Transnational Party Political Actors:The Difficulties of Seeking a Role and Significance

『日本EU学会年報』第26号, pp.63-83平成18年

Transnational party political actors:the difficulties of seeking a role and significance

Stephen DAY

1.0. Introduction

The goal of this paper is to highlight the possibilities and difficulties associated with establishing transnational party political actors as key players at the transnational level. In so doing, its primary focus will be upon the European Political Parties (henceforth Euro-parties) which have sought, and continue to seek, to play such a role. Reference will also be made to the global Party Internationals (Pls), which despite having a longer history remain far less developed, as a way of highlighting a plethora of organizational difficulties faced by such bodies. Justification for the study of such entities can be gleamed from many sources. In 2000, for example, the Commission Green Paper on European Governance claimed that in the face of globalization new modes of governance were needed in order to rectify public issues of concern. From their perspective while events were shifting '•c towards an international/supranational space not governed by the traditional forms of democracy' the consciousness of the

European public remained'•cgrounded in political mythology of national sovereignty and parliamentary democracy.' Was this a clarion call for political parties beyond the state ? Could such parties give substance to democracy and representation at the transnational level and replicate what political parties had done at the national level a la E. E. Schatt- schneider:'political parties created democracy and modern democracy is

63 『日本EU学会年報』第26号,平成18年9月 unthinkable save in terms of parties' ? Although the subsequent 2001 Laeken Declaration pinned its hopes, primarily, on a transnational network of civil society it also argued that there was a role for the Euro-parties to play. Of course, orchestrating the necessary reform for such a scenario is likely to be highly contested as well as highly problematic. As Dahrendorf observed, when asked if the EU is `intrinsically non-democratic',

`It i s, if we judge democracy by the parameters of parliamentary government in nation states. The point is that, apart from nation states, we shall never find appropriate institutions for democracy. This is not, of course, an argument for ceasing to worry about democracy in Europe. It is instead an awareness that ought to impel us, as the world advances beyond the nation-state to revisit the principles of democracy and ask ourselves how they can be applied in the new situation.'

Indeed, as the EU has developed the qualities of a non-state (multi- level) polity the issue of how, and through what means, the public's voice is to be heard has gained momentum. This is a conundrum recognized by

Commissioner Margot Wallstrom (Vice-President of the European Commis- sion responsible for Institutional Relationslations and Communication Strategy) who, as part of the on-going debate declared that : `Political parties are the lynchpin of any democratic system. A Europe-wide democracy therefore needs Europe-wide political parties or at least cross-border cooperation between national parties.' The 2006 White Paper on Communication con- solidated this position when it heralded the Euro-parties as one of a number of key actors necessary for a 'citizen-centred communication

approach.' Thus within this developing polity, which as Schmitter points

out, displays a '•cplurality of polities at different levels of aggregation-

national, subnational and supranational-that overlap in a multitude of

domains,' a Europe-wide democracy with Europe-wide parties could be an

64 Transnational party political actors:the difficulties of seeking a role and significance (Day) effective way to give citizens voice. However, while some look forward to a Europe that is '•ca robust, transnational parliamentary democracy,' others remain unconvinced that such a path-way is either necessary or desirable. Such doubts have been most forcibly expressed by the Czech

President Vaclav Klaus. From his perspective '[a] "higher", European- wide democracy is an illusion.' In this scenario the Euro-parties are essentially meaningless. The question that concerns us here, therefore, is to what extent are transnational 'party political' actors likely to be part of the formula that solves the equation of democracy and representation at the transnational level? In seeking to illustrate both the difficulties associated with this equation as well as a possible solution the article takes the following structure. Section two will introduce the Euro-parties and highlight how they are nested within the EU institutional architecture. In section three I will question the significance of transnational 'party based' organizations given a series of historical and contemporary problems. In section four it will be suggested that the Euro-parties could benefit from searching for an organizational third-way between the structural rigidity of a national political party and the flexibility of a network. The paper will conclude by arguing that if transnational 'party political' actors are to enhance their role and significance then they will need to show that they are both capable of providing a 'Halics' and developing an organizational form that fits in with the multi-level nature of EU and global governance.

