenge existing social inequities. On the other hand the PKK and Tahlilan promote continuity of social traditions. Malang women are faced with issues concerning which organisation to join, and in particular what the ramifications of their decision will be on themselves, their family and the community.

The values and beliefs associated with organisations shape women’s decision about which organisation to join. In joining an organisation, a woman demonstrates that she agrees with the principles that the organisation advocates and those that the larger umbrella organisation espouses. Women are not simply members of the local organisations, they are simultaneously followers of the larger institutions that the organisations are linked to.

Women who participate in the kampung-based PKK and Tahlilan reinforce the organisations values as they are lived out in the kampung. The findings of extensive

138 participant observation reveal that the vast majority of women living in the kampung view the PKK and Tahlilan organisations as respectable organisations. The women who criticised the local organisations were members of the LKBHWAK who lived on the outskirts of the kampung. This acceptability is linked to the relationship these organisations have to their larger umbrella organisations.

The Malang-based LKBHWAK is not connected to the government like PSW and PKK, nor is it affiliated with an Islamic organisation like Tahlilan. It is affiliated with a wider network of LPSM and LSMs throughout Indonesia. It gains some recognition and social prestige from other LSMs but its official validation, in the form of funding, is imported from overseas. By lacking an Indonesian umbrella organisation. LKBHWAK is still perceived by members of the local PKK, Tahlilan and SMC organisations as ‘radical’.

These negative connotations impact on the members of this organisation. If LKBHWAK is perceived as too radical or political, then the women who participate in the organisation earn themselves the label of ‘bad woman’. This term implies a woman with loose values, the antithesis of the ‘traditional Indonesian woman’.

As representatives of LKBHWAK, women become responsible for the political stance of the organisation. Some members of the society remain hostile towards LSMs/LPSMs and their vocal representatives who choose to publicly discuss ‘taboo’ topics. The stigma attached to these women is a result of their campaigns for social and judicial change in Indonesia. Moreover the stigma not only affects members but also their family and their local status in the kampung. A young woman who works as a tutor at

139 one of the local universities summarises the way that women deny their personal interests and ambitions for the sake of their family’s.

Here we have to always think about our family, when I consider some decision about my life, my career and about things, I always have to consider my parents (Interview # 29)

The emphasis placed on ‘community’ and respecting the ‘greater good’ is exemplified in the above quote. The well-being of the family is always considered in the choice a woman makes. This includes her decision whether or not to participate in a local organisation. In the above quote the woman says that she must always consider the consequences that her actions will have on her parents. Local respect and status are derived in large part from the family name and locally allotted prestige. Participation in women’s organisations can be an act of social disrespect as well as respect.

Women’s familial connection can also work to their advantage. It is not necessary for every woman from one family to attend the PKK meetings. If one woman from a family is present at the PKK meeting that is sufficient. The woman who attends is seen to represent the rest of the women in her family.

When I could not attend PKK in the past, it was OK because my grand mother used to attend and then it was OK. But now I attend and it is OK (Interview # 22).

Family obligations influence younger women’s decisions to attend their local PKK organisation. The woman above was excused from attending the local PKK meeting because her grandmother attended. But the opposite also occurs. Another woman was pressured to attend even though her mother and grandmother attend PKK. Continuing

140 the family tradition pressures young women to join. In both of these situations women’s decision to participate in organisations is linked to their familial relationships.

Young women31 in the kampung revealed that they were reluctant to join in the PKK because they were not socially or ritually competent. They were afraid that they would only embarrass their older female kin. They believed their presence would undermine the status of female kin, would be regarded as disrespectful and even shame their older female kin. This point resonates with Mulder’s observation concerning the social importance of adhering to the social hierarchy (Mulder, 1996:50).

The following story illustrates this point about status. Mbak D is a twenty-eight year old woman. She is married and lives with her husband, daughter, and mother-in-law in the kampung. Mbak D explains her reasons for not attending her local PKK meetings with her mother-in-law. Mbak D is from a poor area of Malang. Her mother has very low social status in the neighbourhood because of her affairs with men outside of marriage.

Mbak D’s mother has been married three times and her daughter has inherited her low status. Mbak D says that she supports the local PKK in her area and hopes to attend one day. Mbak D’s mother-in-law sees Mbak D and her mother as of low social class and even rough (kasar). Therefore, according to her mother-in-law, Mbak D should not attend the PKK meetings (Interview #1).

It was common knowledge in the kampung that Mbak D’s mother was bad (jelek) because of her status as a divorced woman, even though divorce is neither illegal nor uncommon in Indonesia. In the city of Malang between April to December 2001, 1,091

31 Throughout this thesis the term ‘young women’ refers to women under the age of thirty.

141 divorces were reported (BPS, 2001:116). Nevertheless divorce remains socially unacceptable in the kampung.

Mbak D’s mother-in-law regards her own family to have higher status than the family of

Mbak D. Although Mbak D gained status in the local community by marrying into a family of higher status, perceptions are slow and hard to change in the kampung.

It is more than just me being too young to attend, there is also much conflict surrounding me being there and it is just not worth it. I really do like organisations and they are really important. I do not want to attend these groups with Bu U. I do not want to do that. We just do not fit together. It is just a personal thing, maybe at one time later on we will, but not right now, maybe later. I can study for a while maybe one, two or three years and then maybe I will start going to these groups. For me I just want to join in groups related to the welfare of children. I am reading all sorts of medical books, and also I often read magazines about children. I love to read about relationships between mother, father and child. But at the moment I am silent because I am still young and I am not at that stage yet. It is also about respect for my elders. I can learn from them. They explain a lot to me, but I only listen I do not say anything. I just listen and learn from them. I remain silent. I am not really close to Bu U, we are not really compatible. I just bite my tongue and do not say anything. It is about the fact that I am from a poor family. I am from a different class of people from Bu U’s family. I am not educated the same way that she would like for a daughter in law (Interview 23).

In contrast to Mbak D, the older generations of women were more assured about the importance of their attendance and their social obligation to participate. Women in the age bracket 50-80 years had experienced first hand the implementation of the New

Order government’s policies three decades earlier. Attendance at their local PKK (RT) organisation, had been compulsory during the 1970s. In contrast, the young women in the kampung today have not felt the same pressure from the state to participate in local organisations. Instead the pressure they feel today is a residue of the earlier era when participation was mandatory.

142 In order to be recognised as an active participant of an organisation a woman is required to fulfil her share of group-oriented activities. She may be required to volunteer for extra duties that her membership prescribes. PSW members are often required to leave their families and travel to villages for a week at a time to carry out their programs.

For PKK women, there are always local ceremonies such as weddings, khitan and funerals that they are obliged to attend. Time has become a determining factor in a woman’s decision to attend an organisation. For some families the choice means a loss of wages and insufficient money to buy food or pay for their children’s education.

I join in groups PKK, some others like Tahlil I can not join as I work at that time, I have to sell my pangsit and therefore I can not attend - before I worked there I used to attend those groups (Interview # 22).

Respectability and Participation

Members of the PKK neighbourhood organisation react to the government’s gendered policy of State Ibuism by reinforcing traditional roles for women. The PKK policy held that women were to safeguard communal values. ‘Deviant women’ who challenge this policy are not allowed to be members. Participation is politicised in that it allows only

‘good women’ to attend. Although the PKK claims to have an inclusive policy, underlying personal, familial, moral and social issues actually constrain and even prevent participation.

Other women’s organisations are also less than fully inclusive. The process women undergo in order to join the Malang-based LKBHWAK differs from the way a woman joins her local PKK or Tahlilan organisation. Members of the Tahlilan and PKK are

143 defined according to their place of residence. A woman joins LKBHWAK with the intention to engage in political of social change. Members of the LKBHWAK are selected according to their political clout and their ability to get issues voiced in public spaces. The LKBHWAK takes women out of the kampung and into the public spaces of university campuses, radio stations and local courthouses. This reveals the difference in recruitment strategies of the different organisations.

One barrier for women who want to be involved in the Malang branch of LKBHWAK is the rivalry they face from other organisations. Being a member of an LPSM implies a woman is radical, strong, politically-minded and determined. For the older women who have participated in LPSMs since the 1970s, their reputations and identity were achieved through perseverance and struggle. Their membership draws from an older tradition of political and even radical women. Members of Malang branches of LSMs told me that women’s organisations should empower women through an increase in access to political power.

If a woman is a member of our NGO then she is not a member of any other group (Interview # 62).

The significance of this woman’s comment is in what it reveals about the perception of the different organisations in society. The socially radical objectives of LSMs mean that women can not be committed to another traditional, political or religious organisation. If they were it would detract from their socially motivated participation in the LSM. The respondent quoted above is a twenty-five year old graduate from a local university.

144 In the past LSMs were closed down and had their offices raided by the government. This saw women directly pressured by the government not to participate in these organisations. This overt pressure from the government has eased and it is no longer as politically controversial for women to participate in LSMs. Today there is a greater acceptance of LSMs within wider Indonesian society. The above comment (from interviewee #62) illustrates that certain perceptions about what constitutes an LSM remain. Whether originating from the state or from the members themselves, pressures continue to influence women’s decision whether or not to participate in LSMs.

Why Malang Women Participate in Local Organisations.

“Aku nggak mau tinggal sendirian”32

One main reason local women gave explaining why they participate in local organisations was based on their fear of social isolation. Women said Aku nggak mau tinggal sendirian” (I do not want to stand alone or lonely). Women said they wanted to be close (friends) or akrab with their neighbours. The fear of being alone concerned members of the local PKK and Tahlilan organisation, although members of LKBHWAK,

PSW and SMC also gave it as one of the reasons why they participate in their organisations.

Because of the significance of migration in Malang, being socially isolated also refers to the lonely city life. For women who are first or second generation migrants, the fear of being alone is based on the absence of family ties in Malang. Through participation in a local organisation women gain a surrogate extended family.

32 I do not want to stand alone, or be socially isolated.

145 If we have a group we do not feel alone, and we do not have to ask people they will just come to us and they know. That is the first reason, and the second is that we have family everywhere we go and that makes us feel good (Interview # 9).

The family in this context refers to the local community or the ‘imagined’ family. In light of the above respondent’s comments, local women’s organisations reinforce the metaphor that the nation is one large extended family. The local women’s dependence on their fellow members reaffirms the state’s invented tradition of the PKK as the national family.

I feel sad that most of my siblings have already passed away. Now my neighbours are my family and we need each other (Interview # 8).

Membership of the neighbourhood organisations Tahlilan and PKK is synonymous with family and friendship. The fear of being isolated dissipates when women have many friends. Regardless of whether the family is fictitious or blood relatives, the fact that women are like family provides members with a real sense of comfort.

For women at home raising small children, or running a small stall, the friendships formed through these organisations are a welcome alternative to their usual activities within the home. Women who are busy in the home have few alternative opportunities to make friends. The kampung’s local family (PKK) acts as a social support mechanism.

As one respondent commented;

It is about our families. If we are sick and I do not have a car and the mikrolet takes too long, stopping all the time, and my neighbour has a car. So through my organisation I meet all these people and we become friends. Then if I need something from my neighbour then I can just ask. If we do not have these sorts of organisations then we do not have anyone to help us. For Bu W it is different, as she is not a part of organisations in the kampung. She does 146 not have any friends in this neighbourhood and that means she is different from Bu U. If Bu U has a party, everyone will come here because she is so popular. But that is not the case with Bu W (Interview # 23).

For this PKK member the community remains socially very important. She talked about being able to get what she needs from her neighbour and about being popular, both of which relate to women’s need to belong. The fact that women know others will be there for them and provide them with the assistance they need is a major benefit of their membership.

Women do not merely enjoy being familiar with their neighbours, there is also a moral and social obligation that accompanies membership. Organisations offer a way to reinforce and recreate social ties. Kampung women place a strong emphasis on gotong royong.

If I have a neighbour new to my area - then I have to at least know what her name is. This is what we call gengsi33 here. My role as a member of society is to make the newcomer feel welcome and part of the community. I have to at least know her name so that I can walk out the front of my house and say to her ‘Hello’ when I see her. It is the social rule here, and the social etiquette(Interview#19).

This woman is an active member of her local PKK and the local SMC. She has been a member of the SMC since its inception in the 1950s. She explained to me that due to her high social standing, it was imperative that she knows her neighbours and not just something that she chooses to do.

33 Gengsi is prestige or standing. For this woman, if she does not welcome her neighbour she would be jeopardising her high social standing and prestige in the community.

147 Women know other members will come to them when they need them, as it is their responsibility as members. Mutual support is one of the main rules governing membership. If women adhere to these rules their membership and local status are safeguarded.

For example if there is a problem and the woman can not solve it herself, sometimes the women will come to me and ask for my help. They might say ‘Bu U my family has a problem, how should I solve it? That is just an example (Interview # 1).

Familiarity created through membership also engenders a sense of security. Where

‘communal living’ is highly valued the issue of security of the community and all those who live within it becomes a ‘right’ of members. One respondent explicitly made the link between membership, closeness, and traditional values.

We do not want to be lonely. We have to have friends. We have to feel secure of course; we can still feel this way if we are alone, but it is not just about feeling secure. It is also about sharing our experiences and making friends. Like me for example, I do not have any family here, so if I join in and later I have some problem with my family then I can get help. So my closest neighbour, from years ago when I first came here, will come to my aid. So, for example, if my child is sick, and say my husband is not here, whom will I ask for help? So if we are close with our neighbours it is good. And it is also related to religion. In religion we must also get along well with our fellow humans, all human kind should treat each other well (Interview # 18).

In the local kampung it is thought to be unsafe for a woman to be out alone after nine o’clock in the evening. During my time in Malang I often went out in the evening either to visit people or participate in community activities. When I returned home after nine o’clock at night, the exact time of my arrival would be noted. The following morning I would be reprimanded and told of the inappropriateness of my behaviour by my landlady. As an unmarried Javanese woman, it was considered both inappropriate and 148 unsafe for me to be out alone in the evening. The same curfews are not applicable to men in the kampung. I was told that ‘good girls’ come home early and do not stay out late alone because it is not safe (Interview # 5). Three years earlier (1997) during a short field trip to Surabaya, East Java, similar comments were made to me by members of my host family.

Friendship combats the fear of social isolation and satisfies the need for a sense of security. As members, women are entitled to a feeling of security and this is assured by the structure of membership where people look out for one another. Women’s comments are also connected to wider prescriptions for communal living which entail putting one’s self second to the interests of the community (or organisation). At the same time this family-like role does not displace existing familial and kinship structures in the kampung. This fictitious family that the government created reaffirms that members of women’s organisations should safeguard their fellow members and the organisation itself as a condition of membership.

The local women view a woman’s commitment to an organisation in terms of the alternative, non-membership. For the women interviewed the idea of not taking part in their local neighbourhood PKK was incomprehensible. The choice of non-participation means social alienation.

Groups are really important. The people over there (respondent pointed to her neighbours house) never join any groups, they never pay any attention to us, their neighbours, so if they have problems or troubles then no-one will go and help them. No one will go to them (Interview # 9 – author’s parenthesis).

149 The above respondent voiced her views about non-participation when she said that ‘no one will go and help them’ (Interview # 9). This is the sanction for failing to conform to local community values that reinforce gotong royong. Being concerned for the well being of one’s neighbour’s is a prescription for kampung living and a philosophy that

Malang women live by. The ramifications for failing to attend local organisations are that you will not have any friends and that you will not have anyone to help you. The demarcation between members (insiders) and non-members (outsiders) is clear.

Outsiders will not be supported and will not get assistance when they are in need because they do not belong to the community and thus are not their responsibility.

Local women told me that their continued participation in the traditional organisations

PKK and Tahlilan safeguards the morals of the kampung. Attending the kampung organisations is seen as the correct thing to do. Women who do not attend organisations are perceived, by the local PKK members, as rude or conceited (sombong). The women who I spoke with said they felt distressed by those who did not attend and they perceived them as a threat to the kampung’s morality.

Although in the past attendance at a woman’s local PKK was mandatory it has become redefined as a local tradition and thus a social obligation for women which men can not object to.

It is interesting because PKK is a kind of obligation for women, so her husband can understand that she goes because the Government encourages PKK. And during Suharto’s era, it was very important because the Government would enforce participation you know. It was very important because if you were a civil servant and your wife never goes to PKK, the Government would know and you would be reprimanded. So it is interesting now, when you go to PKK, your husband can look after the children for the night, so it is beneficial for the woman to go (Interview # 6). 150 Those who do not attend are criticised and punished by the majority who do. Those who fail to attend are sanctioned through kampung ngrumpi or gossip.

Basically it is like this, if a woman does not attend the meetings in her own neighbourhood, then she will feel like a stranger, she will not know her neighbours or what is happening in their lives (Interview #1).

A couple of respondents voiced strong views about women who do not attend the local

PKK. Many other women insisted that they were not affected in the least by those women who refused to participate. Nevertheless, despite the attempt by members to argue that it was of no consequence whether or not women attended, there was a strong consensus in the kampung that women should be members.

Members of the prayer group Tahlilan are also involved in the social and moral expectations surrounding membership. For the members of Tahlilan participation is demonstrated through their weekly attendance at prayer meetings. If Muslim women in the kampung do not attend the weekly prayer session, neighbours ask questions about their failure to attend. Although these criticisms are discreet and not made into a topic of kampung gossip, non-attendance is still seen as rude and a sign of disrespect.

