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Talabani's Death Leaves Kurdish PUK Wrestling with Leadership Vacuum

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Talabani's Death Leaves Kurdish PUK Wrestling with Leadership Vacuum October 8, 2017 5 News & Analysis Kurds after the referendum Talabani’s death leaves Kurdish PUK wrestling with leadership vacuum Gareth Smyth severity of Saddam’s repression in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1988-90, when about 180,000 Kurds were killed. London During KDP-PUK infighting from 1994-97, when 3,000 civilians died, alal Talabani founded the Talabani accepted assistance from Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Iran and Barzani from Saddam. (PUK) in 1975 as a secular Since 2003, the two parties have democratic party, splitting failed to establish a unified ad- from the Kurdistan Demo- ministration. This has left the KDP Jcratic Party (KDP) led by Mullah stronger in the governorates of Do- Mustafa Barzani because of what he huk and Erbil and the PUK in Su- saw as the KDP’s “tribalism.” laimaniyah governorate. The Kurd- Yet Talabani’s death October 3 in ish parliament has been in abeyance Berlin at age 83 comes with the PUK since 2015 when the KDP apparently no closer to consensus over a suc- blocked the speaker, a PUK mem- cessor than at any time in the five ber, from reaching Erbil, the region- years since he suffered a debilitat- al capital. Barzani has continued as ing stroke. Kurdish president despite his term Talabani was a colossus in Iraqi expiring two years ago. politics. In 2005, he became the One reason for the PUK’s weak- country’s first Kurdish president. ening is the emergence in 2009 Known to Kurds as “mam Jalal” of Goran (Movement for Change), (paternal uncle), Talabani led the founded by Nawshirwan Mustafa, PUK until his death through years long-time Talabani ally and fel- of suppression, war, de facto au- low founder of the PUK. From its tonomy after 1991, an alliance with launch, Goran, which has criticised the United States that removed corruption and nepotism in Kurd- Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the ish politics, appealed to the young. subsequent establishment of the In 2013, the most recent election, it Kurdistan Regional Government won 24 of the Kurdish parliament’s (KRG) through a new constitution. 111 seats. “The emergence of Goran First and foremost, strengthened the KDP because it Unifying leader. An Iraqi man looks at a poster of Iraq’s former President Jalal Talabani outside the Talabani was a undermined the PUK,” said one headquarters of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in Baghdad, on October 4. (AFP) PUK member. “Nawshirwan should Kurdish nationalist have stayed in the party and argued but he was always for change.” “There is no consensus or approv- Talabani told me in an interview First and foremost, Talabani was open to dialogue Mustapha’s death earlier this al by majority among PUK members for BBC radio in 1995 that he had in- a Kurdish nationalist but he was al- with other Iraqis. year, however, showed a different for any of the current members of tended to retire from politics in his ways open to dialogue with other conception of succession reflect- the party’s leadership to replace 60s — he was then 61 — and write his Iraqis. No doubt he would argue The latest — perhaps historic — ing his politics. In his final months, him. One of Talabani’s two sons, memoirs. Yet he remained active the KRG has been a positive exam- development in Kurdish politics Mustapha stood back from day-to- Qubad and Pavel, might replace him until his stroke in December 2012. ple of peaceful development both came September 25 as Iraqi Kurds day leadership — partly for cancer but that won’t go without a strong In that interview he recalled his for Kurds elsewhere and their gov- voted for independence in a refer- treatment but also to give experi- opposition from other PUK leaders schooling in Koysanjak and how ernments. endum condemned by Baghdad, ence to others — and when he died, and from the PUK base who believe the town influenced his direction in No doubt Talabani would pre- Ankara, Tehran and Washington. Goran elected a new leader, Omar that leadership should not be inher- life. “I learned politics in Koysanjak, sent his life as a struggle for Kurd- The calling of the poll by KRG Said Ali, as per its constitution. ited.” a very active town,” Talabani said. ish rights through a secular party President Masoud Barzani, Mullah The PUK, by contrast, struggled One Kurdish official suggested “It was the town of Hajji Qadir Koyi, seeking a democracy. Whether the Mustafa’s son and KDP leader since to maintain cohesion in Talabani’s the sons had been pushed forward the first Kurdish nationalist poet.” PUK can take that legacy forward 1979, reflected the weakening of absence. “The fact that the PUK by Talabani’s wife, Hero, herself an Koyi advocated Kurdish unity and remains to be seen. the PUK against its rival party. couldn’t choose a new leader after astute politician: “Qubad is now independence as early as the 1880s This rivalry has been intense, Mam Jalal’s stroke five years ago deputy prime minister and Pavel and his criticisms of traditional Gareth Smyth is a regular con- sometimes bloody. During the shows this issue is hard to solve,” is a strong man in PUK. Hero has leaders probably shaped Talabani’s tributor to The Arab Weekly. 