2.0. Introducing the Euro-parties

At present there are ten legally recognised Euro-parties that span the political spectrum. Each Euro-party is composed of member parties from across (and beyond) the European Union and are connected with a corresponding European Parliamentary Group (see table one below). The eldest, the ELDR and EPP, turned thirty in March 2006 while the

65 『日本EU学会年報』第26号,平成18年9月

Table One:Euro-parties and corresponding European Parliamentary Groups

youngest, the EUDemocrats, held its founding Congress in February 2006. The reality of their genetic characteristics i. e. being 'a party' composed of national member parties, brings with it a fundamental tension between the transnational aspirations of the Euro-party and the national-based mind-set of its constituent parts. In the face of this supranational/national fault-line, each of the Euro-parties shows various depths of institutionalization at the intra-party organizational and decision-making level. The Euro-parties initially came to prominence in the run-up to the first European Parliamentary election in 1979. At the time there was much excitement about their potential future development. As Hix and Lord put it, '[1] eading academics and politicians openly predicted that these new party structures would launch a new democratic phase of European

66 Transnational party political actors:the difficulties of seeking a role and significance (Day)

integration.' Although they have certainly had a role to play the reality has been a lot less dramatic. Nevertheless the incremental development of

' party-like' characteristics led Simon Hix, writing in 1996, to identify a Euro-party as an organisation having, `a statute, a common programme, a secretariat, an executive body, a party assembly, a hierarchical leadership

structure, the ability to make decisions binding on member parties, s, and

the aspiration to become a fully fledged European political party.' This

latter point is something that continues to drive developments. On the re-

founding of the EFA (post-2004), for example, President Nelly Maes

argued that'•ctoday we have become a fully-fledged political party in our

own right.' Despite such self-ascription though it remains difficult to pin-

point exactly what a Euro-party is (see section four below).

Constitutionally the Euro-parties are recognised by Article 191 of the

EC Treaty :

`Political parties at European level are important as a factor for

integration within the Union. They contribute to forming a European

awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the

Union'

Since 2004 they have also been the recipients of EU funding as a result

of a process that began with an additional paragraph being added to Article 191 by the 2003 Nice Treaty. This read : `The Council, acting in

accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, shall lay down

the regulations governing political parties at European level and in

particular the rules governing their funding.' It was this second paragraph that laid the path for the Party Regulation which was finally introduced in 2004 following a collaborative effort by the five Euro-parties that existed at that time (the EPP, PES, ELDR, Greens and EFA . A key aspect of the Regulation was Article 3 which laid out a series of pre- requisites necessary for the conferment of Euro-party status.

67 『日本EU学会年報』第26号,平成18年9月

Article 3 a) it must have legal personality in the Member State in its seat is located b) it must be represented, in at least one quarter of Member States, by Members of the European Parliament or in the national Parlia- ments or regional Parliaments or in the regional assemblies, or it must have received, in at least one quarter of the Member States, at least three per cent of the votes cast in each of those Member States at the most recent European Parliament elections ; c) it must observe, in particular in its programme and in its activities, the principles on which the European Union is founded, namely the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law ; d) it must have participated in electionsin to )the European Parlia- ment, or have expressed the intention to do so.

The new Regulation, according to Day and Shaw, finally brought :

'•c to EU law an institutionally focused definition of the general

characteristics that are required for a body to be classified as a ` political party at European level', in terms of its legal basis, represen-

tativity, and basic adherence to political values. By bringing a sense

of order and regularizing some aspects of behaviour, the process of

institutionalising the euro-parties within 19) the EU constitutional architecture can be seen to be taking place.'

3.0. Transnational Organizations and Organizational Difficulties

While global problems are constantly said to require transnational solutions the extent to which national-based traditional political structures

68 Transnational party political actors:the difficulties of seeking a role and significance (Day) are able to cope with such tasks has been subject to a sustained critique. Take Leonard and Arbuthnott, for example, who argue that:

' Everywhere, formal political structures seem unable to compete with the dynamism of single-issue campaigns that are freed from the

responsibility of government and able to energise core constituencies

with their simple messages ... The key challenge to ask of today's

generation of reformers is whether they can bring about a European rescue of democracy at national, supranational and regional levels.'

If national political parties are in such a crisis could we expect transnational party political organizations (such as the Euro-parties or the

global Party Internationals : Centrist Democratic International (CDI) ; Glob-

al Greens (GG) ; International Democratic Union (IDU); Liberal Interna-

tional (LI) ; and Socialist International (SI) .) to fill the void and bring

about the rescue of representative democracy at the transnational level ?