Yes it is important, it is just the same as PKK, it is about tightening our relationship with our neighbours. So we can have a close relationship with our neighbours and no bad things will happen between neighbours. If the neighbourhood is harmonious then that is favourable (Interview # 3).

Women believed it would be serious for their deceased beloved if the living did not pray for them at Tahlilan. The sanction against non-attendance for Tahlilan members is the fear of spiritual punishment. 151 If we do not pray together, our loved ones do not complete their journey to the next place. If we do not all go together, their journey is not really complete, so we must pray together and then they can move on. We must send them our prayers (Interview # 24).

Women, who do not attend Tahlilan, do not pray together and consequently fail to learn how to be a good Muslim woman.

I attend Tahlil because if I do not understand something then I can go along to Tahlil and that can help me to understand. I have been to many Tahlil meetings (Interview # 17).

LKBHWAK and PSW

The objectives of the five organisations in this study differ significantly. Women who participate in the PKK and Tahlilan organisations favour the preservation of kampung traditions. By contrast the women who participate in the Malang branch of LKBHWAK and PSW challenge these traditions and opt instead to initiate social change.

As a result of their differences there is sometimes tension between the organisations.

Members of the local PKK and Tahlilan organisations talked negatively about the organisations LKBHWAK and PSW. The criticisms voiced by members of PKK and

Tahlilan are based on the fact that the latter challenge the valued social traditions in the kampung. For the members of LKBHWAK and PSW, the social obligation to participate in women’s organisations operates in the reverse. Women are deterred from participating in these ‘radical organisations’ due to their negative image in the wider society. Members of the Malang-based PSW and LKBHWAK are also affected by the sanctions of the PKK and Tahlilan.

152 One member of a Malang PSW is also politically active within LKBHWAK. As a PSW member, affiliated with a government-funded University she must choose carefully which activities she participates in. Such discretion contradicts the objectives of

‘radical’ LSMs. In order to continue working for the local PSW and not jeopardise her post at the university is secure, she must not get too involved in LKBHWAK activities.

I have to be careful, if I am too active within this NGO I will lose my job at the university. My boss often warns me about that. Yet I really enjoy being involved in the NGOs and I can offer a lot to them too (Interview # 5).

Because the University can terminate her employment based on her actions and disrepute, she has to be cautious and self-censoring. The fear is that as a result of her

‘radical’ behaviour, she may give the University a bad name.

Social pressures challenge women’s own feelings of personal responsibility to be a part of these ‘social reform’ based organisations. For members of PSW and LKBHWAK the social obligation to preserve the community over their individual desires is ever present.

Bu W’s so-called ‘personal endeavours’ stem from her personal obligation to help the community through social reform strategies.

Socialisation

Women’s organisations provide opportunities for women to socialise and because kampung women’s activities outside of the organisations are minimal, their social significance for women is magnified.

We usually do not go and visit each other on a one to one basis. Instead we all like to gather in one place. We love meeting together. It is not usually done on an individual basis. The reason has to do with all of us just being

153 busy and therefore it is much better if it can be arranged with dates and times in a formal manner (Interview # 9).

The comment, ‘We usually do not go and visit each other on a one to one basis’

(Interview # 9) reveals the lack of social forums for women’s socialisation.34 Women’s organisations are one of the only public spaces available for women in the kampung.

The organisations provide a legitimate local space where women can socialise on a regular basis unaccompanied. The above respondent told how they ‘like to gather in one place’, and her comment localises the concept of berkumpul for kampung women.

Members may also see each other on a daily basis, which allows them to develop long lasting friendships with other members of the organisations. Kampung women see each other as they do their shopping at the morning market-place pasar or when they attend kampung celebrations such as weddings, khitan or other social spaces. Whilst women see each other at certain activities, they do not generally visit each other in their homes.

University lecturers who participate in PSW also see each other daily on campus.

Members of LKBHWAK liaise and discuss topics such as prominent court cases or openly debate their concerns during academic seminars. Irrespective of the specific women’s organisation, the ties created by membership play an important part in these women’s wider social and work lives.

We love to have many friends. If we meet together in groups then we can have lots of friends. If we have friends, we can ask them for help. If we do not attend the groups, then we will not have any friends. If we do not have friends, when we walk down the street, no one will know us and therefore

34 Brenner’s work (1998) discusses women’s use of the market place as a form of socialisation.

154 they will not help us. That is why it is good for us to participate in organisations (Interview # 9).

Friendships are formed through the kampung organisations such as Tahlilan and PKK, or within the space of the campus for the members of the PSW. The bond formed reaffirms women’s feeling of belonging. Members of LKBHWAK and SMC gain a similar feeling of belonging and security. This feeling of belonging obtained through membership is achievable irrespective of the specific organisation.

Activities

During interviews Malang women consistently said that they join organisations because of the activities they sponsor. The nature, objectives and social outcomes of the activities differ depending upon the organisation. The different activities attract different women to participate in the organisations.

PSW and LKBHWAK

The members of the Malang-based PSW reported that campaigning for social change and a desire to learn about other people led them to participate in PSW. Women who choose to participate in PSW understand that they are improving the lives of poor women in the ‘target villages’. One PSW member spoke of her experience with the organisation and how it changed her life.

Before I joined PSW I did not know how some women lived but now, through participating with PSW, I can learn about how their lives are. That is why it is important for me to join in PSW. I have really learnt a lot from PSW. I have a life very different from these women’s lives. My situation with my husband and family is very different from theirs. Like I said, I do not have any major problem with my husband. It is different for many of these women. With this kind of research we learn a lot about ‘marginalised women’ and disadvantaged women that we would not normally know about. 155 And I certainly did not know about before I joined PSW. Before I joined PSW I only knew about my own family (Interview # 18).

Like the PSW members, women who join the LKBHWAK are motivated by their desire for social reform. The activities, which the LKBHWK sponsors, are varied yet members are still motivated by their desire to change social, economic, legal or religious issues which disadvantage local women. One local activist outlined the activities she engages in with the LKBHWAK.

I still have time to form an organisation about consultation about legal aid for women and families; I work as a consultant. These days we often get phone calls at our office. We talk and find solutions by phone, and in the end we let the women make their own decisions. Because I work in the law area I handle some cases related to violence and sexual abuse. There are some people whose human rights are violated. One example was a University student who became pregnant and she was not married. There was a very big debate because the father, of the boy responsible, was a town official. There was another case in the local case about a rape. In that case I attend the court to support the victims. I also tried to get much publicity for that case and to make the point. I tried to make the point in public, that rape is crime against humanity, and a curse on society. But until now, society thinks it is ‘natural’, done by the man. It is all the women’s fault, why do they wear clothes like that? Why do they wear mini skirts? Why does she go out late at night but actually the important thing is how the structure protects us, right? How can I work at night and feel safe? Like that. Another side beside culture is structure. Systematically, the New Order has brought women to domesticity, by that I mean has brought women to their husband’s side and so on. That means the woman does not progress. Maybe they know that women have power that can influence the system’s structure that exists, that is the system that the New Order Government put in place. And the effect has lasted until now there is the situation where part of women can on the one side enjoy the progress that she has achieved, but on the other side she has to follow what her husband says (Interview # 5).

PSW and LKBHWAK are organisations that campaign for social change, and this distinguishes them from the local neighbourhood organisations of PKK and Tahlilan.

These organisations regard action as essential for promoting social change. The women interviewed from LKBHWAK and PSW said that it was the activities and programs that

156 these organisations promoted and the demand for change that was behind their decision to participate.

The women who participate in LSMs see the achievement of the organisation’s goals as a result of the active participation of members. LSMs goals are often based on the demand for social change through activities initiated within the community. Eldridge argues that NGOs are increasingly becoming viewed as the catalyst for promoting democratic values in Indonesia (Eldridge, 1995:1). The organisation LKBHWAK followed the example of implementing activities to further their objectives.

Saturday Morning Club

Women in the SMC also explain their membership by the activities the club promotes.

Women join in the club’s activities with enthusiasm and members said that the activities are the main reason they attend (Interview #19). In particular the women said the educative component of the club was the driving force behind their attendance. Women attend this organisation for social and personal improvement through education.

PKK Activities

Responses gathered from surveys of women in the kampung (Appendix II) showed that the majority of respondents enjoy being involved in PKK’s activities. From the women who responded to the survey (appendix II) 80% of women claimed that simpan pinjam, was one of the most important activities within PKK.

Simpan pinjam is important. Usually I need to borrow. I might borrow 40,000 or 50,000 a month or something like that. I borrow the money, say on the 5th March then I should repay the loan on the 5th April. It does not matter though if you can not pay it back, that is OK. If I go on like that for a 157 few months that is also OK, but at the end of each year, we should have all repaid our loans” (Interview # 17).

Another activity that respondents said was still highly valued within the PKK is the fortnightly arisan. Women said they enjoy taking part in the arisan within the PKK meetings. Arisan is viewed as a fun activity to participate in and also acts as a ‘forced’ saving system for women in the kampung. Based on the results from the survey conducted (appendix II) the arisan activity ranked among the top five reasons why women join in PKK

Arisan is important. Each time we meet we have to pay 1,000 rupiah and then one of the women wins the money each time (Interview # 17).

During interviews Malang women told me how it has long been a custom for local women to meet together and participate in arisan. When I asked the women if they knew when or where it first appeared, they could not answer me. As a ‘traditional

Javanese activity’ it predates the creation of the PKK. Today it is still viewed as a symbol of local (Javanese) tradition. It also acts as the focus of the kampung’s local economy. All women in the neighbourhood participate in arisan and it has become the one economic activity that involves the entire kampung. Each of the women is assured their turn of winning. No-one can win more than once until everyone has had their turn.

There was arisan long before there was PKK. It has been around for a long time. I think that arisan is the tradition of Java. At least according to me arisan is a Javanese tradition. But PKK does not only exist here in Java but all over Indonesia. There are many different types of arisan, for instance sugar, plates and so on, it does not always have to be about cash, but it can be many different things (Interview # 26).

In addition to arisan and simpan pinjam, the PKK members who volunteer for the posyandu activities believe it to be a valuable activity for their kampung. The members 158 involved in the posyandu displayed pride when discussing their involvement in the project.

Within PKK there are activities about health - these activities are covered under posyandu. Therefore posyandu is about helping with issues of health. One of the main concerns is the issue of health for children. Well like on that day we focus on weighing the children and from this activity we can see which children are the right weight, which children are under weight and which children are over weight. We look at the reasons that the child is under weight and we measure the child’s weight with their height. Therefore we can see that at a certain age a child should be of a certain weight. Then if a child is under weight, we can write a letter and say ‘this child is not healthy’ and things like that. These groups ask women questions like “why is the child not eating well”. And they can give advice about these various issues” (Interview # 1).

In addition to the activities focusing on health, finance and arisan, PKK has other short- term projects, which aim to assist women in various ways. Women who were interviewed saw the activities as ongoing support for them.

PKK includes like I said, arisan, but it also teaches us a lot of useful skills about cooking and other things (Interview # 18).

The activities including arisan, simpan pinjam, posyandu and the health activities are derived from the ten-point program of the PKK. More than 75% of the women surveyed said that the 10-point program of the PKK was the most important aspect of

PKK and therefore was a major reason for their attendance. The ten-point program is painted on small stone pillars at the entrance to every community or street. Today they serve as a constant reminder of the values of the PKK.

159 The activities run by the PKK compel women to join for very different reasons than those who join PSW, or LKBHWK. Despite their differences women’s organisations do share some broad characteristics. They each run social programs to varying degrees.

The posyandu, Puskesmas, the village development programs of the PSW and the

LKBHWK are focused on helping improve the lives of poor women. The illiterate women in the ‘target villages’ of the PSW programs symbolise ‘poor Indonesian women’. Alternatively ‘poor women’ may include the women in the kampung who can not afford to buy basic medicine and instead obtain free medicine from their monthly posyandu sessions or from their local Puskesmas.

The orientations of the five women’s organisations encompass self-support, mutual benefits and social reform. The activities have reinforced the local tradition of gotong royong and are carried out through women’s adherence of berkumpul. Through participating in the organisation’s activities, women are contributing to communal life, their feeling of belonging is ratified, and they do not fear social isolation.

A Place to Solve Problems

Members from each of the organisations described their relationships with other members as akrab. For some women membership does not entail a close bond with one’s fellow members. Instead, it may mean merely attending meetings regularly and paying money for arisan each month. However, from the women interviewed, more than 70% claimed to have made close friends with their fellow members.

160 The close bond women form with their fellow members allows them to trust one another and see one another as family. The women explained how this ‘closeness’ permits them to talk about their ‘problems’ together.

The most important thing is for us to come together to solve problems, and the second is to improve ourselves and make an effort, this depends on each group (Interview # 2).

Members of the PKK have opportunities to talk together before, during and after the formal meetings. This provides women with a chance to seek advice about issues that are troubling them. Women offer each other assistance in regards to household matters including the cost of living, general family matters as well as seeking information about upcoming communal rituals such as weddings, khitan, or slametan.

In addition Malang women request advice from their fellow members outside of the meetings. Women told me that if they have problems that they can not deal with alone, then they could ask their fellow members to help them.

If we really can not solve that (problem) we should talk with friends, someone who we really trust. For example if I am sure that Bu X would have good advice about how to solve the problem and how to find a solution to the problem then I would ask her. However we will only talk to friends that we really trust (Interview #1 – author’s parenthesis).

During an interview with me one woman told me why women continue to participate in their local PKK organisations and the enticing ‘problem solving’ component of their membership.

If I have some problem with a relationship, any sort of problem, so if there is something that I do not know, or maybe there is something about my 161 mother, or some trouble with my children, then I can ask at the group. I just think to myself, oh tomorrow or next week, I will go to the group, and if I do not know, I can just ask someone who knows. And then I will know. Maybe I will ask Bu U and then she will help me (Interview # 22).

Specific topics are still regarded as taboo by the local kampung women. These include; sex before marriage, pregnancy outside of marriage, marital disputes, domestic violence, rape and abortions. A member of a Malang PSW and a lecturer at a local

University told me of a seminar she was trying to arrange at her University. The seminar planned to discuss the issue of sex, and attitudes toward youth sexuality amongst young university students. However the seminar had to be cancelled because some Islamic leaders in the community vetoed the subject matter as inappropriate. Thus some problems are seen as acceptable to discuss yet others are clearly not.

Those more personal issues are harder to talk about. Usually if there is a personal problem the woman will only speak to a close friend. That is only for a personal problem. Then we might get or give advice with our friend about what we should do about the situation at hand. Sometimes women only talk to their family, their parents or siblings, that usually happens if the women are not so ‘open’. But if the woman is more open they might talk to a close friend about a personal problem. It is good to talk to our family, as they know all about the process they would know more than friends do. People other than family might not know (Interview # 13).

The women involved in the LKBHWAK, told me that their membership is based on a stronger bond (lebih akrab) than the women in the kampung, who they say share only a desire for ‘gossip’ (Interview # 5). Their desire for social change separates the members of the LKBHWAK from the local PKK and Tahlilan women.

Other members of LKBHWAK recognised the positive aspects of the PKK for local women.

162 I do not think they attend the monthly meetings only to hear the latest instructions but also to meet together and other things too. Also if they have no other job then they will attend PKK - and I do see that as something positive for women. And they feel more comfortable to attend that group rather than a lot of new institutions that they do not know much about. (Interview # 20).

The different way in which organisations solve, or at least discuss problems reflects the deeper variances between local women’s organisations. Members of the PKK and

Tahlilan organisations say their meetings are a good place for women to come together and solve their problems. By contrast, the LKBHWAK members told me that the entire

LPSM originates from a ‘problem solving’ discourse. The shaming topics that women want to keep within the home and family are the problems that the representatives of

LKBHWAK try to voice.

For the SMC members, closeness and the sharing of personal problems are less significant than for the members of the PKK and Tahlilan. Personal matters are perceived as less relevant to the SMC’s goals of improving oneself through access to knowledge. There is a level of competitiveness between SMC members and this deters members from sharing their personal issues. The SMC members occasionally ask each other advice concerning every-day issues, in a manner not dissimilar to the way the

PKK women do.

Without the possibility to meet other women and have the chance to build friendships there are few other places in the community where women go to ‘solve their problems’.

The socially structured nature of the organisations and their government endorsement gives them social validity compared to other social places women inhabit such as markets.

163 “We Can Learn Together”

Women reported that when they participate in organisations they are able to learn together. The women actually used the Indonesian term belajar, which means to study.

The word ‘study’ however implies that women read texts and learn some specific academic type of knowledge from a given source or teacher. The English word ‘learn’ is used here, as it is more relevant to the way women talk about their experiences in the organisations.

The type of learning that women participate in is not based on academic learning.

Instead, women are involved in different forms of socialisation and cultural learning.

The subjects women learn about through participating in their local PKK organisation differ from what members of the SMC, PSW and LKBHWAK learn. Thus, for example,

The topics women discuss in the PKK are of little interest to the members of the Malang

LKBHWAK. Similarly the general knowledge that the SMC members seek is not relevant to the women in the target villages of the PSW programs.

Women learn social knowledge through their participation in organisations. The nature of this knowledge, and the way women choose to use what they learn, depends on the specific organisation. Within the ‘Saturday Morning Club’, there are regular activities and programs based on the principle of improving general knowledge. Members see regular research and language activities as opportunities to advance their social knowledge and thereby their social status.

For me it is important so that I can study, learn and practice the English language. I attend the SMC for this particular reason. It focuses on people 164 wanting to learn English even though their native language is Indonesian. We need to come together and to learn together (Interview # 19).

