IT-09-92-T 81116 D81116 - D81078 14 August 2014 MB
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Case No. IT-09-92-T IN THE TRIAL CHAMBER
Before: Judge Alphons Orie, Presiding Judge Bakone Justice Moloto Judge Christoph Flügge
Registrar: Mr. John Hocking
Date Filed: 13 August 2014
THE PROSECUTOR
v.
RATKO MLADIĆ
PUBLIC
DEFENCE MOTION PURSUANT TO RULE 92TER TO ADMIT THE WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF DESIMIR SARENAC
The Office of the Prosecutor: Mr. Dermot Groome Mr. Peter McCloskey
Counsel for the Accused: Mr. Branko Lukić Mr. Miodrag Stojanović
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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
PROSECUTOR
v.
RATKO MLADIĆ PUBLIC
DEFENCE MOTION PURSUANT TO RULE 92TER TO ADMIT THE WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF DESIMIR SARENAC ______
The Accused, RATKO MLADIĆ, by and through his counsel of record, respectfully submits the instant Motion pursuant to Rule 92ter of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and in support thereof states as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Pursuant to the Guidance previously expressed by the Trial Chamber, motions offering written statements under Rule 92ter of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are to be filed at least 30 days before the anticipated testimony of a given witness. Witness DESIMIR SARENAC is currently scheduled to testify approximately within the next 30 days and thus the Defense hereby files the instant motion in compliance with the Chamber’s guidance, and applying for the evidence of this witness to be heard pursuant to Rule 92ter. This Motion is filed publicly, as the witness does not require protective measures.
2. Herein this application is made to tender one written witness statement of the witness, with 25 associated exhibits. At this time the Defense estimates that the evidence-in-chief of this witness will last up to 30 minutes.
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3. The number of associated exhibits is necessary to render the witness’ testimony complete and meaningful. It represents a savings of multiple hours in direct examination. The Defense does not otherwise seek to deviate from the Chamber’s Guidelines in tendering this witness’ evidence.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
4. Under Rule 92ter of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (hereinafter “Rules”) a Trial Chamber is permitted to admit the evidence in whole or in part in the form of a witness statement or transcripts of a proceeding before the Tribunal, under the following conditions: i) the witness is present in court; ii) the witness is available for cross-examination and any questioning by the Judges; and iii) the witness attests that the written statement or transcript accurately reflects the witness’s declaration and what the witness would say if examined.1
5. A party calling a witness pursuant to Rule 92ter may seek to admit into evidence documents that have been discussed by the witness in his or her witness statement of previous testimony.2
III. DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS
a) The Chamber Should Admit the Witness Statement
6. The Defence seeks leave of the Chamber to call Branko Davidović as a witness pursuant to Rule 92ter. The Defence submits that the proffered statement,
1 Rule 92ter of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 2 Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, “Decision on Prosecution’s Submission regarding Additional Transcript Pages from Momcilo Mandic’s Stanisic and Zupljanin Testimony for Admission into Evidence.” 8 September 2010, para.5.
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(attached hereto as Annex A) meets the requirements of Rule 92ter, and thus should be admitted under that Rule.
7. Witness Davidović’s statement is relevant, reliable and probative, as set forth in greater detail herein below.
8. The witness will be present at trial, and thus will be able to attest to the evidence and will be available to be cross-examined by the Prosecution. Thereby the requirements of Rule 92ter will be fulfilled, and fairness to the Prosecution will be observed.
9. The Defense submits that due to the nature of the Witness’s testimony 30 minutes will be necessary in order to conduct a limited and focused direct examination of the witness to clarify, expand on, and contextualize aspects of his evidence directly relevant to the Defense case.
10. Witness Sarenac was a JNA officer that went to Sarajevo as part of the 4th JNA Corps, 49th mechanized brigade. He became chief of Security of the 1st Sarajevo mechanized brigade and served until May 1995 when he became a battalion commander.3
11. Witness Sarenac’s testimony is relevant to and probative of salient and material issues pertaining to the Indictment. The Defense is confident in that it will, among other things, establish the following: a. The ABIH positioned military forces and installations in civilian zones.4 b. The 1st smbr was made up of members of the local population.5 c. The Primary task of the SRK was to protect the Serb population and homes.6
3 Statement para. 7 4 Statement para. 20, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 46, 47, 48, and 49 5 Statement para. 8
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d. The Muslim forces mounted offensive actions.7 The SRK prohibited artillery fire into Sarajevo (ie. against civilian facilities).8 e. The VRS instructed soldiers to abide by IHL.9 f. The Serb side observed all ceasefires.10 g. Bosnian Muslims lived next to the Lukavica barracks in the same conditions as Serb families.11 h. The ABIH side shelled their own hospital to try and gain intervention of the outside world on their side.12
b) The Chamber Should Admit the Associated Exhibits
12. Each associated exhibit is directly relevant to the case, and is inseparable and indispensable to the witness’s statement, and can be contextualized and explained most effectively through this witness. They constitute an essential component of the witness’ evidence, and also are of importance to the Defense case, and therefore it is submitted that it is in the interests of justice that they be admitted.
13. There are a total of 25 associated exhibits to this witness statement, as set out in the table that is attached at Public Annex B.
14. The associated exhibits will help assist the Chamber in understanding the evidence of this witness, as the documents relate to providing additional sources and material that support the statement.
6 Statement para. 11 7 Statement para. 12 8 Statement, para 16 9 Statement, para. 19 10 Statement, para. 21 11 Statement, para. 22 12 Statement, para. 44
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15. For instance, the following are relevant documents supporting the information conveyed in the statement, and therefore are inseparable to the same:
a. 1D03019 – describing the numerical strength of the ABIH forces.13 b. 1D03039 & 1D03058 – describing placement of ABIH forces.14 c. 1D03020 & 1D03033 – statements of defectors that were the bases of locations of the MUP.15 d. 1D03059 & 1D03080 – Documents evidencing the Bosnian Muslim side made people pay to get out of Sarajevo.16 e. 1D03031 – demonstrating the smuggling in Sarajevo.17 f. 1D03078 – demonstrating that the muslims organized paramilitaries in Sarajevo.18 g. 1D03077 & 1D03059 & 1D03080 & 1D04398 – demonstrating the position and encirclement of the SRK by the ABIH and the movement of ABIH forces.19 h. 1D04398 & 1D03036 & 1D03057 & 1D03038 & 1D03060 & 1D03034 & 1D03075 & 1D03079 & 1D03061 & 1D03060– Demonstrating the ABIH mis-use of civilian areas and facilities. i. 1D04399 & 1D03015 – Demonstrating the Muslim use of snipers. j. 1D03076 – Demonstrating that the muslim side shelled their own hospital to try and get the outside world to intervene.20 k. 1D03035 & 1D03037 – Demonstrating the Muslim side producing armaments.
13 Statement, para, 13 14 Statement, para. 14 15 Statement, para. 24 16 Statement, para. 28 17 Statement, para. 29 18 Statement, para. 31 19 Statement, para. 32-34 20 Statement, para. 44
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16. The exhibits are all explained in the statement, and result in a savings of time because there would need to be an additional 3 hours of direct examination to go through these same documents in court. They should be admitted as associated exhibits as a matter of court efficiency.
III. CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing arguments, the Defense respectfully requests that the Chamber issue an order: a. Granting the Defense leave to call Desimir Sarenac as a witness pursuant to Rule 92ter. b. Granting the Defense leave to admit the proffered statement, (attached hereto as Annex A) under Rule 92ter. c. Granting the Defense leave to admit the associated exhibits, (attached hereto as Annex B) under Rule 92ter.
Word Count: 1,200
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED BY:
Branko Lukić Miodrag Stojanović Lead Counsel for Ratko Mladić Co-Counsel for Ratko Mladić
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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Case No. IT-09-92-T
THE PROSECUTOR
v.
RATKO MLADIĆ
PUBLIC
ANNEX A ______
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INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1991
WITNESS STATEMENT
WITNESS INFORMATION:
Surname: ŠARENAC
Name: Desimir
Father’s name: Novica
Date of birth: 5 May 1948
Ethnicity: Serb
Date(s) of interview(s): 5 July 2014
Interview(s) conducted by: Saša Lukić
Language used during the interview: Serbian
Signature of the Witness: ______/signature/ ______
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WITNESS STATEMENT
1. My name is Desimir ŠARENAC. I was born on 5 May 1948 in Stari Brod, the Municipality of Rogatica, Bosnia-Herzegovina. I completed primary education in Borike, and in 1968 I finished the infantry school for non-commissioned officers in Sarajevo.
2. I joined the professional service of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) on 18 July 1968. My first post was in the garrison located in the place called Delnice in the Republic of Croatia, where I served as a platoon commander. I remained in the position of platoon commander in Delnice until 1972, whereupon I was transferred to the garrison in Zagreb, to the position of military police platoon commander. In 1973 I started working in the security organs (OB) of the JNA, first in Zagreb, where I stayed until 1977, and then in Bihać, where I remained until 1982.