Etzioni-Halevy, certainly highlights the challenge when he writes, `Modern

democracy has been fashioned to suit the governing institutions of the

territorial state, and it still remains to be seen if it can be adopted to

transnational political bodies.' An additional complication stems from the

fact that as politics has shifted away from '•c capital and labour to being

largely about identity and sovereignty,' the ability of transnational orga-

nizations to nest themselves is likely to face even stiffer resistance.

Daniele Archibugi, though, is clear that political parties should organize

and operate at the transnational level : `Given the dramatic growth and

efficiency of multinational enterprises ... it seems astonishing that political parties should still be confined almost exclusively to the national level.' At present though democracy and representation at the transnational level remains in its infancy. Why might this be the case ? From this authors perspective one could point to (among others) four related factors : path-dependent lessons ; the fear of centralization and lack of

69 『日本EU学会年報』第26号,平成18年9月 linkage ; the need for a functional role ; and transnational aspirations verses national realities.

3.1) path-dependent lessons Historically it has been the political left that most vocally proclaimed the need for international/transnational political organizations. At the time of the programmatic declaration of the Second International (1889) for example social-democratic parties were championing the fight for wid- ening the franchise and introducing provisions of social welfare. According to Donald Sassoon, '[t] hey all had a common tactical-strategic principle:no cooperation with bourgeois parties. They all had a common expectation : the inevitable collapse of capitalism ... They all had a common `foreign policy' based on a vague concept of internationalism, anti-colonialism and pacifism. It was not long however before internal differences began to appear not least between the dominant German position and that of other European countries. 'Jean Jaures ... argued ... at the 1904 Congress of the Socialist International that there could be no supranational model for socialism ... In particular, Jaures said, Germany, where parliamentary decisions simply vanished into emptiness like a wind, could not impact on governmental priorities.' While the Second International struggled to maintain a common line the story of the Communist International (Comintern) highlights an altogether different experience : an inherent organizational danger stemming from a transnational body built on asymmetrical foundations. As the Soviet Union sought to control national Communist Parties, in the name of international fraternity, they left little or no room for innovation and change from the Satellite States. Such control though provoked a number of well-known and not so well-known examples of resistance. One of the lesser known initiatives was the movement of horizontalists (poziome struktury) that established themselves within the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) The implementation of Martial Law in 1981, however, put an end to their

70 Transnational party political actors : the difficulties of seeking a role and significance (Day) hope of bringing about a fundamental renewal of the party via the formation of alternative information networks. In light of such a poor historical record it is not surprising that transnational organizations came to be viewed with either suspicion or disdain.

3.2) the fear of centralisation and the lack of linkage Building on the above it could be argued that a generic problem for transnational bodies concerns a tendency towards centralized control over national constituent parts that in turn generates a sense of remoteness ; or, in contrast, an organization that is simply too big to have a sense of itself. This issue of size is picked up by Robert Dahl who expressed the problem in terms of democratic control:

`The smaller a democratic unit , the greater its potential for citizen

participation and the less the need for citizens to delegate government decisions to representatives. The larger the unit, the greater its

capacity for dealing with problems important to its citizens and the

greater the need for citizens to delegate decisions to representatives.'

Added to the issue of size is the question of linkage. According to ClausOffe, any institutionis built upon a duality,namely : `socialization

(sense of loyalty, obligation)' and `a functional role'. Nurturing a situation where people identity their own fate with the fate of transnational entities is problematized by a number of factors not least that the Party Interna- tionals and Euro-parties are viewed as elitist entities that lack room for individual participation. This comes at a time when there does seem to be evidence to suggest that people are feeling more 'European' and seeking something'•c more concrete, more relevant to their daily lives and more democratic, not more remote, more 'technical', more elitist •c.' It remains to be seen if the initiatives associated with the Commission's Plan D for

Democracy, Dialogue and Debate spearheaded by Commissioner Wallstrom

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and a number of participatory openings offered by the Euro-parties in 2005-6 (such as opening up individual membership to anyone, as in the case of the European Left, and/or increasing the participatory opportunities to those who are already members of the national parties that make- up the Euro-parties, as in the case of the PES) can address this issue.

3.3) establishing a functional role Both of the aforementioned issues contribute to a situation whereby transnational party political entities face a short-fall in their functional role which, in turn, is likely to undermine their potential and future development. As Nelson Polsby points out a role is crucial for any type of deliberative body.

