Reappraising the Elizabethan and Early Stuart Soldier: Recent Historiography on Early Modern English Military Culture David R
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History Compass 9/1 (2011): 16–33, 10.1111/j.1478-0542.2010.00748.x Reappraising the Elizabethan and Early Stuart Soldier: Recent Historiography on Early Modern English Military Culture David R. Lawrence* Department of History, Glendon College, York University Abstract For much of the 20th century, historians could muster little praise for the late Tudor and early Stuart soldiery, often portraying them as amateurs who were part of a decaying and moribund military tradition isolated from the transformations shaping warfare on the European continent. In the 1980s and 1990s, these theories were tested and found wanting by those who argued that the English were fully engaged in the so-called early modern military revolution. Instead of decline and decay, England is now considered to have been engaged in the military revolution from early in the 16th century, with scholars arguing that the English art of war was in step with continental practice. This article weighs the contributions of a new generation of historians to the ongoing reappraisal of late Tudor and early Stuart soldiering over the last decade. Along with examining England and the military revolution, new work has focused much attention on the motivations and mentalities of English officers serving in France, the Low Countries and Ireland, with confes- sional zeal, honour and economic hardship seen as the primary factors motivating English volun- teers to serve abroad. At the same time, scholars are also taking a fresh look at how military administration and improvements to training affected the lives of common soldiers. The late Tudor and early Stuart soldier has undergone a significant historical reappraisal over the course of the last three decades. Prior to the 1980s, scholars portrayed the early modern English soldiery as amateurish in the best of times and downright incompetent in the worst. The words ‘decayed’, ‘dormant’, ‘inexperienced’, ‘inefficient’, ‘uneducated’ and ‘isolated’ were commonly used to describe him and the evidence supporting this gloomy portrait seemed, on the surface, to justify such criticisms.1 When a list of late Tudor and early Stuart military expeditions is drawn up, the failures clearly outweigh the successes – evidence that few historians could overlook.2 Consequently, when Michael Roberts advanced his military revolution thesis in 1956, outlining the emergence of inno- vations in weaponry, tactics and the growth of armies that transformed European warfare from 1560–1660, he considered it a truly continental revolution, with few manifestations on English soil. Geoffrey Parker’s The Military Revolution: Military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500–1800 (1988), a technologically deterministic elaboration of Roberts’ revo- lution proved kinder to the British Isles, but Parker still concluded that prior to 1642, the English ‘lagged far behind continental practice at home’.3 The military revolution debates reinvigorated the study of early modern English mili- tary history with scholars weighing the influence of the revolution on the theory and practice of war in the British Isles. Much of this groundbreaking work was carried out in the late 1980s and 1990s with scholars such as Sir John Hale, David Eltis, Simon Adams, John Nolan, Gervase Phillips, Mark Fissel and Bruce Lenman uncovering a much more ª 2011 The Author History Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd Reappraising the Elizabethan and Early Stuart Soldier 17 vibrant military world in England than the one previously depicted.4 This first generation of revisionist, as well as the generation that followed, have argued against the view of an isolated and increasingly demilitarized England during this period. There is now a grow- ing consensus that late Tudor and early Stuart society was in fact highly militarized, with elites actively participating in the country’s military culture and an English citizenry quite knowledgeable of military affairs.5 This essay will examine new research on late Tudor and early Stuart soldiering published between 2002 and 2010 but will omit new military histories of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms.6 I start the essay with a discussion of areas where consensus is appear- ing, especially in relation to English participation in the military revolution before moving on to areas were historiographical debates are heating up, looking particularly at what motivated gentlemen volunteers to serve abroad and exploring the influence of confessional zeal, honour and economic hardship in their decision to take up arms. I con- clude with new research into the effectiveness of the common soldier, both the men pressed into service and the members of