Role of Phantasms in Aquinian Perceptual Theory

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LISSKA, Anthony Joseph, 1940- ROLE OF PHANTASMS IN AQUINIAN PERCEPTUAL THEORY.

The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1971 Philosophy

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Anthony Joseph Lisska

1971

THIS DISSERTATION HAS SEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED ROLE OF PHANTASMS IN AQUINIAN PERCEPTUAL THEORY

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University

Anthony Joseph Lisska, A.B., A.M.

*****

The Ohio State University 1971

pproved by

Department of Philosophy ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation owes its inception, development and completion to many, many people.

To my former teachers at St. Stephen's College, I owe my first thoughtful introduction to the philosophy of St. Thomas. Had it not been for their care and insistence upon disciplined scholarship, I would never have ventured into an analysis of an Aquinlan topic.

To Fr. Pierre Conway, O.P., who knows the texts of St. Thomas better than anyone 1 know, I am grateful for many hours spent discussing references and meanings of the Aquinian corpus.

To Professors Allan Hausman and Ivan Boh I owe a special word of thanks for the many good and really perceptive comments made during the development of this dissertation.

To Professor Robert G. Turnbull this dissertation owes very much indeed. Not only did Professor Turnbull spend many hours worrying with me over the epistemological "chestnuts" discussed in this dissertation, but, beyond the limits of this dissertation, it was Professor Turnbull who, as a teacher, forced me to re-think and ultimately re-appreciate the epistemological Insights of St. Thomas. To Professor Turnbull I owe any success I have at using the tools of analysis on the writings of the medieval philosophers.

To my mother and my aunt, Mrs. Florence Lisska and Mrs. Howard Stokes I am grateful for their painstaking efforts at proof-reading the final draft.

To Mrs. Mary Ann Richards I owe special thanks for quickly typing sections of the final manuscript.

And finally and in a very special way I owe very much to my wife, Marianne, who not only lovingly put up with a very irrita ble husband during the many stages of development of this disserta tion, but who also typed, read, edited, re-read, corrected and generally worried along with me over what Aquinas really was try ing to say about phantasms. It is to her that this dissertation is dedicated.

11 VITA

July 23, 1940 . . Born- Columbus, Ohio

1963 ...... A.B., Providence College, Providence, Rhode Island

1967 ...... A.M., St. Stephen's College, Dover, Massachusetts

1965-1967 . . . Teaching Assistant, Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1967-1969 . . . Teaching Associate, Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1969, Spring * . Visiting Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, Denison University, Granville, Ohio

1969, 1970 . . . Visiting Summer Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, Ohio Dominican College, Columbus, Ohio

1969-present . . Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Denison University, Granville, Ohio

A.M. Thesis: "Analysis of John Stuart Mill's Theory of the Syllogism"

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Fields: Metaphysics, Epistemology, Medieval Philosophy

Studies in Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Professors William A. Wallace, O.P., Michael Stock, O.P., and Eugene Bondi,-0.P.

Studies in Analytic Philosophy of Perception. Professors Robert G. Turnbull, Herbert Hochberg, Alan Hausmann, and Morris Weitz.

Studies in Metaphysics. Professors E.J. Nelson and J.C. Taylor, O.P. Ill TABLE OF CONTENTS

page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... 11

VITA ...... Ill

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS...... vi

Chapter

I. AQUINAS ON INTENTIONALITY...... 1

Aquinas as an Empiricist Principles of Intentionality......

II. AQUINAS AS A DIRECT REALIST...... 27

Direct vs Representative Realism Source Material

ill. EPlSi'EMOLOtltAL DiSPOSillOWS...... 42

The Empedoclean Principle Conceptual Dispositions Perceptual Dispositions

IV. OBJECTS AND FACULTIES...... - 72

Priority of Object Objects of Sensation Non-veridical Awareness Common Sensible and Incidental Object Incidental Object and Vis Cogitative Common Sensibles and Secondary Qualities

V. PRECONDITIONS OF VISUAL AWARENESS...... 103

Sight and Its Object Light and the Diaphanum Light and Color Color and Sight

iv Chapter page

VI. NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR PERCEPTION...... 125

The Triadic Relation Causal Aspects Direct Realism

VII. THE INTERNAL SENSES...... 154

Kantian Possibility and the Internal Senses The Four Internal Senses Aquinas vs Avicenna

VIII. THE SENSUS COMMUNIS...... 164

Function of Sensus Communis Sensus Communis as "Root'1 of Sensation Power of Reflection Sensus Communis and External Sensorlum

IX. THE IMAGINATION...... 183

Phantasla and Imagination Function of Imagination Imagination and Early Modern Philosophy

X. THE VIS COGITATIVA...... 194

Vis Aestlmativa vs Vis Cogitativa Awareness of Individuals The Individual as of a Kind The Sense Memory

XI. PHANTASMS...... 212

Alternative Interpretations Sense Datum Position Location of Phantasm Image Position '‘Likeness" Primary Substance and Vis Cogitativa

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 254 ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations for the works of Thomas Aquinas are used throughout this dissertation:

S.T. Summa Theologies

S.C.G . Summa Contra Gentiles

Com. On the Soul . . - Commentary on Aristotle19 On the >oul (Expositio in III Libros De Anir.a)

Com. On the Physics. . Commentary on Aristotle * s Physics (Expositio in VIII Libros Physicorum)

In referring to the two Summae, I have used the conventional notation. Thus, S.T., 1, Q. 78, a. 4, sed contra, would refer to the Prima Pars of the Summa Theologica, Question Seventy- Eight, the sed contra of the fourth article.

vi CHAPTER I

AQUINAS ON INTENTIONALITY

Aquinas as an Empiricist

In two very real senses of the term, Thomas Aquinas Is to

be considered as an empiricist In his theory of knowledge. In the

first place, Aquinas adamantly refused to admit Into his ontology

any subsistent entities which would serve as objects of knowledge

but which would go beyond the data of direct experience. In this

regard, Thomas Is structurally very much like the Quine of "On What

There Is" In that both are rejecting the "overpopulated universe".

Any account of knowledge, therefore, which admits of a subsistent

realm of Platonic Forms or Moorean Propositions will be quite un

acceptable to Aquinas' mode of doing epistemology. As will be In dicated later In this dissertation, in both sense knowledge as well as in concept-formation, Aquinas is basically opting for a struc

tured mental act; it is by means of this structured mental act that he is able, both with the senses and the Intellect, to philo sophically undercut any epistemologlcal need for positing a realm of subsistent objects in his ontology.

Secondly, Aquinas is an empiricist in that he does adopt as an epistemologlcal axiom the following statement: "Nihil est in

Intellectu quod non prlus est in sensu." This acceptance, however, must be qualified. Aquinas will admit more to a Lelbnizean position on this axiom than to a Lockean or Berkelean position. In other words* Aquinas would structurally be very much In sympathy with

Leibniz's characterization of Locke's dictum* "Nihil est in intellectu quod non prlus est in sensu nisi intellectus ipse," than he would of any form of straight-forward Anglo-American empiricism.

This claim will also become apparent when the role of the intellectus agens is briefly considered later in this dissertation. This notion of a structure to concept-formation, which is the role of the in tellectus agens in Aquinas' epistemology, will find a very detailed parallel in Aquinas' account of the workings of the internal sensorium.

Even though Aquinas is indeed working within an empiricist epistemologlcal context, he does have a dual position on knowledge.

This dual position consists of sense knowledge— which includes direct awareness of sense objects by the external sensorlum and phantasm-formatlon by the internal sensorlum— and intellectual knowledge— which is concept-formatlon and also the exercise of such concepts in understanding. The following two passages explicitly indicate this two-fold division regarding knowledge:

...He (Aristotle) sets himself to discriminate between actual sensation and thinking; and he finds the first reason for distinguishing these activities in the differ ence between their objects, i.e., the sense-objects and the intelligible objects which are attained by actual sensation and actual thinking respectively. Com* on the Soul # 375 3

Aquinas continues this discussion by further considering the objects of the two categories of knowledge:

The sense objects which actuate sensitive activities-- the visible, the audible, etc.— exist outside the soul; the reason being that actual sensation attains to the individual things which exist externally; whereas rational knowledge is of universals which exist somehow within the soul. Whence it is clear that the man who already has scientific knowledge about certain things does not need to seek such things out side of himself; he already possesses them inwardly, and is able, unless prevented by some incidental cause, to reflect on them whenever he pleases. But a man cannot sense whatever he pleases; not possessing sense-objects inwardly, he is forced to receive them from outside. Ibid.

Another difference between sense knowledge and Intellectual knowledge is brought out in the following passage:

Now the difference between intellectual and sensuous cognition is that the latter is corporeal. Sensation can not occur apart from the act of a bodily organ, whereas understanding, as we shall prove later, does not take place by means of such an organ. Ibid. # 622

tfith the distinction between sense knowledge and Intellectual knowledge, Aquinas seems to be structurally reiterating the Platonic distinction between sense knowledge and science or understanding.

In a generic manner, the former consideration concerns our awareness of the particular things of the world, both by the external sensorlum and by the internal sensorlum, and the latter concerns our knowledge of universals.

On both levels of this epistemologlcal theory, Aquinas is operating within the boundaries of a thesis of intentlonallty which is both more elaborate and Intricate as well as philosophically more interesting than most contemporary students of philosophy have been wont to admit. In the development of his epistemologlcal theory, Aquinas is, In m y opinion, exemplifying Gustav Bergmann*s description of such an Inquiry; Bergmann writes as follows:

Eplstemology or theory of knowledge is nothing more than the ontological assay of the awareness situation.*

The primary task of this dissertation is to provide a com plete and thorough analysis of Aquinas' "ontological assay of the awareness situation", with special amphasls placed on Aquinas’ account of «ense-awareness and phantasm-formatlon. Such an analysis of the "awareness situation", moreover, works within the confines of some rather explicit and basic principles. Before beginning an

In-depth analysis of Aquinas' thesis of Intentlonallty, I want to structurally describe and explain these principles around which X believe Aquinas constructs his eplstemology.

Principles of Intentlonallty

The following principles will provide the structure upon which I will attempt to provide an analysis of Aquinas' theory of perception. These principles are of a generic nature; in addition to serving for my present analysis of sense knowledge, they could be

^Gustav Bergmann, "Inclusion, Exemplification, and Inherence in G.E. Moore," Studies in the Philosophy of G.E. Moore, ed. by E.D* Klemke (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), p. 8 6 5

suitable extrapolated in order to provide an analysis of Aquinas'

theory of concept-formation and concept-exercise.

Principle A : An act can only be an act of some potency or other.

The potency-act distinction Is, I believe, the crucial meta

physical distinction upon which Aquinas constructs his entire on

tology and eplstemology. Such a dominant principle is not odd in

philosophical systems, as Gustav Bergmann notes In the following

passage:

In what a great philosopher says there is a pattern. It all flows from one source, a few fundamental ontological Ideas. In the light of this source and only in this light, it can all be understood.^

The potency-act distinction is such a "fundamental ontologi

cal idea". This distinction is used by Aquinas in both his onto

logical account of the things of the truncated world— except God—

as well as of those things capable of possessing objects in an in

tentional Inexistence. By a "truncated world" I mean a world as it would be without any minds at all. In essence, a truncated world

is a denial that idealism is true. In Thomas' Commentary on Aris

totle's Physics. the following passage is found: "Potency and act

are the prime divisions of being...." (Bk III, Lee 2) The analogy here is between matter and form. Form is the perfection which in

some way determines the matter to be what it is--"...for matter and

form are related as potentiality and act." (SCG, II, 71, #2) Thus

2Ibld.. p. 82. 6

"act" does not merely mean a "mental act" for Aquinas; rather It Is

construed much more broadly as any perfection or completion at all

which anything at all possesses. It Is Important, moreover, to

realize that act Is to be understood In two senses. First of all,

there Is the actual state of a thing (as a state or dispositional

property) and, secondly, there Is the actual exercise of a per

fection (act as exercise). This distinction will become more clear

when concepts as dispositions and concepts being exercised are dis

cussed later in this dissertation.

In conjunction with the present discussion, it is interesting

to consider the following passage from Aquinas' Commentary on Aris

totle's On the Soul:

As a receiver is to what it receives a potency to Its actuality; and as actuality is the perfection of what is potential; so being acted upon in this sense implies rather that a certain preservation and perfection of a thing in potency is received from a thing In act. For only the actual can perfect the potential; and actuality is not, as such, contrary to potency. Com. on the Soul # 366

In effect, what Principle A Is asserting is that there is no

such thing as a "free-floating" perfection or act; rather, each and

every perfection is a perfection of something or other. The only

exception to this principle, as was hinted at above, would be Aqui

nas' conception of God as an Actus Purus. In effect, God becomes

the only "free-floating" act in Aquinas' ontology.

Principle B : A potency as such can only be affected by some "X" or other which is in act. This principle is, in effect, a co-relative principle with

Principle A. Concerning this inter-relationship between potency and act, note the following passages:

Everything potential, he (Aristotle) says, is acted upon and moved by some active agent already existing; which, in its actualising function, makes the potential thing like itself. Com. on the Soul 8 366

...a potency Is actualized by something already in act. Ibid. 8 372

A thing In potency is one that can be in act. Com. on Physics Lee. 3, f 2

This. inter-relationship also applies to knowledge, as the following passage indicated:

...whenever a potential knower becomes an actual knower, he must Indeed be actualised by what is already in act. Com. on the Soul 8 371

In assessing the potency-act distinction as being crucial to an understanding of Aquinas' ontology and eplstemology, I am in agreement with many classical scholastic commentators who have written on this subject. For example, F.C. Copieston, in his work,

Aquinas, writes as follows:

The foregoing outlines of the distinctions between sub stance and accident, matter and form, essence and existence, all of which illustrate in their several ways the general distinction which runs through all finite being, namely the distinction between act and potentiality....

3 P.C. Copleston, Aquinas (Baltimore: Penguin, 1955), p. 104. Principle C : A potency must be specified In order to receive any

given act.

This principle, like both Principles A and 8, applies to both

the exlstents of the truncated world as well as to the beings capable

of intentlonallty. The point of this Principle is that things have

dispositions— they are "tailor-made1' for specific acts. Note the

following passage from the Commentary on the Soul:

Indeed the two are really similar, for potency is nothing but a certain relationship to act. And without this likeness there would be no necessary correspondence between this act and this potency. Com. on the Soul # 366

What Aquinas is asserting by this principle is that any given

potency must be adapted to receive a given specific act. In other

words, there is a relationship of an ontological nature between any

given potency and the specific act which perfects that potency. As

1 mentioned above, this claim is asserting that a potency or dis

position is "tailor-made" for a particular act. In the Aquinian

ontology, for example, it would be absurd to argue that the form of

an oak tree could be embodied with the matter which was disposed to

receive the form of a mouse. In effect, Aquinas is arguing that

dispositional properties are necessary in order for a form or act to

be received in a potency. This entails that there Is no such onto

logical existent as "pure" matter in Aquinas* metaphysical system.

The only matter which does actually exist is "natured" matter.

Accordingly, "materia prlmaV a term which does occur frequently in the Aquinian corpus, is used as a mental construct; it does not exist as such— "fleshed-out", as it were— in the truncated world.

Tet dispositional properties do belong in the truncated world and it is these very dispositiinal properties which account for change in the external world. In Aquinas' ontology, change is nothing more than a reception of a different form with the substratum re maining the same. That this principle does indeed apply to Aquinas' thesis of intentlonallty will become apparent when the problem of perception is directly considered later in this dissertation.

Another point which will become clearer as we proceed is that the testing ground for the existence of a set of dispositions is a counter-factual proposition. This is not to claim that the proposit ion itself is the ground; rather, the counter factual is the means for determining whether or not a set of dispositions are actually present in an object.

Principle D : An act remains "specifically" the same but it may have different embodiments in different potencies.

This principle is claiming that the "species" of the act remains tho same even though there are different instances or em bodiments of the species which, accordingly, are numerically different from one another but nevertheless remain specifically the same. Ob viously, this is Aquinas'way of providing a solution to the old one- many problem. The basic sameness of things in the world is accounted for by their having identical forms, and these things are individuals in so far as these forms, which are specifically the same, can occur 10

In different potencies. An entallment of this principle is that matter or the dispositional properties of any given thing is that which accounts for individuality. Here, disposition is obviously being used in a metaphysical sense and not in an empirical sense.

In De Ente et Essentia the following passage is found:

...the principle of distinct individuality is not matter in any and every sense of the word, but only marked-off matter; and by "marked-off" matter 1 mean matter thought of as having definite dimensions. De Ente et Essentia Lee 2

In this passage, "marked-off" matter can be interpreted to mean "properly disposed" matter. And what is properly disposed can receive the same type or forms— i.e., forms of the same species.

Therefore, an act, while remaining specifically the same, can be found in different potencies.

Parenthetically, there appears to be something rather philo sophically strange going on with Principles C and D. Structurally,

It seems that Aquinas Is quite serious about affirming the necessity of having the potency or disposition adequately or properly disposed.

In other words, the potentialities are to be considered as disposi tional properties and not as "pure" potencies. But if a disposition is properly disposed, this seems to demand that it possess some type of form by which one disposition Is constructed differently from an other disposition. But does this "form" which renders the disposition to be properly disposed-dlsposltlon again require an additional form to make it disposed in order to receive such a disposition. This entire process smacks of an infinite regress. In other words,-the

problem here concerns two senses of essence. There is the usual

notion of essence which is what Aquinas often refers to as a "pri mary substance" or as "second matter". This is complimented by

Aquinas in that it also seems to be the case that he holds the four

basic elements— earth, air, fire and water— to be the fundamental

constituents of the external world. The problem now arises— what

disposes the "matter" in either case to accept one form rather than

another. In the first sense of essence, why does the form "man" only go with certain "matter" and not all instances of matter? One might respond that the composition of earth, air, fire and water

constitutes the "dispositions" of the matter so that it can receive a certain type of form. This kind of response, however, only evades

the problem at issue. For Aquinas also considers materia prima to be an ultimate receiver of all forms. The question then arises, why does earth go only with one bit of materia prima and fire another?

If "materia prima" must be disposed, then by what form does this occur?

This seems to lead into an infinite regress in demanding for disposed matter in all instances. But if matter Is not disposed in all in stances, then what accounts for the difference of the four basic elements. Aquinas is disturbingly silent when it comes to discussing in detail the nature and levels of disposed potencies.

Another philosophical perplexity surfaces when the notion of

Individuality is analysed. In this area, Aquinas often speaks of matter as "ear-marked" by quantity— i.e., materia signata quantitate. 12

Thus, quantity— the first of the accidental forms in the nine cate gories of accidents— is what Aquinas is referring to by the "marked- off" terminology in the passage mentioned above in De Ente et Essentia*

But if matter is rendered disposed by merely being "quantified", then what becomes of the various other dispositions. Certainly these other metaphysical dispositions are not reducible to mere quantity alone. Quantity is being used here as "being spread out". If every thing is ultimately disposed by quantity— which Aquinas defines as

"part-outside-of-part"— then Aquinas indeed seems to be flirting with a strange type of atomism, which not only might make his talk of dis positional properties questionable, but also is Inconsistent with other passages, which will be considered later, in which Aquinas explicitly rejects atomism as a viable philosophical position.

In considering the above problems on individuality, however, one must not be too philosophically harsh with Aquinas. For in herent "vagueness" seems to be quite germane in any discussion of the problem of individuation. This is true not only of medieval philos ophers but also holds for contemporary philosophers as well. Scotus* haeccaeitas is far from the clearest philosophical concept and

Bergmann*s "bare particular" is indeed somewhat vague. In conclusion, it oust be remarked that a thorough and explicit analysis of Aquinas* notion of "materia sIgnata" still needs to be undertaken; such an analysis, however, is quite beyond the scope of this dissertation in that a structural account of Aquinas' theory of perception can be pro vided without a clear analysis of his notion of individuality. 13

Principle D-li A knower Is, by definition, any "X" which haa a

"potency" or "disposition” to acquire or to be Impressed by "acts"

In a non-entltatlve manner.

This principle Is a corollary, albeit an extremely important one, of Principle D. In Brentano's terminology, this corollary is a description of the basis for an Aquinian "thesis of Intentlonallty" in so far as intentlonallty is a philosophical description onto- logically distinguishing a knower from a non-knower. In fact,

Aquinas defines intention in the following manner: "...intention, as the name Indicates, means to tend toward something." (S.T., I-Il,

Q. 12, a. 1) It must be noted, furthermore, that this principle only applies to finite knowers.

Principle D-l is claiming that a knower as such has a potency of disposition to receive or to be Impressed with acts in such a manner that the knower does not literally or entltatively become the thing known. A knower is a knower precisely Insofar as It possesses a peculiar set of properties— i.e., dispositlons— which enable It to take on a "form" of a thing "immaterially" without be coming a new thing in the external world. In this context, imma teriality must be precisely understood. It does not refer to what

Gilbert Ryle termed the "ghost In the machine". Rather it refers to a knowerrs having the requisite disposition to acquire "forms" with out the form actually becoming "tied-down" with a material potency.

This entails that In Aquinas* ontology, there are two generic classes of things— knowers and non-knowers. Mon-knowers themselves are w grouped into classes Insofar as a group of exlstents— e.g., tables, chairs, beer-cans— possess the same kind of form; in other words, a class of things is determined in so far as each member of that class has the same sat of specific dispositions by means of which the specific class is established. A form, accordingly, is being used here In the sense of substantial form; it can be best described as a supreme set of dispositions which determines different classes.

All distinct groups of knowers also possess some kind of supreme set of dispositions which places them into specific classes— e.g., cats, horses, humans. Yet in addition to a group or class determining supreme sets of dispositions, knowers possess one addi tional disposition which non-knowers lack. This additional disposition is the ability to receive forms in a non-entltative or immaterial manner.

Principle D—1 t therefore, is claiming that a knower as such has a disposition or potency or ability to receive or to be impressed with acts in such a manner that he does not literally become the thing known. The following passage from the Summa Theologies provides an analysis of intentlonallty as the proper characteristic or disposition of knowers as this notion was understood by Aquinas"

Knowing agents differ from those that do not know In that the non-knowers possess their own form only, while the knower is adapted from its origin to possess also the form of another thing, in the sense that the species of the known thing may be present in the knower. It is clear, then, that the nature of a noncognltive thing is more restricted and limited, while the nature of knowing things has greater fullness and extension. This 15

Is why the Philosopher says in the third book, On the Soul, that "the soul is in a way all things". S.T., 1, Q* 14, a* 1*

Continuing with this same passage, Aquinas next considers the role of matter as a limiting factor:

Now the limitation of the form is due to matter. Hence we said above that the more immaterial forms are, the more do they approach some sort of infinity. It is plain, then, that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it Is able to know; and the level of cognition depends on the level of immateriality. So, too it Is stated in the second book, On the Soul, that plants do not know, because of their materiality. But the sense power is cognitive because it takes in species without matter; and the intellect is still more cognitive because it Is more "separated from matter and unmlxed" as is said in the third book, On the Soul. Ibid.

Furthermore, that intentlonallty is a capacity or disposition germane to a knower as knower and is thus one of the dispositions crucial for knowledge is apparent from the following texts from

Aquinas' Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul:

Ue speak...in one sense of potency when we say that man is a knower, referring to his natural capacity for knowledge. Man, we say, is one of that class of beings that know or have knowledge, meaning this, that his nature can know and form habits of knowing. Com. on the Soul 9 359.

...man is said to be "able" through belonging to a certain genus or "matter", i.e., his nature has a certain capacity that puts him in this genus, and he is in potency to know ledge as matter is to form. Ibid., # 360.

Aquinas' characterisation of intentlonallty, moreover, is not 16

just as a potency or a capacity, but as a "tending toward" something

beyond Itself while being part of the knower; Aquinas, moreover con

tinually stresses that all knowledge implies that .the thing known is

somehow present in the knower. In effect, therefore, the disposition which constitutes a knower as a knower is such that It can go be

yond itself and yet not physically or materially become that which

It is "tending toward". This means that the knower, by means of an

Intentional disposition, Is able to know. In perception, the object

actually existing in the external world reduces a "potential" knower

to an "actual" knower. The following passage illustrates this

claim:

Assuming that they were bodily, the ancient physicists thought objects of knowledge existed materially in the soul that knew them, which they said, has a nature common to all of them. This explanation, however, can be disproved by the analysis of knowledge. When material objects are known they exist in the knower in some immaterial manner, and for the following reason: since knowledge lights on what is outside the knower, while matter constricts a thing within its own one nature, the conditions of materiality conflict with those of knowledge. When a form is received into the material texture, as in the case of plants, it is not known. S.T., I., Q* 6A , a . 2.

Aquinas offera a further analysis of "immateriality" by providing the following two-fold division of "immutatlon" or re ceptlon of forms:

There are two aorts of Immutatlon, physiological and psychological. The former comes about by the physical re ception of the agent in the patient, the latter according to a certain spiritual reception. Sensation requires this latter process, the entrance into the sense organ of a likeness or relation to the sensible thing. If physiological 17

Immutatlon alone sufficed, all natural bodies would have sensations when they underwent alteration.

Ibid., Q. 78, a. 3.

In his Commentary on the Soul, Aquinas offers some similar remarks In discussing Empedocles* theory of perception. Empedocles had as a perceptual principle, "like knows like"; furthermore, this philosopher offered a very literal interpretation of this prin ciple and thus an entallment of such a principle was that the sense faculties were actually made up of the same kinds of things as the things in the external world. In other words, the same elements which made up the sense faculties themselves were structurally and entltatively the same as the constituents of the material things

In the external world. In commenting on the Empedoclean principle,

Aquinas further establishes his claim regarding the immaterial nature of his thesis of intentlonallty.

...note that all, who, like Empedocles, said that like was known by like, thought that the senses were actually sense- objects— that the sensitive soul was able to know all sense- objects because it consisted somehow of those objects; that is, of the elements of which the latter are composed. Two things follow from this hypothesis. 1) If the senses actually are, or are made up of, the sense-objects, then, if the latter can be sensed, the senses themselves can be sensed. 2) Since the presence of Its object actually exists in the faculty as part of its composition, it follows that sensation can take place in the absence of external objects. But both of these consequences are false. Com. on the Soul # 352-3.

The importance of the above passage lies not in Aquinas' arguments, as they do not uncritically seem to refute representative realism. Their Importance rather lies in what Is affirmed within the statement— i.e., If "like knows like" is to be an epistemological principle, then it must be understood In a manner quite differ ent from Empedocles' understanding of such a principle. In essence,

Aquinas is here affirming the centrality of an Immaterial reception of forms— Point Number One in the above passage— and a basic "tend ing toward" an object beyond the knower itself— Point Number Two in the above passage.

In considering Aquinas' thesis of intentlonallty. It Is in teresting to briefly review Aristotle's conception of the act-object distinction. This distinction, especially as written about by

Brentano and Moore, serves as a basis for an Intentlonallty thesis.

The following passages are found In Book XII of the Metaphysics:

But it is clear that knowledge, perception, opinion and understanding always have some object other than them selves; they are only incidentally their own objects...... thinking and being thought of are different.... For the essences of "thinking" and "being thought of" are not the same. Meta Ch. 9.

Both of the last two passages considered can be taken as pro viding an act-object distinction. And Insofar as the object is dis tinct from the mental act— which distinction and separation Aristotle seems clearly to be asserting— this separation entails an intentionality thesis in that there must be some connection between the mental act and the intentional object.

The weight, philosophically speaking, of all the combined 19 passages Just considered and of Principle D-l Itself Is that a knower, when he takes on the form of an object In the external world* does not himself literally and physically become the object as it Is In the material world. Accordingly, this principle is affirming the possi bility of a knower being able to be aware of "red" without becoming

"red" himself entitatlvely. Accordingly* the proper analysis of

"immaterial manner of becoming" is crucial for an adequate under standing of Aquinas' thesis of intentlonality. Were it not for the lcnower's ability to be impressed with the form of the object and still not literally become the object entitatlvely, then Aquinas would argue that there would be no such thing as knowledge at all.

By taking on a form immaterially or intentionally, Aquinas is structurally considering the very same epistemological distinction that Descartes argues for in the Third Meditation when he discussed that famous distinction between formal reality and objective reality.

And from this it follows, not only that something cannot be derived from nothing, but also that the more perfect, that is to say, that which contains in itself more reality, cannot be a consequence of and dependent upon the less perfect. This truth is not only clear and evident in regard to the effects which philosophers call actual or formal reality, but also in regard to the ideas where one considers only what they call objective reality. Meditations III.

This distinction, furthermore, Is not merely of historical importance when considering eplstemological theories. Frans Brentano, in Psychologic vom empirlschen Standpunkt. was concerned over the very same distinction. The following passage is from the above-mentioned 20

eplstemologlcal treatise:

The data of our consciousness make up a world which, taken In Its entirety, falls into two great classes, the class of physical and the class of mental phenomena.... Every presentation of sensation or imagination offers an example of the mental phenomenon.... Thus hearing a sound, seeing a colored object, sensing warm or cold, and the comparable states of imagination as well, are examples of what 1 mean.... Examples of physical phenomena, on the other hand, are a color, a shape, a landscape, which I see; a musical chord, which I hear; heat, cold, odor, which 1 sense.... These examples may suffice as concrete illustrations of the dis tinction between the two classes.^

The purpose of indicating other sources as Descartes and

Brentano la not to claim that all three have an equal intentionality thesis— i.e., Aquinas, Descartes and Brentano. It is, rather, to point out that what Aquinas is asserting in discussing an Immaterial reception of forms is eplstemologlcally not as philosophically odd as one might at first glance Judge him to be* In effect, Aquinas Is structurally very much akin to any assay of intentionality, although there are differences in specifics regarding various philosopher's interpretations of such a thesis. Aquinas, as with an eplstemologist considering intentionality, is attempting to offer an analysis of what it means to be a 'knower". And his analysis of such a fact Is through the notion of having a form in an immaterial manner. By such an account Aquinas believes that he can provide an analysis of why, when a knower is aware of "red", this knower does not become another

^Roderick M. Chisholm, ed., Realism and the Background of Phenomenology (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), pp. 39-41. red object in the world. If such an account of immaterial reception

of forms were not the case, then Aquinas would argue that every im

pression of an act on a potency would produce another object in the

external world and thus there would never be any such fact as know

ledge. Accordingly, the principle of immaterial reception of forms

is Aquinas* crucial eplstemologlcal principle. Furthermore, the

principle of immaterial reception is the basis for the isomorphism between form in the mind and form in the world which Aquinas so

strongly argues for. Ultimately, this isomorphism is the ground structurally for the possibility of veridical knowledge. The use of veridical here is in the sense of not making a true judgement but

rather in a Kantian fashion of indicating how veridical knowledge is possible. This problem will be considered at greater length later in this dissertation.

Principle E : A form is, by definition, an act.

This principle indicates why Aquinas refers to the knower as taking on the "form" of an object in the external world. Structur ally, this relating of form to act also applies to Aquinas' ontology and not just to his eplstemology. This is indicated in the following passage from De Ente et Essentia:

For, because of form, which is an actuation of matter, matter Is made into an actual being.... De Ente et Essentia Lee 2.

The concept of form, which really breaks down into the onto logical ground for a supreme set of capacities or dispositions which 22 wake a thing to be a certain thing— i.e., the form puts a thing into a particular ontological category, is intrinsically tied-up with the concept of potency-aet. It Is only upon a realization of the latter distinction that the former distinction can really be understood.

In his Commentary on the Soul, Aquinas writes as follows:

Matter, then, differs from form in this, that it is a potential being; form is the "entelechy1' or actuality that renders matter actual; and the compound is the result ing being. Com. on the Soul $ 215

It should be noted that this principle does not identify act with form. Form, rather, is a type of act. That Aquinas would not make such an identification is apparent from the fact that in his metaphysics, God is an actus purus but not a form. A form is a type of an act which needs a material embodiment. Accordingly, a form and an act are not to be identified.

Principle F : An "X" is knowable only in so far as it is in act.

Given Principles A and D-l, the above principle is a derived principle. If a knower, which is an existent capable of taking on the form of another immaterially, actually does so take on the act of an object in an immaterial manner, then the object which is known must have been in act before it could have been known. This is obviously a philosophical statement which follows from Aquinas' notion that every potency can be reduced to act only by something that is already in act.

In addition, Aquinas wants to argue that there are two different 23

kinds of potencies: a) ontological potencies (materia prlma and

and materia secunda) and b) eplstemologlcal potencies (the faculties

of the external sensorium, the faculties of the Internal sensorium,

and the Intellectus posslbllls). Furthermore, It follows from Prin

ciple F that neither an ontological potency nor an eplstemologlcal

potency can be known In and of Itself. The act or form cf an on

tological potency in the external world Is what Is known and not the

ontological potency itself. This Is the reason why 1 argued earlier

that materia prima had to be an intellectual construct for Aquinas

and thus cannot have an existential referent. In addition, an

eplstemologlcal potency of either the Internal or the external sen

sorium cannot know Itself. As will become clear later in this dis

sertation, reflective awareness Is only possible in Aquinas' epls-

temology of perception because there Is a specific faculty— the

sens us comiaunis— which can be aware of the acts of the external

senses. Parenthetically, Aquinas will argue, however, that the

Intellectus posslbllls Is capable of self-refleetIon. This is due

to the complete spirituality of such a faculty; in other words, it is

not tied-down to any physical organ. This problem, however, is far

beyond the limits of our present inquiry.

This present principle, moreover, further explains Principle

J>-1. The ontological potency is what gives "body” or "fleshing-

out” to the material, existing thing. In Aquinas' ontology, weight

and extension follow from, in the sense of being dependent upon, matter; and matter Is the ultimate potency of the external thing. 24

The eplstemologlcal potency, on the other hand. Is the capacity to

receive the form of the existing thing but not to give that form a

material embodiment as so happens with an ontological potency. In

one sense, however, there is a "fleshlng-out" with respect to the

eplstemologlcal potencies; for It Is by means of an eplstemologlcal

potency that a "piece of knowledge" is anchored down Into a partic

ular space-tlme context. Aquinas Is arguing that if an epistemolog-

ical potency were exactly the same as an ontological potency In all

of Its functions, then such an Identity would In effect rule out

knowledge all together. For then it would be the case that there would be another object in the world Instead of a known, Intentional object.

Principle G : Each knowing potency Is properly disposed to receive one and only one "species" of act.

This principle will apply to both sense knowledge and In

tellectual knowledge. By "species" I mean the "appropriate object" of each knowing potency or capacity. In other words, a knowledge potency is so structured that it "reaches out" or "intends" only a certain kind or type of object. For example, Aquinas will argue

that the knowing potency of sight is so structured that it Is dis posed to receive the act of color and only of color; such a peculiar and unique structure precludes the faculty of sight's reaching out to sound or sweetness or hardness. Furthermore, none of the other external sense faculties can be disposed to receive color as such.

Thus whenever a percelver is directly aware of color through an 25 impression on the external senses, it is only the faculty of sight which is the epistemological potency which is so structured that it can be affected by the form of color as it exists in the external world. In effect, Aquinas is here arguing for a structured mental act position; effectually, he is ruling out a relational diaphanous mental act as espoused by G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell. Such a structured position can be claimed for all of the knowing potencies— i.e., the faculties of the external sensorium, the internal sensorium and the Intellectus possibilis. Note the following passage:

For the very essence and definition of each sense con sists in its being naturally fitted to be affected by some such special object proper to itself. The nature of each faculty consists in its relation to its proper object. Com on the Soul 9 387.

One might object that there is indeed a quaint bit of tele ology going on here in this part of the present analysis. However, this is not too philosophically disturbing in that all Aquinas is claiming is that the sense faculties are unique in and of themselves and quite distinct from each other. In other words, the eye is the organ for the faculty of sight and the ear is the organ for the faculty of hearing and it would be somewhat odd to have the functions of these knowing potencies change in that they could reach out to new and different objects and yet claim that the potencies themselves remain the same. If a charge of teleology is made, then it is at most a benign type of philosophical teleology.

Aquinas makes one further distinction which should be kept in

q 26 mind. This is Che distinction between the organ of sensation and

the faculty of sensation. The organ would be the unique physiological construct which the faculty uses in perceiving. Accordingly, the eye

is the organ through which the power of the faculty of sight is ex ercised. Note the following passage in which Aquinas argues for

Buch a distinction between organ and faculty:

The powers do not exist for the sake of the organs, rather the organs exist for the sake of the the powers. Hence it is not that different organs give rise to differ ent powers but that nature established diversity in the organs to go with the diversity of the powers. , S.T., I., Q. 78, a. 3.

This Is a strong assertion. In effect, the claim is that the structure of the disposed organ is geared to the function of the sense power and faculty. Accordingly, structure or disposition is used in two senses. In the first sense, the structure refers to the physical make-up of the organ Itself. This appears as a necessary condition for the sense faculty to work. In the second sense, the faculty is disposed in that it is ordered toward a spiritual or isnaterlal reception of the form of a sensible object in the exter nal world. The point to bear in mind is that the physical organ is not what "perceives1'; rather, as shall become clearer later, the faculty of sight in conjunction with the sensus communis is that by means of which one has an awareness. This, furthermore, will entail that Aquinas is adopting a structured act of awareness. CHAPTER II

AQUINAS AS A DIRECT REALIST

Direct VS Representative Realism

Having discussed what I take to be the principles which under pin Aquinas' intentionality thesis, I am now ready to begin the pri mary task of this dissertation which is to provide a structural elu cidation of the Aquinlan view of sense knowledge. As was briefly in dicated above, such an elucidation will encompass both Aquinas' ac count of direct perception of the things in the external world— i.e., an analysis of imagination, vis cogitative, and sense memory. In line with the traditional Aristotelian gambit on knowledge, the Aquin lan view of sensation is distinguished from concept-formation in that sensation is wholly concerned with the individual, particular thing rather than with the universal. Sensation, furthermore, pertains to our awareness of such an individual thing, whether such a thing be directly experienced, imagined, or remembered. Accordingly, the first main division of this treatment of sensation will concern direct per ception followed by an analysis of the internal senses and their ob jects.

The first problem to be discussed concerns a provisional state ment on how Aquinas' perceptual scheme is to be classified. According to standard procedure for such an epistomologlcal classification, the-

27 28 ories of perception are divided into direct realism and represent

ative realism. The force of such a distinction focused on whether

the mind has for Its object the "thing" in the external world or else an "idea" of the thing. In the former view, the mind is directly

aware of an object in the external world while the latter view drives an "epistomological wedge" between what is directly perceived and the object in the external world.

In placing Aquinas in one part of the above division rather than in the other, it is important to realize the Aquinas seems to consider perception as an awareness of the particular thing rather than an awareness of an idea of such a thing. Aquinas is very much arguing for a "thing consciousness" and not for an "idea consciousness". To sub stantiate such a position, the following passages must be considered:

The sense objects which actuate sensitive activities— the visible, the audible, etc.,— exist outside the soul; the reason being that actual sensation (perception) attains to the individual things which exist externally. (Italics mine) Com. on the Soul $ 375

Sense is a passive power, and is naturally immuted by the exterior sensible. Hence, the exterior cause of such immutatlon is what is per se perceived by the sense.... S.T. I.,Q,78,a,3.

When we sense any sensible object we affirm that it is such and such. But when we imagine anything we make no such affirmation; we merely state that such and such seems or ap pears to us. Com. on the Soul if 632

These passages give rather strong indication that Aquinas rightfully belongs in the category with the direct realists and not with the representative realists.

In affirming that Aquinas' perceptual theory is direct realism, it is philosophically important as well as rather Interesting to con- 29 aider what he has written about representative realism and why such a theory was not espoused by him. The following passage taken from the Summa Theologies provides textual evidence that Aquinas adamantly denied any allegiance to representative realism as a viable epistemological theory.