'[u]ntil a deliberative body has some minimum amount of work to do, the necessity for interaction among its members remains slight and having no purpose, coordination by means of a division of labor, rules

and regulations, precedents and so on, seem unlikely to develop.'

Once again recent developments seem to suggest an attempt to grapple with this issue as both the Euro-parties and the Party Internationals have sought to enhance their role and significance. The latter, for example, have been encouraging members to develop greater co-ordination/cooperation at a regional level. In the case of the Centrist Democratic International (CDI) this has culminated in the establishment of an Asia- Pacific arm (January 2006) that it hopes will be able to learn from the experiences of the European People's Party (EPP). The PIs have also begun to also work alongside, and in co-ordination with, other non-state actors such as the National Democratic Institute in support of developing

' political parties and democratic movements around the world.' The Euro-

parties, too, have sought to bring a value-added to their national constituent parts. This has been most explicit in the role that the Euro-parties

72 Transnational party political actors : the difficulties of seeking a role and significance (Day) played in forging linkages with sister parties across Central and Eastern Europe and the way they sought to co-ordinate action during the Conven- tion on the Future of Europe.

3.4) transnational aspirations/national realities

Despite offering opportunities for mutual learning and the lowering of transaction costs transnational organizations face a seemingly inherent paradox : to what extent are their supranational rhetorical goals compati- ble with a national-based membership structure that brings with it a corresponding intergovernmentalist mind-set ? This push-pull tension has, for example, been identified within the European Parliamentary Groups where as Bailer and Schneider, suggest'•c MEPs frequently face a trade-

between national and transnational interests.' Similarly Raunio asserted that '•c party groups have reason to view with considerable anxiety developments indicating tighter control by national parties.' At the beginning of 2006 this tension has hit the headlines as the new leader of the

UK Conservatives has pledged to pull his party out of the European

People's Party-European Democrats Parliamentary Group because of its federalist/supranational aspirations. Another stringent criticism of transnational bodies concerns a weakness of cohesion. This critique is often aimed at the Euro-parties. As Dahrendorf claims :

' European political parties, for instance, do not function except at a bureaucratic level. If the social democrat Tony Blair discovers that the social democrat Gerhard Schroder is no longer interested in the Third Way, he does not hesitate to make common cause with the conservative Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, who is in-

terestedin the Third Way.'

National realities also contribute to the lack of widespread recognition of transnational bodies. Take the Socialist International (SI), for example.

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At the beginning of the 2000s an internal report, entitled The Role and Functions of the Socialist International, recognized this deficiency and stressed the need for the SI to raise its profile so that its voice would be heard via a 'comprehensive media and communications strategy'. It claimed that '[w] e all want the SI to be an efficient, relevant and successful player that adds value) to all our member parties and makes a difference in international politics. Similar sentiment can be found in the

2006 Rome Manifesto of the EPP.

4.0. Developing an efficient and effective organizational form

In the face of these above mentioned weaknesses/deficiencies we need to ask ourselves is there an organizational form that could begin to address these problems? The first issue in relation to the Euro-parties is can we seek to understand them through the lens of national parties?

From this author's perspective the answer to that is a qualified 'no'. As

Alan Ware points out national political parties engage '•c in three main kinds of activity:1) preparing for and assisting in the running of election campaigns; 2) sustaining the party organization, membership and other resources; 3) devising new public policies and strategies for the party's elected representatives in public offices.' Beyond such organizational matters national political parties, according to Miroslawa Grabowska,'•cshould- technically speaking-play the role of independent variables:influencing or even forming social identities and interests. Interests have to be carefully constructed, communicated, negotiated by social and political actors like trade unions and-above all-political parties.' These are qualities that are either in an embryonic stage of development or are seemingly well beyond the means of the Euro-parties as they are presently constituted. A check list shows that while a Euro-party (among others) seeks :

• to produce a common manifesto for European Parliamentary

74 Transnational party political actors:the difficulties of seeking a role and significance (Day)

elections ; • to formulate working papers on issues of common concern to

their national member parties ; • to liaise between the various branches of the party-family at the

national/supranational level to enhance the effectiveness and

strengthen its ideological voice at the local, national and transnational level ; • to provide opportunities for national politicians/leaders to interact

and engage with each other ; • to increase their presence as a key political actor in the Euro-

pean political arena. they continue to lack :

• intra-party cohesion over the precise nature of what a Euro- party should be at both the ideational and organisational level ; • a visibility/presence amongst ordinary citizens of the EU as well as amongst card-carrying national party members ; • a socialising capability to be able to effectively project and imbue their norms and values amongst national party members and European citizens ; • a European party system within which they can facilitate their identity ; • the opportunity to form a government ; • the sorts of organizational infrastructure and resources that a national member party is able to command.