This woman told me that ‘we need to come together and to learn together’ which outlines a connection between the fear women mentioned earlier about being isolated and the significance placed on learning together. The learning itself is not as valued as

‘learning together’. It also links together the notion of berkumpul and gotong royong. If women adhere to these two local traditions they gain the benefit of learning together.

The formalised space and time of the meetings provide women with an opportunity to practice their English language skills. Such opportunities are not readily accessible outside of these spaces. Whilst some of the women in the organisation are close friends, many of the members of the SMC are acquaintances who come together only for the purpose of learning.

Members of the other women’s organisations mentioned the beneficial aspect of organisations that allows women to learn together. The main objective of the PSW is to teach poor village women how they can help themselves. Although, it is not only the poor women who ‘learn’ within the PSW organisations. The PSW members continually learn about the lives of ‘poor women’ in order to better meet their needs. PSW’s educational basis sees that the workers attain knowledge about various social, health, educational and marital concerns that face poor women throughout East Java. Members also learn about the lives of poor village communities through the stories and experiences that village women share with them during their visits.

165 Members of the Malang-branch of LKBHWAK recognise the positive consequence of

‘learning together’. As with members of the PSW, LKBHWAK members talked often about social concerns and how they hope to combat them through the programs and activities that they run. Through ongoing self-defined ‘grass roots’ programs the women involved in LKBHWAK are also ‘learning together’.

From the PKK survey, respondents said learning together was an important reason for attending (appendix II). This was reiterated in interviews in which the majority of PKK members felt fortunate to be able to learn together with other members of the PKK.

I join PKK in order to learn the things I need to know (Interview # 17).

The respondent has seemingly accepted and internalised the information she receives at her local meeting. It is imperative for her that she knows these things in order to live out her life in the kampung.

It is the process of socialisation and for people to learn how we should be and what we should do (Interview # 26).

The women learn how to live together in the community. They also learn to respect the social harmony of the kampung by maintaining their role in the social order. Women said they could learn about religious matters, practical economic concerns and how to be good wives and mothers.

Through participating in local organisations women conform to what is expected of them by the wider society. Women do not simply learn skills as a consequence of their

166 attendance, they also preserve the values of the community by upholding local traditions.

Tahlilan Learning

The members of Tahlilan said they enjoy learning about Islam. Their religious learning is different again from the learning women experience in the SMC, PSW, PKK and

LKBHWAK.

If our parents or other elderly people have passed away, if they died, then we can pray together for them and they can make their way to the next world (Interview # 10).

The prayers within Tahlilan are important to the women who attend as well as to the community at large. They form a strong part of the kampung’s spirituality. Religious education is one of the main reasons women attend Tahlilan. The learning within

Tahlilan takes the form of the ‘teaching’ administered at the weekly prayer meetings by their prayer leader.

Tahlil is a spiritual group that helps us to increase our knowledge about our religion and to improve our relationship with God. It is the basis of our morality and our moral education. If we know a lot about Islam then we won’t do bad things because we will be afraid that God will punish us. It is the moral imperative of our lives. It is important. For Tahlil, women and men are separated, and they pray separately. But usually after Lebaran there is an activity called Halal Bihalal. At this time, women and men are not separated but together. The aim of Halal Bihalal is to forgive each other. It is a special occurrence in Indonesia. After (hari raya) (holiday) which is called idul fitri. The tradition is that the younger people go to their elders to ask for forgiveness (mohon maaf) (Interview #1).

The preservation of the social order is respected through Tahlilan members continued attendance at prayer meetings. In the above quote, the respondent pointed out how her attendance at the local weekly prayer meetings ensures they will do ‘the right thing’. 167 Prayers safeguard the community against doing evil deeds. Evil deeds would disturb the harmony of the community and thus should be avoided (Mulder, 1996:231).

Summary

Women’s relationship with organisations, umbrella organisations and the state can be understood on two levels. Firstly, they can be examined through the parallels that exist between nationalist concepts of membership, participation, gotong royong, berkumpul and the preservation of the social order. Women adhere to these local traditions within the space of the organisations. The political ideas of the state infiltrated the traditions of the kampung. As such, women’s adherence to these traditions was used to bring them into a relationship with the state.

This chapter introduced the way women make active decisions concerning which organisations to participate in. The social perception of organisations largely determines this decision. When a woman decides to participate in a certain organisation, she is aligning herself with a social institution embedded with underlying politics, morality and symbolism. Whilst the experiences of women are essentially localised, they are never divorced from the political context in which they exist. Thus women are drawn into a relationship between the local organisations and their wider umbrella organisation, and the meaning it has in the community.

Local women may choose to be identified as maintaining tradition by becoming a member of the PKK, SMC and Tahlilan organisations. A woman, who participates in

Tahlilan, is drawn into a social relationship with NU and how Islam is presented,

168 accepted or challenged by the state. Alternatively, they may decide that they want to align themselves with the social reformist campaigns of the LKBHWAK and PSW.

This chapter has shown how women make decisions concerning which organisations to join and how as a result of their participation certain benefits become available to them.

The following chapter will explain the process that facilitates women’s access to these opportunities in their local community and will illustrate the real consequences of these gains for local women.

169 CHAPTER FOUR

Membership, Social Bargaining and Malang Women

Women gain social, economic and political opportunities for themselves through their membership in organisations. These opportunities do not simply become available once a woman joins an organisation. Nor are they a homogenous experience for women across different organisations. Instead, these gains become available to women as a result of social negotiations that take place through their participation in organisations.

The parametres of these negotiations are premised on the relationship between Malang women, the organisations they participate in, the larger umbrella organisations, which support them, and the state.

The nature of this relationship determines the type of opportunities that women can access. One way to understand this relationship is through discussing the interaction between individuals and social structures. This chapter begins with a discussion of the sociological concept of agency. One aspect of agency that will be examined here includes an individual’s ability to act and thereby cause change and influence these social structures.

Although agency can be a useful concept for understanding the relationship between social structures and individuals, there is a tendency for such discussions to place emphasis on action, change and the significance of collective political resistance. By contrast, this chapter explores the concept of localised resistance to the state and patriarchal oppression, and cites specific cases where women engage in local struggles.

170 These examples show how women have challenged social and political institutions in the past, and how their negotiations have taken place on the local level.

In the kampung the types of negotiation women enter into are local and immediate.

Their participation is not discussed here as a form of resistance. Instead, the term used here to map women’s relationships with organisations and their larger umbrella organisations, is ‘social bargaining’, which will be explained in more detail later in this chapter.

Agency

Sociologist Anthony Giddens (1979) is widely known for his investigations into agency.

In particular he outlines the role of an individual in influencing the events within society through their choice of actions.

The notion of human action logically implies that of power, understood as transformative capacity: ‘action’ only exists when an agent has the capability of intervening, or refraining from intervening in a series of events so as to be able to influence their course. The introduction of a theory of action into sociology thus entails regarding power just as essential and integral to social interaction as conventions are (Giddens, 1979:256).

Another of the main debates about agency is how to understand the relationship between the individual and the collective (Abercrombie Hill and Turner, 1984:9). Much ambiguity remains concerning the inter-relationship between power, the individual and social structures. The uncertainty often concerns which is more significant, the individual or the collective. Other questions that arise include how agency relates to power, and whether or not they are synonymous.

171 Within this thesis the term agency provides one framework to understand women’s relationship with both the state and other institutions in society. It allows women to be seen as social agents who make choices that influence their lives in the community.

The assumption that agency is concerned predominantly with action infers women’s ability to choose. The idea that women’s agency is premised on their action and choices they make becomes problematic when those choices become understood only as forms of political resistance. The second chapter showed how the definition of women’s empowerment is measured by women’s access to political power. There is a parallel between the definition of power and agency. Where empowerment was synonymous with political power, agency refers to an individual’s ability to act. If agency equates to power, then inaction is representative of powerlessness.

Women’s organisations are defined by their ability to politically empower women.

Those that do not, fail to empower women and highlight their lack of agency. This broad use of agency as a measure of political gain has been the conclusion that both

Indonesianists and feminists have drawn when discussing state-sponsored women’s organisations in Indonesia. These structured definitions homogenise women’s organisations and deny any individuality of experience within these local social institutions. The use of agency in this way prohibits the ability to understand women’s relationships with social structures as a mutual relationship.

Women and Localised Resistance

Over the last two decades an alternative framework has been used when discussing resistance and women in Southeast Asia. Localised resistance refers to the way women

172 resist specific social, political, cultural, religious and personal challenges they encounter on the local level.

Localised resistance conceptually challenges the above-mentioned notion that an individual must influence events from outside the society. The gains women achieve through localised resistance have far-reaching consequences for them within their community. The benefits women derive are not so much from the efficacy or political connectedness of organisations. Rather, they are the result of the relationships and social bargaining in which women become involved.

Malang women’s participation in organisations occurs at the grass-roots level. The ramifications of their membership status are premised on kampung based gains. This study uses the paradigm of localised resistance from which to begin thinking about women’s participation in organisations. In this study localised resistance is used in preference to the broader term agency.

In the socio-linguistic study of women in central Java, Laine Berman (1998) argues that agency, as it is known in the west, can be problematic when referring to different cultural locations.

The emphasis on the separateness of people from one another and the individuality of the will has led to a conception of people as independent agents, individually responsible for their actions (Berman, 1998:51).

In her study, Berman finds that agency is not only present in women’s speech but also in their silence. She points out that women’s use of silence can signify ‘resistance’. For

Berman, silence is a form of passive resistance to situations women find themselves in.

173 Inaction and in the context of her own research, silence, is equally a part of women’s agency (Berman 1998:51).

Berman’s work questions the relevance of pre-existing definitions of resistance.

According to Berman, what is required is a new way of speaking about ‘local’ forms of agency that depicts women’s lives and identities. The new definition of agency, for

Berman, needs to consider the impact of cultural constraints on women, yet acknowledge that women exercise choice and make informed decisions.

The findings of Berman (1998) demonstrate how agency should not be thought of as a uniform (western) concept synonymous with individual action. The definition of political agency as the right and responsibility of an actor to carry out various actions has also been challenged by leading feminist scholars. Many feminists have challenged the inference that women who do not ‘act’, are passive (Abu Lughod, 1990; Karim,

1995; Ong, 1995; Rosaldo, 1974; Riley, 1988; Tanner, 1974 and Van Esterick, 1995).

Another writer who discusses examples of women’s localised resistance is Dianne Wolf with her research on Javanese labour laws and female workers (Wolf, 1996). Wolf acknowledges that women who work in factories are faced with both hierarchical and bureaucratic inequalities as a result of their low socio-economic positions and their sex.

She argues that despite operating within structured parameters, women find ways to resist management’s dominant powers. Women do not engage in large-scale political forms of resistance such as strikes. Instead, Wolf explains women engage in more passive forms of protests including production slow downs, stay-outs, walkouts, and seeing ghosts or spirits (Wolf, 1996:160).

174 When the personnel manager refused to consider workers rather direct pleas, ignoring their concerns with safety and wellbeing in a most unfatherly manner, they reacted in a most daughterly manner, by sending him a quiet but angry message that he could not fail to recognise (Wolf, 1996: 161).

Wolf links the women’s decision to adopt a specific form of resistance with the broad- based Javanese value system. She explains that the worker’s reluctance to challenge the system in a formalised way reflects their decision not to use a more kasar form of resistance. The choice to resort to passive resistance is embedded in cultural values that favour the adoption of halus behaviour.

There is also a class factor evident in this discussion, based on how lower class workers know they should accept their lot in life. This notion of respecting the status quo was outlined in detail the third chapter under the sub-heading of ‘social order’.

The centuries of exploitation of the Javanese peasantry by the Javanese aristocracy, the Dutch, and the Japanese, makes contemporary industrial capitalism just one more link in a long chain of extractive relations. Indeed, the low expectations of female workers accustomed to low returns for their labour in the village has made for a relatively quiet recent history of industrial disputes (Wolf, 1996: 162 sic).

The majority of women who work in the factories are from poor village communities and few of these women see it as their place to contest tradition. For women in lower often-disadvantaged social positions, it is more advantageous for them to resist in a subtle and acceptable way.

This decision is premised upon very real fears, not just of losing ones job, but of more serious, possibly fatal, repercussions. In the documentary ‘Silk and Steel’ produced by

Fleming and Ogilvie in 1996, Indonesian lawyer Nursyabani Katyasungkhana discussed 175 how Indonesian labour protests had diminished with the military and police involvement in labour relations. She claimed the Indonesian military and police involvement in industrial disputes saw more people killed, imprisoned and tortured by the police and Indonesian military (Katyasungkhana, 1996: Silk and Steel).

Examples cited in the film included the high profile case of Marsinah, an Indonesian female labour activist from Surabaya. Marsinah was raped, shot and killed as a consequence of her involvement in the advocation of the rights of working women

(Katyasungkhana, 1996: Silk and Steel). The murder of Marsinah was taken by female labour activists as a warning of the fate that awaited them. At the same time, it represented another way in which the state had to repress dissent.

An interview with Lies Marcoes (Silk and Steel 1996) also re-tells the story of Aminah, who was raped for her involvement in labour protests and defending of the rights of women workers. Tragically Aminah subsequently died from the illegal abortion she sought as a result of being raped.

The extension of the New Order’s control over women’s behaviour in the workplace defined permissible behaviour for women to exhibit. If women challenged the system with means that were not ‘Javanese’ it was seen as socially and politically unacceptable.

During the New Order government’s reign there was a ban on unions and industrial protests such as strikes (Wolf, 1996:145).

176 The government’s prohibition of political protests impacted upon the nature of

‘acceptable’ opposition for female factory workers. The women’s choice of protests, including seeing ghosts and slow downs, was socially and politically acceptable.

The workers perceive the form of localised resistance that Wolf refers to as effective. It exemplifies how women resist inequities imposed on them by management. The fact that women adopt a Javanese form of resistance does not guarantee them success, but it does provide women with an opportunity for change. Wolf outlines specific case studies whereby Javanese female workers presented their complaint to management clearly and effectively (Wolf, 1996:161).

Sometimes management rescinded a new rule or changed an existing one; other times, they tightened their control over workers even more, for example, by threatening to fire protestors (Wolf, 1996:161).

Wolf highlights the complex nature of ‘resistance’ and provides an ethnographic example with a culturally relative definition of ‘resistance’. Wolf‘s research (1996) illustrates how women’s resistance takes different forms in specific locations and is linked to class and social considerations. When women find themselves in ‘oppressive situations’ they do not cease being social agents. Even the lowly paid factory workers in

Wolf’s study are capable of resisting the dominant influences of the state by their actions. Despite their situation women continue to make choices that concern their lives.

Localised resistance is evident in other research about women in Asia. Law (1997) discusses the plight of female bar dancers in the Philippines. Law provides an alternative analysis of the widely documented connection between women’s bar dancing

177 and the sex industry in the Philippines. Contrary to popular representations of the dancers as passive victims, Law argues that local bar dancers still make decisions that shape their own lives. One example of this, she says is how women openly resist gender oppression in terms of the control they have over pimps (Law, 1997:119).

Law (1997) questions how the terms ‘resistance’ and ‘agency’ have been defined hitherto. She posits that one must continually investigate local and culturally specific forms of resistance and not oversimplify them. For Law, women are social agents who participate in the negotiation and renegotiations of their identities rather than have them constructed by others (Law, 1997:110).

Resistance and Social Bargaining

This study is a localised discussion of how women can and do change their immediate local realities through their participation in social and gendered negotiations. I use the term ‘social bargaining’ to refer to the way women negotiate social gains for themselves in the kampung.

The term ‘social bargaining’ is related to localised resistance in its emphasis on the local behaviour of individual women. There are however differences between the two concepts. The term ‘localised resistance’ implies a challenge that is oppositional if not antagonistic.

178 For Wolf (1996), it takes the form of resistance to oppressive working conditions in factories. For Law (1997), women challenge the assumed identity that would be placed on them by the existing discourse of the sex industry.

While ‘local resistance’ implies opposition, ‘social bargaining’ implies women bargain to gain something. The concepts of resistance and bargaining are not completely separable. It could be argued that the reason women want to gain something is because they have been denied something. The defining point in this study is not whether women are trying to resist something but rather how women are trying to change their given social, economic, political or personal situation. This does not of course imply that all women are socially equal, or that inequities do not exist. It means that women are not knowingly resisting, but instead trying to gain access to certain opportunities.

I have developed the concept of the ‘social bargain’ by borrowing a related concept the

‘patriarchal bargain’ from the work of feminist writer Deniz Kandiyoti. Kandiyoti’s work looks at women’s experiences in societies of Sub-Saharan Africa and South and

East Asia. She identifies the way women engage with these gendered social systems.

Kandiyoti argues that in different cultural contexts, women bargain and secure benefits for themselves that she describes as a ‘patriarchal bargain’ (Kandiyoti, 1988:275). For

Kandiyoti the bargaining process occurs within specific social, political and gendered institutional arrangements (Kandiyoti, 1988:275). The bargaining process does not outside the parameters of particular forms of patriarchy.

In her study of women in African societies she describes the strategies women use to maximise their autonomy.

179 Yoruba women in Nigeria, for instance, negotiate their terms of their farm- labour services to their husbands while they aim to devote more time and energy to the trading activities that will enable them to support themselves and ultimately give up such services. Hausa women, whose observance of Islamic seclusion reduces the demands husbands can make for their services, allocate their labour to trade, mainly the sale of ready-cooked foodstuffs (Kandiyoti, 1988:276).