Some have held that our cognitive powers know only the impressions made on them, for instance, that sense knows only the alteration of its organ. According to this reading, mental states are the objects of knowledge. This opinion seems to be false for two reasons. First, if the objects of intelligence and Bclence are merely psychic con ditions, It would follow that science does not deal with non-men tal things, but merely with Impressions in consciousness. Secondly, it would revive the ancient error of maintaining that whatever seems so is truly so, and that contradictions are simul taneously tenable* Were a cognitive power able to perceive no more than its own proper state, then it could judge only about those. Now an object appears according to the manner the faculty is affected, and were modes of consciousness the only data, a faculty could judge merely its own proper impressions, and every judgement would be true; when a clean tongue judges honey to be sweet then it would judge truly, and when a dirty tongue judges it to be bitter, then also would it judge truly, in each case going on its Impressions. Every opinion would be equally valid; so also in general would be whatever was fancied. S.T., I.,Q,85,a,2.

The importance of the above passage is not so much th e manner or force of Aquinas' philosophical objections to representative realism; rather, the relevance lies in the explicit claim that mental states themselves are not to be considered as the direct objects of knowledge.

In the given passage, Aquinas is affirming some common sense observa tions about the ramifications of representative realism and is not offering a philosophical refutation as such. Aquinas seems to be ar guing that If mental states themselves are the direct objects of know ledge, then two extremely odd conclusions follow, namely a) that we never know anything beyond our mental states and thus every inquiry 30 will be nothing but a psychological inquiry, and b) that if sensa tions themselves and not objects are the direct referent of mental activity, then Protagoras' dictum that "Kan Is the measure of all things" becomes the philosophically established norm. In a struc tural sense, therefore, by Indicating what philosophically odd con clusions follow necessarily from any theory which has as the direct object of mental activity the very mental functions themselves,

Aquinas Is providing a reductio ad absurdim argument against repre sentative realism. What Aquinas seems very much concerned over is that if one does not get beyond the "mental state", then one is never aware of the real world. That this is at the heart of the realism-idealism issue is obvious. In effect, Aquinas is indicating pre cisely where certain philosophical problems lie with representative realism— i.e., how to connect the representation with that which is represented.

That the above argument is not an adequate structural analysis by Aquinas of representative realism as an eplstemologlcal theory of perception is obvious. It seems to me, however, that Aquinas never really considered that representative realism as espoused by Locke or

Descartes was even prima-facie plausible. It must be remembered that

Aquinas' philosophical milieu was definitely not that of Descartes or

Locke in which the mechanistic claims of the "new science" and its corresponding atomism did bring to bear a very real problem concerning how ideas (the realltas objective) represent to us the "formally" ex- sis ting things in the external world (the realltas formalis). Without the critical eplstemologlcal impetus of the new science, Aquinas has 31 no philosophical worries over an eplstemologlcal "wedge" being

driven between what la per celved and what causes us to perceive. An

example of this is Aquinas1 consideration of "color", which would be

a secondary quality and therefore mind-dependent for Locke and Des

cartes. In a very real ontological sense, Aquinas places color as well as the rest of the secondary qualities in the external world;

they are in no way mind-dependent for Aquinas as they were for the

classical representative realists. In addition to the above-men

tioned passage from the Commentary on the Soul, "...the visible, the

audible...exist outside the soul..." (#375) there is the following

passage from Aquinas* Commentary on Aristotle*s Physics, "So also

color does not mean the same as being seen." (Bk. Ill, Lee. 2.)

What Aquinas Is claiming here is that there is a real ontological

power present In the truncated world which is causally efflcatious

in producing an awareness of a "secondary quality"; this power, how

ever, Is qualitatively distinct from a quantified being. In other words, there is a qualitative distinction in kind between a "form" of a secondary quality and the form of a primary quality. More of

this later. Such statements would be structurally unacceptable to

Locke or Descartes, not to mention Berkeley and Hume. But for Aquinas

there was no concern over the eplstemologlcal problems engendered by

the rise of the new science. For him, therefore, representative real

ism seemed completely Incomprehensible in that he could see no philo

sophical problem serious enough to force him Into considering repre

sentative realism as a viable eplstemologlcal assay.of perception.

For the classical 17th century representative realists, there was no 32 qualitative distinction between the causal factors for the awareness of the primary qualities and the secondary qualities. For Descartes, for example, the atoms — merely quantified existents — were the only things existing in the truncated world. Aquinas will not affirm such an atomism. As shall become clear later, Aquinas can be class*? ifled as an objective relativist. This factor, more than anything else, I believe accounts for his rather quick and abrupt dismissal of representative realism as any form of a serious eplstemologlcal position.

This discussion concerning Aquinas and representative realism, moreover, does not belong simply to an historical exegesis pertain ing to the annals of medieval scholarship. Contemporary epistemological students have been attempting to provide structural analysis of different theses of intentionality; this contemporary attempt applies especially to Brentano*s account of intentionality. As Bren tano was wall trained in medieval philosophy, it is no philosophical surprise that his thesis of intentionality has structural similarities to that of Thomas Aquinas. In view of this relationship, one road of interpretation of Brentano is by structural re-analysis of Aquinas' position. Such an attempt, however, has produced one highly critical article by Peter Sheehan, "Aquinas on Intentionality",* in which the author attempts to prove, by reducing Aqulnlan intentionality to rep

*Feter Sheehan, Aquinas: A Critical Study, ed. by Anthony Kenny (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc.,1969). 33 resentative realism, that a re-lnterprctatlon of Aquinas' epistemology will be Co no avail In elucidating Brentano's intentionality

thesis. A fuller account of Sheehan's remarks will occur later in this dissertation when the question of phantasms ia structurally con sidered ; for it is by a structural move on phantasms that Sheehan at tempts his reduction of Aqulnlan perceptual theory to representative realism.

In light of the present discussion of intentionality and repre sentative realism, it is sufficient for now to realize at least how

Aquinas textually treats such an eplstemologlcal theory. Accordingly,

In opposition to a representative realism interpretation of Aquinas, the claim of this dissertation is that Aquinas was definitely opting for some form of direct realism, both from textual evidence as well as from a structural analysis. Obviously, only the former has been provided so far; the main brunt of this dissertation is to establish the latter, especially bringing to light his thesis of objective rela tivism. Textually, however, Aquinas seems to definitely be philosoph ically quite far removed from representative realism. "Nevertheless, the primary object (of a mental act) is the thing...." S.T. l.,Q,85,a,

2. This type of "thing consciousness" language occurs over and over throughout the philosophical texts of Aquinas.

In contrast to the almost negligent worry about the problems of representative realism, Aquinas, on the other hand, was indeed very much concerned with providing a detailed philosophical analysis and critique of any form of exaggerated realism or early Platonism. This problem is directly related to an analysis of the intellectus agena 34

and the "coming to be" of the universal In the mind, as transcendental

Platonism is, In essence, related directly to concept-formatlon and

yet have every object of knowledge always "rooted" In the things of the

common sense world of experience; such an analysis, therefore, Is phil

osophically opposed to any position which has as the object of know

ledge any species, form, or universal subsisting In any type of Pla

tonic transcendental realm. Much of Aquinas' efforts in eplstemology

theory was to philosophically refute such theories, especially August-

inlan "Illuminatio Divlna" and the "separated intelligences" of the

Arabian philosophers.

Source Material

Mow that it has been textually established that Aquinas regards

the direct object of perception to be the "thing" in the world and

not the "idea" of a thing, it remains for us to provide a philosoph

ical analysis of the Aquinlan perceptual theory. Regarding such

source material, this dissertation will differ radically from most

traditional and contemporary accounts of Aquinas on intentionality.

For most discussion regarding Aquinas' position on direct awareness,

the Summa Theologica is the locus classicus. Not only do most tradi

tional scholastic commentators cite Questions 78-79 and 84-89 in the

Summa Theologica as the basic texts for an adequate Interpretation of

Aquinlan eplstemology, but so too do most of the comientators outside of the traditional scholastic school. As evidence of the former claim, such distinguished scholastic interpreters as Etienne Gilson in his 35 2 monumental The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas and F.C. Copieston 3 in his generally quite good work, Aquinas, both frequently refer to the Summa Theologica for textual references. In addition, two pri marily historical works, Armand Maurer's Medieval Philosophy^ and

C David Knowles' Evolution of Medieval Thought make copious use of the

Sumna Theologica. In showing his deference to the Summa Theologica, along with the Summa Contra Gentiles and the Commentary on the Sen tences, Knowles writes the following:

...Pride of place must be taken by his (Aquinas') three large works, the early Commentary on the Sentences (1253-57), the Summa Contra Gentiles (1261-64)...and the Summa Theologica I and II (1266-71) and III (1272), left unfinished at his death.

In addition to the scholastic interpreters and historians, many contemporary analytic interpreters have usually made use of both

Summae, but with special deference to the Summa Theologica. Thus,

D.W. Hamlyn's Sensation and Perception: A History of the Philosophy of Perception,^ has nearly continuous reference to texts in the

2 Etienne Gilson,The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. by Edward Bullough (St. Louis and London: B.Herder Book Company, 1939). 3 Copleston, Aquinas■

^Armand A. Maurer, Medieval Philosophy,(New York: Random House, Inc., 1962).

^David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought, Vintage Books (Mew York: Random House, Inc., 1962).

6Ibid., p. 260.

^D.W. Hamlyn, Sensation and Perception, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), pp.46-51. 36

Summa Theologica, as does Julius Weinberg in his excellent A Short 8 History of Medieval Philosophy, Moreover, two new and extremely

interesting articles which have appeared in the recently published

Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays, one by Anthony Kenny 9 entitled "Intellect and Imagination in Aquinas" and another one

previously mentioned by Peter Sheehan entitled "Aquinas on Inten-

tionallty"*^, both keep referring continuously to the passages in

the Summa Theologica for textual substantiation of their claims.

Furthermore, most analytic philosophers who have bothered to read

Aquinas claim that on all points the Summa Theologica is an example

of his mature philosophical thought. Thus we find in D.J. O'Conner's

Aquinas and Natural Law the following statement: "The two Summas

have been the most studied and contain most of his mature work."**

Historically, Kurt Tranoy's quite enlightening article on Aquinas

in D.J. O'Conner’s A Critical History of Western Philosophy makes 12 almost exclusive use of texts from the Summa Theologica. Obviously,

a Julius R. Weinberg, A Short History of Medieval Philosophy , (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964). Q Anthony Kenny, "Imagination in Aquinas," in Aquinas: A Col lection of Critical Essays, pp. 273-296.

^Sheehan, "Aquinas on Intentionality," in Ibid., pp.307-321.

**D.J. O'Conner, Aquinas and Natural Law,(London: MacMillan & Co.,Ltd., 1967), p.3.

12 D.J. 0 Connor, A Critical History of Western Philosophy (New York: The Free Press, 1964). 37

this is not an exhaustive list of textual references, but it is suf

ficient in so far as it Indicates the pre-emminence that the Summa

Theologica has as source material for Aquinlan scholarship.

In this dissertation, I will be disagreeing vith this general

trend regarding Aquinas source material. I believe that the best

account of Aquinas theory of perception as well as the most thor

oughly worked-out position regarding lqtentlonality Is to be found

in his Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul (In Aristotelis Librum

De Anima Commentarium). This work is Aquinas1 detailed cotmentary and

explication of Aristotle's massive inquiry, On the Soul. In making

this claim, I do not wish to take sides in the argument as to whether

the "real" Aquinas Is to be found in the Aristotelian Commentaries

(J.M. Ramirez, Charles De Konlnck, J.A. Oesterlc) or rather in the

two Summae (Etienne Gilson, Joseph Owens, A.G, Pegis). Rather all I

am maintaining is that on the particular question of how to analyze

Aquinas' account of perception, Aquinas provides a more fully de veloped position in his Aristotelian Commentary than in the Summa

Theologica, or, as far as 1 can discover, in the Summa Contra Gentiles,

either.

Furthermore, 1 want to claim that there is both textual and

structural evidence in the Summa Theologica itself that Aquinas was

not particularity concerned with a perceptual inquiry in that work;

if this is the case, and I want to argue that it is, then it follows

that it is a tremendous mistake to consider the passages in the Summa

Theologica as Aquinas* ultimate and moat fully developed account of the questions concerning perception. An indication of the structural 38 evidence Is the following passage from the prologue to Question 78

In the Prima Pars of the Summa Theologica:

We next treat of the powers of the soul In particular. The theologian, however, has only to inquire specifically concerning the intellectual and appetitive powers, In which the virtues reside. And since the knowledge of these powers depends to a certain extent on the other powers, our consideration of the powers of the soul in particular will be divided Into three parts: first, we shall consider those powers which are a preamble to the intellect; secondly, the intellectual powers; thirdly, the appetitive powers. S.T. Prologue to Question 78

I mention this passage because here Aquinas is explicitly stating that he is considering, within the confines of the Suama Theologica itself, primarily the powers or potencies of the intellect and of the will (appetitive power); every other philosophical consideration is secondary and is so considered only in so far as it has a direct application to the intellect and/or the will. This being the case, therefore, Aquinas will treat of the problem of perception only in so far as this inquiry is needed in order to aid his analysis of the intellect and will. Accordingly, the account of perception is not being elaborated as an Intellectual end in itself.

This point is further maintained when one considers the textual structure of the Summa Theologica; the entire analysis of sensation, both regarding direct awareness of the external senses and the unique workings of the internal sensorium, are treated only within the con fines of two articles in one question, namely Articles Three and Four of Question Seventy-Eight. On the other hand, Aquinas specifically considers Intellectual knowledge or concept-formation in all of the following questions and articles: Question Seventy-Nine, with thlr- 39 teen Articles, Question Eighty-Four, with eight Articles, Question

Eighty-Five, with eight articles, Question Eighty-six with four articles, Question Eighty-Seven, with four articles. Question

Eighty-Eight, with three articles, and Question Eighty-Nine with eight articles. Thus, whereas sensation is philosophically treated in only two articles, there are, on the other hand, fifty-three ar ticles devoted to the various facets on concept-formation. Accord ingly, even if one if one were not to take Aquinas* own words ser iously that he is treating only incidentally of those problems which are not directly concerned with conceptualization or willing— as was stated in the prologue to Question Seventy-Eight— nevertheless, the mere quantity of the texts which treat of concept-fonnation in com parison with the rather sketchy treatment given to perception should provide any interested student with a philosophical hint as to where

Aquinas* real scholarly Interests lie within the confines of the

Summa Theologica itself.

In addition, it must be remembered that in writing the volumes of the Summa Theologica, Aquinas was primarily interested, as the name itself indicates, a treatment of theological issues; and for him, as for most medieval theologians, questions of perception did not direct ly pertain to theological concerns.

Finally, if one were still to doubt the claim that the Summa

Theologica is not the place in which to find Aquinas* developed position on perception, he need only refer to the following statement at the beginning of the Summa;

Since the teacher of Catholic truth has not only to 40

develop advanced students but also to shape those who are asking a start, according to St. Paul, "Even as unto babes In Christ I have fed you with milk and not meat." (1 Corin thians 31), we propose in this work to convey the truths which are part of the Christian religion In a style ser viceable for the training of beginners.

Not only is the treatise Intended for "beginners", but it also will not be an exhaustive treatment, as the rest of the above passage

Indicates:

For we have in mind how much newcomers to this teaching are hindered by various writings about It, partly by a swarm of pointless questions, articles, and arguments, partly be cause essential points are treated according to the require ments of textual commentary or of academic debate, not to those of a sound educational method, partly because repetitiousness breeds boredom and muddle in their minds. Eager, therefore, to avoid these and other like draw backs, and trusting in God's help, we shall try to pursue the truths of Christian Theology, and, so far as the sub ject permits, to be concise and clear in the process. Forward to S.T. In this passage, Aquinas Is explicitly claiming that his work is to be considered as a "textbook" for beginners in the study of theology.

Thus his own claim is that this work is not to be taken as a truly definitive philosophical monograph. Accordingly, the problem of perception would seem to stand even a lesser chance of a first-class treatment in the Summa Theologica, both from the point of view of theology— which was Aquinas' chief intellectual concern— and also from the point of view that the Summa Theologica was to be a "text book" for beginning students and not a symposium for the masters.

Remarking on the textbook function of the Summa Theologica, D.J.

O'Conner writes the following interesting historical note:

It (Summa Contra Gentiles) discusses in greater detail than the Summa Theologica the arguments for natural religion .... The Summa Theologica is designed as a textbook of the- 41

ology for beginners--probably, next to Euclid's Elements, the most famous textbook ever vritten. 3

From the evidence provided In both a textual analysis as well as a structural consideration, X believe that It Is a serious mistake to dwell too heavily on the passages of the Summa Theologies for a complete, lucid and total account of Aquinas' position on percep tion. I further want to argue that the account In Question Seventy-

Eight of the Surma Theologica on perception relies heavily on what he develops in further detail in the Aristotelian Commentary. Ac cordingly, my analysis of Aquinas' theory of perception will dwell rather extensively on the texts in his Aristotelian Commentary, al though some references from the Summa Theologica and the Summa Contra

Gentiles will be utilized.

130*Connor, Aquinas and Natural Law, p.3. CHAPTER III

EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISPOSITIONS

As has been Indicated, the principal source material for my analysis of Aquinas on perception will be his detailed Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul. I will begin in the middle sections of the Commentary, beginning with Aquinas' remarks on Book II, Chapter

Five of Aristotle's work; in the Commentary, this comprises Lectio

Ten, Number 350 and following. The material considered by both Aris totle and Aquinas previous to these sections principally concerns the vegatative principles of the soul and these, as such, have no direct bearing on perception.

The Empedoclean Principle

In the listing of the principles of intentionality as construed by Aquinas, the terms "act" and "potency" occurred repeatedly. Begin ning with Lectio Ten in the Commentary, Aquinas provides a rather elaborate analysis of these terms by indicating how they are used in various eplstemologlcal contexts. What emerges is the development of somewhat of a "family resemblance" approach to the various uses of

"act" and "potency". By making this claim, I certainly do not wish to argue that Aquinas was a later Wittgensteinlan; however, what I do wish to assert Is that what a contemporary analytic philosopher

42 43 might call a "family resemblance" approach acquired by an analysis of the different uses of individual terms is quite similar to the methodology used by Aquinas in discussing how to arrive at the mean" ing of act and potency.

Aquinas begins this discussion of the uses of "act" and "potency" by considering two propositions which have come to him through the history of perception:

1) To sense is to be moved or acted upon in some way, for the act of sensation involves a certain alteration of the subject....

2) ...It was the view of some enquiries that the pas sivity of sensation was an instance of like being acted upon by like. Com. on the Soul tf 350

These two propositions are germane to the act-potency distinc tion in that both mention a "change" or "being acted upon"; the im portance is that "act" and "potency" apply analytically to the Aris totelian notion of change or alteration:

The fulfillment (act) of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially, is motion. Physics Bk III Ch. 1

Accordingly, both the terms act and potency will definitely be used in any discussion of change; furthermore, both of the propositions listed above consider perception as some form of change.

Aquinas first considers the second proposition, which, in effect, is historically rooted in the Empedodean axiom further developed in the Platonic tradition that "like knows like". Aquinas will strongly 44

argue that this axiom does Indeed apply In an analysis of perception,

but that It must be Interpreted In a different sense from that as

postulated by Empedocles.

The historical Empedocles affirmed that perception occurred

because of an identity of objects within and without the knower. Note

the following passage taken from one of the surviving Empedoclean frag

ments:

For It is with earth that we see Earth, and Water with water; by air we see bright Air, by fire destroying Fire. By love do we see Love, and Hate by grievious hate. Fragment tf 109

Empedocles is thus affirming that it is only because of the actual presence of an element within the knower that the knower Is aware of

the element outside the mind.

Aquinas' purpose is to philosophically modify the "like knows like" axiom; he makes use of the act-potency distinction in such a modification by claiming that the sensitive soul— perceptual dis- poslton— contains its object only potentially and not actually. Aqui nas is taking the rudimentary Empedoclean eplstemology literally and claiming that Empedocles did indeed assert the "actual existence" of

the elements within the knower itself. Aquinas argues against this position by claiming, as was indicated earlier in the discussion of an''lnaaterlal" reception of forms, that if the sense faculties actu ally and materially contained their objects, then, for the following

two reasons, any thesis of Intentionality would be philosophically undercut: 1) Any knower would be able to sense his own sense facul- 45 ties by means of the faculty In question; and 2) Sensations could be had even though the objects thero-selves were not present.

At a cursory glance, these ramifications of a strict Empedo- clean axiom may appear somewhat odd. Uliat Aquinas is indicating, however, is that if a strict interpretation of the Empedoclean ax iom is given, then the objects of sensation would also be contained materially— i.e.,"existentially fleshed out"— within the structure of the sense faculties themselves. If this is a viable theory of per ception, then Aquinas argues that it entails that a perceiver should be able to perceive his very sense faculties. In this framework, Aqui nas is implicitly using the act-object distinction. His statement, moreover, cannot be taken as denying that we are aware of our own awarenesses— i.e., that we, as beings capable of intentionality, have the ability, even on a perceptual level, to have reflective self- awareness; in fact, Aquinas will argue, as will become clear later in this dissertation, that the sensus coimnunis is the faculty by which a perceiver accomplishes this reflective act of being aware of his own awarenesses. Thus, in the above argument against a strict reading of the Empedoclean principle, Aquinas must be considering the sense faculty Itself as a possible object of perception by the per ceiver himself and not the mental act of the sense faculty in ques tion. On an experiential level, It does seem that Aquinas does have a point, as it is Impossible for us to see our own eyeball or hear our own ear-drum and so forth. Aquinas' claim, then, is that if

Empedocles' axiom is adequate in accounting for direct awareness, 46 then the above odd-conclusions follow.

The second ramification of the Empedoclean principle is cer tainly not to be taken as a structural argument for direct realism.

In one sense, Aquinas is merely restating what he means by percep tion— i.e., an awareness of an object in the external world. His treatment here is again evidence of the strong realistic overtone of his perceptual theory. One might claim that Aquinas is begging the question here against Empedocles; however, as was indicated earlier during the discussion of representative realism, Aquinas does not seem to understand any alternative to epistemological realism; if any theory of perception either denies an awareness of things of the world or has a structural component which would entail such a denial, then Aquinas considers this fact alone to be a rc- ductio ad absurdum argument against such a theory.

The above problems with the "like knows like" axiom are not serious enough to warrant a complete discarding of such a principle.

By means of the act-potency distinction, both Aristotle and Aquinas feel that they can structurally re-habilltate the Empedoclean axiom.

Note the force of the following passage;

Now since these difficulties are insurmountable If the sense faculty consists of its objects in their actuality (as the early philosophers thought), Aristotle concludes that the sensible soul is clearly not actually, but only potentially, the sense object. That is why sensation will not occur without an exterior scnse-object, just as combustible material does not burn of itself, but needs to be set on fire by an exterior agent; whereas if it were actually fire, it would burn simply of Itself. Com. on the Soul 0 354 47

In order to amplify these claims, Aquinas writes the following:

...He (Aristotle) shows how it follows from the above that the old theory that "like senses like" c

Aquinas is accordingly questioning Empedocles' axiom and also pro viding an interpretation of the axiom In terms of potency and act; the sense faculty is able to "become" the object in the external world in an immaterial, Intentional manner.

In offering an analysis of Aristotle and Aquinas' account of

"like knows like" in terms of the act-potency distinction, the fol lowing remarks must be made. . It seems that there is a two-fold consideration being elucidated of problems in which the terms po tency and act are used: 1) the mental act of direct awareness

Itself; and 2) the knowing power of faculty as a disposition.

From the texts quoted above, it appears that Aristotle and Aquinas are considering both points whereas Empedocles was probably only con cerned with the first. The act-potency distinction does indeed enter

Into the second proposition in which the knowing power is considered as a disposition or potency capable of "intentionally becoming" another thing. However, this second problem does not seem to have been Empedocles' basic worry as he appears to have been concerned 48

only with the mental act of perception itself. Furthermore, it

appears that here Aristotle and Aquinas are claiming that "inten

tional becoming"is quite different from "material hecoming"; if

"like knows like" were only another instantiation of "material be

coming", then this would rule out any "intentional becoming".

This point will be further considered later in the present dis

cussion of act and potency in perception.

The two propositions are not conflicting; furthermore, they

do indicate that Aristotle and Aquinas were not just commenting upon

an historical position but were rather elaborating upon their own

positive perceptual theory. Accordingly, the terms "act" and "po

tency" are used in two senses in discussing "like knows like";

the first use is in providing an account of an epistemological dis

position, and the second use is to give an analysis of "intentional

becoming" as being quite different from "material becoming". Both

of these points will be further elaborated upon later in this pres

ent discussion.

Conceptual Dispositions

Having discussed and modified the Empedoclean axiom, Aquinas

next considers the first proposition above— as stated on page 43.

To sense is to be moved or acted upon in some way, for the act of sensation involves a certain alteration of the subject. Com. on the Soul # 350

This is a proposition concerning sensation as being an Instance of 49

"being moved" or "being acted upon" in some way. This analysis of the first proposition Is again In terms of a discussion of potency and act. As has been air eady indicated, this is consistent with the

Aristotelian definition of motion as found In the Physics. Accord ingly, if sensation Is related to motion in some way, then it too will use the terms used in the definition of motion. At this point, it is crucial, however, to realize the qualified remark about sen sation being a motion. Note that the text of the proposition is partly as follows: "To sense is to be moved or acted upon in some way...." The phrase "in some way" is of utmost importance for

Aristotelian episteoology; Aristotle, and Aquinas will concur, will claim that knowledge is only analogous to a motion. And this is not to claim that knowledge is to be identified with a motion or an action. This position will become more clear as the present dis cussion develops, as it will be important to ascertain the "action- status*' of a mental act according to the epistemological gambit of

Aristotle and Aquinas.

Following Aristotle, Aquinas lists the various contexts in which the terms act and potency are used in an epistemological analysis of the first proposition above. Aquinas begins his assay with a discussion of these terms as applied to the Intellect where both concept-formation and concept-exerclse take place. His dis cussion is germane to this dissertation in that the analysis of the terms as used in relation to concepts is modified so that it can also apply to perception. 50

In the analysis of the terms potency and act, Aquinas uses a two-fold structural approach insofar as these terms apply to the intellect. His first approach is to explain what types or classi fications of potencies and acts are used in epistemological con texts. This is conjoined with an analysis of a potency reduced to an act in a knowing process. These two considerations are inter related in that the first discussion pertains to a description of what types of potencies or dispositions and acts or perfections are needed for an epistemological assay while the second discussion is concerned with the development or process from a disposition to an actuality. The immediate reason for such an analysis Is obvious; these terms will lead to an epistemological assay of how a non- knower becomes a knower; here, non-knower is being used as a being capable of knowing but who does not yet know.

The use of disposition is very important in this context too.

By means of a disposition or capacity, Aquinas is arguing that only certain types of existents are capable of knowledge. In other words,

It is by the philosophical gambit of disposition that Aquinas struc turally argues that a stone cannot form a conceptus but that a human being can. Furthermore, this is structurally the philosophical point

Sartre was making with the distinction between Being-In-itself (en- soi) and Being-for-itself (pour-soi). Furthermore, Aquinas, Just as 3artre, will use a dispositional analysis to widen the Structural gap between human knowers and non-knowers rather than lessen such a distinction. 51

Regarding the first point--i.e., to explain the different types

of dispositions used in an epistemological situation— Aquinas illus

trates the various uses of act and potency in the following manner:

Then he distinguishes act and potency in the intellect; we speak, he says, in one sense of potency when we say that man is a knower, referring to his natural capacity for know ledge. Han, we say, is one of that class of beings that know or have knowledge, meaning that his nature can know and form habits of knowing. In another sense, however, we say of some one that he knows, meaning that he knows certain definite things; thus we say of one who has the habit of some science— e.g., grammar— that he is now one who knows. Com. on the Soul # 359.

Aquinas further explicates this difference in the following passage:

Now, obviously, in both cases the man's capacities are im plied by calling him a knower; but not in the same way in both cases. In the first case, man is said to be "able” through belonging to a certain genus or "matter”, i.e., his nature had a certain capacity that puts him in this genus, and he is in potency to knowledge as matter is to its form. But the second man, with his acquired habit of knowing, is called "able" be cause he can, when he wished, reflect on his knowledge— unless, of course, he is accidentally prevented, e.g., by exterior pre occupations or by some bodily indisposition. Ibid. #360.

Aquinas then makes a further elaboration:

A third case would be that a man who actually is thinking about something here and now. He is the one who most properly and perfectly is a knower in any field; e.g., knowing the letter "A", which belongs to the above-mentioned science of grammar. Of the three, then, the third is simply in act; the first is simply in potency; while the second is in act as compared with the first and in potency as compared with the third. Clearly, then, potentiality is taken in two senses (the first and second man) and actuality also in two senses (the second and the third man). Ibid. # 361 52

In the above passages, Aquinas, In elucidating the various use of

act and potency, Is claiming that epistemological dispositions and

their corresponding perfections can be used In at least two different

senses* Parenthetically, the methodological importance of such

passages illustrates that Aquinas is not arguing for a singular and

unified meaning for the terms involved in his epistemological assay.

On the contrary, these terms have different senses and nuances de

pending upon the context in which they are being used or in which

they appear. This is one basis for claiming that Aquinas is using

a '’family resemblance" type of methodology in his analysis of act

and potency.

In offering an analysis of the above passages in Aquinas' Com mentary, a new set of terminology will be introduced; hopefully this

terminology will aid in understanding Aquinas' account of disposi

tional properties and their corresponding perfections as applied in

intentionality claims*

The first sense of potency will be called Dlspositlon-1. Dis position- 1 is the state in which any given potential knower finds himself when he has the ability or capacity to know; yet this ability has not yet been perfected in any way whatsoever. In a fundamental sense, such a disposition is structurally what would distinguish

Sartre's en-soi from the pour-soi. Furthermore, Disposltion-1 seems to be the basis for Aristotle's claim that the Intellect is, in a sense, all things* Note the following passage from Aristotle's

On the Soul: 53

...Che mind is In a sense potentially whatever Is thinkable* though actually it Is nothing until It has thought. What It thinks must be In it just as characters may be said to be on a writing tablet on which as yet nothing actually stands writ ten: this is exactly what happens with the mind. On the Soul 430a.

The next step in the analysis is the process of going from Dis position-! to its corresponding perfection or act. Disposition-1 is actualized or perfected by means of acquiring a habitus of know ledge or what is also called an intellectual conceptus. By acquir ing a habit of knowledge, a knower actualizes Disposition-1 and the state of Actuality-1 has been produced. The essence of this claim is that there is a difference between a person who knows Hungarian— i.e., one who has the developed habit acquired the mastery of the Hungarian language— and a person who may have an innate language ability or capacity to learn slavlc languages but who has yet to embark on such a study. For example, there would be a difference between a pro fessor of Hungarian in aSlavic Language Department and a beginning freshman student who wants to learn Hungarian but who knows nothing yet of the Hungarian language.

It must be noted, furthermore, that Actuality-1, when it refers to the habit of acquired mastery of a "piece of knowledge”— a conceptus— may also be used sb a disposition. In this context, this will be re ferred to as Disposition-2. The reason for making such a distinction is that a knower may have the acquired mastery of a parcel of knowledge but not now be actually exercising this ability. The professor of

Hungarian Language might be watching a football game and thus be far removed from a situation in which his ability to function well with

Hungarian grammar and syntax could be used. However* even though the

language professor may not be here and now using his acquired ability*

this does not mean that he is on the same knowledge-level as the

beginning freshman who knows nothing of the language. In other words*

the professor of language has an acquired disposition which he Is not

here and now exercising whereas the freshman student would only have

a disposition to acquire a further disposition. The acquired dis

position of the language professor— Disposition-2— is one type of

actuality; however* it is also a disposition or capacity in that it

is not always being exercised. Accordingly* Actuallty-1 is identical

to Disposition-2.

In addition* Insofar as both the beginning freshman student and

the Hungarian Language Professor have Disposltion-1 in some way or

other* they are both alike and thus both generlcally differ from a

slab of marble or an oak tree. Disposltion-1* therefore* is a generic

disposition to acquire further dispositions— Disposition-1 -Actuality-2 ,

both of which are Identical— and thus is the dispositional property which ultimately distinguishes knowers from non-knowers.

As has already been indicated* Dlspositlon-1-Actuality-2 can be

further actualized to become Actuallty-2. This would be the case when

the Hungarian professor was actually speaking or writing or in some other way actually using his acquired mastery of the Hungarian lan

guage. In other words, he would be here and now actually exercising his acquired disposition. 55

In the fore-going analysis, Aquinas is definitely offering a two fold and dual level ontological structure to the epistemological dis positions. Disposition-1 would be that dispositional property which generlcally determines a knower from a non-knower. Disposition-2, on the other hand, is a type of dispositional property which would dis tinguish various knowers from one another insofar as each would have different acquired dispositions.

In Aqulnlan terminology, the acquired disposition— Disposition-

2-Actuallty-l— is a conceptus. A precise and detailed analysis of this acquired disposition pertains to a discussion of concept-formatlon and the relation between concept and phantasm. Later in this pre sent dissertation, a partial analysis of these complex problems will be given; however, a detailed analysis exceeds the limits of this inquiry.

While discussing acquired dispositions, it Is worth while to note that two contemporary analytic philosophers have been interested in the formation of a conceptus. Peter Geach, in his enlightening but rather difficult book, Mental Acts, provides a detailed and interest ing account of concept-formation in terms of an acquired ability whose existence Is manifested by a mastery of linguistic usage. In addition to Ceach, Anthony Kenny provides an analysis of disposition

In the Introduction to his translation of Volume XXII of the new Eng lish Edition of the Summa Theologies. It should be noted, however, that neither account is completely satisfactory concerning the relation of phantasm to conceptus.

A rather important tangential problem comes to the surface with 56 the present discussion of acquired dispositions. This is the question of whether or not Aquinas has Innate ideas in his Intellectual apparatus; the following passage is crucial regarding this problem:

But whereas a sense faculty is natural to every animal— so that in the act of being generated it acquires a sense faculty with its own specific nature— the case is not the same with Intellectual knowledge; this is not naturally Inborn in man; it has to be acquired through application and discipline. Com. on the Soul 8 273

The present passage indicates that innate ideas definitely are not components of Aquinas' structural account of the mind. However, a distinction must be made between Dispositlon-1 and Disposition-2.

Aquinas is arguing that there is no such thing as an Innate Disposi- tion-2. In other words, no human knower has inborn capacities— i.e.,

Disposition-2-Actuality-1— for particular pieces of knowledge. In effect, this means that there is no such epistemological entity as an inborn or innate conceptus. Every parcel of specific knowledge— every conceptus or habitus— must be acquired. The structural need for postulating the intellectU3 agens is important for concept- formation. If one were to class intellectus agens an innate idea, then Aquinas would not be philosophically disturbed; his claim re garding the absence of innate ideas for human knowers wholly concerns

Dlsposltlon-2.

One might claim that Disposltlon-1 is an Innate idea. I believe

Aquinas would agree with this also; in effect all this would be stat ing is that a knower has a generic dispositional property which dif ferentiates him from non-knowers. On the other hand, what Aquinas 57 seems to be referring to in above passages is Disposition-2. Thus, one may argue that Aquinas has innate ideas in so far es he dis tinguished a Sartrean pour-soi from an en-soi. With this move,

Aquinas would have no philosophical complaint; but he adamantly claims that no human knower has innate capacities of a Dlsposltional-

2 variety.

The given passage also includes a reference to the Innateness of sense faculties. The structural analysis of this claim must wait until a direct consideration of the external sensorium has been pro vided.

Having provided an analysis of his first question about the different uses of the terms act and potency, Aquinas then proceeds to consider the related question conserning the reduction of potencies to acts— i.e., the reduction of a disposition to its corresponding perfection. Such an analysis will entail a two-fold consideration, as Aquinas argues that an identical reduction is not had With both

Disposltlon-1 and Disposltion-2. Note the following passage:

...while in the first two cases there is potential knowledge and while potency is such that it is able to be actualized, there is a difference, in respect of actualization, between a primary and a secondary potency* But one in potency in the secondary sense— i.e., as already possessing the habit— passes from the state of having, indeed, sensations or knowledge but not exercising them, into the state of actually knowing something here and now. And this kind of actualization differs from the other. Com. on the Soul # 362-64.

Once the difference between the two types of reduction has at least been stated, the immediate and foremost problem concerns whether 58 such a reduction, In either or both cases, Is an action or a move ment in the physical sense. That this problem has a contemporary analytic philosophy of mind bent to it is obvious; Aquinas, following

Aristotle, was also philosophically concerned about the "action- status" of an act of knowledge. Again, the Aristotelian position has more than a mere historical interest to it.

In order to offer an analysis of this problem, Aquinas begins by distinguishing the various senses of "being acted upon". He does this s6 that he might arrive at a clearer analysis of how these terms apply in the knowledge process.

...he remarks that being acted upon has several meanings, like potency and act. In one sense it implies some kind of destruc tion caused by a contrary quality. For in the strict sense the state of being passive to action seems to connote, on the side of the patient, a loss of something proper to it through its being overcome by the agent; and this loss is a sort of destruc tion, either absolutely, as when the patient loses its substantial form: or relatively, as in the loss of an accidental form. And the loss implies a contrariety in the agent, the imposition upon the patient's matter, or being, of a contrary form from outside. In the first and strict sense, then, "being acted upon" means a destruction caused by a contrary agent. Com. on the Soul 0 365.

The account just given is in effect a further development of the

Aristotelian account of change already given. It is important to realize, however, that in the next passage Aquinas will structurally offer a wider sense of "being acted upon" which is somewhat different from the reduction required of physical change.

In another and looser sense, the term connotes any reception of something from the outside. And as a receiver is to what it 59

receives as a potency to Its actuality; and as actuality la the perfection of what Is potential; so being acted upon In this sense Implies rather that a certain preservation and per fection of a thing in potency Is received from a thing In act. For only the actual can perfect the potential; and actuality is not, as such, contrary to potency; indeed the two are really similar, for potency is nothing but a certain relationship to act. And without this likeness there sould be no necessary correspondence between this act and this potency. Hence potency In this sense is not actualised from contrary to contrary, but rather from like to like, in the sense that potency resembles act. Ibid. 0 366.

The structural Importance of the above passages is that they definitely are attempts to show that knowledge is not, in itself, a physical activity. An analysis of this claim will Indicate, as is to be expected, that Aquinas is very much working within the framework of an Aristotelian definition of motion. Such a definition asserts that to be moved is to undergo a reduction from a potentiality to an actuality. Yet Aquinas is strongly affirming that there Is a dif ference in a reduction of a knowledge disposition— either Disposition-

1 or Disposition-2— to its corresponding perfection and a reduction of a physical disposition to its appropriate perfection. The force of this argument lies In the fact that Aquinas is claiming that a act of knowledge is not contrary to potency; since there is an absence of contraries, physical movement cannot occur. Accordingly, with such a distinction in mind, Aquinas will argue that there is a difference between a change in cold water becoming hot water and a change from the non-exercise of the Intellectual habit of speaking Hungarian by the

Slavic Language Professor to his actual exercise of such a habit by here and now speaking Hungarian. In the former sense, when the cold 60 water becomes hot, Aquinas argues that there is a "destruction" in that the physical substratum; obviously, this is a much ammended use of

"destruction", for what Aquinas means Is that the cold water, when it

Is heated, no longer is cold— -the quality of being cold has been destroyed. Accordingly, such a physical change of qualities will always involve a destruction of the contrary quality. The Aristotelian theory of opposites is evidently at work here. Note the following passages from Aristotle's Metaphysics:

Change 1b from opposite to opposite or from intermediate to opposite; but it does not occur from just any opposite— a voice, after all, is not white— but only from contrary to contrary.... There are four kinds of change: change of what a thing is; change of quantity; and changes of quality of of place. Change of what a thing is is simple coming to be and perishing; change of quantity is growth and diminution; change of affection is alteration; change of place is motion; and in each case the change is into the appropriate contrary state. Meta Bk XII, Ch 2.

