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The Nation Needs a 400-Ship Navy Thomas Callender  SPECIAL REPORT No. 205 | OCTOBER 26, 2018 The Nation Needs a 400-Ship Navy Thomas Callender The Nation Needs a 400-Ship Navy Thomas Callender SR-205 About the Author Thomas Callender is Senior Research Fellow for Defense Programs in the Center for National Defense, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation. Before joining Heritage, he served for five years as Director for Capabilities in the Capabilities and Concepts Directorate of the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy for Policy. This paper, in its entirety, can be found at: http://report.heritage.org/sr205 The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. SPECIAL REPORT | NO. 205 OCTOBER 26, 2018 Table of Contents Introduction........................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Force Requirement Drivers .......................................................................................................................................................... 3 Navy Force Structure Methodology ........................................................................................................................................ 9 13 Carrier Strike Groups ............................................................................................................................................................. 12 15 Expeditionary Strike Groups .............................................................................................................................................. 13 105 Large Surface Combatants ................................................................................................................................................. 16 71 Small Surface Combatants ................................................................................................................................................... 17 54 Combat Logistics Force Ships ............................................................................................................................................. 18 77 Submarines .................................................................................................................................................................................... 19 Total Ship Requirement ............................................................................................................................................................... 20 Endnotes ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 22 iii SPECIAL REPORT | NO. 205 OCTOBER 26, 2018 The Nation Needs a 400-Ship Navy Thomas Callender America’s shipbuilding industrial base has the capacity to build at least an additional 22 amphibious warships, 20 frigates, and 24 combat logistics force ships between FY 2020 and FY 2039: enough to meet the recommended numbers of amphibious warships, small surface combatants, and CLF ships (although the SSC mix would not yet include the 56 recommended frigates). To achieve the 400-ship Navy goal by FY 2039 with the recommended force mix would require an additional $4 billion–$6 billion annually above the current long-range shipbuilding plan. If Congress and the DOD fail to prioritize and provide stable funding for this long-term shipbuilding plan, our nation’s ability to deter aggression and win in conflict when necessary will be at risk. Introduction the globe and shift its presence wherever needed Since its inception, the United States has been without any other nation’s permission. It can do this a maritime nation whose economy and security because the vast majority of the 139 million square depend on the oceans. It was threats to American miles of the world’s oceans are international waters merchant shipping by the Barbary pirates that led and not subject to any one nation’s laws or control.2 Congress to authorize the fledgling U.S. Navy’s A U.S. Navy strike group consisting of warships first six frigates. Maritime trade, first with Europe supported by logistics ships can operate continu- and later with the world, has fueled our economy ously at sea for several months without needing since colonial times. Today, “[n]early 80 percent of to enter port. In other words, access to local ports U.S. export trade by tonnage moves over water.”1 for the resupply of logistic ships is desired but not In addition, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans required. As a result, the Navy is often America’s have provided our nation with natural boundar- first responder to regional crises and, with its per- ies spanning thousands of miles to help keep our sistent forward presence, preserves U.S. security adversaries at bay. Since World War II, the U.S. interests through the spectrum of military opera- Navy has continuously maintained a portion of tions. In addition to the ability to project combat the fleet deployed globally in regions that are vital power rapidly anywhere in the world, a globally to the nation’s security. This allows the nation’s deployed peacetime Navy supports such missions senior leadership and the Navy to respond rapidly as securing sea lines of communication (SLOC) to regional crises and, if necessary, engage aggres- for the free flow of goods and services and free- sors in the open ocean or near their own coasts, dom of navigation operations to contest unlawful keeping the fight and threat far from U.S. shores. maritime territorial claims. Unlike ground or air forces, which require fixed, This paper provides the recommended mini- large support bases necessitating host nation con- mum numbers of battle force ships required to sent, the U.S. Navy can operate freely at sea across handle two simultaneous or nearly simultaneous 1 THE NATION NEEDS A 400-SHIP NAVY major regional conflicts (MRCs) with a 20 percent n Effectively provide the 13 carrier strike groups additional margin. Although U.S. defense strate- (CSGs) and 12 expeditionary strike groups (ESGs) gies have varied over the past 25 years, the need for required to meet the two-MRC construct; America to conduct two nearly simultaneous major combat operations has been a consistent theme.3As n Provide the historical steady-state demand of summarized succinctly by Daniel Gouré: approximately 100 ships constantly forward deployed in key regions around the world; and Senior decision makers across five Adminis- trations, Republican and Democrat, have been n Have sufficient capacity to maintain its ships unable to avoid the reality that, in a world of con- properly and ensure that its sailors are adequate- tinuing globalization and growing political and ly trained to “fight tonight.” military uncertainty, the U.S. needs a military that is large enough and has sufficient range of This represents a significant increase from the capabilities to cover multiple major military con- U.S. fleet’s 286 battle force ships as of October tingencies on overlapping time frames.4 2018,6 the 2015 Heritage Foundation benchmark of 346 ships,7 and the official U.S. policy of “not The extra 20 percent capacity both serves as fewer than 355 battle force ships” as established in a strategic reserve and helps the U.S. to main- the fiscal year (FY) 2018 National Defense Autho- tain an enduring peacetime global forward naval rization Act (NDAA).8 However, it is fully in accord presence. A strategic reserve is necessary because with previous strategic competition assessments, training and maintenance requirements make it over 70 years of historical naval records, and Navy infeasible to deploy 100 percent of the force, and analysis concluding that a fleet of at least 459 ships committing the entire force to combat operations was “needed to achieve Navy’s missions with rea- would leave the nation without any resources to sonable expectations of success without incurring handle unexpected crises.5 In addition, some ship significant losses.”9 and submarine losses should be expected in an The U.S. Navy maintained more than 400 MRC against a near-peer competitor. A strategic ships throughout the Cold War, the last time its reserve is therefore needed to replace damaged or force structure was designed to address a stra- sunk ships, because the time needed to repair (one tegic competition adversary,10 but recent fleet year) or build (five years) modern ships makes it readiness issues and emphasis on the “reemer- highly unlikely that they could be returned to the gence of long-term strategic competition” in the fight before a conflict has ended. 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS)11 point This independent analysis reviewed previous to the need for a much larger and more capable U.S. naval force structure assessments, historical fleet. This larger fleet includes not only addition- naval combat operations, U.S. Navy and Marine al small surface combatants (SSCs) to support Corps guidance on naval force composition, cur- the strike groups, but also a significant increase rent and near-future maritime threats, U.S. naval in combat logistics force (CLF) ships to ensure strategic guidance, and enduring naval missions. that distributed
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