Kandiyoti recognises that despite the limitations of polygamous societies, the increased income women earn from trading allows them an amount of autonomy (Kandityoti,

1988:277). The bargain sees women work less in the farm labour services and increases the opportunities for them to earn their own money and thereby become less dependent on their husbands.

Social Bargaining and Malang Women’s Organisations

As members of local organisations in Malang, women engage in a form of social bargain. The nature of the bargaining process differs to Kandiyoti’s patriarchal bargain discussed above. The negotiations are based on the connection between women, local organisations and the larger umbrella organisations that are affiliated with the organisations.

The relationship between the women’s organisations and their larger umbrella organisations was described in detail in the second chapter. These larger religious, social and political umbrella organisations continue to validate the social significance of local women’s organisations. Their social significance facilitates the form of social bargaining which women engage in.

Women adhere to socially acceptable behaviours through their participation in local 180 organisations. As a result certain social, financial, political and personal opportunities become available to them. These gains are not measured in terms of wider issues of legal rights, legislative reform, or increased access to positions of decision making power.

The following analysis will revisit the benefits women said they gain through participating in organisations. It will show how these ‘benefits of membership’ are the result of women’s bargaining with the social parameters of organisations and the state.

It will also highlight how the different organisations provide different opportunities for local women.

Having Friends, Contacts & Networking

Chapter three showed how Malang women believe it is important to live in a community where people care about one another. They spoke to me about this benefit in terms of having many friends, or banyak teman. The women said that being a member of an organisation meant they did not feel socially isolated. Women feel ‘alone’ sendirian when they do not participate in kampung activities including organisations.

They reported that when they belonged to women’s organisations other members would come to their aid without being asked.

Groups are important otherwise we would live alone and we do not want that (Interview # 31).

Their participation in neighbourhood organisations means local women have ‘friends wherever we go’. The desire to not be socially isolated and the importance of having many ‘friends’ applies especially to the neighbourhood organisations PKK and Tahlilan.

181 Nevertheless the importance of feeling part of a community was also present in the other organisations.

Membership creates the possibility of having many friends, which is otherwise difficult to achieve. Living in the kampung’s close-knit community means that ‘having friends’ extends beyond exchanging greetings at the morning market or civilities at the group meetings. ‘Friends’ suggests not simply how many people you know, but who you know. Certainly women’s relationships are important and give meaning to their everyday lives, although ‘having friends’ also extends beyond this. Having friends means opportunities will emerge which are not available to women who do not ‘have friends’ (non-members).

Membership can also be beneficial for business. A key informant, Bu U, is extremely active in her local PKK (RT, RW and Kelurahan) organisation. Despite not having an official ranking within the PKK hierarchy, she devotes her time to organising PKK activities and events in the kampung. Through her friendship with fellow members and her dedication to the local PKK organisation, Bu U networks with members at the top end of the PKK structure.

Her position in the organisation helps to identify her as a respectable member of the kampung. Through her status as dedicated member of the PKK, Bu U has acquired enough prestige to be able to visit the home of the male head of the PKK. If a woman, who is not a member of the local PKK, was to visit the male head of the community in his home, it would be seen as socially presumptuous and not allowed (tidak boleh).

182 Bu U’s relationship with the new leader of the RW (Pak RW) has developed and they have become close friends. On numerous occasions she visits Pak RW in his home to discuss various PKK matters. Bu U is now well known for the time and effort that she puts in to the local PKK organisation. As a loyal member of her local PKK she is able to bargain with other members of the organisation.

Bu U adheres to local kampung traditions of gotong royong. The social order is maintained through the respect she shows for the male leader Pak RW. The nature of Bu

U’s social bargain is the result of the extra time and effort she invests into kampung activities. She volunteers her time and that of her family to assist with local activities and events. Through this continued effort she is admired by Pak RW for the self sacrificing effort she makes for the PKK.

Bu U also works for a local insurance company in Malang, although she seldom attends its city office. She is paid a commission on the amount of insurance she sells. In return for her friendship and dedication to PKK, the local leader of the RW (Pak RW) puts

(insurance) business her way. As a result, her income increases substantially. Bu U does well financially as a result of having ‘friends’ in the local organisation. These friends, some in high positions (in the case of Pak RW) are helpful to her.

Bu U’s business situation is not uncommon amongst other (smaller) traders in the kampung. Women may rent a small stall at the kampung market, or sell manchester from home and earn a small percentage in commission on their sales. In each case the fellow members of the organisations are also women’s ‘customers’. If there is more than one woman selling the same item in the kampung, women (members of the PKK)

183 always support one another. The friendship and networks she gains from PKK membership is a sound business investment for Bu U.

The way Bu U uses her membership and active role in PKK is a type of bargain. If she is a good member and actively helps with the running of the organisation and activities, she makes significant personal gains. In this situation the social bargain has two sides. It forms a kind of circular pattern of bargaining and investment, which includes the translation of economic gain into symbolic, then social capital.

Bu U, and other women, who trade with members, accesses financial opportunities as a result of the ‘friends’ they have made in the kampung. As a consequence of this negotiation, Bu U is able to afford to purchase expensive material, which she will use to have elegant clothes made for her. Appearance is important in the kampung and the effort and expense that goes into her appearance will be noticed. Bu U’s status may well rise in the local kampung as she also gains respect from the local community.

Knowing that you can rely on people in times of need is important. It is equally vital that fellow members of the community show their support by attending the homes of other members when they host traditional rituals in the kampung. Ritualised Islamic feasts mark the anniversary of the death of a member of the community. Islamic feasts are one example of slametan. The purpose of slametan is to achieve “slamet, a state in which events will run their fixed course smoothly and nothing untoward will happen to anyone” (Mulder, 1996:52).

184 In the kampung, a slametan is a communal activity. Women from the local PKK (RT) organisation join together to assist in the preparation of the slametan ceremony. Women gather to prepare food for the family of the deceased. This ensures the widowed does not carry the responsibilities of the formal ceremony alone. They share the burden with other members of their PKK and Tahlilan organisations.

The women in the kampung said the community believe the ritualised feast, together with prayers, ensures their loved ones are successful in their journey to the after-life.

Muslim women of the kampung and the members of Tahlil and PKK participate in the slametan.

The preparation of food and participation in prayers for the family is socially very important.

Women take this as a serious duty that they must carry out with or without the help of their husbands. Women see the obligation to participate in ritual as a kind of “helping out” (rewang), something that they already do when they assist each other in cooking or preparing in other ways for a ritual celebration, a frequent and time consuming social requirement for women of all classes. It is usually only mature adults who are expected to “help out” by preparing for or attending slametan and other such collective rites. One rarely sees children or young, unmarried adults at these events (Brenner, 1998:185).

In the example of the slametan, the family acquires respect from their local society through adhering to the religious ritual. How one’s neighbours perceive one is crucial for people in the kampung. The numbers of people who attend the slametan indicates the type of person they are. It is an informal measure of whether a person is halus or not.

185 The majority of women attending the slametan are either family or fellow members of

PKK or Tahlilan organisations. Membership of local organisations expands ones social network and thereby ones social status. This is reflected by attendance at important rituals. If many people attend a slametan it reinforces a positive image of the family and ensures them continued high status in the kampung. In this case status is afforded to the family of the deceased.

A third example of the social reality of ‘having friends’ can be illustrated in another ritual, this time a local kampung wedding. A wedding, as with the slametan, is a communal affair. Much importance is attached to ‘who’ and how many ‘friends’ attend.

Fellow members of the PKK (RT) organisation come to the home of the mother or relative of the bride. Hundreds of family, friends and neighbours gather to offer their congratulations to the bride, groom and their families. Fellow members of PKK and

Tahlilan prepare copious amounts of food to ensure there will be enough to feed the large crowds.

The preparation time also serves as a social opportunity for the women to chat and gossip as they prepare food boxes for the anticipated guests. The women enjoy the chance to gossip, but at the same time offer practical help and assistance to the bride’s family. This social ritual sees women help their fellow RT members ‘without being asked’. Membership, or having many friends, ensures that the burden and stress that a wedding inevitably brings, is shared. The chatting and working together is the lived reality of the gotong royong principle. Working together symbolises tradition and thus women help each other to uphold local values in the society. Fulfilling social tradition and women’s membership of organisations reinforce each other.

186 The women who do not attend the PKK or Tahlilan organisations experience a different reality. Bu W is the female head of a local household and is an active member of PSW and the Malang branch of LKBHWAK. She does not however attend her local PKK or

Tahlilan organisation. As a result members of her local RT PKK organisation know her as a ‘non-member’. She is consequently made the topic of gossip or ngrumpi in the kampung.

Bu W hosted her niece’s wedding in her home on the outskirts of the kampung. The wedding day arrived, as did the accompanying list of chores to be carried out. Of the thirty female members of Bu W’s local PKK RT organisation, only two women arrived to assist with the preparations. During a subsequent PKK meeting, one of the members said that the reason no one turned up to help was because Bu W never attends her PKK meetings. According to this informant, Bu W had neglected her duties to the community.

Her fellow members thought Bu W had failed to fulfil her communal obligation. There remains a prevailing sense of obligation to help, and in this case two women still turned up to help prepare the food for the wedding. During other wedding preparations in the kampung, between fifteen and twenty women help with the preparations.

Bu W is viewed as sombong by her neighbours in the kampung, and lacks respect. The fact that only two women attended her niece’s wedding, meant that Bu W had much more work to do than she would have if she had ‘more friends’. In this way, having

‘many friends’ makes light work.

187 The social benefit of ‘having many friends’ is valued in the kampung. In particular it is about helping one another with practical concerns including preparations for rituals. It also entails living together and being involved in each other’s lives.

Even though a woman might make a decision not to attend her PKK, she is not exempt from the community’s reaction to her decision. When living in a community that favours communal values and obedience and gotong royong a type of obligation, non- attendance is viewed as unfavourable. Even though Bu W does not participate in the

PKK kampung activities, she is still judged by the kampung rules. The affiliation between the organisations and social tradition sees Bu W judged for her non- attendance.

Having Friends, Outside the Kampung

‘Having many friends’ for members of the PSW and LKBHWAK relates to the social networking inherent in their roles as social activists. Some of the ways ‘having friends’ play themselves out is through Malang’s social network. If Bu W does social favours for certain individuals or organisations, she may gain them access to press coverage in the

Malang newspaper. The friends she has also refers to the way she relates to people in positions of authority. When Bu W does something in society her actions and behaviour are publicly visible. People know what she does and will remember the results she achieves for them in a local court case, aiding a divorce application or protecting an abused wife from her husband. In return, they will look out for her when she or her family is next in need. It also has ramifications for her family. If someone knows Bu

W’s children, then they connect them with her and this provides her offspring with opportunities.

188 Being Heard

Members from each of the organisations said that participating in women’s organisations offers them a forum where they can solve their problems. Through interviewing kampung women, it became clear that there are different kinds of problems. Broadly speaking there are two different classifications for women’s problems. There are problems that are personal or taboo, and those that are of a more general nature and thereby acceptable. The way problems are addressed within organisations is related to two important social considerations. Firstly, the gendered compartmentalisation of public and private space within Indonesian society. Secondly the different organisations have their own way of dealing with different problems.

A public and gendered forum for problem solving is significant for Malang women. One must remember that within Javanese society, space is divided roughly into private or public arenas. Sullivan argued that men dominate public space and women predominantly reside in the private space of the home (Sullivan, 1994:148). Each domain contains rules and protocols. Public spaces are not the place for problems to be voiced. The New Order government reinforced this gendered division of social space as a dimension of its nation building policies and social control.

PKK

Despite the end of the Suharto regime six years ago and the removal of specific laws which censored culturally taboo matters35, women still hesitate to discuss their personal

35 Since the end of the Suharto regime, Indonesia has witnessed changes to the freedom of the press laws, passed by President Habibie during his interim presidency (Hefner, 1997:209).

189 matters in public. Women engage in a type of self-censorship. Although women talk openly about general concerns including health and education of children, familial health and housekeeping concerns these are distinct from ‘personal’ problems. The personal matters include sexuality, unwanted pregnancies and domestic violence. The way these problems come to be classified as either personal (taboo) or general and acceptable was discussed in the third chapter.

Only ‘general’ problems get talked about within the groups, they never discuss ‘family problems’ with women from these groups. You can only do that with women who you really trust. But things like my children, I can discuss these within the groups. It is OK if I talk about that. For me I have never discussed a private issue with anyone outside my family, it is just not OK. And like I said, I do not really have any close friends. To me it is a real issue of ‘tradition’. We just simply do not talk about ‘family’ with people outside of our family. Some things are OK, like if we want to talk about our children, we can do this at PKK or at posyandu (once a month) or even at Puskesmas, that is all OK. But if it is about personal or family problems, then we can not talk about them with people outside of the family (Interview # 12).

Women talk about household matters within the PKK. The woman in the above quote is a member of the local PKK and Tahlilan organisation in Malang. Her classification of problems mirrored other kampung women’s sentiments.

Women who attend the Tahlilan and PKK organisations generally do not discuss problems of a personal nature within the organisation meetings or activities. When I asked kampung women whether or not they felt comfortable to talk with other women in public about personal matters, overwhelmingly they said that they would feel terlalu takut atau malu (too afraid or embarrassed and shy).

If there was a ‘personal’ problem then we do not share them with anyone. However there are some women who feel brave to talk openly about matters more personal. Yet the majority of women are not so brave, they are shy. I myself would be afraid of my husband if I told others outside the family 190 about a private issue. My husband, and many Indonesian men, do not like it if women tell other people about their problems, it is not ‘polite’ (Interview # 7).

Women seek advice from their fellow members on an array of matters. They discuss their concerns before, after and even during the meetings and activities. They seek advice, support and material aid from their fellow members which is of substantial benefit for women in the kampung and this sense of support is not easily attained through other means.

The permission members have to discuss problems in a public space is rare and for the majority of members was not available outside the space of the organisations. Despite the taboos surrounding certain personal topics, women continue to share their general concerns by talking with their fellow members about non-controversial matters.

Women’s desire to uphold local tradition influences not only their attendance at these organisations but also how they behave within these spaces. Women’s associations remain embedded within the constraints of kampung social life. The organisations are not a radically separated space in which women can behave without social constraints.

If women fear becoming the topic of gossip, they will visit trusted fellow members and discuss the matter in the comfort of their home.

There are different perceptions. If we ask everybody else’s advice we have to be sure that she can help to solve the problem, also that she can keep a secret. Usually the women do not want to talk about their problems at the meetings so they would rather come to my house. Maybe the woman is ashamed because it is a family problem (Interview # 1).

191 Women share their secrets with their ‘friends / family’ through bonds formed in local women’s organisations. Women offer advice to their fellow members about personal concerns. Local women feel strongly about this aspect of membership as they told me that they are happy they can ‘solve’ their problems within the organisations.

Tahlilan and Problem Solving

Within the weekly Tahlilan sessions, women openly discuss general matters before and proceeding the prayers. The ‘problems’ are discussed with reference to their religious

(Islamic) significance. Women may inquire about the requirements for slametan or for an Islamic wedding. Women request advice on these matters and feel a sense of solidarity when they discuss every-day topics. One respondent highlighted the difference in topics discussed in her local PKK organisation to those discussed within the Tahlilan organisation.

Women often discuss their problems within the PKK (not within Tahlil), as Tahlil is primarily a religious organisation. Women can talk about their problems in the PKK, but only issues pertaining to the household or very general family issues (Interview # 13).

Not all women felt terlalu malu to talk about their problems. One of the women I spoke with said she does feel able to converse with her fellow members.

As for me, I am not afraid to tell anyone. I am quite open about things. If I have something to say I just go ahead and say it. But it just depends on the individual woman. I love to talk and am open to talk about my problems. I often talk to my older sister about things and I like to do that (Interview # 9).

The majority of the women in the kampung however do not have her open nature. For other local women, sharing personal information is undesirable as it causes anxiety as

192 they are not confident their secrets will be kept private. The respondent quoted below is also a member of the same PKK and Tahlilan. In contrast to the comments from interviewee # 9, she believes that her personal problems should stay within the family.

If it is me, and I have a problem with my husband, then I will talk to my husband first. If my husband and I can not resolve it, then I go to my close friend and ask for her advice. It is OK for me to do this. I like her to give me some advice about what I should do (Interview # 2).

During one interview, the topic of women’s problems ‘in general’ was interpreted as

‘her’ specific problems; the woman was offended and responded accordingly.

Actually I do not want to talk about this, so I will answer that I am happy. No I do not want to talk about this, because I know that if I do, my husband will be angry with me (Interview # 7).

This woman is a member of PKK and Tahlilan and her views about who she should discuss personal problems with was limited to her husband. The fear that others would find out her personal information and use it as gossip led her to fear talking about them openly.

Tahlilan is a place where women can solve religious concerns that they face, through prayer. Women learn about their religion and what is expected of them in their society.

Women told me continually that they enjoy participating in organisations ‘because they come together and solve their problems’. Certainly, within Tahlilan women do solve problems and this is something not available to them through other means.

Solving Domestic Disputes in the Kampung.

The way women solve problems in the kampung is illustrated in the story of how one instance of domestic violence was handled by local PKK women. A PKK member’s 193 daughter was physically abused by her husband. The mother of the abused woman confided in her friend, a fellow member of the PKK. The two women had formed a close bond over the past thirty years. Such was the closeness of this bond that the woman in question felt comfortable confiding in detail what her daughter was experiencing. She also spoke of her own difficulties, as the girl’s mother to find some way to help this situation. The woman told her friend that she felt sad because she could not protect her daughter from her husband’s rage. The issue of domestic violence is a

‘sensitive’ one and thus socially taboo. When I asked, the woman explained to me that domestic problems are neither the concern, nor the business, of the Indonesian police.