3. In 1982 I moved to Gospić, where I stayed until 1990. In 1990 I was transferred to the garrison in Belgrade, where I remained until mid May 1992. On 16 May 1992 I went to Sarajevo and reported for duty at the 49th Mechanised Brigade (mbr) of the 4th JNA Corps, which was located in Sarajevo. The war had already begun when I arrived in Sarajevo.
4. When I reported for duty on 16 May 1992 at the Slaviša Vajner Čiča Barracks in Lukavica, the situation there was totally chaotic. Members of the JNA who were born outside BiH were looking forward to their upcoming departure for Yugoslavia, while a majority of the JNA members born in BiH decided to stay in BiH.
5. After most of the JNA members of Muslim and Croat ethnicity deserted from the JNA, the JNA units were decimated. Since the remaining officer cadre and soldiers were not sufficient to respond to the upcoming tasks, it was necessary to mobilise the reserve officer cadre.
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6. The JNA was in complete disarray. The Barracks became a reception centre for refugees coming from various parts of BiH - Zenica, Travnik, Visoko, and for a large number of refugees from Sarajevo. Even the Muslims from Dobrinja would come to the military canteen in Lukavica. Literally, no one knew who was doing what and where one was. With the few members of the military police I started introducing some basic measures in order to establish order in the military and attempted to establish control of the movement of persons on the perimeter of the Barracks because it was a military facility and I was afraid that the military equipment and materiel could be abused, which was to be prevented.
7. Around 20 May 1992, the 4th JNA Corps was renamed into the Sarajevo- Romanija Corps of the Army of Republika Srpska (SRK VRS), and the 49th JNA mbr /Motorised Brigade/ was renamed into the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade (smbr) of the VRS. I performed the duty of Chief of Security in the 1st smbr until May 1995, when I was appointed battalion commander within the 1st smbr, and I served in that position until October 1995. From October 1995 until the end of the war I was Chief of Security in the 1st smbr.
8. The 1st smbr was mostly comprised of the local population, though it was partly manned by the refugee population that fled to the zone of responsibility of the 1st smbr; this was what represented and comprised the army. The VRS, and thereby the SRK, was lacking professional officer cadre. In order to best illustrate this problem, I will explain it using my own example. I was the only professional officer in the OB /Security Organ/, which was headed by me, and in the military police company only the company commander was a professional.
9. The primary task of the Security Organ of the 1st smbr was counter-intelligence protection of the Brigade, which involved monitoring, preventing or disabling the intelligence work of the enemy. Due to the fact that since the very beginning of the armed conflict there was a large number of cases of people crossing over or defecting from the Muslim territory to the Serb-controlled territory, it was necessary to conduct information interviews with all of them in order to obtain data on the persons who crossed over to our side and to gather relevant intelligence about the armed forces of ABiH /Army of Bosnia- Herzegovina/.
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10. At the beginning of the conflict, the zone of responsibility of the 1st smbr /Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade/ stretched from Vraca through Mojmilo, parts of Dobrinja and via Kasindol to the ravines above Kijevo village. Thus, the separation line passed exclusively along the edges of the settlements in which Serbs were a majority. During the war, the Brigade’s zone of responsibility changed several times due to organisational changes in the SRK /Sarajevo-Romanija Corps/, but the separation lines essentially remained at the positions that had been established in the beginning of the conflict, in early April 1992, when the local population on both sides set up barricades there.
11. The primary task of the SRK forces was the protection of the Serb population and their homes in order to avoid a repetition of the massacre of World War II committed by the Croats and Muslims against the Serb people. Before the separation lines were established, the Muslim, Croat and Serb population had protected their homes, families and estates by barricades, and subsequently by organised guards set up in front of their apartment buildings, houses and in their streets.
12. During the war it was mainly the Muslims who mounted offensive actions, due to which the lines would be moved to the detriment of the VRS. In this manner, members of the Muslim armed forces took Mojmilo, Žuč and some other points that had been under the Serb control at the beginning of the conflict. The SRK would mostly engage in defensive activities, and it mounted only one offensive operation, at the outer edge of Sarajevo, in order to establish a firm and safe connection between the forces of the SRK and the Herzegovina Corps (HK) and thus hinder the regrouping of the ABiH units. This was Operation LUKAVAC 93.
13. To the best of my recollection, the SRK forces were in the so-called double encirclement of the Muslim and Croat forces. At the so-called outer ring, the SRK forces were surrounded by the forces the 4th, 3rd and the 2nd ABiH Corps on one side; also, the SRK units were surrounded by the forces of the 1st ABiH Crops on both the inner and outer sides of the so-called ring. We received the data about the positions and layout of the ABiH units from the persons who fled from the part of Sarajevo under the control of the so-called ABiH to our territory. The numerical strength of the 1st ABiH Corps in Sarajevo, as can be seen from document 65ter 1D03019, even allowed for the possibility to send the forces of this Crops to assist other ABiH forces outside Sarajevo. In this case,
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units the size of four brigades were sent to the positions at Igman, Olovo, Zenica and Doboj.
14. Document 65ter 1D03039 shows that members of the 1st Motorised Mountain Brigade of the ABiH were also deployed to the positions outside the city of Sarajevo. As is the case with the above documents, document 65ter 1D03058 reveals that the ABiH units very easily regrouped and moved from the city of Sarajevo towards the other areas of BiH controlled by the ABiH.
15. I learned all of the above from a large number of statements my colleagues and I took from escapees/defectors /BCS: prebeg/ and former members of the ABiH who fled from the Muslim part of Sarajevo to the VRS-controlled territory. I would also like to emphasise that each member of the Security Organ was authorised to take statements. Through the reports they submitted to me about their work and interviews they conducted with defectors, my associates would always inform me about the contents of notes they made in this regard.
16. Since the very beginning of the war, the SRK Command issued orders prohibiting the use of artillery fire against the city, i.e. the use of artillery fire against civilian facilities. Likewise, I know that most of the orders issued by the Corps Command explicitly requested all the units to engage in defensive activities. I know that the orders with such and similar contents came from the GŠ VRS /VRS Main Staff/.
17. The civilian population that lived in the VRS-controlled territory was in constant fear because it was exposed to the infantry and artillery fire of the enemy practically throughout the zone of my Brigade, which resulted in a huge number of civilian casualties during the war. In June 1992, the inhabitants of Lukavica and the surrounding settlements were so frightened by the enemy fire from Mojmilo and the neighbouring positions that they were preparing to move out collectively. What prevented the people from moving out en masse is the fact that the SRK Command was stationed in Lukavica, which helped the people regain courage and confidence.
18. I never heard or saw that any member of my unit inflicted terror on civilians, regardless of their faith and place where they lived, be it in the ABiH-controlled part of Sarajevo or the part under the control of the VRS. Moreover, I never saw or heard an order by the superior command requesting that something like that be done. As far as I
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know, our units responded to the fire from the city only when they were attacked and in order to protect themselves and neutralise the danger it posed to the unit and the population.
19. Our units were provided with copies of extracts from international conventions describing the rules of conduct towards the enemy, prisoners and civilian population, and the provisions of international humanitarian law in general. Such extracts were distributed to the Brigade personnel.
20. The Muslim forces misused civilian facilities in the city of Sarajevo. The civilian facilities were also abused by the Muslim snipers in order to terrorise the civilian population. Once a sniper starts using a facility in which civilians live or work as the location to open fire from, the facility becomes a legitimate military target that needs to be neutralised in order to protect the civilians and the army. Such a target is neutralised by all available means.
21. The Serb side observed all the ceasefire agreements that it signed because it was not in our interest to continue the war and the suffering of soldiers and civilians, who were exposed to constant shelling and sniper fire from the part of Sarajevo under Muslim control. Unlike us, the Muslims would regularly breach every ceasefire, and used that time to prepare for the continuation of the war as best as they could.
22. Right next to the Slaviša Vajner Čiča Barracks in Lukavica there were Muslim families living in their houses in the same conditions as Serb families. Bearing in mind that the Muslims were not obliged to serve in the VRS one can say that they were in a better position in this regard than the Serbs; however, there were Muslims who voluntarily served in the VRS, such as Mr Dedić, who was a volunteer in the VRS until the end of 1993, and Aladin Murić. In 1993 Mr Dedić left the VRS and Repulika Srpska at personal request and moved abroad, while Aladin Murić stayed in the VRS throughout the war.
23. I personally proposed and took the measures within my jurisdiction in order to punish the members of my Brigade responsible for identified irregularities. I remember requesting the dismissal of a military police (VP) platoon commander who overstepped the authorities of the VP organ. Specifically, he used physical force against a prisoner of
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war of Muslim ethnicity in a case where conditions for the use of physical force had not been meet, thereby violating the rules of service in the VP.
24. In our interviews with defectors we mostly focused on collecting information about the layout of ABiH units and the military equipment in the possession of those armed forces. We received this information from individuals who fled from the part of Sarajevo controlled by the ABiH and who had been mobilised into the units of the 1st ABiH Corps or the MUP /Ministry of Inerior/ of Sarajevo. Strong forces of the MUP were deployed in several locations. Some of the locations where the MUP forces were deployed are described in the statements given by defectors, as can be seen from documents 65ter 1D03020 and 1D03033.