Too much emphasis on the reduction of one contrary to another contrary cannot be given for it is on this basis that Aquinas will argue that knowledge is not a physical action or movement. Such a reduction, furthermore, is obviously rooted metaphysically in Aris totelian hylomorphism.

To further elaborate on this point, when there is a physical re duction in terms of act and potency, the act or perfection of being cold, for example— the fact or state of affairs— is no longer around as a fact or state of affairs when the water has been heated. There fore the fact— the water's being cold— is no longer a fact and thus the 61

"cold fact" has been destroyed* Aquinas Is arguing that In any physical action, such a destruction is a necessary condition. As was indicated in the passages from Aristotle's Metaphysics, this

"destruction"— i.e., the going from one predicate to its contrary by means of some efficientagent— occurs in both what Aquinas terms sub stantial change as well as in accidental change. The former is when, for example, a block of wood becomes char-coal and the latter is ex emplified by the cold-hot water example. That there are ontological problems with the substantial-accidental distinction 1 will not deny; however, what is crucial for this present inquiry is that both of these types of physical change have a movement to a contrary state as a necessary condition of their ontological assay. Knowledge— both sense knowledge and concept-formation— on the ocher hand, is not in volved with a reduction to a contrary state. It is on this ground that

Aquinas is hinting that knowledge is a "perfection" rather than an action. The precise analysis of such a procedure is now our next task.

If "being acted upon" in a knowledge process is not to be taken in the sense of a physical action in the Aristotelian framework, then there is an obvious structural question about the status of the newly acquired phrase. Accordingly, Aquinas' next consideration is to ade quately apply a meaning of "being acted upon" to the two senses of disposition already considered--!.e., Disposition-1 and Dlsposltion-

2— and thus indicate how they can Involve "being acted upon" and yet not be a physical action. Aquinas begins this analysis by considering

Disposltlon-2 in the following manner: 62

...Aristotle discusses whether the actualising of already acquired knowledge Involves a being acted upon. And he takes first the transit from secondary potentiality Into fullest actuality; ...he asserts that this movement Into actual think ing is not truly passively being altered; for. as we have seen, no movement into act. as movement into act. is such. The term applies, strictly, only to the alteration of a subject from one to the other of two mutually exclusive qualities. Com. on the Soul 6 367.

That such a reduction is not had in the going from Dispositlon-2

Actuality-1 to Actuality-2 is indicated in the next passage:

But this is not what happens when a man begins to exercise his mind on knowledge he already possesses; rather, he is de veloping ii quality already possessed; as Aristotle says here, it is a "new perfection" in him and an "increase in actuality." for perfection increases with actuality. And if one insists on using the terms "actuality" and "being acted upon", they must be taken in a wider and less strict sense. And to illustrate the point he adds that it is just as inept to speak of a thinker being "altered" when he actually thinks as to say of a builder that he is altered by building. Ibid.

The importance of this page is obvious* Here. Aquinas is defi nitely arguing that the exercise of knowledge— the going from Dis position-2 to Actuality-2— is not an action or physical activity; rather it is a perfection or a qualitatively exercised becoming.

This is why Aquinas lsat pains to claim that the exercise of know ledge is not an alteration or "being altered". It cannot be an al teration because in this sense an alteration is a change from a con trary to its opposite. But Aquinas wants to strongly affirm that in going from Disposltlon-2 to Actuality-2, there is In no way a movement or becoming from contraries. There is. rather, a further developing of a quality or perfection already possessed. Thus knowledge, for 63

ArlstoCle and Thomas, will belong to the category or class of quality

and not to the category of action when the ten categories are filled-

out with various exemplifications.

The present discussion involving not placing knowledge in the

category of action seems to be centered around a question of inten

sity. Accordingly, Actuality-2 is a more Intense "having11 of a

quality which is already possessed conceptus. A piece of knowledge,

therefore, actually being exercised, for example, a mathematician

here and now knowing the pythagorean theorem, is a quality possessed

by a knower rather than an action being performed by such a knower.

Of course, philosophically this analysis is quite dependent upon the

Aristotelian structure of motion and definition of change as well as

the account of the ten categories. However, in light of much con

temporary philosophical discussion concerning the philosophy of action when concerned with knowledge-states, it is philosophically interesting

to note that Aristotle and Thomas definitely did not predicate action

to the mental states of knowing, either in the case of sense knowledge or conceptual knowledge.

The next consideration facing Aquinas is over the use of "being

acted upon" as applied to Disposition-1:

Then...he discusses whether the transit from potency to act on one who acquires completely fresh knowledge is an "alteration" In the sense of "being acted upon". He says that when a learner, previously knowing only potentially, is instructed by a master already knowing actually, one should either call this simply not a case of alteration and being acted upon, or else distinguish two kinds of alteration. Com. bn the Soul # 369. 64

Aquinas then goes on to make such a distinction:

The one kind is a "change to a condition of privation", I.e., into qualities opposed to those which the thing already has, and incompatible with these, and therefore until now excluded by them. The other kind is "by change to a possession and maturity", i.e., through receiving habits and forms which per fect the thing's nature and involve no loss of what it already has. And the learner is altered in this second sense, not in the first. Com. on the Soul & 369.

Again, the central concern is over whether knowledge is an al teration, and if it ia an alteration, then knowledge would be an example of a physical activity. But here, as above, with the actu alization of Disposition-1, Aquinas is arguing that there is not a strict sense of alteration, as this would imply a reduction from one contrary state to its opposite. Rather, the acquiring of Actuallty-1 from Disposition-1 is a perfection of a knowing being. In other words, a being capable of intentionality is perfected or further developed by acquiring both Actuallty-1 and Actuality-2; it does not lose any property or quality when it perfects Disposition-1 by acquiring habits of knowledge.

In this context, It is important to realize that Aquinas will refer to knowledge as an immanent activity rather that as a trans ient activity. The root difference between the two is that the former essentially consists in a qualitative perfection of the agent whereas the latter consists essentially In the production of something beyond the agent— I.e., beyond the knower himself.

Aquinas Is quite concerned about making certain that there is no 65 way that a movement from contrary to contrary occurs in the process of knowing. With this concern in mind, he raises the linguistic ques tion about a knower who goes from a state or condition of error to a condition of having true knowledge. Thus Aquinas is considering the possibility that the process of acquiring knowledge from a previous state of error might be considered as an action. In other words, such an acquisition might be construed as a movement from a contrary state to its opposite— in other words, from error to truth. The following passage is rather instructive as to Aquinas' methodology here, as it is quite linguistically orientated:

Ignorance has two meanings. It can be purely negative: when the Ignorant person neither knows the truth nor is in volved in the opposite error; and In this case, he is simply brought into actual knowledge, not changed by being rid of a contrary habit. On the other hand, ignorance may imply the bad condition of being involved in error contrary to the truth; and to acquire knowledge, then, one must be changed by being delivered from the contrary habit. Com. on the Soul & 363.

Aquinas continues:

But really, when one is brought from error to the knowledge of truth, there is indeed a certain likeness to the change from one quality to its opposite, but It is only a ikeness. For where there is true alteration both the opposed qualities— the terms of the process— are necessarily and essentially involved, e.g., becoming white Involves not only white, but also black, or some intermediary colour which in relation to white is a sort of blackness. But where knowledge is acquired it is quite accidental that the learner was previously in error. He could learn without first being in error. Hence it is not in the true sense of an alteration. Ibid. I 370.

Aquinas is thus satisfied that there is no important sense of 66

"being acted upon" which applies to knowledge in the form of an action. Therefore, the process of acquiring and exercising know ledge— either Actuality-1 or Actuality-2— Is never to be taken as an alteration. On the other hand, such an acquisition or exercise of knowledge is a perfection of the knower and as a perfection in no way "destroys" any function of the knower himself. Action, therefore, is definitely excluded from the Aquinian assay of concept-formatlon and concept-exerclse.

Perceptual Dispositions

Aquinas now applies this distinction gained from his assay of concept-formation and concept-exercise to the perceptual situation.

He begins by considering the relation of potency and act to sen sation:

...we must take Into account that, as in the intellectual cog nition, so too in sensation, potency and act are each two-fold. For what so far possesses no sense faculty but is due by nature to have one, is in potency to sensation; and what has the sense- facuity, but yet does not sense, is in potency to actual sen sation in the same way as we have seen in the case of acquired Intellectual knowledge. Now, as a subject moves from primary potency into primary actuality when it acquires knowledge through teaching, so too a subject's primary potency to the possession of a sense-facuity is actualised by his birth. Com. on the Soul # 373

Aquinas further elaborates on this position:

But whereas a sense faculty is natural to every animal— so that in the act of being generated it acquires a sense faculty along with its own specific nature— the case is not the same with intellectual knowledge; this is not naturally inborn in man; it has to be acquired through application.... Ibid. 67

Referring back to Aristotle, Thomas continues with this dis

cussion:

This is what he means by saying that "the first change in the sensitive being" is caused by the parent. This "first change", he explains, is from sheer potency to the primary actuality; and it is due to the parent; because there is a power in the semen to actualise the sensitive soul with all its capacities. Once an animal has been generated it has its senses In the same way as a man who has been taught possesses knowledge. And when it actually senses it corresponds to the man who actually exercises his knowledge by thinking. Ibid. tf 374.

Aquinas is here making an Important point which will have much

bearing on our later discussion of the structure of the individual

acts of the external sensorlum. He is asserting that an external

sense faculty, by the very fact that it exists as a functional

faculty, is already in a state of Dlsposition-2— Actuality-1. In

other words, nothing more than the existence of the functional sense

faculty— i.e., being in the state of an existent— is needed to have

such a sense faculty adequately disposed or properly rendered ready

to sense a particular type of object; thus the sense faculty, in its very state of existing, is in the state of Disposition-2— Actuallty-1.

In effect, this is the structural reason why Aquinas will argue, as

shall be considered later in this dissertation, that the external sense faculties are "per se infallible" regarding their proper ob jects.

The above passage is very crucial for understanding Aquinian epistemology. For it Is here that Aquinas is providing the essential and structural difference between sense knowledge and concept-fonnation. 68

Such an epistemological dichotomy consists in the fact that differing concepts are not innate to the knower but rather must be acquired dis positions* On the other hand, the abilities or dispositions to have differing perceptions— the meaning of perception here concerns the object of the perceptual act and not the mental act itself— are structurally innate to a human perceiver. These perceptual disposi tions or abilities are to be understood in terms of a disposition to see colors, to hear sounds, to feel roughs and hots, etc. A perceiver, therefore, in so far as he exists and functions well, has Disposition-2 type sense faculties. Regarding concepts, however, he must acquire these Disposition-2 habits through experience by "application and discipline" as they are not innate. Aristotle indicated such a dis tinction in the Metaphysics; note the following passage from Book IX:

All potencies are either Innate (such as the senses) or acquired by habit (such as the potency for playing the flute) or by learning (such as those involved in arts). Meta Bk IX, Ch 5.

In summary, therefore, the structural difference between sense knowledge and concept-formation is that the perceptual dispositions are all by nature on the level of Disposition-2 abilities whereas the gene ric conceptual dispositions— a disposition to acquire further disposi tions— is on the level, by nature, of a Dispositlonal-1 ability.

This structural difference, furthermore, serves the purpose of providing Aquinas with the necessary condition for postulating the

Intellectus agens. In other words, the intellectus agens forms a conceptus— a Disposition-2— for intellectual knowledge. Such an 69

eplstemological faculty Is postulated because, in Aqulnian ontology, unlversals— -which are in some way the object of concept-format ion—

do not exist outside of the mind. Thus there must be some means by which the mind can form concepts. Aquinas would definitely disagree with Russell when the latter claimed that he was "directly acquainted" with universale. On the intellectual level, therefore, the intellectus agens is that faculty by means of which a knower goes from Dlspositlon-

1 to Disposltion-2-Actuality-l. It, furthermore, Is that faculty which makes or forms the acquired dispositions of the knower. Aqui nas is cognizant of this latter function in that he refers in places

to the intellectus agens as a kind of "efficient cause". This position will briefly be considered later in the dissertation.

In addition, in this present account, Aquinas is structurally reiterating the ramifications of the Platonic distinction between opinion and knowledge. Accordingly, It is natural and quite easy for a percelver to have perceptions and thus remain within the cave of the Seventh Book of the Republic. It is difficult, on the other hand, to acquire knowledge of concepts in the brilliance of the light outside the cave's environs. Aquinas sums up this position with the following rather explicit statement:

...as a subject moves from primary potency into primary actuality when it acquires knowledge through teaching, so too a subject's primary potency to the possession of a sense faculty is actualized by hie birth. Corn, on the Soul # 373.

In other words, in so far as a human knower has functioning sense 70

faculties— I.e., innate Dlspositlons-2— he Is guaranteed perceptions.

In concept-formation, on the other hand, these Disposltions-2 have

"...to be acquired through application and discipline." Whereas sense knowledge is easily attainable, intellectual knowledge requires some contribution on the part of the agent.

Having distinguished between potency and act in both conception and perception, Aquinas next considers the difference between the actual process of sensing and the actual process of thinking:

...he sets himself out to discriminate between actual sen sations and thinkings; and he finds the first reason for distinguishing these activities in the difference between their objects, i.e., the sense objects and the intelligible objects which are attained by actual sensation and thinking respectively. The sense objects which actuate sensitive ac tivities— the visible, the audible, etc.— exist outside the soul; the reason being that actual sensation attains to the individual things which exist externally. Com. on the Soul 8 375.

Aquinas next considers knowledge of unlversals:

Whereas rational knowledge is of unlversals which exist somehow within the soul. Whence it is clear that the man who already has scientific knowledge about certain things does not need to seek such things outside of himself; he already has them inwardly, and is able, unless prevented by some in cidental cause, to reflect on them whenever he pleases; not possessing sense objects inwardly, he is forced to receive them from the outside. Ibid.

This passage is a lucid exposition of the Aquinian dichotomy In epistemology regarding objects. The sense faculties are the means by which the percelver is aware of the individual things of the world, whereas the intellectual faculty la that by means of which the knower Is aware of unlversals which exist only within the mind. Accord ingly , this quotation is quite important in that Aquinas is explicitly claiming that the mind, when it is cognizant of unlversals, is in no way aware of something outside of itself. Therefore, the universal is a product of the mind and not an object of the mind in rerum nature. Were this present inquiry concerned with concept-formatlon via the functioning of the intellectus agens, the above discussion would require much detailed analysis. For this can only be understood in terms of the distinction between first intentional consciousness and second intentional consciousness. Suffice It to say here that when Aquinas considers the universal— i.e., the actual relation of one to many— these objects of knowledge are classified as second intentions. In other words, they are products of the mind reflecting on what it knows rather than on something outside of the mind. CHAPTER IV

OBJECTS AND FACULTIES

Priority of object

An analysis of Aquinas' assay of perception will now begin.

Such a discussion will follow the methodology used by Aquinas in his Aristotelian Commentary. This discussion remotely is divided into two segments. The first concerns the objects of perception and the second concerns the faculties of perception. The reason for such a division is basically teleologlcal in nature, as evidenced by the following passages:

Beginning then, he observes that before we decide what the senses themselves are we must discuss the objects of each sense; for objects are prior to faculties. Com. on the Soul # 383

For the very essence and definition of each sense consists in its being naturally fitted to be affected by some such special object proper to itself. The nature of each faculty consists in its relation to its proper object. Ibid. # 387

As ve indicated earlier, there is a quaint bit of teleology going on here. However, this teleology must be understood in two senses, neither of which is extremely philosophically disturbing. In the first sense, this teleology is an instantiation of Aquinas' prin ciple that potencies are related to acts* The knowledge faculty is

It 73

ontologlcally considered as a potency; thus, it is In some way

directly related with Its corresponding act. Accordingly, Aquinas

is consistently affirming that a knowledge potency— in this case,

a perceptual potency— is what it is only because of its corresponding

act; thus, the "very definition and essence of each sense consists

in its being naturally fitted to be affected by some special sense proper to itself."(Com. on the Soul # 387)

Secondly, there is a very benign sense of teleology exhibited here in that Aquinas is claiming that each sense faculty has a particular object and differing sense faculties do not have any cross-reference to different categories— i.e., species— of sense objects at any given time. Thus the faculty of sight is that sense faculty by which we are aware of colors; the faculty of hearing is that sense faculty by which we are aware of sounds, and so forth.

It is impossible for the eye to be the means by which the perceiver Is aware of the note of B-flat and it is correspondingly impossible for the ear to be the means by which the perceiver is aware of any shade of red. In this instance, such a teleological structure is nothing more than a way of philosophically analysing some common-sense data. Thus,

I do not find such a use of teleology to be philosophically harmful.

In the former Instance, one might indeed question Aquinas' use of teleology. However, such a use would In effect be fundamentally rooted in his basic ontological distinction, that of act and potency.

Accordingly, to reject his teleological structure here would also be to refute his entire act-potency dichotomy. This is not to argue 74

that Aquinas Is ontologlcally correct with his act-potency distinction,

but It Is to argue that to reject the Aquinian eplstemology be

cause teleology Is involved Is too easy a philosophical move. In

other words, such a use of teleology Is Intricately connected with

Aquinas' entire system, and this teleological use only makes sense

for Aquinas when considered with his entire system. To further sub

stantiate this claim of the inter-relatedness in the present context

is to indicate that here Aquinas is being rigorously consistent with

the claims of his Aristotelian ontology. The following passage from

Aristotle's Metaphysics will help illustrate this point:

...it is clear that actuality is prior to potency; and 1 mean not merely that it is prior to that definite potency that is described as a source or principle of change in something else or in itself qua something else, but that it is prior in general to every principle of movement and rest.... That it is prior in definition is evident, for it is only be cause there is a possibility of its being actual that what is potential in the primary sense is potential; for instance, what is capable of building is what can build, what is capable of seeing is what can see, and what is visible is what can be seen, the same argument applies to everything else, so that the de finition of the actual must precede that of the potential, and knowledge of it must precede knowledge of the potential. Meta Bk IX Ch 8 .

This passage indicates that act is ontologlcally prior to potency.

Accordingly, if the perception faculties are potencies, that which will make them "in act" is prior to the potency itself. Accordingly, the objects of perception— the reds and C-sharps and sweets— must be con

sidered first as it is because of them that the perception potencies are what they are. One cannot consider the faculties of perception unless one knows what it is in act that will actualize these potencies. 75

This is the intent of the above mentioned passage from the Meta physics . With such an ontological commitment to the priority of act to potency, it is obvious that in the case of perception Aquinas considers it necessary to treat of the sensible objects in act first.

For these objects are prior to the sense faculties. This statement, therefore, is an instantiation of his general philosophical maxim that acts are prior to potencies.

Objects of Sensation

In his discussion of the objects of sensation, Aquinas follows the three-fold Aristotelian division of such objects into the proper sensibles, the common sensibles and the incidental objects of sense.

Now the term sense-object is used in three ways, one way incidentally (per accidens) and in two ways essentially or absolutely (per se); and of the latter we use one if referring to the special objects proper to each sense, and the other in referring to the objects that are common to more than one sense in all sentient things. Com on the Soul # 383.

In this above passage, Aquinas is claiming that the objects of sensation are not to be taken in a univocal sense; on the contrary, there seems to be something of a hierarchy of these objects, which classification will become more clear as the present discussion pro ceeds. In effect, Aquinas is much more complex in his analysis of the objects of perception than, for example, G.E. Moore. Moore con tinually writes of sense data as being the only type of object of sensation. For Aquinas, on the other hand, there are two generic kinds of sensible objects: a) those which are perceived directly, and b) those which are perceived Indirectly. The proper and common 76 senslbles are directly perceived and the Incidental object of sense is indirectly perceived.

In order to provide a fuller development of the various kinds of objects of sensation, the following passages from the Commentary will be considered:

.**he explains the members of the division, and first what he means by a special sense-object. He says that he means by this term what Is perceived by one sense and by no other, and in respect of which the perceiving sense cannot err; thus it is proper to sight to know colour, to hearing to know sound, to taste to know flavour or savour. Touch, however, has several objects proper to itself: heat and moisture, cold and dryness, the heavy and the light, etc. Each sense judges the objects proper to itself and is not mistaken about these, e.g., sight with regard to such and such a colour or hearing with regard to sound. Com. on the Soul 0 384

Next Aquinas considers the common senslbles:

...he says, touching the second member of the division, that the cosmon sense objects are five: movement, rest, number, shape and size. These are not proper to any one sense but are common to all; which we must not take to mean that all these are common to all the senses, but that some of them, i.e., number, movement, and rest, are common to all. But touch and sight perceive all five. It is clear now what are the sense-objects that are such in themselves or absolutely. Ibid. # 386.

Finally, the incidental object of sense is discussed:

...he takes the third member of the division. We might, he says, call Darius or Socrates incidentally a sense object be cause each happens to be white: that is sensed incidentally which happens to belong to what is sensed absolutely. It is accidental to the white thing, which is sensed absolutely, chat it should be Darius; hence Darius is a sense-object incidentally. 77

He does not, as such, act upon the sense at all. Ibid. tf 387.

In the Summa Theologica, Aquinas provides the following account of the three fold division concerning the objects of sensation:

Senses know things from being Impressed with their likeness. Now this likeness can be taken at three stages. First, Immediately and directly, as when the likeness of color is In the sight; so also with the other proper sense-objects in their appropriate senses. Secondly, directly but not immediately, as when the likeness of bodily shape or size is in the sight; so also with sense-objects shared through several senses. Thirdly, neither immediately not directly, but Indirectly, as when the likeness of man is in sight; he is there not because he is a man, but be cause he is a colored object. S.T*, 1., Q* 17, a. 2#

The above passages give a more complete description of the vari ous kinds of sense objects. In these passages, sense is being used to refer to the external sensorlum when considering the proper and common senslbles and to the internal sensorlum when the incidental object of Bense is being considered. This will become more clear as this dissertation proceeds*

To reiterate, In this area of sense objects, Aquinas is much more complex than most sense data epistemologlsts, of which G.E. Moore is a prime example. For Moore, a sense datum will always be the direct object of perception. Aquinas, as has been Indicated by the quotations listed above, distinguished three generic kinds of objects of percep tion— the proper senslbles, the common senslbles and the incidental objects of sensation. Aquinas, therefore, is being epistemologically more sophisticated than the rather simplistic structure of the sense 78

data theory of perception*

Furthermore, Aquinas will argue that the Internal sensorlum has

a distinct set of functions and objects. When referring to the acti

vities of what Aquinas would call the internal sensorlum— the imagi

nation, the vis cogitativa and the sense memory— Moore would also

claim that their objects are sense data. Moore seems to be arguing

that there are many different species of a generic mental act called

"awareness". Aquinas, on the other hand, will distinguish many types

of mental activities, each of which is somewhat peculiar to Itself. In

regard to the activities of the internal sensorlum, Aquinas will offer

the "phantasm" as the vehicle by which the internal senses are to be

distinguished from direct perception; in other words, by the intro

duction of phantasms, Aquinas further complicates and elaborated upon

an already complex structure for sense knowledge. Accordingly, the

rather simplistic sense data position on perception is structurally

foreign to the Aquinian theory. The question of the correct analysis

of phantasm will occur after the internal sensorlum itself has been

discussed later in this dissertation.

In considering the objects of sensation, it has been noted

that Aquinas offers two generic types of such objects: a) the objects which are directly perceived— the proper and the common senslbles— and

b) the objects, which are indirectly perceived— the incidental object of sensation. The notions of "directly perceivable" and"indirectly perceivable" need explication. At first glance, it might be claimed

that by this distinction between the directly perceivable and the in 79 directly perceivable, Aquinas would be referring to two types of awareness, one of which is a direct awareness of objects In the ex ternal world and another type in which an object is known only by means of an inference* G.E. Moore used such a distinction in Some Main

Problems of Philosophy. By means of such a distinction, Moore claimed that while the sense datum served as the object of direct awareness, the material object was the object of Indirect awareness; this distinction was also used by Moore in claiming that a knower was directly aware of a "proposition" but indirectly aware of the fact to which the proposition either corresponded or failed to correspond. In both cases, the object of indirect awareness was an inferential awareness or inferential act to an object which was beyond direct perception. In other words, the object of indirect awareness was not a direct object of a mental act. Obviously, in these cases,

Moore was deeply concerned with the realism-idealism Issue; accordingly, he was attempting to find a structure by which he could Introduce an object beyond the immediate data of perception. This however, does not seem to be the Aqulnian epistemological concern. The directly sensible objects are those objects which can be sensed by means of the external senses; the indirectly sensible objects, on the other hand, are those objects which can be sensed by using one sense faculty of the internal sensorlum, namely, the vis cogitativa. The precise analy sis for this internal sense and its function will occur later in this dissertation.

At this point, furthermore, another distinction must be made. So 80

far the terms "sensation" and "perception" have been used almost

interchangeably; In fact, textually, Aquinas does not seem to have

made any distinction between these two terms or either between the

respective mental acts to which they refer or their respective ob

jects. By applying the above terminology— the directly perceivable

and the Indirectly perceivable— a distinction between sensation and

perception will be argued for. As has already been indicated, the

directly perceivable objects will be both the proper senslbles and

the common senslbles; the indirectly perceivable objects will be

the incidental objects of sensation. Both of these types of mental

acts are treated as acts of sensation by Aquinas in so far as neither makes use of first or second intentions on the level of concept-

formation or the awareness of unlversals. The indirectly sensible—

even though it is not direct perception as such— nevertheless is still not the object of a conceptus of the intellect; rather, such a category of senslbles are known through one of the acts of one of

the faculties of the internal sensorlum. The external senses, as will be argued for later in this dissertation, are necessary conditions for the functions of the internal sensorlum, but they definitely are not sufficient conditions. This, 1 believe, is the basis for Aquinas' distinction between the direct object of sensation and the indirect object of sensation.

Accordingly, for Aquinas, sensation is a generic term— which 1 will refer to as "Sensation-I". The characteristics of the objects of Sen sation- 1 are that they are all in some way an awareness of the objects 81

of Che external world— i.e.* particulars— and are In no way con

nected with the awareness of unlversals— i.e., either first Intention

concept-formatIon or second intention universal-formation. However,

there are two types of Sensation-I and each type of Sensation-I has

its own respective objects. The first type of Sensatlon-I will be

direct perception with the external senses. The sense objects here

wlllbe the directly perceivable objects, which also might be termed

"Objects of Sensation-lla". These objects, structurally, will be the

proper and the common senslbles. The second type of Sensatlon-1 will be the workings of the internal sensorlum with regard to the via cogitativa; this will be the mental awareness which has for its objects the indirectly perceivable, which accordingly, also might be

termed as "Objects of Scnsation-IIb". This class of objects, as will become clear when the internal sensorlum is discussed in detail, will be determined by the use of phantasms.

Structurally, the objects of Sensation-lla— the directly perceivable objects— are known only by the external senses. Accordingly, it is the objects of Sensation-lla which are the objects of direct perception.

The objects of Sensation-IXb— the indirectly perceivable objects— are known only by an internal sense. Yet both types of sensation are in some way of particular things which exist in the external world. It is for this reason that I Introduced the term Sensation-1 as a generic notion which has subsumed under it Sensation-lla— Direct

Perception— and Sensatlon-Ilb— Sensation by means of the Internal senses. It is important to realize that there is no use of inference with Senaation-IIb. When G.E. Moore considered "Indirect awareness", 82

It Appears that he was considering such an act of awareness as an

Inferential process; It is on this ground that he is able to pro

ceed from the directly perceivable— the sense datum in his epis-

temology— to the indirectly perceivable— the material object.

Aquinas does not use such an inferential process; accordingly, I do not believe that his use of what I have termed the indirectly per ceivable objects is equivalent to Moore's use of the same term in

Some Main Problems of Philosophy.

Non-verldlcal Awareness

Having discussed the three divisions of sense objects, a brief discussion of perceptual error as to object might well be in order.

This necessarily will be brief, as the act of perception has not yet been scrutinized. Nevertheless, a discussion of non-verldlcal per ception, albeit brief, is necessitated here in that Aquinas does consider perceptual error both as regards mental act and the object of a mental act. In other words, the distinction which Aquinas de velops regarding non-verldical perception and to be here discussed depends upon the categories of objects of perception; Aquinas will admit non veridical perception as to object in only two of the three categories of objects considered above. Regarding mental act, however,

Aquinas will admit non-verldical perception into each category of perceptual awareness. In other words, regarding objects, there can be non-veridical awareness in two categories of these objects; re garding mental acts, there can be non-verldical awareness in all three categories of perceptual awareness— i.e., the awareness of a 83 proper sensible, Che awareness of a common sensible, and the aware ness of an Incidental object of sense* In effect, as shall become more clear later, this is a structural hint that Aquinas will argue for a structured mental act in perception rather that opting for the

"diaphanous arrow of consciousness" of Russell, Moore, and ultimately of Plato himself.

Regarding non-veridlcal sensation as to objects, Aquinas writes as follows in the Summa Theological

Except to find error in the senses to no greater extent than truth. Truth is in the senses not because they can know what truth is, but because they have a true perception of sen sible object. Similarly error enters when the senses apprehend and judge things to be other than they are. S.T*, I., Q.17, a. 2*

To explain this discussion, Aquinas continues:

Senses know things from being Impressed with their likeness. Now this likeness can be taken at three stages. First, immedi ately and directly, as when the likeness of color is in the sight.... Secondly, directly, but not Immediately, as when the likeness of bodily shape or site is in the sight.... Thirdly, neither immediately not directly but Indirectly, as when the likeness of man is in sight; he is not there because he is a man, but because he is a colored object. Ibid.

Aquinas then concludes this analysis by considering error as to objects of sensation:

So then to apply this distinction: we say that the senses are not deceived regarding their proper sense objects, except by interference and in abnormal cases and when the sense organ is Impaired. Regarding common and indirect sense objects, there can be erroneous sensations even in a healthly sense: for the 84

sense Is not immediately related to them, but only Incidentally* namely* in consequence of their being involved in its primary function. Ibid.

According to the above passage, non-verldlcal sensation can occur with the common senslbles and the incidental object of sense. But it must be noted that this discussion only concerns error regarding ob jects of sensation as such and does not concern the possibility of error regarding the mental act Itself. This is why Aquinas mentions in the above passage that the proper senslbles are always veridically perceived except in the cases when there is "Interference and...when the sense organ is impaired." When the act of perception is analysed* this discussion will be further elucidated; but it may not be too early to mention that Interference will refer to the "medium" needed for each act of perception and impaired sense organ will refer to the adequately disposed sense organ. This discussion will be thoroughly explicated later when we consider the medium* disposed faculty and appropriate object as the necessary conditions for an act of perception within the Aquinian eplstemologlcal structure.

The below passages will reiterate the claim that Aquinas regards non-verldical sensation regarding objects only to be possible in two categories of sensible objects. These passages are taken from the

Commentary:

First* about its proper object as sense is always true or only slightly false. Natural powers are not unable to perform their proper activities* except In the minority of cases on account of lllneas or injury. So the senses are not deficient 85

in judging their proper objects, except sometimes because of impaired organs, as when the dirty tongue of a feverish patient makes sweet taste bitter. Com. on the Soul # 661.

Aquinas next treats of the coamon senslbles:

A sense also has to deal with the common objects of sense.... Sise, for instance, and motion are common sensibles of bodies. The judgement must vary according to the differences of dis tance and misjudgement is easy. Ibid. # 663.

And the Aquinian account of the Incidental object of sense is

provided last:

...a sense has to deal with what is indirectly sensible, and here it may be deceived. In seeing white, the sense may be deceived as to whether it be snow or something of the sort. Mistakes are especially easy with regard to strange or dis tant objects. Ibid. # 662.

Aquinas further elaborates his position with the following

passage:

But the senses can be deceived both about objects only in cidentally sensible and about objects common to several senses. Thus sight would prove fallible were one to attempt to judge what a coloured thing was or where it was; and hearing likewise if one tried to determine by hearing alone what was causing a sound. Such then are the special objects of each sense. Ibid. f 385.

These passages again make the claim that Aquinas regards non-

verldical sensation regarding objects only to be structurally possible within twe categories of objects. Again, Just the object of sensation 86

is being considered and not the act itself. Even when Aquinas

affirms that the perceiver is never wrong— i.e., never non-veridi-

cally perceiving— regarding the proper senslbles, he nevertheless

Imswdlately qualifies this statement insofar as the perceiver is what

a contemporary philosopher might call a "normal" perceiver under

"normal perceptual conditions". A complete account of perceptual

error can only be given after the act of perception itself is care

fully analyzed.

Common Sensible and Incidental Object

A further problem emerges when the "common senslbles" are

contrasted with what both Aristotle and Aquinas refer to as the

"Incidental object of sense". In the previous analysis, both the proper and the common senslbles were classified as Scnsation-IIa objects and the incidental object of sense was classified as a Sen- sat ion- lib object. This is the distinction between the directly perceivable objects and the indirectly perceivable objects. The problem arises when one wonders why the common sensible is a Sen sation- I la object rather than a Sensation-IIb object. In other words, the sense faculty is directly ordered to a proper sensible. Then how

Is it possible that the common sensible is also a Sensation-lla object? To offer a complete analysis of this problem, both the in cidental object of sense and the common sensible Itself must be con sidered in detail.

In his psychological treatise, On the Soul, Aristotle makes a 87

quite pithy remark concerning the Incidental object of sense; in all,

Aristotle spends very little time offering an analysis of such an

object. The following passage is Aristotle's account of the in

cidental object of sense:

We speak of a Incidental object of sense where, e.g., the white object which we see is the son of Diares; here because "being the son of Diares" is incidental to the directly visible white patch;we speak of the son of Diares as being (incidentally) perceived or seen by us. Because this is only Incidentally an object of sense, it in no way as such affects the senses. On the Soul 418a20.

The incidental object of sensation seems to be the particular

or individual thing as such in the external world. There is an

awareness of an individual as an individual and not as a color

patch or as any bundle of sensations. In his Commentary, Aquinas

offers the following account of the above Aristotelian passage:

We might, he says, call Diarus or Socrates Incidentally a sense object because each happens to be white: that is sensed incidentally (sentitur per accidens) which happens to belong to what is sensed absolutely (sentitur per se). It is accidental to the white thing, which is sensed absolutely, that it should be Diarus; hence Diarus is a sense-object incidentally. He does not, as such, act upon the sense at all. Com. on the Soul #387.

The important note which emerges from these passages of both

Aristotle and Aquinas is that the incidental object of sense is not directly apprehended per se by the external sense as such. The in cidental object of sense is not a Sensation-Ila object but rather a

Sensation-11b object. But It must also be noted that the lack of direct apprehension for the incidental object of sense refers ex- pllcltly to the external senses. This will be quite Important in a later discussion when Aquinas will argue that the vis cogitativa is the faculty by means of which a perceiver is directly aware of an

Individual as such. Accordingly, Aquinas is not here arguing for representative realism; rather he is only denying that the external sense alone are the means by which a perceiver is directly aware of an individual and not as a mere bundle of sensations. This is a further indication that the structural workings of the internal sensorlum are intricately connected with the Aquinian account of perception. It further establishes the fact that this account is far more philosophically sophisticated than the theories of per ception presented by the traditional empiricists from Locke, Berkeley and ilume right on up to the twentlcth-century sense data positions of

Moore, Russell and Price.

Aquinas is concerned about the paucity of the Aristotelian account of the Incidental object of sensation and how this is related to the common senslbles. In the following passage, Aquinas attempts to ex plain how the proper senslbles are determined by the external sense faculties, which explanation is Important as a structural foundation upon which to clarify the difference between the Incidental object of sensation and the common sensible. For as was indicated earlier, the proper senslbles and the common senslbles are placed in the cate gory of Sensatlon-IIa objects. Thus, structurally, the common sensible

Is distinct and accordingly belongs to a different category than the

Incidental object of sense, which object is a Sensatlon-IIb object. 89

Note the following passage from the Commentary:

While It Is true, however, that both common and special sense-objects are all absolutely or by and of themselves percept ible for a sense, yet, strictly speaking, only the special sense objects are directly perceived (proprle per se sensibi- 11a) , for the very essence and definition of each sense consists in its being naturally fitted to be affected by some such special object proper to itself. The nature of each faculty consists in its relation to its proper object. Com. on the Soul # 387.

This passage explicitly brings to light the problem under con sideration. In other words, the distinction mentioned in the pre ceding passage about the proper senslbles being the only objects which are directly perceived creates a philosophical difficulty in that quite possibly both the common senslbles and the incidental objects of sense are equally just "Incidentally sensible". That

Aquinas wants to deny this possibility and argue forcefully for the inclusion of the common senslbles into the category of Sensation-lla objects is indicated in the following passage:

We have seen that sensation is a being acted upon and altered in some way. Whatever, then, affects the faculty in, and so makes a difference to, its own proper reaction and modification has an intrinsic relation to that faculty and can be called a aense-object in itself or absolutely. But whatever makes no difference to the immediate modification of the faculty we call an Incidental object. Hence, the Philosopher says explicitly that the senses are not affected at all by the Incidental object as such. Com. on the Soul # 393.

Aquinas further explains this passage by noting that there are two ways in which a sense faculty can be "acted upon": 90

Nov an object may affect the faculty's Immediate reaction in two ways. One way is with respect to the kind of agent causing this reaction; and in this way the immediate objects of sensation differentiate sense-experience, inasmuch as one such object is colour, another sound, another white, another black, and so on. For the various kinds of stimulants of sensation are, in their actuality as such, precisely the special sense-objects themselves. And to theqt the sense faculty (as a whole) is by nature adapted; so that precisely by their differences is sensation Itself differentiated. Com. on the Soul # 394 .

But there Is another manner in which the object can affect the sense faculty:

On the other hand there are objects which differentiate sen sation with respect, not to the kind of agent, but to the mode of its activity. For as sense qualities affect the senses corporeally and locally, they do so in different ways; if they are qualities of large or small bodies or are diversely situated, i.e., near or far, or together, or apart. And it is thus that the common aenslbles differentiate sensation. Ob viously, size and position vary for all the five senses. And not being related to sensation as variation In the immediate factors which being the sense to act, they do not properly differentiate the sense faculties; they remain common to several faculties at once. Ibid.

In the above passage, Aquinas is attempting to causally account for both the proper and the common senslbles so that they can both be classified as Sensation-lla objects. He is claiming that what is directly perceived can affect or Influence or act upon the sense faculty or disposition in either of two ways. In the first manner, the affectation is according to the kind of agent which is doing the

"affecting", while in the second manner, the affectation is not pro portionate to the kind of agent but rather as to the mode or manner in which the agent is "affecting" the sense faculty or disposition. As to the first division, the kind of agent refers to the proper sen

sible as such. In other words, the colored object as such— i.e., inso

far as the thing has a color-producing power— is considered as a kind of agent in that It reacts directly and proportionately with a

sense faculty— in this case, with the faculty of sight— and the re sult can be the mental awareness of seeing, given the other requisite conditions. The same structural account is given for the rest of the proper senslbles. The common senslbles, on the other hand, do not affect the sense faculty directly as a specific kind of agent, but their "affectation" is in the manner or a way or mode of acting. Mode seems to be the manner in which a perceiver is aware of the common sensible. Thus, a perceiver can "see shape" and "feel shape". The uode seems to refer to a complex causal disposition which is capable of affecting more than one faculty. Aquinas is somewhat sketchy as to the positive analysis of how a mode functions with the common senslbles.