The woman presented this as her own personal justification for not going to the police.

The trust women develop with other members (in this case through the local PKK organisation) means some are brave enough to confide in fellow members when it comes to important issues such as domestic violence. According to a local activist in

Malang the large majority of women do not pursue cases of abuse through the official judicial system. Thus support from fellow members provides them with another kind of community to support them when they are in need (Interview # 5).

Coming together to solve problems extends beyond what women feel they are permitted to discuss within the space of the organisations. It includes women’s conversations with fellow members in the privacy of their homes. In the above example, participating in her local organisation has brought a new meaning to the reality of ‘having many friends’.

Having friends means that the pain she has endured, learning of her daughter’s situation, is shared. In this case the PKK is a place where this member can solve her problems. At least to the degree that she no longer carries the burden alone. For the woman above

194 whose daughter is being physically abused the ability and option she felt she had to discuss this with a fellow member was most significant.

The social bargaining evident in this example is that the member of PKK sought the advice and guidance of a fellow member of PKK. The women said it is not acceptable, even kasar, to discuss their personal problems within the organisations. However, the fact that women are members sees close personal bonds develop between the women.

Such is the nature of these personal bonds that women create for themselves the space in which to discuss these personal matters.

LKBHWAH; Personal Problems and Social Reform

Whilst members of the local neighbourhood organisation are terlalu malu to discuss their personal problems, the opposite is the case for members of the LKBHWAK. The members of the LKBHWAK and even the Malang branches of the PSW talked at length about the importance of getting taboo topics out into public spaces.

The controversial issue of domestic violence is not silenced or restricted to LKBHWAK members lounge rooms. By contrast, the members of the LKBHWAH campaign to get these crimes against women officially acknowledged by the Indonesian judicial system.

The issue of domestic violence against women featured strongly during an interview with a local PSW member.

Violence against women in Indonesia: Basically we do not like to talk about it because, especially in Java, we always talk about harmony. So nobody wants to think about violence. Even though we might really hate something, it would not be right to say it. So, like Suharto, he was always smiling in 195 front of others, yet what he was really doing no one knew. If we are not able to bring about harmony for the family, then it will end in divorce. So in my opinion Islam has made issues such as ‘Domestic Violence’ taboo, but in my opinion we must talk about such things. This is only my opinion. Therefore we need to find a legal system in this country that is prepared and equipped to talk about the issue of domestic violence in Indonesia. Therefore I believe that domestic violence is an important issue (Interview # 6).

Despite women’s decision not to discuss controversial or ‘sensitive’ topics, they told me that the organisations were places where they can solve their problems and can seek advice. Even the LKBHWAK member quoted below concedes that local neighbourhood organisations are a safe space for women to solve their problems and that this is beneficial for women.

I do not think they attend the monthly meetings only to hear the latest instructions but also to meet together and other things too. Also if they have no other job then they will attend PKK, and I do see that as something positive for women. They feel safer to attend that group rather than a lot of new institutions that they do not know much about. They feel comfortable and safe within these groups (Interview # 20).

The local LKBHWAK prides itself on loyalty and member solidarity to combat serious social inequities. Being a part of this member-based community, as with the other organisations, sees members of LKBHWAK form bonds of trust and friendship. Within this community members feel able to discuss their own personal problems with fellow members. For political activists, women’s personal problems are political and members perceive these ‘personal problems’ as social responsibilities. This is a way of thinking far divorced from the ideals presented by PKK and Tahlilan members. For the latter, the personal is very personal and the political is not discussed (taboo).

196 The members of LKBHWAK say that there is no such thing as a personal problem. For

LKBHWAK representatives, personal concerns including violence against women, rape, women’s access to divorce and women’s financial dependence on men, are social problems. The organisation did not however run activities for unmarried pregnant mothers or sex education programs for youth. In this way, even the LKBHWAK saw matters relating to sex as ‘private’.

Part of the LKBHWAK member’s challenge is to encourage change to society by changing laws and local customs which they argue constrain women in Indonesia. The women in the LKBHWAK seek women’s empowerment through legal change. The fact that LKBHWAK women have formed strong friendship bonds with their fellow members allows them to come together and solve their problems.

One advocate, a member of a local PKK, PSW, and a religious organisation, said that

Indonesian culture complicates women’s roles in Indonesia.

Every meeting with PKK we must sing a song, and the content of the song, is always referring to women as wife or ‘ibu rumah tangga’ the housewife. It is very hard for us to talk about something against it, because we are part of it (Interview # 6).

PSW

Members of the Malang-based PSW organisations said that they seldom have the time, or the desire to attend their local PKK or Tahlilan organisations. Instead, for these women their fellow PSW members are their community. The women in the kampung, predominantly members of the PKK perceive these women as radical. As a result the women who participate in PSW and the LKBHWAK in Malang rely on their fellow members to discuss their problems. The friendship bonds formed between the PSW 197 members are as important to these women as the PKK and Tahlilan bonds are for the women in the kampung.

Friendships that have been formed between the members of the local PSW allow women to create their own community separate from the kampung. However, the separation also alienates them. It was noted earlier how Bu W was judged as sombong by the other women in the kampung because she did not attend local meetings. At the same time her academic colleagues respect because of her leadership position within the PSW and her enthusiasm for the projects which she co-ordinates. The status she gains within the university ensures her job security. Often, performance is a necessary pre-requisite for maintaining one’s position, if targets are reached and programs are successful, Bu W may secure a pay rise or promotion.

The social bargaining that members of the PSW engage in is not based on their adherence to local tradition like the members of the PKK. For members of PSW their gains come about through the programs they run and take the form of financial and career enhancements.

The different umbrella organisations attached to the local women’s organisations mean women discuss, or remain silent about, different problems within the space that these organisations occupy. Some members of PSW have built close friendships with fellow staff-members at the universities where they work. PSW members confide in one another about serious and sometimes personal concerns and seek advice from their fellow members.

198 As with the members of the Tahlilan and PKK organisations, members of the PSW feel able to talk about their problems as they have come to know and trust their fellow members. The women who participate in the PSW do not discuss such matters with their neighbours.

The space that becomes available for women as a result of their membership is for them the place where they can ‘come together and solve their problems’. The social bargaining for women in each of the organisations includes building friendships which allows women to share their problems.

Any forum where women can share their problems is a positive reality for local women.

The reality means that ‘having friends’ still provides a refuge for women, who live in a society, which does not yet have a “legal system that is prepared and equipped to talk about the issue of crisis” (Interview # 6). Women have to show solidarity because even though there may be laws to protect them, the nation’s legal system does not enforce them.

Feeling comfortable is something that local women value. It is also within this environment that women create friendships. Having trusting relationships allows women of all organisations to be honest and share their burdens. This benefit is only made available to women as a result of their membership status and is one of the positive outcomes of their social bargaining.

199 Learning together as Self Improvement

Women in Malang told me that the emphasis on learning together contributes to securing their social validation in the kampung. Women engage in organisations not as learning institutions36 but as social institutions where they ‘learn’.

The type of learning that women engage in depends on the organisation they belong to.

The women attending PKK learn how to look after their children and where to buy rice at the best price. The SMC women improve their English conversation skills and social etiquette thereby reinforcing their cultural capital and social exclusivity.

The topics that members of the contemporary PKK learn about are related to general health concerns, household matters such as buying cheaper food alternatives, and other everyday concerns. Women within the PKK generally learn about issues that directly concern their own lives.

PKK is only about the household. So we can learn about cooking in PKK. For instance if we want to learn how to make cakes we can learn that. There are many women there who can make cakes, she can teach the others how to make these things (Interview # 2).

One member of PKK illustrated this by saying that for her learning is about communication. In this context, communication refers to the information she and her fellow members receive about other levels of the PKK organisation including the upcoming events, changes to posyandu and changes to leadership positions. Women at the lower village or kampung levels of society are informed about PKK concerns through the hierarchical communicative channel of the organisational structure. At the

36 With the exception of the SMC where women said they attend to learn the English language.

200 beginning of the monthly RW meetings information and updates are read out to the groups of women by the secretary. This information is then presented at the subsequent

RT meetings.

PKK only occurs once a month. We can meet with our friends who live far away. And later if there is some information from our Kecamatan, then we can learn about it through our PKK group. There are all sorts of things we can learn about (Interview # 2).

The learning that members of the local neighbourhood organisations engage in revolves around their own lives whereas the development initiatives of the PSW together with the ideals of LKBHWAK see members focus on (learning about) the lives of other women.

PSW leaders speak to the women in the village about how they should improve themselves. Their discussions focus little on women’s roles as wives and mothers37 and more on how poor village women will benefit from being financially independent.

Members of the PSW organisations said that education referred to improving women’s financial independence and thereby reducing their dependence on their husbands.

Learning together in this context is about improving oneself. In this case, a woman’s self-empowerment will (theoretically) allow her to be independent from her husband.

The learning environment alleviates women’s fear of social isolation and gives them a sense of personal and social security. Learning together is indirectly a way in which women can solve their problems. Through the organisations learning schedules, women are armed with knowledge that aids in their decision-making processes on an immediate level.

37 Whilst they do not discuss these issues, their programs often take for granted that children are women's responsibility.

201 When women attend their local organisation and adhere to the rules and expectations that govern that space, they engage in a form of learning. The nature of the learning may be domestic knowledge, religious learning, or knowledge about welfare concerns. In any case, participating in local organisations allows women an opportunity to access local knowledge that would not otherwise be available. Through attending these organisations, as socially acceptable institutions, women ‘learn together’ and at the same time this learning reinforces group identity.

Percaya Diri38

Despite the nature of the learning, when women ‘learn together’ certain opportunities become available which can have the effect of enhancing women’s self-esteem. A number of women attending their local neighbourhood organisation (PKK or Tahlilan) have had little formal education. For these women access to learning is limited to the local spaces in the kampung, which they can attend for free. Local women told me that they see it as a real privilege to be able to attend the monthly PKK meetings. The women said they do not feel embarrassed or ashamed if they are ignorant, because within the neighbourhood organisations they can learn together. They feel self-assured by the knowledge they gain through their meetings and are pleased that they can gain it in an informal culturally acceptable manner. Through the learning they experience within organisations women gain a sense of pride and feel it is a vehicle for self improvement.

The increase in self-confidence is the result of women’s participation in local

38 Percaya means belief, Diri means self. PD is commonly used as an expression to be self-confident.

202 organisations. Through bargaining women gain self respect by learning certain skills.

The gains women attain through learning together result in an increase in their sense of self-pride and social acceptance.

Local Status as Gain

Learning is as much about gaining personal autonomy as it is about maintaining local status in the kampung. One young Malang woman revealed the importance of cultural learning;

I must know about my culture and about who I am; this is my life, this is my identity (Interview # 29).

For this woman, organisations offer a place for cultural learning where local traditions, including the singing of group songs or participating in arisan, are upheld. Once women feel confident about their culture, they will successfully pass it on to their children.

Important cultural values are maintained through women’s participation in these organisations. Various forms of cultural knowledge must be understood by members of the community to ensure that local rituals are upheld and respected.

It is important to meet together. If there is something we need to know then we can learn about it. For instance if someone has passed away, then we need to help out. It is important for our communication as well. It is important for us (Interview # 30).

Women gain cultural capital through their participation in local organisations and by carrying out religious and social rituals. This accumulation of cultural knowledge facilitates women gaining access to certain opportunities.

203 Women’s participation in local organisations also impacts upon the status of the family.

This can be demonstrated with the issue of women’s marriageability in the kampung. If a kampung girl is from a poor family who cannot afford to pay for her education, the family’s status alone may determine whether the girl would be a desirable daughter-in- law, and thus fit to marry. In this example a poor family can improve the marriage prospects of a daughter through the mother’s participation in the PKK, or other local organisations.

The organisations provide women with an opportunity to increase local social status through maintaining kampung traditions. These may take the form of carrying out rituals such as slametan, weddings or khitan. Mbak D’s mother’s low social status

(mentioned in the third chapter) was one of the factors in her decision not to attend the local PKK. The irony in the case of Mbak D, is that due to the low social status of her mother, she said it would be too controversial for her to participate in her local PKK. In this instance Mbak D’s low family social status prohibits her from entering the organisation and from participating in the social bargaining system.

Membership of the socially elite organisation SMC, reinforces claims to members’ high status in their community. If women are known in their neighbourhood or community to be fluent English speakers, other opportunities come about as a result. These opportunities include extra income as English tutors.

Organisations as Reprieve from Domesticity

Local women told how they enjoy participating in regular meetings because it provides them with an opportunity to have time away from the family home. The structured

204 timetable of the meetings provides women with a reprieve from domestic responsibilities.

They like it because it gets them out of the house. They can go and chat with their friends as opposed to spending that time alone in the house like they usually would do (Interview # 6).

The PSW, Tahlilan, PKK and the SMC are overall socially and culturally acceptable groups for women. Local women’s organisations are legitimate places where women access information, which may improve their position in society. The time spent at meetings is acceptable absence and for the most part is not questioned.

The one exception to this is women’s participation in the LKBHWAK. The women who participate in the Malang branch of LKBHWAK are stigmatised as trouble makers for their participation in organisations, which promote social change.

Women said they enjoy getting out of the house as it allows them to feel they are valued outside their role as wife and mother. Kampung women either stay at home where they carry out housework, look after children or run small stalls from their home. Even the more affluent women who can afford to hire a pembantu are still expected to look after their husband and children. Within the space of these organisations women are

‘members’. For women, being a member means they are important not only to their husbands and children, but also to the community. Their participation in organisations allows them to earn another form of social status. To be outside of the home and participating in organisations provides a sense of purpose. For the duration of meetings and activities women are free from their normal duties of cooking, cleaning, washing or looking after small children.

205 The time spent at meetings and participating in activities is time away from husbands and other male relatives. However, it does not lessen the influence men have on their lives but at least puts them outside the direct scrutiny of their men. Ironically perhaps, it is the fact that women are dutiful members of organisations, and the respectability that is afforded these organisations, that allows them the opportunity to temporarily leave the home.

Summary

Malang women are social agents who make decisions that influence their own lives. The social bargaining process has been described in this chapter and illustrated by the discussion of the specific opportunities which women negotiate for themselves within their local community. The types of social opportunities which arise for women in the kampung include woman’s eligibility to marry, gain employment, enhance her financial situation, or gain local social status.

The organisation’s social respectability defines the parameters with which women can bargain. Members of LKBHWAK and PSW continue to bargain but their work colleagues at the University campus replace the kampung based local respectability and acceptability that PKK, SMC and Tahlilan members enjoy. The gains that members of

PSW and LKBHWAK organisations seek are thought of in terms of social goals as opposed to personal ones.

A woman’s ability to bargain is validated through her attendance at local organisation meetings and activities. Social bargaining is only available to members of women’s

206 organisations. Non-members are excluded from this process, and therefore excluded from obtaining the opportunities which members have access to.

This chapter has shown how umbrella organisations provide the parameters within which women can bargain. The following chapter will explore in detail the limitations of women’s bargaining process and address the different forms of social control which larger social institutions prescribe.

207 CHAPTER FIVE

Social Taboos and The Limitations of Social Bargaining

Participation in local organisations is a story about how Malang women manage their lives in the kampung. One part of the story includes how local women negotiate gains for themselves as a result of the social bargaining process. The gains women make for themselves include; learning together, having friends and participating in social activities which provides a culturally legitimate alternative to their domestic duties.

These gains are readily available to women within the society. However, the way that different women’s organisations facilitate ‘problem solving’ is more complex.

Local women reported that the most significant problems they faced included the taboos surrounding; sexual relations outside or before marriage, abortion, contraception, domestic violence, rape, divorce, financial independence and poverty. This chapter will show how these issues are deemed socially taboo. They are discussed within this chapter in terms of the broader concepts of women’s sexual behaviour and financial independence. Thus being defined as socially taboo, they constitute the limitations of social bargaining. Through a discussion of the way the organisations approach socially taboo problems, the differences between the women’s organisations is revealed.

Sexual Behaviour

Social acceptability within the community depends on women behaving like ‘good women’.39 The connection between social morality, tradition and women’s sexuality is revealed in Roazario’s book about women in a Bangladeshi village (Rozario, 1992).

39 By which is meant sexual propriety.

208 Rozario found that women’s honour is safeguarded through their sexual purity.

(Rozario, 1992:84). Shame is brought about when women behave in a sexually deviant manner.

Pre-marital sex is controversial in Javanese culture and Islam. It is seen as a challenge to social morality and damaging to the harmonious order of the society. According to one respondent,40 ‘Islam forbids these things to happen’. These socially damning topics are not openly discussed. To do so would be considered kasar.

The PKK, Tahlilan and SMC women regard the topic of pre-marital sexual relations as taboo. As one PKK member clearly stated;

Basically issues pertaining to ‘sex’ or sexual relationships are all taboo. It is forbidden to talk about sexual issues or relationships (Interview # 6).

The reason PKK and Tahlilan women gave for not wanting to talk about their sexual behaviour is that they fear being judged by their neighbours both inside and outside the organisations. Women told me that they feel that if they speak in public about their personal problems they will become the topic of local gossip.

