House of Commons Defence Committee Deterrence in the twenty-first century Eleventh Report of Session 2013–14 Volume II Written evidence Ordered by the House of Commons to be published 11 March 2014 Published on 27 March 2014 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited The Defence Committee The Defence Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Ministry of Defence and its associated public bodies. Current membership Rt Hon James Arbuthnot MP (Conservative, North East Hampshire) (Chair) Mr Julian Brazier MP (Conservative, Canterbury) Rt Hon Jeffrey M. Donaldson MP (Democratic Unionist, Lagan Valley) Mr James Gray MP (Conservative, North Wiltshire) Mr Dai Havard MP (Labour, Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney) Adam Holloway MP (Conservative, Gravesham) Mrs Madeleine Moon MP (Labour, Bridgend) Sir Bob Russell MP (Liberal Democrat, Colchester) Bob Stewart MP (Conservative, Beckenham) Ms Gisela Stuart MP (Labour, Birmingham, Edgbaston) Derek Twigg MP (Labour, Halton) John Woodcock MP (Labour/Co-op, Barrow and Furness) The following Members were also members of the Committee during this inquiry. Thomas Docherty MP (Labour, Dunfermline and West Fife) Penny Mordaunt MP (Conservative, Portsmouth North) Sandra Osborne MP (Labour, Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock) Powers The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the internet via www.parliament.uk. Publications The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the internet at www.parliament.uk/parliament.uk/defcom. The Reports of the Committee, the formal minutes relating to that report, oral evidence taken and some or all written evidence are available in a printed volume. Additional written evidence may be published on the internet only. Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are James Rhys (Clerk), Dougie Wands (Second Clerk), Karen Jackson (Audit Adviser), Ian Thomson (Committee Specialist), Christine Randall (Senior Committee Assistant), Rowena Macdonald and Carolyn Bowes (Committee Assistants). Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Defence Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 5745; the Committee’s email address is [email protected]. Media inquiries should be addressed to Alex Paterson on 020 7219 1589. List of written evidence (published in Volume II on the Committee’s website www.parliament.uk/defcom) 1 Ministry of Defence Ev w1 2 Professor Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield, FBA Ev w4 3 General (rtd) Sir Hugh Beach Ev w6 4 Dr Jeremy Stocker, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Ev w11 5 Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament Ev w14 6 United Nations Association–UK Ev w16 7 Dr Rebecca Johnson, Director, Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy Ev w18 8 Dr Andrew Futter & Dr Benjamin Zala, University of Leicester Ev w23 9 Nuclear Information Service Ev w26 10 Dr Nick Ritchie, Department of Politics, University of York Ev w30 11 Ward Wilson, Senior Fellow, British American Security Information Council Ev w40 12 Paul Bell, Director, Albany Associates Ev w43 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [SO] Processed: [24-03-2014 11:45] Job: 037146 Unit: PG01 Defence Committee: Evidence Ev w1 Written evidence Written evidence submitted by the Ministry of Defence “No state currently has the combination of capability and intent needed to pose a conventional military threat to the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom. Yet history shows that both capability and intent can change, sometimes in a matter of only a few years. Our aim is to deter direct threats, including through our membership of NATO and, ultimately, our independent nuclear deterrent.” 2010 National Security Strategy Introduction 1. This memorandum considers the current role of deterrence in defence and the involvement of the UK Armed Forces, as well as highlighting areas where new thinking about deterrence is underway. Deterrence has an essential role to play in dealing with the diverse current and future threats facing the UK, but the rapid evolution of the threat, including new state and non-state actors, and the increased accessibility and proliferation of advanced technology, will in some circumstances challenge the UK’s ability to deter in future. This paper aims to inform and reassure the Committee that these complex issues and series of relationships are being properly addressed in the run-up to the 2015 SDSR. What is Deterrence? 2. The deterrence of threats to the UK’s security, influence and prosperity is the primary peacetime role of the Armed Forces. In strategic terms, deterrence is a “way” by which a state might seek to deliver its policy “ends”. In a military context, deterrence employs the proportionate threat of force to discourage someone from doing something, by convincing them that the costs of their actions will outweigh any possible benefits. 