Rather than providing a positive account of the structure of a mode and its corresponding function, Aquinas provides a two-fold reductio ad absurdum argument to indicate that the common senslbles and the proper senslbles cannot be identical. To begin with, Aquinas argues that if the common senslbles directly affected the sense faculty as a kind of agent, then it would structurally necessitate that a per ceiver would need additional sense faculties in order to grasp each of the common senslbles. Aquinas then responds to this type of state ment. In the first case, he argues that de facto a human perceiver only has five external senses. If a perceiver is to directly appre- 92 hend the counon senslbles as a "kind of agent", then this perceiver would have to possess as many faculties and organs as there are both proper and comnon senslbles. Aquinas Is here appealing to a "conmon sense position" in that a human perceiver only has five external sense organs and faculties and thus the common senslbles cannot be structurally analyzed as being Identical with the proper senslbles re garding their analysis. Secondly, Aquinas argues that the common senslbles can be known or are made aware to the perceiver by means of more than one sense. In effect, this is his principal reason for calling them the "common" senslbles— i.e., they are common to more than one sense. Again appealing to a common sense position, Aquinas argues that with this datum of ordinary sense experience— I.e., that we do In fact perceive the common senslbles with more than one sense as when both the eye and the sense of touch are the means by which a perceiver determines the common sensible of shape— both the common and the proper senslbles cannot be direct objects of perceptions as a kind of agent as this would entail that each of them could be known by only one sense faculty. In the end, therefore, Aquinas' distinction between "kind" and "mode" seems to be grounded In the fact that the proper senslbles are fitted to one sense faculty in the external sensorlum while the common senslbles can be perceived by more than one faculty of this sensorlum. But I think, furthermore, that a mode can best be understood ontologlcally as a complex dis position which is such that it can affect two or more different sense powers at the same time. 93

Incidental Object and Vis Cogitativa

Having attempted to indicate that both the conmon and the proper

sensibles are Sensation-lla objects, Aquinas then embarks on a dis

cussion of how these objects— Sensation-lla objects— differ from the

incidental object of sensation— Sensation-IIb object.

Having seen how we should speak of the absolute or essential sense objects, both common and special, it remains to be seen how anything is a sense-object "incidentally". Now for an ob ject to be a sense-object incidentally it must first be con nected accidentally with an essential sense-object; as a man, for instance, may happen to be white, or a white thing may happen to be sweet. Com. on the Soul 0 395.

In addition to this connection, there is the following condition:

Secondly, it must be perceived by the one who is sensing; as if it were connected with the sense-object but not Itself being perceived, then it could not be said to be sensed in cidentally. But this implies that with respect to some cog nitive faculty of the one sensing it, It is known, not inciden tally, but absolutely. Now this latter faculty must be either another sense faculty, or the Intellect, or the cogitative faculty, or natural instinct. I say another sense faculty, meaning that sweetness is incidentally visible inasmuch as a white thing seen is in fact sweet, the sweetness being directly perceptible by another sense, i.e., taste. Ibid.

The analysis of the above passage seems to be that if any object is sensed at all, then there must be a faculty by which the perceiver is directly related to that object. Thus human perceivers have the faculty of sight in order to be aware of color and so on for the rest of the proper senslbles. From the data of ordinary experience,

Aquinas further realizes that one common sense datum of such ordinary 94

experience Is that at times a human percelver Is definitely aware

of an Individual person or thing precisely as that Individual person

or thing and not as a color patch or shaped object or any mere

Berkelelan bundle of sensations. In the Aquinlan eplstemology, If

the above data of experience Is to be assayed— and Aquinas Is con

vinced that human percelvers are directly aware of Individuals as

Individuals— then Aquinas is structurally committed to postulating

a separate sense faculty In order to account for this different

type or species of awareness. This Is obviously another example of an Aquinlan instantiation of Principle G from Chapter I that a dis position is directly related to an act. In the present case, the act Is the awareness of an individual as an individual. This act needs a requisite disposition, which Aquinas will call the vis cogitatlva. In effect, as will become evident in the following textual claims, Aquinas proposes that the vis cogitatIva Is that faculty or disposition by which a percelver Is directly aware of an Individual as an individual— the son of Diares as such.

The above claims are more explicitly made in the following quotations:

But speaking precisely, this Is not in the fullest sense an incidental object of sense (I.e., the sweetness to sight example as discussed In the last quotation.); it Is Incidental to the sense of sight, but it is essentially sensible. Now what is not perceived by any special sense is known by the Intellect, if it be a universal; yet not anything knowable by intellect in sensible matter should be called a sense object incidentally, but only what is at once Intellectually apprehended as soon as a s ense-experlence occurs. Com. On the Soul # 396.

4 95

Aquinas then continues with this problem:

Thus, as soon as I see anyone talking or moving himself my intellect tells me that he is alive; and 1 can say that I see him live. But If this apprehension Is of something in dividual , as when seeing this particular coloured thing, 1 perceive this particular man or beast, then the cogitative faculty (in the case of man, at least) is at work, the power which is also called the "particular reason" because it cor relates universal ideas. Ibid.

The above passages are firm textual evidence that the vis cogi tative is that faculty of the internal sensorlum by means of which a percelver is directly aware of an individual precisely as an in dividual. As will be discussed in detail later in this dissertation, the vis cogitativa appears to have two functions: a) the recognition of an individual as an individual, and b) the recognition of an individual as a member of a certain kind. This faculty is structurally similar to instinct in animals; this point will be farther developed when the entire internal sensorlum as such is considered. This difference between instinct and vis cogitativa— Aquinas will refer to instinct in animals by the phrase via aest imativa— is alluded to In the following passage in addition to the claim that vis cogitativa belongs to the internal sensorlum and not to reason or the process of concept-formation.

Nevertheless, this faculty belongs to sensitivity; for the sensitive power at its highest— in man, in whom sensitivity Is Joined to Intelligence— has some share in the life of the In tellect. But the lower animal's awareness of individualised notions is called natural Instinct, which comes into play when a sheep, e.g., recognises its offspring by sight, or sound,or 96

something of that sort. Com. on the Soul t 398.

Aquinas* however* distinguishes instinct from the workings of the

via cogitativa:

Mote* however* that the cogitative faculty differs from natural Instinct. The former apprehends the Individual thing as existing in a common nature, and this because it is united to Intellect in one and the same subject. Hence it is aware of a man as this man* and this tree as this tree; whereas instinct is not aware of an individual thing as in a common nature, but only insofar as this individual thing is the term or principle of some action or passion. Thus a sheep knows this particular lamb, not as this lamb, but simply as something to be suckled; and it knows this grass just insofar as this grasa is food. Ibid. tf 399.

Aquinas further elaborates on the instinct process:

Hence* other individual things which have no relation to the sheep's own action or passions are not apprehended at all by Its power of natural instinct. For the purpose of natural Instinct in animals is to direct them in their actions and passions, so as to seek and avoid things according to the requirements of their nature. Ibid.

The philosophically Interesting point about the above passages

Is the claim by Aquinas that the cogitative faculty is neither instinct nor speculative reason. There are two fundamental problems with the

above analysis. The first problem concerns the claim that the vis

cogitativa is some way "has some share in the life of the Intellect".

I am not exactly sure what this means. At first glance it semantically

resembles Descartes pineal gland. However, I do believe this discussion

chiefly concerns the recognition of an individual as a member of a 97

"kind". Yet this process is not exactly concept-formatlon either, as

the individual as individual is Still the knowledge object. In effect, Aquinas is claiming that this recognition of an individual as one of a kind— "he is aware of a man as this man;"— is what dis tinguishes the cogitative faculty from the animal's natural instinct.

In other words, awareness of an individual as of a kind is not the function of the vis aestimativa. This is also probably the case why

Aquinas is at times using the term "particular reason when considering the via cogitativa.

Secondly, Aquinas' discussion of instinct is a topic which should best be left to the empirical psychologist experimenting with animals in testing cages* Aquinas may very well be correct with his analysis of Instinct, but some empirical evidence and data seem to be required in order to substantiate such claims.

One further note of importance is mentioned in the above passages quoted from the Commentary. Aquinas Implicitly is affirming that in stinct, which could be classified as an innate idea, is proper only to animals and not to human percelvers. In effect, the claim is that man is not a percelver endowed with any sense disposition re sembling an innate idea in the strict sense. By this I mean that every "content" of any act of human awareness must ultimately be derived from the working of the external sensorlum. It is true that insofar as each sense faculty has a unique and peculiar function, then it must also have a unique structure--!.e., Disposltlon-2-Actuality-

1— but this structure must be actualized by the sensible objects 98 existing outside the mind. Instinct, on the other hand, does not need any experience in order for e "content" to be of an awareness, this problem will further be considered when the internal sensorlum per se is discussed; in addition, a structural analysis of the vis cogitativa itself will occur in that discussion of the internal sen sorlum. Parenthetically, the phantasm will play a crucial role in the functioning of the cogitative faculty.

Common Sensibles and Primary Qualities

Before finishing this present discussion of the objects of sen sation, one more structural problem should be considered. In dis cussing the common sensibles, Aquinas makes an ontological move on this category of objects of sensation which is remarkably similar to the position advocated by some of the early modern philosophers In their attempts to make philosophy square with the claims of the rising new science. Aquinas will attempt to reduce the common sen sibles to quantity; this is very close to Descartes' position in which the atoms possessed only the primary qualities, being modi fications of an extended basic particle. In the Summa Theologies, there is found the following quite interesting passage in which

Aquinas sttempts to make such a reduction of all the common sensibles to quantity; it must be noted that quantity refers to the category of quantity in the Aristotelian listing of such categories, which is essentially characterised by a thing having "part outside of part"—

I.e., it is extended: 99

Size, shape, and the like, which are called common sensibles, are midway between accidental sensibles and proper sensibles, which are the objects of the senses. For the proper sensibles first, and of their very nature, affect the senses, since they are qualities that cause alteration. But the common sensibles are all reducible to quantity. As to size and number, It Is clear that they are species of quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity, since the nature of shape consists In fixing the bounds of magnitude. Movement and rest are sensed according as the subject is affected in one or more ways in the magnitude of the subject or of its local distance, as in the movement of growth or of locomotion, or again, according as it Is affected In some sensible qualities, as in the movement or alteration; and thus to sense movement and rest is, in a way, to sense one thing and many. S.T., X., Q. 78, a. 3*

Aquinas now goes on to consider the role of quantity as such:

Mow quantity Is the proximate subject of the qualities that cause alteration, as surface is of color. Therefore, the common sensibles do not move the senses first of their own nature, but by reason of sensible quality; as the surface by reason of color. Yet they are not accidental or incidental sensibles, for they produce a certain diversity in the immutation of the senses. For sense Is Immuted differently by a large and by a small surface; since whiteness itself is said to be great or small, and therefore is divided according to its proper object. Ibid.

This and the previous passage basically concern the problem men tioned earlier of how both the proper and common sensibles can be classified as Sensatlon-IIa objects. This passage, furthermore, Is a response to an objection which Aquinas considers. It might be

Interesting to note the text of the objection itself, which objection centers around the classification of proper and common sensibles.

Further, magnitude and shape, and other so-called common sensibles, are not sensibles by accident, but are contradis tinguished from them by the Philosopher. Mow since the di versity of the proper objects diversifies the powers, thus 100

magnitude and shape are further from color than sound Is and it seems that there is much more need for another sen sitive power that can grasp magnitude or shape than for that which grasps color or sound. S.T., I., Q. 78, a. 3, obj. 2.

The interesting structural point about the response to this objection, however, concerns not what Aquinas is attempting to prove but rather the way in which he is offering such a proof. For in the

response, Aquinas does indeed claim that all of the common sensibles are reduced to quantity. This is basically the same structural move which Locke and I>escartes make regarding the primary qualities.

That the common sensibles of Aquinas are similar to the primary qualities of Locke is obvious from a reading of the following passage from Locke * s Essay Concerning Human Understanding t

Quellties thus considered in bodies are, first, such as are utterly Inseparable from the body, in which estate soever it be; such as...sense constantly finds in every particle of matter, which has bulk enough to be perceived, and the mind finds Inseparable from every particle of matter, though less than to make Itself singly be perceived by our senses.... For, division...can never take sway either solidity, extension, figure, or mobility from any body.... These 1 call original °r primary qualities of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz, solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number. Essay Concerning Human Under standing Bk II Ch VIII.

In this passage from the Essay, it is Important to note that Locke

Is claiming that the primary qualities as such are reducible as modi fications of the basic material substratum of the external world.

This basic substratum of the material world is essentially quan tified or "spread out" over a certain spatial volume. 101

Descartes, moreover, makes It quite clear that the essential property of material substance Is extension:

Of this class of entitles Is corporeal nature In gen eral and Its extension, Including the shape of extended things, their quantity, or size and number, and also the place where they are, the time that measures their duration and so forth. Meditations I.

There appears to be a direct structural connection here between

Locke and Descartes on the one hand and Aquinas on the other. Aqui nas was claiming that what is quantified— i.e., what Is extended, as quantity Is defined as that which has part outside of part— is the ontological foundation for the common sensibles. This Is also the very same ontological claim being put forward by Locke and Descartes.

In other words, If "extension" Is taken away in the Cartesian ontology, then so go the rest of the primary qualities. Sc too for Aquinas.

If quantity Is taken away then too there would be no foundation for the common sensibles. This present discussion is a further instance of the claim made by Etienne Gilson so many years ago that quite probably Locke and Descartes are not as far away from the traditional medieval philosophical synthesis as many historians of philosophy, who laud them as the fathers of Modern Philosophy, are wont to assume.

One final point which might prove interesting is to compare the listing of the common sensibles of Aquinas with the listing of the primary qualities of Locke; this listing will indeed show the very great structural similarities: 102

Aquinas Locke

Movement Motion

Rest Rest

Number Number

Shape Figure

Size Solidity

Extension

Aquinas: "The common sense-objects are five: movement, rest, number shape and size." Com. on the Soul 0 386.

Locke: "These I call original or primary qualities...: solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number." Essay Bk II Ch VII.

It is to be noted that Locke Includes "extension" in his listing;

Aquinas does not. But it must be remembered that Aquinas, in the passage quoted from the Summa Theologies, reduced all five common sensibles to quantity. Quantity, furthermore, is defined as the accidental characteristic in the ten categories of Aristotle which denotes an extension of "part outside of part". Thus quantity, as

Aristotle intended the term to be used in his metaphysics, denotes extension. Therefore, there is both a textual as well as an onto logical similarity between the common sensibles and the primary quali ties as these categories are used by Aquinas and the early Modern

Philosophers, Locke and Descartes. C H A P T E R V

PRECONDITIONS OF VISUAL AWARENESS

Having discussed the objects of sensation and the faculties of sensation, it is now appropriate to consider the acts of sensation.

This will be a two-fold consideration. The first discussion will pertain to the acts of the external sensorlum and the second dis cussion will pertain to the acts of the internal sensorlum.

Sight and Its Object

In the following analysis of the Aquinlan theory of direct per ception, I will specifically concentrate on the sense of sight; structurally, however, all of the acts of perception— Sensatlon-

11a— are basically the same. Furthermore, within the confines of the Commentary Itself, Aquinas does explicitly consider all five sense operations of the external senses.

A careful analysis of the texts of the Commentary reveals what

1 consider to be Aquinas' complete structural position on perception.

In these texts, Aquinas is much more detailed, lucid, and specific about perception than he is in any other of his works which I have discovered. As this present analysis of Aquinlan perception-epistemology proceeds, I will attempt to describe this position as a three-term relation. This three term*relation will become the

103 104 necessary condition for perception. In addition, this relational analysis will serve as the device to be used in a later analysis of that crucial yet most difficult Aquinlan term, the phantasm.

Raving discussed the proper and comnon sensibles as well as the

Incidental objects of sensations, Aquinas begins his detailed analy sis of the act of perception with a discussion of the sense of sight.

...he says that...the proper sense-object being that which each sense perceives oi itself exclusively, the sense-object of which the special recipient is sight is the visible. Now in the visible, two things are included; for both colour is a visible, and also something else, which can be described in speech, but has no proper name; which visible belongs to things which can be seen by night, such as glow-worms and certain fungi on oak trees and the like, concerning which the course of this treatise will inform us more clearly as we gain a deeper under standing of the visible; but we have to start from colour which is the more obvious visible. Com* On the Soul # 399.

This passage is rather interesting for two reasons. First of all, Aquinas is offering color as the visible, which will become the proper object of the sense of sight. This is not just an analytlc- a priori definition, as will be shown shortly. Secondly, Aquinas is definitely giving evidence of a sharp empirical foundation for his discussion of "perceiving the visible". Granting that by sight a percelver is aware of an object of perception— which on human terms at least appears to demand both a color and a sufficient amount of light— Aquinas is also concerned about those objects which appear to "be seen" in the dark. If this is the case, then there must be at least two categories of the visible, one which is color and one different from color. As will become clear as this discussion pro 105

ceeds, Aquinas will claim that color can only be perceived under the

conditions of sufficient light. Nevertheless* Aquinas' principal

interest is with color* as this is what he will take to be the object

of human visual perception. Accordingly, Thomas is fundamentally

Interested in human perception.

Aquinas does want to consider color as being essentially visible:

First of all, then, he says that, colour being visible, it is visible of itself, for colour as such is essentially vis ible. Com. On the Soul # 400.

An Immediate problem arises which any philosopher concerned with

analysis must face— i.e., in what sense is Aquinas using the term

"essentially"? Accordingly, Aquinas is considering some kind of

necessary relation existing between color and visible. Immediately

it appears that such a necessary proposition cannot be an analytic

a priori definition; this is so because Aquinas has already enter

tained the possibility that there are visible objects which are per

ceived in the dark. These objects of sight, which have to be visible

in some sense, cannot be colored, as color is not manifested without

light. Therefore, it does seem that in the mind of Aquinas, "bring visible" and "being colored" are not analytically related.

In pursuing this point, Aquinas attempts to explicate the senses

in which "essentially" can be taken:

"Essentially" (per se) is said in two ways. In one way, when the predicate of a proposition falls within the definition of the subject, e.g., "man is an animal"; for animal enters into the definition of man. And since that which falls within the defi- 106

nltion of anything is in some way the cause of It, In cases such as these the predicate Is said to be the cause of the subject. In another way, on the contrary, when the subject of the proposition falls within the definition of the predicate, as when it Is said that a nose is snub or a number even; for snubness is nothing but a quality of a nose, and evenness of a number wfeich can be halved; and in these cases the subject Is a cause of the predicate* Com. On the Soul # 401.

Aquinas continues this present analysis with the following passage:

Now color is essentially visible in this second manner, not in the first; for visibility is a quality, as being snub is a quality of a nose. And this is why he says that color is vis ible "essentially'’ but not "by definition"; that is to say, not because visibility is placed in its definition, but because it possessed of itself the reason why it should be visible, as a subject possesses in itself the reason for its own peculiar qualities. Ibid. # 402.

These are very interesting passages for a philosopher to put under the scrutiny of philosophical analysis. I believe that Aqui nas is here attempting to distinguish synthetic necessary propositions from analytic necessary propositions. Aquinas provides two distinc tions regarding propositions in order to make his point clear. His remarks regarding an essential relation between subject and predicate are two-fold. First of all, the essential relation holds if the predicate "falls within the definition of the subject". Aquinas gives as an example the following proposition: "Man is an animal."

In this case, It appears that Aquinas is claiming that "animal" Is a part of the definition of "man"; accordingly, this would be an analytic a priori definition. 107

In Che second case, Aquinas claims Chat the "subject falls within the definition of the predicate." Examples of such a re

lation between subject and predicate are the following propositions:

'‘Nose Is snub" and "number Is even". In this case, the predicate is not a part of the definition of the subject, but Is rather a quality of a number which can be halved and of a nose which Is snub. Aquinas Is considering necessary qualities. Snub and even ness Are necessarily related to their subjects. Parenthetically, this discussion would be evidence that In an ontological assay of individuality, Aquinas would definitely argue aguinst the Bradleylan position that a subject or individual is nothing more than a col lection of universal qualities.

In both of the above cases, a notion of necessity is being con sidered. As was indicated above, I believe that the first case is an example of an analytic a priori definition. In other words, animal as a predicate Is part of the definition of what a man is. Accord ingly, the property of being an animal Is a necessary condition for being a man. This aspect of necessary condition Is what I believe

Aquinas Is referring to when he mentions that the predicate Is the cause of the subject; In any event, this conception of cause Is not to be taken as an efficient cause. In the final analysis, therefore, part of the definition of man Is the predicate animal.

In the second case, however, the predicate is not a part of the definition of the subject; rather, it is a quality of the subject.

However, it is not an accidental property but a synthetically neces- 108 sary property; in other words, certain subjects are so structured that they must have the property In question and only those subjects do Indeed possess that property* This aspect Is brought out by Aqui nas when he asserts that "...a subject possesses In Itself the reason for its own peculiar qualities." Again, not any quality is being considered, but only a quality peculiar to the subject. This is what

1 would take to be a synthetic necessary property. Aquinas is not merely claiming that a quality must belong to a subject; rather he

Is affirming that certain qualities are such that they must go with certain subjects and only those subjects. Aquinas' example of

"number is even" can be used to Illustrate this point. Aquinas Is claiming that evenness is a quality by which a number can be halved.

Yet this quality is only what it is because the subject has certain dispositions. In the end, such a property is necessarily related to the subject because the subject is so structured as to be never found without that particular quality. This structured subject, therefore, is an ontological denial of the Bradleylan position.

In regard to color, the proposition "color is visible" is not an analytic a priori definition. Bather, "being visible" is a synthetic necessary dispositional property of color. In other words, being visible la a necessary property or quality of color. However, from the example quoted in the passage from the Commentary concerning

"glow-worms and certain fungi on oak trees", everything which is visible is not colored or seen by means of its color. Accordingly,

I believe that the two senses of essential predicates mentioned in the passage under consideration are distinguishable into the cate- 109

gories of analytic and synthetic necessary propositions. In fine,

visible Is related to color by means of a synthetic necessary relation

of predication.

Light and the Dlaphanum

Aquinas next considers the problem of the dlaphanum. What

Immediately comes to mind when this term Is mentioned in a philo

sophical treatise is that the writer is philosophically considering

some "ether-type" element which hovers around the earth's surface*

In the present discussion in the Commentary, however, this does not

appear to be what Aquinas was concerned with:

Which he proves by this, that every colour as such is able to affect what is actually diaphanous. The diaphanous is the same as the transparent (e.g., air or water), and colour has it in its nature to actualize further an actual transparency* And from this, that it affects the actually transparent, it is visible; whence it follows that colour is of Its nature visible. And since the transparent is brought to its act only by light, it follows that colour is not visible without light. And therefore before explaining how colour is seen, we must discuss light. Com. On the Soul 9 403.

This passage is quite important in that here Aquinas is ex

plicitly maintaining that the dlaphanum is the same as the trans

parent. I would further claim that Aquinas is here providing an

analytic a priori definition. By that 1 mean that what is trans

parent is to be equated with the dlaphanum. Accordingly, the dla

phanum has a much wider use than merely as that strange, inert sub

stance whose existence was finally refuted by the famous Mlchelson-

Morley experiment. The following passage, in addition to offering 110 a further explanation of the relation of color to the transparent, provides examples of what Aquinas means by the dlaphanum:

...he says that If color Is that which of its nature affects the transparent, the latter must be, and In fact is, that which has no intrinsic colour to make it visible of itself, but is receptive of colour from without in a way which renders it somehow visible. Examples of the transparent are air and water and many solid bodies, such as certain jewels and glass. Now, whereas other accidents pertaining to the elements or to bodies constituted from them, are in these bodies, on account of the nature of those elements (such as heat and cold, weight and lightness, etc.), transparency does not belong to the nature of air or water as such, but is consequent upon some quality common, not only to air and water, which are corruptible bodies, but also to the celestial bodies, which are perpetual and in corruptible. (Italics mine) Com. On the Soul $ 404.

Thus the transparent or dlaphanum has as explicit examples anything which one could "see through". Aquinas, accordingly, gives as examples, water, air, jewels and glass.

This passage also gives evidence of a crucial element in Aquinas' account of perception in the Commentary about which there is some textual dispute concerning some passages in the Summa Theologies.

In the texts from the Commentary, Aquinas is arguing that the function of color is to "actualize further an actual transparency." His claim here seems to be that color affects that which is transparent; thus if there is nothing which is transparent around, there will be no color around to serve as the visible. As a prelude to a further con sideration of this problem, I am convinced that there is an analogous first act-second ontological discussion going on here by Aquinas. In other words, the dlaphanum is related to colors as first act is related Co second act. The dlaphanum serves as Che disposed capacity which

Is further actualized by the various colors. But the dlaphanum It

self Is In first act and thus Is not a complete unstructured dis

position or potency; and what constitutes the dlaphanum In first act

Is "light". Accordingly, it is light which renders the potentially

diaphanous or potentially transparent— Disponltlon-1— into that

which is actually diaphanous or actually transparent— Disposltlon-

2-Actuallty-l. The common sense datum which Aquinas is trying to

analyze is the fact that without light, there Is not such thing as

something being transparent; but with light, various exlstents like

"air, water...jewels and glass...." become examples of a transparent

or dlaphanum. Again, these disossions seem to rule out the possibility

that Aquinas could have meant the dlaphanum to refer to some inert

ether-type element.

Having considered the relation between the transparent and the

colors, Aquinas further considers what is the relationship between

light and the transparent. Accordingly, he embarks on a consideration

of light both by trying to refute what he considers to be Inadequate

positions as well as by providing his own positive ontological assay

of light. As such a consideration of light is primarily ontological

in character, I will not consider his structural assay of light in

detail within the confines of this dissertation. However, I will briefly consider his positive remarks about the conclusion of his ontological Inquiry about light; such a conclusion is indeed germane 112 to the present analysis of the Aquinlan perceptual theory. In other words, the direct and specific object of the sense of sight Is color, and since color, according to the account provided In the Commentary, actualizes the transparent, and since the transparent its.elf Is actualized by light, In any detailed account of Aquinas' assay of per ception, some positive consideration of light Is necessary*

Aquinas begins his discussion of light with the following passage:

•..light is the act of the transparent as such. For it is evi dent that neither air nor water nor anything of that sort is actually transparent unless it is luminous. Of itself, the transparent is in potency to both light and darkness (the latter being a privation of light) as primary matter is in potency both to form and the privation of form. Now light is to the transparent as color is to a body of definite dimensions: each is the act and form of that which receives it. And on this account he says that light is the colour, as it were, of the transparent, in virtue of which the transparent is made actually so by some light-giving body, such as fire, or anything else of that kind, or by a celestial body. For to be full of light and to communicate it is common to fire and to celestial bodies, just as to be diaphanous is common to air and water and the celestial bodies, Com. on the Soul # 405*

Bare Aquinas is arguing that light is a quality or form which comes to an existent properly dlsposed— Disposltion-1— to receive it.

Once light becomes a quality of such a body, then it is a trans parent or dlaphanum. In other words, light renders an existent to be properly disposed— Disposition-2-Actuality-1— to receive color.

Thus light "co-exists with the diaphanous body." (Ibid., # 408) •

It must be noted that Aquinas does not want to consider light as the mere manifestation of color. He gives the following reason for such a claim: 113

But this Is patently untrue In the case of things that shine by night, their colour, nevertheless, remaining ob scure. Com. On the Soul # 419.

This passage further illustrates Aquinas' claim that the objects

seen In the dark are not seen because they are colored. I am re

iterating this point merely for the sake of explication of Aquinas' true meaning; this is not to validate his argument, because it might be instead empirically proven that objects seen in the dark actually are seen by color. At any length, such a discussion is not relevant to the present inquiry.

Aquinas then provides his own positive conclusion on the function of light:

Hence our own conclusion Is that, just as the corporeal ele ments have certain active qualities through which they affect things materially, so light is the active quality of the heavenly bodies; by their light these bodies are active; and this light is in the third species of quality, like heat. Ibid. # 420.

Light, however, differs from heat in the following manner:

But it differs from heat in this: that light is a quality of the primary change-effecting body, which has no contrary: therefore light has no contrary, whereas there is a contrary to heat. And because there is no positive contrary to light, there is no place for a contrary disposition in its recipient: therefore, too, its matter, i.e., the transparent body, is always as such immediately disposed to its form. That is why illumina tion occurs instantaneously, whereas what can become hot only become so by degrees, tfow this participation or effect of light in a dlaphanum is called "luminosity” (lumen). And if it comes about in a direct line to the lightened body, it is called a "ray" (radius); but if it is caused by the reflection of a ray upon a light-receiving body, it is called "splendour^ (splen dour) . But luminosity is the common name for every effect of 114

light In the dlaphanum. Com. on the Soul 0 421.

This discussion of light reminds one of Robert Grosseteste*

discussion of lux and lumen. But this Is not the important structural

similarity. What 1 find tremendously Interesting in this discussion

is Aquinas' apparent deference to Neo-Platonism. Granted that Gros

seteste was Neo-Platonic, as were most of the Fransiscan philosopher

schooled in Augustinianlsm. But Aquinas is often considered to be

an Aristotelian. This line of argument— that Aquinas has some obvious

Neo-Platonic overtones to his system— cannot be thoroughly pursued within this dissertation. However, it should be noted that the Aqui

nlan ontology, at times anyway, gives evidence of Neo-Platonism,

evidences which in Aquinlan studies have heretofore been unexplainedly

almost neglected.

Light and Color

Having discussed the ontological aspects of light, Aquinas next

considers the relation between color and light:

With regard to the third point (i.e., the necessity of light for seeing), note that it has been the opinion of some that not merely seeing, but the object of seeing, i.e., colour as such, presupposed the presence of light; the colour as such had no power to affect a transparent medium; that it does this only through light. An indication of this was, they said, that one who stands in the shadow can see what is in the light, but one who stands in the light cannot see what is in the shadow. The cause of this fact, they said, lay in a correspondence between sight and its object: as seeing is a single act, so it must bear on an object formally single; which would not be the case if colour were visible of itself— not in virtue of light— and light also were visible of itself. Com. on the Soul I 423. 115

According to this position expressed in the Commentary, color has no power in and of Itself. In other words, light actualizes color. If this is the.case, then color will not actualize the trans parent medium, because it has no active power of its own. In the

Commentary, Aquinas will not accept this opinion:

Now this view is clearly contrary to what Aristotle says here, "and...(color) has in Itself the cause of being visible"; hence, following his opinion, I say that light Is necessary for seeing, not because of colour, in that it actualizes colours (which some say are in potency only so long as they are in darkness), but because of the transparent medium which light renders actual, as the text states. Com. on the Soul tf 424.

Accordingly, in the Commentary, Aquinas is maintaining that light per se actualizes the dlaphanum and not color as such. In proof of this claim, Aquinas offers the following ontological assay:

...note that every form is, as such, a principle of effects resembling itself. Colour, being a form, has therefore of it self the power to Impress its likeness on the medium. But note also that there is this difference between the form with a complete, and the form with an Incomplete, power to act, that the former is able not merely to Impress its likeness on matter, but even to dispose matter to fit it for this likeness; which is beyond the power of the latter. Now the active power of colour is of the latter sort; for it is, in fact, only a kind of light somehow dimmed by admixture of opaque matter. Hence it lacks the power to render the medium fully disposed to receive colour; but this, pure light can do. Ibid. 8 425.

Aquinas continues this discussion in the following passage:

Whence it is also clear that, as light Is, in a certain way, the very substance of colour, all visible objects as such share in the same nature; nor does colour require to be made visible other extrinsic light. That colours in light are visible to 116

one standing in the shade is due to the medium's having been sufficiently illumined. Com. On the Soul # 426.

Aquinas is claiming that a necessary condition for sight is that

there be an Illumined or transparent medium. In other words* without

such a medium, there will be no perception. And this medium is im

portant insofar as color Itself actually affects the medium which

has been Illumined by light. This relation between the transparent

medium and color is considered in the following passage:

, ..ft's clear, from the foregoing, that the transparent medium is receptive of colour; for colour, we have seen, acts upon it. Now what is receptive of colour must Itself be colourless, as what receives sound must be soundless, for nothing receives what it already has. The transparent medium is therefore colourless. Com. on the Soul # 427.

In offering an analysis of these passages, it seems to me that

there is a two-fold causal notion at work here. First, the light in

ter-acts upon the dlaphanum and makes it luminous; then the colored object acts upon the luminous dlaphanum to make It colored. Thus what is non-colored becomes colored by the force of the colored object.

The colored object is thus acting as a causal power; this Is Important in justifying the claim that Aquinas is an "objective relativist" in his perceptual theory.

This discussion is furthered in the following passage:

...as bodies are visible by their colours, the transparent medium must Itself be invisible. Yet since one and the same power apprehends contrary qualities, it follows that sight, which appre- 117

heads light, also apprehends darkness. Hence, although the transparent medium of itself possesses neither light nor colour, being receptive of both, and is thus not of itself visible in the way that things bright or coloured are visible, it can, all the same, be called visible in the same sort of way as dark things and scarcely visible things are so called. The dlaphanum Is there fore a kind of darkness, so long as it is not actually but only potentially transparent: the same thing is the subject, some times of darkness, sometimes of light. Thus the dlaphanum, while it lacks luminosity and is only potentially transparent, is in a state of darkness. Com. on the Soul # 428.

The structural point continually emphasised in the Commentary is that the dlaphanum receives color in some way— i.e., color, as an act, affects the dlaphanum which functions as a disposed capacity—

Disposition-2-Actuality-l— and color is a causal factor. Textually, it is quite obvious that Aquinas is adamantly committed to this position in the Commentary. In the Summa Theologies, however, he actually hedges on accepting such a position. Mote the following passage from the Summa Theologies:

There are two opinions as to the effect of light. For some say that light is required for sight, in order to make colors actually visible (here, Aquinas has a reference to Avempace and Averroes). And according to this, the agent intellect is required for understanding in like manner and for the same reason as light is required for seeing. But in the opinion of others, light is required for sight, not for the colors to become actually visible, but in order that the medium may become actually luminous, as the Commentator says on De Anitaa (Again, a reference to Averroes). And according to this, Aristotle's comparison of the agent intellect to light is verified in this, that as it is required for understanding, so is light required for seeing; but not for the same reason. (Italics nine) S.T., I, Q. 79, a. 3, ad 2.

It is obvious that in the above passages from the Summa Theologies.

Aquinas will not commit himself to a position. Such an ambivalence in 118

the Summa Theologlca la structurally odd, for the fact that the opposite

was the case in the Commentary, In which a definite and decisive com

mitment was affirmed* This ambivalence as to position is further

puzzling in that both the Summa Theologlca-Prima Pars and the Com

mentary appear to have been published quite near to each other. Ivo

Thomas dates the Commentary as late as 1271— noting that Aquinas died

in 1274.(Introduction to Com. on the Soul) Furthermore, the Prlma

Pars of the Summa Theologlca— the Prlma Pars being the section in 1 which the passages under consideration appear— was completed in 1268.

Accordingly, there does not appear to have been a great deal of time

spanning the completion of the Prlma Pars of the Summa and the Aris

totelian Commentary. Such an adamant affirmation in the Commentary

does appear strange when contrasted with the obvious non-committal nature of the texts from the Summa. On the other hand, it took

Bertrand Russell only two years to go from the "dver-populated uni verse" of his Principles of Mathematics (1903) to his "Theory of

Descriptions" in "Denoting" (1905).

Color and Sight

Aquinas' next problem is to consider how color actually affects eight;

...he says that we are now clear that what is seen in light Is colour, and that colour is invisible without light; and this because, as has been explained, colour of its nature acts upon a transparent medium, and it does this in virtue of light,

^Vernon J. fiourke, Aquinas' Search for Wisdom (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1965), p. 195. 119

which is the latter's actuality. Hence light la necessary if colour Is to be seen. Com. On the Soul f 431.

Aquinas continues his discussion with the following comments:

An indication of this Is the actual fact that if a coloured body Is placed upon the organ of sight it cannot be seen; for then there remains no transparent medium to be affected by the colour. The pupil of the eye is indeed some such medium, but so long as the coloured body remains placed upon it, it lacks actual transparency. There has to be a medium, say air or some thing of the kind, which, being actualized by colour, Itself acts upon the organ of sight as upon a body continuous with itself. For bodies only affect one another through actual contact. Ibid. # 432.

The above passage indicates that a diaphanous medium between the object and the perceiving organ itself is a necessary condition of any visual perception. This claim of a diaphanous medium might be

Interpreted as a vacuum in the manner construed by Democritus and his atomistic theory. 1 believe both Aristotle and Aquinas were aware of this likely interpretation; accordingly, their next con sideration is to explicitly argue against any Identification of their perceptual theory with that of Democritus.

Then he sets aside an erroneous view. The atomists were wrong in thinking that if the medium between the eye and the thing seen were a vacuum, any object, however small, would be visible at a distance, e.g., an ant in the sky. This cannot be. For if anything is to be seen it must actually affect the organ of sight. Now it has been shown that this organ as such is not affected by an immediate object— such as an object placed upon the eye. So there must be a medium between organ and object. But a vacuum is not a medium; it cannot receive or transmit effects from the object. Hence through a vacuum nothing would 120

be seen at all. Com. on the Soul # 433.

Aquinas further criticizes Democritus and the atomists in the following manner:

Democritus went wrong because he thought that the reason why distance diminished visibility was that the medium is of itself an impediment to the action of the visible object upon sight. But it is not so. The transparent medium as such is not in the least incompatible with luminosity or colour; on the contrary, It Is proxlmately disposed to their reception; a sign of which is that it is illumined or coloured instantaneously. Ibid. # 434.

Here Aquinas is denying atomism on the grounds that it would admit a vacuum into his ontology. Aquinas, following, Aristotle, ada mantly refused to admit the existence of a vacuum. It must be noted that In arguing against atomism, however, Aquinas is not arguing against a causal theory of perception* On the contrary, he is affirm ing a causal assay as will become evident later in this present chapter.

This unequivocal denial of atomism, and especially the reference to Democritus, is quite important considering a rather explicit pas sage found in D.W. HamlynTs Sensation and Perception. Hamlyn affirms rather than denies such an affinity between the Democritian and the

Aqulnian assay of perception:

The Thomist theory (of perception) looks like a combination of the Aristotelian point of view with one such as that put 121

forward by the Atomists. Aquinas makes frequent reference to Democritus. 2

The passages from the Commentarycan be used to refute Hamlyn's position as just stated. It Is true that Aquinas does make frequent reference to Democritus; but this referring to the atomlst philosopher is usually in criticising the. atomlst position rather than in defend ing It as a plausible theory of perception.

One would get the impression from reading the Aqulnian texts that not only would Aquinas reject atomism because of its insistence on a vacuum* but he would principally reject it on the philosophical grounds that it definitely claimed that the secondary qualities had no existence as dispositional properties independently of a perceiver. Structurally* the secondary qualities of the atomists— which are the proper senslbles for Aquinas— are completely mind de pendent. Note the following passage of Dectocrltian atomism taken from the writings of Lucretius* who more or less reiterated the classical atomlst position;

Moreover* since colours cannot be without light nor do the first beginnings of things come out into the light* you may know how they are not clothed with any colour. For what colour can their be in blind darkness?.... De Rerum Nature pp 90-94.

Lucretius continues his discussion with the following comments:

But lest you think that the first bodies abide bereft only of

D.W. Hamlyn* Sensation and Perception (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul* 1961)* p. 47. 122

colour, they are also sundered altogether from warmth and cold, and fiery heat, and are carried along barren of sound and devoid of taste, nor do they give off any scent of their own from their body. De Rerum Natura p 94.