Gossip or ngrumpi acts as a control mechanism within the kampung. It is an informal social sanction in place to monitor the behaviour of the women who inhabit that (public) space. If women break the rules and speak openly about ‘taboo topics’ or their ‘personal problems’ within the organisation, the punishment is that everyone in the kampung will soon know their personal business.

40 A local leader of (NU’s) youth organisation, Tibaan. The respondent is known in the kampung for her strong and conservative Islamic beliefs.

209 Mostly women here do not want to talk about these issues. They prefer to stay quiet and keep their mouths closed about such things. Maybe it is because they feel afraid. That could be part of it. For me, I do not want to talk to others about my personal problems, especially those problems that are really personal. People here really like to gossip. So I think it is better not to talk about that. If people want to tell me things, I will stay quiet and not open my mouth. I will just listen, but there are others who are happy to talk and gossip. So I prefer not to tell others my problems (Interview # 38).

It is not only the local PKK and Tahlilan that censors these topics from being discussed in their organisations. Personal problems are also taboo within the elitist SMC as they are seen as shameful. Bu Ka has been a member of the SMC since its inception fifty years ago. She is known in the Malang community as a respectable, affluent and educated Javanese woman. Despite her high social status her behaviour and the topics she discusses within the SMC are constrained by her concern with respectability.

I remember a time when I really wanted to talk about some problem with someone. But I had to think about my husband’s position and his requests for me to stay silent. He did not want me to talk about it. I do not really know why. We must control ourselves and I do not know why, what for? Although not everyone is like that (Interview # 19).

The situation of Bu Ka showed that gossip is not only evident in the neighbourhood organisations but is also powerful in controlling the behaviour of more affluent women.

Despite Bu Ka’s financial independence and her high level of education, she is not excused from adhering to conservative values silencing taboo issues. The threat of gossip, which influenced the behaviour of women in the PKK and Tahlilan organisation, also circumscribes women’s participation in SMC.

210 Kontrasepsi

With the emergence of the Institute for Family Planning in 1968, the Indonesian government encouraged women to be pro-active in the national family planning program (Pausacker, 2001:91). Today a variety of contraceptives are available throughout Indonesia. Condoms are sold in pharmacies (apotik) throughout Indonesia.

Additionally local health clinics sell birth-control pills at relatively low prices so that even women on low incomes can afford to purchase them.

The respectability of women accessing contraception is related to their marital status.

Bu H, an employee at a Malang birth clinic, told me that it is predominantly married women who purchase the birth-control pill from her.

They can buy it from me or else they go to their doctor and they can get it prescribed. For one month the medication costs 700 rupiah. There is also one that costs 500 rupiah for one month. There are many different types available for people here (Interview # 33).

An unmarried twenty-year-old respondent, the daughter of a PKK and PSW member, told me that she and her boyfriend wanted to start having sex. She felt afraid that if she was seen buying condoms in the city, her parents would find out. If members of the local community knew she was having sex, it would bring shame for herself and her family.

In Indonesia if women transgress social rules governing sexuality, they face the consequences of their deviant actions. The (tainted) girl is seen as ‘cheap’ and is often referred to by derogatory animal names such as ‘pig’ (babi) or ‘dog’ (anjing). Within the kampung the girl is deemed unmarriageable and a social outcast. To avoid the

211 imminent social shame, the girl and her boyfriend continued to have sex without using contraception. The threat of the gossip cycle impacts on the lives of kampung women in many ways. In this instance it deters young unmarried men and women from purchasing contraception.

The challenge to social morality through sexual promiscuity is viewed as an imported problem. Some local kampung women said that they thought westernisation has brought about a decline in sexual values of the Indonesian youth. One expressed the view that:

Many young and unmarried girls have abortions. I blame that on the amount of ‘imported’ porn films that Indonesian youth are watching from the west (Interview # 38).

This belief of kampung women that westernisation is morally corrupting has been echoed in many other Muslims societies. The negative attributes of westernisation have also been discussed in the work by Abu-Lughod, 1998; Karim, 1995 and Moghadam,

1993 and 1994. Each has outlined how westernisation has influenced local community’s values in a negative way. According to the above respondent Indonesian society and values have been damaged by the loose western morals.

Aborsi41

Unmarried young women who become pregnant will often seek abortions from a dukun, midwife (bidan) or from one of the local hospitals42. Bu H, told me that abortion for an unmarried girl is still seen as taboo in Indonesia.

41 Translates as ‘Abortion’. 42 The fee for an abortion in a hospital is greater than the bidan or dukun.

212 There are one or two doctors here in town that will do abortions. Sometimes these young girls go to these doctors and have abortions there. But I do not know the names of these doctors, I just know they exist. But if they come to me I do not do abortions for them. I try to stay positive (Interview # 33).

Bu H confirmed the controversy surrounding youth pregnancies and abortion. Her reluctance to name the doctors who carry out the procedures reinforces the taboo nature of abortion. The social stigma attached to abortion is such that those assisting in the process are labelled deviant.

Those who have experienced abortions were more informative. A research informant of mine, spoke with six young Malang women who had recently had an abortion. The young women were too embarrassed and ashamed to discuss their experiences in person so they were asked to write about it.

One of the women (Mbak T)43 had an abortion the previous year, when she was 19 years old. Mbak T was studying at a local university when she found out she was pregnant.

I had to have an abortion because I did not know who was responsible. I did not know for sure who the father was because at that time I was having sex with many different men. That is how it is for university students. A male friend of mine told me how I could go about getting an abortion. The actual process of the abortion was quite simple. It was carried out by a bidan. The procedure cost me 200,000 rupiah44, although this fee depends on the stage of the pregnancy. First I was given a capsule by the bidan. After drinking it I felt quite sick. Then, not long afterwards I started to bleed. I was then given more medicine. After I had the medicine the fetus came out, as it would in a normal birth. Before I went through with the abortion, I had to agree that the bidan was in no way responsible for any outcome that resulted from the procedure (Mbak T, November 2000).

43 The particulars of these respondents were never disclosed to ensure the women’s privacy. 44 At the time this fieldwork was carried out 200,000 rp was equivalent to AUS$40.

213 Mbak T’s story reveals how she was not given any information about the ‘medicine’ that she was administered. She was not aware of what was happening to her throughout the experience. Neither the woman carrying out the abortion, or the patient wanted to talk about what was happening or why. Mbak T was only required to pay the fee of (200,00 rupiah) for the abortion. This is considered a large amount of money for kampung women.

For women who lack access to financial means, self-abortion involves drinking a herbal medicine known as jamu or inserting a foreign object to abort the pregnancy. A member of LKBHWAK and PSW spoke about the issue of pregnancies amongst young women.

There are always unmarried women who are very young and pregnant and seeking medicine to help terminate their pregnancies. They can drink Jamu, this is believed to aid in the termination of pregnancy, she will not go to see a doctor because she is too scared to see a doctor. Then there is the result (Interview # 32).

To avoid the shame that having a baby out of wedlock brings to the family young schoolgirls are sent away (Interview # 38).

Sometimes the boys leave the women when they find out they are pregnant. So the young girls are left to either try a dukun usually drinking jamu, or secondly, to abort the pregnancy using their own means, this is highly dangerous and often fatal. I knew a girl who tried to perform her own abortion and she died as a result. That is not uncommon. Sometimes schoolgirls get pregnant and they are ‘sent away’. Islam forbids pregnancy, abortion and sex before marriage (Interview # 38).

Respondents told me that there is nowhere for young unmarried pregnant girls to get help or support because it is such a taboo issue. For unmarried girls it is difficult and also immoral to have an abortion. Rather than be disgraced by being ‘sent away’, or be

214 shamed through having an abortion at a clinic, women will take matters into their own hands. The inability for women to discuss these issues leads thousands of Indonesian women each year to attempt self-abortions. Indonesia has the second highest rate of maternal mortality in the world (Silk and Steel: 1996).

They try to do their own abortions and they die. There are not that many, but it happens. The women sometimes end up in the hospital or sometimes in the Puskesmas (Interview # 33).

Women in the kampung are so fearful of the social consequences that they risk their lives instead. Interviews with young women revealed how two local kampung girls had recently died as a result of attempting their own abortions. Women are aware of these tragedies, yet the organisations in which they participate do not allow these taboo topics to be discussed. The organisations sanction a conservative morality, which inhibits members broaching the topic.

In contrast to the experiences of young unmarried women, a member of PSW told me that married women could have abortions without encountering social sanctions. If a married woman wants an abortion it is easy to obtain (Interview # 38). Her comment paralleled remarks mentioned in an interview with a local woman, Bu W. Twenty years earlier Bu W found out that she and her husband were expecting their third child. The doctor had encouraged them to terminate the pregnancy. At the time (1980) “women under 30 were to have a maximum of two children, with their first delivery over the age of 20” (World Bank, 1990:56).

Bu W’s memories of being encouraged to abort her pregnancy reflect the opposite circumstance to Bu H’s comment concerning the taboos surrounding young women’s

215 choice to have an abortion. The act of abortion becomes even more controversial taboo when it is associated with other social dilemmas, principally that of conception out of wedlock.

Abortion is officially illegal in Indonesia. The taboo nature of abortions is more related to the social and religious morality and the stigma attached to abortion, more so than legal concerns. The tension between the legacies of state-initiated family planning programs and the question of local community, specifically Muslim morality, play themselves out and influence women’s choices and lives in society.

The discussion of abortion highlights the social and religious perceptions concerning sexual behaviour. The reality is that unmarried women in the kampung have sex and seek abortions as a result of unwanted pregnancies. Despite this, Bu H is too embarrassed to discuss the topic and denies knowing the people who carry out the procedure. Her behaviour reaffirms the social belief that no one can speak about this particular social/personal problem. The reluctance to accept a less than perfect image of society and morality leaves women to deal with these socially stigmatising personal problems alone.

The lack of discussion about sex illustrates how social bargaining is restricted by social morality. The social control in the form of gossip constantly reinforces the morality of silence. Rather than have other women judge them or become a social outcast, women attempt to avoid shame through carrying out their own abortions, or choose to have sex without using contraception.

216 Sex Education, PSW and LKBHWAK

Unlike the members of the PKK and Tahlilan, PSW women told me how they believe sex needs to be discussed publicly. One member went so far as to say that the problem of pre-marital sex and pregnancy arises from the ignorance and ignorance of kampung women and their need for sex-education.

Actually they are not aware what the consequences of their actions are. If they have sex they do not know that they will become pregnant. They do not know how they become pregnant. When she is pregnant she is confused and not brave to go to the doctor, or a special organisation which can assist her. So then she will take medicine or a special kind of massage for her stomach that is more dangerous. It is more dangerous with that result, than if we had just taught them about sex in the first place (Interview # 4).

The PSW member reveals the social ramifications for the code of silence about sex in the local community (Interview # 4). According to this respondent, if society were more relaxed about sex education then the socially undesirable outcomes of pregnancy and abortions would not be an issue (Interview # 4).

This PSW member said that she desperately wanted young people in Malang to be educated about sex. The example was given in the third chapter how she once tried to chair a sex-education seminar at a Malang university. Local Islamic leaders thought such topics were not relevant as young people do not have sex before they are married

(Interview # 4). Furthermore, they argued that sex education only encourages the sin of sexual behaviour outside of marriage and consequently the seminar did not take place.

The LKBHWAK members successfully host sex-education seminars at Malang universities. Members told me that this is one way that they can help educate young

217 men and women about the prevention of unwanted pregnancies. They see the issue of sexual behaviour as a social concern and not a personal problem.

The limitations of sex education at universities are two fold. Firstly, only young people from wealthy families attend University. This means that the majority of young people in the kampung are not exposed to any information and advice about sex education.

Secondly, the age of a first year student is approximately nineteen years. Consequently even this select group receive no information about sex prior to that age. This is problematic because young women, as Mbak T’s story reveals, are sexually active at an earlier age.

Apart from seminars, the LKBHWAK does not yet have programs that can help young unmarried pregnant women. When women become pregnant outside marriage, the discrimination is considered a social concern rather than a legal one. As they lack a defendant to prosecute, the LKBHWAK is limited in how it can publicly address this social issue.

The social realities concerning sexual behaviour are important for local women and the wider community. The stigmatising of young, unmarried pregnant women reaffirms the taboo nature of the act and makes the work of LKBHWAK, who attempt to raise such issues difficult.

Financial Independence in the Kampung

In addition to the concerns women voiced about their sexual behaviour, is what they talked about as their lack of financial independence. The term ‘financial independence’,

218 used here, refers to women’s ability to support themselves through wage employment.

This ‘support’ is not based solely on women’s desire for personal consumption but is also about paying for necessities such as household bills, essential household items and paying for their children’s school fees.

The discussion of women’s financial independence should not be confused with a discussion of women’s empowerment. The women whom I interviewed did not associate their access to money with improved mobility in the kampung. Rather, the women talked more personally about how certain difficulties in their life would be alleviated.

The thing is we often have to obey what our husband says. I think that is difficult. We still depend on our husbands. I think the issue of not having independence, not having our own money and not having our own freedom is a big problem for women here. I always have to ask if I can buy things before I do it. I am not allowed to buy things without his permission. My husband plays in a band and a lot of his money and time goes into that. It is because he is a musician. It is not easy for him. Pity for him. This is my daughter, she is already married, and she was married at 18 years. The same age as me. I want to go into business for myself. I want to have a kind of food store and sell things. I want to have like a stall you know and I can get some money for myself. But my husband forbade me and said no. He said it was not OK for me to do that. He said I had to help him and stay in the home only. I would sell rice, sugar, and eggs at the market. I would but according to my husband I can not do that. He wants me to stay at home with him and help him. He does not have anyone else to help him with his music business. So I stay home and help him with it. There is no one else (Interview # 30).

Women said that if they had access to their own money their lives would improve. They said they would use the money to buy things for themselves including clothes and cosmetics.

219 I think a real problem facing women at the moment is that they need to be more independent with their own money. So women have to be smart and intelligent themselves, and then they can be independent (Interview # 23).

However, of the women I lived with only a few actually work outside the home.

Approximately 75% of the women I interviewed in the kampung have never worked outside the home, nor have they ever supported themselves financially. Of the women who participated in the study, the only women who were financially ‘independent’ were members of the PSW45, half a dozen members of the local LKBHWAK46 and nine members of the SMC.

Although the majority of women in the kampung stay at home, approximately half of these women receive an income through selling goods, insurance or food from their homes. The women told me that they preferred to be at home so that they could look after their husband and children. Others said that they would prefer to leave the home to work and earn their own money.

The decision for a woman to stay at home or go to work is not a simple matter. Social, familial, cultural, gendered, political and religious issues influence their choice. One local woman, Bu Su, illustrates this. Bu Su lives in the kampung in a two-room house with her husband and twelve-year-old daughter. Her husband works at a local motorbike shop where he earns a weekly wage. The family are not wealthy. According to Bu Su her husband was adamant that she stay in the home and look after their daughter. To supplement her husband’s income Bu Su sells material from home to fellow PKK members and other family members. The income she receives is from the goods she sells,

45 These women are employed as lecturers at Universities in Malang. 46 In Malang six women were members of both the PSW and the local branck of LKBHWAK.

220 for which she receives a small commission. The amount of money she earns fluctuates from month to month. Her income has meant that she can afford to pay for her daughter’s schooling and has even allowed her to buy a new couch for their home. Even though women like Bu Su are able to earn some money, according to the women in this study, this does not guarantee them financial independence. In the case of Bu Su working in itself does not bring about autonomy.

Women’s comments that they lack autonomy due to the fact they do not work needs to be considered in light of the different forms of work available for women in Indonesia.

Women with little or no formal education obtain low-skilled work in factories, work as pembantu or sell goods from their home and receive a small commission.

If women fail to find employment in a nearby town they may apply to work overseas.

The amount of women applying to work overseas in the Middle East as ‘domestic workers’ has increased since the economic crisis of 1997.

Women not only work as domestic helpers overseas where they receive relatively good income, women continue to work as domestic servants within Indonesia. During the fieldwork year I conducted interviews with young women who work as pembantu in

Malang. The girls come from small villages on the outskirts of Malang. Due to their families impoverished financial circumstances the girls did not complete their schooling.

They left school at age eleven to work as domestic servants for affluent families in the city. Their lack of education has contributed to their inability to obtain alternative forms of employment.

221 Alternatively, University educated women seek high paying employment positions in the business and trade sectors. The latter have become known as career women or wanita karier. This term refers specifically to women who work in white-collar jobs in the modern sectors of the economy (Brenner, 1998:242).

The real outcome of this needs to be analysed in more depth. The social class division within Indonesia complicates the topic of women and work. Women who work in cigarette factories and earn 100,000 rupiah a month would not see themselves as autonomous or financially independent. The women who work as pembantu for rich families do not boast that they are affluent and independent. The women who I spoke with who worked in these positions said that they cannot afford to send money back to their families in the village. They told me how they earn just enough to live. Such

‘undesirable’ topics are not mentioned within the neighbourhood organisations or in the

SMC. Although it can be seen that some LKBHWAK and PSW members spoke about their concern for the amount of ‘uneducated and poor’ women in the villages.

The question about women, work, income and autonomy is not only about how women’s autonomy is measured in different employment situations, but also how autonomy is defined. Is the assumption to be that women’s independence from men is derived solely from income?

