JANUARY~~~~~~~ - MARCH~~~---1999------27 Afflnnation of Statehood and Territorial Integrity of (2)

Hrvoje Kacic

The Diplomatic Recognition of Croatia 1992 must be seen as the keystone to the recognition of Croatia. The subsequent recognition by other states The disintegration or collapse of Yugoslavia was only a logical consequence of the European was well underway. With the August 27, 1991 resolu- Twelve's consensus-based decision. tion by the European Twelve (with the agreement of The United States, it should be noted, had al- all the republics and the federal government of the ready announced officially that it would stand by any former Yugoslavia who were participating in the con- decision by the European Community with regard to ference), Yugoslavia de [acto became a state under recognizing Croatia - and thus on the fate of international trusteeship. Yugoslavia thereby achieved Yugoslavia's unity - no matter what that decision a unique distinction in the history of international re- might be. Actually, the United States decided to rec- lations, since normally the states that are emerging as ognize Croatia only on April 7, 1992, that is after con- independent entities are placed under the tutorship of siderable delay, and just one day before Croatia, international organizations, while in the case of Yu- , and Bosnia-Herzegovina were to be accepted goslavia it was the latter's passing away which was as full-fledged members in the United Nations. occurring when Yugoslavia became under an interna- As noted already, with the establishment of the tional protectorate. This situation was confirmed by Conference on Yugoslavia under the aegis of the Eu- United Nations Security Council Resolution 713. ropean Community, it was understood that the final In tandem with this, Croatia's international le- result of the Conference would be to grant diplomatic gal identity was also devel- recognition to those repub- oping apace, beginning on The article gives a historical lics of the former SFRY June 25, 1991. By the very overview of the political which desired it. The course act of passing its Declaration developments leading to the of events, however, was to of Independence that day, break-up of Yuqoslavla and, proceed in a different and Croatia achieved its deJacto subsequently, affirmation of the unplanned manner, due to recognition, followed Croatian state and its territorial the onslaught by the quickly by political recogni- integrity. The initial international Yugoslav Army (that is by tion when the European situation was not in favour of Serbia and Montencgro) Community sent its delega- Croatian independence since the against Croatia, which invol- tion on June 28, 1991 to international community intended ved the use of tanks, aircraft, to meet with the lead- warships, and surface-to- to preserve the common Yugoslav ers of Croatia and Slovenia. surface missiles, despite the state. After the Croatian (and Final diplomatic recognition repeated cease-fires on was only of a declamatory Siovenian) declaration of which the European Com- nature. independence (1991) the EC and munity insisted as expressed The mutual recogni- UN began to see the impossibility through its mission in tion between Croatia and of a Yugoslav state, a fact soon Croatia. Slovenia as soon as they had highlighted by the aggressive The world, and espe- proclaimed their indepen- Belgrade's military intervention. cially Europe, was shocked dence marked the beginning Further, particular role of by the brutality of the aggres- of this process of diplomatic and diplomatic recognition of sion against Croatia, and recognition. Soon thereafter, Croatian state are discussed Germany now took the lead Latvia, the , and including an overview of the in promoting the position that recognizing Croatia Lithuania were to recognize developments concerning the Croatia, to be followed by could reduce the level ofvio- final recognition of Croatian Iceland. Nevertheless, the lence of those attacks and territorial integrity. diplomatic recognition ex- put a stop to the aggression. tended by the European In addition to the factors al- Community on January 15, Key words: Croatia, Yugoslavia ready mentioned which en- 28 CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEYi

abled Germany - along with Austria and the Vatican Croatia already met those criteria and following small - to take a positive stand before others did on recog- adjustments the only question that remained was when nizing Croatia, there were also other even more im- diplomatic recognition would follow. portant factors: Lord Carrington, however, was strongly op- l.The world was impressed by the willingness posed to an early recognition, and firmly believed that of the Croatians, and especially of the younger gen- at that moment conditions were not ripe yet and that eration, to take up arms and to stand up to a militarily the necessary preconditions for the recognition of much stronger adversary. Slovenia and Croatia had not been met yet i.e. in De- 2.The world was shocked by the brutality with cember 1991. In other words, he still adhered to the which the aggressor attacked and destroyed Croatia's European Community's earlier position that recogni- cities and villages, killing and expelling the civilian tion for Slovenia and Croatia should be coordinated population, and plundering. with the outcome of the Conference on Yugoslavia. 