'II Auth: AC Initials 1 June 1945 HEADQUARTRS EASTERN AIR COMAND SOUTH EAST ASIA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMh~ARY NUJ3B.R 40 1 June 1945 With the reopening and consolidating of the port of Rarngoon the primary objective in the reconquest of BHt:a has been achieved. Fighting has not yet stopped but all organized resistance has ended. Another chapter of the war in South East Asia has therefore closed, and with it we cease publication o'? this Summary which has been, in part, a record of thc joint efforts of the Amrerican and British Air For- ces in this campaign. In the future, events will take a new course and perhaps this publication will be revived in a diff- erent setting; but, for the moment, suffice it to say that our forces have made a glorious advance along the rocd to Tokyo, We are glad to have had the privilege of recording part of that advance. By command of Lieutenant General STRATEvit1 R: A, T. RICHARDSON Group Captain, RAF Chief of Intelligence Section Office of DC/AS, OPTI i HEADQUARTERS EASTETN AIR 001MAND SOUTH EAST ASIA TO: All Personnel of Eastern Air Command, and all R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. Administrative and Service Units Which Have Supported E.A.C. Combat Operations. 1. On 15 December 1943 Eastern Air ommnand was organized as an integrated R.A.F.- A.A.F. air command, to which were also assigned squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air Force and Royal Indian Air Force. At that time I stated our mission and our mutual problems as follows: "A resourceful, able and wily enemy must be blasted from the jungles of Burma and driven from its skies in days to come. His lines of communication must be obliterated, his shipping destroyed, his will to resist crushed ...... our life line to China must be strengthened and protected. Every ounce of energy of every man of this Command will be required to accomplish this purpose. We must merge into one unified force, in thought and in deed - a force neither British nor American, with the faults of neither and the virtues of both. There is no time for distrust or suspicion ..... We must establish in Asia a record of Allied air victory of which we can all be proud in the years to come. Let us write it now in the skies over Burma." 2. 'Tithithe fall of Rangoon our mission in Burma is accomplished and our joint task fulfilled. As of 1 June 1945, I am relinquishing command of Eastern Air Command. The United States Army Air Forces units which have fought side by side with the air units of the British Empire are being withdrawn. 3. It is with a feeling of sincere and frank regret that I bid farewell to the personnel of Eastern Air Command. I take this opport- unity to thank you all - both military and civilian personnel - for the fine spirit of duty, the cooperation, and the loyalty you have shown during this entire period. It has been my good fortune to become per- sonally acquainted with many of you. I have been impressed beyond words by your seriousness of purpose and your ability to work success- fully together, with a minimum of friction and a maximum of accomplish- ment. To my commanders and their staffs, to the ground crews and ser- vice personnel, and above all to the gallant air crews who did the job with the tools and ecuipment their brothers-in-arms so ably supplied, I extend my heartfelt thanks for the victory your efforts have brought. 4 ' I relinquish command reassured through my association with you that our combined efforts will, in the not too distant future, bring us final victory. The triuaph of our cause will bring security for those principles of democracy in defense of which we freely offered our all, and which we will continue to do until Japan is smashed. Good luck to each and every one of you, and may God bless you and preserve you to see the day of final victory. GEtrE E. S ,TRATE F, Lieutenant General, U. S, A ir Forces . :Comanding. p t ~ xr ~ $W3 IED EASTERN AIR C0iMtlANI) WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUIAMARY I June 1945 Number 40 TABLE ;OF CONENTS Section Z EC Sit;3ti.ori Revs eo~ Burma Victory 1-2 Eastern Air Command: The Completion of a Mission 3-5 Scale of EAC Air Effort in South East Asia 6 Eastern Air Command Combat and Transport Operations, 1944-1945 7-8 EAC Comments on Japanese Air Strength 9-10 Enemy ir activity; 24 - 30 lMay 1945 10 Review of Enemy Air Activity, Januiary - June 1945 11-12 ---- urma Reconguored 13-17 Japanese Army Operational Air Strength in S.E.A. 18 Section II Technical Intelligence and Tactics Spits of 17 Squadron Tangle With Oscars Again 1.2 B-24 Sights "Circle of Light" 3 ATAIU Study lircraft and Equipment on Airfields Near Rangootn 4 Section III Objective Folder and Tart Chart Data Railays in Burma and Siam: Review of Activities During Six Months, Dec. 194 - Mal 1945 1=3 -Roads in Burma and.' Siam: Review of Activity and Developments in 1945 4-6 ., tha Notes and Notes on Waterwvays 7- Coastal Shipping, Rangoon - Victoria Point: Rewiowof ctivity Jan - I y 1945 ,.