25. Most of the defectors would cross to the Serb territory from the Muslim part of Sarajevo under the cover of darkness, usually across the Miljacka River, and reach our positions in this way. The soldiers and officers were obliged to inform the Security Organ (OB) about the location at which a defector crossed over, and to detain or transfer the person to the OB.
26. Once the OB took over the person, it would first be ensured that the person got some rest, food and drinks, whereupon the person would be interviewed about the following: personal status of the defector, reasons for defection, his/her knowledge about the layout of the Muslim forces and their activities, living conditions in Sarajevo, crimes against the Serb people, etc. Based on the statement taken from the person an official note would be prepared and reported to the unit command, along with the measures proposed for the protection of the unit, the population and the territory.
27. It is in this manner that we obtained most of the intelligence about the positions of the Muslim army and police in Sarajevo and about their plans, the layout of their combat equipment, the production of weapons and military equipment, the crimes against the Serbs, the relations within the Muslim community and about other matters of relevance to the security.
28. Besides the individual or group departures that were organised independently and involved a lot of risk, there existed a thriving activity of taking out the citizens, predominantly ethnic Serbs, for a fee. Some people on both sides got rich in this manner. We were often unable to contact the people who left Sarajevo in this way because they
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would quickly leave the territory of Sarajevo and depart from Republika Srpska, i.e. from BiH. The fact that the citizens of Sarajevo could not leave the city freely, and that they had to do it in a manner that would put their lives in danger or require hefty sums of money, shows that Sarajevo was blocked from the inside, by the Muslim government. All of the above can be seen from documents 65ter 1D03059 and 1D03080. These documents reveal that the escapees paid between 800 and 1500 Deutsche Marks so that they could leave Sarajevo.
29. Keeping the inhabitants of the city of Sarajevo under blockade was not done only for trading with the freedom of the citizens. A good moneymaking opportunity presented itself in the form of smuggling and reselling commodities that were in short supply (65ter 1D03031). A small circle of people in Sarajevo held the sale of all types of scarce goods that were in high demand: coffee, cigarettes, petroleum and alcohol. The black market was flourishing, which was another reason for preventing the citizens from leaving Sarajevo. If the people who controlled the black market in the city and the movement of citizens allowed the majority to leave the city, they would lose their customers and the money.
30. I remember a group of defectors comprising 4-5 individuals of the Muslim ethnicity. After they were processed, we accommodated them in a building on the perimeter of the Barracks. Their personal documents were deposited in my office. They spent about 30 days there. About 15 days after their arrival, two of the Muslims came to my office and one of them asked for his address book in which he allegedly had 100 Deutsche Marks. I asked him why he did not report it immediately so that everything could be registered. He just shrugged his shoulders. I found his notebook, and, luckily for me, the 100 Deutsche Marks. I do not know who was more surprised. During their stay at the Barracks they were not under any special regimen; they ate together with us, and after about 30 days they said that they wanted to go back to Sarajevo, which we enabled them to do.
31. Because I arrived in Sarajevo on 16 May 1992 I had no direct knowledge about the Muslims and Croats illegally arming themselves and organising paramilitaries and parapolice in Sarajevo. I got the first information about their units through the means of communications, as soon as I arrived in Sarajevo. At that time we all extensively used the hand-held radio stations that could be easily intercepted, and it was then that I first heard
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of Talijan, Juka, Caco, Dedo, Ćelo and other criminals of Sarajevo who led the paramilitary units in the city. Later on, through my operative work I would obtain information about how the Muslims organised their paramilitaries in Sarajevo (65ter 1D03078).
32. We obtained the information from the defectors about the Muslim army engaging in constant provocations by opening fire from the available weapons in order to keep the tensions in the city at a high level, primarily with the view to portraying to the world public that the situation in the city was most difficult, so that the Muslim soldiers from the city would avoid being sent to the Nišići plateau, Igman, Treskavica - the parts of the front in the so-called outer ring, as can be seen from the document (65ter 1D03077).
33. How "difficult" the situation was in Sarajevo, who was launching the attacks and who was defending is also seen from the example that whole parts of the units from the positions in the city under the Muslim control were sent to the outer ring. Older generations would stay on the positions and the younger ones would be sent to other fronts in BiH (documents 65ter 1D03059 and 65ter 1D03080). Had it really wanted to capture and destroy Sarajevo, the Serb side would have taken advantage of the fact that the lines in the city were completely weakened and it would have engaged in offensive actions of large or small proportions. This is another piece of evidence that the Serbs were only defending themselves in the Sarajevo theatre of war.
34. The units of the SRK /Sarajevo-Romanija Corps/ were confronted by the units of the 1st ABiH Corps, and I possessed information about the zone of responsibility of the units of the 1st ABiH Corps facing the SRK forces in and around Sarajevo - 65ter 1D04398, map of the city of Sarajevo. The 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade was directly confronted by a number of brigades of the 1st ABiH Corps:
The 15th Mountain Brigade (referred to in some documents as 15. mtbr), the former 10the Mountain Brigade. The zone of responsibility of the Brigade: to the left: junction with the 2nd Mountain Birgade - Lapišnica - Kozja Ćuprija - Čolina Kapa - Brakovac - Boguševac - Zlatište - Vrbanja - Jewish Cemetery - Borak; to the right: junction with the 101st mtbr.
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The 101st mtbr /Motorised Brigade/, zone of responsiblity: to the right: junction with the 15th Mountain Brigade - Museum - Bristol - Electric Power Enterprise - Strojrad - Loris - Šanac - Hrasno.
The 5th mtbr, its zone of responsibility being: to the left: junction with the 101st mtbr - Vojničko Polje - Mojmilo - Student dormitories at Dobrinja. In the area of Mojmilo, my brigade was in direct contact with the 5th mtbr of the ABiH.
The "King Tvrtko" Croat Brigade - this brigade was assigned a zone of responsibility several times during the war, and due to mistrust on the part of the Muslim military and political leadership it had a role of undefined reserve on several occasions. For a part of the war, its zone of responsibility stretched from the Museum to the Bristol Hotel.
35. Based on the grouping of the enemy, it can be seen that three to four brigades of the 1st ABiH Corps were engaged against the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade of the SRK. Such a distribution of power was decisive for the manner and extent of activities. According to the JNA military doctrine, which was also taken over by the ABiH, the troops of the attacking force must outnumber the enemy 3:1 or more in order to carry out their task most successfully, to overpower the enemy and conquer the attacked area. Based on the foregoing, one can easily conclude who carried out offensive activities and who engaged in defensive activities. It was the ABiH that carried out offensive activities.
36. Besides the forces of the 1st ABiH Corps that were directly confronting my Brigade, we had information that the following units of the 1st ABiH Corps existed in the city of Sarajevo: the 2nd Mountain Brigade, the Koševo Independent Battalion, which was later renamed into the 105th Koševo Moutain Brigade, the 1st mtbr /Motorised Brigade/, the 2nd mtbr, the 2nd Vitez Brigade, the 4th mtbr from Hrasnica, etc. In addition to the above units, I also recall that various pieces of combat equipment intended for air defence, artillery support, logistics, etc., were positioned in the parts of the city inhabited by civilians and containing public institutions such as health centres, schools and other public institutions (65ter 1D04398, map of Sarajevo).
37. Members of the 1st ABiH Corps misused housing facilities and public buildings in which civilians lived and worked. The Muslim forces misused the facilities by placing their troops and equipment in them. For instance, a large number of primary and
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secondary schools were used for military purposes. I will provide a few examples: the Dental Technology High School, the Fifth Gymnasium and the Faculty of Civil Engineering, the Bjelave student dormitory, the Miljenko Cvitković Elementary School and the kindergarten in Skerlićeva Street, the Ivan Goran Kovačić School end the Faculty of Civil Engineering (65ter 1D04398, map of Sarajevo).
38. For instance, the building of the School of Mechanical Engineering was used for the production of items intended for military purposes, document 65ter 1D03036, and it also served as a sniper nest (65ter 1D03057). The building of the Faculty of Traffic Engineering served as a storage of materiel and technical equipment, and as a sniper nest (65ter 1D03038). The special unit of the ABiH, the so-called Laste /Swallows/, which numbered between 200 and 300 soldiers, was accommodated in the building of the Faculty of Civil Engineering and their headquarters was near the Jewish Community building in the municipality of Stari Grad (65ter 1D03060). The Command of the 2nd Independent Battalion was situated in the building of the Faculty of Dental Medicine, while the 2nd Company of the said Battalion was stationed at the so-called Bazar only 100 metres away from the Koševo Hospital. The 3rd company of this Battalion was stationed in the kindergarten building (65ter 1D03034).
39. The Muslim forces in Sarajevo did not hesitate to use the hospitals and other health care institutions in the city under Muslim control as military facilities, or to place artillery equipment near them in order to conceal their activities.