This leads us-to ask `well what exactly are they'? Are they a'party of parties'? An umbrella organization? A meta-network ? Have the Euro- parties, as presently constituted, reached the limits of their organizational development? If not what form might they be able to take? Could we

75 『日本EU学会年報』第26号,平成18年9月 see organizational parallels with that of the Catholic Church as defined by

Ivan Vallier ?

`It s center in Rome coordinates and shapes the actions of the subsidi-

ary field units by supplying them with general norms, symbolic leadership, and authoritative decisions. Each of the field units posses-

ses, in turn, a certain autonomy vis-a-vis the center ; the field units

make demands on the center, may provide it with new ideas, and oftengenerate key resourcesfor the center,for example,loyalties, money and skills.'

The dual concern of centralization and loss of sovereignty, on the part of the national member parties, is likely to prevent such a possibility. A contemporary and more fashionable possibility ties the Euro-parties and

PIs to the idea of a network. Networks, according to Keck and Sikkink are '•cforms of organization characterized by volntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange.' Their decentralized nature and ability to reach out beyond the nation-state, while not seeking to undermine the nation-state, is something particularly valued by Mark

Leonard, who writes, '[t]he rules and order that govern them depend on reciprocal relationships, shared values and a common identity rather than on a rigid hierarchy.' While it is easy to recognise the appeal of a network solution it is important not to shy away from potential short- falls. Many of those who advocate such an approach seem to put their faith in it being led by a `great individual' focusing on out-puts. `This yearning for providential men or women [in the words of Dominique

Moisil in our global age results from at least three factors. The first concerns the complexity and vulnerability of our world. The second, paradoxically, reflects our growing cynicism towards politics and politicians. And the third is the result of our media culture, obsessed as it is with putting a "face" to events.' This contains a number of potential

76 Transnational party political actors:the difficulties of seeking a role and significance (Day) dangers such as a tendency towards personalism where the attractions of short-term expediency cannot be discounted. The actions of numerous EU

Member State national leaders, during 2005-6, for example, led Commis- sioner Peter Mandelson to talk of `the emotion of economic nationalism' as they sought, counterproductive, in the view of the Commission, national protectionist measures. Secondly, it is also unclear how decision-making actually takes place within a network ? Does it take place on the basis of unanimity or some form of qualified majority voting (QMV) ? What sort of sanctions can it draw upon in the face of 'non-compliance'? In light of such difficulties could another pathway be taken ? Is there some form of half-way house between the structure of a national political party and the flexibility of a network for the Euro-parties/Party Interna- tionals to pursue ? One possible avenue could be to draw lessons from the work on `polycentrism' as presented by Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren. At the start of their 1961 paper they argued that although metropolitan areas lacked both a legal status and the subsequent `general instrumentality of government available to deal directly with the range of problems', a sense of cohesion between the `multiplicity of federal and state governmental agencies, counties, cities, and special districts that govern within a metro-

politan region,' could be achieved under, what they termed, a 'polycentric

political system'.

'Pol ycentric connotes many centers of decision-making which are formerly independent of each other. Whether they actually function independently, or instead constitute an interdependent system of

relations, is an empirical question in particular cases.'

Some of the newer Euro-parties can already be seen to be ex- perimenting with different organizational initiatives as they seek to work- out the relationship between supranational and national norms. In the face of such difficulties flexibility has become an integral part of the lexicon.

77 『日本EU学会年報』第26号,平成18年9月

The Greens, for example, claim:'The Federation is a flexible structure for the European Greens where t here is room for all [Green] parties...with

different political standpoints •c' The European Left (EL) calls itself a networking party made up of '•ca flexible, decentralised association of independent and sovereign European leftwing parties and political organizations which works on the basis of consensus.' It is however the case of the European Democratic Party (PDE) that comes across as the most interesting. Article 4 of its statutes claims that '[t]hrough their regional

and national actions, the parties members sustain the positions defended by the PDE in the framework of the European union •c' The fact that the

national parties have to defend and support the actions of the PDE, that

emanate from the European level, is an interesting and noteworthy

development.