That the proper senslbles exist in the truncated world as qualitatively distinct causal powers is an accepted part of Aquinas’ ontology. "So also color does not mean the same as being seen."

(Com. on the Physics Bk III, Lee 2)

The above mentioned two claims inherent to atomism— the existence of the vacuum and the mlnd-dependence of secondary qualities— seem to be evidence enough that to group Aquinas with the atomists in a elucidation of a perceptual theory very much misrepresents Aquinas' eplstemology. However, this denial of atomism does not entail that

Aquinas does not have a causal theory of perception; this causal factor will become evident as the present discussion progresses.

While discussing Democritus, Aquinas argued against the atomlst assay regarding the concept of distance. Concerning distance and perception, Aquinas gives the following elucidation:

The real reason why distance diminishes visibility is that everything seen is seen within the angle of a triangle, or pyramid, whose base is the object seen and the apex in the eye that sees. It makes no difference whether seeing takes place by a move ment from the eye outwards, so that the lines enclosing the triangle or pyramid run from the eye to the object, or e con- verso, so long as seeing does Involve this triangular or pyramidal figure; which is necessary because, since the object Is larger than the pupil of the eye, its effect upon the medium has to be scaled down gradually until it reaches the eye. And, obviously, the longer are the sides of a triangle or pyramid, in proportion the smaller is the angle at the apex, provided that the base re- 123

mains the same. The further away, then, is the object, the less does It appear— until at a certain distance it cannot be seen at all. Con* on the Soul 9 435.

I will readily admit that the above passage is somewhat tangential philosophically to the present discussion. However, it is an inter esting bit of optical theory based on a mathematical model. I have

Included it to incidate that some of the medieval philosophers seri ously attempted a type of rudimentary scientific sypotheslzlng. Thus, these philosophers were not busy all of the time trying to count the number of angels that could stand on the head of a pin!

It is important to realize that the discussion of the appropriate medium necessary for visual perception has a similar development for all of the faculties of the external sensorlum. Accordingly, some type of medium is a necessary condition for all the faculties of the external senses, as the following passage indicates:

...he shows how the case of the other senses is similar to sight. Ho sound or odour, e.g., is perceived if there is Immediate contact with the organ in .question. There must be a medium affected by sound or odour, which itself then affects our sense of hearing or of smell. A sounding or odourous body placed upon the organ is not perceived as such. The same is true even of touch and taste, though, for a reason to be given later, this is less evident. Com. on the Soul 9 437.

Aquinas continues this discussion In the following manner:

Finally, he states what is the medium in hearing and smelling. That of hearing is air, and that of smelling is something common to air and water— just as both of these provide a medium for colour insofar as each is a transparence. There Indeed is no name for the quality in air and water which provides the medium for odour; but It certainly is not transparency. And that both 124

air and water are conductors of smell he shows from the fact that marine animals have a sense of smell. Man, however, and other animals that walk and breath, only smell by breathing; which proves that air Is the medium of smell. This fact will be ex plained later. Com. On the Soul # 438.

As our present Inquiry Is limited to the act of visual perception alone, the above passage Is included for the sake of informative completeness rather than for analysis. Aquinas, therefore, views the concept of a medium as a necessary ontological structure for an act of perception from the external sensorium. CHAPTER VI

NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR PERCEPTION

Having established Aquinas' position on perceptual objects—

the proper senslbles, the common sensibles, and the incidental ob

ject of sense— as well as the need for a proper medium— the trans

parent , for example, regarding visual perception— it is now time

to reflect on what has taken place.

The Triadic Relation

I believe that a correct analysis of Aquinas' position of visual perception is that it essentially consists of a three-term necessary relation. This triadic relation itself can be classified as the necessary condition for perception. The terms of such a necessary triadic relation will be the sensible object, the adequate medium, and the properly disposed sense faculty* In explaining the inclusion of these three categories as the terms of the necessary relation, it must be remembered, first of all, that Aquinas is defi nitely opposed to affirming any type of representative realism; accordingly, one of the terms of the triadic relation is the presence of an object, which object Aquinas will refer to as a sensible.

In addition to the presence of an object, there must be both a proper

125 126

■tedium as well as a sensing faculty or power Itself. These three

entitles constitute the terms of the triadic relation which relation

Is what I want to argue la the nedessary condition for the Aquinian

assay of perception. Furthermore, each of these entities Is Itself

a necessary part of the necessary triadic relation; by that 1 mean

that If any term Is missing, then quite obviously, there will be no

triadic relation. Accordingly, it can be asserted that the necessary

condition for the Aquinian assay of perception is a three-term rela

tion, each of whose parts is itself necessary. In other words, each

term is a necessary condition for theexistence of the triadic rela

tion, which relation itself is the necessary condition for perception as such. I will symbolize this necessary triadic relation as follows:

NC(O-M-F) . This, quite perspicuously, stands for Necessary Condition

(Object-Medium-Faculty). The previous discussion of sight in the pre ceding pages has indicated the textual foundations for these claims;

the present task is to elucidate these passages.

Following the precedent already established in the above sections of this dissertation, visual perception will continue to be used as the paradigm case in the analysis of the Aquinian perceptual theory. Aquinas himself considers this act of Sensation-lla to be the highest or "best*1 of the acts of perception of the external senses in that it acquires a status near to the "spiritual" awareness of the intellect; In. other words, the act of perceptual vision is closer to concept-formation than the other acts of the external senses.

Now sight, which is without natural inmiutation either in 127

its organ or In Its object, Is the most spiritual, the most perfect, and the most universal of the senses. S.T., I, Q. 78, a. 3.

The question of "immutation" mentioned in the above passage

Is a crucial problem which will be considered later in this present chapter. Without such a consideration, however, it is still evident

that Aquinas considers visual perception to be the best example of our sensory awareness of the external world. It is because of this that this present discussion of Aquinian perceptual theory will continue to use visual perception as the paradigm case for all per ception.

It has been Indicated above that with visual perception there is an object, which is color; color, In turn, has been defined by

Aquinas as the primary visible. Thus Aquinas considers the secondary quailties— which he refers to as the proper sensibles— In some way or other exist as qualitatively distinct causal factors In the world independent of a mind. This existence of color in a truncated world does not entail, however, that there can be no difference in the actual perception of a color— a proper sensible— in differing per ceptual situations. In other words, Aquinas would be the first to admit that a color will be perceived differently in the bright sun light of high-noon and in the dimness of twilight. The facet of visual perception which forced Locke to admit that secondary qualities are mind-dependent was also faced by Aquinas; however, the variability of the proper sensibles will be explained by other factors than by

Locke's gambit which was to make such a category of perceptual ob jects to be completely dependent on « mind. For Aquinas, perceptual conditions do Indeed differ; but this Is not because the object has changed* but rather because the medium has been affected differently.

The diaphanum changes due to the Intensity of the light actually present. Accordingly* it is not the object alone which determines what is perceived* but also the Intensity of the transparent medium.

It aaist be remembered that the diaphanum becomes transparent only because of light. Therefore* the change in the medium is due to the intensity of the light actually present in the medium. The affect of this-medium--the diaphanum— on visual perception further substanti ates Aquinas1 claim that secondary qualities are not mine-dependent as they were for the classical representative realist. In other words

Aquinas1 claim is, as will become apparent later in this present dis cussion* that the medium contributes greatly to the way something is perceived. Accordingly* the proper sensible— in this case* color— can exist Independent of a mind as a qualitatively distinct causal factor but nevertheless be perceived differently in differing cir cumstances partly because of the different intensity of light in the diaphanum. Accordingly* the variability of sense perception regard ing colors does not force Aquinas into maintaining that such sense objects are completely mind-dependent. This is a further Instance of Justifying the claim that Aquinas is an objective relativist In perception.

The preceding discussion presented two of the three necessary conditions for the triadic relation* namely, the object and the medium 129

The third necessary condition for perception Is the perceiving organ

and the perceiving faculty. As was indicated in Chapter 1, Aquinas

distinguishes between the organ and the faculty. The organ Is the

physiological machinery and the faculty is the ability to Immaterially

receive the form of another thing in non-entitatlve manner. There

fore, "sensation apparatus" will refer to both the sense faculty and

the physiological organ of that faculty. The following passage from

Che Commentary Indicates such a distinction between organ and faculty:

...the "primary sensitive part", i.e., organ of sense, is that in which a power of this sort resides, namely a capacity to receive forms without matter. For a sense organ, e.g., the eye, shares the same being with the faculty or power itself, though it differs in essence or definition, the faculty being as it were the form of the organ.... A bodily organ is "what receives sensation", i.e., is the subject of the sense faculty, as matter is subject of form., and yet the magnitude and the sensitivity of sense differ by definition, the sense being a certain ratio, i.e., proportion and form and capacity, of the magnitude— i.e., of the organ. Com. On the Soul 0 555,

Not only must the organ exist along with the faculty, but they must be properly disposed so that they may perform a certain perceptual

function. There are two senses of "being disposed properly" for the sense apparatus but it is too early not to consider them. At any

length, the perceiving organ and the perceiving faculty are not to be

considered as a tabula rasa but rather as structured entitles geared

to do certain functions. Thus the activity of the organ and sense

faculty only occur because its structure reacts in a certain manner with the proper and appropriate sensible object as found in a sufficient medium. The perceiving apparatus therefore, is in itself found in a 130

condition of Disposltlon-2 by Its very make-up or structure. This claim is a necessary component In the claim that Aquinas Is opting for a "structured mental act" in perception as well as in concept- formation. Such a claim makes Aquinas quite far removed from the

Moorean position of a "diaphanous arrow of consciousness".^ This analysis, furthermore, does entail that the perceiving apparatus could not be such an apparatus without its structure. The faculty and organ are not diaphanous in any sense of the term. A sensation apparatus with a certain dispositional order is necessary for perception to occur at all. Accordingly, the claim is put forth that the exis tence of a properly-disposed perception-faculty-organ is one term of the necessary triadic relation which itself comprises a necessary condition for the act of perception itself.

Having explicated the three conditions without which percep tion cannot take place, it is now appropriate to consider the act of perception itself insofar as it makes use of these three necessary conditions. For without any one of these necessary Ingredients, there will be no perceptual awareness. It is because of the necessary char acter of all of the three terms that Aquinas will assert claims like the following:

...the sense always apprehends a thing as it is, unless there is an impediment in the organ or In the medium.... Consequently, the judgement of the sense about proper sensibles is always true unless there Is an impediment in

%.E, Moore, "Refutation of Idealism", 20th Century Philosophy: The Analytic Tradition, ed. by M. Weitz (New York: Free Press), p.31. 131

the organ or In the medium. (Italics mine) De Verltate, I, 11.

It must be noted that Aquinas places all three categories

— object, medium and organ— on the same plane. Accordingly, I claim

categorically that Aquinas Is arguing for a necessary triadic relation

as the necessary condition for the act of perception. Such a triadic

relation Is best elucidated under the title of objective relativism.

In the two passages quoted in the last paragraph, what Aquinas

is analyzing is that If one of these terms of the triadic relation

is deficient In any way whatsoever, so much the worse for veridical per

ception in that particular Instance. For example, if the eye is a

color-blind organ, then no matter how luminous the medium might be

nor how pristine the color, the perceiver will nut see the object

Insofar as color-blindness affects the particular color in question.

In a similar vein, Aquinas argues that the tongue of a person affected with the flu will not permit him to taste the sweet and the sour as will be the case when the taster is well. The following passages

from both the Commentary and the Sunana Theologies stress the im

portance of a properly disposed faculty for veridical perception:

For, in the first place, sense perception Is always truthful with respect to its proper object, or at least it incurs, with respect to these, the minimum of falsehood; for natural powers do not, as a general rule, fall in the activities proper to them; and if they do fail, this is due to some derangement or other* Thus only in a minority of cases do the senses Judge Inaccurately of their proper objects, and then only through some organic defect, e.g., when people sick with fever taste sweet things as bitter because their tongues are ill-disposed. Com. On the Soul # 661. 132

We say that the sense are not deceived regarding their proper sense object, except by Interference and In abnormal cases and when the sense organ Is Impaired. S.T., 1, Q. 17, a. 2.

It Is Interesting to note that here Aquinas is claiming that

a defective organ can contribute to a faculty sensing incorrectly.

It seems to be the case that a defective organ will then contribute

to a defective faculty. However, the faculty or power itself can

only be defective in so far as there is a corresponding organic

deficiency. In other words, a properly working organ Is a necessary

condition for a properly functioning faculty.

My previous analysis in terms of Disposition*-2-Actuality-1

offers an explication of the above mentioned passages. Aquinas is

arguing that the sense organ itself must be properly disposed if it

is to contribute to perception at all; if such an adequate disposi

tion is absent, then veridical perception has no possibility of

taking place.

Furthermore, the medium must be appropriate. Our previous

discussion of light as being essential for the perception by sight of a proper sensible makes this claim rather obvious. Thus, no matter how perfect the eye— i.e., it is properly disposed to perceive all

colors— andhow visible-potential the color, if there is not an adequate medium— i.e., if the intensity of light In the diaphanum is not sufficient for the color to react with it— then again there is no

possibility of perception. It is because of considerations like the ones just mentioned that I am convinced that Aquinas' position on per- 133

ception can best be explained by a necessary triadic relation, NC

(O-M-F).

Aquinas Is aware of the instances of non-veridical perception; yet his claim is that such non-verldlcal perception Is a minority of cases considering all our perceptions and that such non-veridical perception is due to either a deficiency of the organ or of the medium.

It must also be remembered that when speaking of non-veridical per ception and veridical perception, we are only considering percep tion involving the proper sensibles. Moreover this is just one cate gory of objects of sensation. That non-veridical perception is had with the common sensibles and the incidental objects of sensation is more obvious and Aquinas will consider such cases. Yet he is willing to admdt non-veridical perception even Involving the proper sensibles; but such a non-veridical perceiving is due to a faulty faculty or an inappropriate medium.

It is of tremendous importance to realize here exactly what

Aquinas is actually trying to submit to philosophical analysis. In the entire discussion under consideration, Aquinas is not providing a criterion for distinguishing veridical perception from non-verldical perception of perceived proper sensibles. The Cartesian and

Lockean worry about the relation between image and extra-mental causal object at any given moment of perceptual awareness— the ob jective reality versus the formal reality— is not Aquinas' concern at all. Accordingly, a philosopher concerned with a basic doubt over veridical perception based on representative realist worries and further concerned with what characteristics a veridical perception

has aa distinguished from a non-veridical perception will view Aqui

nas' brushing off of the problem with askance. As was mentioned

earlier* Aquinas never seems to have been seriously worried about the

possibility of representative realism ever being taken as a viable

epistemological position. Behind this claim probably is a teleo-

loglcal position. In other words* the perceiving apparatus is natu

rally fitted for its object. Descartes and Locke* however* do not

adopt such a teleological view. In accord with the rise of the new

science* and of course it corresponding mechanism, there is no on

tological teleology. For Aquinas, with the qualitatively distinct proper sensibles functioning as a causal factor in the external world*

there are such objects to which the external sense faculties can be

"fitted". Given such a teleology* he assumes that at times we do perceive veridlcally; accordingly* he is basically concerned over what must be the case epIstemologically if an adequate analysis of veridical perception is to be provided. If a percelver does not per ceive veridlcally* then it is due to a failing of one of the necessary

conditions. Therefore* I believe that Aquinas is principally inter ested in providing an adequate account of normal perception and thus

is not Interested in providing a criterion for distinguishing any given image or awareness as veridical or non-veridical. In other words*

Aquinas is assuming that there are times when normal perception does occur. His intention Is to offer a philosophical analysis of such

Instances of normal perception. Admittedly* there is a further ques- 135

tlon— and an important question at that— concerning the determination

of when an Instance of ''normal" perception is actually had. Aquinas

does not seem to be concerned with this second question of esta

blishing criteria to determine an instance of veridical perception

from an instance of non-veridical perception. His principal phi

losophical concern, granting that a perceiver does at times have

veridical awarenesses, is to analyze what must hold eplstemologlcally

if such an instance of perceptual awareness is to be adequately as

sayed.

A related question obviously arises— what if everyone per

ceives our world through rose-colored glasses? Again, this type of

question does not seem to have bothered Aquinas philosophically. In

other words, the basic critical problem as espoused by Descartes and

furthered by Kant is quite foreign to the thought of Aquinas. Aqui nas assumes that we do perceive veridlcally sometimes, and it is

these cases that hewants to provide an analysis of. In other words,

if everyone perceives the world through rose-colored glasses, Aqui nas' worry is still to provide an analysis of how everyone actually does perceive, not to see if they are possibly Influencing their perceptions themselves when perceiving the proper sensibles. Again it must be remembered that Aquinas is here only considering the work ings of the external sensorium. When the question of the proper functioning of the internal sensorium arises later in this disserta tion, then Aquinas will be very much concerned about what the per ceiver himself contributes to the acts of the internal sensorium. 136

Throughout this present discussion, 1 do not want to make Aquinas to

be a philosopher of common sense, a la G.E. Moore. However, I do

believe that Aquinas would be willing to share some of the tenets of

Moore Insofar as the latter attempted to eliminate pseudo philosophi

cal questions from privileged status by showing that such problems

involve a misuse of common sense as well as of ordinary language.

In other words, given the two statements, a) " I am perceiving a

rose.", and b) "How do I know that I am not hallucinating that I am

perceiving the rose?", Aquinas is claiming that it is difficult e- nough to provide an adequate account of a theory of Intentional con

sciousness for normal perception without worrying about a cartesian

dream problem Aquinas is arguing that it requires a sophisticated

epistemologlcal theory in order to provide an account of statement "a" without demanding an answer to question "b" right away. As shall be

Indicated later, Aquinas does consider that questlon"b" should be

answered, but this is neither the first nor the most Important problem to be considered in offering an epistemologlcal assay of perception. In the end, Aquinas is very much like Bishop Berkeley,

in that, as Berkeley in Dialogue III between Hylas and Philonous, a criterion of consistency and coherence is used in order to distinguish

statement "a" from statement 'V.

Causal Aspects

Given that the object, medium and faculty of perception have been extensively considered, it is now necessary to consider what happens when the triadic necessary relation occurs so that perception 137 results. In essence, Aquinas Is adopting a causal theory of per** ception; yet this account Is far from the blatant atomism that critics like D.W. Hamlyn attribute to him: "Aquinas combines an atomlst eplstemology with an Aristotelian view of soul." It is true that

Aquinas does give a causal account from the fact that If there were no object, then there would be no perception. This follows from the triadic necessary relation for perception, one of whose terms is the proper sensible Itself. Furthermore, the "sensible species"— a term which will be thoroughly analyzed later in this chapter— is caused in the sensing faculty by means of the object. Just because a causal theory of perception is advocated does not necessarily entail such a causal theory is to be identified with atomism.

It Trill be advantageous to begin the causal analysis of the

Aquinian perceptual theory with Aquinas' own account of why he con siders the Democritean assay to be Inadequate. Aquinas, as was noted in the last chapter, argued adamantly against atomism and Democritus in particular. Aquinas is claiming that such a perceptual theory allowed for only a material, physical change In the sense faculty.

On the other hand, Aquinas* own account of perception permits for both a spiritual immutation as well as a physical immutatlon. Such a distinction is brought out in the following passage:

Democritus did lay down that no other cause for any of our knowledge is required save the emission of bodily images from things and their entrance Into our soul.; the process of know ledge is an affair of images and discharges. The absence of any distinction between mind and sense underlies this opinion;

2 Hamlyn, Sensation and Perception, p. 51. 138

Che assumption is Chat all knowledge is like sensation, where a physiological change is induced by objects of sense.... Sensation is not the activity of soul alone, but of the body-soul compound. So also with regard to.all the activi ties of the sensible part. That sensible things outside the soul cause something in the human organism Is as it should be; Aristotle here agrees with Democritus that the activities of the sensitive part are produced by the impressions of sen sible objects on the senses— not however in the manner of a discharge, as Democritus had said, but in some other way. Democritus, Incidentally, held that all action is the upshot of atomic changes. S.T., 1, Q. 84, a. 6.

This passage is crucially important for an adequate causal

analysis of Aquinian perceptual theory in that it explicitly denies

that perception is sufficiently explained solely in terms of physical

or bodily activity. That a strict atomlst causal explanation is not

acceptable for Aquinas is evident from the following passage taken

from the above quotation:

...The activities of the sensitive part are produced by the impressions of sensible objects on the senses— not however in the manner of a discharge, as Democritus had said, but in some other way. Ibid.

This "some other way" is crucial here and, obviously, needs much explaining. I want to argue that this phrase has a two-fold

analysis and interpretation for Aquinas. In one sense, It Is referring

to a causal analysis which Is different from that offered by Demo critus. Secondly, Aquinas is arguing that perception, as all know ledge, Is partially a spiritual process; this is a further reitera

tion of his principle that lntentlonality is basically an "Immaterial" 139

reception of the form of a material thing. The following passage

form the Sutana Theologies elucidates this two-fold consideration

expressed by Aquinas: .

Some wish to base the distinction and number of the external senses of the difference of their organs; others on the diverse natures of sensible qualities in the medium of sensation. But neither attempt really meets the bill; for faculties are not for organs, but conversely; there are not diverse senses because there are different organs, Instead nature provides diverse organs to match the diver sity of powers. Similarly as regards the media of sensa tion. The basis for the distinction and number of the ex ternal senses should be really grounded on what is direct and proper to sense. Sense is a receptive power, the sub ject of change by an external sensible object. This external principle of action Is what is directly perceived by sense, and the senses are diversified according to the diversity found here. S.T., I, Q. 78, a. 3.

Aquinas further elaborates on this by considering two kinds

of immutation:

There are two sorts of immutation, physiological and psychological. (Est autem duplex lmmutatio: una naturalis, et alia spirltualis.) The former comes about by the physical reception of the agent in the patient, the latter according to a certain spiritual reception. Sensation requires this latter process, the entrance into the sense organ of a like ness of, or relation to, the sensible thing. If physiological immutation alone sufficed, all natural bodies would have sen sations when they underwent alteration. Ibid.

As was Indicated earlier, the notion of "some other way" of

a causal analysis has a two-fold meaning for Aquinas in this present discussion. This two-fold interpretation is expressed by the two different kinds of limitation, physiological and psychological. It should be noted that the translation of immutatio naturalis and lmmutatio spirltualis as physiological and psychological immutation are the terms chosen by Thomas Gilby In his translation of Question

Seventy-Eight of the Sum"»* Theologies, Prima Pars* The second sense, ismutatlo spirltualis, is an indication of the basic spiritual in gredient in all Intentional activity; In effect, this Is Aquinas' characterization of the realitas objectiva of Descartes. Yet this is not the only sense of Imnutation which is necessary for visual per ception. In the consideration mentioned above, it must be remembered that Aquinas was discussing Democritus' version of a causal theory of perception. Accordingly, the "some other way" would seem to also have to relate to some type of physical causality. The problem pre sented here, therefore, is how this physical causality expresses it self in visual perception.

In order to get at an adequate solution of this problem, it will be necessary to return to Aquinas' treatment of the proper sen sible— in the case of visual perception, color— and the medium— in the case of visual perception, the transparent diaphanum. In the

Commentary, as was elucidated above, it was Aquinas' position that the visible— color— affects the transparent medium— the diaphanum. In the case of visual perception, the most obvious medium would be air.

Color affects the medium, and the medium, as a physical body, reacts with the physical disposition of the eye. In other words, the medium

"becomes colored*', and this physical body which is a transporter, as it were, of color directly affects the physical organ of visual sen- sat ion, which is the eye. If this were all there was to visual perception, then Hamlyn would be correct in identifying the Aquinian account with that of Democritus regarding their respective assays of visual perception. However, such an identification is structurally

Impossible for two reasons. First of all, the medium does indeed affect the eye; but it does not produce a corresponding physical lmutation with the eye. It must be remembered that change for Aqui nas is a reception of a form from another. If a physical reception were taking place with visual perception— i.e., when the colored medium affects the eye— then the eye itself would become colored.

Obviously this does not happen. Accordingly, Aquinas will argue that

"...in some sense we find spiritual immutation only, as in sight...."

(Ibid.) This means that the eye does not become red even though the colored object and the medium both are red. Yet a certain physical reaction was occuring; in other words, the colored medium did react with the disposed faculty for visual perception. But the effect was not a "red" eyeball but rather a spiritual immutation which will be what Aquinas will refer to as the "sensible species". As we shall see later, other senses do become physiologically changed as well as spiritually changed; an example would be the sense of touch when it encounters a hot object. In such a case, there Is a physical change as the sense receptor Itself becomes hot. In the case of visual per ception, however, there only occurs a spiritual iranutatlon. This spiritual immutation is the basis for Aquinas' claim that "immateri ality" is the root for all knowledge--!.e., the ability of some "X" 142

to have the form of another without taking on Its physical character

istics. This is the ultimate meaning of Principle D-l in Chapter I.

In summation, therefore, the physical causality which is needed for visual perception is the colored medium affecting the visual dis position which results in a spiritual immutation— i.e., the formation of the sensible species. In other words, Aquinas differs from Demo critus in thatthe physical reaction— the causal interaction from the objects in the external world— doesnot exhaust whet occurs; for, in addition, the spiritual immutation— the having of the form immateri ally— is accomplished in the visual disposition. The following pas sage from the Commentary illustrates the present points under dis cussion:

...he remarks that color-affected air itself modifies the pupil of the eye in a particular way, i.e., it imprints on it a likeness (the sensible species) of some color, and that then the pupil, so modified, acts upon the common sense. Similarly, our hearing...(is)...itself affected by the air.... Com. on the Soul it 773.

This discussion is extremely interesting, for it reaffirms the basic and rudimentary spirituality of Aquinas' thesis of intentionality even on the perceptual level. In a later century, Descartes would speak of a "realitas objectiva", which is structurally similar to what Aquinas was trying to explicate with his notion of "psychologi cal immutation. Because of this immaterial immutation, Aquinas can not be classified as a strict atomist, as critics like Hamlyn are wont to do. Aquinas may have his atomlst leanings, but this seems to be 143 only in so far as he asserts that there are objects in the external world which do causally affect our sense faculties resulting in per ception. In effect, his atomlst leanings are only in the fact that he is a realist; accordingly, a truncated world does indeed exist, which world, when in the presence of a knower— a being capable of having an Intentional inexistence— causally affects that being capable of intentionality. Thus Aquinas' only claim to atomism is a state ment that Berkeleian subjective idealism is an inadequate account of sense perception; in other words, the material, physical world does have a causal influence in our perceptual awareness. This is a very benign form of atomism to say the least. This is a further indication that Aquinas is an objective relativist in perception.

For the act of sensation is not an act of movement; rather to sense is to be moved: since, through the sen sible object's altering the condition of the senses in acting upon them, the animal (i.e., the perceiver) is made actually sentient from being only potentially so. S.C.G., Q. 82, n. 12.

According to my interpretation of Aquinas' account of per ception, there is a three-term relation which is at the core of the perceptual process. But it must be noted that this three term re lation, MC(O-H-F), Is only the necessary condition for perception and is not the sufficient condition for perception. What happens with sight is that when the eye come3 into contact with a colored object

In a properly lighted medium, then the faculty of sight is immuted or takes on the form of the object. This psychological immutation is the reception of the sensible species. What this amounts to is that 144

the faculty of sight is now ready to see. But it cannot be overly stressed that the object of perception is the red object existing in

the external world and not the sensible species itself. It is to stress this fact that Aquinas keeps reiterating such passages as the following:

A conscious impression is related to a cognitive power as a medium; it is a form by^ which the faculty knows. S.T., I, Q. 85, a. 2.

But the sensible species is not what is perceived, but rather that by which the sense perceives. Ibid., I, Q. 82, a. 2, s.c.

Hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing.... The likeness of a sensible thing is the form of the sense in act. S.T., I, Q« 85, a * 2.

The likeness through which we understand is the species of the thing known in the knover. Ibid., I, Q. 85, a. 8, ad 3.

The essence of Aquinas' claim here is that the exterior object affects the sense faculty in such a way that the faculty is now dis posed to perceive the object as such; this state of being actively disposed is when the faculty has the sensible species Impressed upon its disposition. This sensible species has been caused by the per ceptible object— the proper sensible-— in the external world. This sensible species is the effect of the physiological immutation but is expressed only by the psychological immutation. This point has been further developed by the Renaissance followers of St. Thomas, notably

John of St. Thomas in particular, when these commentators wrote ex tensively of the species impressa. What they meant by this term is that the sense is now properly disposed to perceive a particular proper sensible. There is a subtle play going on here over the use of the terms "properly disposed11. The best analysis I can provide

Is that Aquinas can be interpreted as using "disposed to know" in two ways when referring to the sense faculties of the external sensorium.

The first sense is when the faculty of sight is geared towards per ceiving colors and not sounds and so forth for the other four facul ties of the external senses. The first sense is when the faculty of sight is in a state of Disposition-2-Actuality-l. But Aquinas is claiming that visual perception is a sophisticated happening. By elucidation of a second sense of "disposed to know", Aquinas is attempting to explain how that even though the eye is disposed to wards perceiving color, the faculty for visual perception is not always perceiving the same color nor even any color when the eye lids are closed. Accordingly, the eye is not always knowing every color nor always knowing one color. What makes the eye disposed to perceive red at Time-1 and to perceive green at Time-2 is the re ception in the eye— which is already by its very constitution in a state of Disposition-2-Actuality-l— of the sensible species— the psy chological Immutation— which has been caused by the physical immutation, which in turn was caused by the colored thing in the ex ternal world. Thus we are getting what one might call a generic level of disposition and then a specific level of disposition. The generic level— Dlsposition-l-Actuality-2— is what distinguished the faculty of seeing from the faculty of hearing. As to the proper sensibles In the external world, the genus of color Is, as it were, structurally different from the genus of sound. But within this genus of each object of each external sense— the proper sensibles— there are further species. Thus the eye is not ordered to just

"color11, but to reds and greens and lavenders and so forth. But in order to perceive these species of color, there tuust be an ap propriate disposition. And the reception of this disposition is ultimately caused by the thing in the external world through the physiological inmutation which results in a sensible species— the psychological immutation. Accordingly, the sensible species is that which makes the visual faculty disposed to perceive this par ticular red rather than that particular green. That Aquinas is con sidering something like the species impressa of the Renaissance scholastics is somewhat evident from the following passage from the Summa Theologies:

In the sense-part of man, there are two kinds of activity, one by change (immutatlo) effected from the outside; thus the activity of the senses is fully carried out through a change effected by sensible objects. The other activity is the for mation by which the faculty of imagination forms for itself a model of something absent or even of something never seen. S.T., I, Q. 85, a. 2, ad 2.

The first part of the above passage is crucial for the pre

sent discussion; here Aquinas is discussing the "change"— which 1

referred to as the psychological becoming— of the sense faculty

already properly disposed— Disposltion-2-Actuality-l— to perceive

a member of a genus of a proper sensible. 147

It also must be noted that Aquinas Is distinguishing between the sensible species received from the thing in the external world and the formation by the mind of an "image". These are two decid edly different functions of the sensorium: a) the formation of the sensible species in one of the faculties of the external senses, and b) the formation of an image in one of the faculties of the

Internal sensorium. The formation of the sensible species is a causal function due only because there are proper sensibles existing in the external world. The consideration of "image" formation must await our discussion of Che function of the internal sensorium.

In conclusion, therefore, the point seems to be that there is a rendering of a disposition— Disposition-2-Actuality-1— disposed to do something in particular— psychological immutation or the for mation of the sensible species— and this "rendering" is accomplished by the sensible objects in the external world. But it must be re membered that the sensible species is not the direct object of knowledge; it is not the object of knowledge but rather the means by which the sense apparatus is disposed so that the percelver can be aware of the object in the external world.

The need for such immutation applies to all of the faculties of the external sensorium, as the following passage indicates:

But in some sense we find spiritual immutation only, as In sight, while In others we find not only a spiritual but also a natural (physiological) immutation, and this either on the part of the object only, or likewise on the part of the organ. On the part of the object, we find local natural immutation in sound, which is the object of hearing; for 148

sound Is caused by percussion and commotion of the air. We find natural immutatio by alteration in odor, vhich is the object of smelling; for in order to give off an odor, a body must be in a measure affected by heat. On the part of the organ, natural immutation takes place in touch and taste; for the hand that touches something hot becomes hot, while the tongue is moistened by the humidity of flavors. But the organs of smelling and hearing are not affected in their respective operations by any natural immutation, except accidentally. S.T., I, Q, 78, a. 3.

Direct Realism

A further corollary of my present claim is that the phantasm— a much nsed and much misunderstood Aquinian concept— is not to be identified with the specifically disposed sense faculty. An adequate structural account of the phantasm will occur later in this dis sertation; however, it is crucial to keep in mind that the phantasm is not to be identified with the sensible species or with what the scholastic commentators will call the "species impressa". That this is a common interpretation of Aquinas I will not deny, as many non scholastic as well as scholastic writers seem to assert this. Fur thermore, there is a tremendous textual blur in the writings of Aqui nas over the term, "sensible species". A sensible species is often defined in terms of a "simllitudo", which is best translated as a

"likeness". Furthermore, a phantasm is also described in terms of a

"slmilitudo1’. That this requires much explication should be obvious; however, as will become apparent when the phantasm as such Is con sidered, there are two distinct and quite different uses of likeness being asserted here. Accordingly, "sensible species" Is not to be identified with phantasm. 149

Before concluding the present chapter, I want to present a rather lengthy series of passages from the Commentary; in these pas sages, Aquinas sums up his treatment of perception:-

...while it ia true that every recipient receives a form from an agent, there are different ways of receiving form. Form received in a patient from an agent sometimes has the same mode of existence in the recipient as in the agent; which occurs v;hen the patient is disposed to the form in the same way as the agent. For whatever is received is received into the being of the recipient so that, if the recipient is disposed as the agent is, the form comes to be in the recipient in the manner in which it exists in the agent. And in this case the form is not imparted without the matter.

In other words, matter is the receiver of forms; he continues with this discussion;

For although the numerically one and the same division of matter that is in the agent does not become the recipient's, the latter becomes, in a way, the same as the material agent, in as much as it acquires a material disposition like that which was in the agent. And it is in this way that air re ceives the influence of fire, and any other passive thing in Nature the action that alters its natural quality.

That this is not the only type of reception is indicated by the following passage:

Sometimes, however, the recipient receives the form into a mode of existence other than that which the form has in the agent; when, that is, the recipient's material disposition to receive form does not resemble the material disposition in the agent. In these cases the form is taken into the recipient '‘without matter", the recipient being assimilated to the agent in respect of form and not in respect of matter. And it is thus that a sense receives form without matter, the form having, in the sense, a different mode of being from which it has In the object sensed. It is in the latter case that it has a material mode of being (esse naturale), but in 150

the sense faculty it has a cognitional and spiritual node.

Aquinas next provides an analogous example to help explain his

point:

Aristotle finds an apt example of this in the Imprint of a seal on wax. The disposition of the wax to the image is not the same as that of the iron or gold to the image; hence wax, he says, takes a sign, i.e., a shape or image, of what is gold or bronze but not precisely as gold or bronze. For the wax takes a likeness of the gold seal in respect of the image, but not in respect of the seal's intrinsic disposition to be a gold seal.

He then uses this analogy to explicate sensation:

Likewise, the sense is affected by the sense-object with a colour or taste or flavour or sound ‘not in respect of what each is called as a particular thing'-, i.e., it isn't af fected by a coloured stone precisely as stone, or sweet honey precisely as honey, because in the sense there is no such disposition to the form as tlier is in these substances; but it is affected as such by them precisely as coloured, or tasty, or as having this or that "informing principle" or form. For the sense is assimilated to the sensible object in point of form, not in point of the disposition of matter.

The organ-facuity distinction is now considered:

...he concludes about the organ of sense. Since from his teaching that the sense receives forms into cognition imma terially, which is true of the intellect also, one might be led to suppose that sense was an incorporeal faculty like the intellect; to preclude this error Aristotle assigns to sense an organ, observing that the ‘primary sensitive part'-, i.e., organ of sense, is that in which a power of this sort resides, namely a capacity to receive forms without matter.

Organ and faculty are explained after the fashion of matter and form: 151

For a sense organ, e.g., the eye, shares the same being with the faculty or power itself, though it differs in essence or definition, the faculty being as it were the form of the organ.... So he goes on to say "an extended magnitude", i.e., a bodily organ, is 'what receives rensation', i.e., is the subject of the sense faculty, as matter is subject of form; and yet the magnitude and the sensitivity of sense differ by definition, the sense being a certain ratio, i.e., pro portion and form and capacity, of the magnitude.

Following Plato in the Theaetetus, Aquinas uses the example of a "ratio":

When he says, "It is clear'1 he infers from these pre misses a reply to two questions which might arise. Vhat has been said, he observes, explains why an excess in the object destroys the sense-organ; for, it sensation is to take place there must pre-exist in the organ of sense "a certain ratio" or, as we have termed it, proportion. But the proportion is destroyed and the sense itself, which precisely consists, as has been said, in the formal proportion of the organ, is neutralized. It is just as though one were to twang cords too violently, destroying the tone and harmony of the in strument, which consists in a certain proportion.

This following section, concludes by giving a brief restate ment of the Aquinian thesis of intentionality:

His analysis also gives us the answer to another question, namely, why plants do not feel, though they have some share in the soul and are affected by certain sense-objects, i.e., tangible things, as well as by heat and cold. The reason why they do not feel Is that they lack propoi'tion needed for sen sation, in particular that balance between extremes of the tangible qualities which is a prerequisite of the organ of touch, apart from which there can be so sensation. Hence, they have no intrinsic principle for receiving forms "apart from matter", that is to say, no sense. They are affected and undergo changes only materially. Com. On the Soul # 552-557.

1 have included the above rather lengthy passages from the 152

Commentary because not only do they sum up nicely Aquinas' entire

analysis of perception, but it is probably the best and most lucid

exposition of his thesis of intentionality that I have discovered in

his writings. There is a very great structural similarity in this

account with that provided by Plato in the Theaetetus; this is espe cially true of the "ratio" account and the concept of too great a stress on the faculty destroying the ratio, which ratio indeed makes perception possible. It is this ratio which I want to argue makes up the Disposition-2-Actuality-l constitution of the sense faculties.

In essence, Aquinas is very much like Plato in so far as both are providing an account of visual perception in the manner of objective relativism.

Once a sense faculty has been properly disposed with a sen sible species, then it is capable of perceiving. Perception, however,

Is not sufficiently explained by the mere passive reception of a form; there must be some contribution on the part of the perceiver. By this

X mean that it is plausible to say that some person is in a certain state in which all the necessary conditions are present but that he himself is not perceiving the proper sensibles; this would be the case, for example, when one is staring blindly at a wall and is thus not conscious of perceiving at all. The requisite conditions would be present here— a red wall, sufficient light and a properly disposed faculty— but these alone would not be sufficient for perception. What is necessary is that the perceiver actively engage with the immuted sensible species and thus begin to perceive. Thus in addition to 153 the three necessary conditions for perception— HC(O-M-F)— the per ceiver must also contribute his part. It is only with this mental activity in conjunction with the necessary conditions that perception will take place at all. An adequate analysis of this "activity" must wait until the sensus communis— one faculty of the internal senses~has been considered; as will become apparent* this internal sense is an intricate and necessary faculty in accounting for the

Aqulnian perceptual theory.

That Aquinas is an objective relativist should be obvious by now. This claim of objective relativism depends upon the three term necessary relation as being the necessary condition for perception.

