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Bibliography of the Writings of Gustav Bergmann Bibliography of the Writings of Gustav Bergmann 1928 Zur Axiomatik der Elementargeometrie. Weiner Akademie Der Wissenschaften, 26, (1928): 1-3. 1929 Über eine mit den Hypertorsen verwandte Flachenklasse. Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik, 36, (1929): 259-268. Zur Axiomatik der Elementargeometrie. Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik, 36, (1929): 269-284. 1930 Ebenen und Bewegungsgruppen in Riemannschen Räumen. Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker Vereiningung, 39, (1930): 54-55. (with E. Lukács) Ebenen und Bewegungsgruppen in Riemannschen Räumen. Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik, 37, (1930): 303-324. (with E. Lukács) 1931 Zwei Bemerkungen zur abstracten und kombinatorischen Topologie. Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik, 38, (1931): 245-256. 1932 Zur algebraisch-axiomatischen Begründung der Topologie. Mathematische Zeitschrift, 35, (1932): 502-511. 1935 Zur analytischen Theorie literarischer Wertmasstäbe. Imago, 21, (1935): 498-504. 1940 On Physicalistic Models of Non-Physical Terms. Philosophy of Science, 7, (1940): 151- 158. On Some Methodological Problems of Psychology. Philosophy of Science, 7, (1940): 205-219. The Subject Matter of Psychology. Philosophy of Science, 7, (1940): 415-433. 1941 The Logic of Probability. American Journal of Physics, 9, (1941): 263-272. Operationism and Theory in Psychology. Psychological Review, 48, (1941): 1-14. (with K. Spence) 1942 An Empiricist Schema of the Psychophysical Problem. Philosophy of Science, 9, (1942): 72-91. Syntactical Analysis of the Class Calculus. Philosophy of Science, 9, (1942): 227-232. Remarks Concerning the Epistemology of Scientific Empiricism. Philosophy of Science, 9, (1942): 283-293. The Indexical and Presentative Function of Signs. Philosophy of Science, 9, (1942): 372- 374. 1943 Notes on Identity. Philosophy of Science, 10, (1943): 163-166. Psychoanalysis and Experimental Psychology: A Review from the Standpoint of Scientific Empiricism. Mind, 52, (1943): 122-140. Outline of an Empiricist Philosophy of Physics. American Journal of Physics, 11, (1943): 248-258 and 335-342. 1944 The Logic of Psychophysical Measurement. Psychological Review, 51, (1944): 1-24. (with K. Spence) An Empiricist’s System of the Sciences. Scientific Monthly, 59, (1944): 140-148. Holism, Historicism, and Emergence. Philosophy of Science, 11, (1944): 209-221. Pure Semantics, Sentences, and Propositions. Mind, 53, (1944): 238-257. Notes on Identity. Philosophy of Science, 11, (1944): 123-124. 1945 The Formalism in Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law. Ethics, 55, (1945): 110-130. (with L. Zerby) A Positivistic Metaphysics of Consciousness. Mind, 54, (1945): 193-226. Frequencies, Probabilities, and Positivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 6, (1945): 26-44. Review of Ebenstein’s The Pure Theory of Law. Ethics, 56, (1945): 71-72. Review of Ortega y Gasset’s The Mission of the University. Journal of American History (formerly Mississippi Valley Historical Review), 32, (1945): 266-267. 1946 Remarks on Realism. Philosophy of Science, 13, (1946): 261-273. (also in The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, 1954) Some Comments on Carnap’s Logic of Induction. Philosophy of Science, 13, (1946): 71- 78. Review of Cohen’s The Faith of a Liberal. Iowa Law Review, 32, (1946): 178-181. 1947 The Logic of Quanta. American Journal of Physics, 15, (1947): 397-408 and 497-508. Russell on Particulars. Philosophical Review, 56, (1947): 59-72. (also in The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, 1954) Undefined Descriptive Predicates. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 8, (1947): 55-82. Sense Data, Linguistic Conventions, and Existence. Philosophy of Science, 14, (1947): 152-163. (also in The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, 1954) Review of Kelsen’s General Theory of Law and State. Ethics, 57, (1947): 213-215. 1948 Conditions for an Extensional Elementaristic Language. Analysis, 8, (1948): 44- 47. (also in The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, 1954) Concerning Carnap’s Definition of “Extensional” and “Intensional”. Mind, 57, (1948): 494-495. Contextual Definitions in Nonextensional Languages. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 13, (1948): 140. Descriptions in Nonextensional Contexts. Philosophy of Science, 15, (1948): 353-355. Review of Köhler’s Gestalt Psychology. Psychological Bulletin, 45, (1948): 351-355. 1949 The Finite Representations of S5. Methodos, 1, (1949): 217-219. On Non-Perceptual Intuition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 10, (1949): 263-264. (also in The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, 1954) Professor Ayer’s Analysis of Knowing. Analysis, 9, (1949): 98-106. (also in The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, 1954) A Syntactical Characterization of S5. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 14, (1949): 173-174. Two Criteria for an Ideal Language. Philosophy of Science, 16, (1949): 71-74. Review of Russell’s Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. Physics Today, 2, (1949): 27-28. 