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, both the said Salam Abdulrahman, head of also managed to control the party later disquiet with Mullah Mustafa He was chief correspondent PUK and KDP sometimes allied political science at Sulaimaniyah’s finances. So my sense is that one of Barzani and his own decision to es- in Iran for the Financial Times with Iran. This contributed to the University of Human Development. his sons will replace Talabani.” tablish the PUK. in 2003-07. Is an independent Kurdistan economically viable? ollowing the Iraqi Kurds’ est export market and a plethora controversial independ- of Turkish goods are sold in the ence referendum that region. Although Turkey would Tallha Abdulrazaq resulted in an over- suffer from any halt in trading is a researcher at the University whelming “yes” vote, with Iraq’s Kurds, it definitely has of Exeter’s Strategy and Security the Kurdistan Regional cash reserves and trade with other FGovernment (KRG) has been placed global partners to help it weather Institute in England. under conditions that strongly any turmoil until their one-time resemble a siege. ally Barzani can be brought to heel. Baghdad, Tehran and Ankara In conjunction with an energy em- have all taken measures to crip- bargo, that could take place within ple an already fiscally precarious a very short time. Iraqi Kurdistan, pressuring it to re- Even before the referendum the nounce the referendum despite the KRG was in the midst one of the KRG having made no formal moves worst financial crises in its short towards declaring independence. life due to a plunge in oil prices, The besieging parties are at- the explosion of the Islamic State tempting to punish the KRG, led in 2014 and Baghdad’s halting pay- by President Masoud Barzani. By Landlocked. Haj Omran border between Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan. ments to the KRG. These payments, turning the screws on the Kurdish (Reuters) which amounted to 17% of Iraq’s leader, they are attempting to force national budget and 80% of the him to backtrack against the results much these days, it disagrees with airports in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah KRG’s income, were worth approxi- of the poll. Turkey on just about everything to more closely resemble ghost mately $12 billion. Without them, Barzani is heavily reliant on the apart from the issue of Kurdish in- ports devoid of activity. This came Iraqi Kurdistan plunged into a fiscal goodwill of his neighbours and dependence. As such, Turkey, Iran after the KRG refused to hand its crisis and Kurdish civil servants extensive support from foreign and Iraq have agreed that sanctions airports over to the federal govern- and peshmerga militiamen saw powers, including the United imposed by one must be imposed ment. The last flights from Erbil their salaries slashed or halted. States. Without this goodwill and by all. To that end, Ankara has departed September 29. Foreigners The economic issues that plagued While Iraq agrees support, an independent Kurdis- agreed to go exclusively through left stranded were invited to depart the KRG still exist and were exacer- tan could arguably fail to survive Baghdad for oil exports, putting Iraq from Baghdad International bated by the sanctions it has been with Iran on much economically. It could be relegated the KRG-controlled oil pumped Airport which, prior to this, was far hit with since the vote. Although it these days, it to an economic backwater, impov- from Kirkuk to Turkey’s southern less busy than Erbil, which was an is highly unlikely that Barzani will erished, crippled and unviable as a Ceyhan port at risk. Iran has halted oasis of stability in a highly violent surrender his credibility with the disagrees with real state. trucking energy products, includ- and unstable Iraq. Kurdish people by formally back- Turkey on just First, the KRG’s existing bor- ing oil, through its shared border While food, agricultural products tracking on the independence vote, ders — even if one was to include with the KRG, placing the Kurds and technology pass through the it is highly likely he will be forced about everything the illegally occupied Kirkuk and under enormous financial strain. KRG’s borders, these necessities for to make enormous concessions to apart from the other territories — are landlocked Similarly, flights to, from and normal modern life are also at risk his besiegers if he wants to survive.
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