40. A particularly extreme case of misuse of facilities - schools, and children, for military purposes is the case of the Petar Dokić Elementary School, a part of which was used as army accommodation while classes were held for children in the other part (65ter 1D03075).
41. Since the very beginning of the conflict, the Muslim forces started using snipers in their warfare - single snipers, sniper pairs, and sniper groups (65ter 1D04399). They usually opened fire from housing areas, from upper floors or rooftops of apartment buildings. They fortified their snipers deep inside the room so as not to be discovered quickly. From those positions they could easily observe and pick targets to fire at. Among the snipers were a number of professional sport shooters who achieved significant results at local and international competitions.
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42. In an attempt to reduce the effects of Muslim sniper fire, the Serb people and the army in the entire area of Grbavica, Vraca, parts of Dobrinja and other settlements through which passed the separation line employed various disguise measures that hindered the observation and shooting activities of the enemy snipers. Those were different kinds of improvised curtains, made of tarpaulin, shelter-halves, cardboard, blankets, opaque nylon, etc.
43. Despite these protection measures, the Muslim snipers were lethal to both the civilian population and the troops in the zone of responsibility of the 1st smbr /Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade/. I think that the exact number of individuals killed and wounded by snipers has never been established. The document that has been shown to me, 65ter 1D03015 - Seriously or gravely injured civilians hospitalised at the Kasindo Hospital 1992-1995, clearly shows a large number of civilians killed by the enemy fire, both from infantry and artillery weapons, in the zone of the 1st smbr, and especially at Grbavica.
44. Sometimes the Muslims shelled their own hospitals in order to trigger an intervention of the international community (65ter 1D03076). Unfortunately, the Muslims succeeded in deceiving the international community and the international forces intervened against the military and civilian targets across Republika Srpska.
45. Production of ammunition, mortar bombs and other ordnance was organised in the part of Sarajevo under the Muslim control, and they produced or adapted to their combat needs various types of combat equipment. The production of 60, 82 and 120 millimetre mortar bombs was particularly well developed. (65ter 1D03035 and 65ter 1D03037).
46. The Muslim forces opened mortar fire from Dobrinja on the zone of responsibility of the 1st Smbr, from Mojmilo they opened mortar and artillery fire, and from Zlatište they also opened mortar and artillery fire. From the statements given by defectors we obtained information about military targets at the following points or in their immediate vicinity, and we checked and analysed much of the data obtained in this manner in order to establish their veracity: TV Building, Military Hospital, Velešići, City Hall, Alipašino Polje, Dobrinja 3B, Dobrinja C5, Ivana Krndelja Street, Briješko Brdo - Bulbulistan, Dobrinja, Nikole Demonje Street and AVNOJ /Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia/ Boulevard, the stretch from the Electric Power Distribution Enterprise to the Marin Dvor edifice (the Sniper Alley), Čengić Vila, Miljenka Cvitkovića
12 IT-09-92-T 81096
Street (Ferde Hauptmana), Hrasnica, School, Alekse Šantića Street, the Žica Factory, Vahide Maglajlić Street, Moševićko Brdo hill (Jasen and Polom), the Dobrinja-Butmir tunnel, the Koševo Hospital, the Dobrinja Hospital, 65ter 1D04398, map of Sarajevo.
47. At Square of the ZAVNOBIH /State Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Bosnia-Herzegovina/ - Alipašino Polje, there was the base of the unit led by Kruško. The base was located at the Balkan restaurant (65ter 1D03079).
48. The Kulin Ban unit was located at Rade Končara Square, in the building which once housed the pastry shop. Across the building at Klare Cetkin Street No. 16 there was a military police unit, and mortars were located on the left side of the Tranzit lane, which was used by trolleybuses (65ter 1D03061).
49. Moreover, certain units were deployed in the settlement called Otoka. The kindergarten in the settlement of Otoka was the place where people were brought in for interrogation and it served as the headquarters of the military police of ABiH. Two 120 mm mortars stood next to the playground, the garage and the staircase that leads to the Aneks settlement, while the HEPOK building housed a T-34 tank, as can be seen from the document (65ter 1D03060).
50. In June 1992, the Muslim forces launched an offensive from the city against all the VRS positions, i.e. against the parts of the city controlled by the Serbs. In this offensive, the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade /smbr/ lost its positions at Mojmilo hill and it did not regain them until the end of the war. In August and September, the Muslim forces mounted a powerful offensive on the area stretching from Moutain Zvijezda to the Sarajevo - Olovo regional road. The 1st smbr defended the line in the area of Moševačko Brdo hill with a force the size of a company.
51. Also, in another part of the front, in the area of Trnovo, the Brigade lost a part of the territory around the Hydroelectric Power Plant. From April to October 1995, the forces of the 1st ABiH Corps carried out a practically incessant offensive in both the outer and the inner circles. In this Muslim offensive the Serb forces lost certain parts of the territory on several occasions, but with extreme efforts they eventually managed to win them back and push the Muslim army back to their initial positions.
13 IT-09-92-T 81095
WITNESS CONFIRMATION
I have read this statement comprising fourteen (14) pages, and it contains all that I said to the best of my knowledge and recollection. I have given this statement voluntarily, and I am aware that it can be used in the proceedings before the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, and that I may be called to testify publicly before the Tribunal.
Signature:______/signature/______
Date: ______27 July 2014______
14 IT-09-92-T 81094
MEDUNARODNI SUD ZA KRIVICNO GONJENJE OSOBA ODGOVORNIH ZA TE~UKRSENJA MEDUNARODNOG PMVA NA TERITORIJI BWSE JUGOSLAVIJE OD 1991
IZJAVA SVEDOKA
PODACI 0 SVEDOKU:
Prezime: SARENAC
Ime: Desimir
Ime oca: Novica
Datum rodenja: 05.05.1948.
Nacionalnost: Srbin
Datum(i) razgovora: 05.07.2014.
Razgovor(e) vodili: SaSa LukiC
Jezici koriSCeni u toku razgovora: Srpski Potpis svedoka: eAce- e IT-09-92-T 81093
IZJAVA SVEDOKA
1. Zovem se Desimir SARENAC. Roden sam 05.05.1948. godine u Starom Brodu, opStina Rogatica, Bosna i Hercegovina. Osnovnu Skolu sarn zavrSio u Borikama, a peSadijsku podoficirsku Skolu 1968. godine u Sarajevu.
2. U profesionalnu. vojnu sluzbu Jugoslovenske narodne armije (JNA) stupio sam 18.07.1968. godine. Prvo mesto sluibovanja mi je bilo u garnizonu koji se nalazio u mestu koje se zove Delnice u Republici Hrvatskoj i tu Sam bio na duhosti komandira voda. Na mestu komandira voda u Delnicama sam proveo sve do 1972. godine nak8n Eega prelazim u garnizon koji se nalazio Zagrebu i to na duZnost komandira voda vojne policije. 1973. godine poEinjem da radim u organima bezbednosti (OB) JNA i to najpre u Zagrebu gde ostajem sve do 1977. godine, a potom prelazim u BihaC gde ostajem do 1982. godine.
3. 1982. godine prelazim u GospiC gde ostajem sve do 1990. godine. 1990. godine Sam prekomandovan u garnizon u Beograd gde ostajem do polovine maja 1992. godine. 16. maja 1992. godine odlazim u Sarajevo i javljam se na duznost u 49. mehanizovanu brigadu (mbr), 4. korpusa JNA koji se nalazio Sarajevu. Kada sam stigao u Sarajevo. rat je veC poEeo.
4. Kada sam se 16.05.1992. godine javio na duhost u kasarnu ,,SlaviSa Vajner CiEa" koja se nalazila u Lukavici zatekao sam potpuno haotiEno stanje. Pripadnici JNA koji su rodeni van BiH su se radovali skorom odlasku u Jugoslaviju, dok je veCina pripadnika JNA koji su rodeni na prostoru BiH donela odluku da ostanu u BiH.
5. Nakon Sto je veCina pripadnika muslimanskog i hrvatskog naroda dezertirala iz JNA, jedinice JNA su desetkovane. Preostali stareginski i vojniEki kadar nije bio dovoljan da odgovori predstojebim zadacima, s toga je morao biti mobilisan rezervni stareginski kadar. IT-09-92-T 81092
6. U vojsci JNA je vladalo totalno rasulo. Kasarna je postala centar za prihvat izbeglica iz mnogih delova BiH, Zenice, Travnika, Visokog kao i za veliki broj izbeglica iz Sarajeva. DeSavalo se i da Muslimani iz Dobrinje dolaze u vojniEku kantinu u Lukavicu. Apsolutno se nije malo ko je gde i ko Sta radi. Sa malobrojnim pripadnicima vojne policije poko Sam da uvodim osnovne mere za uspostavljanje vojnog reda i pokuSavao da uspostavim kontrolu kretanja lica u zoni kasarne, jer je to bio vojni objekat i bojao sam se da bi moglo doCi do zloupotreba vojniEke opreme, sredstava itd. i to je trebalo spreEiti.