In so far as any term of the triadic relation is not accounted for* so too will perfection in perception be found wanting. CHAPTER VII

THE INTERNAL SENSES

A structural analysis of the internal senses Is the next step

In explicating the Aquinian assay of visual perception. A corollary of the previous treatment of the external senses is that Aquinas structurally adopted a rather rigorous faculty psychology. Being cpistemologically consistent, Aquinas will transfer this rigor re garding the faculties or capacities over into hie discussion and analysis of the functionings of the internal senses. As a result, the internal senses have a much greater and a much more detailed and positive role to contribute in human perception than such sensitive awareness is accustomed to have for most of the classical and con temporary British Empiricists’ from Locke and Berkeley to Russell and

Moore. This latter point obviously has to be argued for and the last part of this dissertation can be seen as offering an argument and an analysis for such a point.

By the internal senses, moreover, it must be remembered that

Aquinas is not referring to "introspection"; on the contrary, he is arguing for a unique set of faculties, each of which has a unique role to play in a perceiver's awareness of the world around him.

154 155

Kantian Possibility and the Internal Senses

The basis for arguing for the Internal senses seems to be that human awareness of the.external world Is not completely and adequately explained only In terms of an awareness of "sensiblesrr— both proper and common— of objects in the external world. To use a contemporary twist, Aquinas Is arguing that a mere awareness of sense data does not exhaust human perception. In other words, a mere awareness of sense qualities— what G.E. Moore might call our awareness of sense data— Is not sufficient for Aquinos in completely explaining human perception. The need for positing additional sense faculties thus comes about because of the inadequacy of the functioning of the ex ternal senses alone to completely explain human awareness of the objects of the external world.

As nature does not fail in necessary things, there must needs be as many actions of the sensitive soul as may suffice for the life of a perfect animal (i.e., a perceiver). If any of these actions cannot be reduced to one and the sane prin ciple, they must be assigned to diverse powers; since a power of the soul is nothing else than the proximate principle of the soul’s operation. S.T., I, Q* 78, a. A.

If the preceding analysis of the Aquinian theory of perception is correct, then the intentional awareness of an object in the ex ternal world is an '‘awareness of P", where "P" is a sensible— either proper (color, sound, taste, etc.) or common (shape, motion, number, etc.)— in the external world. Moreover, the object l!P" is per ceivable only in conjunction with the other two necessary conditions for perception, namely, a sufficient medium and a properly disposed 156

* faculty. Aquinas' contention is, however, that such an analysis does not sufficiently explain what or how a perceiver is aware of objects during an act of perception. In other words, there is more to perception than a mere awareness of primary and secondary quali ties— the proper and common sensibles.

In a very real sense, Aquinas is almost Kantian here; the force of his argument is that if knowers manifest knowledge behavior which cannot be totally and sufficiently explained in terms of external sensation alone, then an additional account is needed in order to adequately provide an ontological underpinning for sensation.

In the Summa Theologica, Aquinas sets forth probably the clearest and shortest account of the need for the internal senses:

Now we must observe that for the life of perfect animal (i.e., a perceiver), the animal should apprehend a thing not only at the actual tines of sensation, but also when it is absent. Otherwise, since animal motion and action follow apprehension, an animal would not be moved to seek something absent; the contrary of which we may observe especially in perfect animals, which are moved by progression, for they are moved towards something apprehended and absent. Therefore, through the sensitive soul an animal must not only receive the species of sensible things, when it is actually affected by them, but ±_t must also retain and preserve them.,.. Therefore...the power which receives the species of sen sible things must be distinct from the power which preserves them.

Yet, Aquinas is affirming that the internal senses do not only retain sensible species:

Again, we must observe that if an animal were moved by pleasing and disagreeable things only as affecting the sense, there would be no need to suppose that an animal has a power besides the apprehension of those forms which the senses per ceive, and in which the animal takes pleasure, or from which 157

It shrinks with horror. But the animal needs to seek or to avoid certain things, not only because they are pleasing or otherwise to the senses, but also because of other advan tages and uses, or disadvantages; just as the sheep runs away when It sees a wolf, not because of its color or shape, but as a natural enemy. So too, a bird gathers together straws, not because they are pleasant to the sense, but because they are useful for building its nest. Ibid.

These examples lead to additional functions for the internal senses:

Animals , therefore, need jro perceive such Intentions, which the exterior sense docs not perceive. Now some dis tinct principle is necessary for this, since the perception of sensible forms comes by an immutation caused by the sen sible, which is not the case with the perception of the above intentions. Ibid.

The Four Internal Senses

An analysis of these passages will reveal that Aquinas is ar guing that a simple direct awareness of sensibles is not enough to adequately account for sense perception in knowers. In essence, there seems to be a three-fold reason for such ■ ? claim. First of all, Aquinas is claiming that knowers not only are directly aware of brute sensations— the proper and the common sensibles— but they are also simply aware of complete "wholes"; a perceiver is not merely aware of a red color patch, but of the red patch together with a certain shape, a certain size, and so forth with the rest of the proper and the common sensibles pertaining to any given perception.

The awareness of "complex wholes" as well as a discrimination of 158

of Che different genera of the proper sensibles one from another

force Aquinas into postulating the faculty of the sensus communis.

The proper sense (external sensorium) judges of the proper sensible by discerning it from other things which come under the same sense; for Instance, by discerning xjhite from black or green. But neither sight nor taste can discern white from sweet, because what discerns between two things must know both. Kence, the discerning judgement must be assigned to the sensus communis. To it, as to a common term, all aprehensions of the senses must be referred, and by it, again, all the intentions of the senses are perceived... S.T,, I, Q. 78, a. 4, ad 2.

This internal sense is needed, therefore, in order to distin

guish the various sensibles of different genera as well as to syn

thesize or unify the data of the individual external senses in order

that the perceiver can be aware of a complex whole as the perceived object. This unifying function comes about because the sensus communis is the common root of the external sensorium. Note the following passage from the Commentary:

Now sensitivity flows to the organs of all the five senses from one common root, to which in turn are trans mitted and in which are terminated, all the sensations occurring in each particular organ. Coo. Oil the Soul tl 609.

Accordingly, the sensus communis does not "make" a whole; rather it receives a composite sensible— a concrete whole— from the external senses.

Secondly, there is a need for an additional sense faculty— which Aquinas will refer to as the phantasia or imagination— which is the faculty which retains or conserves the complex impression 3.59 which has been received as a unified whole by the sensus communis.

...for the reception of sensible forms, the proper sense and the sensus communis are appointed. Of their distinction we shall speak later. But for the retention and preservation of these forms, the phantasy or imagination is appointed, being as it were a storehouse of forms received through the senses. S.T., 1, Q. 78, a. 4.

The second of the internal senses, therefore, is that faculty which conserves or retains impressions gained by the extemel sen-

sorium. A further analysis of this faculty will occur later.

Aquinas' third reason for positing the internal sensorium is his conviction the human perceivers are aware of individuals and not

just of "bundles of sensations". But this facet of sense experience

cannot be explained in his analysis of direct perception insofar as

the external sensorium is concerned. Accordingly, Aquinas needs another Internal sense, which he refers to as the vis cogitativa in the human perceivers and the vis aostimativa in animal knowers.

Furthermore, for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the senses, the estimative power is appointed.... Therefore, the power which in other animals is called the natural estimative, in man is called the cogitative, which by some sort of comparison discovers these intentions. Ibid.

Hence it (vis cogitativa) is aware of man as this man and this tree as this tree. Com. on the Soul ? 398.

A correlative principle is that not only are these "unsensed intentions" an object of awareness, but they are also conserved and retained. And this is the function of the sense memory. 160

...and for their preservation (the intentions not received through the external senses), the memorative power, which is a storehouse for such intentions. S.T., I, Q. 78, a. 4.

Accordingly, in so far as a human perceiver is aware of com plex wholes and also retains these wholes and furthermore is aware of individuals and not just of mere bundles of sensations as well as their retention, Aquinas posits the four internal senses of sen sus communis, imagination, vis cogitativa, and sense memory. In other words, Aquinas is convinced that these four internal sense faculties are needed in order to account for the above-mentioned facets of perceptual awareness.

Aquinas VS Avicenna

It must be remembered, however, that Aquinas is not arbitrar ily pulling internal senses out of some cognitive "magician's hat".

Rather, by an analysis much like the manner of Strawson, Aquinas is attempting to analyze what he believes every perceiver is "com mon sensically" aware of; furthermore, he is offering epistemologlcal categories in order to account for what such a perceiver is w a r e of.

To use Strawsonian terms, Aquinas is providing a "descriptive meta- physic1 of knowledge and not a "revisionary metaphysic’ of knowledge.

To interpret this experience— what Strawson would refer to as "the massive central core of human thinking*’^— Aquinas is using his already established epistemological principle that a knowing power is specl-

*P.F. Strawson, Individuals (Carden City, N.Y., 1963), p. xiv. 161

fled or determined by Its acts and objects. Accordingly, if there

Is a specific type of mental activity, then there must be a cor

responding capacity of ability for which to explain such a given

type of activity. Again, Aquinas is adopting a rigorous faculty psychology. His axiom permits him to consistently posit the various

faculties of the Internal sensorium. Accordingly, if there is a characteristic activity, this activity did not just happen; on the contrary, there structurally is needed some capacity or disposition such that it can explain the actually going on activity.

In light of this present discussion, it is interesting to observe how Aquinas rejects Avicenna's account of the number of the faculties necessary to explain the functioning of the internal sensorium.

Avicenna, however, assigns between the estimative and the imaginative a fifth power, which combines and divides imaginary forms. As when from the imaginary form of gold, and the ima ginary form of mountain, we comoose the one form of a golden mountain, which we have never seen. But this operation is not to be found in animals other than man, in whom the imaginative power suffices for this purpose.... So there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the sensitive part— namely, the sensus communis, the imagination, the estimative (or the vis cogitativa) and memorative powers. S.T., I, Q. Id, a. A.

The structural Importance of the above passage is that here

Aquinas explicitly illustrates his method for establishing the spe cific sense faculties for the internal senses* His claim is that the activity of the fifth internal sense postulated by Avicenna is not distinct from the activity of the Imagination. Accordingly, then 162

there would be no need to argue for an additional faculty other than

the Imagination when the Imagination itself can take care of the

activity of putting together various elements of sensation in order

to form complex images of things which have never been observed in

the external world. That the Imagination can structurally do this

Is explicitly stated in the following passage:

There are two operations in the sensitive part. One is limited to immutation, and thus the operation of the senses takes place when the senses are impressed by the sen sible. The other is formation, in so far as the imagination forms for itself an image of an absent thing, or even of something never seen. S.T., I, Q. 85, a. 2, ad 2.

It is obvious that Aquinas is making use of Ockham's razor.

That he was aware of such a methodological device is clear from the following passage from the Summa Theologlca: M...quod potest com- pleri per paueiora prlncipia, non fit per plura.'' (S.T., I, Q. 2, a.3)

By a judicious use of Ockham's razor, Aquinas claims that

Avicenna does not have warranted philosophical grounds for positing the fifth internal sense faculty. Aquinas' gambit is that the ima gination itself is the faculty which can form Images of things which are not directly perceived— the mermaids, unicorns, and leprechauns which have caused contemporary philosophers who have read Meinong so much anguish.

Much structural analysis yet need to be done in elucidating the functions of the faculties of the Internal senses. The greater part of the remainder of this dissertation will be devoted to just such a task. Furthermore, it will be argued that the internal senses, especially the vis cogitativa and the sense memory, have a crucial role to play in the analysis of concept-formation. -Accordingly, it is safe to indicate already that all of the Internal senses do not have for their objects just the "faint" impressions in the manner in which Uume had argued. On the contrary, the internal senses are distinctively creative in addition to being the locus of a perceiver’s awareness of an individual as an individual and not just as a bundle of sensations. It will be the claim of this dissertation that both the British Empiricists and the Continental Rationalists blurred the workings of the internal senses with the functionings of the external senses and as a result the sophistication of the Aqui nian Internal sensorium was completely misunderstood.

As I indicated previously it Is crucially important to keep in mind that by "inner sense", Aquinas does not mean introspection as usually is the case with empiricist philosophers. The inner sense almost has a Kantian flavor to it. Each part of the internal sen sorium has a distinct role to play in our perceptual awareness of things In the external world. Therefore, it would be a serious mis take to read "inner sense" as if it meant only introspection. CHAPTER VIII

THE SENSUS COMMUNIS

The first of the faculties of internal sense which Aquinas considers is the sensus communis. This term is often translated as the "common sense". In order to avoid confusion, it must be immediately noted that Aquinas is using this term to denote an in ternal sense. It is not being used to refer to some type of

"common sense knowledge" acquired by wise old men with plenty of experience. Neither is he advocating any type of "common sense criterion" for the admission of philosophical truths which G. E.

Moore made use of in adamantly arguing against the Absolute

Idealists. Furthermore, Aquinas use of the "sensus communis" is not to be confused with the "Common Sense Realism" of Thomas Reid.

Quite the contrary, Aquinas is affirming the existence of a special internal sense faculty. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I am not going to translate the term but will always refer to it as the "sensus communis" rather than its accustomed translation, the

"common sense".

It might be added that some translators, aware of the problems generated by such a translation, have contrived new "coined terms" in reference to the sensus communis. Thomas Gilby is probably

164 165 the most adept at his verbal gymnastics. In his St. Thomas Aquinas:

Philosophical Texts, Gilby refers to the sensus communis as a "clear- house". He also refers to it as the "communal sense" in the above mentioned book, while in his translation of the Summa Theologica, he calls it the "central internal sense".

Function of Sensus Communis

The analysis of the sensus communis will begin with the following passage in which Aquinas explicitly considers the unique function of this faculty of the internal sensorium.

...he(Aristotle) points out the faculty that discriminates, as the particular senses cannot discriminate, between the objects of the different senses. ...the demonstration has three parts: a) he shows that there is a sense that perceives the differences between black and white and sweet; b) that this sense is one faculty, not two; and c) that it simultaneously perceives both objects between which it discriminates. ...he observes that whereas we are able to distinguish not only between black and white or sweet and bitter, but also between white and sweet, and indeed between any one sense-object and another, it must be in virtue of some sense that we do this; for to know sense- objects as such is a sensuous activity; the difference between white and sweet is for us not only a difference of ideas, which would pertain to the intellect, but precisely a difference between sense-impressions, which pertains only to some sense faculty. Com. on the Soul #601

Aquinas leads up to the need for postulating a specific internal sense to take care of the activities of the sensus communis by con sidering the following problems which would result if sensation were completely exhausted in terms of the functioning of the external 166 senses alone.

Sight does not perceive the audible as such, not hearing the visible as such (for eye takes no impression from the audible, nor the ear from the visible) but both objects are perceived by each sense only in so far as "one sense", i.e., one actual sensation, so to say, bears upon an object which contains both. I mean that both the senses in question are exercised at once upon one and the same sensible thing, as when bile is at once seen as red and tasted as bitter; so that as soon as we see that this thing is red we Judge that it is bitter. But there is no external sense for the conjunction of redness and bitter ness, for this conjunction is quite incidental, and what is incidental cannot be the object of any special faculty. Ibid #581, p 355.

The problem Aquinas is facing is that we are aware that the same thing is both "red" and "bitter", to use his example, yet such a conjunction is not obvious to any of the external senses as such.

By that he means that the conjunction is not perceivable as the proper sensibles are qualities and not relations. Aquinas is almost being Berkeliau on this point. However, Aquinas claims that even though the external senses are not properly geared to perceiving the conjunction, nevertheless a thing is immediately perceived as a bundle of sensations and not as a series of discrete sensibles. To account for this awareness of conjunction, which awareness cannot be structurally accounted for by means of the external senses, Aquinas posits the sensus communis.

This account is further developed in the Summa Theologica; in this work, Aquinas also notes that another activity of the sensus communis is that of proper reflection of sensual awarenesses. The 167

sensus communis, in other words, is the faculty by which a per

ceiver is aware that he is perceiving.

The proper sense judges of the proper sensible by dis cerning it from other things which come under the same sense, for instance, by discerning white from black or green. But neither sight nor taste can discern white from sweet, because what discerns between two things must know both. Hence, the discerning judgement must be assigned to the sensus communis. To it, as to a common term, all prehensions of the senses must be referred, and by it, again, all the intentions of the senses are perceived; as when someone sees that he sees. For this cannot be done by the proper sense, which knows only the form of the sensible by which it is immuted. In this iromuta- tion, the action of sight is completed, and from it follows another immutation in the sensus communis, which perceives the act of seeing. S.T. I., Q, 78, a, 4, ad 2.

That this is one sense faculty or power is indicated by the

following passage:

Also, it follows that in a man, the sensus communis, which is greater than the proper senses— although it is a single faculty— knows all the things which are known by the five external senses. S. T. I., Q, 57, a, 2.

The first role of the sensus communis is that it is the faculty which explains the perceiver*s ability to discriminate between the

different sensibles of divergent categories which are known by the

external senses. Inanalysing the above passages, it becomes obvious

that Aquinas is arguing for the sensus communis in that the external senses themselves cannot perceive the given difference between different genera of sensibles— both proper sensibles and common sensibles. Thus 168 the eye might distinguish between the given "red" and the given

"blue", but it cannot distinguish the "c-sharp", from the "blue"*

But Aquinas, again appealing to a common sense of awareness, claims that human perceivers do make such distinctions. Furthermore, if such a distinction can be mentally made, then there must be a corres ponding mental act to make such a distinction, and if such a mental act, then there must be a corresponding ability or capacity to account for such an activity. This, in effect, is Aquinas' argument for postulating the sensus communis as a necessary factor in completing his epIstemological account of perception.

Although Aquinas textually places great weight on "discrimina tion" or "discriminating ability" as the chief operational charac teristic of the sensus communis, X believe that this discriminating ability is treated structurally as a necessary condition for the synthesizing ability of the sensus communis. In other words, the sensus communis is the faculty which "ties-together" the discrete sensible data of the external senses into concrete wholes. The sensus communis, for example, is the faculty which synthesizes the red-sensible with the round-sensible with the sweet-sensible together in forming the concrete sensible whole, which, in this case, would be the red, round apple being here and now tasted. Aquinas, in effect, is arguing that psychological atomism Is not sufficient in explaining our direct perceptual awareness. In other words, per ception is not exhausted by the human perceiver's being able to be 169 bombarded with various sense-quallties in a totally disjointed manner. Aquinas' claim is, quite to the contrary, that the perceiver is able to put together various qualities into co herent, concrete wholes. Thus, the perceiver is not limited to only mere awarenesses of discrete psychological atoms; the perceiver, on the other hand— due to the function of the sensus communis— is able to be aware of concrete wholes— i.e., bundles of sensations actually conjoined as one.

Sensus Communis as Root £f Sensation

The reason a perceiver is aware of a "concrete whole" is due to the Aquinian apparatus for perception. Aquinas claims that the sensus communis is the structural root or source for the workings of the external sensorium. Aquinas seems to build to this

"common root" idea by considering what must be necessary if dis crimination of senslbles is to occur. In order to explain this argument, it would be beneficial to consider the texts of the

Commentary in detail.

On Common Sense:

...he shows that it is by one and the same sense that we distinguish white from sweet. For one might have supposed that we did it by different senses, by tasting sweetness and by seeing whiteness. But if this were true, he says, we could never perceive that white was other than sweet. If this difference is to appear it must appear to some one sense faculty; so long as white and sweet are sensed by distinct faculties, it is as though they were sensed by two different men, one perceiving sweet and another white; I this and you 170

that. In this case sweet and white and white are obviously distinct, because I am impressed in one way by sweetness, and you in another by whiteness. #603

Aquinas goes on to elaborate on this distinction:

But this would not show us their sensible difference. There must be one single faculty which "says" that sweet is not white, precisely because this distinction is one single object of knowledge. The "saying" is the expression of an Inward knowing; and as the saying is a single act, It must spring from a single act of understanding and sensing that what is sweet Is not white.... As then the man who judges white to be other than sweet must be one man aware of both objects, so he must do this by means of one faculty; for awareness is the act of a faculty. Hence, Aristotle's conclusion, that it is clearly impossible to perceive "separ ate", i.e., by distinct, means; there must be one single power aware of both things. #604

Aquinas continues his argument in establishing the unity of the sensus communis:

...the judgement of difference is in the present in the sense that there is a difference at present; which necessarily implies a simultaneous apprehension of the two different objects; they are both known in the same instant as they are known to be different. Obviously, then, they are known at once and together. Hence, as one undivided faculty perceives the object's difference, so in one undivided moment both are apprehended. #605

Using an analogy of a point and a line, Aquinas argues for unity of perception:

...he gives the true solution (to the sensus communis), using the simile of a point. Any point between the two ends of a line can be regarded either "as one or two". It is one as continuing the parts of the line that lie on either side of it, and so forming the term common to both. It is two Inasmuch as we use it twice over, to terminate one part and begin the other. #609 171

Aquinas applies this analogy to the sensus communis;

Now sensitivity flows to the organs of all the five senses from one common root, to which in turn are transmitted, and in which are terminated, all the sensations occurring in each particular organ. And this common root can be regarded from two points of view: the common root and term of all sensi tivity, or as the root and term of this or that sense in particular. Hence,what he means is that, just as a point, under a certain aspect, is not one only but also two or divisible, so the principle of sensitivity, if regarded as the root and term of seeing and of hearing, appears twice over under the same name, and in this way it is divisible. Ibid

The sensus communis, accounts for the unity of the external sensorium.

It is a common sensitive principle, aware of several objects at once because it terminates several organically distinct sensations; and as such its functions are separate. But just because it is one it itself it discerns the differ- between these sensations. #610

But in so far as each external sense faculty is defined only in terms of one generic type of proper sensible, there cannot structurally be an cross-reference merely by using the activities of the external sense faculties alone. As a consequence of this structural impossibility for faculty cross-reference among the external senses themselves, Aquinas argues for the need for an additional faculty which can account for this cross-reference, which

Aquinas is convinced does exist from the data of his own sensual experience. And this needed faculty is the sensus communis. The function of the sensus communis, consequently, is not merely one of discriminating; rather, this discrimination is a necessary condition 172 for unifying the discrete data perceived by the external senses.

Therefore, in so far as Aquinas is convinced that perceivers do indeed experience "concrete wholes'* and not mere "psychological atoms" or discrete "sense data", he postulates the sensus communis as the faculty which explains the perceiver awareness of sensible wholes, even though the immediate data of the external senses is solely in terms of discrete sensibles— the proper and common sensibles. Accordingly, the sensus communis accounts for the unity of sensation in the external sensorium.

In so far as we have just been considering the proper and common sensibles as being discrete objects of direct perception, this rules out the possibility of a confusion over the function of the sensus communis. One might easily be led to claim that the sensus communis is that faculty by which the cotmnon sensibles are perceived.

This is not the case however, for the following reasons. If the conxnon sensibles were the objects of the sensus communis, then it is indeed limited to that sensible. But the sensus communis is also aware of the proper sensibles; this, I believe, totally rules out the possibility of claiming that the sensus communis is the faculty which is directly aware of the common sensibles in themselves. In addition, as was discussed earlier in this dissertation, the claim was quite apparent that the "commonness" of these sensibles was that they belong to more than one sense faculty. And here the 173

faculties In question are the faculties of external perception.

In support of this line of argument, there Is the following

passage from the Commentary!

...he rejects the suggestion that the "common sensibles" are an object of another and distinct sense. For the proper and direct object of any one sense is only known indirectly by any other sense; but the common sensibles are not known indirectly by any sense at all; rather they are each directly known by several senses. Therefore they cannot be the proper objects of any one sense. Com. on the Soul #575

And also the following passage:

...(the common sensibles)...are a common yet direct object of several distinct senses. It follows that they answer to no special and distinct sense. Ibid #580

Power of Reflection

In addition to discriminating between different exemplifies^

tions from the different genera of sensibles as well as unifying the concrete wholes of experience, Aquinas claims that the sensus communis is a reflexive faculty. By this is meant that it is the faculty by which a perceiver is aware of seeing an object— i.e., not only is the perceiver seeing the object, but he is aware

that he is seeing it. Aquinas' claim is that the structural potency which takes care of this mental act of reflexing awareness if the sensus communis. The structural reason for such a claim is that it is absolutely impossible for a mental act to have any physical, sensible qualities or properties; therefore, the act 174

of awareness cannot possess any existent, "fleshed-out" proper

or common sensibles. Accordingly, a mental act of seeing Is

not Itself colored, even though it Is "about"— i.e.* it "intends"

— a colored object. Aquinas' whole basis of intentionality is brought

to bear on this issue. The form of the thing known is had in an

immaterial manner and definitely not in a physical, entatative—

i.e., "fleshed-out"— manner. To reiterate a classic and crucial

passage concerning intentionality:

There are two sorts of immutation, physiological and psychological. The former comes about by the physical reception of the agent in the patient, the latter according to a certain spiritual reception. Sensation requires this latter process, the entrance into the sense organ of a likeness or, or relation to, the sensible thing. If physiological immu tation alone sufficed, all natural bodies would have sensations when they underwent alteration. S.T. I., Q, 78, 2, 3.

The result of this"psychological immutation" or "spiritual

insnutation" is that the mental act in perception lacks any physical characteristics denoted by either the proper or common sensibles.

But, Aquinas affirms that a perceiver is aware that he is aware—

i.e., when a perceiver actually perceives (P), he can also be aware

that he is perceiving (P).

To it (the sensus communis) , as to a common term, all apprehensions of the senses must be referred, and by it, again, all the intentions of the senses are perceived; as when someone sees that he sees. For this cannot be done by the proper sense, which knows only the form of the sensible by which it is 175

immuted. In this immutation, the action of sight is completed, and from it follows another immutation in the sensus communis which perceives the act of seeing. S.T. I., Q» 78, a, 4, ad, 2.

Structurally, therefore, it is the sensus communis which is the faculty of reflexive perception. This is necessary because the external senses, in so far as they are essentially ordered to the proper and common sensibles, cannot perceive their own mental acts themselves because these mental acts per se, due to Aquinas' theory of intentionality, lack both proper and common sensibles.

In effect, the sensus communis becomes the "root" or "source" of consciousness.

The interior sense (called the sensus communis) is called common not by predication, as if it were a genus, but as the common root and principle of the external senses. S. T. I., Q, 78, ar, 4.

Take, for instance, the sensus communis; visual and audible phenomena are both included in its object, namely a thing the senses can perceive, and while gathering in all the objects of the five external senses it yet remains a single unified faculty. S. T. I■, Q, I, a, 3, ad, 2.

As was indicated earlier, what this ultimately means is that the sensus communis is the source of consciousness. Sleep as well as being unconscious is due to the non-functioning of the sensus communis. This, furthermore, structurally accounts for dreaming as being an act of the imagination and not of the sensus communis.

This will be a crucial aspect of the structure of the Internal 176

sensorlum once our consideration of "phantasms" begins.

One additional point needs clarification in order to complete

the analysis of the sensus communis. Many commentators on the

Aquinian theory of perception have argued that a phantasm is needed

in order to have the sensus communis function at all. Note the words of D. W, Hamlyn from Sensation and Perception I

Aquinas believes, therefore, that corresponding to the physical change in the sense-organ there is a spiritual change resulting in a phantasma, which is a particular mental entity.... On the Thoraist view the phantasmata set up are mental entities and for this reason are like sensations which are produced by stimulation of our bodily organs; yet, being somehow representative of the objects which produce them, they are more than mere sensations. They are indeed more, like the ideas or impressions of the British Empiricists, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, except that Aquinas holds that we are not ordinarily aware of them.

Furthermore, Julius Weinberg in A Short History of Medieval

Philosophy claims the very same thing:

An object external to the human organism causes the medium between the object and the sense-organ to have duplicates of the forms of the object. In turn, the medium communicates forms to the sense-organs and thence to the faculties of sense. These various forms thus received are brought together (by the inter nal senses) into a common image or phantasm. 2

1-D. W. Hamlyn, Sensation and Perception, pp. 47-49.

^Julius R. Weinberg, A Short History of Medieval Philosophy. (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 207 177

What the two quotations given above are claiming is that the awareness of a "complete whole" by the sensus communis is done by means of a phantasm. In other words, the "conjunction" of discrete sensibles accomplished by the sensus communis produces a phantasm which is the object of the awareness of the sensus communis itself. In effect, the claim is that the sensus communis has for its object a phantasm.

It is not my purpose now to elucidate the notion of a phantasm; however, many commentators have construed the phantasm as being actively Involved in direct perception involving the external senses. In other words, the conclusion of their argument is that a phantasm is either produced in all of the external senses or else is the synthesis produced by the sensus communis from the discrete data of the external senses. But as far as 1 can textually discover, Aquinas never uses the term phantasm when discussing direct perception involving only the external senses or any activity involving the sensus communis. On the other hand, he explicitly mentions the powers or sense faculties in which the phantasm does occur, and this listing conspicuously omits any discussion of the sensus communis. Note the following passage from the Summa Contra

Gentiles:

...the powers in which the phantasm reside, namely imagination, memory and cogitation (vis cogitative). S.C.G. II, 73, 11 178

In so far as Squinas Is discussing the internal senses in the above passage, it does indeed seem strange that he would omit the sensus communis if Indeed the phantasm were involved in its proper functioning. In addition, I have yet to find a passage in which Squinas explicitly discusses phantasms as belonging to the sensus communis. The positive analysis of the phantasm will occur later in this dissertation; presently, however, I want to emphatically affirm that textually there seems to be no evidence to support the claim that a phantasm is found in the workings of the sensus communis; on the other hand, there is textual evidence to support the claim that a phantasm does not occur in such a faculty. I believe that commentators like Hamlyn and Weinberg have confused the "sensible species" with the phantasm. I want to affirm that they are different. A complete discussion of phantasms and their relation both to the sensible species as well as to sense data positions will take place following the analyses of the remain ing three faculties of the Internal sensorium— the Imagination, vis congitativa and the sense memory.

Sensus Communis and the External Sensorium

In order to complete our analysis of the functions of the sensus communis, one final point must be considered. Aquinas does include this faculty among his listing of the internal senses. 179

So there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the sensitive part— namely the sensus communis, the imagination and the estimative (or vis cogitativa in human) and memorative powers. S.T. I. , Q, 87, a, 4.

The reason for placing the sensus communis as an internal

sense seems to have been Aquinas* physiology in which the bodily organ in which the sensus communis was found was located someplace

in the brain. With such a biological location, it could not be classified as one of the external sense organs. Structurally, however, the sensus communis is really part of the external sensor

ium in that its object is not an image or phantasm or any type of post-sensation. Rather, the object of the sensus communis is a concrete whole unified from the discrete data of the external

senses. Textually, Aquinas concludes his discussion of the sensus communis in the Commentary with the following remarks:

Concluding, he says that he has now discussed the principle according to which an animal is said to have, or be able to have, sensations. Com. on the Soul #614

It is important to realize here the distinction between the external and the Internal senses and between the external sensorium and the internal sensorium. The distinguishing factor behind the external and internal senses seems to be the physiological location of the organs of sensation. Each organ of the external senses is 180

located on or near the immediate surface of the body. The Internal

senses, on the other hand, have their organs located within the

body, presumably in the brain.

The division between internal and external sensoria, on the

other hand,is determined by means of function. The function of

the external sensorium is to be aware of the things in the external

world which are immediately present to the perceiver in a casually

efficatious way. If there are no objects, then there will be no

functioning of the external sensorium.

The internal sensorium, on the other hand, has the ability

to both "remember" what had been perceived as well as "interpret"

what is presently experienced. Both of these functions go beyond

the immediate data of the external sensorium. As will become clear

in the remaining chapters, what distinguishes the internal sensorium

from the external sensolrum is the presence of phantasms. In other

words, the role of phantasms is crucial to "inner sense."

From the fact that the sensus communis is the root of conscious

ness, it follows that Aquinas would claim that when one is sleeping

it is because the sensus communis is affected so as not to be working

properly. The physiological claims are not relevant here, obviously; what is relevant, however, is the structural consequence of placing

the sensus communis with the external sensorium. If this is the

case, and I am arguing that it is, then it follows that no images

or phantasms are used with the sensus communis as such. The final necessary condition for sense perception is the working of the sensus communis. In the last chapter, I provided what I considered to be the necessary conditions for the workings

of an external sense; these were expressed in a necessary triadic

relation, NC (O-M-F). In addition to this necessary triadic

relation, the final necessary condition is the function of the

sensus communis. In other words, the sufficient condition for perception is the occurence of a series of necessary triadic

relations— proper and/or common sensibles, adequate mediums, and properly disposed faculties— together with the working of the

sensus communis, which is the "root" of consciousness. In con clusion, Aquinas' account of perception is a conjunction of a series of necessary three-term relations together with the working of the

internal sense faculty of the sensus communis. The final stage of

the working of the external sensorium is the awareness of a

"concrete whole". I believe this "concrete whole" can best be

schematically expressed as a conjunction of a series of three-term relations along with the awareness of the sensus communis . In effect, the sensus communis is that part of the external sensorium which accounts for the unity of sensation. Accordingly, the unity comes about because there is a single faculty which is the root or source of the five external senses and not because the sensus communis forms a new "object"— be it image or phantasm— from the data of the five external senses. Aquinas' rejection of psychological 182 atomism is structurally rooted in the unity of the external sensor1

A mu, a unity which is explained by means of sensus communis. CHAPTER IX

THE IMAGINATION

Phantasia and Imagination

An Important textual clarification must be made before the

positive account of the three remaining internal senses is pre

sented. In providing an analysis of perception by means of the

external senses and the sensus communis, the principal textual source has been Aquinas' Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul, although

Judicious use of passages from both Summae have been Included.

Concerning the classification of the internal senses, however, a

strange structural phenomenon occurs in the Commentary. Here,

Aquinas seems to be using the term "phantasia" to apply to all

three senses of the internal sensorium— imagination, vis cogitativa

and sense memory. This is structurally quite strange, for in this very

same work, he had previously made explicit reference to the inciden

tal object of sense which he had indicated as the object of the vis cogitativa itself. This "blurring" of the three faculties of

the Internal sensorium seems to have been overlooked by the trans

lators of the Conmentary, as they keep rendering "phantasia" into

English translation and be justified in concluding that Aquinas was only considering one internal sense. As I indicated above, this is

183 184

Indeed strange as previously Aquinas himself had considered the vis cogitativa explicitly.

On the other hand, it is textually correct that Aquinas does use the term "phantasia11 sometimes to refer to the imagination alone; this is obvious from the following passage from the Summa

Theologica;

But for the retention and preservation of these forms, the phantasy or imagination is appointed.... S.T. I., Q, 78, a, k

The Latin text is as follows:

ad harutn autem formarum retentionem aut conversationem ordinatur phantasia, sive imaginatio, quae idem sunt.... Ibid

Accordingly, the structure of the texts in these passages indicates that the phantasia is to be identified with the imagina tion. This may refer to the reason why the translators of the

Commentary have rendered the term "phantasia" as "imagination" in this latter work. Yet the structure of the argument indicates that even though the term "phantasia" is being used, nevertheless the phantasia is referring to all three of the faculties of the internal sensorium and not just to the imagination itself. Accordingly, it is important to keep in mind that there are two textual uses of

"phantasia" in the writings of Aquinas. 1) In the Summa Theologica, it is used to refer to the imagination alone, while 2) in the 185

Commentary, it is used as a generic term in referring to all three of the faculties of the internal sensorium as such. As will become clearer later, the "phantasia", as used in the

Commentary, refers to those faculties in which the phantasms alone are found.

However, it is important also to realize that there seems to be no textual evidence that the phantasia itself is a separate internal sense along with the other internal sense faculties.

Julius Weinberg seems to think that the phantasia itself is a separate and distinct sense faculty, as is indicated by the follow ing passage:

...the sensitive (powers) include the functions of the five exterior senses (sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch) as well as the functions of the interior senses of the common sense, the phantasy, the imagination, the estimate (or cogitative) capacity, and memory. 1

There seems to be no textual evidence for such a claim of dis tinctness for the phantasia in addition to the other internal senses.

Function of Imagination

A direct analysis of the imagination will now begin. There are numerous passages in which the imagination itself is spoken of

^Julius R. Weinberg, A Short History of Medieval Philosophy, p. 201. 186 as a distinct sense faculty in itself; in other words, even though the imagination and the phantasia are identified in the Summa

Theologica and the phantasia is used as a generic term for classi fying all the proper internal senses in the Commentary, there are nevertheless passages in which the imagination itself is spoken of as a distinct and unique sense faculty of the Internal sensorium.

In imaginatione non solum sunt formae rerum sensibilium secundum quod accipiuntur a sensu, sed transmutatur diversi- mode. S.T. I-II..Q, 173,a, 2.

Vis enim imaginative est apprehensiva similitudinum corporalium, etiam rebus absentibus quarum similtudines. S.T. I-II..Q, 15, a, 1.

Note that two different terms— imaginatio and vis imaginativa

— translated as imagination and imaginative power, are used in discussing the function of the imagination; yet there is no indica tion of the phantasia at all. Accordingly, I want to conclude that there is a special faculty called the Imagination which pertains to the internal sensorium.

The function of the Imagination is indicated by the following passage from the Summa Theologica:

...for the reception of sensible forms, the proper sense and the common sense are appointed.... But for the retention and preservation of these forms, the phantasy or imagination is appointed, being as it were a storehouse of forms received through the senses. S.T. Q, 78, a, 4. 187

It will be useful and beneficial to provide the Latin text of the above passage.

Opportet ergo quod animal per animam sensitivam non solum recipiat species sensibilium, cum praesentialiter imniu- tatur ab els, sed etiam eas retinet et conservat.... Ad harum autem formarum retentionera aut conservationem ordinatur phantasia, sive imaginatio, quasis Thesaurus quidem forma- tum per sensum acceptarum. Ibid.

In the Latin text, it should be noted that Aquinas refers to

the imagination as the "Thesaurus11. The imagination then is the

thesaurus of the forms received by means of the external senses and

the sensus communis. This term is usually translated as "storehouse", which, I believe, does get to the meaning of the function of the

imagination. The imagination, as a thesaurus, is a faculty whose objects are a complete aggregate of impressions of "concrete v/holes" which have been perceived by the external senses in conjunction with

the sensus communis. Accordingly, the imagination has at least the function of storing or retaining the forms of the things directly

perceived. What is conserved takes on the status of a phantasm, although the positive structural account of this term will not occur until the internal sensorium's faculties have been discussed. In

effect, the imagination is the faculty by which one has "experience"

rather than being a complete novice. It is my means of the imagina

tion that a person conserves his experience of concrete wholes so

that every working of the external senses in conjunction with the 188 sensus communis is not a completely new happening to the per ceiver. This is what the British Empiricists usually will refer to as the memory ; why Aquinas does not do this and what is the precise function of the sense memory must await our discussion of the vis cogitativa, as sense memory and vis cogitativa are

Intricately related as to function.

But this "conservation" or "retention" of "concrete wholes"

Is not the only function of the imagination; Aquinas is adamant in affirming that the imagination is not a mere storehouse of the

"sensible forms". In the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas notes that "...the imaginative power extends itself to everything which the five senses know plus it does more."^ The meaning of this passage is that the imagination can retain everything that is known by means of the five external senses in conjunction with the sensus communis in addition to doing more than contained with the sensed-limits. In other words, the imagination can know more than what is directly known by means of the external sensorium. What

Aquinas is pointing out here is that the imagination has a certain creative ability. In the Summa Theologica, he writes as follows:

There are some powers of knowing which from likenesses first conceived can form others— as in the imagination we can form the image of a golden mountain from those of gold and a mountain. S.T. I.,Q, 12, a, 9, ad 2.

2Summa Contra Gentiles. Book I, Number 65. 189

Imagination and Early Modern Philosophy

It is because of this creative capacity that I believe Aquinas also called the imagination the "phantasy11. As I mentioned earlier, in the Commentary Aquinas uses the term "phantasia" to encompass the entire internal sensorium. And the internal sensorium— especially the vis cogitativa— is that which can go beyond the immediate data of sensation by providing interpretations to the

"concrete wholes" of perception by means of interpretation via the phantasms. Thus in so far as the imagination too has a certain creative ability, then it too Is entitled to be called "phantasy".

