THE 2000 VOTE FOR PRESIDENT

KENNETH M. GOLDSTEIN

n the aftermath of zle. With peace and a presidential elec- prosperity in the Ition that essentially country, all political ended in a tie, atten- science or economic tion has been focused models of the contest on all sorts of topics predicted a comfort- that have been able win for Al Gore. ignored in previous In fact, in early years — and that September, a panel of would have been seven political scien- ignored this year were tists presented their it not for a few thou- findings at the disci- sand votes in one pline’s annual meet- sunny state. For exam- ing in Washington ple, the television net- D.C. All seven confi- works have made mis- dently predicted that takes in previous Al Gore would win years on their between 53 percent night calls, hundreds and 60 percent of the of millions of votes two party vote. There have been cast on punch card ballots over the certainly may be some problems with such last thirty years, a small percentage of ballots models, but it is hard to argue with their basic have always been undercounted in presiden- intuition: the political winds were certainly in tial in this country, and ideology has Gore’s sails. So, what happened? always been an important determinant of judi- Using election-day exit polls conducted by cial decisions. Similarly, all sorts of fundamen- the media consortium, Voter News Service tal currents and divisions within the electorate (VNS), many observers have pointed to the have been “discovered” and are now hot top- gender gap, the race gap, the income gap, and ics with pundits and analysts. Much of this the rural/urban gap (just to name a few) as an post-election analysis, however, ignores a key explanation for why one presidential candi- question: why was this election so close? date or the other did not win the presidential In other words, much attention has been race more decisively. “If only George W. Bush paid to the consequences of a close election — had done a couple percentage points better re-counts, chads, and judicial intervention — with women or black voters.” “If only Al Gore but relatively little attention has been paid to had done a bit better with men or middle what caused the closeness. The very closeness of this election is most certainly its biggest puz- Kenneth M. Goldstein is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Wisconsin Interest 23 income voters.” According to many of these two factors that were also highly correlated same pundits, the various gender, racial, and with a Democratic vote. class gaps also demonstrate that the United More generally, this last example under- States is a nation characterized by deep politi- scores the point that divisions among demo- cal divisions. graphic groups may really speak to the endur- To be sure, men and women, blacks and ing characteristics of each of the party’s core whites, rich and poor, city dwellers and rural voters or partisans. Decades of research have inhabitants did have strikingly different shown that party identification is the single patterns in the 2000 election. Al Gore won most stable and powerful predictor of political women’s votes by 11 percentage points (54 attitudes and voting behavior. Put in its most percent to 43 percent) and George W. Bush simple form, Democrats almost always win the took the votes of men by an identical 11-per- votes of Democratic identifiers, who are more centage point margin (53 percent to 42 per- likely to be women, minorities, union voters, cent). Similarly, white voters went for Bush by the less affluent, and city dwellers. 12 percentage points (54 percent to 42 percent), Republicans almost always win the votes of while exactly nine in ten black voters and a lit- Republican identifiers, who are more likely to tle over six in ten Hispanic voters (62 percent) be men, whites, the affluent, and small town or went for Gore. Wealthier voters with house- rural residents. The turnout rates as well as the hold incomes over $100,000 favored Bush by loyalty of partisans and the votes of indepen- 11 percentage points (54 percent to 43 percent). dent voters decide presidential elec- Those with incomes under $30,000 picked tions. In the 2000 contest, Gore won the votes Gore by a 15-percentage point margin (55 per- of 86 percent of Democrats and Bush won the cent to 40 percent). A little over six in ten vot- votes of 91 percent of Republicans. ers from urban areas (61 percent) voted for The bottom line is that there is little new in Gore, while just a little fewer than six in ten “gap” analysis, and such a focus obscures fun- rural voters (59 percent) went for Bush. damental truths about the nature of the Although 2000 evinced the largest gender American electorate and what factors drove gap on record, such differences have been part this election. In short, when it comes to the vot- of the electoral landscape for the past 20 years. ing patterns of particular groups in the 2000 In 1996, for example, there was a 16-percentage election, the story was really just more of the point gender gap, and while winning a land- same. There were — as there have always been slide victory, lost to Bob Dole — real differences in the voting patterns of among male voters. Moreover, one must be those with strong party attachments. careful when looking at bivariate relationships. Putting these gaps in perspective also sug- For instance, amongst women there were sig- gests that the existence of such group divisions nificant differences in voting patterns. White in the electorate does not necessarily translate women split evenly between Gore and Bush, into a divided nation. With their most loyal while non-white women supported Gore by 60 voters secure, both candidates spent most of percentage points. Working women favored the campaign aiming their messages at swing Gore by 19 percentage points while women voters in the center of the ideological spec- who did not work outside the home favored trum: suburban voters who comprised 48 per- Bush by eight percentage points. Finally, work- cent of the electorate, independents who com- ing mothers favored Gore by 22 percentage prised 27 percent of the electorate, and self- points, while at-home moms favored Bush by described middle class voters who comprised 24 percentage points. All in all, women in the 49 percent of the electorate. There were cer- electorate were more likely to have lower lev- tainly some heated moments during and after els of education and lower levels of income — the campaign. Predictably, the Democrats