7. Oko 20. maja 1992. godine 4. korpus JNA je preimenovan u Sarajevsko-romanijski korpus Vojske Republike Srpske (SRK VRS), a 49. mbr JNA u 1. sarajevsku mehanizovanu brigade (smbr) VRS. U 1. smbr obavljao sam duinost nazelnika bezbednosti sve do maja 1995. godine kada sam postavljen na dhost komandanta bataljona u okviru 1. smbr i tu duZnost sam obavljao do oktobra 1995. godine. Od okotbra 1995. godine, pa do kraja rata bio sam na duhost naCelnika bezbednosti u 1.smbr.
8. U sastav 1.smbr su ulazili uglavnom lokalni stanovnici, ali je bila popunjavana i delom od izbeglog stanovniStva koje je izbeglo na podruEje zone odgovornosti 1 .smbr i to je ono Sto je Einilo i predstavljalo vojsku. VRS, a samim tim i SRK je bila deficitarna kada je u pitanju profesionalni oficirski kadar. Kako bih Sto bolje ilustrovao taj problem objasniCu ga na svom primeru. U OB, na Eijem Eelu sam se ja nalazio, bio sam jedini profesionalni oficir, a u Eeti vojne policije sarno je komandir Eete bio profesionalac.
9. Osnovni zadatak organa bezbednosti 1 .smbr bila je kontraobaveStajna zaStita brigade, Sto je podrazurnevalo praCenje, spreEavanje ili onemoguCavanje obaveStajnog rada neprijatelja. Kako je od sarnog poEetka ratnih sukoba bio veliki broj prelazaka ili prebega sa muslimanske teritorije na teritoriju pod srpskom kontrolom, to je postojala potreba da se sa svima njima obave informativni razgovori kako bi imali podatke o IT-09-92-T 81091
licima koja su preSla na naSu stranu, a istovremeno i prikupili bezbednosno interesantne podatke o orubim snagama ABiH.
10. Zona odgovornosti 1.smbr na pdetku sukoba iSla je od Vraca, preko Mojmila, delova Dobrinje preko Kasindola do klanaca iznad sela Kijevo. Dakle, linija razdvajanja je prolazila iskljuEivo obodima naselja u kojima su Srbi bili veCina. U toku rata zona odgovornosti brigade s.e vise puta menjala zbog organizacijskih promena u SRK, ali su linije razdvajanja ostale uglavnom na pozicijama koje su bile uspostavljene na poEetku sukoba, poEetkom aprila 1992. godine i koje je uspostavilo lokalno stanovniStvo sa jedne i druge strane i to postavljanjem barikada.
r 11. Osnovni zadatak snaga SRK-a je bio zdtita srpskog iivlja i njihovih ognjiSta kako se ne bi ponovio pokolj iz perioda I1 svetskog rata koji su nad srpskim narodom poEinili Hrvati i Muslimani. Pre nego Sto su utvrdene linije razgraniEenja, muslimansko, hrvatsko i srpsko stanovniStvo je svoje domove, porodice i imanja Stitilo barikadama, a zatim i organizovanim strhma ispred zgrada, kuCa i u svojim ulicama.
12. Tokom rata su, uglavnom Muslimani, preduzimali ofanzivne akcije zbog kojih je dolazilo do pomeranja linija na Stetu VRS. Tako su pripadnici muslimanskih orubnih snaga zauzeli Mojmilo, 2uE i neke druge objekte koji su na sarnom poEetku bili pod srpskom kontrolom. SRK je izvodio uglavnom odbrambena dejstva, a preduzeo je samo jednu ofanzivnu operaciju i to na spoljnom obodu Sarajeva kako bi uspostavio Evrstu i sigurnu vezu izmedu snaga SRK-a i HercegovaEkog korpusa (HK) in a taj naEin zaustavili lakSe pregrupisavanje jedinica ABiH. To je operacija ,,LUKAVAC 93".
13. Po mom najboljem seCanju snage SRK-a su se nalazile u takozvanom (tzv.) duplom okruienju muslimanskih i hrvatskih snaga. Na tzv. vanjskom prstenu jedinice SRK su, sa jedne strane, bile okruZene snagama 4,3, i 2. korpusa ABiH. Takode, jedinice SRK su bile okruiene snagama 1. korpusa ABiH i sa unutraSnje i sa spoljdnje strane tzv. prstena. Podatke o poloZaju i rasporedu jedinica ABiH smo dobijali i od lica koja su IT-09-92-T 81090
beiala iz dela Sarajeva pod kontrolom tzv. ABiH, na naSu teritoriju. Broj pripadnika 1. korpusa ABiH u Sarajevu, kao Sto se moZe videti i iz dokumenta 65ter 1D03019, je dozvoljavao Eak i mogudnost da se snage tog korpusa poSalju u ispomod ostalim snagama ABiH van Sarajeva. U ovom sluEaju poslate su jedinice veliEine Eetiri brigade na poloiaje Igman, Olovo, Zenica i Doboj.
14. Iz dokumenta 65ter ID03039 se vidi da se pripadnici 1. motorizovane brdske brigade ABiH takode razmeStaju na polohje van grada Srajeva. Iz dokumenta 65ter 1D03058 se moie videti, kao i iz predhodnih doumenata, da su se jedinice ABiH vrlo lako razmeStale pregrupisavale iz grada Sarajeva ka ostalim delovima BiH pod kontrolom ABiH.
15. Sve prethodno pomenuto mi je poznato iz velikog broja izjava koje smo moje kolege i ja uzimali od strane prebega i bivSih pripadnika ABiH, a koji su iz muslimanskog dela Sarajeva beiali na teritoriju pod kontrolom VRS. ielim da istaknem i to da je svaki pripadnik organa bezbednosti mogao da uzima izjavu. Moji saradnici su me uvek upoznavali sa saddinom zabeleSke koji bi sdinili podnosedi mi izvegtaje o svom radu i o obavljenim razgovorima sa prebezima. 0 prikupljenim podacirna na terenu smo obaveStavali komandu korpusa.
16. Od smog poEetka ratnih sukoba komanda SRK je izdavala naredbe vezane za zabranu upotrebe artiljerije po gradu, odnosno za dejstvo po civilnim objektima. Takode, poznato mi je da je vedina naredenja od strane komande korpusa izriEito naredivala svim jedinicama da izvode odbrambena dejstva. Znam da su naredenja istih ili sliEnih sadr2aja dolazila i iz GS VRS.
17. Civilno stanovniStvo koje je Zivelo na teritoriji pod kontrolom VRS je bilo u neprekidnom strahu jer je bilo izloZeno dejstvu neprijateljskog peSadijskog oruZja i artiljerijskog oruda gotovo u Eitavoj zoni moje brigade, Sto je za posledicu imalo ogroman broj poginulih civila u toku rata. U junu 1992. godine meStani Lukavice i okolnih naselja su bili toliko uplaSeni dejstvom neprijatelja sa Mojmila i okolnih IT-09-92-T 81089
poloZaja da su se spremali za kolektivno iseljenje. Samo zahvaljujuCi Einjenici da je komanda SRK-a bila rasporedena u Lukavici je spreEila ljude da se kolektivno isele, jer je ulivala poverenje i vraCala samopouzdanje ljudima.
18. Nikada nisam Euo ni video da je neko od pripadnika moje jedinice sprovodio terror nad civilima bez obzira na veru i bez obzira na mesto gde su ti ljudi Ziveli, da li u delu Sarajeva koji je bio pod kontrolom ABiH ili u delu Sarajeva pod kontrolom VRS. Takode, ja nikada nisarn video ili Euo naredbu pretpostavljene komande da se izvrSi takvo neSto. Koliko je meni poznato naSe jedinice su odgovarale na vatru iz grada samo kada su bile napadnute, a radi sopstvene zaStite odnosno neutralisanja opasnosti po jedinicu i stanovniStvo. a
19. NaSim jedinicama su dostavljani kopirani izvodi iz medunarodnih konvencija u kojima je pisalo o pravilima pondanja prema neprijatelju, zarobljenicima i civilnom stanovniStvu i uopSte o odredbama medunarodnog humanitarnog prava. Takvi izvodi su deljeni pripadnicima brigade.
20. Muslimanske snage su zloupotrebljavale civilne objekte u gradu Sarajevu. Civilni objekti su bili zloupotrebljeni i od strane muslimanskih snajperista kako bi terorisali civilno stanovnigtvo. Onog momenta kada snajpersita kao mesto sa kojeg dejstvuje koristi objekat u kojem Zive ili rade civili on postaje legitiman vojni cilj i takavu metu je neophodno eliminisati kako bi zdtitili i civile i vojsku. Takav cilj se neutraliSe svim raspoloiivim sredstvima.