If the imagination were just to "retain and conserve", then I do not believe that Aquinas would have referred to it as the phantasy.

Furthermore, I do not believe that this is just a moot point; this aspect gets to the essential characteristic of the internal sen sorium, which is to go beyond the data of immediate perception.

This characteristic obviously needs much explanation; this will occur as the vis cogitativa and the sense memory in turn are analy sed. Structurally, the imagination, when used in its creative capa city as the phantasia, is quite probably what Descartes was refer ring to when he mentioned the "Fancy" in his writings. Hobbes, furthermore, makes use of the same notion in the Leviathan.

All which qualities, called Sensible, are in the object that causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed, are they any thing else, but diverse motions; 190

(for motion, produceth nothing but, motion.) But their appearance to us is Fancy, the same waking, that dreaming. Leviathan, Part I, Chapter 1

It is Interesting to note that in the passage from Hobbes, the

Fancy seems to be the faculty which is.directly aware of sensations; in other words, there is a blur in Hobbes between the sensus communis and the imagination, which he calls the "fancy". Hobbes is not alone in this either. In Meditation II, Descartes textually blurs the distinction between the sensus communis and the imagination.

The following passage is indicative of such a blur.

I shall proceed with the matter in hand, and inquire whether I had a clearer and more perfect perception of the piece of wax when I first saw it, and when I though I knew it by means of the external sense itself, or, at all events, by the common sense (sensus communis), as it is called, that is, by the imaginative faculty. Meditation II

It should be noted that Descartes uses the terms "sensus conmmnis" in his text; furthermore, the identification with the imag ination is explicitly stated. It seems that by the Seventeenth

Century, the precise distinctions between the sensus communis and the imagination were quite blurred. Moreover, this structural iden tity of faculties and functions, I believe, accounts for the claim that the phantasm is the direct object of knowledge. When dis cussing the sensus communis, this point was made quite explicitly by quoting from commentators like Hamyln and Weinberg. I believe these commentators are trying to make use of Seventeenth Century 191

Interpretations while working with Thirteenth Century writings.

That the direct object of knowledge was a phantasm by some

Seventeenth Century philosophers I will not deny. The following passage from Locke is a clear indication of such a claim.

...1 idea*...is that term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks...(It) express(es) whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species.... Essay Con. Human Understanding

I believe, furthermore, that such claims are directly connec ted with representative realism; in so far as Aquinas was a direct realist, he would have the object in the world as the object of knowledge. But when representative realism came to the fore-front of philosophical circles In conjunction with the rise of the new science, there was a blurring of the categories which were brought into early modern philosophy from its scholastic fore-fathers. If anything at all, such a discussion as this should well indicate that it is a mistake to try and interpret the medieval philosophers by the way they were understood according to their descendants in early modern philosophy. This is one case where such an attempt can prove disastrous; 1 am firmly convinced that such a misunderstanding of crucial Aquinain terms like phantasm, sensus communis, and imagina tion have disastrously affected medieval scholarship; if the medlevals are to be understood, then their own texts must be closely read as the texts themselves are constructed and not by interpretations 19 z gleaned from the modern period of philosophy. 1 am categorically prepared to state that Locke, Descartes and Hobbes were not struc turally using the categories of the medievals as the medlevals themselves had used them. Accordingly, I believe that commentators like Hamlyn and Wienberg have misunderstood the medievals because they transferred an understanding of terminology and structure from the early modern philosophers to the medievals themselves.

Accordingly, the imagination has two functions as envisaged by Aquinas. First of all, it conserves and retains the sensible forms— the "concrete wholes"— as received through the external sensorium; secondly, it creates its own "intentions" from the material given it by the external sensorium. The direct object of the act of the imagination — either in retaining or in creating— is a phantasm.

Because of the imagination's creative capacity, Aquinas does not completely trust it regarding veracity. Note the following passages:

As regards the apprehension of the senses, it must be noted that there is one type of apprehensive power, for example, a proper sense, which apprehends a sensible species in the presence of a sensible thing; but there is also a second type, the imagination, for example, which apprehends a sensible species when the thing is absent. So even though the sense always apprehends a thing as it is, unless there is an Impediment in the organ or in the medium, the imagination usually apprehends a thing as it is not, since it apprehends it as present though it is absent. Consequently, the Philosopher says: "Imagination, not sense, is the master of falsity". De Veritate 1, 11. 193

Here Aquinas is concerned over dreams and hallucinations; structurally, the vis cogitativa is the power by means of which such non-veridical mental acts occur. In the Summa Theologica, furthermore, the following passage is found;

Now, although the first immutation of the imagination is through the agency of the sensible, since the phantasia is a movement produced in accordance with sensation, nevertheless it may be said that there is in man an operation which by division and composition forms images of various things, even of things not perceived by the senses. Sum Theq I,Q,84,a,6,ad 2.

The imagination thus can be very much involved in non-veridical awareness. Non-veridical is here used to denote an act of awareness even though there is no object present in the external world, I would not be surprised if Descartes and Locke, with the blur they have made over the functions of the sensus communis and the imagina tion, have emphasized the function of the imagination with its built- in non-veridical nature and thus ultimately claimed that one can never be assured that the idea truly represents the external world. But that this is a misunderstanding of the Thirteenth Century philosophers should be obvious by now. CHAPTER X

THE VIS COGITATIVA

While considering the objects of sensation, the Incidental object of sense was briefly considered; it was mentioned at that time that this object of sensation is known by the vis cogitativa.

The exact nature of this faculty was not discussed at that time as such a discussion entailed a structural account of the internal sensorium. Obviously, now is the appropriate time to consider the structure of this particular faculty of the internal sensorium.

Vis Aestimativa vs. Vis Cogitativa

Aquinas distinguishes this particular sense faculty in so far as it pertains to animal perceivers and to human perceivers. Re garding animals, he refers to this faculty as the vis aestimativa, whereas this sense power in human perceivers is referred to as the vis cogitativa. Both sense faculties are posited to account for an object of sensation which goes beyond the "concrete whole" synthesized by the sensus communis from the discrete senslbles of the external senses. In the Summa Theologica, Aquinas gives the following data in attempting to establish a factual foundation for positing such an internal sense faculty.

194 195

Furthermore, for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the senses, the estimative power is appointed; and for their preservation, the memorative power, which is a storehouse for such intentions.... S. T. I., Q, 78, a, 4.

Aquinas then considers why there is the need for such powers:

Again, we must observe that if an animal were moved by pleasing and disagreeable things only as affecting the sense, there would be no need to suppose that animal has a power besides the apprehension of those forms which the senses perceive, and in which the animal takes pleasure, or from which it shrinks with horror. But the animal needs to seek or to avoid certain things, not only because they are pleasing or otherwise to the senses, but also because of other advantages and uses, or dis advantages; just as the sheep runs away when it sees a wolf, not because of its color or shape, but as a natural enemy. So too, a bird gathers together straws, not because they are pleasant to the sense, but because they are useful for building its nest. Ibid.

This power therefore, goes beyond the Immediate data of sensation.

Animals, therefore, need to perceive such intentions, which the exterior sense does not perceive. Now some distinct principle is necessary for this, since the perception of sensible forms comes by an immutation caused by the sensible, which is not the case with the perception of the above intentions. Ibid.

The above passage is quite explicit in describing the function of the vis aestimativa. It is obvious that such a faculty functions as that by which a perceiver is aware of "intentions" which are not perceived in the external world as such. In the case of the vis aestimativa, this faculty functions as "instinct". The wolf, which 196 makes the sheep run* is perceived by the external sensorium only as a dark object of a certain shape making certain sounds in the near distance; yet the sheep, according to Aquinas, recognize this dark, shaped sound-producing object as a "thing-to-be-feared". His claim is that the fact that the sheep get to something beyond what is immediately sensed indicates that there is a need for postulating a sense faculty which is able to structurally account for such mental acts. The same evidence accounts for the case of the bird's gathering straw in order to build a nest. It is obvious that what Aquinas is claiming here as the work of the vis aestimativa is what one would today call "instinct". Furthermore, in the case of instinct, it seems to be correct that Aquinas would be structurally arguing for a type of "innate idea". The animal is manifesting behavior which is due to something more than what is directly sensed. Accordingly,

Aquinas somewhat modifies his axiom— nihil est in intellectu quod not prius est in sensu— in that here instinct seems to be functioning as an innate idea. The "innateness" functions as a "conditioning" of the mental act so that it perceives the object in a unique way.

This "conditioning" will become clear in the quotation below in which

Aquinas considers an act of awareness of the vis aestimativa. As will become apparent later, Aquinas does not place innate ideas into the vis cogitativa as such. Textually, however, when referring to the vis aestimativa, this is the only place I could find in which

Aquinas even considers the notion of an Innate idea as such. 197

That Aquinas indeed considers the vis aestimativa as instinct

is clear from the following passage from the Commentary:

But the lower animals' awareness of individualised notions is called natural instinct, which comes into play when a sheep, e.g., recognises its offspring by sight, or sound, or something of that sort. Com. on the Soul #397

In the case of this particular internal sense, as well as of the entire discussion of sense faculties, it Is interesting that Aquinas is proceeding in an almost Kantian manner. By that I mean that

Aquinas assumes as a given datum of perceptual experience that sensi tive or intentional beings do experience the external world in a certain fashion; then he goes about trying to account for that fact in terms of a faculty psychology. In another sense, Peter Strawson's attempt in Individuals to provide a "conceptual scheme" for the way a human knower does in fact know the world seems remarkably similar to Aquinas' methodology in trying to account for sensation. Both take as a given that we do perceive or are aware of certain facets of the world around us. Then the philosophical attempt is made— what Strawson refers to as "descriptive metaphysics" as opposed

to "revisionary metaphysics"— to best explain in a Kantian fashion how this procedure structurally accounts for the given facet of perceptual experience. The weight of these remarks must be taken only up to a point; I am not trying to make Aquinas into a Kantian or a Strawsonian. But I am arguing that there are important 198 structural similarities In their modus operand! and that these similarities indeed may be quite Important similarities.

• * Awareness of Individuals

In the case of a human perceiver in opposition to an animal perceiver, there is a structural change as to the workings of this particular internal sense.

Now, we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference between man and other animals; for they are similarly immuted by external sensibles...But there is a difference as to the above intentions (i.e., of the internal sense): for other animals perceive these intentions only by some sort of natural instinct, while man perceives them also by means of a certain comparison. Therefore the power which in other animals is called the natural estimative in man is called the cogitative, which by some sort of comparison discovers these intentions. Therefore it is also called the particular reason, to which medical men assign a particular organ, namely, the middle part of the head: for it compares individual intentions, just as the intellectual reason compares universal intentions. S.T. 1., Q, 78, a, 4.

What Aquinas is attempting to explain in this passage is that the vis cogitativa does not work like instinct; accordingly, this is Aquinas * way of arguing that there are no innate ideas among human perceivers. Rather than being a "natural instinct", the vis cogitativa actually makes comparisons regarding individual things.

In other words, the vis cogitativa is that sense faculty by means of which the human perceiver is aware of an individual as such an individual and not merely as a bundle of conjoined proper and common sensibles. After providing some textual material on the 199 function of this faculty and its object— the incidental object of sensation— I will attempt to provide a consistent analysis of what "making comparisons" entails.

In the Commentary, Aquinas writes as follows about vis cogitativa:

Having seen how we should speak of the absolute or essen tial sense-objects, both common and special (proper), it remains to be seen how anything is a sense-object "incidentally". How for an object to be a sense-object incidentally it must first be connected accidentally with an essential sense-object; as a man, for instance, may happen to be white, or a white thing may happen to be sweet. Secondly, it must be perceived by the one who is sensing; if it were connected with the sense- object without itself being perceived, it could not be said to be sensed incidentally. But this implies that with respect to some cogitive faculty of the one sensing it, it is known, not incidentally, but absolutely. Now this latter faculty... (is) the vis cogitativa.... Com On the Soul #395-396

This faculty is aware of individuals:

But, speaking precisely, this is not in the fullest sense an incidental sense-object; it is incidental to the sense of sight, but it is essentially sensible. Now what is not per ceived by any special sense is known by the intellect, if it be a universal; yet not anything knowable by intellect in sensible matter should be called a sense-object incidentally, but only what is at once intellectually apprehended as soon as a sense-experience occurs. Ibid. #395-396

Aquinas continues:

Thus as soon as I see anyone talking or moving himself my intellect tells me that he is alive; and I can say that I see 200

him live. But if this apprehension is of something individual, as when, seeing this particular coloured thing, I perceive this particular man or beast, then the cogitative faculty (in the case of roan at least) is at work, the power which is also called the "particular reason" because it correlates individualised notions, just as the "universal reason" correlates universal ideas. Ibid. #395-396

Aquinas continues this discussion:

Thus I perceive indirectly that so and so is Cleon's son, not because he is Cleon's son, but because he is white; white ness as such only happens to be connected with Cleon's son. Being the son of Cleon is not (like sweetness) indirectly visible in such a way as to imply its being directly perceived by some other sense. Ibid. #580

Hence it (the vis cogitativa) is aware of a man as this man, and this tree as this tree.

The Individual as of _a Kind

As was indicated earlier, the vis cogitativa has two functions.

The first is to recognize an individual as an Individual; the second is to recognize an individual as a member of a kind. "Hence it is aware of a man as this man." In his Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics,

Aquinas explains this facet of the vis cogitativa in the following manner:

...In men, the next thing above memory is experience, which some animals have only to a small degree. For an experience arises from the association of many singular (intentions) received in memory. And this kind of association is proper to man, and pertains to the cogitative power (also called particular reason), which associates particular intentions just as universal reason associates universal ones. Com. on Meta. #15 (p. 11) 20*

According to this quotation, I believe Aquinas is claiming that the vis cogitativa is aware of an individual as a member of a particular kind. This is not to be associated with concept-formation, because a concept is an awareness of the "nature'1 or "essence" of a thing.

This nature Is common to many, so thus the individual as such is precluded in any activity of the intellectus possibilis. This is precisely where the vis cogitativa comes into play. It is that sense faculty which is conditioned to be aware of an individual as a member of a "kind". This does not mean that it is an awareness of a "nature", as this is the role of first intentional awareness on the part of the intellectus possibilis. In other words, the vis cogitativa is not aware of man as man, but rather of Jones as man. How this awareness comes about will be extensively treated in the next chapter when phantasms are discussed. Suffice it to say now, however, that the phantasms peculiar to the vis cogitativa

"condition" or "color" the mental awareness of the vis cogitativa so that it interprets the object In the external world in a unique way. This is an almost Kantian move regarding a structured aware ness. The structure of the act of awareness of the vis cogitativa is determined by the phantasms, which in turn, come about only because of the range of the perceiver*s experience. In other words, the vis cogitativa "interprets" an object as an individual of a kind and not merely as a unified concrete whole. This, in 202

effect, distinguishes the vis cogitativa from the sensus communis*

Again, this is evidence for placing the sensus communis in the

external sensorium and not in the internal sensorium even though

it is classified by Aquinas as an internal sense*

The paramount example of "inner sense" is the vis cogitativa.

It is by means of this faculty that Aquinas is able to get beyond

phenomenalism.

An important corollary of this discussion is the role that

substance plays in the functioning of the vis cogitativa. In his

Metaphysics, Aquinas claims that the basic and fundamental things

in the external world are primary substances. A primary substance

Is an individual thing of a certain kind. The "kind" or species

is determined by the substantial form of the thing. The vis

cogitativa seems to be the faculty by which the perceiver is aware

of a primary substance and not just of a bundle of sensations.

This, again, requires an interpretative function on the part of the

vis cogitativa; in effect, "inner sense" is going beyond the data

of the external sensorium. Accordingly, Aquinas not only has primary

substances in his ontology, but his epistemology is structured so that

the perceiver can be aware of these primary substances. The end

result is that Aquinas believes both that there are things in the

external world and that we are aware of these things. And the

possibility of our being aware of things is accounted for by means 203 of the phantasm-structured vis cogitativa* The external sensorium

Is aware of unified wholes of proper and common sensibles; the vis cogitativa is aware of the primary substance which makes the

"unified whole" into an individual of a kind.

Accordingly, the vis cogitativa is that faculty by which a human perceiver is aware of an individual of a kind. Aquinas is positing this internal sense faculty to account for our aware ness of what Aristotle calls the "incidental object of sense".

By the incidental object of sense, both Aristotle and Aquinas mean that a human perceiver is aware of this bundle of sensations (40 as Cleon's son and this other bundle of sensations (40as Cleon's son and this white patch (a)as snow and this other white patch (8) as flour. This indeed Is going beyond the immediate data of per ception— i.e., the "concrete wholes" which are the unified con- conjunctions of the proper and the common sensibles. Yet human perception is not exhausted by mere sense data. Aquinas continually stresses that point.

...but the senses have also their Indirect objects, and with regard to these they can be deceived. What seems to be white is indeed white as the sense reports; but whether the white thing is this or that thing, Is snow, e.g., or flour, is a question often answered badly by the senses, especially at a distance. Ibid. #662

The importance of this sense faculty is that Aquinas is claiming that one of the experienced data of our perceptual life is that we, 204 as perceivers, seem to be primarily directed towards things rather

than just to a collection of qualities. Accordingly, Jones, as a perceiver, is aware of Smith— as an individual— and not of just a collection of proper and common sensibles. This same datum is pointed out by contemporary philosophers In claiming that we ordinarily talk as if we perceive things and not sense data. John

Wisdom, for example, considers the difference between "sense state ments" and "thing statements";^ this, I believe, is also Aquinas' concern in discussing the vis cogitativa. Aquinas is structurally undercutting the sense data theories by claiming, in effect, that our experience if of things rather than of sense data and then by providing the epistemological machinery so that one may be per ceptually aware of an object beyond the immediate data of the proper and common sensibles. Again, there is a similarity to Strawson who claims that particulars are the basic elements of a human perceiver's conceptual scheme. Accordingly, Aquinas, like Strawson, is arguing that it is a mistake to claim that human perceivers are primarily and fundamentally aware of bundles of sense data; rather, such perceivers have a direct "thing consciousness" or "individual consciousness" and such a "consciousness" or "intentional awareness" is crucial and principal for human perceivers.

Ijohn Wisdom, "Philosophical Perplexity". 20th Century Philosophy; The Analytic Tradition, p. 292. 205

X believe that it is proper to compare the functionings of the vis cogitativa with what is common sensically referred to as experi ence. The first time Jones sees Smith, he obviously does not recog nize him as Smith— as far as being Smith to Jones the perceiver,

Smith is no more than a mere bundle of sensations. Yet after Jones has got to know Smith, then he immediately recognizes Smith "as

Smith" as soon as Smith comes into view. It is important to realize that Aquinas is not claiming that we remember this particular bundle of sensations— I.e., the "concrete whole"— as Smith; rather, we perceive him to be Smith. Yet "being Smith" is not some type of property which is directly perceivable in the external world. Accord ingly, Aquinas claims that it is by means of the internal sense of the vis cogitativa that a human perceiver is able to "immediately recognize" an individual as an Individual. In other words, when

Jones is directly aware of Smith, he is not remembering that he saw this same bundle of sensations before; quite the contrary, he is directly aware that this "concrete whole" Is Smith— a particular individual. That such an Individual property is unperceivable per se is probably consistent with Aquinas' position on individuation; such an ontological problem is resolved in Aquinas' metaphysics by the assertion that "materia signata" is the principle of individuation.

Accordingly, there is no postulation of an individualizing form, as Scotus* haecaeitas. Because only a form can be knowable directly, and since materia signata is the individuator, there is nothing as 206 such in the external world which could be the object of direct perception regarding an individual as an individual. Accordingly,

Aquinas makes use of the vis cogitativa as the faculty of the internal sensorium which accomplishes our awareness of individuals and not just of "concrete wholes".

The entire question of a "phantasm" is crucial here as with the imagination; such a position will be considered in detail after some brief remarks concerning the remaining Internal sense, the sense-memory.

The last faculty of the internal sensorium to be considered is the sense memory. Textually, Aquinas is quite explicit about the use of this faculty. Accordingly, a few introductory words are needed to avoid needless confusion. In ordinary linguistic usuage, memory quite normally means a "calling to mind of an image"— i.e., a mental visualizing about something which is not here and now present.

Aquinas, however, has a much narrower meaning for the sense memory.

In effect, it is not just the faculty which has the capacity to recollect images, as the Imagination does this; on the other hand, it is the internal sense by which the human knower recollects an image of a particular thing in a certain past time. The imagination is the "storehouse" of sensations— i.e., the "concrete wholes" synthesized by the sensus communis from the discrete data of the external senses in the form of proper and common sensibles— whereas the sense memory is the "storehouse" of perceived individual things 207

or objects. Structurally, the sense memory is to the vis cogitativa as the imagination is to the sensus communis. On this relation,

Aquinas writes as follows in the Suntma Theologica:

Furthermore, for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the senses, the estimative power is appointed: and for their preservation the memorative power, which is a storehouse of such intentions. S. T. I., Q, 78, a, 4.

To further illustrate the similar structural roles played by

the imagination and the sense memory, it is worthwhile noting that

Aquinas uses the same term in referring to both these sense

operations— i.e., "thesaurus'*,which is often translated as "store house". The same structural point is made in the Summa Contra

Gentiles:

Some of the sensitive powers only receive— the external senses, for instance; while some retain, as Imagination and memory, which are therefore called store-houses. S.C.G. II., Ch. 73, 034.

In addition to merely storing the objects of the vis cogitativa—

which would be the various experiences of incidental objects— the sense

memory in human perceivers also has the ability of "reminiscence"; note

the following passage from the Summa Theologica:

As to the memorative power, man has not only memory, as other animals have, in the sudden recollection of the past, but also reminiscence, by seeking syllogistically, as it were, for a recollection of the past by the application of individual inten tions . S.T. I., Q, 78, a, 4. 2Cg

What Aquinas is trying to account for here is that human knowers

have the ability to search or "rummage around" with their memories

of individuals to attempt to discover a fact. For example, Aquinas would argue that we do this when we try to think of a name or a

person whose "memory image" is quite clear and distinct; this is what we do in trying to recall the name of a person when we can't

think of it right away— as when we say, "The name is on the tip of my tongue!" Reminiscence is, thusly, the ability to try to locate within our past experiences of individuals some particular piece

of knowledge. And this ability is part of the sense memory.

These considerations bring to bear the crucial fact that the

sense memory has for its object individual "intentions" which had

been perceived by the vis cogitativa. This particular note of

"at a particular or specific past time" is crucial, as Aquinas

brings out in his work, De Memoria et Reminiscent!a;

...memory is of past things.... I #307.

In this same work, Aquinas further considers how this faculty

functions:

The memorative power retains, about which a thing is to be remembered not in any way whatsoever, but only in so far as it has been apprehended by a sense in the past. Ibid. II #321

This same point is reiterated in the Summa Contra Gentiles: 209

Now, the memory is located in the sensitive part of the soul, because its scope is limited to things subject to deter minate times; there is memory only of what is past. Therefore... the memory does not abstract from singular conditions. S.C.G. Bki II., Ch. 74, #17.

The sense memory, therefore, is that faculty by means of which

a human knower is aware of individuals previously experienced; in

effect, it serves as the "storehouse" for the incidental objects of

sensation.

If this analysis of the role of the sense memory is correct, then

this expllcatio textus should further explain Aristotle's remarks in

the Posterior Analytics about the universal's "coming to be" in the soul. A crucial part of that account is the role of experience and memory. In commenting on the Posterior Analytics, Aquinas agrees with Aristotle on the role of the memorative faculty in the process of concept-formation.

He (Aristotle) shows in the foregoing how the knowledge of first principles comes about within us. He concludes from what has been said that memory arises out of sensation; that is so in the case of those animals in whom the sensible impression endures, as was said above. Then, out of memory, that has been produced many times concerning the same thing (under a variety of different individual conditions, however), there comes experience; for experience is obviously nothing but the taking of something from many instances retained in memory. Nevertheless, experience requires some reasoning about particulars, by which it relates one item to another, and that Is characteristic of reason. For Instance, when it is remem bered that a certain herb has many times cured many people of fever, we say that it is our experience that there is such a remedy for fever. Com on Posterior Analy. II, Lee. 20. Memory, therefore, functions as the storehouse of experienced

"individuals", not of experienced "bundles of sensations"; this is

crucial as Aquinas, like Aristotle before him, will claim that the

universal comes to be in the "soul" by repeated experience with

individual things. If we do indeed have experience of things, then

there must be some way to distinguish this experience from the

experience of bundles of sense qualities, which would be the "con

crete wholes" composed of discrete proper and common sensibles. For

if the only object of experience were the proper and common sensibles,

then this type of experience would seem much too fleeting for an

"universal" ever to come to be in the "soul". But Aquinas does indeed

claim that a human perceiver is aware of things— i.e., that a human

perceiver does have a "thing- consciousness"— and such an awareness

is had by means of the vis cogitativa, whose objects are intentionally

stored in the sense memory. With the stored repertoire of "Indivi

dual intentions"— i.e., intentions of individuals and of individuals

of a kind— from these individuals it is more readily apparent how the

mind can "form" the universal from such individual intentions

by means of the Intellectus agens. In other words, the sense memory

is the foundation for the many "individualized intentions" from which

the mind makes the universal. If the perceiver were not aware of

Individuals but merely of bundles of sensations, then it does seem quite difficult for Aristotle and Aquinas to structurally claim how the "universal" could ever "come to be" in the mind. Parenthetically, 211

It may be due to Berkeley's denial of an awareness of an individual but only of "bundles of sensations" that he found it impossible to talk of "abstract ideas". That the sense memory Is concerned with individualized intentions is substantiated by the above quo tation from the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics in which the object of the memory is the "herbs" and not of a bundle of sense qualities which were observed by the external senses in conjunction with the sensus communis.

In conclusion, therefore, I want to strenuously argue that the sense memory is a crucial faculty in Aquinas' eplstemological essay. It is distinguished from the imagination in that it is a storehouse of sensed individuals, and is not merely a storehouse of sense qualities put together as concrete wholes by the sensus communis. This faculty, furthermore, as evidenced by the passage quoted from the Conmentary on the Posterior Analytics.structurally serves a quite important role in the "coming to be" of the univer sal in the mind. And this latter question is quite important for

Aquinas, although Its actual eplstemological account is beyond the

limited scope of this present inquiry. CHAPTER XI

PHANTASMS

In Aquinas' eplstemological assay both of sense knowledge

and of concept-formation and concept-exercise, the term "phantasmata" often occurs. This is a crucial element in his epistemology

for two reasons. First of all, the phantasm Is a necessary condition

for concept-formation. The intellectus agens "scans” the phantasms

in the process of forming a "conceptus". This scanning process is what Aquinas refers to as the "conversio ad phantasmata". That this

is a difficult bit of philosophy to adequately explicate is affirmed by Peter Geach in Mental Acts. At any length, if any sense at all

is to be made of Aquinas' theory of concept-formation, then this hinges on an adequate account of what a phantasm is. This, Indeed, is the process which Aquinas is referring to when he so often claims

that conceptual knowledge cannot be had without the appropriate imagery. This claim of the phantasm as being a necessary condition

for concept-formation is explicitly made in both the Summa Theolo gica and the Summa Contra Gentiles.

...we do not understand the things whose species are in the possible intellect without the presence of phantasms for this purpose. S.C.G., II, Ch. 73, # 40.

212 213

...we do not understand the things whose species are in the possible intellect without the presence of phantasms disposed for this purpose. Ibid.

In the present condition, the mind cannot actually under stand anything except by reference to phantasms... Yet in understanding, either freshly or summoning knowledge already gained, the mind's activity must be accompanied by the activ ity of imagination and of the other sense powers. When the imagination is warped, as in madness or the memory is lost, as in amnesia— either condition may result from bodily injury— a man is prevented from understanding even those things he previously knew. Secondly, each man experiences in himself that when he attempts to understand a subject he must picture it and use images as examples to hold his attention. S.T*, X, Q« 8A , a. 7*

These passages speak for themselves as to the importance of the presence of phantasms in order both to form concepts as well as to actually understand by means of concepts which the intellectus possibilis already possesses.

Secondly, an analysis of phantasm is crucially Important in light of recent critiques of Aquinas' theory of intentionality.

These analyses of his assay of perception reduce his perceptual theory to representative realism by a structural move on the phantasm.

A certain twist in understanding the phantasm can lead to a distorted view of Aquinas' perceptually theory. Accordingly, the present discussion of phantasm is not a moot point by any means; it is crucial if my interpretation of Aquinas' theory of perception as being one of direct realism is to hang together at all.

Textually, translators at times have rendered "phantasmata" into English as "image". This, obviously, is a crucial move for any one who wants to argue that the phantasm Is a wedge between the mind 214

and the object and thus force Aquinas Into a position of representa

tive realism. This is precisely the move made by Peter Sheehan in

his article* "Aquinas on Intentionality".* As I will indicate later

in this discussion of phantasms* although a phantasm may on occasion

function as an image, it is never a necessary condition for the exist ence of a phantasm that it be an image.

A further note is important here regarding the English term*

"image". As far as 1 can textually discover, Aquinas does not use the Latin term "imago" when providing any eplstemological discussion whatsoever. This term is used, however* in various theological dis cussions in the Sunma Theologica when Aquinas is offering an inter pretation of how man is made in the image and likeness of God.

"Ergo imago In divinls relative dicitur." (S.T., I, Q. 35, a. 1, sed contra.)

When one reads the various English translations of Aquinas' various treatises on knowledge, the term "image" often occurs. In the Summa Theologica, this is very often a translation for the Latin term "similitudo11. Furthermore* in the Summa Theologica* the Latin term "indolum" occurs once in an eplstemological discussion and this too Is often rendered as "image" by different translators. The point remains* however* that even though the English term "image" occurs many times in many translations* this is the translator's preference for phantasmata* similitudo or indolum; as far as 1 can discover* the

1-Peter Sheehan* "Aquinas on Intentionality"* Aquinas * ed. by A. Kenny (Garden City* N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969), pp 307-323. 215 Latin term ".imago" is distinctly absent from any of Aquinas' epistemological discussions. Such a translator's preference Is found in the various translations made by Thomas Gilby, Anton Pegis, Paul

Durbin, Vernon Bourke, Kenelm Foster, and Silvester Humphries, all of which I have consulted in the research process of this present dis sertation.

Alternative Interpretations

In providing an"explicatio textus" of the phantasmata, there are at least three possible alternatives. Each of these could be inter preted as a structural account of a phantasm. Two of these have been either argued for or at least implied by various philosophers who have attempted to provide an assay of Aquinas' thesis of intentionality.

In this dissertation, I want to argue for a third position. I want to so argue for such a third position in that I intend to adequately show that the other two positions are either structurally untenable or can not be reconciled with other textual evidence found in the writings of

Aquinas. The positions I wish to argue against can be generally stated as follows: 1) that a phantasm is identical structurally to a sense da tum, and 2) that a phantasm is always to be identified with an image.

The rest of this dissertation can be regarded as a philosophical anal ysis attempting to disprove both the above positions and to establish what I believe to be a consistent, structural account of a phantasm.

A definitive account of a phantasm is extremely difficult. Aqui nas is quite limited in what he does positively write about such an eplstemological entity. One almost gets the impression that Aquinas 216 was certain that just everybody automatically knew what a phantasm really is so there would be no need to offer a further explication of the term. Aquinas does offer a few brief descriptions of his use of the term, but his own positive account is terribly Insufficient.

This lack of a positive development on Aquinas' part, therefore, forces the contemporary analyst to reconstruct an account. Such an account, however, in so far as it is a reconstruction, must be able to be reconciled with the other texts which explicitly deal with epls temological issues.

Historically, as I indicated in the above paragraph, it seems that Aquinas was convinced that everyone who might read his texts would be familiar with how aphantasm was to be used* I believe much historical research needs to be done In this particular area. As I indicated in the discussion on the sensus communis, both Locke,

Hobbes, and Descartes had misconstrued the functioning of the ima gination with the sensus communis; such a misconstruing can also affect the understanding of the phantasm. Accordingly, I believe it is terribly mistaken to attempt to understand the phantasm by con sidering how the early modern philosophers used the term. Instead, a much more fruitful approach would be to consider the writings of other medlevals, especially the Arabian philosophers; in the Summa

Contra Gentiles, Aquinas makes explicit reference to Avicenna when dis cussing the role of the phantasm. Such historical research has not been done for this dissertation; however, 1 believe that it must eventually be done, even though it will be an extremely difficult task. 217

Sense Datum Position

1 will now proceed to consider the first position about the

structure of a phantasm, which I will refer to as the "sense datum"

approach. To begin this discussion, I want to consider an important

passage from the Commentary in which Aquinas discusses the phantasm.

"Phos" is graeco, idem est quod lux; et inde venit "phanos" quod est apparitio, vel illuminatlo et phantasia. Com. on the Soul if 668

The English translation of the above passage and what Immed

iately precedes It is as follows;

He explains the name phantasia. Note that phos is the Greek for "light", whence conies phanos, i.e. ."appearance" or "enlightening", and phantasia. He says, then, that be cause sight is the principal sense, being more spiritual and knowing a wider range of objects than any other, therefore imagination, which arises from actual sensation, gets its name from light, without which nothing can be seen. Ibid.

Given the above passage, it is not too difficult to place a

great emphasis on the term "apparitio", which Is translated and ob viously can mean "appearance". Such an emphasis on appearance leads one to argue that the phantasm is nothing more than a "sense datum"

as thlB term is used in contemporary eplstemological discussions.

Furthermore, the above passage is not an isolated case in which Aquinas uses the term "appearance". Note the following two passages as well:

The word "imagining" (phantasia) is itself taken from seeing or appearing. Cam. on cne Soul $ 632 218

He suggests that Imagination Is a sort of movement: that just as the sensing subject Is moved by sensible objects, so, in imagining,.one is moved by certain appearances called phantasms. Ibid. If 656

In addition to the use of "appearance", in the Summa Theo logica, Aquinas, in considering concept-formation, by means of the abstractive function of the Intellectus agens, he speaks of phantasms as "likenesses" of physical objects. Consider the following passage:

Therefore, material things must needs be understood according as they are abstracted from matter and from material likenesses, namely phantasms. S.T. 1. Q, 35 a. 1.

Given this sort of textual evidence, one can plausibly argue that the phantasm is nothing more than a sense datum. Accordingly, there is some textual evidence which could provisionally lead one to reconstruct a phantasm as a sense datum.

In order to further explicate this position of phantasms being identified with sense data, I will Include the following passages in which various contemporary epistemologists attempt to provide an ex plication of what a sense datum is. A classic exposition of such a theory is located in G. E. Moore's Some Main Problems of Philosophy.

I hold up this envelope: I look at it...What has happened? We should certainly say that we all saw that envelope... But now what happened to each of us, when we saw that envelope? I saw a patch of a particular whitish color, having a certain size, and a certain shape, a shape with rather sharp angles or corners and bounded by fairly straight lines. These things: this patch of a whitish color and its size and shape I did actually see. And I propose to call these things— the color and size 219

and shape— sense data, things given or presented by the senses— given in this esse, by roy sense of sight....

Moore now shows that the sense datum is not Identical with the material object:

Kow all this seems to me to show very clearly that, if we did all see the same envelope, the envelope which we saw was not identical wijtli the sense data which we saw: the envelope cannot be exactly the same thing as each of the sets of sense data, which we each of us saw: for these were in all probablity each of them slightly different from all the rest, and they cannot, therefore, all be exactly the same thing as the envelope.^

In addition to G.E. Moore, the following philosophers have also had some interesting things to say about sense data. In the

Problem of Knowledge, A.J. Ayer writes as follows:

What, according to them (Locke, Berkeley, Russell) Is immediately given in perception is an evanescent object called an idea, or an impression, or a presentation, or a sense datum, which is not only private to a single observer but private to a single sense.3

Ledger Wood, in An Analysis of Knowledge, provides the follow ing account of a sense datum:

Like the "impressions" of Hume from which they derive historically, sense data are discrete, qualitative essences produced by epitomizing extended and enduring sensational qualities. In other words, a sense datum is the ideal limit approached by a qualitative minimum sensible when it is

2 G.E. Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953), pp. 30-31. 3 A.J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge (Edinburgh: Penguin Books, 1956), p. 85. 220 4 imagined to be qualitatively homogeneous and changeless.

H.H. Frlce accounts for sense data in the following manner in

This peculiar and ultimate manner of being present to consciousness is called being given, and that which Is thus present is called a datum. The corresponding mental attitude is called acquaintance, intuitive apprehension, or sometimes having. Data of this special sort are called sense-data. And the acquaintance with them is conveniently called sen sing. ...3

And finally, Bertrand Russell analyzes sense data in the fol

lowing way in his The Analysis of Mind:

If there is a subject (knower), it can have a relation ta> the patch of color, namely the sort of relation which we might call awareness. In that case the sensation, as a mental event, will consist of awareness of the color, while the color itself will remain wholly physical, and may be called the sense-datum, to distinguisn it from sensation.^

In providing an explicatio tcxtus of the above passages by various contemporary philosophers considering the status of sense

data, the result which emerges from such an analysis is that a sense

datum is considered to be the direct object of a perceptual awareness.

Furthermore, each of these sense datum accounts indicate that a

relational model of perception is accepted as the structural assay of

^Ledger Wood, The Analysis of Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 34.

^H.H. Price, Perception (New York: McBride, 1933), p. 3.

^Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind (London; George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1921), p. 141. 221 such a mental awareness. This is especially clear in the Russell passage from The Analysis of Hind. Moreover, a sense data position usually argues for a private object of direct perception; a sense datum is usually not a public object. Rather it is the term of a private awareness relation. In addition to the privacy problem, Moore is quite explicit in affirming non-identity of sense data with the ex ternal object. In other words, a sense datum is what is presented to the knower when he is actually in a relational act of knowing— i.e., having an awareness. In all of these positions, there is a distinction drawn between the sense datum and the physical object.

Consequently, the sense datum theory drives a wedge between the object of perception and the thing itself. In "A Defense of Common Sense",

Moore did look upon sense data as entitles wedged between the mental act and the physical object; that this was indeed Moore's position is argued for by Klemke in The Epistetnology of G.E. Moore:

Moore's views on perception, although occupying more pages than any other single epistemological topic, contain the greatest number of unresolved problems of all. Taking the "problem of sense data'1 first, on only one point is Moore consistent: there are sense data. Why so? Because they are objects of certain sorts of awareness, and one cannot (Moore thinks) have an awareness without an object. But would not physical objects fill the bill. Moore thinks not, for then we could not satisfactorily account for the phenomena of illusion, hallucination, after-images, and perspectival visual sensings. Moore overlooks the view that we could say that certain things (e.g., coins) look certain ways (e.g., ellipical) without requiring that there be sense data as entities.

On this perceptual model, the important structural question

^E.D. Klemke, The Epistetnology of G.E. Moore (Evanston: North western University Press, 1969), p. 190. 222 which arises is how to get from the sense datum to the material object.

Of coursej many solutions have been proposed for this problem ranging from instinctive beliefp to constructs to convictions of common sense to permanent possibilities of sensations. But these various solu tions are not of interest In this present dissertation. What does interest me tremendously though is the difference between a phantasm and a sense datum. It is in order to argue effectively for such a difference that I have provided a somewhat detailed discussion of what a sense datum is for some of the many twentieth-century philoso phers who have seriously considered the philosophical import of such an epistemological entity.