3. Ultimately, deterrence and coercion are about conditioning or changing the perceptions of a potential opponent in order to influence or persuade them. They are different from warfighting, which involves the actual use of physical force to degrade or destroy the capabilities of an adversary to the point where they are unable or unwilling to continue resistance. If force is used in support of coercion or deterrence, it is used in a limited way in order to demonstrate resolve and to establish the credibility of determination and ability to resort to more extreme measures if necessary. Of course, either the threat or the use of force can only be employed in circumstances where there is a sound legal basis. 4. The Armed Forces are only one tool, albeit an important one, in a nation’s ability to deter. Diplomacy and economic statecraft can also offer important levers to affect an adversary’s calculus. These can be used alongside the threat of force in varying combinations and sequences, and with differing degrees of intensity, to achieve the desired effect. Deterrence is in fact most effective when it harmonises effects across government, drawing together and using all the instruments of national and international power. 5. There are two main forms of deterrence: deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment. Deterrence by punishment, which threatens to inflict costs on an adversary through retaliation after an attack, is perhaps the better known. Deterrence by denial aims to dissuade a potential attacker by convincing them that their aggression will not succeed and that they will be denied the benefits they hope to obtain. Very often, the two forms of deterrence will work closely together. UK Deterrence Policy and Doctrine 6. The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) acknowledged the important role of deterrence in supporting the strategic objective of a secure and resilient UK. Deterrence is seen as a core part of two of the National Security Tasks: exerting influence to exploit opportunities and manage risks; and protecting the UK and our interests against threats from state and non-state sources. 7. The 2010 SDSR demanded “a renewed emphasis on using our conventional forces to deter potential adversaries” as part of a broader focus by the Armed Forces on tackling risks before they escalate, and on exerting UK influence, as part of a better coordinated overall national security response. To this end, the SDSR sought consciously to maintain a broad spectrum of defence and other capabilities. Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence 8. To many, the word deterrence has become inextricably linked with nuclear weapons. The UK’s nuclear deterrent is delivered by a fleet of four submarines, known as SSBNs, under Operation RELENTLESS. One of these submarines is always at sea as part of a Continuous At Sea Deterrent (CASD) posture, which has been unbroken since 1969. This capability is widely referred to as “The Deterrent”. It is there to prevent, at the extreme, any threat to national existence, or nuclear blackmail from a nuclear-armed state against the UK homeland or our vital interests. However, while the destructive potential of nuclear weapons is an extremely powerful deterrent, the possession of which helped to maintain peace with other nuclear powers, that same destructive potential means that the use of nuclear weapons is only appropriate to deter the most extreme threats. The UK views its nuclear weapons as political not military or war fighting weapons. Nuclear weapons cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [24-03-2014 11:45] Job: 037146 Unit: PG01 Ev w2 Defence Committee: Evidence are therefore just one element of the total capability to maintain/achieve the deterrent effect the UK seeks. To be most effective, deterrence requires the knitting together of both conventional (including, increasingly, asymmetric capabilities such as cyber) and nuclear capabilities in a carefully graduated tapestry, supported by clear strategic messaging. 9. British Defence Doctrine recognises that, given the complexity and variety of threats faced, “most contemporary deterrence is achieved through conventional means and a wider, more flexible range of postures and responses with the associated levels of military and political risk”. Underpinned by this doctrine, the UK’s armed forces are involved in a number of deterrent activities. These include longstanding commitments, such as that undertaken by British Forces South Atlantic Islands whose mission is “to deter military aggression against the South Atlantic Overseas Territories,” and the RAF’s Quick Reaction Alert deterring threats to the integrity of UK airspace, as well as more targeted or one-off activities such as the deployment of the Rapier air defence system in London for the duration of the 2012 Olympics (a form of deterrence by denial) and the Royal Navy’s contribution to deterring piracy off the Horn of Africa.