the trained bands – the militia that protected the country from invasion. Grounds for Consensus: England and the Military Revolution It is safe to say that Geoffrey Parker’s depiction of the English as ‘laggards’ has been put to rest. Historians now see the English soldiery as actively engaged in the transformation of European warfare from the second decade of the 16th century and, though debates continue over the use of the term ‘revolution’ to describe those developments, evidence indicates English soldiers were keenly aware of the new tactics and technologies shaping continental warfare. Readers hoping to better understand this process of engagement across the breadth of the 16th century might begin by examining the works of James Raymond, Luke MacMahon and David Grummitt. While their research explores the late 15th and early 16th centuries, students of the late Tudor and early Stuart periods should not overlook these authors, as they challenge many of the long held beliefs about the qualities and capabilities of the English soldier and the development of England’s military machinery during the Tudor period. In his Henry VIII’s Military Revolution: The Armies of Sixteenth-century Britain and Europe (2007) James Raymond (re)sets the date for English participation in the military revolution, making a persuasive argument that ‘English mili- tary theory and practice were broadly in-line with that of its continental neighbours from the outset of the reign of Henry VIII’.7 Raymond suggests that Henry and his general’s ‘well-appreciated the value of gunpowder’, engaging in the effective use of artillery and ‘the scientific application of the latest siege techniques’.8 He finds evidence for the spread of new military ideas and methods in manuscript military treatises circulated at court, contesting David Eltis’ claim that it was printed military books published in the 1570s and 1580s that marked the arrival of the military revolution in England. It is on this point, however, that aspects of Raymond’s thesis might also be questioned, as even he points out that ‘the extent to which military manuscripts were read and employed remains unclear’ and that while products of military veterans, manuscripts might reflect ‘desirable best practice’ rather than battlefield actualities.9 Nevertheless, Raymond raises an important point that I will return to throughout this essay, the existence of an institu- tional memory in the English army that was fostered by long-serving nobility, garrison troops and a reliance on mercenary soldiers. Similarly, in his essay ‘Chivalry, Military Professionalism and the Early Tudor Army in Renaissance Europe: A Reassessment’ (2003), Luke MacMahon rebuts Gilbert Millar’s ª 2011 The Author History Compass 9/1 (2011): 16–33, 10.1111/j.1478-0542.2010.00748.x History Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 18 Reappraising the Elizabethan and Early Stuart Soldier claims that Henry VIII’s armies were unskilled and inexperienced.10 MacMahon finds no lack of experience among the king’s noble officers, nor does he see Henry’s quest for glory and honour undermining either his military judgment or his strategic interests. Drawing on the State Papers and manuscript sources, as well as works by Steve Gunn and David Grummit, MacMahon recognizes the emergence of a nascent professionalism among two groups in Henry’s ranks, European mercenaries and the king’s bodyguard garrisoning the coast and the Scots border.11 In weighing the traditions of chivalry against the emergence of professionalism, MacMahon argues that the ‘warrior nobility of early Tudor England could be chivalrous and professional’.12 Yet both MacMahon and Raymond point out that throughout his reign, Henry was forced to rely on foreign mer- cenaries for his heavy cavalry, pikemen and arquebusiers, a decision that indicated the king’s grasp of the changing nature of warfare, but one that suggests English troops may have been ill prepared for war. Even though Henry was ‘committed to modernization’, it was a very slow process, with the English unable to fill these manpower gaps until much later in the century.13 David Grummitt’s excellent monograph, The Calais Garrison: War and Military Service in England, 1436–1558, offers yet another assenting voice that the English were well con- nected with continental military culture.14 Mining some rich veins of Chancery and Exchequer records related to Calais’s administration, Grummitt describes the town as the ‘school of war’ for successive generations of soldiers and England’s ‘largest permanent establishment of military resources’.15 Its loss in 1558 proved a major blow to national pride and a significant setback to England’s military establishment.16 Like Raymond and MacMahon, Grummitt offers up more evidence of the continuity of military practice up to 1558, suggesting that the late Tudors owed a far greater military debt to