24 Winter 2001 attempted to convince voters that Bush was strong, the public is likely to have a favorable not up to the job and would destroy the Social view of the incumbent administration. Swing Security system with risky tax cuts for the voters are most influenced by such short-term upper class. Equally as a predictable, factors. Republicans tried to convince voters that Gore Some strategic decisions of the Bush cam- could not be trusted and would squander the paign can — and certainly will be — second- entire federal budget surplus with new spend- guessed. Most prominent among these deci- ing programs. All in all, though, with their sions was the decision to contest California. bases secure, both candidates minimized ideo- logical differences and the campaign was not Throughout the fall, the Bush campaign particularly divisive. The Bush campaign dis- made modest buys in some of the state’s less played racial diversity at their convention and expensive media markets, Fresno, Sacramento, promised that they would save Social Security, and San Diego. In later October, however, the provide prescription drug benefits, and focus campaign poured millions of dollars into buys on education. The Gore campaign talked about in the pricey Los Angeles and San Francisco fiscal responsibility and markets. Overall, the pressuring the entertain- Bush campaign and the ment industry to reduce Republican National the amount of sex and Committee (RNC) spent violence in its movies. over 14 million dollars on television advertising in With only a slight [M]athematically what the state. Not only did Democratic advantage in made this election so Bush not even come close party identification (39 in the state — losing by percent to 35 percent for close was the fact that 12 percentage points — the Republicans) and but his spending there loyal voters on the swing voters did not failed to shake Gore from both sides, mathematical- his strategy; the Gore ly what made this elec- swing. campaign did not divert tion so close was the fact any resources for televi- that the swing voters did sion advertising into the not swing. Independents Golden State. divided 47 percent for Bush to 45 percent for Gore. Self-defined “mid- Some Republican strategists argue that the dle-class” voters went 49 percent for Bush and campaign was already covering at saturation 48 percent for Gore. Suburbanites split 49 per- levels all the other important markets. cent for Bush and 47 percent for Gore. The real Although that is true enough, perhaps money puzzle then is why the swing vote did not could have been used for other purposes. Also, swing. even if the money could not have been placed in other markets or used for purposes other Presidential elections are on than television late in the campaign, perhaps it the incumbent. Even though Americans may could have been used in August or September. know little about the exact policies of the two Remember Al Gore’s August? From choosing parties, they do know whether times are good Joe Lieberman to kissing his wife before a well- or bad and vote accordingly. Prominent received convention speech, Gore received among the short-term factors that influence a extremely positive coverage in August and voter’s sense of the times and assessments of early September and took a solid lead over the incumbent administration — and conse- Governor Bush. While there was little that the quently the loyalty of partisans and the direc- Bush campaign could have done about all this tion of independents — is public perception of free media coverage, the Democratic National the state of the economy. When the economy is