21. Srpska strana je poStovala sva potpisana primirja jer nama nije bilo u interesu da se nastavi rat i stradanje vojnika i civila koji su bili izloZeni stalnom granatiranju i snajperskoj vatri iz dela Sarajeva pod muslimanskom kontorlom. Za razliku od nas Muslimani su redovno krSili svako primirje i vreme koristili kako bi se Sto bolje pripremili za nastavak rata. IT-09-92-T 81088
22. Uz sarnu kasarnu ,,SlaviSa Vajner Ci~a"u Lukavici u svojim kuha su Bivele muslimanske porodice u istim uslovima kao i Sto su iivele i srpske porodice. S obzirom da Muslimani nisu bili u obavezi da sluie u VRS moie se reCi da su po tom pitanju bili'u povoljnijem poloBaju u odnosu na Srbe, ali bilo je i Muslimana koji su dobrovoljno sluZili u VRS kao Sto je gospodin DediC koji je do kraja 1993. godine bio dobrovoljac u VRS ili MuriC Aladin. Gospodin DediC je na sopstveni zahtev 1993. godine napustio VRS i Republiku Srpsku i otiSao negde u inostransvo dok je MuriC Aladin do kraja rata bio u VRS.
23. LiEno sam predlagao i preduzimao mere iz svoje nadleinosti za sankcionisanje uoEenih nepravilnosti od strane pripadnika moje brigade. SeCam se da sam jednom prilikom trdio smenu komandira voda vojne policije (VP) jer je prekoraEio ovlaSCenja organa VP. Naime prirnenio je fiziEku silu prema ratnom vojnom zarobljeniku muslimanske nacionalnosti, a nisu bili ispunjeni uslovi za primenu ftziEke sile Eime je prekrSio pravilo sluZbe VP.
24. Prilikom obavljanja informativnih razgovora sa prebezirna najviSe smo prikupljali podatake o rasporedu jedinica oruianih snaga ABiH kao i podatke o sredstavima ratne tehnike kojima su raspolagale te snage. Te informacije smo dobijali od lica koja sa beZala iz dela Sarajeva pod kontrolom ABiH, a koja su bila mobilisana u jedinice 1.korpusa ABiH ili MUP-a Sarajevo. Jake snage MUP su bile smeStene na vise lokacija. Neke od lokacija gde su bile rasporedene snage MUP su opisane u izjavama prebega Sto se moZe videti i iz dokumenata 65ter ID03020 i 1D03033.
25. VeCina prebega je, iz muslimanskog dela Sarajeva na srpsku teritoriju, prelazila pod okriljem noCi, uglavnom preko reke Miljacke i tako dolazila do naSih poloiaja. Obaveza vojnika i staresina je bila da obaveste OB o taEki prelaska prebega, kao i da zadr2i lice koje je prebeglo ili da to lice sprovede do (OB).
26. Kada OB preuzeme lice, licu su se prvo obezbedivali uslovi za odmor, hrana i pike, nakon Eega se pristupalo obavljanju informativnog razgovora po slededim pitanjima: IT-09-92-T 81087
liCni status prebega, razlozi za prelazak, saznanja o rasporedu muslimanskih snaga i njihovim aktivnostima, uslovi iivota u Sarajevu, zloEini protiv srpskog naroda i sl. Na osnovu uzete izjave saCinjavala se slu2bena zabeleska i izvegtavala komanda jedinice kojoj su se ujedno predlagale mere zaStite jedinice, stanovniStva i teritorije.
27. Na ovakav naCin smo doSli do veCine podataka o rasporedu muslimanske vojske i policije u Sarajevu kao i njihovim planovima, rasporedu borbenih sredstava, proizvodnji naoruhnja i vojne opreme, zloEinima nad Srbima, medu-muslimanskim odnosima i drugim bezbednosno interesantnim stvarima.
28. Pored pojedinaCnih ili grupnih izlazaka u sopstvenoj retiji i uz veliki rizik postojala~e i razvijena aktivnost izvodenja gradana, preteino srpske nacionalnosti, za novCanu naknadu. Na taj naCin deo ljudi sa obe strane se obogatio. Sa licima koja su na ovaj naEin izaSla iz Sarajeva Cesto nismo bili u moguCnosti ni da kontaktiramo jer su oni vrlo brzo napustali teritoriju Sarajeva i odlazili van Republike Srpske, odnosno BiH. Sama Einjenica da stanovnici Sarajeva nisu mogli napustiti grad po sopstvenoj ielji veC su to radili na naCin kojim su sebe izlagali tivotnoj opasnosti ili su izlazak plaCali pozamaSnom sumom novca govori o tome da je Sarajevo bilo blokirano iznutra od strane muslimanske vlasti. Sve prethodno navedeno se vidi i iz dokurnenata 65ter ID03059 i 1D03080. Iz prethodno pomenutih dokumenta se vidi da su prebezi plaCali od 800-1500 nemaCkih maraka kako bi mogli da izadu iz Sarajeva.
29. Dr2an.e stanovnika grada Sarajeva u blokadi se nije vrSilo sarno trgujuCi slobodom kretanja gradana tog grada. Dobra prilika za zaradu je je bio i Sverc kao i preprodaja deficitarne robe (65ter lD03031). Mala grupa ljudi u Sarajevu je pod svojom kontrolom dr2ala prodaju svih vrsta deficitarne, a tra2ene robe, kafe, cigareta, nafte i alkohola. Crna berza je cvetala i to je bio joS jedan razlog i motiv viSe za spreCavanje izlaska stanovniStva iz Sarajeva. Ukoliko bi ljudi koji su kontrolisali crnu berzu u gradu i koji su kontrolisali kretanje stanovni5tva dozvolili veCini da napusti grad istovremeno bi ostali bez kupaca, a sarnim tim i bez novca. IT-09-92-T 81086
30. SeCam se jedne grupe prebega u kojoj je bilo 4-5 ljudi i bili su Muslirnani. Posle izvrSene obrade smestili smo ih u jedan objekat u krugu kasame. Njihova liCna dokumenta bila su deponovana u mojoj kancelariji. Tu su boravili oko 30 dana. Posle nekih 15 dana u moju kancelariju su uSla dva Muslimana, a jedan od njih je traiio svoj notes jer je navodno u njemu imao 100 nemaEkih maraka. Pitao Sam ga zagto to odmah nije prijavio kako bi sve bilo evidentirano. Samo je slegao ramenima. PronaSao sam njegov notes i na moju sreCu i tih 100 maraka. Ne znam Eije je iznenadenje bilo veCe. Za vreme boravka u kasarni nisu bili ni pod kakvim posebnim regimom, hranili su se zajedno sa nama, a posle 30-ak dana izrazili su Zelju da se vrate u Sarajevo Sto smo im i omoguCili.
31. Kako Sam u Sarajevo doSao 16.05.1992. godine, nisam imao direktnih saznanjaPo ilegalnom naoruiavanju i paravojnom i parapolicijskom organizovanju Muslimana i Hrvata u Sarajevu. Prve informacije o njihovim jedinicama saznao Sam preko sredstava veze odmah po dolasku u Sarajevo. Svi smo u to vreme masovno koristili ruEne radio stanice koje su se lako mogle sluSati i tada Sam prvi put Cuo za Talijana, Juku, Cacu, Dedu, ~elui druge sarajevske lcriminalce koji su u Sarajevu vodili paravojne jedinice. Kasnije Sam kroz operativni rad dolazio do informacija i o paravojnom organizovanju Muslimana u Sarajevu (65ter 1D03078).
32. Od prebega smo dolazili do informacija da muslimanska vojska vrSi neprekidne provokacije konstantnim dejstvovanjem iz raspoloiivog naoru2anja u cilju odriavanja visoke tenzije u gradu, a osnovni razlog za to je bio da situaciju u gradu prika2u Sto teZom za svetsku javnost, te kako bi muslimanski vojnici iz grada izbegli upuCivanje na NiSiCku Visoravan, Igman, Treskavicu, odnosno delove fionta na takozvanom spoljnom prstenu, Sto se mo2e videti i iz dokumenta (65ter 1D03077).
33. Koliko je situacija u Sarajevu bila ,,teSkaU i ko je izvodio napade a ko se branio pokazuje i primer da su sa poloiaja iz grada pod muslimanskom kontrolom upuCivani Eitavi delovi jedinica na spoljni prsten. Na poloiajima su ostajala starija godigta, dok su mladi upuCivani na druga ratiSta u BiH, (dokumenti 65ter ID03059 i 65ter 1D03080). Da je zaista htela da osvaja i razori Sarajevo, srpska strana bi iskoristila IT-09-92-T 81085
Einjenicu da su linije u gradu potpuno oslabljene i preduzimala bi veCe ili manje ofanzivne akcije. To je jog jedan dokaz da su se Srbi na sarajevskom ratiStu samo branili.