3.Initially, Germany sought to gain the support Great Britain's Foreign Minister, Douglas Hurd, was of the rest of the European Community through infor- somewhat less adamant, but he was also convinced mal contacts at a time when consultations among the that recognition was still premature. Allied to European Community's foreign ministers were espe- Genscher on this question were 's Foreign cially intensive in preparation for the Maastricht Con- Minister Ellernann-Jensen and 's Eyskens. ference. To be clear, the Maastricht Conference held 's Foreign Minister Roland Dumas did not take on December 9-10, 1991, turned out to be a major an openly opposing stand, but emphasized instead the disappointment for Croatian public opinion, since the need to understand Germany's position. At that meet- Croatian issue was not even mentioned on the ing, 's de Michelis, who up to then routinely had conference's official agenda. However, what the con- taken a favourable stand toward Belgrade, warned ference did establish was in fact that the member states (possibly influence by Cossiga and by Andreotti's re- should adopt a common position on matters of defence thinking) that the European Community's credibility and foreign policy. This was to be a decisive factor in was being undermined by the Serbs' ignoring of its the European Community meeting held a week later positions and warnings. De Michelis took the posi- in Brussels. tion that an end had to be put to this situation, and that this could be accomplished by granting recognition to Croatia and Slovenia. In particular, de Michelis The European Community Makes A Decision stressed that all the European Community members had to agree unanimously on a decision on recogni- Despite the request which de Cuellar and Baker tion. Van den Broek (as the President of the European sent in writing to Genscher and the one Bush sent to Community's Council of Ministers - a position which Kohl on December 15, 1991 for Germany not to rush rotated every six months) - also accepted this posi- unilaterally into recognizing Croatia and Slovenia - a tion, as he was especially irritated by Belgrade's du- request intended to moderate Germany's known in- plicity. Specifically, the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav tention to do so - these demarches by the Secretary Army on several occasions had signed cease-fire General of the United Nations and by the President of agreements and had promised not to shell civilian tar- the United States did not have any effect, since gets. Contrary to the commitments already undertaken Genscher was able to deflect such warnings and ap- the Yugoslav Army continued its attacks and seizure proaches skilfully. of territory undeterred. The attacks on Vukovar, Slunj, At Genscher's initiative, a discussion of a "list Drnis, Zadar, Karlovac, Osijek, and Dubrovnik re- of conditions" for the recognition of new states - or vealed the true nature of the Yugoslav Army's out-of- more exactly a declaration of procedures for the rec- control leadership and had a profound impact on Van ognition of new states in Eastern Europe and the So- den Broek's views. viet Union - was placed on the agenda of the Confer- Thanks to the principles announced in ence on Yugoslavia. The draft of this document had Maastricht mandating a united approach on foreign been worked out already by France and Germany, and policy matters for members of the European Commu- contained the criteria which individual countries nity a consensus was achieved on December 17, 1991 would have to fulfil in order to meet the precondi- on diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. It tions for diplomatic recognition. The foreign minis- is natural and to be expected that differences could ters quickly reached agreement on these criteria, based arise in the assessments and positions of twelve inde- on the text of the above-mentioned declaration, a de- pendent countries, especially when the focus of such cision which followed naturally from the reports of differences was only on the appropriate moment to the Arbitration Commission of the European provide Croatia and Slovenia with protection and the Community's Conference on Yugoslavia. Slovenia and satisfaction of a diplomatic recognition from such a JANUARY - MARCH 1999 29 respected group of countries. Indeed, it would be more included countries on all continents. With that, surprising if such differences did not exist, especially Croatia's legal existence as a state was confirmed ir- given the different experience, level of knowledge, revocably and for all times. and interpretation of the nature and cause of the con- After the end of the Cold War, the United States flicts which appeared generally as the tyranny of Com- remained as the sole superpower. However, the United munism collapsed in Europe. States was to take the initiative commensurate with However, it is more difficult to understand how its role and importance only in those areas where countries such as Great Britain and France, with a American national interests are at stake. It sounds wealth of experience in foreign affairs, left room for eminently logical when President William Clinton says speculation, doubt and criticism