5.0. In lieu of a conclusion

Historically transnational party political actors have struggled to consoli- date a role and significance. Today, it is clear that both the Euro-parties and Party Internationals remain in a statu nascendi (state of becoming) with an uncertain future. Concomitantly, it is clear that they face considerable obstacles that constrain their capacity to deliver the sorts of self-ascribed outcomes contained within their mission statements, manifes- toes and declarations. Nevertheless, while recognising the problems that the Euro-parties face, Day and Shaw claim that they do indeed have a role to play:

' Re-emphasising the rather hidden nature of parties in EU discourse,

many important political initiatives related to the future evolution of

the Union ignore political parties and appear to prefer the legitimacy

afforded to the Union's political processes by the involvement of civil

society at the European Union •c.Despite this apparently negative

78 Transnational party political actors:the difficulties of seeking a role and significance (Day)

balance sheet, we would none the less argue that transnational

parties do represent important institutional and ideational settings within which the processes of European integration itself, the Euro-

pean dimensions of national, regional or local political issues, and the dynamics of Europeanisation and globalisation can all be debated amongst stakeholders.'

From this authors perspective if the Euro-parties and the Party Interna- tionals are to enhance their status then the next step that they need to take is to show an ability to deliver-or to use the modern jargon show that they are capable of bringing a value-added. By developing an expertise in those areas where they already have a competitive advantage and which are not perceived as a threat to the sovereignty of their national member parties is likely to be the most fruitful pathway. In terms of their organizational appearance, the need on the part of the Euro-parties and Party Internationals to fit in with the contextual reality and the multi-level structure of EU and global governance would seem to necessitate a form that offers both the flexibility of a network and the reliability of a rules-based system built around the structural cohesiveness of a party. In addition the need for increased organizational resources and operational space is paramount if they are to enhance their role and significance However, when was the last time you heard a national politician singing the praises of the Euro-parties and Party Internationals to a national audience ? Thus although they are organizations in their own right they remain in an umbilical embrace tied to the wishes and whims of the national member parties. Future developments are therefore difficult to predict as they are dependent on the exact balance of this relationship which itself changes according to the particular issue, and time that events are unfolding.

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* This paper draws upon researchthat I have been undertakingon the Euro-partiesfor a number of years. This began with a joint research project with Prof Jo Shaw entitled `Th e Constitutionalisation of Transnational Political Parties (ESRC Grant Number R000223449) which ran from 2001-2002 and a European Science Foundation Grant for an Exploratory Workshop entitled 'The Role and Significance of the Transnational Political Parties which was held in London in December 2003. I am grateful to both organisations for their financial support. I am also grateful for the feedback and comments that I received from various colleagues, in particular Professor Yoichiro Usui, at the EUSA- Japan Workshop held at Kyushu University, November 11-12,2005 and the EUSA-Japan, Kyushu Branch Workshop held at Seinen University, Kyushu, August 1, 2005. 1) 'The Future of Parliamentary Democracy:Transition and Challenge in European Governance' Green Paper prepared for the Conference of the European Union Speakers of Parliament, September 2000. European Commission, Secretariat General, European Gov- ernance Team, Brussels, 9 November 2000, A/S D (2000). 2) Quoted in Seymour Lipset, 'The Indispensability of Political Parties', Journal of Demo- cracy, Vol. 11, No.1, 2000, pp. 48-55. 48. 3) See Annex I 'Laeken Declaration on the future of the European Union', Presidency Conclusions - European Council Meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 December, 2001 (SN 300/ 01), pp.2-9. 4) Ralf Dahrendorf, 'Making sense of the EU:The Challenge for Democracy', Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2003, pp. 101-115.107. 5) See for example a draft speech by Commission vice-president Margot Wallstrom ' Closing the communication gap' presented at an ALDE Seminar 'Connecting with the citizens of Europe-how to close the Communication Gap', January 10, 2006, p. 6. 6) Margot Wallstrom, Transnational Democracy - the road ahead for Europe, paper presented at IDEA, Stockholm, 10 June 2005. See http:// www.idea.int/about/ anniversary/upload/Wallstrom. pdf 7) White Paper on a European Communication Policy (presented by the Commission), Brussels, 1.2.2006 COM (2006) 35 final, p. 2. of 13. 8) Philippe C. Schmitter, How to Democratize the European Union ... And Why Bother Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC. 2000, p. 17. 9) See ELDR Task Force (Chaired by Andrew Duff MEP) paper on the Future of Europe, `Towards a Liberal Laeken', point 10.1 and 8.3. Document held on file. 10) Both the Finnish Foreign Minister Slovak President have also expressed similar concerns. See `Slovak president joins sceptics on European Parliament', EUobserver. com, November 2, 2005 and 'MEP in spat with Finnish foreign minister', EUobserver. com 20 October 2005. These can be found at http://euobserver. com 11) See `The Czech Republic and the EU after the French and Dutch Referendums',

