The Mayaguez Incident an Organizational Theory Analysis
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Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive DSpace Repository Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items 2006-09 The Mayaguez incident an organizational theory analysis Tyynismaa, Michael D. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/2558 Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT: AN ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY ANALYSIS by Edward J. Lengel Charles R. Rambo Shelley A. Rodriguez Michael D. Tyynismaa September 2006 Thesis Advisor: Erik Jansen Second Reader: Brian H. Greenshields Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED September 2006 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: The Mayaguez Incident: An Organizational 5. FUNDING NUMBERS Theory Analysis 6. AUTHORS Edward J. Lengel, Shelley A. Rodriguez, Michael D. Tyynismaa and Charles R. Rambo 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited A 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Applying selected concepts of organizational theory to the Mayaguez incident of 1975 leads to a more comprehensive understanding of events and more accurate lessons learned. Application of organizational theory to the Mayaguez incident demonstrates the decision processes at the executive level left the military operation vulnerable to failure. Henry Mintzberg’s structural contingency model and Lee Bowman and Terrence Deal’s frames model are used and are applied to executive-level decisions. The rationale behind focusing on the executive level is twofold: first, it is where final critical decisions are made and second, military operations cannot take place without an executive-level authorization. The Mayaguez crisis was rife with potential pitfalls and, though President Ford was equipped with an organization of intelligent, competent personnel, the result was unnecessary loss of life. Publicly, the operation was a success and President Ford the savior of the Mayaguez crew. To the military, the operation was an embarrassment because of failures in the organizational structure and decision making. Application of organizational theory provides an avenue for analysis of the military operation within the Mayaguez rescue. 14. SUBJECT TERMS Mayaguez, Organizational Theory, President Ford, decision making, 15. NUMBER OF executive level, frames, Mintzberg, Structure in Five, coordination mechanisms, organizational PAGES design, divisionalized form 197 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UL NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT: AN ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY ANALYSIS Edward J. Lengel, Major, United States Air Force B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 1992 Charles R. Rambo, Major, United States Army B.S., East Tennessee State, 1994 Shelley A. Rodriguez, Major, United States Air Force B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 1992 M.B.A., Touro University, 2000 Michael D. Tyynismaa, Major, United States Air Force B.S., North Carolina State University, 1991 M.A. George Washington University, 2000 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL September 2006 Author: Edward J. Lengel Charles R. Rambo Shelley A. Rodriguez Michael D. Tyynismaa Approved by: Erik Jansen Thesis Advisor Col. Brian H. Greenshields Second Reader/Co-Advisor Gordon McCormick Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT Applying selected concepts of organizational theory to the Mayaguez incident of 1975 leads to a more comprehensive understanding of events and more accurate lessons learned. Application of organizational theory demonstrates the decision processes at the executive level left the military operation vulnerable to failure. Henry Mintzberg’s structural contingency model and Lee Bowman and Terrence Deal’s frames model within organizational theory are used and are applied to executive-level decisions. The rationale behind focusing on the executive level is twofold: First, it is where final critical decisions were made, and second, military operations cannot take place without an executive-level authorization. The Mayaguez crisis was rife with potential pitfalls and, though President Ford was equipped with an excellent organization of intelligent, competent personnel, the result was unnecessary loss of life. Publicly, the operation was a success and President Ford the savior of the Mayaguez crew. To the military, the operation was an embarrassment—all because of failures within the organizational structure and poor decision making. Application of organizational theory provides an avenue for analysis of the military operation within the Mayaguez rescue. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. PURPOSE:........................................................................................................1 B. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................3 C. METHODOLOGY AND CHAPTER REVIEW...........................................7 D. CHAPTER REVIEW ......................................................................................9 II. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY .............................................................................11 A. INTRODUCTION TO ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY..........................11 B. FRAMES.........................................................................................................11 C. STRUCTURAL FRAME ..............................................................................13 D. MINTZBERG’S STRUCTURE IN FIVES .................................................14 E. HUMAN RESOURCE FRAME ...................................................................20 F. POLITICAL FRAME ...................................................................................23 G. SYMBOLIC FRAME ....................................................................................25 III. MINTZBERG’S STRUCTURE IN FIVES .............................................................29 A. DIVISIONALIZED FORM ..........................................................................29 B. STRUCTURAL FORM DURING THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT..........32 IV. FRAMES.....................................................................................................................39 A. THE STRUCTURAL FRAME.....................................................................41 B. THE HUMAN RESOURCE FRAME..........................................................42 C. THE POLITICAL FRAME..........................................................................44 D. THE SYMBOLIC FRAME...........................................................................47 V. FINDINGS..................................................................................................................51 VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY AND CONCLUSION ........................57 A. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY..................................................57 B. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................60 APPENDIX A.........................................................................................................................63 APPENDIX B .........................................................................................................................65 APPENDIX C.........................................................................................................................69 APPENDIX D.........................................................................................................................71 APPENDIX E .........................................................................................................................73