surrounding the dip- that the United States does not want to be the world's lomatic recognition of Croatia. That is, after having policeman. However, being the sole superpower does weighed all the pros and cons, France and Great Brit- not mean simply having more rights; it means at the ain agreed to recognize Croatia, but it seems that they same time also having more responsibilities. It is also should not have allowed the impression to develop in understandable that the preconditions (were not for) European public opinion that the decision had been the United States' sending its boys to die in some taken against their advise and even their will, and that Balkan valley. Nevertheless, by the same token, the they had agreed only under German pressure. impression was created that the United States was not On the contrary it is abundantly clear that both only tolerating but encouraging aggression. Such ac- France and Great Britain had viewed the decision to tions as the parading of the Sixth Fleet in the Adriatic, recognize Croatia as both justified and appropriate. stationing the most modem aircraft a few minutes' Based on that premise, these two countries' experi- flying time away from the combat zones, patrolling enced diplomatic corps should have used the strength the air space over Bosnia-Herzegovina to monitor the of their authority to prevent the Belgrade regime from "No Fly Zone" (even though the Serbian air force has avoiding blame for its defeat before its own people by violated that air space hundreds of times), as well as using such false excuses. France and Great Britain had the reinforcement provided indirectly by its public an obligation to prevent paranoia in the Serbian me- declarations, suggest such an intent. That is, how was dia from having a field day by distorting history and Serbia to interpret the statements and warnings by claiming that Croatia had achieved its independence official spokesmen that the United States viewed that solely thanks to German revanchism aimed against its own national interests would be at risk if violence Serbia, and that this represents a new German thrust began against Macedonia or Kosovo? In Belgrade, the toward the East, that Serbia's traditional allies in two conclusion to be drawn was that, therefore, Croatia world wars had betrayed it and that Serbia was a vic- and Bosnia-Herzegovina were outside the United tim of German economic expansion. Since such dis- States' defence perimeter and that "we have a free tortions have fertile ground in Serbia, Great Britain hand to use violence there and seize as much land as and France should not have granted to Milosevic such we can." a favour and, at the same time such a disservice to the This state of inertia, agony violence, and war Serbian people. has lasted too long. Ambassador Warren Zimmerman, The subsequent flow of events suggests that Secretary of State James Baker and, in particular, Un- Great Britain and France should have sent Belgrade a der Secretary of State Lawrence Egleburger squan- direct message that the diplomatic recognition of dered valuable time before they understood that Croatia was a direct consequence of the aggression Milosevic, the butcher of the Balkans, was hurtling and policy of force which the JNA and Milosevic's the peoples of the former Yugoslavia, and perhaps Serbia had implemented systematically against beyond, into the maelstrom of war. Croatia. Such a move would have put a stop to Serbia's It must also be noted that the military power exploitation of the "precani" Serbs and would have which Belgrade was able to build up over decades ended the hold of Milosevic's propaganda over the made the Yugoslav Army the third or fourth largest in Serbian masses. Europe, and the United States cannot deny its part in creating that oversized armed force, which was sup- plied with an arsenal of modem weaponry. It was that The Ultimate Affirmation of Statehood armed force which swooped down on the very people it had supposedly been designed to protect, while au- In the weeks following Croatia's recognition by diences across Europe, the United States, and around the European Community, recognition also followed the world watched in horror. Finally, the principal fi- by many other countries, begining with Austria, Hun- nancial infusions enabling the Yugoslav Communist gary, , , the Scandinavian and Latin dictatorship to survive came from the other side of American countries, Australia, and , and the Atlantic. 30 CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW USA Initiative in South-Eastern Europe One has to remember that in neither the beginnings nor the preconditions for democracy to de- It is instructive to also remember the decisive velop have ever existed, despite the fact that society and courageous statement that President Ronald has produced many world-class philosophers, artists, Reagan directed to the Soviets during the first days of and activists working for human and national rights, his first term in office, that is when the Cold War was social justice, and tolerance. However, the Orthodox still raging and, perhaps, was at its very zenith. That ethos and belief system incline toward absolute rule, statement went something like this: "The Soviets are and the opportunity to prevent the development of a prepared to