Wisconsin Interest 25 Committee (DNC) also outspent the RNC by the economy is shown by the following exam- over ten million dollars ($35 million to $25 mil- ple. In 1996, one in three Americans thought lion) over the course of the summer. This high- that their family’s economic situation was bet- ly aggregated number, however, masked a ter than compared to four years prior. Bill more significant story. According to data I Clinton won these voters by over 40 percent- gathered on the television air war during the age points. In the 2000 contest, even more vot- month of August, in the top markets in the ers thought that they were better off than they major swing states (Detroit, Flint, Grand were four years ago (50 percent). Yet, Al Gore Rapids, Columbus, Cleveland, Toledo, only won their votes by 25 percentage points Cincinnati, Wilkes Barre, Pittsburgh, in 2000. Philadelphia) the DNC had a three to two or The data are not in hand to determine two to one advantage in spots aired over the definitively why Al Gore did not perform bet- RNC. Although, the RNC and Bush campaign ter. Still, some speculation is in order. Gore made massive buys in the last weeks of the certainly did not have the charisma or political election to close these gaps and the Bush cam- skills of a Bill Clinton. Gore’s awkward and paign was able to regain momentum by the often arrogant performances on the campaign end of September, Gore’s August bounce trail and in the debates stand in contrast to not structured the early part of the race. only Clinton but to Gore’s own performance in Given how close the race ended up, and his concession speech. As I write this essay, a contrary to some of the snap polling conducted few days after the final Supreme Court deci- in its aftermath, it seems plausible that the sion and the concession speech, a number of release of Governor Bush’s drunk driving Democratic consultants have bemoaned to me arrest did have an impact on the race. In most the fact that the “concession speech” Gore was national polls, Bush seemed to be gaining not visible during the campaign. ground and had a three or four percentage Ralph Nader clearly hurt the Vice- point lead. As we all know, the race ended up President’s chances. Most analysis has focused even and exit polls suggest that many late on parsing up Nader’s 2.7 percent of the deciders went for Gore. Although we will national vote. Although we cannot know for probably never have the data to know for cer- sure, it seems reasonable to claim that while a tain that it was the drunk driving arrest that significant number of Nader voters may not stopped Bush’s momentum and caused late have voted or might have voted for another deciders to go for Gore, I think it has to be part fringe candidate, more of Nader supporters of the story. It is very unusual for undecided clearly would have voted for Gore. So, with voters to break toward an incumbent (which Nader out of the race, Gore would have Gore essentially was) in the last days of cam- enjoyed a slightly larger win in the overall pop- paign. Most political consultants playing ular vote. It is, of course, the states that matter Monday morning quarterback argue that the and Gore eventually won the states where it Bush campaign should have released this seemed that Nader’s presence provided the information on its own at a much earlier point greatest challenge: Minnesota, Washington, in the campaign. Oregon, New Mexico, and Wisconsin. Of Still, whatever mistakes the Bush cam- course, given the closeness of this race and the paign may have made, it is the Gore campaign fact that even a few hundred Nader votes in that has more to explain. With the wind at Florida or a few thousand votes in New their back in the form of a strong economy at Hampshire cost Gore the presidency, one may home, relative peace and security abroad, and need to go no further than this basic analysis to an opponent with little national political or show that Nader’s presence mattered. policy experience, their man was not able to Still, Nader’s real effect may have been win swing voters in a relatively decisive fash- more indirect. Nader’s presence forced the ion. Gore’s inability to take full advantage of

26 Winter 2001 Gore campaign to alter both its message and among voters in their attitudes toward Clinton the targeting of campaign resources. In other as president and as a person. Although 55 per- words, while Gore ended up winning states cent of voters approved of the job that Clinton like Wisconsin and Minnesota, the Gore cam- was doing as president, over one in three of paign had to head to the left with a populist these very same voters (20 percent of all vot- message to secure its base. Such a message did ers) thought little of Clinton as a person. While not resonate as well with swing voters. these voters still went for Gore by 30 percent- Furthermore, the more populist message, age points, voters with a positive view of described by one wry observer as “we’re rich Clinton’s job performance and the state of the as hell and we’re not going to take it,” made it economy should have been an even greater difficult for Gore to embrace the strong econo- source of Gore votes. my as much as he needed to — and as most Of course, in an election that was this election models assumed he would. close, just about anything could plausibly be Nader provided tactical or targeting chal- argued to have made the difference: the lenges as well to the Gore campaign. Gore and turnout of partisans, the existence of various his interest group allies on the Democratic left gaps, the advertising and travel decisions of had to spend money in states that should have campaigns, and the airing of Governor Bush’s been safely in the Democratic column. For drunk driving conviction days before the elec- example, an analysis I did on television adver- tion. The presidential election proved a virtual tising expenditures during the 2000 campaign tie because of the close balance in terms of core showed that Gore and his party and interest party identification and loyal partisan voters group allies spent close to four million dollars on both the Democratic and Republican side in Milwaukee and Green Bay alone. When and the fact that swing voters split almost expenditures in Madison and other markets equally for Gore and Bush. The vice-president are added in, and the cost of an extensive field failed to fully capitalize from the favorable operation is included, Democratic expendi- campaign environment (especially the strong tures in Wisconsin certainly approached six economy) because of the leftward shift in strat- million dollars. Gore ended up with a narrow egy which his campaign adopted in response victory in the state, but with Nader out of the to Nader’s candidacy; his relative lack of politi- race many of these resources could have been cal skills; and the electorate’s divided opinion targeted in other states. of Clinton. There was also, of course, the Clinton fac- tor with there being significant divisions

Wisconsin Interest 27