The paradox between financial autonomy and cultural expectations is a reality for one of the young respondents in the study. Mbak P is twenty-eight years old and works full-time as a tutor at a local University in Malang. She lives in a nearby kampung with her grandmother, younger sisters and cousins. The income she earns from her tutoring

222 position supplements the household income by paying some of the bills. She told me that she feels a sense of personal achievement and confidence through being employed as a tutor at the university. At the same time, she said it is not easy being a young unmarried employed woman in Malang. Although she gains real benefits through working outside the home, gendered expectations are imposed on her from both her family and the community at large.

Mbak P told me that her family always ask her when she is going to get married. They constantly remind her how important it is for Javanese women to marry while they are still young. Mbak P said that her family continually tell her that if she leaves it too long no one will want to marry her. Attending family or kampung weddings are difficult as she is always asked ‘When will it be your turn’? Mbak P told me that the independence, which she has attained through her working life, does not eradicate the pressure society and family place on her to get married.

Brenner makes a similar point in her book (1998) about the trade off between women’s work and domestic responsibilities. She says “Wanita Karier ambiguously signifies a woman who is admired for her ability to participate in the modern economy, but who is at the same time fundamentally suspect for her presumed selfishness and lack of attention to her family”(Brenner, 1998:242). For Mbak P, the sense of self-fulfillment she associates with working is not one of the main attributes that a Javanese man seeks in a wife. In this case a young woman’s desire to be independent is challenged by familial and social expectations for women to marry and have children.

223 Any discussion about whether women’s access to financial gain is a positive experience needs to be weighed against the existing gender roles within Indonesia. A trade off exists between the modern conceptualisation of the wanita karier and the cultural prescriptions, which have assigned women a clear role in the domestic sphere (Brenner,1998:242).

This conceptualisation of the modern, autonomous Indonesian ‘wanita karier’ which assume that all working women are autonomous, simplifies the complex gendered, economic and social situation of working Indonesian women (Brenner, 1998:242). The kampung women’s claims that they would be autonomous if they worked outside the home, refer to this ideal that all women who work are ‘wanita karier’. Poor women do not aspire to work as pembantu or to work in a tobacco factory on the outskirts of

Malang.

The pressure that women feel on the one hand to be in the home looking after their family and on the other to be financially independent, is a real concern for local women.

Whether and how these contrasting elements can be reconciled is something, which this thesis will not seek to answer. What is of importance here is whether or not women can discuss their uneasiness with other members of local organisations. Despite the problems that their lack of autonomy causes, women’s problems are still perceived as ‘personal’ and therefore not discussed within the local organisations of the PKK, SMC and Tahlilan.

Divorce, Legal Rights and Women’s Autonomy

The LKBHWAK and PSW differ from the kampung organisations in that they perceive the issue of women’s financial independence as crucial for women’s development. They believe there is a real social need for poor women to be financially independent.

224 Various programs run by the two organisations are geared towards helping women access their legal rights despite their low financial position.

Bu W is a member of the Malang branch of LKBHWAK. Part of her work includes advocacy for women who have failed in filing for a divorce. Divorce can be financially devastating for women, as courts will often collude by acting in the interests of men.

Alternatively, they can simply refuse to grant women a divorce. The difficulties women face discourages them from filing for a divorce.

There was a case just recently of a woman who was married to a man and he sold everything, she actually wanted to separate from him so we went to the court and helped with some arrangements. The woman then fled to another province and remarried there. She wrote us a letter thanking our organisation for the help we had given her. We had helped her process a divorce from her husband. Her husband thought that he should be ‘served’ by her as she is of lower status than he is. There are also some divorces involving friends of mine who are professionals. I mean lecturers. Many more approach our organisation LKBHWAK for help than who go to the law faculty in general. Why? Because in the law faculty there is only one woman and women who are seeking to divorce their husbands do not wish to discuss their reasons for divorce with men. And usually the men in the department would deal with divorce (Interview # 20).

LKBHWAK members acknowledge that as a result of their financial independence, women are not always aware of their legal rights. The LKBHWAK seeks to combat the inequities women face through advocacy. The organisations involvement in such matters is relatively new and is contested by some sectors of the community.

Their efforts to help women obtain a divorce, conduct sex-education seminars at university and prosecute men who commit violent acts against women is seen as

‘radical’ by the wider community. The reasons for this judgement are based on the social taboos circumscribing personal problems. The way members of LKBHWAK talk 225 about sensitive topics on the news, in interviews and in public forums leads to them being labelled as anti-traditional and a challenge to Javanese culture.

PSW

In addition to the work that LKBHWAK carries out in Malang, the PSW organisations also run programs aimed at increasing women’s financial independence. Members of the local PSW said that their organisation aims to challenge gendered economic inequity through raising women’s income-earning capacity.

The programs that the members of PSW run in the target villages talk specifically about how women can be involved in projects and earn more money. They see this as a way for women to improve themselves and become less dependent on their husbands. The leaders who run the programs talk directly to the local women and use simple Javanese terms that the women can understand.

The seminars entitled ‘gender socialisation’ are another way that women’s roles become a matter for public debate and no longer just private concerns. The seminar provides a public space where local women can talk about their lives and roles in the household.

The leaders tell village men and women that gender is about changing the way men and women see their roles in society. The idea of harmonious gender relations is promoted through women and men working together.

If women can earn more money PSW leaders argue, they can feel better about themselves and men and women will be more equal. The seminars they run are focused entirely on ‘improving women’s financial situation’. PSW members see women’s

226 financial independence as an indicator of social reform and a sign of Indonesia’s achievement of modernisation.

Their reform-oriented objectives are far removed from the kampung organisations

Tahlilan, PKK and SMC. LBKWAK and PSW demand that women’s lives change and this can be achieved through women talking publicly about problems such as sexual behaviour and lack of money.

Poverty as Social Taboo

Beyond women’s financial independence from men is the broader concern of poverty in kampung life. Sullivan explores this issue in her ethnographic study of gender relations in urban Java (Sullivan, 1994:96). For Sullivan, personal problems are linked to the financial situation of local women and men.

Clearly some kampung households are desperately unhappy places for some of their members. It is extremely difficult for some kampung parents to achieve their goal of providing a happy and secure environment for their children and themselves under prevailing economic conditions that engender high levels of stress for many adults and children (Sullivan, 1994:96).

A family’s financial situation is not discussed within local organisations. Wealth is still linked to the issue of social status in the kampung. The respondents explained how it is impolite (tidak sopan) for a woman to talk openly about her family’s financial situation, especially if they lack money. Ongoing difficulties, which lead to financial hardship, are considered taboo as they present an image that things are not harmonious.

If I have problems, like if I do not have money, then I do not discuss it with other women from PKK. If I am short on money then I just borrow from my family (Interview # 17). 227 Kampung women I spoke with frequently commented about the hardship they endured without sufficient funds to feed their families or to pay for their children’s education.

Women, more so than men, are required to carry the social burden as managers of the family purse strings (Sullivan, 1994: 8). When asked why they did not talk about these issues the women mostly replied “Itu tidak boleh” (it is forbidden).

There are also many things about money that are not OK to be spoken about, such as if someone has a lot of money or if they do not have much money. If there are people who have a lot of money and they always talk about how much money they have, those people that do not have much money will feel upset. On the other hand, if the people who do not have much money always talk about how little money they have, then that is also not a good thing and is looked down upon. So it is also true that there are various issues surrounding money that it is almost taboo to discuss too (Interview # 6).

The taboo nature of financial matters has consequences for local kampung women. Bu

Su, introduced earlier, runs a small business selling household items to women in her neighbourhood on a credit scheme. Customers take possession of goods and make monthly repayments to Bu Su until they have paid for the goods with interest. The interest they pay on the products purchased constitutes Bu Su’s wage.

One evening Bu Su confided that a customer (a neighbour and fellow member of her

PKK) owed her a considerable amount of money. In fact the neighbour had not made a repayment for the past two months. Despite this, Bu Su had to repay the supplier who was frustrated and had made verbal threats. Bu Su said she could not sleep and she just lay awake at night worrying about the problem. She told me how she just cried continually (aku menangis terus).

228 I have only told you and my daughter. I can not talk to anyone else. I do not even want to talk with my husband, he will get angry. No it is best that I try and deal with it myself (Bu Su Nov 2000).

Several weeks went by while Bu Su continued to approach her neighbour about the debt.

When she asked for the money the woman replied “Aku membaya nanti” (I’ll pay later) or “Aku membayar besok pagi” (I’ll pay tomorrow morning).

Bu Su said there was no one else who she could confide in about the debt. She had already borrowed money from PKK to pay for her daughter’s school fees and so did not want to increase her debt by borrowing more. Her friends from PKK were not informed about this incident. In part this was because the debtor was also a fellow member. Bu

Su’s husband was eventually told, but he could not make the woman repay her debt. It would have been seen as kasar for Bu Su to speak publicly about a fellow member in a negative fashion. This incident illustrates that personal conflicts, despite their financially crippling impact for both parties, can not be spoken about openly.

This incident illustrates the reluctance women feel to discuss financial problems within local organisations. Financial matters are potentially socially rupturing. Bu Su would be perceived as making trouble and trying to embarrass a fellow member. In so doing Bu

Su would have brought shame onto her fellow member, which contradicts the organisations’ principle of putting the needs of the organisation over and above one’s own. Even the PKK preserves its identity in society at the expense of ‘helping’ its’ members. Despite the financially crippling effects on members, financial difficulties are not spoken about openly. The pressure to preserve the harmonious image of the community prohibits women from talking publicly about these matters.

229 LKBHWAK and PSW ‘Improving Women’

Overseas funded aid programs (LKBHWAK and PSW) are in place to improve the economic position of poor women in the villages. The presence of these programs acknowledges the social problem of poverty in Indonesia at this time.

At this time the economic situation is like this, it is focusing on industry for women. So now, from the kelurahan they want to help women to become more independent. There might be seminars, the focus at this time is mostly about economics, and for younger women it is just the same. The young people have a different way to see things, they do not always agree with their parents, but they really have the same kinds of problems (Interview # 29).

Even within the Malang-based PSW, which sees employment projects run in poor

‘target’ villages, the emphasis is on improving poor women more so than measuring nation-wide poverty. Everyone involved recognises that poverty is the reason that the programs are being undertaken. Even within the more ‘radical’ organisations members and the women in the target villages do not talk openly about their own financial distress. Nor do the women discuss the broader issue of poverty in Indonesia. Instead, programs are geared toward self-improvement for poor village women.

The social bargaining process does not include the controversial social reality of poverty. A poor society would signify disharmony and pose a challenge to the social order. The social taboo surrounding poverty seems ironic given that inherent in the activities of the organisations PKK, PSW, and LKBHWAK are activities that specifically help women access wage incomes. On the one hand society acknowledges that women endure financial hardship, yet on the other it is unacceptable to be publicly stated. Those who voice these concerns in public are deemed anti traditional and ‘radical’ and trouble makers.

230 Tinggal Sendirian

The third and fourth chapters explored how women enjoy participating in women’s organisations as it means they do not feel socially isolated or alone. In this chapter,

‘being alone’ takes on another meaning for women in the kampung. Women are left alone as single heads of households when their husbands are away for long periods.

The men’s absence adds to women’s domestic duties, including child minding, which they have to shoulder alone. Bu Si, a member of PKK, commented that one of the main problems for many women in Indonesia at the moment is that their husbands are often away from home. A man from a poor family may have to frequently travel to other provinces for work, leaving his wife and children alone for weeks or months at a time.

It is not only labour migration reasons that see men leave their wives alone. Men have a social license to be absent from the family home. Bu Si said that her husband leaves the family home to socialise with friends after work and does not return home till after midnight. Society condones such behaviour for men but not for women. Hence Bu Si is left alone with the children during the day and well into the night. These long absences, fuel women’s suspicion of their husband’s fidelity. This fear of infidelity was frequently mentioned during interviews and was said to be a common fear amongst kampung women. Bu Si said that a lot of women have to tell their husband to come home and to not be out late (Interview # 9). This sees women left as heads of the household much of the time.

231 Women face the hardship of looking after the home and children for long periods of time. Their membership of organisations does not see local women talking together about this hardship. If women talk about the hardship of raising children alone, they present a less than harmonious image of society.

Education

Kampung women told me that their lack of financial independence is linked to their lack of formal education compared to males. The price of education has been increasing in

Indonesia over the last seven years with the result that children from poor families are forced to leave school (between nine and fifteen years) to earn money to help support their families. School children are frequently found in the city begging for money or busking.

Tertiary education is expensive and only those from wealthy families can aspire to study at university. Education in the past signified a family’s wealth. In contemporary times it has become a necessity to safeguard a family against poverty. As it is now difficult for individuals to obtain a well-paid position education is crucial. The dilemma is the limited number of jobs available.

Restricted educational opportunities affect the kampung in various ways. Often families have to decide which child will be educated and which will be denied an education. Bu

Su’s situation illustrates how her economic influences her child’s educational aspirations.

Siti begged me to let her go to university. She loves books. I want her to go to University too. Because education is so expensive, that is the reason I do not want to have another child. I have promised her that she can study at 232 university, as I am afraid that if I have another child I will not be able to afford to educate them both (Bu Su Nov 2000).

One theme to emerge from the interviews with Malang women was that they wanted their children to have opportunities that were not available to them. Bu Su’s desire to educate her daughter stems from her own lack of education. For Bu Su, this means choosing not to have more children, as it would mean not being able to send Siti to university. The choice is made with issues of class and status in mind. To have many children is not a guarantee of higher social class. By contrast, to have children who are university educated, in contemporary times, is an indicator of high social status.

Not all families make this decision. It is not uncommon for families to have between three and ten children. For larger, single income families it is financially impossible to educate every child. The fact is that education is increasingly out of reach for families.

This poses a crisis for the social aspirations of many families. The need to educate future generations is ever more important yet the accessibility of this education is harder to achieve.

The fieldwork data revealed clear evidence of discontent and dissatisfaction with the price of education. Some women even choose not to have children (as in the case of Bu

Su) for fear of not being able to afford to educate them. Education has become a sensitive topic because it is an indicator of relative wealth and therefore social mobility and status. Failure to attain education is thus socially shameful or at least denigrating. It goes largely un-discussed within women’s organisations.

233 Domestic Violence and PKK

In Indonesia, violence is perceived as an unwanted disruption to the ideal of harmonious relations in the community. Therefore to publicly acknowledge violence disturbs the social order. Consequently the topic of violence against women, men and children in

Indonesia is categorised as private and thus taboo. As a consequence, domestic violence goes un-discussed within local organisations with the exception of the LKBHWAK.

In her study Sullivan found that domestic violence did occur in kampung life in central

Java.

The myriad of pressures associated with living in this crowded, poor, insecure and unhygienic place undeniably lead to violent conflicts within some families (Sullivan, 1994:96).

There were not many known cases of domestic violence in the local kampung.

Nevertheless it does occur, as the example of Bu V’s daughter in chapter four demonstrates. This case study also illustrated how it was handled, by being kept in the family. The convention of silence makes it very difficult to know the magnitude of the problem.

If a couple is married, and there is some trouble within the household, it is not OK for other people to know about it. A good family is one that does not talk about problems. There is just no facility there to aid women and to help women with those things (Interview # 20).

Shame silences women and the fact that ‘there is no facility to aid women and to help women with those things’ only reinforces the silence. Even if women defy ‘tradition’ and discuss domestic violence, they believe no one can help them to change their situation. If women leave their families and children and go to a larger city, it is possible

234 for them to access practical help. If they stay in the same community the threat of gossip is ever present.

Bu V chose to discuss the problem with a close friend, but she would not talk about it with just any member of the PKK or Tahlilan organisations. If she spoke about her personal problems with women in the organisation she said she would fear becoming the topic of local gossip.

Whilst Bu V is bold enough to talk about her daughter’s domestic reality with a close friend, there are other women in similar situations who choose not to talk with anyone.

This incident shows how the woman’s immediate family and the kampung community deal with or choose not to deal with these issues. Notions of acceptability and respectability in the kampung circumscribe their behaviour.

But I think the first reason for this is related to our culture, it is still taboo for us to talk about sexual matters with children here and that is why there are so many problems here, like rape (Interview # 4).

The religious, social and political emphasis on not talking about personal problems is portrayed as symbolic of local tradition. One of the women I spoke with confirmed this when she said, “to me it is a real issue of tradition” (Interview # 12). Whilst the woman did not explain where, how or why the tradition came about, the fact that it is about

‘tradition’ deters her from discussing her personal problems.

235 LKBHWAK Challenges Local Traditions

The LKBHWAK is one of the only organisations in Malang which speak out against what it perceives as the state’s failure to protect women. Members of the LKBHWAK directly address violence against women in society including acts of rape.

The Malang branch has proved effective in supporting individual women. Part of preserving women’s rights, members told me, is women’s right to physical safety.

Members have been instrumental in getting police to prosecute men accused of rape and other acts of violence against women in the community. Successfully encouraging police to prosecute is itself a challenge for members. Members of the LKBHWAH have conducted debates in the media and in seminars about domestic violence and rape.

LKBHWAK uses the medium of media (talkback radio) to promote community education.

We are often on the radio and women participate by calling us up and discussing their problem on the radio. Through this medium they are introduced to our organisation and learn about research focusing on women. There is no other organisation for women that discusses these issues, even though we have had these types of problems for ages (Interview # 20).

Talkback radio is perceived as an imported consequence of modernisation. Despite its modern image, talkback radio is effective in the kampung. Women in this study either had a phone in their home or had access to a phone through their friends, neighbours or families.