lie, bluff, kill, and commit any crime in new mastodon in Eastern Europe will probably be lost order to achieve their goals," Milosevic, General Ratko soon, to the detriment of the U.S. and the European Mladic, and those like them who were weaned on the Union. A giant will arise again in the East. Because same Soviet ideology undoubtedly deserve the same of its nature and essence, this giant will always be approach as was used with the Soviets. If Reagan was governed by absolutists and dictators. Bolstered by so successful against the Soviets using this approach, revived ideologies and utopias, and exploiting mis- Bush would surely have also been successful with understandings and crimes, this giant could become Milosevic. the dominant superpower in the Balkans. Contrary to Despite a long and consequence-laden delay, the U.S., Russia will always consider the entire policymakers in the U.S. eventually arrived at the con- Balkans to be a vital national interest, even without clusion that Milosevic and Karadzic are war crimi- making any provocative declarations to that effect. nals and that they would have to answer for war crimes Ultimately, what the West and the United States committed in the former Yugoslavia. Yet, surprisingly, have failed to understand about Milosevic's Serbia is Croatian policy was slow to respond to this clearly that Milosevic has only changed the name of his Com- positive initiative. munist Party, while, under the new clothing the old What is at stake, ultimately, is the credibility of Bolshevik structure, contents, ideology, methods, and the European Community, the United Nations, and of totalitarian machinery have survived unchanged. the only remaining superpower, the United States. Can I am inclined to agree with Michael Kramer their prestige be restored, in light of the fact that after who, in seeking to define the Clinton Doctrine, wrote many months they still have not been able to cut off in Time magazine that Clinton justifies his retreats eu- oil supplies to Serbia completely? It is sad to realize phemistically as "pragmatism". As a result, Kramer that if Serbia's oil had been cut off immediately when warned, America must worry about becoming a pris- the United Nations sanctions were imposed, the de- oner of self induced impotence which, perhaps, will structive war and the civilian population's suffering be how the "Clinton Doctrine" will be remembered in in this region would have ended long ago. Despite the history. The United States' performance in the US's international role, significance, and power, the Yugoslav crisis up to middle of August 1995 has been latter has accepted in a surprisingly casual manner the less than adequate for the world's only superpower. fundamental principle of a sort of Manroe Doctrine In view of the importance and the number of as applied to the territories of the former Soviet Union. Muslim states in Africa and Asia, the Security Coun- That is, other powers should not interfere in those ar- cil and the USA Administration began to realise that eas that once formed part of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the USA as the only world super power should not Russia's hegemony is tolerated and accepted even remain passive regarding the war horrors in Bosnia - though there is no guarantee (or even likelihood) that Herzegovina. During 1993/94 USA finally took the totalitarianism, absolutism, and autocracy will disap- initiative which resulted first with the Washington pear in Russia.For Moscow, the key concern is to pro- Agreement and then the Dayton Agreement. It has to mote those forces in neighbouring states which favour be said that as early as 1993 Washington initiated the greater direct political, economic, and state links of gathering of support among the allies in Europe, fist dependency with Russia. Even now, many Orthodox of all Great Britain and France, to stop the Serbian Communists enjoy Moscow's support as they com- aggression by using superior military power in the air pete against democratic movements if the latter move- and on the sea. ments are seen to promote independence or autonomy The Pentagon prepared the strategy called "lift from Russia. This short-sighted perspective of Russia and destroy "which involved imposing the no-fly zone should be of concern because it is very probable that and destroying the Serbian military potential in Bosnia. the current economic and political crisis in Russia - However, while touring the European capitals in the which is the result of the breakdown of the Commu- attempt to gather support the US Secretary of State nist system - will abate and that Russia will recover Warren Crhistopher failed dismally. in due course. l JANUARY - MARCH 1999 31 The Confirmation of the Croatian Integrity but literally of the right to live of over one hundred thousand men, women and children. By attaching high value and respect to all rel- Under such circumstances and particularly as evant UN Security Council resolutions, Croatia had a result of the inefficiency of UNPROFOR and Carl the right to expect that despite the years of shelling Buildt's wrong estimates and behaviour, the action and armed conflict in the neighbouring Bosnia - "Storm" took place. The Croatia defenders stopped Herzegovina, "the Safe Areas" as declared by the UN, further escalation