Some Theorists Argue That Moral Bioenhancement Ought to Be Compulsory

Penultimate draft—final version to be published in Bioethics Compulsory Moral Bioenhancement Should Be Covert ABSTRACT: Some theorists argue that moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory. I take this argument one step further, arguing that if moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory, then its administration ought to be covert rather than overt. This is to say that it is morally preferable for compulsory moral bioenhancement to be administered without the recipients knowing that they are receiving the enhancement. My argument for this is that if moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory, then its administration is a matter of public health, and for this reason should be governed by public health ethics. I argue that the covert administration of a compulsory moral bioenhancement program better conforms to public health ethics than does an overt compulsory program. In particular, a covert compulsory program promotes values such as liberty, utility, equality, and autonomy better than an overt program does. Thus, a covert compulsory moral bioenhancement program is morally preferable to an overt moral bioenhancement program. Keywords: moral enhancement; public health ethics; autonomy; public policy; harm Advancements in technology and globalization create many opportunities. Among them are not only greater opportunities to enhance our capacities for cognition, but also to use those enhanced capacities to cause “ultimate harm,” which is an event or series of events that brings about either the annihilation of humanity or a condition of living that is so poor that life is not worthwhile.1 Global in scope, ultimate harm is characterized by high rates of death, and, for those that survive, immense suffering. Examples of potential catalysts of ultimate harm are familiar and include global warming, terrorists, and short- sighted scientists unleashing a plague. Some argue that as cognitive enhancement increases in scope and availability, the potential for ultimate harm is greater, especially when conjoined with some of the possible catalysts of ultimate harm.2 But an event or series of events doesn’t have to be caused by an agent or agents to be ultimate harm. A large meteor or supernova could also bring about ultimate harm. 1 Persson, I., & Savulescu, J. (2008). The perils of cognitive enhancement and the urgent imperative to enhance the moral character of humanity. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 25(3), 162–177 2 Op. cit. note 1. 1 Penultimate draft—final version to be published in Bioethics Persson and Savulescu claim that in order to prevent the greater possibility of ultimate harm, it is necessary for humans to be morally enhanced.3 More specifically, it is necessary to morally bioenhance the population in order to prevent ultimate harm. Moral bioenhancement is the potential practice of influencing a person’s moral behavior by way of biological intervention upon their moral attitudes, motivations, or dispositions. The technology that may permit moral bioenhancement is on the scale between non-existent and nascent, but common examples of potential interventions include infusing water supplies with pharmaceuticals that enhance empathy or altruism or otherwise intervening on a person’s emotions or motivations, in an attempt to influence the person’s moral behavior. The proposal of engaging in moral bioenhancement has since generated a lot of controversy, resulting in a substantial literature debating the ethics of moral bioenhancement. Among the ethical issues with moral bioenhancement are its impact on autonomy, whether moral bioenhancement will result in a more or less egalitarian society, whether it will erode personal identity, and whether it will benefit others or just the people who are morally enhanced.4 There has also been debate around the empirical issues of whether a means of moral bioenhancement is or ever will be feasible and whether it really is necessary.5 Others have argued that if moral bioenhancement is 3 Persson & Savulescu op cit.; Persson, I., & Savulescu, J. (2012). Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement. Oxford University Press. Persson, I., & Savulescu, J. (2013). Should moral bioenhancement be compulsory? Reply to Vojin Rakic. Journal of Medical Ethics. 4 Douglas, T. (2008). Moral enhancement. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 25(3), 228– 245; Sparrow, R. (2014). Egalitarianism and moral bioenhancement. The American Journal of Bioethics : AJOB, 14(4), 20–8; 5 Crockett, M. J. (2014). Moral bioenhancement: a neuroscientific perspective. Journal of Medical Ethics, 40(6), 370–1; Harris, J. (2011). Moral enhancement and freedom. Bioethics, 25(2), 102–111; Sorensen, K. (2014). Moral enhancement and self-subversion objections. Neuroethics, 7(3), 275–286.; Wiseman, H. (2014a). SSRIs as Moral Enhancement Interventions: A Practical Dead End. AJOB Neuroscience, 5(3), 21–30.; Wiseman, H. (2016). The Myth of the Moral Brain: The Limits of Moral Enhancement. MIT Press. 