34. Jedinicama SRK su bile suprotstavljene jedinice 1. korpusa ABB i irnao sam saznanja i podatke o zoni odgovornosti jedinica 1. korpusa ABiH koje su bile suprotstavljen jedinicama SRK-u u Sarajevu i oko Sarajeva 65ter ID04398 mapa grada Sarajeva 1.Sarajevskoj motorizovanoj brigadi bilo je direktno suprotstavljeno vise brigada 1.korpusa ABiH:
15. brdska brigada, (u nekim dokumentima 15. mtbr), bivSa 10. brdska brigada. Zona odgovornosti brigade: levo, spoj sa 2.brdskom brigadom-LapiSnica-Koaa ~uprija-~olina-~apa-~rajkovac-~ogu~evac-~latiSte-~rbanja-~evrejsko-~robljeBorak desno spoj sa 10 1.mtbr. 101. mtbr, zona odgovornosti: desno, spoj sa 15.brdskom brigadom-Muzej-Bristol- ~lektro~rivreda-~trojorad- ori is-Sanac-~rasno. 5.mtbrYZona odgovornosti brigade bila je: lev0 spoj sa 10l.mtbr-VojniEko Polje- Mojmilo-studentski domovi na Dobrinji. Moja brigada je, u rejonu Mojmila, bila u direktnom dodiru sa 5.mtbr ABiH. Hrvatska brigada ,,Kralj Tvrtko", brigadi je vise puta u toku rata odredivana zona odgovornosti i vise puta je zbog nepoverenja muslimanskog vojnog i politiEkog rukovodstva imala ulogu nedefinisane rezerve. U jednom delu rata zona odgovornosti joj je bila od Muzeja do Bristola.
35. Prema grupisanju snaga neprijatelja uoEljivo je da su naspram 1. smtbr SRK angdovane snage tri do Eetiri brigade 1. korpusa ABiH. Odnos snaga je opredeljivao i naEin i obim dejstva. Prema vojnoj doktrini JNA, koju je preuela i ABiH, snage napadaEa moraju ostvariti prednost u Bivoj sili u odnosu 3:l i vise kako bi Sto uspesnije izvela zadatak, savladala neprijatelja i ovladala prostorom koji je napadnut. Na osnovu prethodno iznetog, lako se moZe izvuCi zakljuEak ko je izvodio ofanzivna, a ko odbrambena dejstva. Ofanzivan dejstva je izvodila ABiH. IT-09-92-T 81084
36. Pored snaga 1. korpusa Al3iH koje su bile direktno suprotstavljene mojoj brigadi imali smo podatke da u gradu Sarajevu u okviru 1. korpusa ABiH egzistiraju i 2. brdska brigada, Samostalni bataljon ,,KoSevoU koji je kasnije preimenovan u 105. brdsku koSevsku brigadu, l.mtbr, 2.mtbr, "2.ViteSka", 4.mtbr iz Hrasnice itd. Pored navedenih jedinica seCam se da su u delovima grada gde su Siveli civili i gde su bile javne ustanove poput domova zdravlja, Skola i drugih javnih ustanova, bila rasporedena i razliEita borbena sredstva namenjena za PVO, artiljerijsku podrSku, logistiku i drugo (65ter ID04398 mapa Sarajeva).
37. Pripadnici 1. koprsa ABiH su zloupotrebljavali stambene objekte i zgrade javnih ustanova u kojima su Siveli i radili civili. Objekti su zloupotrebljavani tako Sto su muslimanske snage u te objekte rasporedivale svoje vojne snage i sredstava. Na primer, veliki broj osnovnih i srednjih Skola je koriSCen u vojne svrhe. IzneCu nekoliko primera o tome, ZubotehniEka Skola, Peta gimnazija i gradevinski fakultet, Studentski dom Bjelave, 0.S. ,,Miljenko CvitkoviC" i obdanigte u SkerliCevoj, Skola ,,Ivan Goran KovaEiC" i gradevinski fakultet, (65ter ID04398 mapa Sarajeva).
38. Na primer, zgrada MaSinsko-tehniEka Skola je koriSCenja za proizvodnju sredstava namenjenih vojsci, dokurnent 65ter 1D03036, a sluZila je i kao snajpersko gnezdo (65ter lD03057). Zgrada SaobraCajnog fakulteta posluBila je kao skladiSte materijalno-tehniEkih sredstava i snajpersko gnezdo (65ter 1D03038). Specijalna jedinca ABiH, tzv. "Laste" koja je brojala oko 200-300 vojnika, je bila smeStena u zgradi gradevinskog fakulteta, dok im je sediSte bilo kod Jevrejske opStine u Starom gradu (65ter lD03060). Komanda 2. sarnostalnog bataljona je bila smeStena u zgradi StomatoloSkog fakulteta, dok je 2. Eeta tog bataljona bila smeStena u tzv. "Bazar" koji je od bolnice KoSevo bio udaljen svega 100 metara. 3. Eesta istog bataljona je bila smeStena u zgradi obdaniSta (65ter lD03034).
39. Muslimanske snage u Sarajevu se nisu ustruEavale da bolnice i zdravstvene ustanove u gradu pod muslimanskom kontrolom koriste kao vojne objekte ili da dozvoljavaju da se u cilju maskiranja dejstva atriljerije ista postavlja u njihovoj blizini. IT-09-92-T 81083
40. Posebno ekstreman sluEaj zloupotrebe objekata-Skola i dece u vojne svrhe je zgrada osnovne Skole ,,Petar DokiC" koja je jednim delom koriSCena za smeStaj vojske, a u drugom delu zgrade se izvodila nastava sa uEenicima (65ter 1D03075).
41. Od sarnog poEetka sukoba muslimanske snage su poEele da koriste snajpere kao orsje i to pojedinaEno, kao i snajperske parove ili grupe snajperista (65ter lD04399). Uglavnom su dejstvovali iz stambenih zona sa viSih spratova ili krovova zgrada. Da ne bi bili brzo otkriveni snajpere su utvrdivali u dubini prostorije. Sa tih pozicija snajperisti su dobro osmatrali i po izboru cilja dejstvovali. Medu njima bio je i izvestan broj ljudi koji su se pre rata profesionalno bavili streljdtvom i postizali znaEajne rezultate na domaCim i medunarodnirn takmiEenjima ?
42. U pokuSaju da urnanji efekte dejstva muslimanskih snajperista srpski narod i vojska na celoj teritoriji Grbavice, Vraca, delova Dobrinje i ostalih naselja kroz koje je prolazila linija dodira su preduzimali mere maskiranja kojima su oteZavali osmatranje i dejstvo neprijateljkih snajperista. Bile su to razne vrste improvizovanih zastora u obliku rdirenih cerada, Satorskih krila, kartona, Cebadi, neprovidnog najlona i sliEno.
43. I pored preduetih mera zdtite muslimanski snajperi su bili kobni po civilno stanovniStvo i vojsku u zoni odgovornosti 1.Smbr. Mislim da nikada nije u potpunosti utvrden tazan broj poginulih i ranjenih dejstvom snajpera. Iz predoEenog dokumenta 65ter ID03018 - TeSko ili teie povredeni civili 1992.-1995. godine na leEenju u bolnici Kasindo, se jasno vidi veliki broj civila stradalih od dejstva neprijatelja, Sto iz peSadijskog naoruZanja, Sto iz artiljerijskog, u zoni l.smbr, a pogotovo na Grbavici.
44. DeSavalo se da su Muslimani granatirali sopstvene bolnice da bi izazvali intervenciju medunarodne zajednice (65ter lD03076). Na Zalost, Muslimani su uspeli da obmanu medunarodnu zajednicu i do310 je do intervencije medunarodnih snaga po vojnim i civilnim ciljevima Sirom Republike Srpske. IT-09-92-T 81082
45. Sve vreme rata, u delu Sarajeva pod muslimanskom kontrolom, organizovana je proizvodnja municije, mina za minobacate, drugih vrsta ubojnih sredstava, a istovremeno su proizvodili ili prilagodavali borbenim potrebama vise vrsta borbenih sredstava. Posebno dobro je bila razvijena proizvodnja mina za minobacaEe 60, 82 i 120mm (65ter ID03035 i 65ter 1D03037).
46. Muslimanske snage dejstvovale su po zoni odgovornosti 1.Smbr iz Dobrinje minobacacima, sa Mojmila minobacaEima i artiljerijom, sa ZlatiSta minobacacima i artiljerijom. Iz izjava prebega imali smo informacije o vojnim ciljevima na sledeCim taEkama ili u njihovoj neposrednoj blizini. Mnoge podatke dobijene na ovaj naCin viSestruko smo proveravali i analizirali da bismo utvrdili njihovu taCnost: Zgrada W, Vojna bolnica, Veles'iii, Gradska vijeinica, Alipas'ino Polje, Dobrinja 3B, ~obri8ja (2.5, Ulica Ivana Krndelja, BrijeSko brdo-Bulbulistan, Dobrinja, u1.Nikole Demonje i Bulevar AVNOJ-aPotez od Elektrodistribucije do Marin Dvora (Aleja snajpera), cengii Vila, ul. Miljenka Cvitkoviia (Ferde Hauptmana), Hrasnica, s'hla, 3 ul. Akke gantiia, Fabrika &a, UI. Vahide Maglajlii, Mobviiko brdo (Jasen i Polom), Tunel Dobrinja-ButmirJ3olnica Kos'evo, Dobrinja bolnica, 65ter ID04398 mapa Sarajeva.
