71-27,511 LISSKA, Anthony Joseph, 1940- ROLE OF PHANTASMS IN AQUINIAN PERCEPTUAL THEORY. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1971 Philosophy University Microfilms, A XEROXCompany , Ann Arbor, Michigan (£) Copyright by Anthony Joseph Lisska 1971 THIS DISSERTATION HAS SEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED ROLE OF PHANTASMS IN AQUINIAN PERCEPTUAL THEORY DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Anthony Joseph Lisska, A.B., A.M. ***** The Ohio State University 1971 pproved by Department of Philosophy ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This dissertation owes its inception, development and completion to many, many people. To my former teachers at St. Stephen's College, I owe my first thoughtful introduction to the philosophy of St. Thomas. Had it not been for their care and insistence upon disciplined scholarship, I would never have ventured into an analysis of an Aquinlan topic. To Fr. Pierre Conway, O.P., who knows the texts of St. Thomas better than anyone 1 know, I am grateful for many hours spent discussing references and meanings of the Aquinian corpus. To Professors Allan Hausman and Ivan Boh I owe a special word of thanks for the many good and really perceptive comments made during the development of this dissertation. To Professor Robert G. Turnbull this dissertation owes very much indeed. Not only did Professor Turnbull spend many hours worrying with me over the epistemological "chestnuts" discussed in this dissertation, but, beyond the limits of this dissertation, it was Professor Turnbull who, as a teacher, forced me to re-think and ultimately re-appreciate the epistemological Insights of St. Thomas. To Professor Turnbull I owe any success I have at using the tools of analysis on the writings of the medieval philosophers. To my mother and my aunt, Mrs. Florence Lisska and Mrs. Howard Stokes I am grateful for their painstaking efforts at proof-reading the final draft. To Mrs. Mary Ann Richards I owe special thanks for quickly typing sections of the final manuscript. And finally and in a very special way I owe very much to my wife, Marianne, who not only lovingly put up with a very irrita­ ble husband during the many stages of development of this disserta­ tion, but who also typed, read, edited, re-read, corrected and generally worried along with me over what Aquinas really was try­ ing to say about phantasms. It is to her that this dissertation is dedicated. 11 VITA July 23, 1940 . Born- Columbus, Ohio 1963 .......... A.B., Providence College, Providence, Rhode Island 1967 ...... A.M., St. Stephen's College, Dover, Massachusetts 1965-1967 . Teaching Assistant, Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 1967-1969 . Teaching Associate, Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 1969, Spring * . Visiting Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, Denison University, Granville, Ohio 1969, 1970 . Visiting Summer Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, Ohio Dominican College, Columbus, Ohio 1969-present . Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Denison University, Granville, Ohio A.M. Thesis: "Analysis of John Stuart Mill's Theory of the Syllogism" FIELDS OF STUDY Major Fields: Metaphysics, Epistemology, Medieval Philosophy Studies in Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Professors William A. Wallace, O.P., Michael Stock, O.P., and Eugene Bondi,-0.P. Studies in Analytic Philosophy of Perception. Professors Robert G. Turnbull, Herbert Hochberg, Alan Hausmann, and Morris Weitz. Studies in Metaphysics. Professors E.J. Nelson and J.C. Taylor, O.P. Ill TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................... 11 VITA ..................................................... Ill LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS...................................... vi Chapter I. AQUINAS ON INTENTIONALITY..................... 1 Aquinas as an Empiricist Principles of Intentionality........... II. AQUINAS AS A DIRECT REALIST.............. 27 Direct vs Representative Realism Source Material ill. EPlSi'EMOLOtltAL DiSPOSillOWS................. 42 The Empedoclean Principle Conceptual Dispositions Perceptual Dispositions IV. OBJECTS AND FACULTIES......................... - 72 Priority of Object Objects of Sensation Non-veridical Awareness Common Sensible and Incidental Object Incidental Object and Vis Cogitative Common Sensibles and Secondary Qualities V. PRECONDITIONS OF VISUAL AWARENESS............ 103 Sight and Its Object Light and the Diaphanum Light and Color Color and Sight iv Chapter page VI. NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR PERCEPTION........ 125 The Triadic Relation Causal Aspects Direct Realism VII. THE INTERNAL SENSES........... 