2 Penultimate draft—final version to be published in Bioethics necessary to prevent ultimate harm, then moral bioenhancement should be compulsory.6 I adopt this argument, but go a step further. Not only should moral bioenhancement be compulsory, it should also be covert, conducted without the knowledge of those who are being enhanced. I have previously argued on the grounds that it is the only way for a program to be effective for it to be covert (Author, redacted). Here I argue on ethical grounds that a moral bioenhancement program ought to be covert, if it ought to be compulsory. My argument rests on two assumptions. The first is that moral bioenhancement is necessary to prevent ultimate harm. Whether moral bioenhancement is so necessary is an empirical matter. Here, I assume it is necessary. The second assumption is that whatever moral bioenhancement is used will be safe and effective. Moral bioenhancement will be safe and effective when it can reliably intervene on a person’s moral capacities and do so without causing serious adverse events. Whether this assumption is true is also an empirical matter. Admittedly, these are demanding assumptions, and for some readers this demand may push what follows into the merely theoretical. Perhaps I give too much credit to scientists and too little to the moral motivations of large groups of people, but I don’t find the assumptions to be merely theoretical. Moreover, most of the recent discussion of the ethics of moral bioenhancement has proceeded from the assumption that moral bioenhancement can be safe and effective. It is a common assumption, and without it we can all stop discussing the ethics of moral bioenhancement until the science is settled. However, even if the argument that follows is merely theoretical, then it at least represents the limiting case from which it is possible to reason about other potential interventions upon moral behavior. The argument that follows is intended to support the claim that if moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory, it ought to be covert. I do not offer a vigorous defense of the antecedent of this conditional, that moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory. Others have defended this elsewhere, but I do review the argument for this 6 Persson & Savulescu (2008) op. cit. note 1 3 Penultimate draft—final version to be published in Bioethics position in the first section. Second, I argue that contrary to the focus of the literature on moral bioenhancement, moral bioenhancement is a matter of public health and is therefore subject to ethical norms that guide decisions on public health interventions rather than the ethical norms that guide individual medical decisions. I then introduce the frameworks for public health ethics. The final step is to argue that according to these frameworks, moral bioenhancement ought to be covert, if it is to be compulsory. Compared to an overt program, a covert program is better. This conclusion is likely to be unacceptable to some. I aim to establish the implication of covert moral bioenhancement from compulsory moral bioenhancement. If the consequent of this implication is unacceptable, it is a short step to the notion that moral bioenhancement should be voluntary. And if it shouldn’t be voluntary, the only alternative is to forego moral bioenhancement completely. I conclude with a discussion of these inferences. 1. Compulsory Moral Bioenhancement Given that the costs of not preventing ultimate harm are indefinitely high7, there is no intervention the costs of which would outweigh utility of the prevention of ultimate harm. Thus, if an intervention is necessary to prevent ultimate harm, and the intervention will actually prevent ultimate harm, then that intervention ought to be carried out, because the cost of not doing so is indefinitely high. Moral bioenhancement is necessary, because as cognitive enhancement makes causing ultimate harm more accessible to nefarious moral agents, ultimate harm is much more likely, unless everyone is enhanced.8 Where it used to require an extraordinarily coordinated effort to cause ultimate harm, now, or in the near future, it only takes one person. Thus, moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory for everyone. 7 The costs of ultimate harm are so high because (a) not existing at all or existing in a state in which it would be better to not exist is the worst event, state, or intervention and (b) if ultimate harm were to occur it is impossible to know the goodness that such an occurrence would prevent (Persson & Savulescu op. cit. note 1). 8 I discuss in section five the likelihood and potential inevitability of ultimate harm. 4 Penultimate draft—final version to be published in Bioethics To get the conclusion that moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory, three propositions must be true: that the costs of not preventing ultimate harm are indefinitely high; that moral bioenhancement is causally necessary to prevent ultimate harm; and that moral bioenhancement is safe and effective. That the costs of not preventing ultimate harm are indefinitely high is disputable. If ultimate harm has occurred, then most of us are either dead or in a state of living that is so bad that death would be an improvement.

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