47. Na Trgu ZAVNOBIH - AlipaSino Polje nalazila se baza jedinice koju je vodio "KmSko. Baza je bila smeStena u restoranu "Balkan" (65ter lD03079).
48. Jedinica "Kulin ban" je bila smestena u ulici Trg Rade KonCara i to u zgradi u kojoj se nekada nalazila poslastiliarnica. Preko puta zgrade u ulici Klare Cetkin broj 16 se nalazila jedinica vojne policije, a sa leve strane tranizta, tranzitom se kretao trolejbus, su se nalazili minobacaci (65ter lD03061).
49. Takode, odredene jedinice su bile rasporedene u naselju koje se zove Otoka U vrtiCu, koje se nalazio u naselju Otoka su privodeni ljudi na sasluSavanje i tu je bilo sediSte vojne policije ABiH. Pored igralista, garde i stepenica koje vode prema Aneksu su se nalazila dva minobacaca od 120mm, dok je u zgradi HEPOK-a bio tenk T-34 Sto se vidi i iz dokumenta (65ter 1D03060).
13 IT-09-92-T 81081
50. Juna meseca 1992.godine muslimanske snage izvrSile su snhu ofanzivu iz grada na sve poloZaje VRS, odnosno na delove grada pod srpskom kontrolom. U toj ofanzivi 1.smbr je izgubila poloZaje na brdu Mojmilo i do kraja rata ih nije povratila. U avgustu i septembru muslimanske snage su izvrSile sndnu ofanzivu na jedinice SRK-a u rejonu NiSiCke Visoravni i tom prilikom su zauzeli prostor od planine Zvijezde pa gotovo do magistralnog puta Sarajevo - Olovo. 1.smbr je snagama jedne Eete branila liniju u rejonu MoSevaZkog brda.
51. Takode, na drugom delu fionta u rejonu Trnova brigada je izgubila deo teritorije oko hidroelektrane. Od aprila pa do oktobra 1995. godine, snage 1. korpusa ABiH su t gotovo neprekidno izvodile ofanzivu na spoljnom i unutraSnjem prstenu. U toj muslimanskoj ofanzivi srpske snage su vise puta gubile odredene delove teritorije, ali su na kraju uspevale uz krajnje napore da ih ponovo stave pod svoju kontrolu i vrate muslimansku vojsku na poEetne polohje.
POTVRDA SVEDOKA
ProEitao sarn ovu izjavu od 14 (Eetrnaest) strana i ona sadrZi sve Sto Sam rekao, po svom znanju i seCanju. Izjavu Sam dao dobrovoljno i svestan sam da se mo2e upotrebiti u sudskom postupku pred Medunarodnim sudom za kriviEno gonjenje osoba odgovornih za teSka krSenja medunarodnog prava poEinjena na teritoriji bivSe Jugoslavije od 1991, kao i da mogu biti pozvan da javno svedoEim pred Sudom.
Datum: 2;!* of:. ,20 44 . IT-09-92-T 81080
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Case No. IT-09-92-T
THE PROSECUTOR
v.
RATKO MLADIĆ
PUBLIC
ANNEX B ______
IT‐09‐92‐T 13 August 2014 9 IT-09-92-T 81079
ŠARENAC Desimir Witness Statement to be admited pursuant Rule 92ter Closed Session / Statement Date 65ter Number Under seal Witness Statement of ŠARENAC Desimir 27 July 2014 1D01742 / Associated Exhibits wich the Defence seeks to tender pursuant to Rule 92ter Paragraph Description Number 65ter/EXH Number Doc ID (BCS/ENG) SIGNED Witness Statement of ŠARENAC Desimir RM 65ter 1D01742 1st Sarajevo mtbr - Information on enemy activity 13 RM 65ter 1D03019 1D15-5296 signed by Dragomir SARENAC (Karadžić 65ter 1D02776) 1D15-5299 Official note by Dzordze KOVAC (1st Sarajevo RM 65ter 1D03039 1D15-5363 Brigade), dated 5 February 1994, stamped 14 (Karadžić 65ter 1D28762) 1D15-5365 Official note by MILISIC Dzordze (1st Sarajevo RM 65ter 1D03058 1D15-5380 Brigade), dated 12 April 1994 14 (Karadžić 65ter 1D28790) 1D15-5382 Official note by lieutenant colonel Milan KECMAN RM 65ter 1D03020 1D15-5302 (1st Sarajevo Brigade), dated 9 January 1994 24 (Karadžić 65ter 1D28726) 1D15-5305 Official note by ULJAREVIC Radovan (1st Sarajevo RM 65ter 1D03033 1D15-5317 Brigade), dated 5 July 1994 24 (Karadžić65ter 1D28729) 1D15-5320 Official note by the Command of the 1st Sarajevo Brigade (on the escape of Glisic Sinisa and the hostile 28 RM 65ter 1D03059 1D15-5385 activities on Dobrinja), dated 9 July 1994 33 (Karadžić 65ter 1D28820) 1D15-5388 Official note by Djordje KOVAC (1st Sarajevo 28 RM 65ter 1D03080 1D15-5439 Brigade), dated 8 March 1995, signed by himself 33 (Karadžić 65ter 1D28928) 1D15-5441 Official note by KOVAC Dzordze (1st Sarajevo RM 65ter 1D03031 1D15-5310 Brigade), No. 20/17-35-7, dated 9 February 1994 29 (Karadžić 65ter 1D28727) 1D15-5312 Official note by the Command of the 1st Sarajevo Brigade on the exit from the city under the control of 31 RM 65ter 1D03078 1D15-5425 Muslim forces, dated 6 June 1993 (Karadžić 65ter 1D28924) 1D15-5428 Official note by MILICIC Djordje on the escape of RM 65ter 1D03077 1D15-5420 Muslim people, dated 31 December 1993 32 (Karadžić 65ter 1D28914) 1D15-5422 34 Map of Sarajevo annotated by Defence witness 36 RM 65ter 1D04398 1D15-2044 Desimir SARENAC in the Karadzic case (IT-95-5/18) 37 (Karadžić EXH D03091) 1D15-2045 Official note by ULJAREVIC Radovan (1st Sarajevo RM 65ter 1D03036 1D15-5344 Brigade), dated 18 December 1993, stamped 38 (Karadžić 65ter 1D28740) 1D15-5346 Information from Desimir SARENAC (1st Sarajevo RM 65ter 1D03057 1D15-5368 Brigade), dated 13 August 1993, signed by himself 38 (Karadžić 65ter 1D28779) 1D15-5372 Information on Vogosca from Predrag CERANIC, No. RM 65ter 1D03038 1D15-5356 67/92, dated 2 October 1992, signed by himself 38 (Karadžić 65ter 1D28753) 1D15-5358 Operational note No. 907-01/95, dated 7 November RM 65ter 1D03060 1D15-5396 1995 38 (Karadžić 1D28831) 1D15-5398 Official note by Mirjan Luketa (1st Command from RM 65ter 1D03034 1D15-5327 Ilidza Infantry Brigade) No. 2/72, signed by himself 38 (Karadžić 1D28767 1D15-5332 Official note by TOMIC Ranko, No. 307-01/94, dated RM 65ter 1D03075 23 November 1994, signed by himself 40 (Karadžić 1D28898 1D15-5410 Official note by ULJAREVIC Radovan (1st Sarajevo Brigade), No. 20/06-9-208, dated 4 March 1995, 41 RM 65ter 1D04399 1D15-2048 signed by himself (Karadžić EXH D03092 1D15-2050 RM 65ter 1D03018 1D15-5285 List of patients in Kasindol hospital 43 (Karadžić 65ter 1D10022) 1D15-5291 Official note by PLANINCIC VOJO (1st Sarajevo RM 65ter 1D03076 1D15-5412 Brigade, dated 9 December 1993 44 (Karadžić 65ter 1D28899) 1D15-5415 Justification No. 1/58, dated 14 July 1992 RM 65ter 1D03035 1D15-5338 45 (Karadžić 65ter 1D28738) 1D15-5341 Information from Desimir SARENAC (1st Sarajevo RM 65ter 1D03037 1D15-5350 Brigade), dated 13 July 1993 45 (Karadžić 65ter 1D28743) 1D15-5352 Supplement to an official note No. 04/1-124-4 by IT-09-92-T 81078
MOJEVIC Zeljko, dated 6 July 1995, signed by 47 RM 65ter 1D03079 1D15-5433 himself (Karadžić 65ter 1D28925) 1D15-5435 Official note by VUJICIC Radoslav (Command of the 1st Sarajevo Brigade), dated 16 March 1993, signed by 48 RM 65ter 1D03061 1D15-5402 himself (Karadžić 1D28880) 1D15-5406 Operational note No. 907-01/95, dated 7 November RM 65ter 1D03060 1D15-5396 1995 49 (Karadžić 65ter 1D28831) 1D15-5398