80 Transnational party political actors:the difficulties of seeking a role and significance (Day)

speech given by Vaclav Klaus at the University of Oxford, September 18, 2005. This can be found at http://www.klaus. cz/klaus2/asp/clanek. asp?id=iTrpnK4iCtGd 12) As of May 2006 one can point to a number of other formations across Europe but they fail to satisfy the criteria of the Party Regulation to receive funding (see note 17 below). These include the Nordic Green-Left Alliance which was established by some members of the GUE/NGL group in the European Parliament who felt unable to join the Party of the European Left as well as a new grass-roots based political movement called Newropeans that wants to contest the 2009 European Parliamentary elections. 13) Simon Hix and Christopher Lord, Political Parties in the European Union, Houndmills, Macmillan Press 1997, p. 168. 14) Simon Hix, `The transnational party federations', in John Gaffney (ed.) Political Parties and the European Union, Routledge:London, 1996, pp. 308-331. 308. 15) EFA News Special edition, Spring 2004, p. 1. Document held on file. Yet it remains defined as a 'Federation of political parties' in Article 1 of the Rules of Internal Order adopted by the General Assembly, Brussels, Nov 8-9th, 2004 as modified by the General Assembly May 27-28th, 2005. See http://www.e-f-a.org/efaactive. php?id=67, accessed 28 September, 2005. 16) Similar sentiment could be found in the draft European Constitution. Article 1-45 heralds that 'political parties at European level contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of Union citizens.' See Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, submitted to the European Council Meeting in Thessaloniki, 20 June 2003. 17) Regulation 2004/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding, OJ 2003 L297/1. 18) Ibid. 19) Stephen Day and Jo Shaw, `Political Parties in the European Union:towards a Euro- pean Party Statute?', in K. D. Ewing and Samuel Issacharoff (eds.) Party Funding and Campaign Financing in International Perspective, Oxford:Hart Publishing, 2006, pp. 293- 320.299. 20) Mark Leonard and Tom Arbuthnott, Next Generation Democracy:Legitimacy in Net- work Europe, The Foreign Policy Centre, 2001, p.3. 21) Eva Etzioni-Halevy 'Linkage Deficits in Transnational Politics', International Political Science Review, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2002, pp. 203-222. 204. 22) Christopher Caldwell, `Final round for party politics', Financial Times, (FT. Com) 18 November 2005. 23) Daniele Archibugi, 'Cosmopolitcal Democracy', New Left Review, 4, July/August 2000, pp. 137-151. 146.

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24) Donald Sassoon, `Fin-de-siecle Socialism', in Rene Cuperus and Johannes Kandel (eds.), European Social Democracy:Transformation in progress, (Amsterdam:Wiardi Beckman Stichting/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1998), pp. 31-38. 31-32. 25) Michael Harrington, Socialism Past and Future, London:Pluto Press, 1993, p. 47. 26) The two most documented examples are, of course, the Hungarian Uprising of 1956 and the attempt to develop `socialism with a human face' in Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring in 1968. 27) Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy, Nota Bene, Yale University Press, 2000, p. 110. 28) Claus Offe, `Designing Institutions for East European Transitions', in Jerzy Hausner, Bob Jessop and Klaus Nielsen (eds.), Strategic Choice and Path Dependency in Post- Socialism, (Aldershot:Edward Elgar, 1995), pp. 47-66. 59. 29) Michael Bruter, 'Symbolic Power', E ! Sharp, January-February 2006, pp. 46-48. 47 and 48. 30) For more information on this see http://europa.eu/debateeurope/index en. htm 31) In May 2006 the PES launched their PES activists project whereby participants can contribute to an enhanced range of web-based activities. See http://www.pes. org. The ELDR introduced an 'e-membership' scheme in 2001 while the EPP has had individual membership for a number of years. 32) Nelson W. Polsby 'The Institutionalization of the U. S. House of representatives', American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, No. 1, 1968, pp. 144-168.165. 33) See `Creating an International Partnership for Political Party Development', World Forum for Democracy, June 2000. Document held on file. 34) For more on this issue see Stephen Day, `Die Osterweiterung der Europarteien Ambivalenzen eines Familienzuwachses', in Osteuropa, Vol. 54, No. 5-6/Mai-June, 2004, pp. 223-236. 35) Stefanie Bailer and Gerald Schneider, `When Words Matter:Informal Rules and the Enlargement Debate', in Bernard Steunenberg & Jacques Thomassen (eds.) The Euro- pean Parliament:moving towards Democracy in the EU, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2002, pp. 139-162. 157. 36) Tapio Raunio, 'Beneficial Cooperation or Mutual Ignorance ? Contacts between MEPs and National Parties', in Bernard Steunenberg & Jacques Thomassen (eds.), The Euro- pean Parliament:moving towards Democracy in the EU, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2002, pp. 87-112. 106. 37) Ralf Dahrendorf, 'Making sense of the EU:The Challenge for Democracy', p. 110, as at note 4. 38) The Role and Functions of the Socialist International. Document held on file. 39) See `For a Europe of the Citizens : Priorities for a Better Future ("Rome Manifesto"). Adopted by the EPP Congress Rome, 30-31 March 2006. See http://www.epp-ed.eu/