If a phantasm is to be equated with a sense datum and if a sense datura is the direct object of perception and still distin guished from the material object itself} then Aquinas will have the same consequences to his theory of perception as are entailed by any sense datum theory. The principal consequence of a sense datum theory is that a wedge is driven between the object of perception and the physical object itself. Accordingly} if Aquinas adopts a sense datura theory* then there will be tremendous structural difficulties in so far as Aquinas has written many passages* some of which have been in dicated earlier in this dissertation* in which he explicitly indi cates that the object of perception is the thing itself and not any such intermediary entity. The "thing consciousness" linguistic category is reiterated over and over again in the Aquinlan corpus.

To adopt a sense datum perceptual theory is to drastically modify 223

a realist theory of perception, and If a phantasm is to be Identified with a sense datum, then Aquinas' theory of perception would be

accordingly so modified. In his study of direct sense awareness, D.

W. Hamlyn appears to argue for such an interpretation of a phantasm:

On the Thomsit view the phantasmata set up are mental entities and for this reason are like the sensations which are produced by stimulation of our bodily organs; yet, being somehow representative of the objects which produce them, they are more than mere sensations. They are Indeed more like the ideas or impressions of the British Empiricists.... Phantasmata, then, are postulated as the mental pro ducts of the stimulation of our senses....**

A phantasm, furthermore, is interpreted by Hamlyn to be a mental entity which is needed in any mental act of direct awareness.

It 1- obvious that if the sense datum interpretation of a phantasm

Is to be deemed the correct Interpretation of Aquinas' perceptual

theory, then it follows that a phantasm must necessarily be involved with any act of perception involving the external sensorium. It is precisely this fact, however, that Aquinas explicitly denies. It must be granted, on the other hand, that Aquinas is very often in terpreted by analytic philosophers as having claimed that phantasms are part of the perceptual process involved with each external sense.

To refute such a position, one must consider a crucial passage from the Summa Contra Centlies: "... the powers in which the phantasms reside, namely, imagination, memory and cogitation(vis cogitative).

(S.C.G., Bk. II, Ch. 73, P 11.) In the Commentary, there is found

^Hamlyn, Sensation and Perception, p. 30-31* the following passage in which the locus of the phantasms Is also claimed to be the Internal sensorium: "First! then, he observes that

...It Is through the phantasia that we become conscious of phantasms.

(Com. on the Soul # 638.) 1 have already considered how the term phantasia Is used In the Commentary In that It denotes the functions of the entire Internal sensorium and not just of the imagination.

Furthermore! the second quotation provided above is immediately qualified by the following passage— "unless the term 'phantasm1 is used metaphorically...." (Ibid.) This would further indicate that beyond the functionings of the Internal sensorium, the phantasm does not have a place in Aquinlan epistemology.

When considering the locus of the phantasm, it is crucially important to remember Aquinas1 account of perception which has al ready been discussed. In order to have a perceptual awareness of the external world, the sensus communis is the faculty which serves to unify the data received from the various external senses. One might be persuaded to argue that such a "concrete whole" would be a phantasm. But it must be noted that this specific Internal sense— the sensus communis— is not included but, on the contrary, is quite explicitly excluded when Aquinas considered the sense faculties in which the phantasms belong as objects. This, furthermore, lends credence to my claim above that Aquinas considered the sensus com munis actually to be a part of the external sensorium even though it is classified as an internal sense.

In addition to the passages mentioned above, in the Commentary 225 the Summa Theologies and the Sunana Contra Gentiles, Aquinas argues that the phantasm Is a "second movement" whereas perception Is a

"flrat movement". Accordingly, being classified as. a movement distinct from perception, it seems impossible to claim that a phan tasm could also be involved in direct awareness itself. The fol lowing passages explicate this claim:

The phantasm is not the first but a second perfection, for the imagination is a "movement resulting from the ex ercise of a sense power". S.C.G., BK. II, Ch. 73, #11.

Now although the first imntutatlon of the imagination is through the agency of the sensible, since the phantasy is a movement produced in accordance with sensation.... S.T., I, Q. 84, a. 6, ad 2.

Be (Aristotle) suggests that phantasia is a sort of movement: that Just as tne sensing subject is moved by sen sible objects, so, in imagining, one is moved by certain appearances called phantasms. Com on the Soul # 656.

Next he suggests an affinity between the phantasia and the senses, in that the phantasia presupposes sensation and is found in sentient beings or animals. Ibid. if 657.

...imagination is a certain movement caused by the senses in their act of sensing.... If there is any movement caused by actual sensation, it must resemble sensation, and imagining is the only activity of this kind. Ibid. tf 659.

He distinguishes imagination...first of all from sen sation.... As to sensation, he begins by probing that ima gination is not one of the senses (i.e., the exterior senses), either potentially or actually. For imagination is active during sleep. This cannot be due to any sense as in potency, in which state the senses are aware of nothing at all; nor to any sense as in act, for in sleep the senses are not in act. Therefore, imagination— phantasia-- is neither a sense 226

In potency nor a sense In act. Com. on the Soul # 641.

...those animals have In phantasia. In the precise sense of phantasia, which retains an imprint of things even while they are not sensing "exteriorly" things. Ibid. # 390.

The senses in the act of sensing are always truthful; they cannot err about their proper objects. But phantasms are very often deceptive, when there Is nothing real that corresponds to them. Therefore, the imagination Is dis tinct from every sense in act. Ibid. # 645.

In all of the passages from the Commentary which are noted above, it must be kept in mind that the translators of that work chose to render phantasia as imagination, even though the textual structure of the Commentary is such that phantasia refers to the entire internal sensorium. Accordingly, for every rendition of

'imagination", internal sensorium is to be understood as the appro priate meaning which Aquinas had in mind and not the imaginative power alone.

Accordingly, from the textual evidence provided above, the two following conclusions may be drawn concerning the relation be tween sensation-formation and phantasm-formatlon: 1) the workings of the external sensorium are necessary conditions for the existence of any phantasm in the internal sensorium, and 2) perceptions from the external sensorium are really distinct from the phantasms of the internal sensorium. In other words, all of the passages above in dicate that a phantasm, Insofar as it is the object of the internal senses of imagination, sense memory and vis cogitative. Is part of 227 a mental process which follows from perception and yet Is not equal to perception. One of the passages mentioned above from the Com mentary is very Important in that in It Aquinas explicitly claims that the phantasia "presupposes sensation".

What is textually important and philosophically interesting about the above passages is Aquinas’ explicit claim that the phantasm is not a perceptlon-entity or perception-medium in any way concurrent with a percelver's direct awareness of the external world by means of the external sensorium. In other words, a phantasm is not concomr- mitant with perception, but rather is a "result" from or of per ception. To further substantiate the claim that perception-awareness and phantasm-awareness are really distinct and quite different species of awareness, the two following passages from the Commentary are very important:

...phantasms (are able to) come during sleep when the senses are not in act. Therefore, a phantasm is not an actual sen sation. Com. on the Soul it 647.

He explains why the actions and passions of animals are governed by imagination. Phantasms, he says, "dwell within" in the absence of sensible objects, as traces of actual sensations; therefore, just as sensations arouse appetitive impulses while the sensed objects are present, so do phantasms when these are absent. Ibid. if 669.

Accordingly, 1 believe that I have proper textual evidence to justify my two claims as stated above, that, 1) perceptions from the external sensorium are necessary conditions for the existence of any phantasm of the internal sensorium, and 2) perceptions from the 228

external sensorium are really distinct from the phantasms of the in

ternal sensorium.

In addition to the above passages which indicate that the

phantasm is not present in the perceptual process of direct awareness,

Aquinas, in discussion concept-formation, considers the faculties

which have phantasms and which phantasms are the object of the "scan

ning" by the intellectus agens. It should be noted that the only

faculties listed which have any relation to the phantasms are the

three faculties of the Internal sensorium; again, there is an ex

plicit exclusion of the sensus communis. The following considerations

are found in the Summa Contra Gentiles:

By this cogitative power, together with the imagination and the memory, the phantasms are prepared to receive the action of the agent Intellect. S.C.G., Bk. II, Ch. 60, tf 1.

The disposition of the cogitative and the imaginative powers are relative to the object, namely, the phantasm, which, because of the well-developed character of these powers, is prepared in such a way as to facilitate its being made actually intelligible by the agent intellect. Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. 73, 3 28.

Again, it is important to note the obvious lack of any reference

to the external senses or to the sensus communis when considering the

structured epistemological locus of the phantasm.

I take the above textual evidence to substantiate my claims

that any philosophical position which regards the Aqulnlan use of

phantasm as a sense datum— with a sense datum taken as the direct object of perception yet not being identified with the physical ob 229

ject— to be clearly mistaken and not consistent with the Aquinian

texts.

As Anthony Kenny has noted in his rather Interesting article,

"Intellect and Imagination in Aquinas", It is indeed very difficult

to give a definitive account of the structural nature of the phantasm.

This is the case because Aquinas deems to have used the term in various ways. There are indeed passages, some of which have been noted earlier in this present inquiry, in which Aquinas does write as if phantasms were appearances and impressions; yet to provide a proper and adequate interpretation of these passages, one must be cognizant at least of some of the above-mentioned passages in which

Aquinas definitely and unequivocally asserts the total absence of phantasm-placement regarding direct awareness of things in the external world by the external sensorium. The philosophical task remaining for this dissertation is, quite obviously, to present an adequate structural account of the passages concerning phantasms which speak of them as "appearances and Impressions" and yet remain faithful to what has been textually claimed above about the internal senses in which the phantasms reside, namely, the imagination, the sense memory and the via cogitativa.

As discussed earlier in this dissertation, Aquinas offers an elaborate and sophisticated account of the process of sense knowledge which includes both the workings of the external sensorium and the functionings of the internal sensorium. By complete sense knowledge,

Aquinas means much more than a mere accumulation of sensations or 230 Humean impressions as expounded by the classical empiricists with

their theory or perception structurally rooted in psychological atom

ism. That Aquinas differs from the psychological atomists and how

this difference contributes to an understanding of a positive account

of a phantasm will constitute the main consideration of the remaining

part of this section of our inquiry into the Aqulnlan assay of per

ception*

Image Position

There Is another account of the phantasm which must be con

sidered in any analysis of such an eplstemologlcal term which claims

to be in any sense thorough. This Is the interpretation of the phan

tasm as an image or imago. There are two categories of such an in

terpretation. The first position is that claimed by Peter Sheehan

in his article, "Aquinas on Intentlonality" and also indicated by

Anthony Kenny in his article,."Intellect and Imagination In Aquinas".

Both of these philosophers attempt what they consider to be a struc

tural account of the phantasm which leads them to equate the phantasm with an image which is had during the process of direct awareness.

This position, in effect, reduces Aquinas to a representative realist.

And this is precisely what Sheehan sets out to do, as is indicated

from the following passage from his article;

...for it has become clear that if Aquinas' doctrine is applied to our problem, then what makes my thought one of this X rather than some other X (of this man or horse rather than some other man or horse) is the fact that certain phan tasms or Images are somehow Involved. This account, however 231

It Is more fully filled out, would seem to be susceptible to the arguments already brought forward against the Image or symbol view.

Throughout Sheehan's article, the attempt Is made to reduce

Aquinas to a representative realist; and since In the beginning of his article, Sheehan argues against any representative theory of per ception, it follows a fortloti that If Aquinas' theory of intention al! ty is also representational, such a philosophical refutation befalls his theory too.

This second position Is one that argues that a phantasm Is an image, but an Image only found within and employed by the faculties of the Internal sensorium.. In other words, the phantasm Is not part of the process of direct perception, as the first position above was arguing. Many scholastic commentators have argued for this position.

Note the following definition found in the glossary of one of the volume of the New English translation of the Summa Theologica:

Sense images (phantasmata), material likenesses of material things...the products of the three internal senses, often the result of a synthesising process.^

It should be noted that the above definition does not claim that a phantasm is an aspect of direct perception; rather it is a

®Sheehan, ''Aquinas on Zntentlonallty", Aquinas; A Collection of Critical Essays, pp. 320-321.

^Sunana Theologica, translated by Paul T. Durbin, Vol. XII (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p . 195.

* 232

mental Image which is the "...product of the three Internal senses."

As will become clear later in this present discussion of the nature

of a phantasm, 1 will accept part of this Interpretation; however

1 will also argue that a phantasm does not necessarily have to be

a "sense Image". In other words, it is a sufficient condition that

a phantasm be a sense image, but it is not a necessary condition for

a phantasm's existence that it be a "sense Image".

In considering the phantasm as an image, therefore, there are

two philosophical moves which can be made; of these two moves, I will

accept one in part while the other I will completely reject In that

such a structural move entails a dlsasterous consequence for Aqui-

nian eplstemology. Position A— that entailed by Kenny and Sheehan—

asserts that a phantasm is some type of image within which we per

ceive during our mental acts of direct perception. The other po

sition, Position B— that entailed by man scholastic commentators—

asserts that the phantasm is an image in which we either 1) reflect

on some object of past experience which is no longer present— as my

deceased Aunt Matilda— or 2) construct some complex image of some

thing never perceived per se— as the "golden mountain" of a "beer-

garden in Granville". 1 want to argue that Position A and Position B are not identical and thus not reducible to each other in any way. It

is also my claim that although Position A would probably entail Po

sition B, Position B can stand alone and be not dependent on Position

A. In other words, this claim amounts to the assertion that a direct

realist might be able to claim that there is a creative ability and a 233

memoratlve ability to the Internal sensorium without being a repre

sentative realist in direct perception. On the other hand, if one is

a representative realist in direct perception, any functioning of

the internal senses a fortiori follows from such a representative

function; that is, if images are a necessary condition for direct

perception, there certainly will be a necessary function for them to

play with the imagination and memory too.

For an Aquinian interpreter to adopt Position A— that a phan

tasm is used as an image in direct perception— there would immediately

arise tremendous textual difficulties in the writings of Thomas. Ad

1 indicated earlier, this position would, in effect, reduce Aquinas

into a Cartesian representative realist.- Position A, however, seems

untenable as an interpretation of Aquinian perceptual theory for two

reasons: 1) Aquinas provides an explicit account of representative

realism and rejects it— for textual substantiation, 1 refer the reader

to Chapters One and Two of this dissertation— 2) This present dis

cussion must be considered in view of the recently discussed passages

in which Aquinas Is explicitly denying that a phantasm is in any way

involved with direct perception. If Aquinas is to be made into a

representative realist, then this image— which is the interpretation

of Che phantasm— must be involved in direct perception. However, it has already been extensively shown that a) Aquinas does not drive an eplstemological wedge between the mental act and its physical object, and b) that the phantasm la in no way a part of the workings of the faculties of the external sensorium. 234

In addition, I can find no textual evidence that Aquinas ever argues that the phantasm is an image in the Cartesian sense. For example, in the Suznma Theologica, Aquinas defines the phantasm in the following manner: "...the phantasm is the likeness of an individual thing." (S.T., I, Q. 84, a. 7, ad 2.) Furthermore, it is important to realize that the term translated as "likeness" is "sintllltudo" and not "imago". Textually, however, some translators have rendered similitude Into English as "image", but this is purely a translator’s interpretative preference and has no textual basis in the Latin corpus as such.

"Likeness"

There Is a structural point to be made here, however, concern ing Aquinas' use of the term similitudo and not imago. As 1 indicated earlier in this present chapter, Aquinas did have the term imaRo in his philosophical language and did indeed use it within the confines of the

Sumna Theologica. Note the following account of image as presented in the Sumroa Theologica:

The idea of image includes likeness. Still, not any kind of likeness suffices for the nature of image, but only likeness of a species, or at least of some specific sign. In corporeal things the specific sign seems to be especially the figure. For we see that the species of different animals are of dif ferent figures, but not of different colors. Hence if the color of anything is depicted on a wall, this is not called an image unless the figure is likewise depicted. But neither the likeness of species nor that of figure is enough for an image, for it requires also the idea of origin; because as Augpstine says, "One egg is not the image of another, because it is not derived from it." Therefore, for a true image it is required that one thing proceed from another like to it in species, or at least in specific sign.... S.T., I, Q. 33, a. 1.

He continues:

Image, properly speaking, means whatever proceeds forth in likeness to another. That to the likeness of which any thing proceeds, is properly speaking the exemplar, and is improperly called the image. Ibid. ad 1.

Aquinas goes on with a two-fold distinction:

The image of a thing may be found in something in two ways. In one way, it is found in something of the same specific nature; as the image of the king is found in his son. In another way, it is found In something of a different nature, as the king's image on the coin. In the first sense the bon is the Image of the Father; in the second sense, man is called the image of Cod. And so, in order to express the imperrect character of the divine image in man, man is not simply called the image, but "to the image"; whereby is expressed a certain movement on one tending to perfection. But it cannot be said that Son of God is "to the image", because He is the perfect Image of the Father. Ibid. a . 2, ad 3.

I have included the above rather lengthy passages because I believe It is Important to realize that Aquinas did actually possess the term "imago11 in his philosophical vocabulary. Accordingly, if he wanted to use such a term when referring to direct awareness of things In the external world, he could easily have made such a choice as the term was quite obviously at his disposal. Furthermore, he did not just use the term "imago" once or twice, but wrote two articles about it under the title of De Imagine in Question XXXV.

It is important to realize here how the term image is used. In effect, Aquinas would be at one with Descartes over the precise

import of an Image. The Image Is an additional entity which not only

resembles the original but is derived from it In some way or other.

The crucial point here, however, Is that there are two entitles In

any discussion of an Image— the thing from which the image originates

or la derived from and the image or copy Itself. As Aquinas claims,

an image is not any kind of likeness, but only a likeness which pro

ceeds forth from some originating principle. This is very important

here. My claim is that if Aquinas wanted to he a representative realist

then he would have used imago to be that which the mind is directly

aware of when there is sense perception. If the phantasm is an image

used in direct perception, this would be its use. However, Aquinas

quite explicitly does not ever use the term imago, even though it

is plainly evident that he could have made use of this term if it were to express what he really desired in providing an assay of per

ception. The point is, however, that there is no such thing as an

"Intermediary entity" for Aquinas in perception. Aquinas does indeed

use the term slnilltudo when discussing direct perception; however,

this is to be taken as a species impressa— to use of vocabulary of

John of St. Thomas— which is that "by means of which" the sense faculty

is aware of a proper and/or a common sensible and not the direct object of perception Itself— i.e., the species impressa is not the direct object of perception. In other words, the species Impressa is not what is perceived but rather that by which the sense perceives. I believe the above passages concerning the use of imago are crucially 237

important in illustrating why Aquinas did not Intentionally use such

a term when considering sense perception. He obviously could have

if he had wanted to beo a representative realist— but that was not

his desire in providing an epistemological assay so he deliberately

chose not to use imago in that he was opting for direct realism

rather than representative realism. Accordingly} I believe there are

deep structural reasons for Aquinas not to have used imago when con

sidering sense perception. All in all} therefore, the brunt of proof

for such a claim of representative realism in Aquinas is on the one

making such a claim; furthermore, such a claim must take into con

sideration the texts in the Summa Theologica in which Aquinas ex

plicitly speaks of imago.

The present elucidation is far from complete, however. What

has just been asserted about similitudo— i.e., likeness— obviously

needs much explication. Within the confines of the Summa Theologica,

the following passages are discovered which denote a reference to

likeness:

...the phantasm is the likeness of an individual thing S.T., I, Q. 84, a. 7, ad 2.

But phantasms, since they are likenesses of individuals and exist in corporeal organs.... Ibid., Q. 85, a. 1, ad 3.

Therefore material things must needs be understood ac cording as they are abstracted from matter and from material likenesses, namely, phantasms. I b i d Q . 85, a. 1.

In all of these passages, the phantasm is used as some type of likeness originating from an Individual, material thing. This 238 would refer to Position 6 above. In other words, the likeness is a composite resemblance of the individual thing perceived. In effect, structurally, this would be a "residu" of the unified composite whole perceived by the sensus communis from the discrete data received from the external senses. The notion of residue will be explained later.

In effect, it will refer to a retaining of the content of a direct awareness by the external sensorium.

This, however, is not the only use of the term likeness when Aquinas is considering sensation. The following passages must also be con sidered in which a new twist is given to the very same term:

Hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing.... The likeness of a sensible thing is the form of the sense in act. S.T., I, Q. 85, a. 2.

But the sensible species is not what is perceived, but rather that b£ which the sense perceives. Ibid., sed contra.

Here, Aquinas is using likeness in reference to direct per ception. It is true that a sensible species or what the later scho lastics referred to as a species Impressa— which is the immaterial likeness of an immediate data of sensation, as a red, or a square or any other of the proper or common senslbles— is a likeness had in direct perception. If my previous analysis of phantasm is correct, then this likeness which occurs during direct perception must of

necessity be different from the likeness which was used by Aquinas

in considering phantasms. One more use of likeness must be con

sidered and then I will attempt to offer a structural account of the 239 term simllltudo which will unravel the different uses of likeness.

Likeness is also used when Aquinas considers concept-formation.

It is correct that a detailed analysis of concept-formation is beyond the bounds of this present inquiry; however, Aquinas does use the term likeness in such a discussion and thus it is worth while to see how it fits in with the other uses of the same term. The following passage is an illustration of the use of likeness by Aquinas when considering the faculty of the understanding:

The likeness through which we understand is the species of the thing known in the knower. S.T., I, Q. 83, a. 8, ad 3.

The Latin of a Aimilar expression is as follows:

...conceptio intellectus est siwilitudo rei intellectus. Ibid., Q. 27, a. 2.

In this respect, Aquinas is arguing that the intellectual species is that by means of which a knower is able to have intellect ual knowledge— l.e, the means by which a knower is aware of essences or attains an awareness of a "quldditas".

I want to argue that Aquinas has three distinct and different uses of similltudo. 1 will delineate them as Likeness-1, Likeness-2, and Likeness-3. Aquinas himself does not distinguish these various uses, although John of St* Thomas does Introduce the terms species impressa and species expressa to aid in understanding this difficult aspect of Aquinian interpretation. Although helpful, I do not think that these distinctions of John of St.Thomas, which have been generally 240 adopted by latter day scholastic philosophers, alone offer a com plete structural account of likeness. Hopefully, this point will become clearer as this discussion proceeds.

First of all, 1 want to argue that Llkeness-1 is the actual disposition of the sense faculty which is received from the sensible object in the external world. This disposition makes the sense faculty ready to perceive red rather than purple. Such a use of Llkeness-1 entails that it is a means or necessary condition of perception; however, it is not the object of perception. Accordingly, Likeness-1 is not an image in the sense of Cartesian representative realism.

Llkeness-2, on the other hand, Is the remnants of the actual perception. It will be analyzed in terms of the necessary conditions of perception, which 1 previously characterized as a necessary tri adic relation, NC(O-M-F). It will be seen, moreover, that Likeness-2 is what one might common sensically refer to as "experience", as when one distinguishes the seasoned veteran from the rookie In that the former has more ‘‘know-how" than the latter. This sense of like ness, as we shall see later, Is an Important part of the correct analysis of a phantasm. Likeness-2, in the analysis of the phantasm as such, will further be divided into Phantasm-1, Phantasm-2 and Phan tasm-3. Accordingly, Likeness-2 will be a crucial pivot for the re mainder of this Inquiry.

Finally, Likeness-3 is the intellectual species which is the ability to possess intellectual knowledge or conceptual knowledge as expressed by having a "conceptus". On our previous analysis, this 241 would be Disposition-2 of the Intellectual faculty. Likeness-3 is, in ray analysis, what Peter Geach in Mental Acts refers to as a

"capacity" or "disposition", which ultimately is his analysis of a concept. In other words, disposition is Geach1s basis for under standing Aquinas1 treatment of concept-formation.

A further consideration must be made regarding Likeness-2.

To illustrate this point, I must return t.o a passage from the Summa

Theologica which I have previously quoted:

There are two operations in the sensitive part. One is limited to immutation ard thus the operation of the senses themselves takes place when the senses are impressed by the sensible. The other is formation, inasmuch as the imagination forms for Itself an image of an absent thing,or even of something never seen. S.T., I, Q. 85, a. 2, ad 2.

The ’'iraautationnconsidered in the first part of the quotation refers to Likeness-(l). This is the likeness formed in the sense faculty by the sensible object outside of the mind and what renders the faculty Dlsposed-2 for perception. The second operation forms the species expressa which the scholastic commentators have discussed.

Yet this is not the phantasm per se either. This image is a sufficient condition for the existence of a phantasm but not a necessary condition.

It Is Interesting to note here that the Latin term for "image" is "indolum" and not slmilitudo. Accordingly, indolua is the result of the creative capacity of the imagination. The phantasm as a Likeness-2 Is either a) the material from which the imagination creatively forms 242

an indolmn* b) the indolum Itself* or c) the material from which

the intellectus agens abstracts or "makes1' a conceptus. These dif-

ferent uses of phantasm will become clear as the present discussion

unfolds. In effect* however* my claim is that any view which reduces

a phantasm to just a mere image is not a correct structural assay of

Aquinas' epistemology.

Having considered what a phantasm is not* it is now time to

consider what positive account might be given to such a crucial yet ever so nebulous an Aquinian eplstemological entity. My positive account will dwell heavily on what has already been stated concerning phantasms as well as some interesting passages from the Commentary

Itself. In the Commentary* we find the following passage:

He explains that the actions and passions of animals are governed by the phantasia. Phnatasms* he says* dwell within in the absence of sensible objects* as traces of actual sensations; therefore* just as sensations arouse appetitive impulses while the sensed objects are present, so do phan tasms when these are absent. Com on the Soul # 669.

In offering an analysis of this passage, 1 want to focus attention on the words "phantasms...dwell within as traces of actual sensations." My claim here is that the term phantasm is itself a term referring to three different aspects of a process of "dwelling within" in the internal sensorium. We have already seen that the internal senses of imagination* vis cogitatlva and sense memory are the only sense faculties in which phantasms reside— "...the powers in which the phantasms reside* namely* imagination, memory and cogi- 243

Cation." Furthermore, we have already seen that each of these senses of the internal sensorium Is such that it has a different function; and since Aquinas has adopted as an eplstemological prin ciple that every faculty, as a disposition, is determined by its object, and since he is claiming that there are indeed three fac ulties of the internal sensorium, then it follows that each of these must have a different object. But he has already asserted that the phantasms belong to each of these faculties in the role of determin ing their objects. Accordingly, I must conclude that^ that in order for Aquinas to be consistent, there are necessarily three different senses of phantasm, each of which corresponds to a different faculty of the internal sensorium. I will classify such distinctions re garding phantasms as Phantasm-1, which will be connected with the imagination, Phantasm-2, which will be connected with the vis cogi tative, and Phantasm-3, which will be connected with the sense memory. Such a division, furthermore, will contribute to a more adequate understanding of concept-formation as developed by both

Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics and by Aquinas in his Commentary on that specific Aristotelian logical treatise. It must be noted, however, that all three divisions of phantasms are grouped under

Likeness-2.

Concerning Phantasm-1, I must refer back to what has already been stated regarding the function of the imagination. This Internal sense was seen to be the "storehouse" of the sensible forms. What this means, 1 want to claim, is that there is a residue left from each mental awareness of the external sensorlum— i.e., the external senses in conjunction with the sensus communis. When the act of per ception as such was considered, it will be recalled that my analysis of the necessary condition of perception for each external sense was in terms of a triadic relation, NC(O-M-F). This in effect claimed that it was necessary in order for perception to occur that there be a sensible object, appropriate medium and disposed faculty. My claim is that Phantasm-1 is the residue of what was perceived in accord with the necessary conditions which were part of the actual exercise of the external senses in direct perception. Phantasm-1, however, is not to be confused with Likeness-1 which has already been discussed.

Likeness-1 will be one of the necessary conditions for perception— the properly disposed faculty— whereas perception Itself demands all three necessary conditions— properly disposed faculty, adequate med ium and suitable sensible object, either proper or common sensible.

Accordingly, what is "stored' in the imagination is a residue of the content perceived by the external sensorium. As was indicated above, the ultimate object of the external sensorlum was the concrete whole. This concrete whole was a result of the workings of the the external sensorlum itself. The external senses were the means by which a perceiver was aware of the proper and common sensibles.

Now a necessary condition of the faculty being able to contribute to perception was a three-term necessary relation. Each awareness of a quality was had Insofar as it actually was an Instantiation of

NC(O-M-F). The concrete whole then was a conjunction of perceptions 245 determined by a series of triadic relations. Now the product of this conjunction— i.e., the exact way a bundle of qualities was perceived by the external sensorlum— Is what, as a residue, becomes Phantasm-1

In other words, my claim Is that Phantasm-1 is the residue of the actual perceptual experience of the external senses. Thus, If per ception Is to occur at all, there had to be these three necessary conditions for each external sense which I have expressed in the form of a necessary triadic relation. Phantasm-1 Is an imprint of the product of the conjunction of a series of perceptions determined by the necessary conditions of each perceptual experience, which product is implanted on the imagination. Aquinas claims, as we have already seen, that the vis imaglnativa is the "thesaurus" of the received sensible impressions. Accordingly, Phantasm-1 Is one type of Likc- ness-2.

It seems that most commentators, both within the traditional scholastic school as well as philosophers of the analytic school, have primarily dwelt on this one aspect of the phantasm. I do want to insist, however, that all of these commentators have greatly mis understood the role of the phantasm. In addition, Scholastic com mentators and their students have sometimes confused the species impressa with the phantasm. This, however, is not the case. The species impressa is equal to Likeness-1, which in turn is only one of the necessary conditions of a three-term necessary relation for perception. I want to categorically Insist that the phantasm and the species impressa are completely and totally different and distinct 246

eplstemological categories. Secondly, the phantasm Is neither

a sense datum nor a full-blown image. Some commentators, as I have

indicated, have implied that the phantasm is to be understood as an

image at all times. Yet neither of these positions will hold as

Phantasm-1 is to be understood as the Imprint of a perception, which

imprint Is beyond actual perception or direct awareness by the ex

ternal sensorlum. A Phantasm-1 does not have to be an object of

an act of awareness; it is merely a residue of a previous actual

sensation, which residue is in terms of the product of a conjunction

of a series of perceptions determined by the triadic relations which

comprised the necessary conditions for the act of direct awareness

in the first place.

One further note must be considered while discussion Phan

tasm-1. As 1 Indicated earlier when considering the imagination as well as when briefly considering Likeness-2 just above, It seems that the imagination has two functions for Aquinas. First of all, it is

the thesaurus for the sensible forms, which I have just discussed as

Phantasm-1. Furthermore, the imagination has a certain creative

capacity in that it can form compound images from the experienced data in the thesaurus itself. Thus one can form the image of a golden mountain. Aquinas writes as follows:

This is also a use of a phantasm, but it is more properly called

an indolum, as Aquinas himself so states in the Sumna Theologies. I

will admit that Aquinas is somewhat blurry on this matter of Indolum

versus phantasm, as in the Commentary we find that "...phantasms come

during sleep when the senses are not in act." (Com On the Soul £ 647)

Accordingly, a dream image as well as a formed image of something

never seen applies to the functioning of the imagination. If we are

to call this too a phantasm, then we must further distinguish it

from Phantasn-1; we might call it Phantasm-la. However, I prefer to

classify both the dream image as well as the "created" image-day-

dreaming, as it were— as an indolum— which indeed is an Aquinian term— and thus not introduce another distinction into a dissertation already

too full of such analytic devices. Suffice it to say that a Phantasiu-1 need not always be the object of a direct awareness of the vis imagi

native; when It is such an object, then it is an indolum. Yet It can be a Phantasm-1 without being the object of direct awareness— it can be just "there" as the residue of a former direct perception in terms of a triadic relation.

In summary, therefore, I am arguing that Phantasm-1 is an

imprint of an actual perception stored in the imagination. And what is this imprint but that unified product of a conjunction of a series of perceptions determined by the three-term necessary relations which were necessary in order to have had a perception at all. Accordingly,

Phantasm-1 is an imprint in the imagination of this product— the like ness— which product is nothing other than the result of the necessary 248

conditions for perception by the external senses which has been

unified by the sensua communis. Hopefully, this account of Phan

tasm- 1 in terms of a triadic relation will both aid in understanding

the other two senses of phantasm as well as greatly contribute to our understanding of the intellectus agens and its structure in

"abstracting1' or "forming" the intellectual species from the phan

tasms.

Phantasm-2 is involved in the process by which the vis cogl-

tativa perceives an individual object as a particular thing or in dividual. As was indicated earlier, the object of the vis cogitativa

is not just a concrete whole as unified by the sensua communis but rather an individual object as such; in other words, the vis cogi

tativa is the faculty by which a human percelver is aware of an in dividual as an individual of a kind and not just as a bundle of sensations. In the Suroma Theologies, we find the following passage:

Sense knows things from being impressed with their likeness. Now this likeness can be taken at three stages. First, immediately and directly, as when the likeness of color is in the sight; so also with other proper scnslbles in their appropriate senses. Secondly, directly but not Immediately, as when the likeness of bodily shape or size is in the sight; so also with the sense-objects shared through several senses. Thirdly, neither immediately nor directly, as when the likeness of man is in the sight; he is not there because he is a man, but because he is a colored object. S.T., 1, Q« 17, a 2*

This passage is quite Interesting in that it explicitly speaks to the differences in use of "similltudo1' about which 1 spoke above.

The likeness which Aquinas considers when treating of both the proper and the common sensibles Is Likeness-1; both of these are directly

caused by the sensible qualities existing in the external world.

However, the incidental object of sense— which is also spoken of as a likeness in the above passage— is also considered as not being produced by the object as being directly perceived. It must be noted how Aquinas refers to what is directly perceived: "...as when

the likeness of man is in the sight; he is not there because he is a man, but because he Is a colored object." In other words, the external senses in conjunction with the sensus communis do not per ceive "man" as such; rather, they perceive "white-tall-stovepipe- shape". Accordingly, some aspect or contribution of the internal sensorlum is necessary in order to account for how a human perceiver is aware of individuals as individuals of a kind and not merely as bundles of sensations; this, moreover, does seem to be a datum of our experience. 1 want to argue that there must be a different sense of "likeness'* here than the sense used with the proper and common sensibles— i.e., Likeness-1. This likeness associated with the incidental object of sense will be classified as a Likeness-2; furthermore, it will also be called Phantasm-2. In other words, it is by means of a phantasm that a perceiver is able to recognize Jones as Jones the man and not just as any old perceived bundle of sensations. The structure of such a phantasm would be composed of .the residue stored in the thesaurus of the imagination plus an additional character, (C), which would denote the indi vidual in question as being a member of a kind. I want to further 250 argue that Phantasm-2 does not occur unless there have been ex periences which have previously produced Phantasm-1. In other words,

Phantasm-1 will be a necessary condition for Phantasm-2. It must be noted, however, that Phantasm-1 Is not a sufficient condition for

Phantasm-2; this merely reiterates the claim which 1 have been as serting all along that the internal sensorlum is itself an active contributor and is not just a passive receptor of sensations or im pressions. Accordingly, David Hume's distinction between ideas and

Impressions which laid stress on the claim.that the former were nothing more than faint copies of the latter is completely foreign to Aquinas' structure for the internal sensorlum. The Internal sense of the vis cogitative is itself an active sense faculty which can interpret the bundles of sensations which are unified by the sensus communis from the discrete objects of the external senses. In the case of the vis cogitativa, this internal sense unifies a certain set of data— a concrete whole— with a particular name and with a specific kind. The name— which in this case will be somewhat like a Russellian use of a proper name as that which refers to a definite

Individual— will be further joined with a recognition of a characteris tic (C) which puts the individual into a certain class. That such a recognition requires previous experience should be obvious. This is what Aquinas is referring to when he claims that in the beginning a child refers to all of the men he sees as "daddy"; it is only after a while that the child can distinguish his own "dad" from his uncle, the fireman, and his older brother. Such a recognition is accom- 251 pllshed by the vis cogitativa, which is that faculty by which an

individual as individual is perceived and also perceived as a member

of a kind.

This phantasm, then, Is not an object of knowledge as such.

Rather it is the conditioning or the act of the vis cogitative by means of which an individual is so recognized. The Phantasm-2, then, interprets the object by conditioning the mental awareness itself of the vis cogitativa.

Phantasm-3 is nothing more than a stored- Phantasm-2. When discussing the sense memory above, it was pointed out that the function of such a faculty was that it stored the objects of the vis cogitativa. Accordingly, if Phantasm-2 is the structured perception of the vis cogitativa, then Phantasm-3 must be closely related to

Phantasm-2. The sense memory was the faculty which "dated1' a per ception of an individual as a perception of a certain time. Thus, a perceiver can remember the picnic during which Aunt Minnie got

"plowed". This is accomplished by means of Fhantasm-3 The dif ference between Phantasm-2 and Phantasm-3 is that the latter has a temporal characteristic of "pastness" in addition to the individual characteristic. In effect, the above claim is admitting that human percelvers do have a special faculty which "stores" direct recognition of individual persons as members of a kind. Accordingly, this amounts to the claim that one's perceptual experience— i.e., what one has been aware of— is not limited to past awarenesses of "bundle of sen sations", but also to awarenesses of "individuals of a kind". 252

Primary Substance and the Vis Cogitativa

In conclusion* it seems that the vis cogitativa is the crucial sense faculty in Aquinas' theory of sense perception. It is by the

"conditioned awareness1 of this faculty— an awareness which uses

Phantasms-2 as a vehicle— that the individuals of the world— which are in effect, the primary substances of the Aquinlan ontology— are known.

Insofar as Aquinas maintains that there is Indeed a world of indi viduals, he also provides the epistemological machinery by which a human perceiver can indeed be aware of these individuals. Further more, because a primary substance is an individual of a kind— which kind is determined by the substantial form— the vis cogitativa is also aware of an individual as one belonging to a "kind". The vis cogitativa, then, explains after a Kantian fashion the possibility for perception of primary substances.

This inquiry, therefore, is brought to a close. By means of a complicated perceptual theory Involving both an external sensorlum and an internal sensorlum, Aquinas has attempted to provide a com prehensive account of how a human perceiver is aware of the world around him. Yet this account of sense knowledge is but half of the

Aquinlan epistemology, as concept-formation and concept-exercise are extremely important for Aquinas. It seems, moreover, that the aware ness of a primary substance by the via cogitativa is an Important step leading to the formation of a concept* When such a concept becomes second intentional, then the universal is known as "one applying to many". And it is this second intentional consciousness 2S3 which Aquinas is really interested in— for when one has an adequate assemblage of second intentional concepts* then one has sclentla; and it is to this stage that all knowledge is ordered, for when one in deed has scientia, then one is a wise man— the philosopher— or he who knows. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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______* Commentary on Aristotle(s Physics. Translated by Richard J. Blackwell, Pilchard J. Spath, and W. Edmund Thirlkel, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963.

______. Commentary of the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Trans lated by John P. Rowan. Library of Living Catholic Thought. Vol. I. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1961.

______. "On Being and Essence." Philosophy in the West. Edited by Joseph Katz and Rudolph H. Weingartner. Translated by John Wellmuth and John Wilkinson. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1965.

______. Philosophical Texts. Translated by Thomas Gilby. New York: Oxford University Press, I960.

______.Summa Contra Gentiles. Book I. Translated as On the Truth of the Catholic Faith by Anton C. Pegis. Image Books. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955.

______. Summa Theologiae. Prima Pars. 3rd Edition. (Leonine Edition of Latin Text.) Matriti: Biblioteca De Autores Christienos, 1961.

. Summa Theologica.Translated by the English Dominican Fathers. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1918.

. "Man" (1a 75-83). Summa Theologica. Vol.XI. Translated by Timothy Suttor. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970.

. "Human Intelligence" (1a 84.-89). Summa Theologica. Vol.XII. Translated by Paul T. Durbin. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968.

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______. Introduction to S3int Thomas Aouinas. New York: Random House, Inc., 1945.

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