of violence and systematic ethnic would be protected and maintained. The Safe Areas cleansing of the population. Although there was sup- included Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac, Srebrenica, Gorazde port in UN resolutions in writing and spirit, Croatia and Zepa. The obligations and guarantees taken from reached the whole of the border line with Bosnia - the UN Security Council and the international com- Herzegovina by using its own forces. It has to be munity were not respected and the ruthless endanger- pointed out that the operation "Storm" opened the way ing of the civil population in the urban communities for the NATO air strike intervention in Bosnia - continued. A special envoy of the UN Secretary Gen- Herzegovina which followed and created the condi- eral, Mr. Akashi, tried in vain to stop the Serb para- tions for Dayton. With the operation "Storm"Croatia military forces from attacking the Safe Area of Bihac actually saved the population of Gorazde and Bihac. from the Croatian territory, the part of which was then Acting in accordance with the Article 51 of the occupied. UN Charter and using its own forces Croatia turned away the rebels from its territory in Banovina, north- However, the war criminals Karadzic and west and the nothern part of Dalmatia. With the Mladic together with their Serb patrons in Belgrade, same police-military operation "Storm"Croatia saved continued with ruthless and callous violence and eth- the Bihac and Cazin area as well as Gorazde. The ob- nic (cleansing) extermination. The tragic fate of the ligations taken by Europe, the NATO and the UN re- population of the Safe Areas in Bosnia - Herzegovina garding these areas were carried out by Croatia. at the beginning of the summer 1995 reached its cul- In doing so Croatia not only stopped the hor- mination in genocidal violence of catastrophic pro- rendous suffering of the already long suffering popu- portions suffered by the whole population of lation in the neighbouring Bosnia -Herzegovina, but Srebrenica and Zepa in July 1995 and passively ob- also saved the reputation of the UN Security Council. served and tolerated by the UNPROFOR and the whole Certain incidents that took place in the occu- of the international community. Shocking scenes of pied areas of Croatia from whitch the terrorists were women, children and the old leaving, not of their own driven away deserve criticism and condemnation. will, but because they were forced to do so, i.e. ethnic Croatia has an obligation to view them as such in or- cleansing gained new momentwn. Those examples fi- der to prove that it is often unjustly put in the same nally proved the indecisiveness and ineffectiveness category as the aggressors. Perfection, however, is of the UNPROFOR. rarely found in this world. At the beginning of August of 1995 it was up Let me conclude by saying that all of this cre- to the uncontrollable self-will of the war criminals ated conditions for the NATO military attack on the Karadzic and Mladic to decide either whether to con- Serbian military targets in Bosnia - Herzegovina which tinue with their crimes in Bihac or to concentrate on soon followed. Following the UN Security Council Gorazde or to do it all at the same time. Judging from resolutions NATO finally used the only language that the circumstances prevailing at the time that is pre- Belgrade understood - the language of military force. cisely what would have happened hadn't Croatia mili- Milosevic finally agreed to halt the war terror and sub- tarily intervened. sequently realized that it would be unavoidable to sit Acting in accordance with its constitutional ob- down at the negotiating table at Dayton. ligations and indisputable commitment of the Croatian people and all Croatian citizens in protecting the sov- Territorial Integrity ereignty and territorial integrity of their state, in order to start liberating the occupied parts ofBanovina, Lika Territory in addition to population and govern- and northern Dalmatia, Croatia at the same time had ing bodies is one of the three main determinants of the obligation to prevent further humanitarian trag- any state. Territory of a state is defined by state bor- edy developing for the population of the Cazin area ders on which the state sovereignty is and Bihac. The basic human rights of the inhabitants extended. Borders are lines which define a state area of these areas were critically abused and they were and can also be defined as an uneven line which brought to the edge of existence by suffering from star- crosses the surface of land mass.Consequently, bor- vation, lack of water and in particular of medicine. It ders extend underground as well as into the air and could and should not be passively observed any longer also cover the area of the sea surface, the sea bed and as it represented not only the abuse of human rights beneath the sea bed. 32 CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSREVIEW

As far as the border problems of Croatia are build a marina for yachts within the area of the concerned, it has to be emphasised that there are not Prevlaka Bay which in addition to the tourist facili- either towards Slovenia or towards Serbia or ties would stretch over the whole area of the Cape Montenegro any hamlets or villages that would be a Ostro. On the very top of the Cape, in the fortress built matter of dispute. However, there is still work to be during the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, building of done on establishing Croatian borders with its memorial museum is planned in order to commemo- neighbours on the sea. rate all the defenders of the Croatian youth killed dur- The integration of the Croatian region, ing the Homeland War as well as the innocent victims has been accomplished. sent to their deaths in the attacks on Risanj and Similarly, in the most south-eastern part of Ledenice in Boka Kotorska in the autumn of 1944. Croatia, at the Cape Ostro, where the UN observers There is a real ground for hope that this initia- are still present with the mandate of the UN Security tive, which aims at creating tourist facilities in this Council resolutions on Prevlaka, there are certain re- deserted area of the Croatian most southern part of strictions preventing the Croatian authorities from car- the coast, will result in a positive reaction from our rying out their duties unhindered. However, that does eastern neighbour. The Montenegrin Government has not essentially impinge on the territorial integrity of already submitted the Plans for the Regional Devel- the Republic of Croatia which was clearly stated in opment for the whole of Montenegro were submitted the UN resolutions. The latest UN resolutions on to the Parliament of Montenegro, but the plans did Prevlaka explicitly state that "The Security Council not include the Prevlaka area i.e. the Cape Ostro. confirms once again its obligation to protect the inde- The imperatives of the economic recovery for pendence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Boka Kotorska and whole coastal area of Montenegro Republic of Croatia." are to be found in tourism which has no chance of Over the last years Prevlaka has received a lot further development unless it gives up for good its of publicity in the international community, although territorial aspirations, i.e. unless the peaceful inten- the cape Ostro or as it is most commonly called tions prevail with our neighbours as well. Many of Prevlaka, as a territory does not physically touch the the Croatian south-eastern neighbours have realised land border between Croatia and the FRY within the that any concessions on the Croatian part either on straits leading into the Bay of Boka-Kotorska. the land or on the sea, would mean a reward for the The land border between Croatia and aggression. Montenegro goes along the mountainous rocks on Croatia is approaching a final agreement on Bjelotina and Dracevica above the eastern part of open questions regarding the borders with the Konavle, while on the shore the border comes out on neighbouring Slovenia. Along the whole of 670 km "Konflin", in the area of the cape Kobila which is not land border which stretches from three-border point part of Prevlaka. The whole 25 km land border has with to the estuary of the river in been bilaterally established with great precision and the Bay of Piran, the geodesist experts with their ex- as such have been respected for centuries. perience and professionalism, have done a great Despite the fact that the Agreement on the amount of work. In several open and unresolved ar- Normalisation of Relations between Croatia and Yu- eas the final solutions are gaining shape and it can be goslavia was signed on 23 August 1996, basic pre- expected that they would be acceptable for both coun- condition for the real development of the relations in tries. A long part of the land border goes along the the border area of the two neighbouring countries is rivers Mura, , and Dragonja which makes the establishing of the Croatia border guards on both the situation considerably simpler, easier. However, Bjelotina and Dracevica along the border line which the change of course of these rivers over the last sev- is the internationally recognised border. eral decades has called for certain coordination. That It is important to stress that in October 1991 the job is in its final phase and that can explain the pa- Parliament of Montenegro has used the term "the ex- tience on the Croatian side regarding the actual situa- isting border" for this particular border. That was in tion on St. Gera, mountain. June 1991 after the NATO's Political Department in its Solution of the border disputes between working paper entitled "Europe's Lebanon", which re- Slovenia and Croatia is made easier by the Constitu- ferred to the areas of the SFRY, of that time had been tional decisions both countries made upon gaining preparing its members, recalling the principles stated their independence. On 25th June 1991 the same view in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, that on mutual recognition and respect of borders which Slovenia and Croatia should be recognised, as well as existed in the former SFRY was accepted. Therefore, any other republic that proclaims its independence the task of diplomatic commissions of the two coun- within the borders established after the World War II. tries is to establish bilaterally the factual situation Croatia shows the adherence to the peaceful co- which existed in June of 1991. So far the progress operation with its neighbours in its determination to made in this area has been encouraging. •