154 Kantian Possibility and the Internal Senses The Four Internal Senses Aquinas vs Avicenna VIII. THE SENSUS COMMUNIS........................... 164 Function of Sensus Communis Sensus Communis as "Root'1 of Sensation Power of Reflection Sensus Communis and External Sensorlum IX. THE IMAGINATION................................. 183 Phantasla and Imagination Function of Imagination Imagination and Early Modern Philosophy X. THE VIS COGITATIVA............................. 194 Vis Aestlmativa vs Vis Cogitativa Awareness of Individuals The Individual as of a Kind The Sense Memory XI. PHANTASMS...................... 212 Alternative Interpretations Sense Datum Position Location of Phantasm Image Position '‘Likeness" Primary Substance and Vis Cogitativa BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................... 254 ABBREVIATIONS The following abbreviations for the works of Thomas Aquinas are used throughout this dissertation: S.T. Summa Theologies S.C.G . Summa Contra Gentiles Com. On the Soul . - Commentary on Aristotle19 On the >oul (Expositio in III Libros De Anir.a) Com. On the Physics. Commentary on Aristotle * s Physics (Expositio in VIII Libros Physicorum) In referring to the two Summae, I have used the conventional notation. Thus, S.T., 1, Q. 78, a. 4, sed contra, would refer to the Prima Pars of the Summa Theologica, Question Seventy- Eight, the sed contra of the fourth article. vi CHAPTER I AQUINAS ON INTENTIONALITY Aquinas as an Empiricist In two very real senses of the term, Thomas Aquinas Is to be considered as an empiricist In his theory of knowledge. In the first place, Aquinas adamantly refused to admit Into his ontology any subsistent entities which would serve as objects of knowledge but which would go beyond the data of direct experience. In this regard, Thomas Is structurally very much like the Quine of "On What There Is" In that both are rejecting the "overpopulated universe". Any account of knowledge, therefore, which admits of a subsistent realm of Platonic Forms or Moorean Propositions will be quite un­ acceptable to Aquinas' mode of doing epistemology. As will be In­ dicated later In this dissertation, in both sense knowledge as well as in concept-formation, Aquinas is basically opting for a struc­ tured mental act; it is by means of this structured mental act that he is able, both with the senses and the Intellect, to philo­ sophically undercut any epistemologlcal need for positing a realm of subsistent objects in his ontology. Secondly, Aquinas is an empiricist in that he does adopt as an epistemologlcal axiom the following statement: "Nihil est in Intellectu quod non prlus est in sensu." This acceptance, however, must be qualified. Aquinas will admit more to a Lelbnizean position on this axiom than to a Lockean or Berkelean position. In other words* Aquinas would structurally be very much In sympathy with Leibniz's characterization of Locke's dictum* "Nihil est in in- tellectu quod non prlus est in sensu nisi intellectus ipse," than he would of any form of straight-forward Anglo-American empiricism. This claim will also become apparent when the role of the intellectus agens is briefly considered later in this dissertation. This notion of a structure to concept-formation, which is the role of the in­ tellectus agens in Aquinas' epistemology, will find a very detailed parallel in Aquinas' account of the workings of the internal sen- sorium. Even though Aquinas is indeed working within an empiricist epistemologlcal context, he does have a dual position on knowledge. This dual position consists of sense knowledge— which includes direct awareness of sense objects by the external sensorlum and phantasm-formatlon by the internal sensorlum— and intellectual knowledge— which is concept-formatlon and also the exercise of such concepts in understanding. The following two passages explicitly indicate this two-fold division regarding knowledge: ...He (Aristotle) sets himself to discriminate between actual sensation and thinking; and he finds the first reason for distinguishing these activities in the differ­ ence between their objects, i.e., the sense-objects and the intelligible objects which are attained by actual sensation and actual thinking respectively. Com* on the Soul # 375 3 Aquinas continues this discussion by further considering the objects of the two categories of knowledge: The sense objects which actuate sensitive activities-- the visible, the audible, etc.— exist outside the soul; the reason being that actual sensation attains to the individual things which exist externally; whereas rational knowledge is of universals which exist somehow within the soul. Whence it is clear that the man who already has scientific knowledge about certain things does not need to seek such things out­ side of himself; he already possesses them inwardly, and is able, unless prevented