=:Inland aterways of Burma and Siam: Review of Jap i3ctivity, January to May 1945 13-14 Bomb Damage Study at Rangoon 15-17 Stores and. Dumps in Burma: Review of Situation 17r18 cnd Atta;Ck3 ,JaIu-ryJ - ry 1945 Section IV a r News Froia Other Fighting Fronts Tli.e 1tr in t j Pacific Section V Jap 1ntiai rcraft Defenses Japanese Antiaircraft in Burma , January - May 1945 1.2 Jap g&ms Heavy 1 Guns in Rangoon 2-3 UA Fire Encountered To Include 28 May .1945 3 Section VI Special Reports From FE6C Tactical units Weather Reconnaissance Plays Part in Burma Campaign 1-2 r'^ 4;x'1 > f ~ _ ,1 _s .. r4, f. ' N 41 it _ _ . _.____ -_ --- _ T _ . war .1 f , r BUMVj VIGTOR'Y This is our Swan Song, and as such, it is appropriate that we spend a little time in'reflection and remi- niscence. This 'campaign which is now concluding in Burma has witnessed one' 6f the most'smashing defeats in- flicted on the Japanese. We have often * talked of the ',Forgotten Front" buit posterity mu't never forget 'that in this campaign over 1I00,000 'Japanese have been 'kil ed and new techniques Sof aerial warare,' of air support and air supply applied and perfected. Spain was Napoleon's running sore; Burma has been an ulcer in the side of Hirohito' But things were very different in 1942. The calamity of Pearl Harbor was followed with brutal suddenness by the catastrophes of Manila and Singapore, We people of the Western world seemed dazed while the little yellow, men spread out over the coast 'f China, t'iough Malaya and the Dutch Fst Indies, through Oceania, until they threateneda our very existence. We wre unprepared, and the ability of the Japanese to eoist on the 'scantiest of' supplies, to travel light and'infiltrate through the jungles, caused us to fall back and back with an ever-increasing rapidity. vTwofactors brought success to his tactics - command of the sea and command of the air. It was then that- we lost Rangoon. The Japanese could land where he liked, bomb where he liked. In vain-that valiant handful of the AVG ahd RAF at Mingaladon and Toungoo strove against overwhelming numbers to stem 'the rush. Daily, almost hourly, the lines of communication,-of the British troops were cut and they were forced to'retreat, So that movement backward continued until after incredible hardships, the remnants of the forces straggled through the mountains into India and the Jap was too extended to follow. We had not many aircraft then. Curious as it may seem now, even Calcutta was in the forward area with fighters based at Dum Dum, while light bombers staged through' this field. We. planned then for the reconquest qf ,Burma, but Europe came first and the Pacific second, It seemed as hough the Chin Hills which had so effectively halted the Japanese advance would prove to be just as effective in preventing 'our return. Roads did not oi.st and that mountain mass seemed an impenetrable barrier. The al- ternative of a seaborne invasion was' impossible. Sufficient ships did not exist in the theatre, and .in our helplessness, we realized why Burma had never before been conquered from tIe north. - In 1942-43 we 1oeld our own. Then the tide began to turn. The growing operations of the life line to China over the Hump and the influx of more and better aircraft began to point the way of the future, In' 1943 few people realized the significance of the fact that-several lonely garrisons in the Naga Hills were being supplied and reinforced entirely by air. Other indications were seen in the supplying of the long range penetration columne of Wingate's' Chindits from the air and in the evacuation of casualties from a hastily improvised strip in the heart of the jungle. The turning point came in the Arakan campaign of the winter of 1943. First of all it was planned -to supply an entire division by air, and then the unexpected happened. The Japanese' used their old infiltration tactics to cut the communications of several brigades on the western side of the Mayu range. In 1942 these brigades would have fallen back; in 1943 they held their positions and were supplied by air.