82 Transnational party political actors : the difficulties of seeking a role and significance (Day)

Press/peve06/eve003/manifesto-en. pdf 40) Alan Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 111. Italics in original. 41) Miroslawa Grabowska, `Polish Political Elites:Representatives of Economic Interests or Groups of Socio-cultural Identification ?', paper presented at V World Congress for CEES, Warsaw:Poland, August 1995. 42) I. Vallier, 'The Roman Catholic Church : A Transnational Actor', International Organiza- tion, Vol. XXV, No. 3, 1971, pp. 479-502. 479. 43) Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 'Transnational advocacy networks in international politics' reproduced in Richard Little and Michael Smith (eds.) Perspectives on World Politics (3rd Edition), Abingdon:Routledge, 2006, pp. 171-185. 44) Mark Leonard, Network Europe : the new case for Europe, The Foreign Policy Centre, 1999, p. 3 & 21. 45) Dominique Moisi "'Great man' syndrome alive and well", The Daily Yomiuri, January 30, 2006, p.10. 46) 'Mandelson attacks "populist" EU protectionism', Financial Times (FT.Com), February 7,2006. 47) Vincent Ostrom, Charles M. Tiebout and Robert Warren, The Organization of Govern- ment in Metropolitan Areas : A Theoretical inquiry', American Political Science Review, Vol. LV, No. 4, pp. 831-42.831. 48) Ibid., p. 831. 49) Article 2 of the Statutes of the European Federation of Green Parties, aisbl. This document can be found at http : //www. europeangreens. org/info/statutes. pdf 50) See Article 1 of the party statutes of the Party of the European Left. Document held on file. This document can be found at http : //www. european-left. org/about/docus 51) Article 4 of the European Democratic Party (EDP) Statutes. This document can be found at http://www. pde-edp. net/main/pde/en/aboutus/statutes/statutes. pdf 52) Stephen Day and Jo Shaw, `The Evolution of European Political Parties in the Era of European Citizenship', in Rachel A. Cichowski and Tanja Borzel (eds.) The State of the European Union Volume 6:Law, Politics and Society, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 149-169. 151.

83 Transnational party political actors the difficulties of seeking a role and significance

Stephen Day

The role and significance of national political parties for democracy and representation at the national level has a long and well documented history. By comparison, far less attention has been given to the possibility of transnational party political actors playing a similar role at the transnational level. The goal of this paper is to highlight the possibilities and some of the difficulties associated with such an endeavour. The primary focus will be up the European Political Parties (Euro-parties). In addition examples will be drawn from the global Party Internationals in order to illustrate some of the issues that problematizes the existence and potential future development of these transnational actors. Following a brief introduction of the Euro-parties, the paper will question the significance of transnational 'party-based' organizations given a series of historical and contemporary problems. It will be argued that if they are to enhance their role and significance, future development requires these actors to pursue a pathway that lies between the structural rigidity of a party and the flexibility of a network. In addition they will also need to show that they are capable of providing a `value-added'.

Key Words : Euro-parties ; transnational actors ; Party Internationals

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