The 2000 Vote for President
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THE 2000 VOTE FOR PRESIDENT KENNETH M. GOLDSTEIN n the aftermath of zle. With peace and a presidential elec- prosperity in the Ition that essentially country, all political ended in a tie, atten- science or economic tion has been focused models of the contest on all sorts of topics predicted a comfort- that have been able win for Al Gore. ignored in previous In fact, in early years — and that September, a panel of would have been seven political scien- ignored this year were tists presented their it not for a few thou- findings at the disci- sand votes in one pline’s annual meet- sunny state. For exam- ing in Washington ple, the television net- D.C. All seven confi- works have made mis- dently predicted that takes in previous Al Gore would win years on their election between 53 percent night calls, hundreds and 60 percent of the of millions of votes two party vote. There have been cast on punch card ballots over the certainly may be some problems with such last thirty years, a small percentage of ballots models, but it is hard to argue with their basic have always been undercounted in presiden- intuition: the political winds were certainly in tial elections in this country, and ideology has Gore’s sails. So, what happened? always been an important determinant of judi- Using election-day exit polls conducted by cial decisions. Similarly, all sorts of fundamen- the media consortium, Voter News Service tal currents and divisions within the electorate (VNS), many observers have pointed to the have been “discovered” and are now hot top- gender gap, the race gap, the income gap, and ics with pundits and analysts. Much of this the rural/urban gap (just to name a few) as an post-election analysis, however, ignores a key explanation for why one presidential candi- question: why was this election so close? date or the other did not win the presidential In other words, much attention has been race more decisively. “If only George W. Bush paid to the consequences of a close election — had done a couple percentage points better re-counts, chads, and judicial intervention — with women or black voters.” “If only Al Gore but relatively little attention has been paid to had done a bit better with men or middle what caused the closeness. The very closeness of this election is most certainly its biggest puz- Kenneth M. Goldstein is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Wisconsin Interest 23 income voters.” According to many of these two factors that were also highly correlated same pundits, the various gender, racial, and with a Democratic vote. class gaps also demonstrate that the United More generally, this last example under- States is a nation characterized by deep politi- scores the point that divisions among demo- cal divisions. graphic groups may really speak to the endur- To be sure, men and women, blacks and ing characteristics of each of the party’s core whites, rich and poor, city dwellers and rural voters or partisans. Decades of research have inhabitants did have strikingly different voting shown that party identification is the single patterns in the 2000 election. Al Gore won most stable and powerful predictor of political women’s votes by 11 percentage points (54 attitudes and voting behavior. Put in its most percent to 43 percent) and George W. Bush simple form, Democrats almost always win the took the votes of men by an identical 11-per- votes of Democratic identifiers, who are more centage point margin (53 percent to 42 per- likely to be women, minorities, union voters, cent). Similarly, white voters went for Bush by the less affluent, and city dwellers. 12 percentage points (54 percent to 42 percent), Republicans almost always win the votes of while exactly nine in ten black voters and a lit- Republican identifiers, who are more likely to tle over six in ten Hispanic voters (62 percent) be men, whites, the affluent, and small town or went for Gore. Wealthier voters with house- rural residents. The turnout rates as well as the hold incomes over $100,000 favored Bush by loyalty of partisans and the votes of indepen- 11 percentage points (54 percent to 43 percent). dent swing voters decide presidential elec- Those with incomes under $30,000 picked tions. In the 2000 contest, Gore won the votes Gore by a 15-percentage point margin (55 per- of 86 percent of Democrats and Bush won the cent to 40 percent). A little over six in ten vot- votes of 91 percent of Republicans. ers from urban areas (61 percent) voted for The bottom line is that there is little new in Gore, while just a little fewer than six in ten “gap” analysis, and such a focus obscures fun- rural voters (59 percent) went for Bush. damental truths about the nature of the Although 2000 evinced the largest gender American electorate and what factors drove gap on record, such differences have been part this election. In short, when it comes to the vot- of the electoral landscape for the past 20 years. ing patterns of particular groups in the 2000 In 1996, for example, there was a 16-percentage election, the story was really just more of the point gender gap, and while winning a land- same. There were — as there have always been slide victory, Bill Clinton lost to Bob Dole — real differences in the voting patterns of among male voters. Moreover, one must be those with strong party attachments. careful when looking at bivariate relationships. Putting these gaps in perspective also sug- For instance, amongst women there were sig- gests that the existence of such group divisions nificant differences in voting patterns. White in the electorate does not necessarily translate women split evenly between Gore and Bush, into a divided nation. With their most loyal while non-white women supported Gore by 60 voters secure, both candidates spent most of percentage points. Working women favored the campaign aiming their messages at swing Gore by 19 percentage points while women voters in the center of the ideological spec- who did not work outside the home favored trum: suburban voters who comprised 48 per- Bush by eight percentage points. Finally, work- cent of the electorate, independents who com- ing mothers favored Gore by 22 percentage prised 27 percent of the electorate, and self- points, while at-home moms favored Bush by described middle class voters who comprised 24 percentage points. All in all, women in the 49 percent of the electorate. There were cer- electorate were more likely to have lower lev- tainly some heated moments during and after els of education and lower levels of income — the campaign. Predictably, the Democrats 24 Winter 2001 attempted to convince voters that Bush was strong, the public is likely to have a favorable not up to the job and would destroy the Social view of the incumbent administration. Swing Security system with risky tax cuts for the voters are most influenced by such short-term upper class. Equally as a predictable, factors. Republicans tried to convince voters that Gore Some strategic decisions of the Bush cam- could not be trusted and would squander the paign can — and certainly will be — second- entire federal budget surplus with new spend- guessed. Most prominent among these deci- ing programs. All in all, though, with their sions was the decision to contest California. bases secure, both candidates minimized ideo- logical differences and the campaign was not Throughout the fall, the Bush campaign particularly divisive. The Bush campaign dis- made modest buys in some of the state’s less played racial diversity at their convention and expensive media markets, Fresno, Sacramento, promised that they would save Social Security, and San Diego. In later October, however, the provide prescription drug benefits, and focus campaign poured millions of dollars into buys on education. The Gore campaign talked about in the pricey Los Angeles and San Francisco fiscal responsibility and markets. Overall, the pressuring the entertain- Bush campaign and the ment industry to reduce Republican National the amount of sex and Committee (RNC) spent violence in its movies. over 14 million dollars on television advertising in With only a slight [M]athematically what the state. Not only did Democratic advantage in made this election so Bush not even come close party identification (39 in the state — losing by percent to 35 percent for close was the fact that 12 percentage points — the Republicans) and but his spending there loyal partisan voters on the swing voters did not failed to shake Gore from both sides, mathematical- his strategy; the Gore ly what made this elec- swing. campaign did not divert tion so close was the fact any resources for televi- that the swing voters did sion advertising into the not swing. Independents Golden State. divided 47 percent for Bush to 45 percent for Gore. Self-defined “mid- Some Republican strategists argue that the dle-class” voters went 49 percent for Bush and campaign was already covering at saturation 48 percent for Gore. Suburbanites split 49 per- levels all the other important markets. cent for Bush and 47 percent for Gore. The real Although that is true enough, perhaps money puzzle then is why the swing vote did not could have been used for other purposes. Also, swing. even if the money could not have been placed in other markets or used for purposes other Presidential elections are referendums on than television late in the campaign, perhaps it the incumbent. Even though Americans may could have been used in August or September.