1950 Logical Positivism. A History of Philosophical Systems, edited by Vergilius Ferm, Philosophical Library, (1950): 471-482. (also in The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, 1954) Semantics. A History of Philosophical Systems, edited by Vergilius Ferm, Philosophical Library, (1950): 483-492. (also in The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, 1954) A Study of Simple Learning Under Irrelevant Motivational-Reward Conditions. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 40, (1950): 539-551. (with K. Spence and R. Lippitt) A Note on Ontology. Philosophical Studies, 1, (1950): 89-92. (also in The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, 1954) Review of Born’s Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance. Philosophy of Science, 17, (1950): 196-199. 1951 Concerning the Definition of Classes. Mind, 60, (1951): 95-96. Ideology. Ethics, 61, (1951): 205-218. (also in The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, 1954) The Logic of Psychological Concepts. Philosophy of Science, 18, (1951): 92-110. Comments on Professor Hempel’s “The Concept of Cognitive Significance”. Daedalus (formerly Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences), 80, (1951): 78- 86. (also in The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, 1954) Logical Atomism, Elementarism, and the Analysis of Value. Philosophical Studies, 2, (1951): 85-92. (also in The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, 1954) Comments on Storer’s Definition of “Soluble”. Analysis, 12, (1951): 44-48. Review of Schilpp’s (editor) Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist. Philosophical Review, 60, (1951): 269-274. Review of Kraft’s Der Weiner Kreis and Juhos’s Die Erkenntnis und Ihre Leistung. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 12, (1951): 139-143. Review of Lasswell’s and Kaplan’s Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry. Ethics, 62, (1951): 64-65. 1952 Two Types of Linguistic Philosophy. The Review of Metaphysics, 5, (1952): 417- 438. (also in The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, 1954) The Problem of Relations in Classical Psychology. Philosophical Quarterly, (1952): 140-152. (also in The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, 1954) A Criterion of Necessity. The Review of Metaphysics, 6, (1952): 128-129. Two Cornerstones of Empiricism. Synthese, 8, (1952): 435-452. (also in The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, 1954) Multiplicative Closures. Portugaliae Mathematica, 11, (1952): 169-172. Review of Brunswick’s The Conceptual Framework of Psychology. Psychological Bulletin, 49, (1952): 654-656. 1953 Theoretical Psychology. Annual Review of Psychology, 4, (1953): 435-458. The Identity of Indiscernibles and the Formalist Definition of “Identity”. Mind, 62, (1953): 75-79. (also in The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, 1954) Logical Positivism, Language, and the Reconstruction of Metaphysics. Revista Critica di Storia Della Filosofia, 8, (1953): 453-481. (also in The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, 1954) Review of Wisdom’s Other Minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 14, (1953): 112-114. 1954 Particularity and the New Nominalism. Methodos, 6, (1954): 131-147. (also in Meaning and Existence, 1959) Sense and Nonsense in Operationism. Scientific Monthly, 79, (1954): 210-214. (reprinted in The Validation of Scientific Theories, edited by P. Frank, The Beacon Press, (1957): 41-52) Some Remarks on the Ontology of Ockham. Philosophical Review, 63, (1954): 560- 571. (also in Meaning and Existence, 1959) Review of Goetz’s Die Entstehung der Ordnung. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 15, (1954): 287-288. Bodies, Minds, and Acts. (first published in The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, 1954) The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, Longmans, Green and Co., (1954). (reprinted by The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967) 1955 Professor Quine on Analyticity. Mind, 64, (1955): 254-258. (also in Meaning and Existence, 1959) Reduction. Current Trends in Psychology and the Behavioral Sciences, University of Pittsburgh Press, (1955): 59-81. Intentionality. Archivio di Filosofia, Semantica, (1955): 177-216. (also in Meaning and Existence, 1959) Dispositional Properties and Dispositions. Philosophical Studies, 6, (1955): 77-80. Dell’ Ideologia. Occidente, 11, (1955): 519-535. (translation of “Ideology,” 1951) Review of Frenkel-Brunswik’s Psychoanalysis and the Unity of Science. Journal of Philosophy, 52, (1955): 692-695. Review of Nagel’s Sovereign Reason and Other Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 16, (1955): 128-130. Review of Stegmüller’s Metaphysik, Wissenschaft, Skepsis. Philosophical Review, 64, (1955): 655-667. 1956 The Contribution of John B. Watson. Psychological Review, 63, (1956): 265-276. (reprinted in Theories of the Mind, edited by J. Scher,
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