The two members of LKBHWAK that host the radio program are lecturers at the law department of one of the Universities in Malang. The advice that the hosts offered their 236 callers concerned not only their legal position, the women often referred to the Koran as a means to address their concerns. The callers were from a lower social class than the women who run the programs. The hosts carefully worded their responses, so as not to be thought of as kasar. In between the calls one of the hosts told me that she feels distressed talking with the women about their situation. She said that she worries many of them may not seek help after they hang up the phone (Interview # 5).

The problems discussed on the radio program are similar to the issues that the

LKBHWAK voice within wider Malang society. The topics of violence against women, women’s access to divorce and domestic violence all featured in the interviews I conducted with women from the PSW and LKBHWAK. Interestingly, it was women from the lower classes that rang the radio station and discussed their experiences on air.

Only a minority of respondents from the PKK, SMC and Tahlilan were ‘brave’ enough to talk frankly with me about these taboo topics.

The women who called and talked on the radio were bolder about discussing their problems than the women who I interviewed. Women were more assertive because of the anonymity that radio offers. This contrasts with face-to-face interviews where the women were identified and taped inside their homes.

Whilst representatives of LKBHWAK believe it is a positive strategy to educate women about their legal rights, participation in national talkback radio is still viewed as controversial. For women in the kampung telephoning the local radio station and having their personal concerns broadcast is not socially acceptable. Women in the kampung believe that it is tradition to keep their problems to themselves. They feel intimidated,

237 shy or afraid to entrust a stranger with their personal problems. This is only heightened with the use of radio by the fear that other people, perhaps even their neighbours, could be listening. The women are reluctant to call as they fear being identified.

LKBHWAK and Indonesian Law Reform

Members of LKBHWAK see women’s personal problems as political issues. They seek social support through their challenge to the Indonesian legal system. The members of the LKBHWAK said the issues concerning women were not about the organisations being a place where women can come to solve their problems. Instead, they argue that the nation’s legal system should provide women with the same rights it affords men.

Unfortunately, Indonesia’s legal system is notorious for its lack of commitment to prosecuting men accused of crimes against women. It is widely believed that not only is it taboo to discuss matters pertaining to violence, but even if one does, nothing will change.

LKBHWAK members demand that women’s grievances be heard in the local courts although this does not imply that they personally see such issues as ‘acceptable’.

Members of LKBHWAK said that they realised that these issues are ‘damaging for women emotionally and psychologically’. Court outcomes are not always beneficial because even if a conviction is secured the victim is publicly stigmatised and therefore women are made victims once again. Their legal rights are not transformed into social justice as victims.

Women told me that despite this opportunity, the court does not really produce desirable outcomes. Cases where women accuse men of violence and rape are difficult to prove

238 and women (as elsewhere) feel ashamed and intimidated to talk about these matters openly.

We have a few laws that are biased against women. Maybe at a later time we will be free. All the way from the top to the bottom, there are biases concerning gender. So even though women are career women and so on there is still much gender bias within Indonesia’s official system. This is very obvious in the example of rape. Rape is very explicit and can only be done when a penis enters a vagina. Rape is not seen as the same as ‘attempted’ rape. But rape, known in any other way, is unheard of within our legal system. So for instance many people think that the damage emotionally and psychologically, does not enter into ‘law’. So many people think that the psychological impact of rape can not be brought to trial. I am really angry with them about that (Interview # 20).

Society’s reluctance to acknowledge such crimes and women’s choice not to prosecute is in part derived from larger social and cultural traditions regarding openly discussing personal concerns. Women feel hesitant to discuss personal matters in public. The airing of personal problems in court, which epitomises public space, is the antithesis of tradition.

Members said that they hope to defend the legislative rights of women by securing jail sentences for those accused of violence against women. One advocate said that

LKBHWAK wants to improve the position of women in society without disrespecting local cultural traditions. The way members of LKBHWAK define tradition is different to how members of PKK understand tradition. The concerns that LKBHWAK is addressing are the shaming topics that PKK members explained are best kept within the family.

This sparks controversy between the different women’s organisations.

Despite the arguable success of LKBHWAK in fulfilling their aims, there are fundamental limitations for this organisation. In reality LKBHWAK is not well known in

239 the city and the criticisms only serve to limit its effectiveness. The Malang branch of

LKBHWAK provides opportunities which challenge the PKK, Tahlilan and SMC focus on the preservation of tradition. However, the social perception of local women’s organisations, and their connection with larger umbrella organisations guarantees their wider social validity. Therefore the lack of respect that LKBHWAK yields in the society influences what it can ultimately achieve for women in society.

Summary

Solving socially damaging problems concerning sexual behaviour and women’s financial independence is difficult. The parameters determining the social bargaining process include the preservation of a harmonious society and respect for the social order. Embedded in the preservation of society is the maintenance of tradition. Women in the PKK, SMC and Tahlilan organisations adopt the behaviour that resonates with what they perceive as traditional. This includes keeping taboo topics within the home and not discussing them in the public space of the organisations or public forums such as the courts or talkback radio.

Alternatively, members of the LKBHWAK see problem-solving in terms of their quest to change the Indonesian legal system. The different approaches organisations have to problem solving reinforce the contrasting social significance of organisations.

This chapter has shown how despite the organisations being distinct, all women are drawn into the politics governing the different organisations. If they fail to adhere to this socially understood ‘tradition’ it is interpreted, by local society, as denying and even

240 rebelling against tradition. The limitations of the social bargaining process are in part the result of the social space women’s organisations inhabit.

The gains and the limitations of social bargaining must be contextualised within the discussion of the different social roles that organisations play within the community.

The conclusion will show how the gains and limitations of the social bargaining process are the result of the relationship between the state, local women’s organisations, umbrella organisations and women. Through unveiling the complexities of this relationship the social and political meanings inherent in contemporary women’s organisations will become apparent.

241 CONCLUSION

This thesis set out to explore the socio-political meanings of local women’s organisations in Malang. In particular, it sought to investigate how these meanings are continually shaped by remnants of the Suharto government’s nation-building policies despite the emergence of reformasi.

To ascertain the space and meaning embedded in local organisations is to implicitly isolate them from other social factors. However as social institutions, local women’s organisations function in conjunction with other social institutions. Instead of arguing that women’s organisations occupy one specific space or are embedded with a single meaning, this thesis has shown the intrinsic inter-relatedness of women’s organisations and other socio-political factors within Malang society.

The socio-political meaning of organisations is determined by the way organisations are connected to politics, religion, social morality, and tradition. Local organisations tell the story about the role local women play in the relationship between the government and local communities. They also reveal the continuing significance of kampung traditions, desires for social change, and the role of Islam in the community. Organisations also provide a way to think about the demands for change in society through both the enforcement of legal rights, and campaigns to provide the financial independence of women.

242 The Social Bargaining Model

Women’s State Organisations

Limitations

Kampung Gains Gains

Limitations

Umbrella Organisations

The Social Bargaining Model illustrates the inter-relationship and fludity of exchange in the community

Figure 1.1

Women’s organisations exist primarily because local women attend the organisations

and participate in their activities. It is not however membership alone that determines

the organisations functions in the community. The space local women’s organisations

occupy is influenced by their relationship with other social and political elements. The

kampung remains influenced by the policies of the Indonesian state, the social values

and customs of the wider umbrella organisations and the traditions of the local

organisations (see figure 1.1). 243 This thesis analysed five different women’s organisations in Malang. I chose to study the socially diverse organisations of PKK, Tahlilan, PSW, LKBHWAK and SMC. Each of these organisations inhabits a different social space. The PKK and Tahlilan organisations operate in the local space of the kampung. For the members of the PSW, their space is within the university campus. The organisations also occupy contrasting social positions, which are class, religion, personal and financially specific.

Whilst organisations inhabit specific social paces, women ensure their fluidity by entering and leaving the spaces at different times. A member may either move from one organisation to another or choose to participate in more than one organisation at a time.

For instance, women are often members of both the PKK and Tahlilan. Alternatively women are members of the LKBHWAK and the PSW.

Despite the fluidity of women’s membership, the social meaning of local organisations is shaped by their relationship with umbrella organisations. Whilst women can join or leave organisations when they choose, they do not have the ability to alter the meaning that is attached to the organisations. Consequently when women decide to become a member of an organisation they are drawn into the relationship between local organisations and umbrella organisations. This is marked on the figure 1.1 with the arrows between the different sectors of the circle.

Local women actively participate in the social network of the state, local organisations and umbrella organisations through their membership of local organisations. Women respect rules governing behaviour within organisation and consequently negotiate a

244 variety of opportunities within their immediate social lives. This was described in the fourth chapter with the concept of ‘social bargaining’. Gains could be made by women in terms of employment, romantic, social, religious and problem solving opportunities.

The social bargaining process takes place within the local community. Consequently, women are influenced by the political, social, religious and cultural taboos circumscribing society. Although women make gains through bargaining, they are also constrained in terms of what is deemed acceptable in the public space of the kampung.

The fifth chapter discussed how women do not feel always comfortable discussing the socially damaging issues of sexual behaviour and financial independence in public. Any form of behaviour that contravenes social morality is disallowed.

The social bargaining process, displayed in the diagram (figure 1.1), provides a way to understand the fluidity of the relationship between local women’s organisations and wider society. It describes the way women participate in local organisations and how this is a story about women’s lives, society’s values and political influences. The way women negotiate goals for themselves depends upon the interconnectedness of the groups to umbrella organisations and the state. Social bargaining highlights how the different organisations for women further reinforce the fluidity of organisations. This allows women to participate in different organisations and thereby secure different gains for themselves.

The social bargaining process describes a relationship in society. It is not referred to in this thesis as an indicator of whether women’s experiences are positive or negative. I have not argued that social bargaining simplifies women’s experiences in organisations.

245 Rather the way organisations are connected to society facilitates a type of social exchange that has not been described or analysed before with regards to the different women’s organisations within Indonesia.

Contribution to Indonesian Studies and Gender Politics

This thesis has contributed substantially to the disciplines of Indonesian studies, gender politics, sociology and Anthropology. This empirical study tells a story about how local kampung women in Malang manage their lives. It uses an integrative approach to explore the different dimensions of social life, the state’s interest in local communities and women’s reactions to this process.

I have challenged previous work concerning Indonesian women’s organisations by arguing that they are not homogenous. Instead I have highlighted the differences between different kinds of women’s organisations and showed how they have contrasting goals and objectives. Because women’s organisations are different and occupy different social spaces, what they aim to do for women is also very specific.

This has fundamentally challenged the idea that women’s organisations in Indonesia were necessarily linked to the women’s movement or espouses empowerment.

I have shown that homogenising women’s organisations by linking local women’s organisations to a national social movement allows no opportunity for women’s organisations to be defined on their own terms. Instead I have shown the complexities of the organisations and the way they function in society as not being solely about

‘women’ but a more complex story of social, religious and political life understood through women’s participation in organisations.

246 This thesis also makes a substantial conceptual contribution. In an effort to analyse the local lives of kampung women I searched for a specific concept to encapsulate the way women negotiate their social circumstances. For Kandiyoti (1988), women bargain within the parameters of patriarchy. The patriarchal bargain assumes that women are subordinate to men. I use the bargain in a broader context, to describe the relationship women engage in with organisations and the state. Women’s participation in these organisations changes the possibilities of action and bargaining through their insertion into nation-wide associations with historical relationships to the state. The relationship between organisations and the state facilitates the social bargaining process. This is an alternative conceptualisation of local women’s organisations, which place them outside former generalised conceptualisations of women, empowerment and political oppression.

The significance of this work is not only to be found in the complex social meanings of local organisations. At the time of writing, there are no other ethnographic theses on women’s organisations in Malang. This study contributes an ethnography of the lives of kampung women in Malang. The key social, economic, political and religious factors, which circumscribe Malang society, have influenced the types of women’s organisations that operate in the community. This rich ethnographic study is unique in that it links the local nature of Malang society to broader political discussions about the state, umbrella organisations and local women’s organisations.

The thesis contributes to the debate about local women’s organisations and their role in social and political change in Indonesia. One key finding is that local communities,

247 despite wider demands for social change, are in fact maintaining local traditions. I have shown how local women play a key role in maintaining social morality in the kampung through upholding traditional social behaviour and values by participating in local organisations. By asking local women why they continue to attend organisations I have given voice to local kampung women and provided a new way of looking at the role of women’s organisations as preservers of tradition as well as vehicles for social change.

Implications for Future Research

The demands for social and political reform in Indonesia will continue to impact on the kampung as women and men participate, resist and encourage such change. Discussions concerning Indonesian social change have already contemplated how to change local women’s organisations (Marcoes, 2001:45). To change women’s organisations one needs to remember that they are embedded with political, religious, social, and moral meanings.

Whilst it may appear simple to discuss replacing existing organisations, it is more difficult to re-invent the traditions upon which local beliefs are premised. One question to consider in light of demands for change is how will ‘new’ organisations be accepted within society. Or will ‘new’ women’s organisations seek to bring their own social meaning into the community and if so, what will it be premised upon? It will be interesting to see how and indeed if, new social institutions can overcome the need for the structural support of umbrella organisations. The relationships that these new organisations have with the government, Islamic organisations and other women’s organisations will determine women’s opportunities to bargain and make gains in their local community in the future.

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278 APPENDIX I

279 APPENDIX I CONTD.

280 APPENDIX II SURVEY Name: Age: Occupation: Marital Status: Husband’s Occupation: Address: Region: Suburb: City: 1. Do you have any children? o Yes o No

2. How many children do you have and what are their ages? ……………………………………………………………………………..

3. How long have you attended the local PKK meetings? ……………………………………………………………………………..

4. What are your reasons for attending PKK? …………………………………………………………………………….. ……………………………………………………………………………..

5. For you, what is important about attending PKK? Why are these things important? …………………………………………………………………………….. ……………………………………………………………………………..

6. What are the most important aspects of PKK for you and why? …………………………………………………………………………….. ……………………………………………………………………………..

7. In your opinion is the Simpan Pinjam component of PKK important? Why? …………………………………………………………………………….. ……………………………………………………………………………..

8. Are you also a member of additional women’s organisations? …………………………………………………………………………….. ……………………………………………………………………………..

9. If yes, which ones? …………………………………………………………………………….. ……………………………………………………………………………..

10. Why do you attend the other organisations above? …………………………………………………………………………….. …………………………………………………………………………….. Thank You for Completing this Survey

281 APPENDIX II CONTD ANGKET

Nama: Umur: Pekerjaan Status Kawin / Tidak Kawin Pekerjaan Suami Anda Alamat RT RW Keluarahan Kecamatan Kodya

1 Apakah Anda suda mempunyai Anak ya / Tidak

2. Berapakah umur anak Anda? Anak pertama…….anak kedua…….. anakak ketiga……….. anak keempat

3. Berapa lama Anda ikut pertemuan PKK?

4. Apa alasan Anda mengikuti pertemuan PKK tersebut?

5. Apakah penting pertemuan PKK itu untuk Anda? Kenapa?

6. Hal-hal manakah dari program PKK yang bermanfaat untuk Anda? Kenapa?

7. Apakah kegiatan simpan-pinjam di program PKK itu penting? Kenapa?

8. Apakah Anda juga menjadi anggota kelompok perempuan lain sekalin PKK? Ya / Tidak

9. Kalau ‘Ya’ kelompok yang mana?

Mengapa Anda Menjadi anggota kelompok tersebut?

Terimakasih Atas Informasi Anda

282 APPENDIX III

INDONESIAN NATIONAL ANTHEM

http://www.londoh.com/indonesia_raya.htm

Indonesia tanah airku, Tanah tumpah darahku. Disanalah aku berdiri Jadi pandu ibuku. Indonesia kebangsaanku, Bangsa dan Tanah Airku. Marilah kita berseru "Indonesia bersatu."

283 Hiduplah tanahku, Hiduplah negriku, Bangsaku, Rakyatku, se'mwanya. Bangunlah jiwanya, Bangunlah badannya Untuk Indonesia Raja.

CHORUS

Indonesia Raja, Merdeka, Merdeka Tanahku, negriku jang kutjinta. Indonesia Raja, Merdeka, Merdeka Hiduplah Indonesia Raja. Indonesia Raja, Merdeka, Merdeka Tanahku, negriku jang kutjinta. Indonesia Raja, Merdeka, Merdeka Hiduplah Indonesia Raja. Indonesia! Tanah yang mulia, Tanah kita yang kaya. Disanalah aku berada Untuk slamalamanya. Indonesia, Tanah pusaka, Psaka Kita semuanya. Marilah kita mendoa, "Indonesia bahagia!" Suburlah Tanahnja, Suburlah jiwanja, Bansanya, Rakyatnya semuanja. Sadarlah hatinja, Sadarlah budinja Untuk Indonesia Raja.

CHORUS

Indonesia! Tanah yang sutyi, Tanah kita yang sakti. Disanalah aku berdiri Ndyaga ibu sedyati. Indonesia! Tanah berseri, Tanah yung aku sayangi. Marilah kita berjanji: "Indonesia abadi!" Slamatlah Rakyatnja, Slamatlah putranja, Pulaunya, lautnya semuanja. Majulah Begrinja, Majulah Pandunja Untuk Indonesia Raja.

CHORUS Indonesia Raya (english translation) Indonesia, my native land My place of birth Where I stand guard Over my motherland

Indonesia, my nationality My people and my country Let us all cry For united Indonesia

Long live my land Long live my country My nation and all my people

Arouse their spirit Arouse their bodies For Great Indonesia

Great Indonesia Free and independent The land, the country I love

Great Indonesia Free and independent Long live Indonesia

284